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2.6

Sudan and South

Sudan and , which together over eligibility to participate in its referendum. host nearly one-third of the UN’s total global In response to the violence and in the context troop deployment, experienced profound and of an agreement by the parties on temporary dramatic changes in 2011 and remain among arrangements for the security and administra- the most challenging theaters for UN peace tion of , the Security Council authorized operations. In 2011 an increasingly complex deployment of the UN Interim Security Force and diverse architecture for UN operations for Abyei (UNISFA) in June 2011. emerged, involving three separate peacekeep- There has also been a deterioration of ing missions and numerous political processes. conditions in areas of the north covered by The secession of Sudan’s southern region the CPA—the Southern Kordofan State and as the Republic of South Sudan is a historical the Blue Nile State—with the eruption of se- and structural political transformation with vere hostilities between the Sudan Armed significant implications for UN peace opera- Forces (SAF) and northern units of the Sudan tions. The January 2011 referendum proceeded People’s Liberation Army that may portend a peacefully, with substantial operational sup- return to protracted civil conflict. Coinciding port from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with the conclusion of the UNMIS mandate, with southerners voting overwhelmingly for this outbreak of violence presented serious - independence. South Sudan’s procession to independence on 9 July 2011 was marked by notable political compromise and restraint by both and and concerted third- party engagement from the African Union, the UN, and key members of the international community. South Sudan’s independence UNMIS prompted the closure of UNMIS and the au- HQ 03/2005 - 07/2011 thorization of a new peace operation, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). EL GEZIRA While the implementation period for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) came to a close in July 2011, key provisions Ed Damazin from the CPA have yet to be implemented, most importantly those concerning the rela- tionship and borders between north and south. Negotiations failed to reach agreement on the referendum for the status of the Abyei area, border demarcation, oil revenue sharing, and citizenship issues. Abyei in particular remained a hotly contested flashpoint, witnessing re- newed hostilities and ongoing disagreement

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Sudan and South Sudan led to large-scale dis- UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) placement and further raised concern about the possibility of a return to conflict. With much attention drawn to north- • Authorization and 24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590) south developments, the eight-year-old con- Start Date •SRSG Haile Menkerios (South Africa) flict in Darfur continued without significant • Force Commander Major-General Moses Bisong Obi progress. In some areas, intensification of (Nigeria) hostilities between rebels and the government •ActingPolice KlausDieter-Tietz(Germany) of Sudan caused civilian displacement and Commissioner deterioration of security and humanitarian • Budget $137.5 million conditions. The UN-AU Hybrid Mission in (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) Darfur (UNAMID) has struggled with its man- •Strengthasof Troops:8,572 date to improve the security situation and pro- 31October2011 Police:409 tect civilians. AU- and UN-led negotiations International Civilian Staff: 90 on Darfur, though they did result in the bro- National Civilian Staff: 507 kering of an accord between the government UN Volunteers: 12 of Sudan and one rebel coalition, continued Note: In accordance with S/RES/1996 of 8 July 2011, the appropriate func- to face opposition from other rebel groups tions of UNMIS were transferred to UNMISS effective 9 July 2011. The 2011–2012 budget reflects proposed costs for the liquidation of UNMIS. and erratic engagement from the government Figures for troops and police as of 31 July 2011. and the international community. For detailed mission information see p. 287 Progress on outstanding post-independence issues and resolution of the ongoing tensions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states will require intensive international engagement, from the UN, the AU, and other key stake- UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) holders. In addition, maintaining the internal cohesion of the two states will be a central •Authorization Date 8 July 2011 (UNSC Res. 1996) challenge for UN peace operations in 2012, • Start Date 9 July 2011 as state authority is weak and violently con- •SRSG Hilde Johnson (Norway) tested in a number of areas. • Force Commander Major-General Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria) • Budget $738.3 million Background (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) •Strengthasof Troops:4,920 The 2005 CPA ended the decades-long con- 31 October 2011 Military Observers: 182 flict between the government of Sudan and the Police: 382 Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement International Civilian Staff: 697 (SPLA/SPLM). On 24 March 2005, Security National Civilian Staff: 1,117 Council Resolution 1590 mandated UNMIS UN Volunteers: 212 as a fully fledged mission fo- For detailed mission information see p. 287 cused on supporting implementation of the CPA. Its responsibilities included monitoring and verification of troop redeployments, in- humanitarian and political challenges, while vestigating CPA violations and providing good also compounding the problems faced in re- offices for the resolution of disputes arising solving north-south issues. The November from CPA implementation, and supporting bombing of a refugee camp in South Sudan, elections and referendums. UNMIS’s mandate reportedly by SAF, led to further deterioration also included coordination of humanitarian in the relationship between the neighboring assistance, promotion of human rights, and states. Direct clashes in December between protection of civilians. 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 71

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The CPA interim period ended on 9 July 2011, which also brought an end to the UNMIS mandate. At its conclusion, UNMIS had deployed personnel across the whole of southern Sudan and in the CPA areas of Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan State through a system involving sectoral head- quarters and numerous remote sites. Despite the persistence of important unresolved CPA issues and the onset of violent conflict, the government of Sudan indicated that it would not consent to an extension of the UNMIS mandate beyond 9 July 2011. UNAMID was mandated in July 2007 to help provide security for humanitarian assis- tance and protect any civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence. UN Photo/Tim McKulla The mission was also called on to monitor Citizens celebrate in the streets as the Republic of South Sudan compliance with cease-fire agreements, inves- proclaims its independence, 9 July 2011. tigate human rights abuses, and assist with implementation of the 2006 Darfur Agreement and any subsequent peace accords. After a no- was a significant achievement. Considerable tably delayed deployment, UNAMID neared technical and operational support was under- full strength through 2010. taken by the UN Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED), which brought together elections staff from UNMIS and the Key Developments UN Development Programme (UNDP) into one team. UNIRED worked in partnership Referendum and Conclusion with the Southern Sudan Referendum Com- of the Interim CPA Period mission to overcome the daunting logistical On 9 January 2011, six years to the day after challenges of conducting the vote across the CPA came into effect, southerners went to South Sudan—with its vast and inaccessible the polls for the referendum on independence. terrain, extremely limited infrastructure, and The official results, announced on 7 February, sparsely distributed population. The mission showed that over 98 percent of voters had provided transportation and procurement of opted for separation. The UN Secretary-Gen- all referendum-related materials,2 assisted in eral’s panel on the referendum, established in a the design of operational plans for conducting monitoring capacity, found that the referen- voter registration and polling, and provided dum reflected the free will of the people of referendum-related security training for the South Sudan and that the process was free, police forces of both South Sudan and Sudan. fair, and credible. National and international The conclusion of the CPA interim period observers, including the Carter Center and the marked a transformation in the framework for European Union Observer Mission,1 publicly UN and international engagement in regard to concurred with these findings. The results the peaceful resolution of issues between the were immediately accepted by the National north and the south. Secession created a new Congress Party (NCP) and were later endorsed state, with previously internal issues now ex- by the national legislature. isting between two sovereign nations. Given the inherent risks in the referendum The AU has hosted the post-CPA negotia- process and delayed preparations, the outcome tions, with the AU High-Level Implementation 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 72

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Box 2.6 Safety and Security

Staff of peacekeeping missions regularly system in reducing the risks that UN which requires states “to take all appro- operate in highly volatile and insecure personnel face in the field. The UN bases priate measures to ensure the safety and environments, risking injury, harassment, its security approach on a “how to stay” security” of these personnel. The chal- abduction, civil unrest, terrorism, and principle aimed at finding ways to keep lenge of addressing this significant gap conflict. While these risks are present in personnel safe and secure during their in the provision of safety and security all peacekeeping contexts, they are par- engagements. for peacekeepers was brought into sharp ticularly acute in the least-secure environ- In January 2011 the UN introduced focus in 2011 in Sudan, where in August ments, including Afghanistan, Somalia, a new security system, based on objec- three peacekeepers serving with the and Sudan. In Afghanistan, the ten-year tive threat assessment, to assist missions UN Interim Security Force for Abyei international operation suffered its dead- in identifying the most acute threats and (UNISFA) died after the government of liest month ever in August 2011, with 66 possible options for mitigation. The UN Sudan threatened to shoot down a heli- peacekeeping fatalities; between January has also extended security training to copter dispatched for their evacuation and September, over 300 troops were nationally recruited staff and introduced after their patrol was hit by a landmine.2 killed.1 As of October, UN peacekeeping a new security policy manual. It has While the Sudanese government denies as a whole suffered 91 fatalities in 2011, also established an executive group on any interference, the incident fits a pat- with significant losses in Côte d’Ivoire security to advise and support the Under- tern of previous action on its part to and Sudan. Secretary-General for Safety and Security. limit peacekeeping activity, and violates Recognizing these risks, the UN has Despite these advancements, it is the status of forces agreement between made a number of improvements in its ultimately the host governments that the UN and the government of Sudan. approach to ensuring the safety and se- bear the primary responsibility for the The incident also underscores the signif- curity of personnel. In 2005 it estab- security of UN personnel. To date, only icant risks for UN personnel operating in lished the Department of Safety and Se- 89 of the UN’s 193 member states have these insecure and volatile environments. curity, which is mandated to lead and signed the Convention on the Safety of oversee the UN’s security management and Associated Personnel,

Notes: 1. “August Was ‘Deadliest Month’ for US in Afghan War,” BBC News, 30 August 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada- 14720918. 2. UN News Centre, “Sudan Delayed Evacuation Flight for Wounded Peacekeepers,” 4 August 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=39235&Cr=Abyei&Cr1.

Panel managing talks between the CPA par- including the sharing of oil revenues (the ma- ties. This process has received significant jority of revenues come from oil fields in the support from the government of , south) and access to oil pipelines and refiner- UNMIS leadership, and key AU member ies (located in the north). On 18 September states. UNMIS Special Representative to the 2011, Sudan and South Sudan did reach agree- Secretary-General (SRSG) Haile Menkerios ment on the opening of ten border-crossing was appointed as the Secretary-General’s Spe- points during the first meeting of the Joint cial Envoy on Sudan and South Sudan in July Political and Security Mechanism, which is 2011 to continue political engagement after designed to strengthen cooperation between the conclusion of the UNMIS mandate. the two countries. The Abyei dispute (addressed in detail The issue of citizenship also remains to later) is just one of many pending post- be settled. Khartoum has taken the line that independence issues on the agenda for nego- all those eligible to vote in the southern ref- tiations between Sudan and South Sudan. erendum automatically became citizens of There are also other contested areas along the South Sudan at the succession of the south. north-south border that must be negotiated This has created uncertainty among the 1–2 before border demarcation can take place, million individuals from the south living in and pending issues on financial arrangements, the north. It is estimated that since August 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 73

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2010 approximately 150,000 southerners have determining the actual SPLA presence in left the north for the south. Many are now de- Southern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State. pendent on aid, due to the limited infrastruc- The future of northern contingents of the SPLA ture and economic opportunities at their places was also taken up in the AU-managed post- of arrival in the south. CPA negotiations on security arrangements. Relations between the two states deterio- UNMIS supported and monitored prepa- rated in November when Sudanese armed rations for the Popular Consultations, a CPA- forces reportedly bombed two locations in mandated mechanism designed to provide cit- South Sudan, including a refugee camp in izens of the two states with the opportunity to Yida, which hosts more than 20,000 individu- express their views on the implementation of als fleeing fighting in the north. Sudan has the CPA and deliver recommendations that denied the charges, but the incident raised would rectify any shortcomings in the consti- tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, tutional, political, administrative, and eco- with each accusing the other of supporting in- nomic arrangements of the agreement. In Blue surgent groups in its territory. The UN and Nile State, the mission provided logistical and the AU urged restraint from both parties. How- material assistance and a series of preparatory ever, following the bombings, direct fighting workshops in support of public hearings that between Sudan and South Sudan erupted in took place in January and February in 108 the disputed Jau border region, leading South centers across the state, during which 69,429 Sudan’s foreign minister to warn that the two people expressed their opinions on implemen- states were on the brink of war. tation of the agreement. In Southern Kordofan, Equally crucial to peace and stability will preparations for the Popular Consultations were be the internal cohesion and dynamics within delayed in order to hold the state elections. the two new states. Sudan is host to the lin- After a one-year delay, the Southern Kor- gering eight-year-old insurgency in Darfur dofan elections were held in May 2011. and the recently erupted conflicts with the UNMIS provided technical and logistical northern contingents of the SPLA in Southern support and voter education training and ma- Kordofan State and Blue Nile State. Simi- terials. The elections pitted previous partners larly, South Sudan experiences regular and ex- in the state power-sharing government, Ahmed tremely violent intercommunal and factional Haroun from the NCP and Abdul Aziz al-Hilu conflicts, which has led the UN to report that from the SPLM, against each other in an en- the main political driver of conflict in post- vironment of heightened tensions. Voting took CPA South Sudan will be internal tensions.3 place without incident between 2 and 4 May 2011. UNMIS SRSG Menkerios met with both Continued Conflict in the North: candidates and urged the eventual winner to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States form an inclusive government to avoid a For the first half of 2011, UNMIS maintained winner-take-all situation that could exacer- its support for implementation of the CPA in bate tensions. Southern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State, However, prior to the national electoral with particular focus on the organization of the commission’s announcement that Haroun had Popular Consultations, the Southern Kordofan won by a narrow margin, the SPLM declared State elections, and the security arrangements that it was withdrawing and would not recog- for SPLA troops from the two states. The nize the outcome. Post-election pronounce- mission provided continued support to the re- ments that the government of Sudan intended deployment of SPLA forces from above the to forcibly disarm SPLA soldiers in Blue Nile north-south border into the south. At the and Southern Kordofan further increased ten- March meeting of the Cease-Fire Political sions. Amid mutual accusations, fighting be- Commission, the mission agreed to concen- tween the two forces broke out in Southern trate its monitoring and verification efforts on Kordofan’s capital, Kadugli, in June and 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 74

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quickly spread across the state. Widespread Charter to protect civilians under imminent fighting, including the use of aerial bombard- threat of violence and to deter violence through ment, led to large-scale displacement and se- proactive deployments and patrols, particularly rious abuses against the civilian population. when the government is not providing such Khartoum alleges that the SPLM continues to security. support SPLM-North, further contributing to While UNMIS was largely guided in its north-south tensions. priorities by the provisions and timeline of the With the NCP and the SPLM’s northern CPA, the new mission is centered on support- faction failing to reach an agreement to halt ing the new government and the institutional fighting in Southern Kordofan, hostilities consolidation of the new state. The mission’s spread to Blue Nile in September. Fighting activities are focused on enhancing national ca- between government and SPLA forces broke pacities to meet political, security, and protec- out in the state capital and again quickly tion challenges in a way that helps the govern- spread across the state. At the same time, ment extend its authority and create the space UNMIS was in the position of commencing for statebuilding and socioeconomic develop- liquidation and withdrawal as these conflicts ment. UNMISS has no executive governing au- broke out around it. The end of the mission’s thority or direct responsibilities for establishing mandate and the absence of a negotiated the institutions of the state. Rather, the mission cease-fire or settlement meant that the UN is tasked with supporting and advising the gov- and other stakeholders had limited opportuni- ernment of South Sudan and providing techni- ties to engage in peacemaking activities. The cal advice on various processes. withdrawal also cast serious doubt over the One significant change from UNMIS to future of the remaining CPA provisions in UNMISS is the structure and approach to these areas, with some observers warning of a mission deployments. No longer designed to return to wide-scale civil war. monitor the redeployment of CPA forces, UNMISS pursues a more flexible approach, Establishment of UNMISS deploying military contingents and civilian Security Council Resolution 1996 established experts based on the needs of local security UNMISS on 9 July 2011 for an initial period and guided by detailed conflict tracking and of one year at an authorized strength of 7,000 early warning mechanisms. To do so, the mis- troops and 900 police. UNMISS inherited sion is restructuring its deployment toward the infrastructure, assets, and personnel from the state level and critical payams (counties). UNMIS, enabling the mission to deploy quickly. For instance, in late August 2011, after inter- Broadly, UNMISS is charged with consolidat- communal fighting in the state of Jonglei re- ing peace and security and helping to establish sulted in the deaths of approximately 600 the conditions necessary for development in people, UNMISS deployed troops to sensitive the Republic of South Sudan. The logic of the locations and conducted roaming patrols and mission’s mandate is peace consolidation surveillance flights to deter further violence. through state consolidation. As such, UNMISS Civilian experts were also deployed to politi- is tasked with providing good offices, advice, cally engage local leaders and communities and and support on political transition; capacity provide good offices for reconciliation efforts. building of key government institutions, in- Although the main emphasis of the mission cluding security sector reform; popular and in- is political, coordination and partnership with clusive participation in political processes; and the UN Country Team, nongovernmental organ- the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of izations, and donors will be vital given the local conflicts. breadth of needs evident in South Sudan, partic- Like its predecessor, UNMISS is author- ularly since South Sudan may have only a short ized to use force under Chapter VII of the UN window to establish itself as a successful state. 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 75

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Political and Security Developments in South Sudan UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) The security challenges facing South Sudan are daunting. There are frequent and severe • Authorization and 27 June 2011 (UNSC Res. 1990) conflicts among heavily armed tribal groups Start Date and between the SPLA and breakaway fac- • Force Commander Lieutenant-General tions. In the first half of 2011, insecurity re- Tadesse Werede Tesfay (Ethiopia) sulted in more than 116,000 internally dis- • Budget $180.7 million placed persons in the southern region. (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) Rivalry and mistrust between communities is •Strengthasof Troops:2,812 high. As the year came to a close, violence 31 October 2011 Military Observers: 80 again erupted between feuding ethnic groups Police: 2 in , with UNMISS warning that International Civilian Staff: 20 thousands of armed men were moving to- For detailed mission information see p. 262 ward Pibor. The movements prompted UN- MISS to deploy a battalion of troops to deter violence and protect civilians, though rapid deployment was hampered by a lack of heli- “right-sizing” the force through the demobili- copters to transport troops. zation of an estimated 150,000 SPLA mem- Largely reliant on international aid for bers, including 70,000 soldiers and 80,000 service provision during the war, rural areas police, prison officers, and other security ac- outside of state capitals are out of reach of the tors, as well as through professionalization. authority and institutions of the government. The capacities of the South Sudan Police Having achieved independence, South Sudan Service (SSPS) are improving, but they remain now faces the challenge of building a state inadequate to secure public safety and police and a sense of citizenship among its people international borders. UNMISS will intensify and communities. An important step was taken efforts initiated by UNMIS to develop the se- in August when President Salva Kiir announced curity and justice sector and coordinate donor the appointment of the first governmental cab- support. Mission police contingents and civil- inet of South Sudan, a geographically repre- ian expert advisers will be co-located with the sentative group comprising twenty-nine min- SSPS at the state and payam level. isters, of whom 30 percent are female. The strongest and most visible of South Abyei Sudan’s institutions, the SPLA, plays the cen- The contested resource-rich region of Abyei tral role in providing security. Seen in some remains the most combustible unresolved areas of the south as a partisan force, it is issue of the CPA and, to date, the most intract- very often deeply integrated into local politi- able. The CPA stipulated that the residents of cal power structures. It has on occasion ob- Abyei would vote in their own referendum, to structed or hindered humanitarian access and be held at the same time as the larger south- has committed transgressions against the civil- ern referendum, to determine whether to se- ian population during security operations. It cede with the south or remain in the north. is also extremely bloated from the integration Abyei’s political weight is disproportionate to of large numbers of opposition militias dur- its geographical size and economic value. It ing the CPA period. One of the immediate— looms large in the calculations of the two par- and most politically sensitive—priorities fac- ties to the CPA, as both have important and ing the mission is supporting the government relatively powerful constituencies connected in transforming the SPLA from a rebel group to the area, constituencies whom neither side into a national army. This transition includes wants to disappoint. 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 76

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After the two parties failed to agree on the UNISFA is further mandated to partici- modalities for the Abyei referendum, the area pate in relevant Abyei area bodies established witnessed a buildup of regular and irregular under the agreement.5 Acting under Chapter forces, and a deterioration of security, through VII, UNISFA is also authorized to ensure the the first months of 2011. This culminated in security and freedom of movement of UN an outbreak of intense fighting between the and humanitarian personnel and of members SAF and the SPLA in May 2011, which dis- of the joint observer teams, protect civilians, placed an estimated 100,000 Abyei residents and protect Abyei from incursions. As in southward and resulted in SAF forces taking previous instances of fighting between the over the town of Abyei and surrounding area. CPA parties, the fighting in Abyei was pre- The UNMIS contingent in Abyei faced criti- cipitated by the unregulated proximity and in- cism for inaction; perceiving themselves to teraction between the two hostile forces. be outmanned and outgunned, the peacekeep- Thus, UNISFA’s ability to uphold its mandate ers were unwilling to intercede forcefully be- to protect the Abyei area from unauthorized tween the fighting parties.4 incursions will be an important factor in de- In response to the situation in Abyei, the escalating tensions between the two countries. AU facilitated high-level meetings in Addis In a further agreement between the Su- Ababa between the CPA parties, which were danese government and the SPLM on border attended by President Omar al-Bashir and security, signed in June, the parties have then–first vice president Salva Kiir. On 20 agreed to establish a ten-kilometer demilitarized June the government of Sudan and the SPLM border zone, pending resolution of disputed signed an agreement on interim security and areas and final border demarcation. This agree- administrative arrangements for Abyei. The ment also requested UNISFA to provide sup- agreement called for the establishment of a port for a joint border-monitoring verification civilian administration for the Abyei area, mechanism, and in December the UN Security though the parties have yet to agree on a chair- Council expanded UNISFA’s mandate to in- person. The agreement also called for the clude support for border verification through deployment of a new armored brigade from investigations, monitoring, arbitrations, patrols, the Ethiopian Defense Force and an Ethio- and security. The enhanced mandate expands pian force commander. Based on the agree- the mission’s area of operations and tasks ment, Security Council Resolution 1990 es- UNISFA to work with Sudan and South Sudan tablished UNISFA. to further develop bilateral border manage- The agreement also called for both the ment initiatives. SAF and the SPLA to withdraw troops from As of November, 2,872 of an authorized the Abyei area. Accordingly, monitoring and 4,250 UNISFA troops had arrived in the verifying the withdrawal is one of the pri- Abyei area. Despite logistical difficulties mary tasks for the new mission. To date, caused by the rainy season and denials of however, full withdrawal has not taken place. flight clearance, the mission’s deployment has In September, the government of Sudan and been one of the fastest on record. the SPLM agreed to withdraw their troops While UNISFA may prove effective at from the border by the end of the month, maintaining security and stability in the in- though Khartoum subsequently denied the terim, the parties have still not reached a final agreement, maintaining that it would not re- settlement on the future of Abyei and negoti- deploy troops until the 20 June agreement ations are ongoing. was implemented, including the establishment of the Abyei administration. South Sudan Darfur maintains that it will fully withdraw at the In Darfur, despite the efforts of UNAMID same time as Sudan. and the AU- and UN-led mediation, progress 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 77

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toward improved security and a comprehen- UN member states over the effectiveness and sive resolution to the conflict proved elusive feasibility of such a strategy remains ongoing. in 2011. A resurgence of fighting between The Doha negotiations were dealt a fur- rebel groups and government forces in some ther blow in September with the return of top areas displaced an estimated 70,000 people in rebel leader Khalil Ibrahim from Libya after early 2011. Throughout the year, UNAMID the fall of the Qaddafi regime. Ibrahim led military and civilian staff, as well as humani- the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), tarian aid workers, have been the target of the region’s most heavily armed rebel group. attacks, ambushes, kidnappings, car-jackings, In November, the JEM joined the Sudan Lib- and violent robberies. With much attention eration Army and the SPLM-North in South- and engagement drawn to north-south devel- ern Kordofan State and Blue Nile State in a opments, and given the discord among UN political and military alliance, the Sudanese and AU member states over the best way to Revolutionary Front, uniting the groups to proceed in Darfur, various efforts and initia- overthrow the government of Sudan. How- tives failed to gain traction. ever, just weeks after JEM joined the alliance, The AU- and UN-led negotiations for Ibrahim was killed in an airstrike, which may Darfur in Doha succeeded in the brokering of prove to be a major setback for rebel move- an accord between the government and the ments in the region. Liberation and Justice Movement in July In December, the International Criminal 2011, but opposition from other rebel groups Court prosecutor announced that he would continued. Efforts are ongoing to bring other seek an arrest warrant for Sudan’s current de- groups into the so-called Doha Agreement, fense minister, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, but the continued fractiousness of the rebel for his part in atrocities committed in Darfur in groups and erratic engagement from the gov- 2003 and 2004. The impact on the government ernment of Sudan render the prospects for a of Sudan and the conflict in Darfur are unclear, comprehensive and credible agreement ex- tremely challenging. Efforts to shape the negotiations were pur- sued by the AU-UN mediation team and sup- ported on the ground in Darfur by UNAMID. UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) The mission implemented a series of consulta- tions with a large number of stakeholders and •Authorization Date 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) facilitated civil society participation in Doha at • Start Date Implement mandated tasks no later than a number of conferences aimed at forging con- 31 December 2007 sensus on key issues of the conflict. • Joint AU/UN Special Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) UNAMID has also been engaging the Representative government of Sudan politically so that certain • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba unilateral measures can be taken in an effort (Rwanda) to improve the situation on the ground. Such • Police Commissioner James Oppong-Boanuh (Ghana) • Budget $1,689.3 million improvements, including lifting the state of (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) emergency, are intended to create an enabling •Strengthasof Troops:17,723 environment for an AU-conceived approach 31 October 2011 Military Observers: 239 to localizing the peace process. This process Police: 4,920 is intended to empower the people of Darfur International Civilian Staff: 1,124 while limiting the role of rebel groups, who National Civilian Staff: 2,904 are often viewed as obstructionist. However, UN Volunteers: 481 these attempts have not yielded any improve- For detailed mission information see p. 225 ments to date, and the discord among AU and 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 78

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but this could prove to further destabilize the Africa, hardening economic conditions stimu- already precarious environment. lated street protests in Khartoum in Septem- ber. The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, though it removed an interventionist and Conclusion often-destabilizing factor from Sudanese pol- Enormous change took place in Sudan in 2011, itics, could also exacerbate an already fragile and the consequences for regional stability and situation. the implications for peace operations are not Sudan and South Sudan will remain ex- yet fully clear. Ongoing political processes tremely challenging environments for peace- and negotiations are certain to impact and keeping operations in 2012, with multiple make further demands upon UN operations. missions pursuing numerous priorities. While Another important factor for the future will allowing for flexibility and responsiveness in be regional dynamics. Although for months achieving peace and stability, this approach Sudan appeared insulated from the popular also heightens the risk of strategic and oper- protests sweeping the Middle East and North ational incoherence.

Notes 1. Carter Center, “Carter Center Finds Sudanese Referendum Peaceful and Credible,” 17 January 2011, http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-011711.html; European Union, Final Report: Southern Sudan Referendum, Election Observation Mission, 9–15 January 2011, http://www.eueom.eu/files/press releases/english/final-report-eueom-referendum-south-sudan-2011_en.pdf. 2. Referendum-related materials included 7.5 million ballot papers, 8,500 ballot booths, 4,300 voter registration kits, and 600 registration training kits. 3. United Nations, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, UN Doc. S/2011/314, 17 May 2011. 4. “Exclusive: UN Probes Absences Amid Sudan Clashes,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2011/06/04/us-sudan-abyei-un-idUSTRE7531WF20110604. 5. The agreement calls for a joint oversight committee and a joint military observer committee to be stationed in Abyei, comprising an equal number of members and observers from the two parties. The agreement also calls for a power-sharing administration and a police force for the Abyei area; details for the latter are to be determined by the joint oversight committee.