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IPERS' Sudan Scrutinized Companies

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IPERS' Sudan Scrutinized Companies Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System's Prohibited Companies List April 1, 2012 Divestment Date * » AKM Industrial Co. Ltd. March 31, 2012 » Alstom » Alstom Projects India » AREF Energy Holding Company » Areva T&D India Ltd June 30, 2013 » AviChina Industry & Technology Ltd. » Biopetrol Industries AG December 31, 2012 » Chemoil Energy Limited June 30, 2012 » Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL) » China Gezhouba Group Limited December 31, 2012 » China Hydraulic and Hydroelectric Construction Group Corporation (Sinohydro) » China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) » China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGC/NORINCO) » China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) » China North Optical-Electric Technology Co. Ltd. March 31, 2012 » China Petroleum Finance Co. Ltd. March 31, 2012 » CNPC Golden Autumn Ltd June 30, 2013 » CNPC HK Overseas Capital Ltd. December 31, 2012 » Daqing Huake Group Co. Ltd. » Dongfeng Motor Group Co. Ltd. (DFL) December 31, 2011 » Egyptian Kuwaiti Holding Company » Electricity Generating Company (EGCO) » Eneos Globe Company June 30, 2013 » Gas District Cooling PutraJaya Sdn Bhd » Glencore FDG LLC December 31, 2012 » Glencore Finance December 31, 2012 » Glencore Finance (Europe) December 31, 2012 » Glencore International PLC December 31, 2011 » Hafei Aviation Industry Co. » Harbin Dongan Auto Engine Co. » Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) » Infotel Broadband Services Ltd. March 31, 2013 » Jiangxi Hongdu Aviation (Hongdu Aviation) » Jinan Diesel Engine Co. Ltd » JX Holdings Inc. December 31, 2011 » JX Nippon Oil & Energy Corporation March 31, 2012 » KEPCO Plant Service & Engineering Co., Ltd. December 31, 2012 » Kingdream PLC » KLCC Property Holdings Bhd » KMCOB Capital Berhad » Kunlun Energy Co. Ltd. September 30, 2012 » Lanka IOC Limited » Liaoning Huajin Tongda Chemical Co. Ltd. December 31, 2011 » LS Industrial Systems December 31, 2012 » Managem » Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. (MRPL) » Mercator Ltd. » Mercator Lines Singapore June 30, 2012 » Midciti Resources Sdn Berhad » MISC Berhad (Malaysia International Shipping Company) » MISC Capital Ltd. » Nippo Corporation March 31, 2013 » Nippon Oil Corporation » Nippon Oil Finance December 31, 2012 » Nippon Mining Holdings December 31, 2011 1 of 3 Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System's Prohibited Companies List April 1, 2012 Divestment Date * » NORINCO International Cooperation Ltd. » Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. (ONGC) » Oil India Limited » ONA S.A. » ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) June 30, 2012 » Optimal Chemicals (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd September 30, 2012 » Optimal Glycols (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd September 30, 2012 » PetroChina Co. Ltd. » Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) » Petronas Capital Limited » Petronas Chemicals Group Berhad September 30, 2012 » Petronas Dagangan Bhd » Petronas Gas Bhd » PT Pertamina Persero March 31, 2013 » PTT Exploration & Production PCL December 31, 2011 » PTT Public Company Ltd. (PTT) » PTTEP Australia International Finance Proprietary Ltd. June 30, 2012 » PTTEP Canada International Finance Ltd. December 31, 2012 » Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd December 31, 2012 » Ranhill Berhad » Ranhill Power Sdn Bhd March 31, 2013 » Ranhill Powertron Sdn » Reliance Holdings USA Inc. March 31, 2013 » Reliance Industries Limited March 31, 2013 » Scomi Engineering Berhad » Scomi Group Berhad » Sichuan Nitrocell Co. Ltd. March 31, 2012 » Sinohydro Group Ltd. December 31, 2012 » Sinopec Corporation (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) » Sinopec Finance Co. Ltd. » Sinopec Group (China Petrochemical Corporation) » Sinopec Kanton Holdings Ltd. » Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemicals Ltd. » Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co. Ltd. » Societe Metallurgique D'imiter » Space Energy Corporation June 30, 2013 » Trafigura Beheer December 31, 2011 » Wuhan Boiler Company » Denotes wholly- or majority-owned subsidiaries, parent companies, or affiliates of companies that have the most problematic operations in Sudan according to the Sudan Divestment Task Force model of targeted divestment. * Denotes deadline for divesting of security. 2 of 3 Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System Effective April 1, 2012 Companies Removed from Prohibited Companies List Nuinsco Resources Limited Companies Added to Prohibited Companies List Areva T&D India Ltd CNPC Golden Autumn Ltd Eneos Globe Company Space Energy Corporation 3 of 3.
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