FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII CIA’s Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960–1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents

David Robarge

From 1960 to 1968, CIA conduct- es in the State Department’s Foreign ed a series of fast-paced, multifaceted Relations of the United States (FRUS) covert action (CA) operations in the series, and random items on the newly independent Republic of the Internet and in other compilations, a Congo (the Democratic Republic comprehensive set of primary sources A comprehensive of the Congo today) to stabilize the about CIA activities in the Congo set of primary sources government and minimize communist has not been available until now. about CIA activities in influence in a strategically vital, re- FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, source-rich location in central . Congo, 1960–19681 is the newest the Congo has not been The overall program—the largest in in a series of retrospective volumes available until now. the CIA’s history up until then—com- from the State Department’s Office prised activities dealing with regime of the Historian (HO) to compensate change, political action, propaganda, for the lack of CA-related material air and marine operations, and arms in previously published collections interdiction, as well as support to a about countries and time periods spectacular hostage rescue mission. when CIA covert interventions were By the time the operations ended, an indispensable, and often widely CIA had spent nearly $12 million recognized, element of US foreign (over $80 million today) in accom- policy.a plishing the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations’ objec- After scholars, the media, and tive of establishing a pro-Western some members of Congress pillo- leadership in the Congo. President Jo- ried HO for publishing a volume on seph Mobutu, who became permanent Iran for 1951–54 that contained no head of state in 1965 after serving documents about the CIA-engineered 2 in that capacity de facto at various regime-change operation in 1953, times, was a reliable and staunchly Congress in October 1991 passed a anticommunist ally of Washington’s statute mandating that FRUS was to until his overthrow in 1997.

Some elements of the program, a. The first intelligence-related retro- particularly the notorious assassi- spective volume was FRUS, 1952–1954, nation plot against Prime Minister Guatemala (Government Printing Office, 2003). It contained documents about the that was exten- CIA’s regime-change operations there that sively recounted in 1975 in one of were not in FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume IV, the Church Committee’s reports, American Republics (Government Printing have been described in open sources. Office, 1983). Forthcoming collections on However, besides the documentary intelligence will deal with the 1953 coup in Iran and the US Intelligence Community excerpts in that report, limited releas- during 1955–61. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

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Congo, 1960–1968 provides essential material for under- standing how the United States and its Congolese allies missions; extended over $850 million prevented the “Bloc feast” from happening. in economic grants and credits; set up front organizations, cover entities, be “a thorough, accurate, and reliable volume discussed here, which was agents of influence, and clandestine documentary record of major United held up after HO’s outside advisory assets; and provided assistance to States foreign policy decisions and committee in 1997 questioned the anti-Western groups directly and significant United States diplomatic completeness and accuracy of the through their allies. The Congo—for- activity” and ordering “other depart- previous collections on the Congo. merly a Belgian colony, one-quarter ments, agencies, and other entities of HO originally conceived Congo, the size of the United States, with the United States Government…[to] 1960–1968 as a volume document- immense natural wealth and strate- cooperate with the Office of the His- ing US policy during the Johnson gically situated in a now-contested torian by providing full and complete presidency, but, at the committee’s region—was a prize of the access to the records pertinent to suggestion, it postponed publication first order. “If Congo deteriorates and United States foreign policy deci- to incorporate relevant CA material Western influence fades rapidly,” the chief of CIA’s Africa Division (AF) sions and actions and by providing missing from previous compendia. copies of selected records” older than wrote in June 1960, 10 days before 25 years.3 The collection is well worth the the Congo gained its independence, wait, and specialists are making the “Bloc will have a feast and will Notwithstanding the new law and use of it already.a In no other single not need to work very hard for it.”5 DCI R. James Woolsey’s pledge in source will scholars find a richer Congo, 1960–1968 provides 1993 to seek declassification review compilation of intelligence and essential material for understanding of 11 covert actions, including in policy documents that, when used how the United States and its Congo- the Congo, the two FRUS volumes in conjunction with the two earlier lese allies prevented the “feast” from published in the early 1990s on that volumes, helps underscore why the happening. The volume contains 582 country for 1958 through 1963 con- fate of the Congo, as well as the other documents and editorial notes and tained very few documents about the newly independent nations in Africa, is divided roughly into two sections. Agency’s CA operations there—even drew so much attention from US na- The first, covering 1960 to 1963, on the Lumumba assassination plot.4 tional security decisionmakers then. depicts the Congo’s political crisis In the case of the first volume, the Before 1960, when, in British Prime and the extensive influence of CIA FRUS editors decided not to delay Minister Harold Macmillan’s famous covert actions to remove Lumumba publication by seeking additional phrase, “the wind of change” began from power and then to encourage records under the access require- blowing over the continent, the So- allegiance to the Leopoldville gov- ments of the just-enacted FRUS law. viet Union, China, and their proxies ernment—especially the pervasive In the second, HO and CIA were still had paid little attention to it. working out how to implement those use of money to buy loyalties within requirements, taking into account the By early 1965, however, commu- leadership circles. The second part, Agency’s concerns about protecting nist countries had established over covering 1964 to 1968, describes sources and methods and the fact 100 diplomatic, consular, and trade the continuation of the political that its records management prac- action programs and the expansion tices were not designed to facilitate of paramilitary and air support to the scholarly research. Serious interagen- a. On 4 March 2014, HO and the Cold War Congolese government in its effort to International History Project cosponsored cy difficulties over HO access to and quell provincial rebellions, some of a half-day symposium at the Woodrow them communist-aided. CIA review of CA-related documents Wilson Center titled “New Evidence: The arose over the next few years but and Its Aftermath, 1960- Over one-third of the sources in were mostly resolved by the early 1968” and featuring the new volume. This reviewer was one of the participants. the volume are from CIA, and over 2000s in an interagency agreement. Details can be found on the Wilson Center 40 percent pertain to CA (the rest are website at http://www.wilsoncenter. about diplomacy, policy, and military The new procedures in that agree- org/event/new-evidence-the-congo-cri- matters). A number of the editorial ment facilitated the completion of the sis-and-aftermath-1960-1968.

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notes usefully summarize heavily icated to supporting outmoded students of intelligence operations, redacted documents or paraphrase regimes.7 the collection demonstrates the wide intelligence information that other- range of “soft” and “hard” covert wise might not have survived the CIA operations officers under- initiatives CIA undertook in an often review process in raw form. In both stood the challenges facing them rapidly changing operational environ- the documents and the notes, the as they dealt with a population of ment. editors helpfully have used bracketed 14 million divided into over 200 insertions to indicate names, titles, or ethnic groups and four major tribes, CIA’s program initially focused agencies in place of cryptonyms that with fewer than 20 Congolese college on removing Lumumba, not only were not declassified. Similarly, in graduates in the entire country, led through assassination if necessary but cases when more than one individual by a government heavily dependent also with an array of nonlethal un- whose name cannot be declassified is on the former Belgian colonialists to dertakings that showed the Agency’s mentioned in a document, they have maintain infrastructure, services, and clear understanding of the Congo’s been designated as “[Identity 1],” security, with an army that was poor- political dynamics. The activities “[Identity 2],” and so forth for clar- ly trained, inadequately equipped, included contacts with oppositionists ity—a much better procedure than and badly led, and a fractured who were working to oust Lumumba repetitively using “[less than one line political structure consisting of four with parliamentary action; payments declassified].” semi-autonomous regions and a weak to army commander Mobutu to and factious “central” government in ensure the loyalty of key officers and the capital of Leopoldville (Kinshasa the support of legislative leaders; today). The US ambassador in the street demonstrations; and “black” A More Nuanced View early 1960s, Clare Timberlake, sym- broadcasts from a radio station in of the Situation pathized with the Agency officers he nearby Brazzaville, across the border worked with: “Every time I look at in the Democratic Republic of the The documents from early 1960 at this truly discouraging mess, I shud- Congo, to encourage a revolt against the inception of the covert program der over the painfully slow, frustrat- Lumumba. show CIA’s nuanced view of the ing and costly job ahead for the UN Congo’s unsettled internal situation and US if the Congo is to really be After Lumumba fled house arrest and the Agency’s fashioning of sensi- helped. On the other hand, we can’t in the capital in late November 1960 ble operational objectives to achieve let go of this bull’s tail.”8 and was tracked down and killed 10 the Eisenhower administration’s goal soon after, Agency CA concen- of regime change.6 President Dwight One of the most valuable contri- trated on stabilizing and supporting Eisenhower clearly expressed his dis- butions Congo, 1960–1968 is likely the government of President Joseph quiet over developments in postcolo- to make is moving scholarship past Kasavubu and Prime Ministers nial Africa at a meeting with senior its prevailing fixation on Lumum- and Moise Tshombe, advisers in August 1960: ba and toward an examination of with Mobutu as behind-the-scenes CIA’s multiyear, multifarious covert power broker. CIA used an extensive The President observed that program and the complexities of assortment of covert techniques to in the last twelve months, the planning and implementing it. The accomplish that objective: world has developed a kind of volume provides additional detail ferment greater than he could about the assassination plot against remember in recent times. Lumumba and his eventual death at The Communists are trying to the hands of tribal rivals abetted by take control of this, and have their Belgian allies, substantiating the particularly concerned with his physical succeeded to the extent that… findings of a Belgian parliamentary well-being, took no action to prevent his a9 death even though it knew he probably in many cases [people] are now inquiry in 2001. Beyond that, for would be killed. The report specifically saying that the Communists are denied that the Belgian government ordered thinking of the common man Lumumba’s murder but that Belgian while the United States is ded- a. The inquiry concluded that advisers to Lumumba’s enemies assisted in wanted Lumumba arrested and, not being making it happen.

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Documents in the collection show that CIA’s political pro- gram was strategically coordinated with overt policies. with local leaders. Still, Devlin large- ly had a free hand, and his skill and connections were so valuable that • Advice and subsidies to political to reinforcing and rebuilding tribal he was brought back as an informal and tribal leaders. allegiances in contested areas and in- interlocutor with the Congolese gov- directly assisting the Congolese army ernment between his tours. The State • Funds to Mobutu to buy the alle- by funding mercenaries in its employ. Department noted in 1965 that giances of army officers through salary subsidies and purchases of For the better part of a year, CIA from the outset the Congo ordnance and communications opted to promote unity rather than operation has had to cope with and transportation equipment. division by declining Tshombe’s and successive crises on a crash other politicians’ approaches for indi- basis. The very nature of the • Payments to agents of influence in vidual subsidies. By mid-1965, when problem has meant that great the Adoula administration and to Tshombe and Kasavubu seemed near- reliance had to be placed on sources in the leftist opposition. ly beyond reconciliation, the Agency close coordination between the tried to resume its previous political Ambassador and the Station • Parliamentary maneuvering aided intriguing and buying of access and Chief in the expenditure of by covert money. influence but became frustrated when funds. Both Ambassadors Guillon and Godley appear to • Contacts with labor unions and the embassy resisted. US ability to have had confidence in the CIA student associations. affect Congolese leaders’ decisions “has never been lower since depar- Station Chief and in his conduct • Newspaper subsidies, radio broad- ture of Lumumba,” Leopoldville Sta- of operations. Although courses casts, leaflet distributions, and tion wrote in late October. A month of action have frequently been street demonstrations. later, Mobutu—“our only anchor to discussed between represen- the windward” and “the best man… tatives of the Department and • Efforts to influence delegations to act as a balance wheel between the CIA, the bulk of the day to day from the (UN) to contending political leaders,” assert- operational decisions were tak- adopt positions that favored the ed CIA—staged a bloodless coup and en in the field without reference Congolese government.11 13 took over the government.12 to the Department. The CIA’s program persisted Devlin’s quasi-ambassadorial through several political crises in dealings with Mobutu underscored the Congo during 1962–63 and at In Concert with US Policy that the army chief was indispens- least can be credited with helping able to the Congo’s stability and, by the government survive them. As of Documents in the collection show extension, US policy in the Congo mid-1964, however, the US strategic that CIA’s political program was and sub-Saharan Africa. Devlin’s goal of bringing about a broad-based strategically coordinated with overt fascinating personal and profes- governing coalition with national policies and benefited from close co- sional interaction with Mobutu, so appeal remained unaccomplished. operation between the chief of station evocatively described in his memoir, The replacement of Adoula with (COS) and the ambassador, at least at comes through in the official record Tshombe, who led a different faction, first, and the COS’s back channel to as well, as does his indirect influence in July 1964 prompted a suspension the Congolese government, partic- on policy decisions in Washington. of political action efforts while the ularly with Mobutu. Larry Devlin, The chief of AF wrote in 1967 that new government established itself COS from July 1960 to May 1963 Mobutu had and soon became preoccupied with and July 1965 to June 1967, had pro- putting down rebel uprisings. By become accustomed and to ductive relationships with Timberlake some degree dependent on the August, insurgents controlled over and Edmund Guillon, less so with one-sixth of the country, and the informal channel to the U.S. G. McMurtrie Godley, who disap- Government thus provided ... Agency redirected most resources proved of the station’s machinations

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[and] would interpret the ter- Paramilitary Operations tenance beset the operations, as did mination of this relationship— staffing issues: the State Department particularly if termination were The primary emphasis of the was reluctant to approve positions for more or less coincident with CIA’s program then shifted to sup- Agency personnel, and CIA’s Congo Devlin’s [second] departure— pressing rebellions in the eastern program managers had to compete as evidence of a desire on the provinces through air and maritime with counterparts in Southeast Asia part of the U.S. Government to paramilitary operations. Congo, trying to build their operations there disengage from the close and 1960–1968 contains many documents as the war in Vietnam expanded.17 friendly relations that have that will help scholars appreciate the characterized dealings between difficulties in planning and running CIA launched the first significant the governments for most of the such activities, especially in a vast CAF air operations in February 1964 period since 1960. territory with very limited communi- against rebels in Kwilu, just north of cations and transportation infrastruc- Leopoldville. Missions against the Godley’s successor, Robert Mc- tures and proxies of questionable eastern rebels followed in May. The Bride, whose posting coincided with skill and reliability. toughest operations came during late Devlin’s reassignment, even more 1965–early 1966, after Chinese- and strongly disapproved of CIA’s private CIA’s air operations began Cuban-provided weapons and train- contacts with Mobutu and other Con- modestly in 1962 as a propaganda ing had improved the rebels’ fighting golese leaders and quickly took steps tactic to raise the Congolese gov- ability. Some of the CAF sorties were to limit them. Starting from when he ernment’s prestige and demonstrate supply airlifts, which the Agency co- arrived at the embassy, the volume its military potential to its citizenry, ordinated with the State Department contains none of the COS-to-Head- provincial secessionist leaders, and and the US Air Force. Besides help- quarters cables of the kind Devlin rebel factions. They grew to provide ing suppress the insurgencies, CIA’s used to send about his talks with tactical support to UN peacekeepers, aviation program proved vital in the Mobutu because such encounters Congolese forces, and mercenaries crackdown Mobutu ordered against were no longer allowed.14 fighting the insurgents. Eventually army mutineers in Katanga in August the aviation component of the CA 1966. In March 1966, the National When Mobutu assumed power program provided aircraft, pilots, and Security Council (NSC) decided that officially, the political side of the CA maintenance personnel for the so- the Congo should pay for its own program was effectively through, called Congolese Air Force (CAF), air force, and the Agency phased out although it did not formally end which existed only because of US its involvement during the next 18 until early 1966—“The objectives assistance. Through the course of months, gradually melding activities of promoting stability and modera- the program, the CAF had 11 T-6s, with US Air Force operations.b 18 By tion remain the same, but the means 13 T-28s, 7 B-26s, 2 C-45s, 3 C-46s, late 1967, the CAF belonged to the needed to pursue these objectives 3 Bell helicopters, and 1 Beech Congolese, who continued, however, are now different,” the chief of AF twin-engine in its inventory. In total, to receive assistance from foreign wrote then—and a few Congolese six CIA officers ran the operations workers. politicians continued receiving in country, aided by 125 contract 15 individual payments well into 1968. maintenance workers employed by CIA also assisted Mobutu’s Although Washington had preferred the Congolese government and 79 government in quashing the rebels to achieve its goal of political order foreign contract pilots, who flew the by staging maritime operations on in the Congo through parliamentary missions because the Congolese were Lake Tanganyika along the Congo’s means, with a military strongman not reliably trained. Difficulties with eastern border and Lake Albert in now in power, it had what it wanted: supplies, airfield and living condi- a relatively stable, nationally based, tions, communications, and main- b. In late 1967, the Johnson administration politically moderate, pro-Western authorized CIA to recruit and pay five government in Leopoldville.a16 pilots for 90 days (with a possible 30-day for Mobutu very demonstratively in 1966 extension) to fly missions assisting the Con- and 1967 by forewarning him of coup plots golese government in quelling an uprising a. The US government showed its support against him, which he quickly put down. of mercenaries on the eastern border.

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DCI John McCone’s role in policymaking comes through clearly in a number of the documents in the volume. the city; and inviting in a mixed force from several African nations.

the northeast. Rebels in the region giance of tribal chiefs in the northeast Washington decided on the first were ferrying Chinese-supplied arms and got their assistance in cutting and second options. The airborne across the two lakes and using them off the flow of arms from Sudan and assault, codenamed DRAGON in the ground fighting in the two re- across Lake Albert from Uganda ROUGE, began at dawn on 24 No- gions, and the covert activities were by providing them with covert cash vember. American C-130 transports intended to interdict the shipments. and other forms of aid. The Agency dropped 340 Belgian paracomman- Lake Tanganyika especially was also assisted with paying foreign dos over Stanleyville and landed a difficult environment for Agen- mercenaries if hard currency was not another 280 at the airport, with cy personnel. It is the longest and available locally. As with its support the CAF providing air cover. The second-largest fresh-water lake in the for the CAF, the Agency gradually CIA paramilitary team, which was world, stretching for over 400 miles reduced its level of engagement in supposed to be in the city at the same but with an average width of only maritime activities and in January time, encountered resistance from 30 miles. Monitoring such a lengthy 1967 turned over its ship inventory the rebels and arrived a few hours coastline was hard when smugglers to the Congolese. Acting on NSC late. The combined force routed the could cross the narrow water body direction, CIA began phasing out hostage-takers, freed their captives, relatively quickly. The first CIA team its paramilitary programs in June and secured Stanleyville. The rescu- deployed to the area in March 1965 1967, withdrawing personnel from ers suffered only nine casualties, but and conducted its first patrol in May. all fronts. After the activities ended the rebels killed or wounded several What came to be called the Agency’s in late 1968, US aid to the Congolese dozen hostages during the first phase “pocket navy” also staged a success- military only came through the De- of the mission. Two days later, the ful amphibious landing operation to fense Department’s Military Assis- United States and Belgium cooper- deploy Congolese troops against a tance Program.20 ated in another operation, DRAGON rebel enclave.19 NOIR, to rescue nearly 400 Western In late 1964, CIA had to deploy hostages held near Paulis, about 240 To run the maritime activities, some of its paramilitary capabilities miles from Stanleyville (CIA was not seven Agency operations officers and in the Congo to support the rescue of involved). After hearing about the at- one communicator worked with a va- nearly 2,000 Western hostages rebels tack there, the rebels murdered nearly riety of (initially unreliable) foreign had seized in Stanleyville (Kisangani 30 detainees before the rescuers 21 crewmen and a flotilla of six 21-foot today) in August. The two dozen arrived. The Johnson administration Seacrafts, one 75-foot trawler, assort- Americans among them included then decided not to stage any more ed small boats, and—after the lake’s three CIA and two State Department such operations (two others, DRAG- unpredictable weather showed the officers. For the next four months, the ON BLANC and DRAGON VERT, need for larger, faster vessels—two rebels tormented the hostages while had been planned).23 50-foot Swifts equipped with radar the US government, African lead- for night surveillance. The operations ers, and the International Red Cross had a psychological impact at first, negotiated for their release.22 intimidating the rebels and inspiring The DCI’s Role the Congolese troops, but over time CIA and the Pentagon planned they largely disrupted the weapons various rescue scenarios without a DCI John McCone’s role in pol- shipments and, combined with the good feel for what was happening in icymaking comes through clearly in Agency’s aerial and other activities, the area. Among the ideas were drop- in the volume. A California busi- helped tip the tactical balance on the ping Belgian paratroopers into Stan- nessman with some background in ground in the government’s favor. leyville from US aircraft; dispatching intelligence from previous US gov- an Agency commando team upriver; ernment service and, more important, In addition to its air and maritime letting the Congolese army recapture a reputation as a hard-nosed manager operations, CIA secured the alle- of large international enterprises, Mc-

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The Congo covert action programs had an important or- Cone came to CIA in late 1961 with ganizational impact inside CIA by establishing the reputa- a White House mandate to carefully tion and prominence of the new AF Division. watch over covert operations and State Department complaints about ant outposts in sub-Saharan Africa, avoid another Bay of Pigs debacle. the Agency’s use of contract pilots which continued to attract significant Beyond that, the new DCI believed and Ambassador Godley’s attempt attention from policymakers through he should not only be the president’s to control the disbursement of covert the 1960s and after.25 chief intelligence officer but, when funds to Congolese politicians. allowed, should proffer advice on McCone had also argued in favor Documents in the volume high- foreign policy as well. of launching all the hostage-rescue light the prominent role money played in the CIA’s program, not McCone was not at all reluctant operations to show that the United States was engaged in humanitarian only during the politically unsettled to do so. He actively participated in years of the Adoula and Tshombe the deliberations of the NSC’s covert activities and not just propping up Tshombe and the Congolese army.24 governments but also after Mobutu action planning group, called the took over. If he and the United States Special Group and the 303 Commit- The Congo covert action pro- agreed that he was the indispensable tee during the years of the Congo grams had an important organization- man, then money became the essen- crisis, and occasionally met with al impact inside CIA by establishing tial feature of their relationship. In policymakers (President Lyndon the reputation and prominence of the 1965, the State Department observed: Johnson among them) separately. new AF Division in the Directorate of “A legitimate question is whether the Besides presenting intelligence Plans. Formerly paired with the more wholesale buying of political…lead- information, McCone argued for and important Near East area of opera- ers is a sound basis for establishing a against policy positions on many tions, AF became a division in 1959 stable government,” and it answered issues, including several related to and was less than one year old when that “in the Congo there appears to the Congo. He doubted that negoti- the Congo became a high-priority have been no feasible alternative.” ations with the rebels were feasible, CA target. At the time, AF had few CIA pointed out in early 1966 that opposed suspending air operations stations in sub-Saharan Africa. Most against them to signal a willingness had opened during the previous five Mobutu has no political orga- to parley, and advocated increasing years and had very small staffs. As nization which, as an alterna- US aid to Tshombe after he became the State Department noted in 1965, tive to the U.S. covert funding prime minister. “the Agency started from scratch in program, can provide him with most [African] countries, laboring the funds needed to ensure his McCone strongly believed that continuation in office. Nor is Washington should support Tshombe under the handicap of the visibility of the white man, few natural cover there any wealthy managerial despite his use of South African or commercial class to whom he mercenaries and reputation as a front opportunities…and language and cultural differences.” can turn to finance his political man for Belgian economic interests. efforts. “I felt we had no choice except to The undersized CIA comple- insure victory for Tshombe,” he told ment at Leopoldville Station, which Moreover, as Devlin wrote later that Secretary of State Dean Rusk in opened in 1951, had responsibility year, early 1965. “I said we should not be for covering most of equatorial Cutting off payments to [Mobu- deterred from this by the persuasion Africa, an area as large as half of the tu] would almost certainly of do-gooders, by reactions from United States. The station grew rap- be interpreted by him as an African states in the United Nations idly during the three months after the indication that [USG] no who didn’t like us anyway, or from Congo became independent, and, as longer supports him. Political the vote in the OAU [Organization of with the Agency’s other facilities on repercussions resulting from African Unity].” the continent, the expansion of covert terminating…payments would activities over the next several years McCone also aggressively defend- be almost as severe as if [USG] ed CIA’s covert activities, rebuffing forced its growth. Leopoldville soon became one of CIA’s most import-

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Over the years, Mobutu proved to be the best geopolitical friend the United States had on the continent, but he also in McBride’s words,28 did not trouble turned into one of the world’s most reviled kleptocrats. Washington then or later. The goals of CIA’s program and US policy were were to cut off [international significant loss of Agency access and mostly achieved, although not always development] funds. influence in the Congolese govern- as originally envisioned. Lumumba ment. COS Leopoldville reported in was removed from the scene but be- Although US policymakers want- late 1968 that he had good rapport came a revolutionary martyr and an ed to move “away from slush funds with Mobutu, who remained the inspiration to anticolonial activists in and toward genuine development beneficiary of largely open-ended US Africa and elsewhere. Over the years, aid,” when Mobutu asked for more support through the Cold War despite Mobutu proved to be the best geo- money in late 1968 with few strings the corruption and profligacy that political friend the United States had attached, he got it because, according were increasingly evident near the on the continent, but he also turned to the State Department, end of the Agency’s covert activities. into one of the world’s most reviled kleptocrats and drove his country He is the ultimate source of In mid-1968, Ambassador into economic ruin and, ultimately, power in Congo…and ready McBride warned of “the galloping political chaos. access to him is vital if we hope onset of the gold bed syndrome… to continue our long-standing vaguely and perhaps deliberately The Soviet Union was kept out policy of assisting the Congo reminiscent of a figure on the banks of the Congo but soon moved its to unity, stability and economic of a more northern river called the anti-Western subversion elsewhere in progress, with the eventual goal Seine.” He was referring to Mobutu’s the region. CIA’s covert activities in of seeing a stable, western-ori- plan to build three replicas of St. the Congo during the 1960s achieved ented government in the heart Peter’s Basilica and “five-million success in the short and medium term of Africa.… We do not wish to dollar Versailles-like parks” and but sometimes set in train develop- risk the impairment of access to his purchase of a luxury villa in ments that were not always consistent him which if it occurred would Switzerland for 1 million Swiss with democratic values. Those out- very probably be carried over francs and, for private use, a British comes, which characterize some but into contacts throughout the aircraft “fitted with bar, salon etc.” by no means most of the Agency’s 26 Congolese Government. and costing two million pounds.a 27 covert action programs, often result from the policy decisions that follow The CIA Board of National That Mobutu “has apparently the completion of the operations and Estimates echoed that view soon risen in soufflé-like grandiloquence,” are not necessarily inherent in them. after: Mobutu’s “departure, if sudden, As the documents in Congo, 1960– would probably result in prolonged 1968 show so well, CIA’s activities political turmoil and a sharp decline a. The amounts mentioned in 2014 dollars are, respectively, $34.1 million, $1.6 mil- during that time there exemplify that in internal security,” not to mention a lion, and $32.6 million. fact.

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Endnotes 1. Department of State, Office of the Historian,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968 (Government Printing Office, 2013). Quotations from the FRUS volumes in this review are as they appear in print. 2. FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951–1954 (Government Printing Office, 1989). 3. The controversy is well recounted in Department of State, Office of the Historian, Toward “Thorough, Accurate, and Reliable”: A His- tory of the Foreign Relations of the United States Series,” chapters 9 and 10, at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history, accessed 19 May 2014. 4. FRUS, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa (Government Printing Office, 1992);FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis (Government Printing Office, 1994). 5. Facts and quote from David Robarge, “CIA during the Congo Crisis: Political Action and Paramilitary Operations, 1960–1968,” brief- ing package derived from internal studies and documents and cleared for public use by the CIA Publications Review Board on 6 March 2014. 6. See, among others, documents 4 and 5. 7. FRUS, 1958–1960, XIV, document 157. 8. Ibid., document 254. 9. Documents 24, 28, 30, 32, 33, 43, 46, 60, 62, 68, 70, 72, 75, and 76. Footnote cite: “The Conclusions of the Enquiry Committee,” 16 November 2001, at http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/comm/lmb/conclusions.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014. 10. Documents 60, 62, 68, 70, 72, and 75. 11. Documents 8–10, 16, 37, 40, 55, 57, 73, 82, 87, 90, 94, 100, 109, 123, 138, 142, 143, 146, 155, 167, and 170; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” 12. Documents 169, 186, 209, 219, 223, 241, 253, 301, 371, 394, 407, 417, 419, 420, 430, 434, 442, 450, and 459. 13. Department of State, “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area,” undated but c. 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa (Government Printing Office, 1999), document 191; Congo, 1960–1968, documents 40 note 9, 64, 170, 194, and 217. 14. Documents 19, 48, 101, 119, 122, 191 notes 2 and 3, 192, 194, 446, 448, 454, 498, and 499. 15. Documents 466 and 573. 16. Documents 470, 471, 474, 475, and 490. 17. Documents 71, 123, 124, 127, 168, 171, 219, 237, 272, 427, 440, 462, 483, 544, 546, and 564; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” 18. Documents 415, 440, 472, 478, 486, 492, 497, and 500; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” Footnote cite: Documents 544, 546, and 564. 19. “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” 20. Documents 219, 223, 427, 431, 462, 464, 486, 494, and 575; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” 21. Many documents on the hostage-takings and rescue operations are between pages 338 and 526 of the collection. 22. Two of the hostages have written of their ordeal in books: David Reed, 111 Days in Stanleyville (Harper & Row, 1965); and Michael P.E. Hoyt, Captive in the Congo: A Consul’s Return to the Heart of Darkness (Naval Institute Press, 2000). 23. Thomas P. Odom, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964, 1965 (Command Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988); Fred E. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo (National Defense Universi- ty, 1980). 24. Documents 178, 180, 211, 218 note 3, 289, 362, 369, 373, and 383. 25. “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area”; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” 26. Documents 54, 65, 77, 102, 109, 219, 227, 462, 485, 501, and 578; “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area.” 27. Documents 577, 579, and 581. 28. Document 581. vvv

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