CIA's Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960–1968
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FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII CIA’s Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960–1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents David Robarge From 1960 to 1968, CIA conduct- es in the State Department’s Foreign ed a series of fast-paced, multifaceted Relations of the United States (FRUS) covert action (CA) operations in the series, and random items on the newly independent Republic of the Internet and in other compilations, a Congo (the Democratic Republic comprehensive set of primary sources A comprehensive of the Congo today) to stabilize the about CIA activities in the Congo set of primary sources government and minimize communist has not been available until now. about CIA activities in influence in a strategically vital, re- FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, source-rich location in central Africa. Congo, 1960–19681 is the newest the Congo has not been The overall program—the largest in in a series of retrospective volumes available until now. the CIA’s history up until then—com- from the State Department’s Office prised activities dealing with regime of the Historian (HO) to compensate change, political action, propaganda, for the lack of CA-related material air and marine operations, and arms in previously published collections interdiction, as well as support to a about countries and time periods spectacular hostage rescue mission. when CIA covert interventions were By the time the operations ended, an indispensable, and often widely CIA had spent nearly $12 million recognized, element of US foreign (over $80 million today) in accom- policy.a plishing the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations’ objec- After scholars, the media, and tive of establishing a pro-Western some members of Congress pillo- leadership in the Congo. President Jo- ried HO for publishing a volume on seph Mobutu, who became permanent Iran for 1951–54 that contained no head of state in 1965 after serving documents about the CIA-engineered 2 in that capacity de facto at various regime-change operation in 1953, times, was a reliable and staunchly Congress in October 1991 passed a anticommunist ally of Washington’s statute mandating that FRUS was to until his overthrow in 1997. Some elements of the program, a. The first intelligence-related retro- particularly the notorious assassi- spective volume was FRUS, 1952–1954, nation plot against Prime Minister Guatemala (Government Printing Office, 2003). It contained documents about the Patrice Lumumba that was exten- CIA’s regime-change operations there that sively recounted in 1975 in one of were not in FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume IV, the Church Committee’s reports, American Republics (Government Printing have been described in open sources. Office, 1983). Forthcoming collections on However, besides the documentary intelligence will deal with the 1953 coup in Iran and the US Intelligence Community excerpts in that report, limited releas- during 1955–61. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, No. 3 (September 2014) 1 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII Congo, 1960–1968 provides essential material for under- standing how the United States and its Congolese allies missions; extended over $850 million prevented the “Bloc feast” from happening. in economic grants and credits; set up front organizations, cover entities, be “a thorough, accurate, and reliable volume discussed here, which was agents of influence, and clandestine documentary record of major United held up after HO’s outside advisory assets; and provided assistance to States foreign policy decisions and committee in 1997 questioned the anti-Western groups directly and significant United States diplomatic completeness and accuracy of the through their allies. The Congo—for- activity” and ordering “other depart- previous collections on the Congo. merly a Belgian colony, one-quarter ments, agencies, and other entities of HO originally conceived Congo, the size of the United States, with the United States Government…[to] 1960–1968 as a volume document- immense natural wealth and strate- cooperate with the Office of the His- ing US policy during the Johnson gically situated in a now-contested torian by providing full and complete presidency, but, at the committee’s region—was a Cold War prize of the access to the records pertinent to suggestion, it postponed publication first order. “If Congo deteriorates and United States foreign policy deci- to incorporate relevant CA material Western influence fades rapidly,” the chief of CIA’s Africa Division (AF) sions and actions and by providing missing from previous compendia. copies of selected records” older than wrote in June 1960, 10 days before 25 years.3 The collection is well worth the the Congo gained its independence, wait, and specialists are making the “Bloc will have a feast and will Notwithstanding the new law and use of it already.a In no other single not need to work very hard for it.”5 DCI R. James Woolsey’s pledge in source will scholars find a richer Congo, 1960–1968 provides 1993 to seek declassification review compilation of intelligence and essential material for understanding of 11 covert actions, including in policy documents that, when used how the United States and its Congo- the Congo, the two FRUS volumes in conjunction with the two earlier lese allies prevented the “feast” from published in the early 1990s on that volumes, helps underscore why the happening. The volume contains 582 country for 1958 through 1963 con- fate of the Congo, as well as the other documents and editorial notes and tained very few documents about the newly independent nations in Africa, is divided roughly into two sections. Agency’s CA operations there—even drew so much attention from US na- The first, covering 1960 to 1963, on the Lumumba assassination plot.4 tional security decisionmakers then. depicts the Congo’s political crisis In the case of the first volume, the Before 1960, when, in British Prime and the extensive influence of CIA FRUS editors decided not to delay Minister Harold Macmillan’s famous covert actions to remove Lumumba publication by seeking additional phrase, “the wind of change” began from power and then to encourage records under the access require- blowing over the continent, the So- allegiance to the Leopoldville gov- ments of the just-enacted FRUS law. viet Union, China, and their proxies ernment—especially the pervasive In the second, HO and CIA were still had paid little attention to it. working out how to implement those use of money to buy loyalties within requirements, taking into account the By early 1965, however, commu- leadership circles. The second part, Agency’s concerns about protecting nist countries had established over covering 1964 to 1968, describes sources and methods and the fact 100 diplomatic, consular, and trade the continuation of the political that its records management prac- action programs and the expansion tices were not designed to facilitate of paramilitary and air support to the scholarly research. Serious interagen- a. On 4 March 2014, HO and the Cold War Congolese government in its effort to International History Project cosponsored cy difficulties over HO access to and quell provincial rebellions, some of a half-day symposium at the Woodrow them communist-aided. CIA review of CA-related documents Wilson Center titled “New Evidence: The arose over the next few years but Congo Crisis and Its Aftermath, 1960- Over one-third of the sources in were mostly resolved by the early 1968” and featuring the new volume. This reviewer was one of the participants. the volume are from CIA, and over 2000s in an interagency agreement. Details can be found on the Wilson Center 40 percent pertain to CA (the rest are website at http://www.wilsoncenter. about diplomacy, policy, and military The new procedures in that agree- org/event/new-evidence-the-congo-cri- matters). A number of the editorial ment facilitated the completion of the sis-and-aftermath-1960-1968. 2 Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, No. 3 (September 2014) FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII notes usefully summarize heavily icated to supporting outmoded students of intelligence operations, redacted documents or paraphrase regimes.7 the collection demonstrates the wide intelligence information that other- range of “soft” and “hard” covert wise might not have survived the CIA operations officers under- initiatives CIA undertook in an often review process in raw form. In both stood the challenges facing them rapidly changing operational environ- the documents and the notes, the as they dealt with a population of ment. editors helpfully have used bracketed 14 million divided into over 200 insertions to indicate names, titles, or ethnic groups and four major tribes, CIA’s program initially focused agencies in place of cryptonyms that with fewer than 20 Congolese college on removing Lumumba, not only were not declassified. Similarly, in graduates in the entire country, led through assassination if necessary but cases when more than one individual by a government heavily dependent also with an array of nonlethal un- whose name cannot be declassified is on the former Belgian colonialists to dertakings that showed the Agency’s mentioned in a document, they have maintain infrastructure, services, and clear understanding of the Congo’s been designated as “[Identity 1],” security, with an army that was poor- political dynamics. The activities “[Identity 2],” and so forth for clar- ly trained, inadequately equipped, included contacts with oppositionists ity—a much better procedure than and badly led, and a fractured who were working to oust Lumumba repetitively using “[less than one line political structure consisting of four with parliamentary action; payments declassified].” semi-autonomous regions and a weak to army commander Mobutu to and factious “central” government in ensure the loyalty of key officers and the capital of Leopoldville (Kinshasa the support of legislative leaders; today).