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National Security Threat Awareness Monthly Bulletin

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National Security Threat Awareness Monthly Bulletin UNCLASSIFIED (U) FBI Tampa Division National Security Threat Awareness Monthly Bulletin APRIL 2014 (U) Administrative Note: This product reflects the views of the FBI-Tampa Division and has not been vetted by FBI Headquarters. (U) Handling notice: Although UNCLASSIFIED, this information is property of the FBI and may be distributed only to members of organizations receiving this bulletin. Dissemination outside of your agency or company is only authorized with prior approval of the FBI. Further publication is not authorized in any manner; however dissemination within your agency to appropriate individuals is appropriate. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. (U) The FBI Tampa Division National Security Threat Awareness Monthly Bulletin provides a summary of previously reported US government press releases, publications, and news articles from wire services and news organizations relating to counterintelligence, cyber and terrorism threats. The information in this bulletin represents the views and opinions of the cited sources for each article, and the analyst comment is intended only to highlight items of interest to organizations in Florida. This bulletin is provided solely to inform our Domain partners of news items of interest, and does not represent FBI information. (U) If you are a security officer, foreign sales representative, or employee of a business or company in Florida, you may receive unsolicited, suspicious emails from a foreign company or individual asking specific and detailed questions about your products, or inquires about starting a joint-venture or other commercial relationship. Your company or agency may also host foreign visitors or delegations that ask specific questions about or seeks access to technology or information outside the scope of their visit. If you have incidents like these to report, please contact FBI Strategic Partnership Coordinator, James “Pat” Laflin, 813-253-1029, e-mail [email protected] .Please note, defense contractors are required under the NISPOM to submit suspicious contact reports to their Defense Security Service (DSS) representative. In the 10 APR 2014 Issue: Article Title Page NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT NEWS FROM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: Naval Espionage - Stopping a Dangerous Insider Threat p. 2 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE THREAT ITEMS FROM THE PRESS: Hawaii Man Pleads Guilty to Communicating Classified National Defense Information to An p. 3 Unauthorized Person Two Individuals and Company Found Guilty in Conspiracy to Sell Trade Secrets to Chinese p. 4 Companies; First Federal Jury Conviction Under Economic Espionage Act of 1996 Reston Man Pleads Guilty to Exporting Unlicensed Goods to Iran; Defendant Shipped over p. 7 $250,000 in High-Tech Items Through United Arab Emirates Former Winchester Brake Pad Engineer Pleads Guilty to Theft of Trade Secrets Charge p. 7 Analyst at Canadian Anti-Terrorism Agency Stripped of Position after Meeting Russian Diplomats p. 8 at Social Events Former Employee of Navy Contractor Pleads Guilty in International Navy Bribery Scandal p. 8 The Black Box of China’s Military; Beijing is Spending Hundreds of Billions of Dollars on Defense, p. 9 but No One Quite Knows What They're up to CYBERSECURITY SPECIAL FOCUS FOR INDUSTRY: How do the FBI and Secret Service Know Your Network Has Been Breached Before You Do? They p. 11 Work Hard to Find Evidence of Stolen Data, but Companies Don't Always Appreciate the Effort Big Threats for Small Businesses; Five Reasons Your Small or Midsize Business is a Prime Target p. 12 for Cybercriminals CYBER THREAT ITEMS FROM THE PRESS: Cyber-War: In Deed and Desire, Iran Emerging as a Major Power p. 14 A Cyber History of the Ukraine Conflict p. 14 Hack Attack - Russia's First Targets in Ukraine: Its’ Cell Phones and Internet Lines p. 15 UNCLASSIFIED 1 UNCLASSIFIED Hacking Critical Infrastructure Companies -- A Pen Tester's View p. 16 IT Leaders Share Tips on Managing Security Risks p. 17 Three Ways to Raise Infosec Awareness among Non-Security Executives p. 18 Major Companies, like Target, Often Fail to Act on Malware Alerts; Target Paid the Price for its p. 19 Apparent Failure; Other Big Firms Follow the Same Pattern and Could Face the Same Fate, Analysts Say 4 Lessons CIOs Can Learn From the Target Breach p. 20 Healthcare Industry Advised to do More Thorough Risk Analyses p. 21 Pre-Installed Malware Turns Up on New Phones; A Fake Version of Netflix that Steals Personal p. 21 Data and Sends it to Russia Has Been Found on Several Phone Models Sophisticated Scam Targeting Verizon Wireless Customers p. 22 COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ITEMS FROM THE PRESS: San Joaquin County Man Arrested at Canadian Border on Charges of Attempting to Provide p. 22 Material Support to Foreign Terrorist Organization Dearborn Resident Charged with Attempting to Support a Foreign Terrorist Organization p. 23 US House of Representatives - Joint Subcommittee Hearing entitled: Iran’s Support for Terrorism p. 24 Worldwide Authorities Identify Third Suspect in Bulgarian Bus Bombing Linked to Canadian Member of p. 26 Hezbollah Al-Qaeda Unveils New Magazine Aimed at Western Jihadis p. 26 Al Qaeda's Latest Magazine: Notes from Dead American Terrorists p. 26 Officials: Al-Qaida Plots Comeback in Afghanistan p. 27 Nigeria: Al-Qaeda Takes Over Boko Haram p. 27 AP Interview: Jihadi Head Says Gaza Groups Growing p. 27 Militant Islamist Website Calls for Attacks on France And Hollande – SITE p. 28 Al-Qaeda Threat to United States Risked In Afghanistan Exit, General Says p. 28 (U) NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT NEWS FROM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: (U) Naval Espionage - Stopping a Dangerous Insider Threat (FBI News Blog, 07 MAR 2014) (U) As a sailor with a top secret clearance, a sensitive job on a submarine, and 20 years of service in the Navy, Robert Hoffman possessed a tremendous amount of knowledge about the US nuclear fleet and its operations—knowledge he was willing to sell to the Russians. (U) “It’s almost impossible to say why someone would become a spy,” said Special Agent James Dougherty, who investigated the case from our Norfolk Division, but Hoffman represents a classic example of the insider threat. “When a US citizen with classified information threatens to betray his country,” Dougherty explained, “the resulting damage to national security and loss of American lives can be catastrophic.” (U) Special Agent James Dougherty has a dozen years of experience investigating spies, and in almost all of the cases he has worked, the subjects’ families, friends, or colleagues had concerns but failed to report them to authorities. “The FBI needs the public’s help to fight the insider threat,” Dougherty said, “and we are willing to pay for that help.” (U) Individuals who provide information leading to the arrest and conviction of a spy—or to the prevention of espionage—are eligible for a $500,000 reward. To report suspicious activities, contact your local FBI office or submit an anonymous tip online. “There will always be espionage cases,” Dougherty said. “This is a war that can’t be won—it can only be fought. But we can never give up the fight.” UNCLASSIFIED 2 UNCLASSIFIED (U) Investigators speculate that Hoffman may have blamed his divorce on the Navy, along with his failure to gain promotion. The FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) became concerned in 2011 when, nearing retirement, Hoffman told friends he was going on a “man-cation” to Belarus to see Russian women he had previously met when he was stationed in Bahrain—even though he knew the women would not be there. (U) “He had some sort of motivation to travel to Belarus that didn’t seem logical,” said Dougherty. In addition, Hoffman ignored the requirement to alert military security officers that he would be traveling out of the country, and he failed to adhere to other security rules of reporting any suspicious incidents while overseas. However, Hoffman did post items on social media channels saying he met the president of Belarus. “All of that added to our suspicion,” Dougherty noted. (U) Using court-authorized surveillance, wiretaps, and other investigative tools, FBI and NCIS investigators began monitoring Hoffman’s movements at his home in Virginia Beach following his retirement from the Navy in late 2011. Soon after, our undercover operatives made contact with him to assess his intentions. Then, in September 2012, a female FBI undercover agent posing as a Russian operative knocked on Hoffman’s door and delivered a message ostensibly from Russian intelligence officials. “He received instructions from the woman, who asked him to respond by e-mail within one week,” Dougherty said. “We didn’t want to pressure him. We wanted him to make a conscious decision, knowing he would be dealing with the Russian intelligence service.” (U) Hoffman didn’t wait a week—he responded within hours. He agreed to answer a series of questions on an encrypted thumb drive that was to be left in a hollow tree in a park—a hiding place known in the spy world as a dead drop. On the third such drop, Hoffman divulged top secret national defense information. “American lives could have been lost based on the information he was willing to give up,” Dougherty said. “He had access to things that were highly, highly sensitive.” (U) In August 2013, a jury in Norfolk found Hoffman guilty of attempted espionage; last month, the 40-year-old was sentenced to 30 years in prison. “The insider threat is very real,” said Dougherty, explaining that in these types of cases, there are often people who are suspicious of a friend or colleague’s statements or behavior but who don’t act on those suspicions. “One of the things we teach in insider threat training,” Dougherty said, “is that if you see something, say something.
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