The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947 – 2015
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Technical Report 17-10 August 2017 The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947 – 2015 Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D. Northrop Grumman Technology Services Approved for Public Distribution Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Office of People Analytics NOTE: For correspondence about this report, please contact [email protected] Technical Report 17-10 August 2017 The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947 – 2015 Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D.—Northrop Grumman Technology Services Released by – Eric L. Lang, Ph.D. Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Office of People Analytics 400 Gigling Rd. Seaside, CA 93955 NOTE: For correspondence about this report, please contact [email protected] REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 3. DATES COVERED: 2. REPORT TYPE 1. REPORT DATE: Sept. 2014 – Mar. Technical Report 2017 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER: 4. The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by 5b. GRANT NUMBER: Americans, 1947 – 2015 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER: 5d. PROJECT NUMBER: 6. AUTHOR(S): Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D. 5e. TASK NUMBER: 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER: 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defense Personnel and Security Research Center 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Defense Office of People Analytics PERSEREC-TR-17-10 400 Gigling Road Seaside, CA 93955 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) 10. SPONSORING/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 11. SPONSORING/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S): 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT: (A) Distribution Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: ABSTRACT: The report describes characteristics of 209 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses against the United States since 1947. Three cohorts are compared based on when the individual began espionage: 1947- 1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2015. Using data coded from open published sources, analyses are reported on personal attributes of persons across the three cohorts, the employment and levels of clearance, how they committed espionage, the consequences they suffered, and their motivations. The second part of the report explores each of the five types of espionage committed by the 209 persons under study. These include: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. The statutes governing each type are discussed and compared. Classification of national security information is discussed as one element in espionage. In Part 3, revisions to the Espionage statutes are recommended in light of findings presented in the report. 14. SUBJECT TERMS: 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE 15. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLASSIFIED PERSON: Eric L. 16. LIMITATION NUMBER 17. Lang, Director OF OF PAGES: ABSTRACT: 260 19b. TELEPHONE a. REPORT: b. ABSTRACT: c. THIS PAGE: NUMBER (Include UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED area code): 831- 583-2846 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) Prescribed by ANSI td. Z39.18 PREFACE PREFACE The Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) dates from 1986. It was founded because of the espionage of John Walker and his ring of spies. Part of a record year for spies in 1985, when eleven Americans were arrested for espionage, Walker’s capture and the revelation that for 20 years he had betrayed the trust the U.S. Navy placed in him as a cryptographic radioman, provoked outrage. A commission to investigate security practices then formed under General Richard G. Stilwell. Among its recommendations for improvement was the creation of an organization to perform behavioral science research on personnel security policies and practices, so the Department of Defense (DoD) established PERSEREC a year later to ground those practices in objective research. For 30 years, PERSEREC has been working to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of the DoD personnel and industrial security systems. One consistent research focus has been the phenomenon of trust betrayal in crimes such as espionage. This report is the fourth in a series of unclassified reports on espionage based on information collected in a database maintained by PERSEREC.1 Materials on espionage and espionage-related offenses, including attempted espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, and theft or illegal collection of closely held national defense information with the intent to commit espionage, have been coded into the database. These reports are based on open sources in order to facilitate public access to them. A founding goal of PERSEREC’s is to improve security education and awareness; broad public distribution of unclassified analytical products about espionage furthers that goal. Eric L. Lang, Ph.D. Director 1 The PERSEREC Espionage Database contains information that is designated For Official Use Only (FOUO) as well as personally identifiable information, and therefore the database itself is FOUO. The information used in this report is unclassified, and this report is unclassified. v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is the fourth in the series on espionage by Americans that the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) began publishing in 1992. The current report updates the scope of earlier work by including recent cases, and it extends the scope by exploring related types of espionage in addition to the classic type. There are three parts to this report. Part 1 presents findings on characteristics of Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1947. The findings are based on analyses of data collected from open sources. Part 2 explores the five types of espionage committed by the 209 individuals in this study: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Each type is described by its legal bases; examples of cases and comparisons with the other types of espionage are provided. Part 3 of the report considers the impact of the context in which espionage takes place, and discusses two important developments: (1) information and communications technologies (ICT), and (2) globalization. Recommendations are offered for revisions of the Espionage Statutes in response to the acceleration in the changes of context for espionage. Part 1 compares data across three cohorts of persons by when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979 (the early Cold War), 1980-1989 (the later Cold War), and 1990-2015 (the post-Soviet period). As the Cold War recedes in time, the recent cohort offers the most applicable data for the present. This executive summary focuses on findings for the recent cohort. Among the characteristics of the 67 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1990, we find that They have usually been male and middle-aged. Half were married, half not. Reflecting changes in the population as a whole, they were more diverse in racial and ethnic composition and more highly educated than earlier cohorts. Three-quarters have been civil servants, one-quarter military, and compared to the previous two cohorts increasing proportions have been contractors, or have held jobs not related to espionage, and or have not held security clearances. Three-quarters succeeded in passing information, while one-quarter were intercepted before they could pass anything; 60% were volunteers, and 40% were recruited. Among recruits, 60% were recruited by a foreign intelligence service, 40% by family or friends; contacting a foreign embassy was the most common way to begin as a volunteer. Compared to earlier cohorts, in which the Soviet Union and Russia predominated as the recipient of American espionage, recent espionage- offenders have transmitted information to a greater variety of recipients. Sixty-eight percent received no payment. Shorter prison sentences than earlier cohorts have been the norm in the recent past. Money is the most common motive for committing espionage-related offenses, but it is less dominant than in the past, since in the recent cohort money was a vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY motive for 28%, down from 41% in the first and 45% in the second of the two earlier cohorts. Divided loyalties is the second most common motive at 22%. Disgruntlement and ingratiation are nearly tied for third place, and more people seek recognition as a motive for espionage. The majority of these 209 individuals committed traditional, classic espionage, in which controlled national security information, usually classified, was transmitted to a foreign government. Classic espionage predominates in each cohort under study, but in the first cohort 94% committed classic espionage, in the second cohort it was 95%, while in the most recent