Konkola News 53
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Load more
Recommended publications
-
Situation Report Last Updated: 9 Dec 2020
ZAMBIA Situation Report Last updated: 9 Dec 2020 HIGHLIGHTS (9 Dec 2020) The Ministry of Health has confirmed 17,916 COVID- 19 cases and 364 deaths as of 7 December. The number of districts reporting COVID-19 infections had increased from 68 in September to 96, as of 30 November. Education partners report that 16 per cent of nearly 39,000 learners in Eastern and Southern provinces have dropped a reading level during COVID-19 school closures.. The food security situation remains of major concern, Community sensitization on COVID-19 in Chawama Market amid a infestation of the African Migratory Locusts in in Lusaka. Photo: ©UNICEF/Mulikita 14 districts across Central, Southern and Western provinces. Nearly 2 million people are facing severe food insecurity between October 2020 and March 2021, despite increased crop production in most areas. KEY FIGURES FUNDING CONTACTS Laura Hastings 10.1M 6.2M $132.9M $66.2M Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Zambia people in need people targeted requested (May-Oct received [email protected] 2020) Guiomar Pau Sole 27 Head of Communications & Information partners operational 51.7% Management, Regional Office for funded Southern & Eastern Africa [email protected] INTERACTIVE (29 Oct 2020) Emergency Appeal Financial Tracking https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/zambia/ Page 1 of 15 Downloaded: 9 Dec 2020 ZAMBIA Situation Report Last updated: 9 Dec 2020 View this interactive graphic: https://bit.ly/ZambiaAppealFunding BACKGROUND (9 Dec 2020) Situation Overview Since the first case of COVID-19 on 18 March 2020, the Ministry of Health (MOH) has confirmed over 17,916 cases with 364 deaths (case fatality rate of 2 per cent) as of 7 December 2020. -
Information Bulletin – 2016 Annual Meetings
Welcome to the 51st Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the African Development Bank and the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the African Development Fund 23rd MAY – 27th May, 2016 LUSAKA, REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA INFORMATION BULLETIN TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION _________________________________________________________________ 3 BEFORE ARRIVAL IN ZAMBIA ___________________________________________________ 3 PRE-REGISTRATION ____________________________________________________________ 4 TRAVEL TO AND FROM ZAMBIA _________________________________________________ 5 Reception at Kenneth Kaunda International Airport (KKIA) _______________________________ 5 Visa requirements ____________________________________________________________________ 5 HEALTH TRAVEL ADVISORY TO ZAMBIA _________________________________________ 9 Medical Insurance ____________________________________________________________________ 9 Malaria _______________________________________________________________________________ 9 Ebola ________________________________________________________________________________ 9 Yellow Fever _________________________________________________________________________ 9 Emergency Services __________________________________________________________________ 9 Importation of Drugs _________________________________________________________________ 10 CUSTOMS FORMALITIES _______________________________________________________ 11 HOTEL ACCOMMODATION IN ZAMBIA __________________________________________ 11 ANNUAL MEETINGS INFORMATION -
Intra-Party Democracy in the Zambian Polity1
John Bwalya, Owen B. Sichone: REFRACTORY FRONTIER: INTRA-PARTY … REFRACTORY FRONTIER: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN THE ZAMBIAN POLITY1 John Bwalya Owen B. Sichone Abstract: Despite the important role that intra-party democracy plays in democratic consolidation, particularly in third-wave democracies, it has not received as much attention as inter-party democracy. Based on the Zambian polity, this article uses the concept of selectocracy to explain why, to a large extent, intra-party democracy has remained a refractory frontier. Two traits of intra-party democracy are examined: leadership transitions at party president-level and the selection of political party members for key leadership positions. The present study of four political parties: United National Independence Party (UNIP), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), United Party for National Development (UPND) and Patriotic Front (PF) demonstrates that the iron law of oligarchy predominates leadership transitions and selection. Within this milieu, intertwined but fluid factors, inimical to democratic consolidation but underpinning selectocracy, are explained. Keywords: Intra-party Democracy, Leadership Transition, Ethnicity, Selectocracy, Third Wave Democracies Introduction Although there is a general consensus that political parties are essential to liberal democracy (Teorell 1999; Matlosa 2007; Randall 2007; Omotola 2010; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller 2015), they often failed to live up to the expected democratic values such as sustaining intra-party democracy (Rakner and Svasånd 2013). As a result, some scholars have noted that parties may therefore not necessarily be good for democratic consolidation because they promote private economic interests, which are inimical to democracy and state building (Aaron 1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments from the editorial staff and anonymous reviewers. -
Zambia Country Report BTI 2016
BTI 2016 | Zambia Country Report Status Index 1-10 5.70 # 61 of 129 Political Transformation 1-10 6.25 # 57 of 129 Economic Transformation 1-10 5.14 # 77 of 129 Management Index 1-10 5.19 # 58 of 129 scale score rank trend This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2016. It covers the period from 1 February 2013 to 31 January 2015. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 — Zambia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. BTI 2016 | Zambia 2 Key Indicators Population M 15.7 HDI 0.561 GDP p.c., PPP $ 3904.0 Pop. growth1 % p.a. 3.1 HDI rank of 187 141 Gini Index 55.6 Life expectancy years 58.1 UN Education Index 0.591 Poverty3 % 78.9 Urban population % 40.5 Gender inequality2 0.617 Aid per capita $ 74.9 Sources (as of October 2015): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2014. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $3.10 a day at 2011 international prices. Executive Summary Zambia remains one of the least developed countries in Africa, with 75% of the population living on less than $1.25 a day and a life expectancy of 57. -
Download File
Republic of Zambia Ministry of Gender Movers and Models for Change on Ending Child Marriage in Zambia National Advocacy and Communication Strategy on Ending Child Marriage in Zambia 2018-2021 Photo @UNICEF Zambia/2013 ACRONYMS. ... v FOREWORD . .. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . .. viii SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ......... 1 Ending child marriage in Zambia: Background and raonale . 1 Determinants of child marriage and teen pregnancy . 3 The communicaon landscape in Zambia . 4 Past and ongoing iniaves on ending child marriage . 4 Theorecal Frameworks . 4 Theory of Change for the Advocacy and Communicaon Strategy . 5 SECTION 2 – ADVOCACY AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FOR BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL CHANGE: “MODELS ON ENDING CHILD MARRIAGE IN ZAMBIA” .. ..... ..... .........7 Guiding principles of this strategy . 8 General objecve of advocacy and communicaon. 9 The advocacy strategy. 9 Advocacy objecves/outcomes . 10 Advocacy acvies and outputs from this strategy . 10 The communicaon strategy for behaviour and social change . 11 Specific communicaon objecves: expected behaviour and social change outcomes . 11 Seven themac areas for behaviour and social change . 12 Parcipant audience groups: stakeholders for ending child marriage . 18 Key messages . 19 Features of “Models for ECM” . 19 Branding . 19 Celebrang role models on ending child marriage . 20 Recognizing champions and role models for ECM . 20 Creang and sustaining a media blitz on ECM . 20 Edutainment (E-E) . 21 Community theatre and the -
Social Protection Policy Reform in Zambia During the Sata Presidency, 2011-2014
CENTRE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH Social protection policy reform in Zambia during the Sata presidency, 2011-2014 Hangala Siachiwena CSSR Working Paper No. 380 Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms June 2016 Published by the Centre for Social Science Research University of Cape Town 2016 http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za This Working Paper can be downloaded from: http://cssr.uct.ac.za/pub/wp/380/ ISBN: 978-1-77011-367-1 © Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, 2016 About the author: Hangala Siachiwena is a Research Assistant on the Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms (LIWPR) project at the CSSR, covering Zambia, Malawi and Namibia, and a PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cape Town. Acknowledgements: The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Prof Jeremy Seekings, who provided useful comments on various drafts. Thanks and appreciation also goes to the people interviewed in Zambia. This paper is a product of the “Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms” research project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Department for International Development (DfID) in the United Kingdom. Social protection policy reform in Zambia during the Sata presidency, 2011-2014 Abstract The election of Michael Sata and his Patriotic Front (PF) party in 2011 led to the expansion of social cash transfers (SCTs) in Zambia, with the state taking over primary financial responsibility from foreign aid donors. Public discontent towards the liberal (or neoliberal) economic policies of the former ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), resulted in the resonance of populist strategies in urban centres and increased support towards interventionist policies. -
Members of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council and National Assembly of Zambia, 1924-2021
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA Parliament Buildings P.O Box 31299 Lusaka www.parliament.gov.zm MEMBERS OF THE NORTHERN RHODESIA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ZAMBIA, 1924-2021 FIRST EDITION, 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................................ 3 PREFACE ..................................................................................................................................................... 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 5 ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 9 PART A: MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1924 - 1964 ............................................... 10 PRIME MINISTERS OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA .......................................................... 12 GOVERNORS OF NORTHERN RHODESIA AND PRESIDING OFFICERS OF THE LEGISTRATIVE COUNCIL (LEGICO) ............................................................................................... 13 SPEAKERS OF THE LEGISTRATIVE COUNCIL (LEGICO) - 1948 TO 1964 ................................. 16 DEPUTY SPEAKERS OF THE LEGICO 1948 TO 1964 .................................................................... -
Article in PDF Format
Nordic Journal of African Studies 10(2): 224-244 (2001) Colonial Legacy and the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991 BIZECK J. PHIRI University of Zambia, Zambia ABSTRACT This paper explores the origin, growth and demise of autocracy in post-independence Zambia from a macro-historical perspective. It is argued that the underlying dynamic, which gradually turned Zambia into a virtual autocracy after its independence in 1964, stems from its colonial past, although augmented by the Zambians themselves. It is shown how emerging hero- worship within the dominant United National Independence Party (UNIP) turned the country’s first president, with the support of the people, into an autocrat. In the 1980’s the autocracy started to seriously crumble in the face of food riots and rising unemployment resulting from a deepening economic depression. It is concluded that, despite the return to a multi-party state in 1991, there are strong indications that this newly found democracy is already being undermined by the same dynamic that led to autocracy in the first place. [Ed.] Keywords: autocracy, colonialism, United Independence Party INTRODUCTION The one-party state system of government in post-independence Zambia, and indeed elsewhere, was perceived as a form of dictatorship. Yet, scholars were merely content to comment on the shortcomings of this system of government. Its origins were generally explained away as part and parcel of the intransigence of political parties that assumed political power at independence. Little was said about the impact of the colonial past, and indeed, the role of society in influencing the political direction of post-independence Zambia. -
Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance Author(S): Pierre Englebert Reviewed Work(S): Source: Africa Spectrum, Vol
Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance Author(s): Pierre Englebert Reviewed work(s): Source: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2005), pp. 29-59 Published by: Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40175054 . Accessed: 26/09/2012 12:43 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Spectrum. http://www.jstor.org afrikaspectrum 39 (2005)1: 29 - 59 © 2005Institut fur Afrika-Kunde, Hamburg PierreEnglebert Compliance and defiance to national integration in Barotseland and Casamance1 Abstract What determines whether peripheralregions in Africacomply with the na- tional integration project? Why do some regional elites, outside the core „fusion of elites'7,willingly partakein the state while others promote sepa- rate paths for their communities?This paper suggests some answers, based on a comparisonbetween Barotseland- where the Lozi leadership has cho- sen not to challenge the Zambian project- and Casamance- where local particularismhas resulted in active separatist defiance towards the Sene- galese state among many Diola elites. It argues that the contrast between the two regions is more apparent than real, and that elites in both cases strive for access to the local benefits of sovereign statehood. -
The Case of Zambia
Working Paper no. 77 - Development as State-making - INCLUSIVE ELITE BARGAINS AND CIVIL WAR AVOIDANCE: THE CASE OF ZAMBIA Stefan Lindemann Crisis States Research Centre August 2010 Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2 ISSN 1749-1797 (print) ISSN 1749-1800 (online) Copyright © S. Lindemann, 2010 This document is an output from a research programme funded by UKaid from the Department for International Development. However, the views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID. 24 Crisis States Research Centre Inclusive elite bargains and civil war avoidance: The case of Zambia Stefan Lindemann Crisis States Research Centre Sub-Saharan Africa is commonly associated with images of violence and war. Such perceptions have spiralled since the early 1980s, greatly reinforced by Western journalists who have tended to paint the continent in gloomy terms (Marnham 1979; Lamb 1982; Harden 1990). More recently, Robert Kaplan (1994) described Africa as littered with tribalism, failed states and endemic civil war. Similarly, The Economist (May 13-19, 2000) decried a ‘hopeless continent’ where ‘wars rage from north to south and east to west’ and the ‘few candles of hope are flickering weakly’. Even respected Africanists such as Jean-Francois Bayart et al. (1999) or Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) seem to suggest that the entire continent is plagued by violent disorder and state breakdown. 40 35 30 25 20 15 Number of Civil Wars Civil of Number 10 5 0 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Europe Latin America Asia Africa Figure 1: Civil wars, 1954-19991 Source: Sambanis 2004a. -
Ficha País De Zambia
OFICINA DE INFORMACIÓN DIPLOMÁTICA FICHA PAÍS Zambia República de Zambia La Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación pone a disposición de los profesionales de los medios de comunicación y del público en general la presente ficha país. La información contenida en esta ficha país es pública y se ha extraído de diversos medios, no defendiendo posición política alguna ni de este Ministerio ni del Gobierno de España respecto del país sobre el que versa. ABRIL 2021 Forma de Estado: República presidencialista. Zambia División Administrativa: Zambia está organizada territorialmente en 10 pro- vincias: Central, Copperbelt, Este, Luapula, Lusaka, Muchinga, Norte, No- roeste, Sur y Oeste. Cada una de ellas cuenta con la figura de un viceminis- tro, que actúa como Gobernador. Nº residentes españoles: 31 (31/01/2021) Día Nacional: 24 de octubre. Mpulungu Año Independencia: 1964 (24 de octubre de 1964, fecha de su indepen- REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA TANZANIA dencia de Reino Unido). Kasama DEL CONGO Gentilicio : Zambiano, -na; zambianos, -nas (RAE). Lago 1.2. Geografía Kansanshi Malawi Mufulirá Kitwe Ndola La mayor parte de su superficie se encuentra en una llanura de entre 1.000 y ANGOLA MALAWI Kapiri Mposhi 1.500 m de altura respecto del nivel del mar, al que Zambia no tiene acceso. Kabwe El punto orográfico más elevado (2.200 m) son las Montañas Muchinga, en el MOZAMBIQUE Mongu LUSAKA este del país. Las Cataratas Victoria y el Río Zambeze comparten frontera con Zimbabue. 1.3. Indicadores sociales NAMIBIA ZIMBABUE BOTSUANA Densidad de población: 23,3 habitantes/km² (2020) © Ocina de Información Diplomática. -
The Principle 'One Zambia, One Nation': Fifty Years Later
The Principle ‘One Zambia, One Nation’: Fifty Years Later Lyubov Ya. Prokopenko Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow ABSTRACT In the first years of independence, United National Independence Par- ty (UNIP) and President of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda, realizing that Zambia as a young multi-ethnic state can develop only assuming nor- mal relations between its 73 ethnic groups, proclaimed the slogan ‘One Zambia is One People’ as the basic principle of nation-building. The formation of a young nation should also be facilitated by the in- troduction of the principle of regional and ethnic balancing – quotas for various ethnic groups for representation in government bodies. Under the conditions of political pluralism since 1991, power in Zam- bia was transferred peacefully, including after the victory of the oppo- sition in the elections in 2011. Zambia is often called a successful ex- ample of achieving ethno-political consolidation in a multi-ethnic Af- rican state, which can be regarded as a certain success in the for- mation of a national state. The new president Edgar Lungu re-elected in September 2016 declares that the policy of his government and of the PF party will be firmly based on the inviolability of the principle ‘One Zambia – One Nation’. INTRODUCTION On October 23, 2014, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Zam- bia's independence, the national bank issued a commemorative 50 kwacha banknote (for the first time as legal means of payment) which portrays all the presidents of Zambia: Kenneth Kaunda, Freder- ick Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa, Rupiah Banda and Michael Sata.