1 Master's Degree in International Relations LUISS GUIDO CARLI

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1 Master's Degree in International Relations LUISS GUIDO CARLI Master’s Degree in International Relations LUISS GUIDO CARLI Department of Political Science Chair of International Organizations and Human Rights THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION FOR LEBANON From the UN Special Tribunal to the European Partnership for Democracy SUPERVISOR CANDIDATE Professor Francesco Francioni Rola Mckey Student Reg. n. 628762 CO-SUPERVISOR Professor Francesca Corrao Academic Year 2016/2017 1 To Family, Country, and the young men and women of Lebanon 2 Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Francesco Francioni of LUISS, for keeping his office door always open and for having immensely supported me throughout my thesis with his patience, valuable knowledge, recommendations and follow up. I would like to thank him for allowing me to express my own work while always steering me in the right direction when necessary. I would like to also thank the co-advisor Professor Francesca Corrao of LUISS, for her interest in this thesis and valuable insights on the subject. This thesis is particularly close to home, and mainly a result of my combined experiences; of growing up in Geneva, then living in Lebanon and finally moving to Italy. Finishing my studies in Italy allowed me to think outside the box, observing international relations, politics, human rights, and society from different perspectives. I learned a most valuable lesson; that knowledge is boundless and limitless; it essentially builds bridges between different cultures, nurturing and strengthening them in order to bring them closer. In Lebanon, we are a generation of war, but we are also survivors, thinkers, builders, and an inspired generation who appreciates life and strives for a better future. This thesis was inspired by the political turmoil and security threats I grew up witnessing in Lebanon and by a dream of building a better society one day. I am grateful for LUISS GUIDO CARLI for giving me this opportunity to finish this Masters at their prestigious institution. I am also grateful for Italy for empowering Middle Eastern women like myself, by providing them with the opportunity, support and encouragement to complete their studies here. Finally, my biggest thanks are to my Italian family at work, Enzo Rocchi, and to my Lebanese family for being there for me through thick and thin, and for encouraging me to pursue my dreams and happiness wherever it might be. 3 4 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 9 CHAPTER I .................................................................................................................................... 14 A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEBANON’S POLITICAL STRUCTURE ................................ 14 1.1 AN IDENTITY CRISIS STRENGTHENED BY A CONTINUOUS BREACH OF SOVEREIGNTY: .. 16 1.2 THE ACCORDS ........................................................................................................................................ 17 CHAPTER II ................................................................................................................................... 22 HEZBOLLAH: THE MANY FACES OF THE PARTY OF GOD .................................... 22 2.1 HEZBOLLAH AND THE TAIF: ............................................................................................................. 26 2.2 THE OPENING UP POLICY ..................................................................................................................... 26 2.3 HEZBOLLAH AND THE HARIRI ASSASSINATION IN 2005 ........................................................... 28 2.3.1 Assassination aftermath ................................................................................................................ 29 2.4 IN THE CONTEXT OF A TRANSITION INTO A SECULAR DEMOCRATIC STATE WHERE WOULD SUCH TRANSITION LEAVE HEZBOLLAH? ............................................................................... 31 2.5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 32 CHAPTER III: ................................................................................................................................ 34 THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: A PATERNALISTIC INTERNATIONAL APPROACH. ............................................................................................. 34 3.1 THE PUBLIC’S REACTION TO THE STL ............................................................................................ 36 3.2 STL ESTABLISHMENT AND ITS JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND JUDICIAL POWER ............. 38 3.3 STL AND THE RULE OF LAW ............................................................................................................... 40 3.4 THE STL’S FUNDING ............................................................................................................................ 40 3.5 THE STL’S JURISDICTIONS: JOURNALISTS ACCUSED OF CONTEMPT ................................... 41 3.6 THE FALSE WITNESSES ......................................................................................................................... 44 3.7 STL JURISDICTIONS DOESN’T APPLY TO INDIVIDUALS BUT TO STATES .............................. 45 2.8 STL MOVES TO PROSECUTE LEGAL PERSONS, CHANGING ITS JURISDICTIONS: ................. 46 3.9 WHY THE UN’S APPROACH TO THE ASSASSINATION HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY: THE STL .................................................................................................................................................................... 46 3.10 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 47 CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................................. 49 THE UNITED NATIONS: NO LONGER THE ONLY OPTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ................................................................................................................................................. 49 4.1 THE FAILURE OF THE UN IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LACKING CREDIBILITY ........................... 49 4.2 THE UN IN LEBANON, 2006 ............................................................................................................... 50 4.3 THE UN IN IRAQ ..................................................................................................................................... 51 4.4 THE UN IN SYRIA .................................................................................................................................. 53 4.5 THE UN IN YEMEN ................................................................................................................................ 54 4.6 THE UN IN AFGHANISTAN .................................................................................................................. 55 4.7 GROWING COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UN AND RELATIVELY NEW INTERNATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS PUTS A LOT ON THE UN’S PLATE .................................. 55 4.8 THE EU, A GLIMMER OF HOPE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ............................................................. 58 4.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 59 CHAPTER V ................................................................................................................................... 60 THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION FOR LEBANON ....................................................... 60 5 5.1 IS LEBANON READY FOR A TRANSITION AND WHY? .................................................................. 60 5.2 WHY NOW? .............................................................................................................................................. 61 5.3 LEBANON IN THE ARAB UPRISING, CANCELING THE ELECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL FAILS THE PEOPLE ................................................................................... 62 5.4 WHERE WAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL AFTER THIS MOVE? ....................................... 63 5.5 BUT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL TRULY INDEPENDENT? ............................................ 65 5.6 IS LEBANON READY FOR DEMOCRACY? THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY ........................ 68 5.7 THE TRANSITION, HOW? ...................................................................................................................... 72 5.8 IMPORTANT FEATURES OF DIG FOR A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION ARE MANY: .................. 75 5.9 HOW DOES THE TRANSITION HAPPEN? ........................................................................................... 76 5.10 INCLUSIVITY: ........................................................................................................................................ 77 5.11 DIG AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ................................................................................................... 79 5.12 WHAT IF THE OLD POLITICAL PARTIES REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN A TRANSITION INTO A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER? ................................................................................................. 80 5.13 WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO
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