Assessing Hard-Target Espionage in the Cyber Era Kyle S. Cunliffe Thesis Submitt
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An existential crisis and a golden opportunity? Assessing hard-target espionage in the cyber era Kyle S. Cunliffe Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD Department of International Politics Aberystwyth University January 18th 2021 Summary Cyberspace is transforming global society. Its effects on states, intelligence, and national security are the subject of much comment, but its relationship with espionage, or human intelligence, remains under-researched to an alarming degree. At a time when the British-US intelligence community is making headway in cyberspace, necessitated by emerging threats and rising nation-state agendas, this is a glaring omission. The strategic imperatives of Russia and China have provoked a reorientation by the British SIS and the US CIA, turning resources back towards nation-state ‘hard targets’. Yet these hard target states are investing resources in innovative surveillance practices, tools that fundamentally threaten intelligence officers’ ability to travel freely or acquire the increasingly important human sources (agents) of espionage. As the operations of British-US intelligence personnel become more threatened in physical terms, espionage agencies now focus their attention towards cyberspace, where innovation opens up new opportunities in tradecraft. By turning to cyberspace to conduct tradecraft, particularly in the recruitment and handling of spies, espionage’s success and failure is now entwined with the value of innovation, and as consequence, cyber-enabled tradecraft is entwined with the present and future of Western security. However, the value of cyberspace to espionage’s sources and methods remains ambiguous, receiving only limited study. Views put forward by a small cadre of mostly seasoned practitioners, express both powerful enthusiasm and debilitating cynicism, reflecting a dichotomy of opinions that have not yet been addressed. No one has yet sought to fully determine the value of cyberspace to espionage when conducted against a hard-target state, where the Internet is subject to the full weight of counterintelligence. This thesis therefore explores the merits of cyberspace to espionage tradecraft, in the context of its value applied toward Russia and China. It uses Cold War history as a basis for drawing abductive hypotheses, turning to the first era of major innovation in espionage affairs, the mid-Cold War period, for guidance in understanding the present period of innovation. In turn, it will explore how this overt technology, used for covert means, carries significant limitations to the purposes of spying, specifically due to technology’s relationship with human behaviour, thus incurring wider consequences for the future of intelligence collection, and concurrently, national security. i Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………iv Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………..v Introduction: A feasible solution?.................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Concepts, literature, and methodology Introduction…………………………………………………………………..10 Key intelligence concepts…………………………………………………….11 Key cyber concepts…………………………………………………………..16 Literature review: the optimists vs. pessimists……………………………….21 Methodology: the merits of abduction:………………………………………32 Evaluation.………………………………………………...………………….44 Chapter 2: Espionage and the ‘resurgence of state based threats’ Introduction…………………………………………………………………..49 The military threat from Russia and China…………………………………..50 The intelligence threat from Russia and China……………………………....60 The impetus for espionage…………………………………………………...73 Evaluation.……………………………………………………………………90 Chapter 3: The new spectre of street surveillance Introduction…………………………………………………………………..95 Street surveillance in Moscow and Beijing…………………………………..96 The problem of ‘cover’ in the digital age…………………………………...107 Cyberspace and the “golden opportunity”…………………………………..126 Evaluation....………………………………………………………………...131 ii Chapter 4: Lessons from the KGB’s panopticon Introduction…………..………………………………………….………….135 The case for the Cold War……………………………….……………….…136 Recruitment…………………………………………………………………148 Surveillance…………………………………………………………………163 Handling…………………………………………………………………….174 Collection…………………………………………………………………...193 Evaluation....………………………………………………………………...201 Chapter 5: Cyber-enabled recruitment & surveillance Introduction…………………………………………………………………207 Recruitment…………………………………………………………………208 Surveillance…………………………………………………………………236 Evaluation..…..………………………………………………….…………..262 Chapter 6: Cyber-enabled handling & collection Introduction…………………………………………………………………268 Handling…………………………………………………………………….269 Collection…………………………………………………………………...291 Evaluation.…………………………………………………………………..306 Conclusion: Is your cyber journey really necessary? Overview: an imperfect solution……………………………………………312 Implications: one step forwards, two steps back.…………...........................318 Closing thoughts…………………………………………………………….322 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………326 APPENDIX 1………………………………………………………………………...382 iii Acknowledgements Akin to any spy, this thesis would not have been possible without a network of supporting, tolerant, and very patient collaborators. It would certainly not exist without the open- mindedness of my recruiters, the agency who ensnared my life for the better part of a decade – the University of Aberystwyth, and its sterling Department of International Politics. My gratitude for receiving the E.H. Carr scholarship cannot be understated, and I will be forever thankful for this opportunity. Nor would it exist without my army of handlers throughout the years, most notably Gerald R. Hughes and Kris Stoddart, whose supervision, wisdom, and guidance have been invaluable. In particular, I would like to thank Gerald R. Hughes, for giving me the freedom to pursue my wild ideas, and for his eternal, straight-talking insights - steering me back on track on more than one occasion. I would also extend a great deal of thanks to Kris Stoddart, who continued to offer advice and wisdom long after his supervisory obligations had passed – and for reassuring me that my mad ideas were perhaps not as crazy as I presupposed. But all wild plans need an inspiration, and to that, I am forever indebted to my former Station Chief, the Yoda of espionage, Len Scott. His teaching during my Masters’ years cemented my passion for the mysterious world of human intelligence, a passion that flourished as Len’s student and later assistant tutor in his Espionage module. It was a great pleasure to turn the deceptive tricks he played on me on and my comrades against fresh and unwitting undergraduates. Without Len’s encouragement, including his teachings on the murky world of espionage and tradecraft, or his mind games involving an octopus and a fez, I don’t believe this thesis would ever have come to be. Aberystwyth Station is, however, only a resounding success through the aid of its tireless support staff, and my appreciation goes out to Vicki Jones, Donia Richards, Elaine Lowe, Glesni Davies, and many others. I offer enormous thanks to my current colleagues at Salford University, and especially to Christopher Murphy, for his tireless support, patience, and input. Moreover, no operation is ever complete without the wisdom of seasoned practitioners. I would therefore like to express particular gratitude to former CIA officers David Gioe and Robert Wallace. The insights they offered via interviews and conversations were greatly appreciated, providing a guiding hand for the direction of this project. I also hold much gratitude to my serving and former agents of the Interpol department, to the men and women who journeyed down the baffling world of the PhD alongside me, and who’s kinship (and many beers) kept me sane and determined, including Charlotte Botfield, Bleddyn Bowen, Jessica Sheehan, Kris Lovell, Chris Smith, Desiree Poets, and many, many more. Bleddyn’s advice throughout the years has also been most helpful, and I greatly appreciate his reviewing of my work and constructive feedback. I also extend my gratitude to former colleagues (and friends) of Aberystwyth’s Residential Tutor department, who’s antics and hard-work passed the long summer months (and forever improved my cocktail-smithing skills.) And I offer a great deal of thanks to Alex da Costa, of Cambridge University, whose proofreading skills flagged up more than a typo or two (an understatement by any measure). And finally, I have endless gratitude to my family and friends, who have kept me grounded, loved, supported and encouraged throughout this journey. Without the endless support of my parents, grandparents, and eclectic range of strange and unusual friends, this thesis would never have neared completion. Particular thanks go out to my grandfather, Joseph Forshaw, whom I will forever miss, and to my mother, for her tireless patience in putting up with me for all these years. iv Recurring abbreviations: CCP – Chinese Communist Party CCTV – Closed Circuit Television CI – Counterintelligence CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (US) DDI – Directorate of Digital Innovation JTRIG – Joint Threat Intelligence Group DoD – Department of Defense (US) DPI – Deep packet inspection EU – European Union FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) FSB – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation GCHQ – Government Communications Headquarters (UK) GRU – Soviet & Russian Federation Military Intelligence. HUMINT – Human Intelligence KGB – Foreign and Domestic intelligence