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The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services

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The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services Beyond Spy vs. Spy The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services Peter Mattis Introduction an important task for the US Intelli- gence Community, but clear under- Scholars of intelligence and com- standing of Chinese intelligence parative politics have tended to serves more than the CI mission. At overlook intelligence services as the core, analysis of Beijing’s intelli- bureaucratic organizations and as gence institutions is about trying to components of government informa- understand systematically how the tion-processing systems. As a conse- Chinese government uses informa- quence, conventionally trained Clear understanding of tion to inform its policy formula- “ analysts and most journalists tend to tion, guidance to diplomats and Chinese intelligence overlook the role of intelligence and security officials, and the execution serves more than the CI security services in extending and of its policies. mission. maintaining state power and interna- tional policy goals. Just as importantly, China’s civil- ian intelligence and security agen- In the case of China, the intense cies are empowered to arrest and to focus of writers on the ups and ” operate inside and outside China. downs of US-Chinese relations sel- The distinction between intelligence dom leads to efforts to more deeply and internal security policy is mini- understand China and the sources of mal, institutionally speaking. This its government’s behavior, and, in makes these services not just part of particular, the effects that Chinese a policy staff process but an integral intelligence services might have on tool for the preservation of the that behavior. Even when journal- power of the Chinese Communist ists and other commentators address Party (CCP).a 1 Yet, very little is the seemingly monthly appearance known about the organizations of new details of Chinese human themselves and their importance to and technical espionage, analysts China and its future.2 tend to focus on each incident as a bellwether of the US-Chinese rela- tionship or as a straightforward The Analytical Questions counterintelligence (CI) issue. The Chinese intelligence services Protecting the integrity of US (CIS) present three distinct analytic intelligence and policy processes is challenges critical to understanding a Beijing has consistently identified this goal as a “core interest” of China, indicating a willingness to use force if necessary. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern- ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 47 Analysis of Chinese Intelligence As Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the intelligence services. Fundamentals of Chinese Approaches Before addressing the analytic the future of China and US-Chinese Chinese foreign interests widen, Bei- questions, I will briefly address some relations. jing increasingly will call upon the misunderstandings of the nature of intelligence services to provide Chinese intelligence operations. The CIS and Domestic Political inputs to assessments of the inten- Many, perhaps most, US observers of Activists tions of states capable of harming Chinese intelligence have argued that First, insights into China’s politi- China’s interests abroad. cal future require analysis of the the Chinese think about and collect competition between domestic polit- Information Processing Systems intelligence in ways fundamentally ical activists and the security ser- The final challenge is evaluation of different from Western or even Rus- vices. A decade ago, China’s the Chinese intelligence commu- sian intelligence. security state appeared to be erod- nity’s information processing sys- In large measure this perception ing as modern communications tech- tems. The civilian ministries include stems from Chinese attempts to nology swept across the country. national, provincial, and local ele- acquire, legally and otherwise, West- Today, domestic intelligence agen- ments, which operate under compet- ern technology information to sup- cies have adapted to the Internet and ing horizontal and vertical lines of port Chinese modernization and mobile communications and are authority. The military intelligence economic priorities. These efforts capable of following electronic services under the General Staff have been equated with Chinese breadcrumbs left behind as people Department compose China’s only intelligence collection and have been move through China’s “informa- all-source intelligence capability, but labeled the “mosaic” or “grains of tized” (xinxihua) society. Whether the mechanics of intelligence fusion sand” approach. Chinese intelli- the current regime stays in power or in the People’s Liberation Army gence, it has been argued in this con- a political movement generates (PLA) are opaque. text, has four basic tenets: enough momentum for political How these agencies collect, pro- reform will depend on how effec- • Chinese intelligence focuses cess, and disseminate intelligence tively China’s internal security on ethnic Chinese as sources; forces perform their work. affects Chinese behavior, and, with the rise of cyberspace issues, the • It relies on amateur collectors Evolution of Chinese Intelligence volumes of information are poten- rather than professional intel- The second issue to be watched is tially staggering and difficult to ligence officers; the evolution of the Chinese intelli- manage. Knowing how this system gence community, particularly on works is a prerequisite to ensuring • It does not use intelligence the civilian side. Internally oriented US leaders can be certain US state- tradecraft familiar to West- security services tend to reinforce ments and acts are interpreted as ern services; the leadership’s worst fears about they were intended. potential adversaries, the United • It pursues high volumes of States in particular, 3 and China’s In this essay I will outline a low-grade (if not entirely civilian intelligence organizations research agenda on the Chinese unclassified) information. 4 both focus on internal security. intelligence services built around these three challenges, and I will This view falls down on both con- The degree to which Beijing suggest some of the factors that ceptual and empirical grounds. Con- resolves the issues of overlapping should underpin future analysis. ceptually, both US and Chinese jurisdictions—or, at least, insulates analysts describe intelligence in sim- ❖ ❖ ❖ the foreign intelligence function ilar terms—a specialized form of from internal security—will help knowledge for reducing uncertainty determine the tone and relative during decision making. Empiri- objectivity of foreign intelligence cally, the cases linked to the Chi- products reaching the leadership. As nese intelligence services—not 48 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) Analysis of Chinese Intelligence Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. simply the illegal activities of Chi- nese nationals or companies—dem- onstrate that professional Chinese intelligence officers use familiar with vulnerabilities familiar to any- nology collection are impor- tradecraft in formalized intelligence one who follows the subject. The use tant, whether the collection is relationships with their sources. of such tradecraft goes back to the linked to Chinese intelligence Additionally, cases are not limited to most famous early known cases, services or not. If “Chinese ethnic-Chinese whatever their Larry Wu-Tai Chin and Bernard intelligence” includes every- nationality.a 5 Boursicot (M. Butterfly). The for- thing from the intelligence mer began in the 1940s and latter in services to a corporation to a Chinese Doctrine the 1960s. criminal entrepreneur, then Chinese writings on intelligence the term becomes almost bear remarkable similarity to famil- Similar techniques have been meaningless.b iar US definitions of intelligence applied in more recent cases—Gregg functions and goals. Sun Tzu taught Bergersen, Chi Mak, James Fon- • A belief that the Chinese rely on that “foreknowledge” (xianzhi) dren, and Tai-Shen Kuo. These amateur operatives risks leading allowed commanders to outmaneu- revolved around a single Chinese CI professionals to dismiss or be ver opponents. More modern defini- intelligence officer, and possibly a inattentive to the threat posed by tions range from “activating second. 8 Each of these sources was China’s professional services.9 [catalytic] knowledge” (jihuo zhi- paid for sensitive information and all shi) to information to protect were aware of an intelligence rela- • When economic espionage national security, domestic stability, tionship. with no connection to the Chi- or corporate interests in a competi- nese intelligence services is tive environment. 6 Consequences of the Conventional interpreted as “Chinese intel- View ligence,” less attention will be Chinese military scholars today Misapprehension of Chinese intel- paid to what those organiza- frame intelligence as a distinct sub- ligence practices has consequences. tions actually do. The Chinese set of knowledge, defined by its rele- Most basically, the “mosaic” or intelligence services and the vance to decision makers and a “grains of sand” concepts fail to Chinese defense industries are competitive environment. Specifi-
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