Zaïre, South Africa: Moving Forward?

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Zaïre, South Africa: Moving Forward? Review of African Political Economy No.72:165-170 © ROAPE Publications Ltd., 1997 ISSN 0305-6244; RIX#7201 Zaïre, South Africa: Moving Forward? Chris Allen Mobutu's undignified exit from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) brings to a close one of the few remaining terminal spoils regimes in Africa. It creates - unlike Somalia - an opportunity for a different, more democratic and decentralised political system, though it is precisely the long process of decline, corruption and internal violence that makes terminal spoils systems so vulnerable that also makes the building of viable popular regimes in their place so difficult. So also do external constraints, pressures and forces: we may have seen the last of Mobutu, the man installed in part by the CIA, but we have not seen the last of American influence upon events. Early in his twin career as head of state and familiar of US Africa policy, Mobutu attempted to conceal the latter role, and enhance the former, by nationalising the Belgian-owned Union Miniere firm, the main copper-mining company in Zaire. Gibbs' article in this issue describes the part played in this by the American diamond company Leon Tempelsman and the US government, stressing the US perception of decolonisation as creating openings for US capital in what the colonial powers had formerly kept as closed areas for metropolitan capital. Thus the US government backed Mobutu's attempt to detach copper-mining from Union Miniere's control (with, in the end, some success), while at the same time combining with other western governments, including Belgium, in opposing nationalisation without compensation. Thirty years later, as Gibbs and Collins (in Briefings) point out, imperialist rivalries persist, as does collaboration in the face a common threat. They have taken two forms: conflict over the nature and extent of intervention (though not wholly its goals), and competition for access to Congo-Zaire's mineral wealth. This time, too, there is a new competitor, South African capital, represented directly by Anglo and de Beers, and indirectly, and more uncertainly, by the ANC-led government. During the cold war, and especially in its final decades, intervention in Africa had three principal goals: exercising control over the nature and development of African economies (increasingly through the IFIs rather than the action of individual economies and firms); the pursuit of cold war geostrategic aims, often reflected in support for individual heads of state like Mobutu; and the national interest of certain states, notably France, for whom Africa - and only Africa - could provide a chasse gardee, or private estate, in which it could act as a global power, displaying its diplomatic, economic and military strength. Since 1990 only the second of these goals has disappeared, replaced for the US at least by a bundle of conflicting goals - structural adjustment, 'democratisation', protection from a variety of new global menaces (Islam, drugs, crime etc), and a division between those who see Africa as too marginal to merit attention, and those who stress the need for further investment, trade and preventative diplomacy. 166 Review of African Political Economy The discourse of intervention has changed too, concealing older goals behind assertions of the need to promote democracy and human rights, and to secure humanitarian goals. State sovereignty, once a convenient cornerstone for ignoring human rights abuses on the part of cold war allies, is now - no less conveniently - ignored. This is a profoundly ambiguous, even inconsistent, discourse. The IFIs impose political conditions for loans, including democracy and human rights. Yet a government cannot be accountable for its economic policy both to the IFIs and to its electorate. Human rights conditions are imposed to different degrees by different leaders, and there is an increasing tendency to ignore abuses once cosmetic changes are made, as with Kenya. Similarly, and especially since the US decision to withdraw from Somalia, humanitarian need has been treated selectively. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, despite the scale of suffering involved and the threat to regional peace and order that they constituted, have been left to ECOWAS and the NGOs, Sudan to a combination of mediation and NGO action; Burundi to the neighbouring states. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 resulted in an extraordinary combination of partial UN withdrawal, belated recognition of the scale of the killings, and then unilateral action by France, a state heavily implicated in the Habiyarimana regime and in the training and arming of its (in)security forces. The French action, so obviously designed to protect the retreat of the former Rwandan government (FGR), its army and militia, points up a second feature of 'humanitarian intervention': its use in re-defining the nature of emergency need and of the underlying political process. In Rwanda the nature of the emergency was entirely clear: a planned series of killings, at first directed towards those seen as political opponents of the extremist wing of the FGR and/or sympathisers with the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), and then more generally towards all those identified as 'Tutsi'. It was their bodies, floating in rivers or piled in churches, that created a demand for international action. But that action became focused almost entirely not on preventing further killing, nor on reconstruc- tion, but on support for the refugees. The flight of the refugees to Zaire and Tanzania had mixed motives. The vast bulk were not Tutsi but Hutu, some genuinely fearful of the RPF (made so by a combination of propaganda and guilt over the massacres). Some were organised into flight by the FGR, and mixed in with the refugees were the killers, protected by a human shield which they would later use in the camps to gain access to food, water and medical treatment. The agencies and NGOs responsible for the camps quickly lost any political control to the killers, and were in no position to deny them: only a rival armed force could have disarmed and detained them, and at considerable risk. In the process the FGR was allowed to re-establish itself within the camps, to continue its propaganda, to rearm (courtesy of the Mobutu regime) and to carry out raids across the border in Rwanda. The raids increased in intensity in 1996, as did the killings of those coming forward as witnesses in the enquiries into the 1994 massacres. More than this: the nature of the 'problem' became re-defined. From one of genocide stemming from a decades long process of political decay and calling for a combination of reconstruction of justice/reconciliation, it became one of the Hutu refugees, calling for the channelling of humanitarian and other aid into Zaire and the camps. The effect has been to leave the genocide unresolved; to direct resources from reconstruction in Rwanda to short term emergency needs to Zaire; and to create a new threat to the RPF government - that a large percentage of Rwanda's population might Editorial: Zaire, South Africa: Moving Forward? 167 never return and that its enemies would be able to resume their programme of genocide. The RPF did not escape the process of redefinition: from being the only force capable of cutting short the genocide it became itself suspected of arbitrary killings and extensive human rights abuses. Recent events in Zaire show analogous patterns. In October 1996 an armed revolt began in Kivu, at its core Banyamulenge farmers, with more or less remote links to Rwanda, and recently exposed to attacks by the Zairean army and the provincial governor. This revolt was led by Laurent Kabila, who became leader of the AFDL (Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire), an alliance of four local groupings, and supported by the governments (and soldiers) of Rwanda and Uganda. Early targets were a number of refugee camps seen as bases for the former Rwandan government (FGR) army and militia, fled into the bush. This prompted demands for humanitarian military intervention, from the UN Secretary General, from a number of African heads of state, and from France and Canada. The purpose would be to protect the refugees, either returning them to their camps (the French view) or creating a safe corridor for their return to Rwanda (the US view, once Clinton had in mid-November decided 'in principle' to support intervention). Before an interventionary force could be assembled and despatched, the refugees had themselves begun to return, encouraged by the AFDL and units of the Rwandan army. About 900,000 returned; but the rest, including the militia and FGR troops, moved deeper into Zaire, some even traversing the entire country to emerge in the Congo or Angola. The presence of these refugees, up to 350,000 in all, and many in poor condition, has created a lever to exert pressure on the AFDL. A variety of NGOs, the new UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other officials, and the French have demanded that the AFDL treat the plight of the refugees as primary and the overthrow of Mobutu - and the elimination of the threat of Hutu extremism - as secondary. Thus in April Kofi Annan called on 'all parties to stop fighting and allow the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population caught in the conflict' (AFP, 21 April 1997). France and the US have, since December, pursued distinct policies in Zaire, readily seen as reflecting rival economic and political interests. France, wishing to retain its influence in Zaire, tried to sustain Mobutu, looking for 'solutions' that would place foreign troops in Zaire, and bring about a transition process that would allow Mobutu or his nominee, to oversee a transfer of power, preferably not to the AFDL, which it saw as a tool of American interests, like the governments of Rwanda and Uganda.
Recommended publications
  • Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ Report by Department of State, 27 January 1961, 4
    This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/113873/ This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication. Citation for final published version: Marsh, Stephen and Culley, Tierney 2018. Anglo-American relations and crisis in The Congo. Contemporary British History 32 (3) , pp. 359-384. 10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598 file Publishers page: http://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598 <http://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598> Please note: Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite this paper. This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders. CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598 ARTICLE Congo, Anglo-American relations and the narrative of � decline: drumming to a diferent beat Steve Marsh and Tia Culley AQ2 AQ1 Cardiff University, UK� 5 ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating Congo; Anglo-American; special relationship; Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan’s � decision to ‘stand aside’ during UN ‘Operation Grandslam’, espe- Kennedy; Macmillan cially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive efects on 10 Anglo-American relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Llchaprer Four the U.S
    llcHAPrER FouR THE U.S. COMES TO AFRICA term presidency is ticking away. Americans are unaware that another such presidency will not soon follow. They don't know that in Vietnam they are already entering their first losing war. They believe that the people of most countries would welcome the arrival of American troops just about the same way the French did in t944. After eight years in office, Eisenhower, the general who commanded those troops in t944, surprises many supporters by worrying publicly about the growing uncontrollability of what he calls a "military-industrial complex" in the United States. John F. Kennedy, the opposition candidate to succeed Eisenhower, com- plains instead of a "missile gap." (It later proves nonexistent.) He pledges to repair "our lost prestige, our shaky defenses, our lack of leadership." Over and over he charges that turmoil in Cuba and the Congo is proof of U.S. weakness. He campaigns to beef up the U.S. military to meet "the communist ghallenge" in such places. He declares the world "half slave and half free," and says it can't continue that way. He doesn't say which half he considers the Congo to be in-or to which half Fulgencio Batista, the deposed anti- communist Cuban dictator, belonged. 196o sees new fleets ofjet-powered Boeing 7o7's and Convair 88o's begin to shrink the country and wodd. Runways are extended, propeller craft replaced, ocean liners mothballed. Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa swell up offshore, only hours away. These new planes, incidentally, create a need for a previously little-known metal that is vital to jet aviation: cobalt.
    [Show full text]
  • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case Log October 2000 - April 2002
    Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case Log October 2000 - April 2002 Requested date: 2002 Release date: 2003 Posted date: 08-February-2021 Source of document: Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 Filing a FOIA Records Request Online The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. 1 O ct 2000_30 April 2002 Creation Date Requester Last Name Case Subject 36802.28679 STRANEY TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH OF INDIA; HONG KONG; CHINA AND WTO 36802.2992 CRAWFORD EIGHT DIFFERENT REQUESTS FOR REPORTS REGARDING CIA EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS 36802.43927 MONTAN EDWARD GRADY PARTIN 36802.44378 TAVAKOLI-NOURI STEPHEN FLACK GUNTHER 36810.54721 BISHOP SCIENCE OF IDENTITY FOUNDATION 36810.55028 KHEMANEY TI LEAF PRODUCTIONS, LTD.
    [Show full text]
  • Save Pdf (0.18
    REVIEW ESSAYS INSIDE THE CIA: CONGO IN THE 1980s Larry Devlin. Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960-67. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. xi + 288 pp. Photographs. Map. Index. $26.95. Cloth. Congo watchers have been distressed at the little mention that the Congo receives in U.S. news media. After all, the lethal crisis there has cost the lives of over five million people—often described as the greatest humani- tarian catastrophe since World War II. So when a book is published about the Congo's history and the New York Times covers it—in its news section, no less—that speaks to its importance. That is what happened in February 2008 to Larry Devlin's Chief of Station, Congo. This book makes a major con- tribution to the history of the Congo just after it gained its independence and especially regarding the role of the U.S. in creating the Mobutu dicta- torship. Devlin was the CIA station chief in Kinshasa in the 1960s. His book reads like a detective novel and tells the story, with impressive frankness, of how he and the U.S. ambassador, Claire Timberlake, quickly came to the conclusion that the newly elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was either Communist controlled or completely duped by Communists, and therefore had to be gotten rid of. It was he who was given the order, appar- ently originating with President Eisenhower, to arrange for the assassina- tion of Lumumba. But he felt this to be both immoral and unnecessary and he states that he basically sabotaged the order.
    [Show full text]
  • The-Diamond-Empire-Transcript.Pdf
    1 MEDIA EDUCATION F O U N D A T I O N 60 Masonic St. Northampton, MA 01060 | TEL 800.897.0089 | [email protected] | www.mediaed.org The Diamond Empire Transcript Part 1 begins on pg. 1 Part 2 begins on pg. 15 PART 1: INTRODUCTION NARRATOR: On a hill above Johannesburg is the private estate of one of the wealthiest families on earth. They’ve made their fortune by manipulating markets and fixing prices. Their money has come from ordinary people all over the world who imagine they’re investing in something rare and valuable. But this is a family which deals in illusion. It presides over one of the last great cartels, an extraordinarily successful business empire worth $60 billion. This is the Oppenheimer family and their trade is diamonds. NARRATOR: The richest diamond jewelry market in the world is in New York. It’s a $10.8 billion business. Around 47th Street, there are twenty-five thousand people who buy, cut, polish and sell diamonds, from the most glamorous jewelry to the cheapest mail-order. It’s a highly secretive and risky business. The Oppenheimers themselves declined to help in any way in the making of this film. Bill Goldberg is one of the few top dealers who will talk openly about what he does. BILL GOLDBERG: It’s fascinating, it’s amazing that a lot of men that are ten years younger than I am can’t wait to retire and I can’t wait to get here in the morning at eight o’clock, to produce these beautiful works, these beautiful pieces of art from what looks like a pebble on the beach.
    [Show full text]
  • Congo to Zaire – and Back
    Page 1 of 7 CONGO TO ZAIRE – AND BACK When I was an English schoolboy – many years ago! – one (of many) dates was drummed into me: 1066, the year the Normans overturned the Saxon kingdom of Harold: if a similarly significant date were to be selected for Africa, it would undoubtedly be 1960 when no less than 18 colonies gained their independence, and of these, the largest, the richest and the youngest – only 52 years old – was the Belgian Congo. Twice the size of South Africa, but possibly of greater diversity: from dense tropical jungles sheltering the rare okapi, to snow-capped mountains, vast prairie-like grasslands, mile-high blue lakes overlooked by volcanoes inhabited by gorillas… the list is endless. A diverse population too, speaking well over 500 languages, with a rich artistic culture, in sculpture, weaving, music… The legendary wealth of Congo, once described as “a geological scandal” includes copper & industrial diamonds, cobalt & cassiterite, gold & niobium… the list is endless. Agricultural produce such as palmoil, coffee, cotton, tea were also exported in significant quantities… but its greatest wealth in many ways is the Congo River, 2 nd -mightiest in the world, sweeping like a silver highway from East to West, crossing the Equator twice, before tumbling down to the Atlantic: and in these last 100km the hydro-electric potential – the equivalent of S. Africa’s total present energy generation – could give the country an economic kick-start… 3RD Feb 1960 “The Wind of Change is blowing through this Continent” warned Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and he was certainly better placed than most of us in Africa to predict the momentous events which were to unfold within the next few months & years.
    [Show full text]
  • America's War in Angola, 1961-1976 Alexander Joseph Marino University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
    University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 5-2015 America's War in Angola, 1961-1976 Alexander Joseph Marino University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the African History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Marino, Alexander Joseph, "America's War in Angola, 1961-1976" (2015). Theses and Dissertations. 1167. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1167 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. America’s War in Angola, 1961-1976 America’s War in Angola, 1961-1976 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History by Alexander J. Marino University of California, Santa Barbara Bachelor of Arts in History, 2008 May 2015 University of Arkansas This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council ______________________________________ Dr. Randall B. Woods Thesis Director ______________________________________ Dr. Andrea Arrington Committee Member ______________________________________ Dr. Alessandro Brogi Committee Member ABSTRACT A study of the role played by the United States in Angola’s War of Independence and the Angolan Civil War up to 1976. DEDICATION To Lisa. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961
    The Congo Crisis, 1960-1961: A Critical Oral History Conference Organized by: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Cold War International History Project and Africa Program Sponsored by: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars September 23-24, 2004 Opening of Conference – September 23, 2004 CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN: Ladies and gentlemen I think we’ll get started even though we’re still expecting a few colleagues who haven’t arrived yet, but I think we should get started because we have quite an agenda for this meeting. Welcome all of you to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; my name is Christian Ostermann. I direct one of the programs here at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Cold War International History Project. The Center is the United States’ official memorial to President Woodrow Wilson and it celebrates, commemorates Woodrow Wilson through a living memorial, that is, we bring scholars from around the world, about 150 each year to the Wilson center to do research and to write. In addition to hosting fellowship programs, the Center hosts 450 meetings each year on a broad array of topics related to international affairs. One of these meetings is taking place today, and it is a very special meeting, as I will explain in a few moments. This meeting is co-sponsored by the Center’s Cold War International History project and 1 the Center’s Africa Program, directed by former Congressman Howard Wolpe. He’s in Burundi as we speak here, but some of his staff will be joining us during the course of the day.
    [Show full text]
  • Lundas – the Stones of Death Angola’S Deadly Diamonds
    Lundas – The stones of death Angola’s deadly diamonds: Human rights abuses in the Lunda provinces, 2004 Co-ordination and editing: Rafael Marques Legal editor: Rui Falcão de Campos Transl. from Portuguese: Lundas - as pedras da morte, presented at the Fundação Mário Soares, Lisbon 9 March 2005 9 March 2005 Lundas – The stones of death Angola’s deadly diamonds: Human rights abuses in the Lunda provinces, 2004 Acknowledgement ....................................................................................................3 Research methodology and techniques ...................................................................4 1. Socio-geographical context ..............................................................................5 2. Socio-economic context....................................................................................6 3. Legal background and analysis ........................................................................9 4. Freedom of movement.................................................................................... 10 5. The privatisation of Law and Order ............................................................... 13 6 Social exclusion: Causes and consequences (and who profits) ..................... 15 7. Recommendations.......................................................................................... 16 To the Angolan government ...................................................................... 16 To the Angolan National Assembly...........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 46446 Spotlight
    SPOTLIGHT Volume 5 Issue 1 / Summer 2007 Focus: How the BHP Came to Be aybe it all started with Deeda Fast forward to June 1996. Maurice Tem- Consultant Physician, heading one of the M Blair, an early (and constant) sup- pelsman, now Chair of the HAI’s Interna- Medical Units at Princess Marina Hospital porter of the Harvard AIDS In- tional Advisory Council, was hosting a din- in Gaborone. As Essex remembers, Dr. stitute. She introduced Max Essex, Chair of ner at Washington’s celebrated Cosmos Joseph Makhema had already retired for HAI, to Maurice Tempelsman in the 1980s. Club. The dinner was in honor of President the night when he was roused by the Pres- Because of his business and personal in- Ketumile Masire of Botswana. Knowing of ident’s knock. Still wearing his bathrobe, terests in Africa, Mr. Tempelsman’s knowl- the growing AIDS crisis in Botswana, Mr. Dr. Makhema joined the two men for a edge and contacts were essential in helping Tempelsman invited Max Essex to the din- discussion about the growing AIDS crisis. establish HAI’s research and prevention col- ner and introduced him to President Masire. At the end of the conversation, it was de- laborations in Senegal. Studies with a cohort The two spoke briefly. The President asked cided that Essex would travel to Botswana of commercial sex workers yielded the iden- Dr. Essex if he could meet with him the next as soon as his schedule allowed. tification of HIV-2 and evidence that it was morning. Essex, who had a class to teach at A few weeks later, in the summer of less virulent than HIV-1.
    [Show full text]
  • South Africa and the 'Congo Crisis', 1960-1965
    South Africa and the ‘Congo Crisis’, 1960-1965 By Lazlo Patrick Christian Passemiers SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN RESPECT OF THE DOCTORAL DEGREE QUALIFICATION IN AFRICA STUDIES IN THE CENTRE FOR AFRICA STUDIES, IN THE FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE February 2016 Supervisor: Prof. I.R. Phimister Co-supervisor: Dr. A.P. Cohen Declaration (i) I, Lazlo Passemiers, declare that the Doctoral Degree research thesis that I herewith submit for the Doctoral Degree qualification in Africa Studies at the University of the Free State is my independent work and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education. (ii) I, Lazlo Passemiers, hereby declare that I am aware that the copyright is vested in the University of the Free State. (iii) I, Lazlo Passemiers, hereby declare that all royalties as regards intellectual property that was developed during the course of and/or in connection with the study at the University of the Free State will accrue to the University. Signature: Date: I Abstract On 30 June 1960, the Belgian Congo gained independence. Congo’s newfound freedom was soon disrupted by a period of severe socio-political chaos and conflict that became known as the ‘Congo crisis’. The exact nature of the relationship between South Africa and the Congo crisis largely remains unknown. The thesis addresses this historiographical omission by asking three main questions. First, how was South Africa involved in the Congo crisis? Secondly, what was the rationale for its involvement? Thirdly, how was the Congo crisis perceived inside South Africa? Besides significantly strengthening and expanding the existing historiography on Pretoria’s involvement and South African mercenaries, hitherto neglected aspects of the crisis are also examined.
    [Show full text]
  • Angola the Spoils of War
    AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA 1 I ANGOLA THE SPOILS OF WAR \\\\Y GET THE BIG PICTURE! Six times a year, AFRICA REPORT brings you authoritative, in-depth features on political and economic developments in Africa and on American policy toward the continent by on-the-scene correspondents and by the newsmakers themselves. AFRICA REPORT goes beyond the coverage you get from the evening news and daily papers to give you the BIG PICTURE— analyses, opinions, and predictions on events in an ever-changing continent. Please enter my subscription as indicated below (six issues per year): •1NDIVIDUAL • INSTITUTION (Add $7 per year) J $30 /1 year Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add $6 year. J$51 12 years Air Rate Overseas: Add $24 per year- U $72 /3 years First-class within U.S.A.: Add $7 per year Name Organization City/State/Zip _ Country <flFRICfl Total amount of my order is : $. My check is enclosed. Make check payable to: Africa Report and send to: (REPORT Africa Report Subscription Services / P.O. Box 3000, Dept. AR / Denville, NJ 07834 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1994 AMERICAS VOLUME 39, NUMBER 1 LEADING MAGAZINE cflFRICfl ON AFRICA A Publication of the (REPORT African-American Institute The Letters to the Editor 4 African-American Institute Update 5 Chairman Editor: Russell Geekie Maurice Tempelsman Angola President The World's Worst War 13 Vivian Lowery Derryck By Cindy Shiner The Siege of Cuito 18 Publisher By Mercedes Sayagues Steve McDonald Editor-in-Chief Interview Margaret A. Novicki George E. Moose: Clinton's Policy Priorities 21 The U.S.
    [Show full text]