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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

Query Please provide an overview of the nature and impact of corruption in Sudan including extent, nature, sectors most affected (extractive industries, public financial management, police and security), anti-corruption efforts, and legal and institutional framework (including judiciary). We are also interested in the following areas: public administration at national, regional and local levels, health, agriculture, natural resources and the environment.

Content Sudan is, without a doubt, one of the most challenging environments for anti-corruption in the 1. Overview of corruption in Sudan world. Corruption is present in all sectors and 2. Corruption by sector across all branches and levels of government: public servants are known to demand bribes for 3. Legal and institutional anti-corruption services that individuals or companies are legally frameworks entitled to; government officials hold direct and 4. Anti-Corruption entry points for highly corrupt indirect stakes in many enterprises, which distorts environments the market through patronage and cronyism; and 5. References the head of state and government is believed to have embezzled up to US$9 billion from oil Caveat revenues. Due to a lack of information, not all the sectors This U4 Expert Answer provides a general requested by the enquirer could be included in the overview of the nature and extent of corruption in answer. Providing policy advice is beyond the the country, the state of its legal and institutional scope of the Helpdesk, for that reason, the last framework to prevent it, as well as its presence section of this document simply summarizes across different sectors of the economy. scholarly advice on how to fight corruption in developing countries and fragile states.

Summary

Author(s): Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka, Transparency International, [email protected] Reviewed by: Kinda Hattar, Transparency International, [email protected] Date: 31 March 2017 Number: 2017:4 U4 is a resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work. Expert Answers are produced by the U4 Helpdesk – operated by Transparency International – as quick responses to operational and policy questions from U4 Partner Agency staff.

Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

1. Overview of corruption in Sudan months without judicial review. Detained opponents and activists are often held in NISS cells Sudan gained independence on 1 January 1956. where they suffer ill treatment and torture. Since then the country has experienced alternating forms of democratic and authoritarian government As an illustration of the brutality of the regime, the and an on/off 50-year civil war between the Islamist International Criminal Court (ICC) has, since 2009, government in Khartoum and secessionist been pursuing the Sudanese president on five Christians and animists in the south. The armed counts of crimes against humanity (murder, conflict, which ended in 2005, left two million dead, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape), and six million refugees and internally displaced two counts of war crimes (intentionally directing people. Despite the prolonged involvement of attacks against a civilian population or against almost every major country and humanitarian individual civilians not taking part in hostilities, and agency in the world, other regional conflicts persist pillaging) and three counts of genocide (by killing, in Sudan (Cockett 2016). by causing serious bodily or mental harm and by deliberately inflicting on each target group Given the complicated humanitarian situation in the conditions of life calculated to bring about the country, Sudan has received extraordinary military group’s physical destruction) (ICC 2009; ICC and financial resources in attempts to help stabilise 2010). The human rights situation in the country the country. Towards the end of the 2000s, for continues to deteriorate. In 2011, Freedom House example, the country was the largest recipient of ranked Sudan as one of the nine countries judged humanitarian aid (Global Humanitarian Assistance to have the worst human rights record, with its 2011). The United Nations’ World Food inhabitants suffering from intense repression Programme (WFP) ran its largest emergency (Martini 2012). project in the world there, while two of the UN’s biggest-ever peacekeeping missions were running The first section of this U4 Expert Answer gives an simultaneously in the country: one in Darfur with overview of the nature and extent of corruption in 26,000 soldiers and security forces, and another in the Republic of Sudan by looking at different the south with a staff of 10,000 people. The UN measurements of corruption and using academic mission in Darfur was costing almost US$1.5 billion insights to illuminate how corruption operates in a a year, and the one in the south another US$1 context as complex as this one. After that is an billion (Cockett 2016). explanation of the main drivers of corruption in the country. This includes the absence of checks and Since 1989, and for almost 28 years now, balances to hold the government accountable, the President Omar al-Bashir has ruled Sudan with an systematic violations of human rights which make iron fist after taking power in a bloodless coup. it difficult for a strong media and civil society to While claiming he would address corruption, flourish, and the close ties between business and financial mismanagement and nepotism, the new politics, among others. The second section of this government quickly established the most answer looks at a variety of sectors and institutions repressive rule the country had known since to illustrate how different types of corruption affect independence (Martini 2012). As part of this them. The third part reviews Sudan’s legal and process, the government dissolved parliament and institutional anti-corruption frameworks, and the trade unions, banned political parties, gagged final section examines possible strategies to help independent newspapers and introduced a curb corruption in the country. nationwide Islamic legal code. As a result of these policies, the country has been dramatically transformed into an authoritarian Islamic single- Nature and extent of corruption in Sudan party state under the rule of al-Bashir’s party: the Corruption in Sudan is a systemic issue. The National Congress Party (NCP). country is perceived as one of the most corrupt in the world: Transparency International’s 2016 Al-Bashir’s government is notorious for its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for example, repressive tactics and legislation to silence the gives the country a score of 14, ahead only of North media, control political opposition and clamp down Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria on civil society. The 2010 National Security Act, for (Transparency International 2017). The World example, grants the National Intelligence and Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator also places Security Services (NISS) extensive powers to the country among the 10 most corrupt countries arrest and detain people for up to four and a half on the planet.

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

These results are hardly surprising given that, Corruption takes a variety of forms in Sudan, Sudan is also considered a fragile state under “very ranging from petty forms of corruption, such as high alert” by the Fund for Peace (2016) and as bribery, to grand corruption (e.g. embezzlement noted by Transparency International (2011) and theft of public funds involving high-level “fragile, unstable states … linger at the bottom of officials) and political corruption, i.e. “the the index ... demonstrate[ing] that countries which manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of are perceived to have the highest levels of public- procedure in the allocation of resources and sector corruption are also those plagued by long- financing by political decision makers, who abuse standing conflicts which have torn apart their their position to sustain their power, status and governance infrastructure”. wealth” (Transparency International 2009). Under such circumstances, the formal institutional This also has consequences for the way in which framework often corresponds to what Acemoglu corruption works in a country: to understand and Robinson (2012) call ‘extractive institutions’ or corruption in a country like Sudan, it is necessary what Kaufman and Vicente (2011) define as ‘legal to let go of the notion that corruption is a deviant corruption’. and exceptional behaviour in which only “rotten apples” participate when the likelihood of being As a result, corruption in Sudan is present across caught is low. all levels of government and there have even been allegations of corruption and money laundering As explained by Persson, Rothstein and Teorell against President al-Bashir (Lindner 2014). (2013), endemic corruption, like that found in Moreover, trying to understand this phenomenon Sudan, is not a flaw that can be corrected with a based on the standard definition of corruption, i.e. technical fix or a political push. It is the way the the abuse of entrusted power/authority for private system works, and it is deeply embedded in the gain, may harmful in such a context, as it might help norms and expectations of political and social life. protect the legal forms of corruption that have been Corruption in this case is a feature of the country’s enshrined in the law. governance regime, and it does not constitute an exception to the rule, but the rule itself (Mungiu- The next section describes some of the main Pippidi 2015); in a thoroughly corrupt setting like drivers of corruption in Sudan. Sudan, the short-term costs of being honest are comparatively high since this will change little in the overall picture (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999). Drivers of corruption in Sudan Hence, unwilling or incapable of bearing the costs, Absence of checks and balances people will instead continue to choose corrupt alternatives before non-corrupt ones (Persson, The principle of separation of powers, where the Rothstein and Teorell 2013). legislative, executive and judicial functions of government are divided among independent Consequently, in a context in which corruption is bodies, is the foundation of governance in the expected behaviour, monitoring devices and democratic nations. Separation of powers implies punishment regimes would be largely ineffective the need for multiple actors to propose, initiate or since there will simply be no actors with an manage the agenda, and is considered a incentive to hold corrupt officials accountable. necessary safeguard against tyranny and abuse of Moreover, there is an absence of stakeholders power (Alt and Lassen 2008). willing to enforce existing laws and policies (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). This requires procedures known as checks and balances, which empower separate actors to Moreover, when violent conflict is present in a prevent actions by other actors, for example country and the law is used as a means of through vetoes, judicial review or regulatory oppression, corruption becomes a means for the oversight, with the aim of ensuring policy victims to evade oppression, For this reason, in moderation and preventing misuse of political countries where factional violence is raging, anti- power. corruption interventions are not particularly well suited (Mungiu-Pippidi 2016). The constitution of Sudan structures the government according to the principle of separation , of powers between the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The regime of president al-Bashir,

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

however, has blurred the lines between the three elections negatively, criticise the armed forces or branches of government. The lack of checks and the government´s economic policy, report low voter balances has granted him a monopoly of power turnout, mention the situation in Darfur or the and turned the system into an autocracy despite armed conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile the efforts of pro-democracy movements (Mukum (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 2016). In Mbaku 2015). the absence of a tradition of respect for freedom of expression, weak media are unable to expose Al-Bashir weakened the judiciary with the corruption without exposing themselves to introduction of a new Islamic constitution and legal defamation lawsuits or risks to their personal codes based on its interpretation of Shariah. As a security; it is common, for example, for journalists result, the executive oversees the training and to be arrested (Freedom House 2016). appointment of new judges, thus undermining the autonomy of the judicial branch (Bertelsmann The government has also imposed severe Stiftung 2016). At the same time, the legislature, restrictions on the operation and mandates of civil widely controlled by the governing party, has failed society organisations, and a number have been to express any opposition to the executive, not forcibly closed. least because of crackdowns on the very few members of the opposition (Bertelsmann Stiftung Lack of political opposition 2016). The existence of political opposition is often considered key to anti-corruption too. In Systematic violations of human rights combination with democratic (free and fair) According to the anti-corruption literature, the right electoral processes, voters can punish corrupt to freedom of expression, assembly and incumbents by voting them out of office. association are fundamental to anti-corruption Incumbents therefore have incentives to behave efforts (see, for example, Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). responsibly if they intend to stay in office (see Where governments permit information to flow Ferraz and Finan 2011). In Sudan, however, freely, it becomes easier to identify and denounce elections are not free and political opposition is not cases of corruption. This requires, however, tolerated. access to multiple sources of information because a single source can be easily corrupted thus The first multi-party election since 1986 was held in compromising the free flow of information (Dahl in 2010. The strict limits on freedom of the press, 2000). Protection of the freedom to form and of assembly and of expression, however, made it affiliate with formal and informal associations, such impossible to guarantee the fairness of the as human rights organisations, is also a vital process. The elections were plagued by element of anti-corruption efforts (International irregularities and failed to meet international Council for Human Rights 2009). standards, according to local and international monitors (see Freedom House 2016; International Violations of these basic rights, however, are an Crisis Group 2011). everyday occurrence in al-Bashir’s Sudan. Even though the 2005 constitution recognises the In June 2014, the electoral system was amended freedom of the press, the authorities censor the to enhance the electoral prospects of small parties, media by confiscating newspapers and targeting notably by increasing the number of seats journalists. Following the approval of the 2009 determined by proportional representation from Press and Publication Act, the government 40% to 50% and eliminating the 4% threshold for appointed a press council to oversee the overall representation. Nevertheless, the political arena performance of the journalistic institutions and remains heavily favourable to the NCP. companies, effectively limiting freedom of expression and the press (Cairo Institute for The regime keeps imposing heavy restrictions on Human Rights Studies 2016). political parties and their members. In April 2015, for example, al-Bashir issued a decree (no. 158) Raids on printing facilities and confiscated print forbidding political parties from organising runs of newspapers considered to be in violation of meetings in their own venues without previous the Press and Publication Act are also common, approval from the government and requiring them and the government has instructed editors not to to ask for authorisation for public meetings 48 cross certain “red lines” in their coverage, which hours in advance (Cairo Institute for Human Rights implies not publishing articles which portray the Studies 2016). Some parties have also been

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

denied registration. The Sudanese Republican 2016 Investment Climate Statement, major Party (SCP), for example, was denied recognition government contracts are often awarded to a firm by the Sudanese Political Parties Affairs Council in controlled by a government official. But the links 2014 because it refused to endorse a system of between business and politics in the country run Shariah (Freedom House 2016). much deeper than that. Members of the NCP, particularly those from favoured ethnic groups, The overall dominance of the NCP over the effectively control the economy and use the wealth country’s political system has also allowed the they amass in banking and business to buy political party to use the state security apparatus to support (Freedom House 2015). intimidate and arbitrarily arrest members of the opposition to prevent other parties from operating According to the International Crisis Group (2011), freely. Opposition leaders and activists are money for the NCP comes not only from the state routinely arrested and held without charge, often but also from foreign investment and development for extended periods. In 2014, the head of the assistance. Most Sudanese businesses sub- National Umma Party, his deputy and the head of contracted for major construction projects are the Sudanese Congress Party were all detained in linked to the Islamists’ companies, and at least 164 separate cases and held for several weeks before companies, operating in a range of services and being released without charge. In the lead-up to the industries are owned or controlled by NCP military, April 2015 elections, opposition figures also faced police and NISS officials. One example is Sudatel, harassment, arrest and detention. On several the national cell phone carrier. occasions, authorities denied opposition parties permits for rallies and forums, including at the The government recently introduced a policy to parties’ own headquarters (Freedom House 2016). privatise state-owned companies, but only a few privatisations have occurred thus far, and the Absence of rule of law companies were often given to those close to the Since independence in 1956, Sudan has not been government, further reinforcing the existing crony able to create an institutional arrangement and a capitalist system (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). governing process that guarantees the rule of law Freedom House (2015) also reports that the (Mukum Mbaku 2015). In other words, the country president’s brothers, Ali and Abdellah Hassan al- has not yet transitioned from a personal-based Bashir, are major shareholders of High Tech, a regime into an impersonal one. This means that the business group with shares in 23 companies country’s laws and institutions have failed to working in such sectors as petroleum, petro- adequately constrain civil servants and political chemicals, engineering, cement, railways and elites, who often behave with impunity and engage telecommunications. in corrupt activities. Moreover, “law has been used as an instrument for ideological or political Excessive administrative burden purposes, as a means of control and repression” Several studies have shown that there is a strong and as an instrument to legitimise and entrench association between bureaucracy and corruption. (Oette and Abdel-Salam Babiker 2016). This is mostly attributed to the fact that excessive regulation increases administrative discretion thus In addition, many government policies during most generating opportunities for corruption (Mungiu- of the post-independence period have been viewed Pippidi 2013). by several groups as repressive and discriminatory and interpreted as attempts to push these groups According to figures provided by the World Bank’s to the economic and political periphery. This, in Ease of Doing Business Survey, administrative turn, has helped fuel armed conflict against the burden in Sudan ranks among the worst in the national government (Mukum Mbaku 2015). world and has worsened over the years. Starting a business, for example, takes 36 days and 10 Close ties between business and politics procedures, and can cost around 25% of the In countries where patronage and cronyism are business owner’s income. Paying taxes is another defining features of the governance regime, complicated process which requires making 42 government officials often hold stakes in private payments per year and an investment of 180 hours. enterprises. This can distort market competition to While these figures are not uncommon in sub- the advantage of politically connected firms (Faccio Saharan African countries, they still lag 2006). In Sudan, politics and business go hand in international best practices and provide incentives hand. According to the US Department of State’s to pay bribes to “speed up” processes.

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

2. Corruption by sector online within a timeframe consistent with international standards. This section illustrates how corruption, in its different forms and shapes, is present across many As a result, the country only scores 10 points out of sectors of the economy and can be considered a a possible 100 in the latest edition of the Open normal occurrence. Budget Index, a decrease from the 2015 survey. Since that assessment, Sudan has published the pre-budget statement in a timely manner, but Extractive industries produced the enacted budget and the year-end The lack of transparency and accountability in the report for internal use only (International Budget extractive sector generates a very high risk of Partnership 2016). corruption and political interference (GAN Integrity 2016), and corruption has been reported all along This lack of transparency and information allows for the production chain, including volume, reporting, a discretionary administration of the public finances reserves, entitlements of foreign companies, as and makes it difficult for anti-corruption watchdogs well as allocations to producing states and and for other branches of government, such as the distribution companies (Sudan Democracy First legislature of the auditor general, to scrutinise how 2016). money is spent. A high proportion of the national budget is spent on unspecified national security In 2009, for example, Global Witness, published an priorities (Freedom House 2016), and rather than analysis of Sudan’s oil figures and showed using public money to provide public services, the discrepancies between the figures of the Sudanese state treasury has become a tool for the executive government and those released by the Chinese to remain in power. Most of the spending is used to National Petroleum Corporation (Global Witness pay relatively good wages to state-level 2009). The report said there were discrepancies bureaucrats to keep them onside or is transferred ranging from 9% to 26% between 2005 and 2007. to the local governments of areas where al-Bashir’s regime needs the most support, i.e. Khartoum and Even after losing around two-thirds of its known oil Gezira state (Cockett 2016). reserves and three-quarters of its oil revenues in 2011, following the secession of South Sudan, the After the secession of South Sudan and despite the allegations of corruption in the sector continue. In resulting economic shocks, such as the dramatic 2014, for example, the auditor general accused the fall in oil revenues, central government transfers to Ministry of Finance and the Sudanese Oil these states increased by 8%. Despite the IMF’s Foundation of spending raw oil revenues to repay advice to cut such transfers, Bashir’s government a Chinese loan for the Khartoum refinery without refused to do so as these allocations had become keeping accounts. Furthermore, he revealed “a part of the economic and social policies designed mismatch in the oil accounts in the period 1996- to keep the regime in place and guarantee the 2012, pointing to an amount of US$628 billion that loyalty of the armed forces (Cockett 2016). Against was classified as ‘operating expenses’” (Dabanga this background, the relatively frequent news on 2014). leakages and embezzlement of public funds should come as no surprise. There have also been reports stating that more than 60% of oil companies operating in Sudan engage in tax evasion and that less than a quarter Courts and the judicial system of the total oil revenues get deposited in the public While the judiciary is institutionally differentiated, it treasury (Dabanga 2014). The ICC has also is largely controlled by the executive, thus confirmed that President al-Bashir has a fortune of compromising its independence. Recruitment up to US$9 billion kept in foreign accounts, which processes are determined by acceptability to the he has skimmed from his country’s oil income regime and at times by systems of nepotism (GAN (Simons 2011). Integrity 2016). Court rulings are unlikely to be objective, especially when it comes to politically Public financial management sensitive or high-level cases (US Department of The lack of access to budgetary data perfectly State 2015a). exemplifies the opacity under which the government of Sudan often operates. According to With the introduction of Shariah law, Islamic the International Budget Partnership, only one of institutions partly replaced universities and eight key budget documents are made available colleges in the provision of legal training, which

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

resulted in new judges who are less well-trained salaries and a lack of strong disciplinary and and often accused of hurried, corrupt and arbitrary monitoring mechanisms (Sudan Democracy First justice (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). Group 2016d). One of the most common ways for the traffic police to extort bribes, for example, is the Inefficiency in the courts is a challenge for foreign abuse of the on-the-spot fines. These fines allow investors. Enforcing a contract takes an average of officers to issue fines for traffic violations ranging 810 days, which is more than the sub-Saharan between US$8 and US$16 dollars. The practice African average of 653 days (World Bank 2016). In was supposed to help relieve the number of cases Darfur, judges are reportedly often absent, thereby that end up in court, thus relieving the courts from delaying trials, and in rural areas judicial institutions an additional burden. However, police officers often are less accessible (US Department of State use the fines for their personal benefit and ask 2015c). Judgements of foreign courts are not violators for bribes to forgo such fines (GAN always respected (US Department of State 2015a). Integrity 2016).

In general, while lower courts provide some due Corruption among the police and other security process safeguards, the higher courts are subject forces, however, goes beyond bribery. Sudanese to political control, and special security and military government officials and high-ranking police courts do not apply accepted legal standards. As officials often have vested interests in state-owned an example of the political nature of the courts, enterprises, making them susceptible to corrupt Farouk Abu Issa, head of the opposition alliance practices (US Department of State 2015a). National Consensus Forces (NCF), and Amin Moreover, officials in the police, military or the Mekki Medani, President of the Confederation of NISS often have their own private enterprises, Civil Society, were arrested on 6 December 2014 which receive favourable treatment from the after returning from Ethiopia and charged with government (US Department of State 2015a). terrorism, undermining the constitutional system and waging war against the state, all punishable by It is worth mentioning that the 2010 National death. On 9 April 2015, they were released after a Security Act gave the NISS sweeping authority to decision by the justice minister under Article 58/1 seize property, conduct surveillance, search of the criminal code, which gives him the right to premises, and detain suspects for up to four and a freeze the lawsuit against defendants. half months without judicial review. The police and security forces, however, routinely exceed these Given the level of state capture, judges’ autonomy broad powers, carrying out arbitrary arrests and to interpret the law is occasionally restricted, holding people at secret locations without access especially when the issue involves certain powerful to lawyers or family members. Human rights people. Further, the judicial system is biased groups accuse the NISS of systematically detaining against the opposition. In many cases, members of and torturing government opponents (Freedom opposition parties are detained and arrested simply House 2016). for expressing their political views and participating in public forums. In other words, sentences are inappropriate and based on politics, with judges Health routinely subject to political incentives. A third of the GCB respondents who claimed having had contact with public hospitals also had to pay a bribe (Transparency International 2016). Police and security forces According to a report from Sudan Democracy First Corruption is widespread in the police and security Group (2016c), people are required to pay bribes forces in the country. Petty bribery is perhaps its to get on to a waiting list for surgery. Given the high most frequent form. According to Transparency number of patients, the waiting period can take International’s 2016 Global Corruption Barometer months, hence patients’ families can seek (GCB), 42% of surveyed citizens perceive the backdoor openings to move their family members police to be corrupt, and more than one in three to the top of the list. The most common technique respondents (37%) who had contact with the police is to bribe the medical staff in charge of the surgery had to pay a bribe (Transparency International waiting list. 2016). Hospital staff members also require additional pay Police bribery is a well-known issue in the country, to perform their tasks, and if no payment is offered, and it has been attributed to the combination of low the patient will not only get bad and slow medical

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

services but will also have to put up with the • extensive state powers and non-transparent employee’s negative attitude while interacting with procedures for the allocation and privatisation of that patient and the members of his/her family. A public land well-known example is when midwives demand the Bushara, a fee required to inform the family of the The prime motivation to engage in corrupt practices gender and health of their newborn. Cleaning staff in the land governance sector at a national level is can also demand a tip to keep a patient’s room profit and personal gain through the extraction of clean, and wards request Ikramiya (a gratuity) to bribes and access to profits from land sales. Land allow visitors to visit their sick relatives, especially is also often used as an asset for patronage to after the set visiting hours (Sudan Democracy First consolidate political power and influence (Sudan Group 2016c). Senior medical specialists often Democracy First Group 2016b). also refrain from seeing patients and have them referred to their private clinics where they can Of particular concern is the risk of corruption charge considerable consultation fees. associated with larger-scale investments, agricultural development corridors and their supply Because of the widespread practice of bribery and chains, whereby investors, including national and other corrupt dealings, the access to the public local elites, can override the rights and interests of healthcare system does not live up to the standards less powerful land users. of justice, fairness and equality. Instead nepotism, bribes and favouritism prevail and access to Corruption has been shown to be extensive in: healthcare is a luxury for those who can afford it. processes of delivery and development of urban land for commercial and residential purposes; in processes of land acquisition from customary Land use and agriculture authorities; use of land revenues by customary Sudan's land holds great agricultural potential, but authorities; and in the capture of land titling the accelerated land acquisition by foreign programmes by national and local elites (Sudan investors is problematic for local farmers who find Democracy First Group 2016b). their land rights disregarded (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). In recent years, corruption in land The main actors in land corruption are public governance in the country has come under greater officials and, in some cases, customary leaders, scrutiny due to the increased commercial value of often operating together with land professionals agricultural and urban land. and commercial developers. Politicians and high- ranking public officials are key actors in cases of There are concerns that corruption plays a role in grand, systematic and political corruption. facilitating large-scale land acquisition by investors. In 2014, allegations of illegal land sales Although allegations of corruption are extremely effected an investigation to determine whether sensitive and hard to prove, the principal public land was sold at a comparatively cheap price conclusion is that corruption is most evident at the to ineligible owners with government connections, higher level of the investment chain, associated but the investigative committee was accused of with deal-making in establishing partnerships, joint being biased and of failing to suggest legal ventures, land acquisition and project planning with recourse to hold those responsible in the illegal concession holders and project managers. This is sales (GAN Integrity 2016). supported by investment finance originating higher

up the chain, with a governance system that According to a report by Sudan Democracy First favours those belonging or connected with the Group (2016b), enablers of corruption in the land political establishment as a prime enabler of and agricultural sector include: corrupt practice (Sudan Democracy First Group 2016b). • the prevalence of discretionary power within land administration • the role of parallel institutions for land Local governments management Power structures officially function on a federal • the overlapping formal and customary basis, but the national government is clearly the institutions and the partial or non-recognition in centre of power while states are often inadequately law of established customary rights resourced and perform limited functions (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). This does not mean,

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

however, that corruption does not happen at the usually not investigated and go unpunished (Global state or local level. Integrity 2016).

In 2015, for example, the auditor general released There are also some mechanisms in place to try a report revealing a series of embezzlements and and prevent conflict of interest. The Interim financial irregularities regarding public funds in El National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan Gedaref state. The report states that US$4.5 (2005) prohibits the president, vice-presidents, million had been embezzled, and that there are ministers and “other constitutional office holders” to further financial irregularities surrounding the use “practice any private profession, transact of another US$1.7 million (Dabanga 2017). Most of commercial business, receive compensation or the money embezzled was taken from the accept employment of any kind other than … the ministries of finance and health. Government” (Art. 75-2). All executive and legislative constitutional office holders, justices, and senior civil service officials are also required by 3. Legal and institutional anti- the constitution to present declarations of their corruption frameworks “assets and liabilities including those of their spouses and children” (Art. 75-1). This obligation is Even though Sudan ratified the United Nations also incorporated in the Sudanese Anti-unlawful Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and Enrichment and Suspect Act (Art. 9). Financial signed the African Union Convention on Preventing asset disclosures, however, are not public and and Combating Corruption, its legislative anti- there are no mechanisms in place to force senior corruption framework is not very comprehensive members of the civil service to comply with this (GAN Integrity 2016). and shows major gaps in obligation (Global Integrity 2016). terms of sanctions. The US State Department also reports a lack of criminal penalties aggravated by The government passed a freedom of information weak enforcement. law in January 2015 to promote greater transparency. However, the law is not publicly When discussing the legal framework of a country available and its content was only outlined during a like Sudan, however, it is important to keep in mind parliamentary hearing (Baitarian 2015). It is known that a legal approach to fight corruption is unlikely that the law has 12 exceptions under which to deliver results. As mentioned before, corruption information will remain classified. These include in Sudan is a defining feature of the country’s personal records and information on national governance regime: the country has not managed security, foreign policy and criminal procedures, to transition from what Mungiu-Pippidi (2015a) calls but it remains unclear how the information will be particularism (a system where the treatment of categorised, Moreover, the executive branch of citizens depends on some particular relationship government will be able to control access to and is based on favouritism) to universalism (a information as the president will have the right to system where everyone is treated equally on the appoint a minister to oversee access to information basis of public integrity and impersonal requests (Baitarian 2015). The government will administrative behaviour). also be allowed to impose fees for each inquiry and individuals will be subject to penalties under other With these limitations in mind, the following laws if they request certain types of classified sections outline the most relevant pieces of anti- information, such as information that the corruption legislation in the country as well as the government could decide is a threat to national main institutions empowered to keep corruption in security (Global Integrity 2016). For these reasons, check. local and international human rights observers and journalists remain sceptical that the law will significantly improve access to information. Legal framework The Sudanese Criminal Act (1991) criminalises a According to the Financial Action Task Force number of corruption-related offences such as (FATF), Sudan has made significant progress active and passive bribery (Art. 88), extortion (Art. addressing strategic deficiencies identified in its 176) and “criminal breach of trust” (Art. 177), which legal framework against money laundering and covers embezzlement and other wrongdoings for terrorism financing (AML/CFT) (FATF 2015). In personal enrichment regarding any public property. June 2014, the country adopted the Money Officials suspected of corruption, however, are Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act (MLFTA),

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Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

which criminalises AML/CFT and also establishes were spent by diplomatic missions abroad and (see US Department of State 2015): were not accounted for (Dabanga 2014). The discovery of the embezzlement, however, did not • adequate procedures for identifying and lead to any action taken against the ministries freezing terrorist assets (Global integrity 2016). The auditor general’s • a fully operational and effectively functioning chamber has issued reports on embezzlement by financial intelligence unit other public officials, but little or no action has been • an effective supervisory programme for taken (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). AML/CFT compliance • customer due diligence measures The judiciary • laws and procedures regarding international An independent and well-functioning judiciary is cooperation and mutual legal assistance essential to good governance and anti-corruption efforts (Gloppen 2014; ACJP 2012). For this There is a public procurement law, which demands reason, the judiciary must be granted sufficient that major public procurement projects go through funds to properly perform its functions and keep it a competitive bidding process and covers conflicts from becoming vulnerable to outside pressures and of interest for procurement officials. However, it is corruption. The Sudanese Constitution states in frequently disregarded in practice (GAM Integrity Article 123(2) that "the National Judiciary shall be 2016). There is also no protection for whistle- independent of the legislature and the Executive, blowers in Sudan. Journalists and citizens who with the necessary financial and administrative report corruption cases can face arrest. For this independence." In practice, however, only the reason, many of them refrain from doing so. lower courts provide some due process safeguards as the higher courts are often subject to political Institutional framework control (Freedom House 2016). Moreover, executive power prevails over judicial power Anti-corruption agency (Global Integrity 2016). The executive has, for example, the right to appoint justices and dismiss In January 2012, Sudanese President Omar justices, and Article 129(1) of the constitution Hassan al-Bashir ordered the establishment of an states that the president "shall establish a anti-corruption commission to “monitor and follow commission to be known as the National Judicial what is being published in the media about Service Commission to undertake the overall corruption and to coordinate with the presidency of management of the National Judiciary”. the Republic and other competent authorities in the ministry of justice and the national assembly to Since the introduction of Islamic law post-1989, complete information on what is being raised about government management of the legal system as a corruption at the state level” (Sudan Tribune 2015). whole has increased. Islamic institutions took over The head of the agency was removed by the from existing universities and colleges in the president only a year after his appointment for not provision of legal training along the lines of Islamic finding evidence of corruption and no replacement law, and older judges were retired or not replaced was appointed. Since then, the agency remains (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). The result was a shift non-functional and, as a result, there is no official, in the court system as many of the new judges were independent body to fight corruption (Global less well-trained and were often accused of Integrity 2016). hurried, corrupt and arbitrary justice. They were almost always loyal to the NCP. Appointment and Auditor general promotion in the judicial system is widely seen as Although the auditor general chamber’s reflecting political acceptability to the regime, as independence is guaranteed by law, in practice it is well as on occasion being the result of kinship and subject to political interference and lacks the ethnic links (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). resources to fulfil its mandate. While the auditor general is expected to make reports publicly Ombudsman available, the government usually does not act on The Public Grievances Chamber of the Republic of its findings and recommendations. In 2014, for Sudan is the country’s equivalent to an example, Auditor General El Tahir Abdel, the ombudsman. This office was set up as an Sudanese auditor general, reported that US$58.4 independent body mandated to consider million had been stolen from the Ministry of Budget complaints related to grievances suffered by in the 2013-2014 period and that US$3.8 million citizens in relation to state institutions after all other

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means of litigation had been exhausted food security programme for several months until it (International Monetary Fund 2013). There is little agreed to collaborate with a local organisation information available on the funding and structure selected by the state government (US Department of this office, and its main website was unavailable of State 2015c). at the time of the research, which made it impossible to look into its latest reports and Moreover, CSOs are frequently harassed if they activities. Older reports by Global Integrity and are not openly “Islamic” and approved by the other sources, however, point out that the government (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). Student ombudsman office was poorly staffed and protest movements have been broken up on underfunded and that its reports were often out- several occasions, while the most widespread dated or unavailable to the public. urban unrest in over 50 years of independence was violently repressed in 2013 with an estimated 200 Other anti-corruption watchdogs deaths. Many anti-corruption scholars have recognised Independent organisations with a political agenda that the civil associations, political participation and face increasing difficulties: As mentioned earlier, in the media all serve to empower collective action on December 2014, NISS arrested members of the behalf of society, thus rendering it better equipped opposition following their return from Addis Ababa to solve common problems such as corruption. where they had been invited by the African Union’s Moreover, both press freedom and the strength of High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). The civil society in a country have been proven to have government has also established its own “civil a positive statistical relationship with the control of society groups”, which are essentially government corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). This section organised non-governmental organisations. considers the state of these two variables in Sudan. Independent groups, such as human rights Civil society organisations, have often been harassed. Cooperation is difficult among groups that are in The interim national constitution and law provide any way critical of government, though some have for freedom of association, but the government has increasingly tried to make a common cause. severely restricted this right over the past years and, as a result, the space for civil society is The media shrinking. According to the US Department of State As mentioned previously, the government has (2015c), the government has closed civil society increasingly attempted to control and interfere with organisations (CSOs) or refused to register them the media´s work: editions have been seized on several occasions. Government and security before publication (security officials regularly forces continued arbitrarily to enforce provisions of monitor the presses), papers have been the NGO law, including measures that strictly temporarily closed or fined when they are too regulate an organisation’s ability to receive foreign critical of the government. financing and register public activities. (US Department of State 2015c). Some of the Defamation in Sudan can also be prosecuted as measures include: either a criminal offence or a civil matter, and even though there have been few high-profile criminal • a requirement to register annually defamation cases against journalists in recent • advanced approval before receiving any foreign years, this is mostly because authorities more often funding respond to critical reporting with other measures, • obstruction of permits for public assembly, including arbitrary detention and suspension of especially following the demonstrations of 2013 outlets. Journalists are also being frequently • penalties and fines if actions are judged as arrested and held in prison without sound reason showing opposition to the government and, as a result, many engage in self-censorship

(Freedom House 2016). Under the government’s “Sudanization” policy, many organisations reported they faced As mentioned earlier, the 2009 Press and administrative difficulties if they refused to have Publications Act allows for restrictions to the press pro-government groups implement their in the interests of national security and public order, programmes at state level. In Blue Nile, for contains loosely defined provisions related to bans example, state authorities prevented one on the encouragement of ethnic and religious humanitarian organisation from implementing a disturbances and the incitement of violence, and

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holds editors in chief criminally liable for all content governance context rather than an exceptional published in their newspapers. There are also other behaviour (see Johnson 2016a, Mungiu-Pippidi laws that are commonly used against the press, et al. 2011). Scholars agree that improving the including elements of the 1991 penal code, the legal framework, increasing sanctions or 2010 National Security Forces Act, and emergency creating new specialized anti-corruption measures that have been enacted in the restive institutions in a highly corrupt environment, is regions of Darfur and Kordofan (Freedom House unlikely to generate the desired results because 2016). these strategies focus only on one side of the drivers of corruption and are often inspired in The National Telecommunications Corporation strategies taken from found in economically (NTC) closely monitors the internet (Global developed and stable environments (Mungiu- Integrity 2016) and blocks websites that are Pippidi 2015). deemed to violate the norms of public morality. The NISS is reportedly capable of blocking websites on • Use of inappropriate anti-corruption national security grounds and has a “cyber-jihadist” strategies for fragile states: Closely related to unit proactively monitoring social media and other the previous point, different contexts require online platforms to spread misinformation, different anti-corruption strategies. Policy manipulate discussions and collect information on frameworks cannot be simply transposed from critical writers (Freedom House 2016). News non-corrupt, stable environments to corrupt and websites also suffer persistent cyberattacks that fragile states, but aid agencies often promote activists attribute to the authorities. In 2015, for the same good-governance reforms in fragile example, at least three news outlets reported states that they use elsewhere. They continue, cyberattacks ahead of national elections (Freedom for example, to focus on petty and bureaucratic House 2016). corruption and working with governments when they should be focusing on political corruption and supporting civil society (Johnson 2016) and 4. Anti-corruption entry points for the media (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). highly corrupt environments • Fighting corruption is not only a technical As portrayed in the previous sections, corruption is challenge: As illustrated throughout this a widespread issue in Sudan and has clear effects document, politics and corruption in Sudan are on the country’s economy and politics, but also on deeply entangled. For this reason, politics its citizens’ every-day lives. The academic should not be considered as an exogenous literature shows, however, that despite big variable by aid agencies and international amounts of money being invested into anti- organisations willing to engage in developing corruption programmes by aid agencies and countries or fragile states (Marquette 2011). A international organizations, progress in the fight successful anti-corruption programme in such a against corruption is often negligible (see Johnson context needs to consider politics to identify 2016 and Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011). Mungiu- potential entry points and local partners, i.e. the Pippidi (2016), for example, manages to identify groups that are expected to win/lose from only six countries that around the world that have fighting against corruption. Fighting systemic managed to overcome systemic corruption and corruption requires a broad basis of successfully establish a regime characterized by participation to succeed and it is highly good governance over the past 30 years. This unrealistic to expect this to happen over a short group of “achievers” includes Estonia and Georgia interval of time and with non-political in Eastern Europe; Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay instruments. Broad national coalitions are thus in Latin America; Botswana in Africa; and South necessary and the main role of the international Korea and Taiwan in East Asia. This lack of community is to support them to grow and progress has been attributed to a number of become powerful (Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011). factors, including: Good governance programmes could, for example, entrust audits, controls and reviews to • Misconceptions of how corruption operates those groups who are losing from the existing in developing countries and fragile states: corrupt arrangements and so draw on natural aid agencies are often ill-equipped to combat competition to fight favouritism and undue corruption in an environment such as Sudan’s, privilege (Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011). where corruption is a defining feature of the

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• Organizational barriers: Several scholars reduces the likelihood that the transition will have pointed out that anti-corruption and good succeed. governance programmes are often ineffective because of the ways in which aid agencies There is also growing consensus among scholars operate (see Johnson 2016 and Marquette that development programming has to change to 2011). Some of the main obstacles include: obtain better results in anti-corruption. A growing inadequate human and financial resources, body of evidence suggests that “development rigid procedures, disbursement pressures, risk programming that is politically savvy, ‘works with aversion, and perverse organizational the grain’ of local political economy conditions and incentives for prioritizing programs with high is led locally (rather than led by donors) is more spending-to-staff ratios (Johnson 2016). likely to be effective than its opposite: aid that is insensitive or ignorant of the local political context; • Lack of donor coordination: To maximize that imposes an external model, whether it fits or impact, donors need to join forces for an not; and that fights against the grain of the local anticorruption long-term strategy which covers political economy, whatever the motivation for all the elements of a balance and avoid both doing so” (Marquette 2016 and Khan 2010). overlaps and oversights. Coordination is needed to allow specialization, with some As a result, over the past 20 years, the governance donors taking over digitalization, others civil agenda has actively attempted to integrate what society development, others freedom of the the OECD (2009) defines as political economy press, rule of law or simplification of trade rules. analysis (PEA), i.e. the study of “political and The simple adoption of indispensable economic processes in a society: the distribution of transparency tools- fiscal transparency, power and wealth between different groups and financial disclosures, property transparency and registration require alignment and local individuals, and the processes that create, sustain coalitions cutting across state and society to and transform these relationships over time.” cooperate with donors (Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2017 forthcoming). However, despite the fact that nearly all donor agencies now have dedicated staff working on Given the challenges outlined above, fighting PEA, efforts to mainstream such approaches have corruption in fragile environments might seem like encountered several obstacles, including “stiff an impossible task. There is, however, academic opposition” within donor agencies, as well as work pointing at strategies that could help improve administrative hurdles, institutional constraints and the current efforts. Huther and Shah (2000: 12 ), for cultural inertia (Jenkins 2016). Evaluations of DFID example, recommend to start fighting corruption in highly corrupt environments with weak governance and World Bank programmes have argued that the by focusing on “establishing the Rule of Law, use of political economy analysis remains a “largely strengthen institutions of participation and intellectual agenda rooted in the governance silo” accountability and limit government interventions (Yanguas & Hulme 2014). to focus on core mandate”. Critics also allege that PEA is too often a one-off Establishing Rule of Law, however, is not an easy exercise and its findings and recommendations task and scholars have only recently started to become subordinated to the broader programmatic explore this issue. In their paper “Microfoundations logic (Yanguas & Hulme 2014; Halloran 2014). of the Rule of Law”, Hadfield and Weingast (2014) They further contend that existing ways of working, claim that introducing rule of law into an existing society requires the transition from one such as the widespread employment of logical coordination equilibrium to another. frameworks, generally foster rigid and linear programme structures unsuited to the changing Since the existing system provides certain benefits, environment which a programme invariably however, people may resist change, especially if experiences over its lifecycle (Algoso & Hudson they are uncertain about either the behaviour of 2016). In this view, the failure of PEA to overcome others or whether the new system will work as existing working practices typical of major donor promised. This uncertainty reduces the benefits of agencies has hamstrung PEA’s potential to behaving according to the new rules and therefore improve programme success rates (Carothers and de Gramont 2013).

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5. References Dabanga. 2014. “Sudan’s Auditor General Reports ‘Corrupt Figures’”, Dabanga (17 Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2012. Why December 2014). Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all- Poverty. New York: Crown Publishers. news/article/sudan-s-auditor-general-reports- corrupt-figures African Centre for Justice and Peace. 2012. The Judiciary in Sudan: Its Role in the Protection of Dabanga. 2017. “Considerable Embezzlement, Human Rights During the Comprehensive Peace Irregularities in Sudan’s El Gedaref state’: Auditor- Agreement Interim Period. General”. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all- http://www.acjps.org/wp- news/article/considerable-embezzlement- content/uploads/2012/04/The-Judiciary-in- irregularities-in-sudan-s-el-gedaref-state-auditor- Sudan.pdf general

Algoso, D. and Hudson, A. 2016. Where Have We Dahl, R.A. 2000. On Democracy. New Haven: Got to on Adaptive Learning, Thinking and Yale University Press. Working Politically, Doing Development Different Etc.? Getting beyond the People’s Front of Judea. Della Porta, V. and A. Vannucci. 1999. Corrupt Oxfam Blogs. Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption. New York: Aldine de Alt, J.E and D. Lassen. 2008. “Political and Gruyter Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments”. Economics and Department of State. 2015a. “Sudan Investment Politics 20. Climate Statement 2015” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24 Baitarian, L. 2015. “Sudan passes freedom of 4666.pdf information law, but journalists remain wary”, Committee to Protect Journalists, Department of State. 2015b. https://cpj.org/blog/2015/02/sudan-passes- “Countries/Jurisdictions of primary concern: freedom-of-information-law-but-journa.php Sudan”, 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2016. “BTI 2016: Sudan https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/supplem Country Report”. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. ental/239312.htm http://www.bti- project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/ Department of State. 2015c. “Sudan 2015 Human 2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Sudan.pdf Rights Report”. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/25 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. 2016. 2945.pdf “Sudan” in Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Human Rights Under Siege: Human Faccio, M. 2006. “Politically Connected Firms” Rights in the Arab Region Annual Report 2016. The American Economic Review 96(1). http://www.cihrs.org/AR6/English/07.pdf Financial Action Task Force. 2015. “Improving Carothers, C. & de Gramont, D. 2013. The Almost Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process – Revolution: Development aid confronts politics, 26 June 2015”. http://www.fatf- Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment. gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon- cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf- Cockett, R. 2016. Sudan: The Failure and Division compliance-june-2015.html - Sudan of an African State, New Haven: Yale University Press. Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2011. “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments,” American Economic Review 101. http://eml.berkeley.edu/~ffinan/Finan_Termlimits.p df

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Freedom House. 2016. “Freedom in the World: Huther, J. and A. Shah. 2000. “Anti-corruption Sudan”. Policies and Programs: A framework for https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- Evaluation” Policy Research Working Paper 2501. world/2016/sudan Washington DC: World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVA Freedom House. 2016b. “Freedom of the Press” NTCOR/Resources/AntiCorruptionPoliciesandPro https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- grams.pdf press/2016/sudan International Budget Partnership. 2016. “Sudan Fund for Peace. 2016. “Fragile State Index 2016” Open Budget Survey”. Washington DC: Fund for Peace. http://www.internationalbudget.org/opening- http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesi budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget- ndex-2016.pdf survey/country-info/?country=sd

GAN Integrity. 2016. “Sudan Corruption Report”, International Council on Human Rights. 2009. GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal. “Corruption and Human Rights: Making the http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country- Connection”, Geneva: International Council on profiles/sudan Human Rights. http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/40/131_web.pdf Global Humanitarian Assistance. 2011. “Resource Flows to Sudan”, United Kingdom: Global International Criminal Court. 2009. “First Warrant Humanitarian Assistance. of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”. http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp- https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir# content/uploads/2011/07/gha-Sudan-aid- factsheet-2011-South-Sudan-focus1.pdf International Criminal Court. 2010. “Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Global Witness. 2009. “Fuelling Mistrust: The Bashir”. Need for Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Sector”. https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir# London: Global Witness. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/fuelling- International Crisis Group. 2011. “Divisions in mistrust-need-transparency-sudans-oil-industry/ Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country’s Future Stability”. Africa Report 174. Global Witness. 2011. “Crude Calculations: The https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/174- Continued Lack of Transparency over Oil in divisions-in-sudan-s-ruling-party-and-the-threat-to- Sudan”. London: Global Witness. the%20country-s-stability.pdf https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Crude20 Calculations_0.pdf International Monetary Fund. 2013. “Sudan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” IMF Gloppen, S. 2014. “Courts, Corruption and Country Report 13/318. Judicial Independence” in Soreide, T. and A. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13 Williams. 2014. Corruption, Grabbing and 318.pdf Development: Real World Challenges, Northampton: Edward Elgars Publishing. Jenkins, M. 2016. “Thinking and working politically https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5091-courts- in donor-funded anti-corruption programmes” U4 corruption-and-judicial-independence.pdf Expert Answer. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Hadfield, G.K and B.R. Weingast. 2014. Johnson, J. 2016. Anti-Corruption Strategies in “Microfoundations of the Rule of Law”, Annual Fragile States. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Review of Political Science 17(21), Publishing. http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/ann urev-polisci-100711-135226 Kaufmann, D. and P.C. Vicente. 2011. “Legal Corruption” Economics and Politics 23(2).

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Khan, M.H. 2010. “Political Settlements and the Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and R. Martinez B. Governance of Growth- Enhancing Institutions”. Kukutschka. 2013. “European Union Member http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/1/Political_Settleme States” in The Anti-Corruption Report vol. I: nts_internet.pdf Controlling Corruption in Europe. Opladen: Barbara Budrich. Lindner, S.. 2014. “Resources on Money http://anticorrp.eu/wp- Laundering in Sudan and on the BNP Paribas content/uploads/2013/09/EU-Member-States- Case” Anti-Corruption Helpdesk. Berlin: Chapter-21.pdf Transparency International. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2015. The Quest for Good Marquette, H. 2011. “Donors, State Building and Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption: lessons from Afghanistan and the Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University implications for aid policy” Third World Quarterly Press. 32(10). Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2015a. “Public Integrity and Marquette, H. 2016. “Tackling corruption: Why we Trust in Europe”. Berlin: European Research need to do things differently” Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committe http://www.eupan.eu/files/repository/20160202135 eevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international- 959_2016-01-21_- development-committee/tackling-corruption- _Public_integrity_and_trust_in_Europe_-_final.pdf overseas/written/30710.html Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2016. “Learning from Virtuous Martini, M. 2012. “Corruption and Anticorruption in Circles” Journal of Democracy 27(1). Sudan”. U4 Expert Answer 342. Bergen: Chr. http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/fil Michelsen Institute. es/Mungiu-pippidi-27-1.pdf http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptio nqas/342_Corruption_and_anti- Mungiu-Pippidi, A., R. Dadasov and S.N Alrado. corruption_in_Sudan.pdf 2017 forthcoming. “Fixing the Balance: The Roadmap to evidence-based control of corruption” Mdulu, N. and M. Grieco (ed.) 2010. Failed and Berlin: European Research Centre for Anti- Failing States: The Challenges to African Corruption and State-Building. Reconstruction. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. OECD. 2009. Donor Approaches to Governance Assessments: 2009 Sourcebook. Paris: OECD Mukum Mbaku. 2015. Sudan: Elections 2015, Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa- Oette, L. and M. Abdel-Salam Babiker. 2014. “The in-focus/2015/04/01/sudan-election-2015/ Rule of Law and Human Rights in Sudan: Challenges and Prospects for Reforms”. Sudan Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2006. “Corruption: Diagnosis Democracy First Group Institutional Reform and Treatment”, Journal of Democracy 17(3). Series 2. http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/corrupti http://www.democracyfirstgroup.org/News/Rule%2 on-diagnosis-and-treatment 0of%20Law%20and%20Human%20Rights%20E NGLISH_FINAL.pdf Mungiu-Pippidi, A., M. Loncaric, B. Vaz Mondo, et al. 2011. Contextual Choices in Fighting Persson, A., B. Rothstein and J. Teorell. 2013. Corruption: Lessons Learned. Oslo: NORAD. “Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail – Systemic https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publicat Corruption as a Collective Action Problem” ions/2011/contextual-choices-in-fighting- Governance 26(3). corruption-lessons-learned/ http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468- 0491.2012.01604.x/epdf

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Sidon, B. 2016. “Sudan: A country report based Transparency International. 2016. “People and on data 1900-2014” V-Dem Country Report Series Corruption: Middle East and North Africa Survey 10. 2016”. Berlin: Transparency International. https://www.v- http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication dem.net/media/filer_public/5f/53/5f530c38-7043- /people_and_corruption_mena_survey_2016 4e69-9ae0-327606f0a03b/cr010_sudan.pdf Transparency International. 2017. “Corruption Simons, M. 2011. “Prosecutor Confirms Perceptions Index 2016” Berlin: Transparency Accusation Against Sudan Leader” The New York International. Times. http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/world/africa/0 /corruption_perceptions_index_2016 2wikisudan.html World Bank. 2016. Doing Business 2017: Equal Sudan Democracy First Group. 2016a. “Pursuing Opportunity for All. Washington DC: The World Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Industry”, Sudan Bank. Transparency Initiative Series. http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/Doin http://www.democracyfirstgroup.org/wp- gBusiness/Documents/Annual- content/uploads/2016/01/Pursuing-Transparency- Reports/English/DB17-Report.pdf in-Sudan-Oil-Industry.pdf Yanguas, P. and Hulme, D. 2014. Can Aid Sudan Democracy First Group. 2016b. “Land Use, Bureaucracies Think Politically? the Ownership and Allocation in Sudan: The Administrative Challenges of Political Economy Challenge of Corruption and Lack of Analysis (PEA) in DFID and the World Bank, ESIF Transparency”. Sudan Transparency Initiative Working Paper 33. Series. http://www.effective-states.org/working-paper-33/ http://www.democracyfirstgroup.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/10/Land-Use-Ownership- and-Allocation-in-Sudan.pdf

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