2016 EITI Report

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

2016 EITI Report Contents List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................6 Executive Summary........................................................................................................................8 1. EITI in Iraq .............................................................................................................................. 14 1.1. About the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ................................... 14 1.2. EITI Implementation in Iraq .................................................................................................. 14 1.3. EITI Governance and leadership in Iraq (Requirement 1.1 – 1.3) ................................ 16 1.4. MSG Governance (Requirement 1.4) .................................................................................. 17 1.5. MSG Workplan (Requirement 1.5) ....................................................................................... 18 2. Legal Framework and Fiscal Regime for the Extractive Industries (Requirement 2.1) . 20 2.1. National Governance Structures ......................................................................................... 20 2.2. Overview of the regulations applicable to extractive industries ................................. 21 2.2.1. Extractive sector regulations in federal Iraq ........................................................................ 21 2.2.2. Overview of the corporate income tax and withholding tax regimes applicable to the oil and gas sector in federal Iraq .............................................................................................. 27 2.2.3. Extractive sector regulations in the Kurdistan Region ............................................................ 29 2.3. State participation in the extractive industries (Requirement 2.6) ............................ 30 2.3.1. MSG definition of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) ................................................... 30 2.3.2. The prevailing rules and practices in relation to the financial relationship between the Government and its owned companies .................................................................. 42 2.4. Fiscal Framework .................................................................................................................... 43 2.5. Reforming of the Regulatory and Fiscal Regime in 2016 .............................................. 45 2.6. Procedures for granting licenses (Requirement 2.2) .................................................................. 47 2.7. Registry of Licenses (Requirement 2.3)............................................................................ 55 2.8. Contracts in the extractive industries (Requirement 2.4) ............................................ 60 2.9. Beneficial ownership of material extractive companies (Requirement 2.5) ............. 66 3. Extractive Industries Exploration, Production and Export Activities (Requirement 3) 67 3.1. Oil and Gas Sector in Federal Iraq ....................................................................................... 67 3.1.1. Oil and gas fields in Iraq .................................................................................................... 67 3.1.2. Oil and Gas reserves in Iraq .............................................................................................. 70 3.1.3. Drilling and well workovers carried out by the Iraqi Drilling Company ................... 72 2 3.1.4. Significant exploration work carried out by the Oil Exploration Company (Requirement 3.1) .............................................................................................................................. 73 3.1.5. Crude oil production for year 2016 ................................................................................ 74 3.1.6. Flow of crude oil for national oil companies during the year 2016 ......................... 76 3.1.7. Gas production during 2016 ............................................................................................. 79 3.1.8. Production and supply of petroleum products during 2016 ..................................... 81 3.1.8.1. LPG, Condensate and Dry Gas production by Basra Gas Company during 2016 81 3.1.8.2. Petroleum products supplied by refineries during 2016 ....................................... 81 3.2. Mining and Minerals Sector in fedral Iraq .......................................................................... 85 3.2.1. Mining deposits in Iraq ....................................................................................................... 85 3.2.2. Exploration activities in 2016 .......................................................................................... 88 3.2.3. Minerals Production during the year 2016 ................................................................... 88 3.2.4. Targeted production capacities ....................................................................................... 89 3.3. KRG Oil, Gas and Mineral Production ................................................................................. 90 3.3.1. KRG crude oil production for year 2016 ....................................................................... 90 3.3.2. KRG natural gas production for year 2016 ................................................................... 92 3.3.3. KRG Mineral production for year 2016 .......................................................................... 92 3.4. Extractive Industries Export data (Requirement 3.3) .................................................... 93 3.4.1. Crude oil exports process ................................................................................................. 93 3.4.2. Extracted quantities of crude oil for export by SOMO ............................................... 96 3.4.3. Crude oil exports during 2016 ......................................................................................... 99 3.4.4. Exported crude oil quantities per region ..................................................................... 101 3.4.5. Exported petroleum products - Naptha ....................................................................... 102 3.4.6. Exported petroleum products - LPG and Condensate .............................................. 103 3.4.7. Mining and Minerals Sector in federal Iraq .......................................................................... 104 3.5. KRG Exports ........................................................................................................................... 105 4. Revenue Collection ............................................................................................................. 106 4.1. Materiality (Requirement 4.1) ........................................................................................... 106 4.2. Revenue streams .................................................................................................................. 106 4.3. Materiality of revenue streams ......................................................................................... 108 4.4. Reporting Companies ........................................................................................................... 110 4.4.1. International Oil Companies ........................................................................................... 110 4.4.2. Government entities ......................................................................................................... 111 3 4.4.3. State-owned entities ........................................................................................................ 111 4.5. Detailed Reconciliations ...................................................................................................... 112 4.5.1. Crude oil export revenue for year 2016 ...................................................................... 113 4.5.1.1. Cost recovery reconciliation ...................................................................................... 121 4.5.1.2. Remuneration fees reconciliation ............................................................................. 123 4.5.2. Corporate Income Tax (CIT) ........................................................................................... 125 4.5.3. Treasury share of SOE net profits ................................................................................ 127 4.5.4. State partner shares in field remuneration fees ....................................................... 129 4.5.5. Internal Service payments (Requirement 4.5) ........................................................... 130 4.6. Subnational direct payments (Requirement 4.6) .......................................................... 131 4.6.1. KRG Revenue ..................................................................................................................... 131 4.7. In-Kind Revenues, barter agreements, and transportation revenues (Requirements 4.2 -4.4) .............................................................................................................................................. 133 4.8. Data Quality and Assurance (Requirement 4.9) ............................................................ 134 4.8.1. Audit and assurance procedures in state-owned entities working in the extractive sector: ............................................................................................................................. 134 4.8.2. Audit
Recommended publications
  • Structuring Petroleum-Sector Institutions
    Briefing October 2014 Considerations for Indonesia’s Universitas New Government: Structuring Gadjah Mada Petroleum-Sector Institutions Patrick Heller and Poppy Ismalina As Indonesia’s new government seeks to maximize the country’s benefits from the petroleum sector, one of its most important tasks will be to resolve the longstanding uncertainty surrounding the roles and responsibilities of the public institutions responsible for managing the sector. This briefing offers a perspective based on global experience in oil and gas as well as Indonesia’s own history. WHY PETROLEUM-SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE MATTERS Effectively allocating roles and responsibilities among ministries, Pertamina, and other government agencies is crucial if Indonesia is to tackle the challenge of reinvigorating its petroleum sector. Indonesia faces declining petroleum reserves and production, rising consumption, costly fuel subsidies and a desire to boost the performance of Pertamina. The country therefore requires an institutional structure that will enable it to execute a coherent strategy and that empowers the assigned entities to manage exploration, production, relationships with contractors, tax collection and the enforcement of Indonesia’s laws and contracts. Most importantly, the government must decide whether to house regulatory (i.e., monitoring and oversight) responsibilities within Pertamina or in another body. The new government has an opportunity to reconcile the Constitutional Court’s decision on BP Migas and build a coherent, effective, forward-looking structure. In the aftermath of the 2012 Constitutional Court decision—which invalidated the role of independent regulator BP Migas as established in 2001 on the grounds that it did not meet the state’s responsibilities under Article 33 of the constitution—there has been confusion about the present and the future of government responsibility for the petroleum sector.
    [Show full text]
  • The New Iraq: 2015/2016 Discovering Business
    2015|2016 Discovering Business Iraq N NIC n a o t i io s n is al m In om in association with vestment C USINESS B Contents ISCOVERING Introduction Iraq continues as a major investment opportunity 5 Messages - 2015|2016 D - 2015|2016 Dr. Sami Al-Araji: Chairman of the National Investment Commission 8 RAQ HMA Frank Baker: British Ambassador to Iraq 10 I Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Executive Chairman, Iraq Britain Business Council 12 EW N Business Matters HE Doing business in Iraq from a taxation perspective - PricewaterhouseCoopers 14 T Doing business in Iraq - Sanad Law Group in association with Eversheds LLP 20 Banking & Finance Citi has confidence in Iraq’s investment prospects - Citi 24 Common ground for all your banking needs - National Bank of Iraq 28 Iraq: Facing very challenging times - Rabee Securities 30 2005-2015, ten years stirring the sound of lending silence in Iraq - IMMDF 37 Almaseer - Building on success - Almaseer Insurance 40 Emerging insurance markets in Iraq - AKE Insurance Brokers 42 Facilitating|Trading Organisations Events & Training - Supporting Iraq’s economy - CWC Group 46 Not just knowledge, but know how - Harlow International 48 HWH shows how smaller firms can succeed in Iraq - HWH Associates 51 The AMAR International Charitable Foundation - AMAR 56 Oil & Gas Hans Nijkamp: Shell Vice President & Country Chairman, Iraq 60 Energising Iraq’s future - Shell 62 Oil production strategy remains firmly on course 66 Projects are launched to harness Iraq’s vast gas potential 70 Major investment in oilfield infrastructure
    [Show full text]
  • Media Monitoring Online Pertamina Projects Stall Amid Policy
    Media Monitoring Online Pertamina Projects Stall Amid Policy Flip-flops, Refinery Blaze Tanggal : Rabu , 31 Maret 2021 Media : The Jakarta Post Halaman : 2 Wartawan : Vincent Lingga Muatan Berita : Netral Narasumber : None () Rubrik : Headlines Topik : Kilang Minyak Nilai Iklan : Rp. 78.000.000 This is really bad news for energy, an extremely vital component of the economy. While Pertamina’s four refinery upgrade projects and two greenfield refinery projects launched in 2014 have been delayed by several years or even canceled, an inferno fire gutted the state-owned oil and gas giant’s newest refinery at Balongan, West Java, early Monday morning. Even though Pertamina has made assurances that the incident would not disrupt fuel supply and distribution, we cannot help but be concerned about the damage incurred on the downstream oil industry. Already Southeast Asia’s largest net importer of crude oil, gasoline and gasoil at an annual volume of almost 1 million barrels per day (bpd), Indonesia may have to import more refined fuel until the Balongan refinery resumes production at its 125,000 bpd full capacity. Pertamina’s six old refineries, which have a combined capacity of 1 million bpd, are able to produce only 850,000 bpd of refined fuel, barely half of national demand. Importing more fuel means stronger pressures on the balance of payments and larger drain on the foreign exchange reserves. The Balongan refinery, which came on stream in 1994, was the last plant Pertamina built. Many new greenfield and expansion projects that have been planned since then have suffered cancellations or prolonged delays due to the country’s notorious policy flip-flops and bureaucratic barriers.
    [Show full text]
  • Process Technologies and Projects for Biolpg
    energies Review Process Technologies and Projects for BioLPG Eric Johnson Atlantic Consulting, 8136 Gattikon, Switzerland; [email protected]; Tel.: +41-44-772-1079 Received: 8 December 2018; Accepted: 9 January 2019; Published: 15 January 2019 Abstract: Liquified petroleum gas (LPG)—currently consumed at some 300 million tonnes per year—consists of propane, butane, or a mixture of the two. Most of the world’s LPG is fossil, but recently, BioLPG has been commercialized as well. This paper reviews all possible synthesis routes to BioLPG: conventional chemical processes, biological processes, advanced chemical processes, and other. Processes are described, and projects are documented as of early 2018. The paper was compiled through an extensive literature review and a series of interviews with participants and stakeholders. Only one process is already commercial: hydrotreatment of bio-oils. Another, fermentation of sugars, has reached demonstration scale. The process with the largest potential for volume is gaseous conversion and synthesis of two feedstocks, cellulosics or organic wastes. In most cases, BioLPG is produced as a byproduct, i.e., a minor output of a multi-product process. BioLPG’s proportion of output varies according to detailed process design: for example, the advanced chemical processes can produce BioLPG at anywhere from 0–10% of output. All these processes and projects will be of interest to researchers, developers and LPG producers/marketers. Keywords: Liquified petroleum gas (LPG); BioLPG; biofuels; process technologies; alternative fuels 1. Introduction Liquified petroleum gas (LPG) is a major fuel for heating and transport, with a current global market of around 300 million tonnes per year.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards a Policy Framework for Iraq's Petroleum Industry and An
    Towards a Policy Framework for Iraq’s Petroleum Industry and an Integrated Federal Energy Strategy Submitted by Luay Jawad al-Khatteeb To the University of Exeter As a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Middle East Politics In January 2017 The thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgment. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature ......................................................... i Abstract: The “Policy Framework for Iraq’s Petroleum Industry” is a logical structure that establishes the rules to guide decisions and manage processes to achieve economically efficient outcomes within the energy sector. It divides policy applications between regulatory and regulated practices, and defines the governance of the public sector across the petroleum industry and relevant energy portfolios. In many “Rentier States” where countries depend on a single source of income such as oil revenues, overlapping powers of authority within the public sector between policy makers and operators has led to significant conflicts of interest that have resulted in the mismanagement of resources and revenues, corruption, failed strategies and the ultimate failure of the system. Some countries have succeeded in identifying areas for progressive reform, whilst others failed due to various reasons discussed in this thesis. Iraq fits into the category of a country that has failed to implement reform and has become a classic case of a rentier state.
    [Show full text]
  • Jtb Steps on the Indonesian
    FEATURES JTB STEPS ON THE INDONESIAN GAS LATHAM & WATKINS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COUNSEL TO THE SPONSOR AND THE BORROWER IN THE FINANCING OF THE JAMBARAN-TIUNG BIRU PROJECT, PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEAL AND INSIGHT INTO SOME OF ITS NOTABLE FEATURES. BY CLARINDA TJIA-DHARMADI, PARTNER, TIM G FOURTEAU, COUNSEL, AND MEREDITH STRIKE, ASSOCIATE. The Jambaran-Tiung Biru Project (JTB Project) is 315m standard cubic feet per day of raw among the largest upstream oil and gas projects gas, the designing and installing of gas to reach financial close in Indonesia in the past processing facilities with a maximum capacity decade, and marks several important milestones of 330m standard cubic feet per day and the for project financings in the region. development of gas flow lines from the wells The limited recourse project financing to the gas processing facilities and sales gas utilised a trustee borrowing structure (TBS) and pipelines from the gas processing facilities to is the first project financing in the region to the Gresik-Semarang pipeline. comprise conventional interest-bearing tranches PEPC and PT Pertamina EP (PEP), a wholly- with Islamic financing tranches. owned subsidiary of Pertamina, are sponsoring It is also the first limited recourse project the development of the JTB Project (though financing to feature a subsidiary of Indonesian PEP is not a party to the financing). PEPC will state-owned oil and gas company PT Pertamina operate and maintain the JTB Project, including (Persero) (Pertamina), namely PT Pertamina EP the gas fields, pipelines and gas processing Cepu (PEPC), as the anchoring sponsor. facilities. Containing extensive Indonesian participation PEPC and PEP own 92% and 8% of the unit throughout the structure, it is also the first oil interests in the unitised JTB field, respectively, and gas project financing in Indonesia to be and will share a proportionate amount of supported by an all domestic offtake, with no project revenues, capital costs and operating government support, solidifying the trend set expenditures.
    [Show full text]
  • Unique UK's Licensing Policy Favours the State Than
    1216-2574 / USD 20.00 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA © 2013 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 54, No 2, pp. 200–204 (2013) DOI: 10.1556/AJur.54.2013.2.6 MARY SABINA PETERS*−MANU KUMAR** Unique UK’s Licensing Policy Favours the State than the Industry: Contradicting Conventional Wisdom Introduction The world petroleum industry is globally interdependent. International oil companies tend to compare investment opportunities worldwide and pursue global strategies: investment opportunities compete with each other and fashion tends to possess world’s oil companies.1 Under such circumstances the role of the state acting as the regulator is of paramount importance especially where the oil and gas industry is a countries key industry.2 In the United Kingdom the government has proprietary rights to the petroleum reserves but they lack capacity to carry out technical tasks as drilling wells and laying pipelines.3 Consequently, the Governments is compelled to turn to private companies who hold most of the fi nancial and technical means needed for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources.4 In the United Kingdom, this symbiotic relationship is given effect through the petroleum licensing mechanism. This paper brings to light the various features of the UK licensing regime consequently bringing to light how this regime is favourable to the state than the industries, by laying emphasis on the proprietary rights to the petroleum revenue which vest in the UK through its governing legislations. Legislation The legislative framework for oil and gas exploration and production activities in the North Sea is as originally established by the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 for onshore activities, subsequently extended to the UK continental shelf by the Continental Shelf Act 1964 and ultimately consolidated by Part I of the Petroleum Act 1998.
    [Show full text]
  • Transparency DIRECTORATE NATIONAL
    Public Disclosure Authorized Major Lessons from My Career By Farouk Al-Kasim Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized 1. Why Not Work Together? 2. The Importance of Resource Assessment 3. Input to Norway’s Approach 4. Sector Organization 5. Institutional Integrity 6. Developing Competencies and Capacity 7. Win-win Approach to Resource Management 8. Joint Research to Reduce Risk 9. Transparency 10. Revenue Management 11. Petroleum Linkage to Total Governance 1 Why Not Work Together? 2 Why not work together? >> After graduation in 1957, I joined the Iraq Petroleum Company 1(IPC), which was the operator for an incorporated consortium comprising BP, Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, and Partex. >> From 1957 to 1972, I followed the bitter negotiations between the Iraqi government and the IPC. I wondered why they could not agree. I was convinced they needed each other, but they simply could not find the way to work together. >> This made me wonder if there was a way for oil companies and governments to work together, rather than waste so much time and energy in conflict. There must be a way! 3 Norway offered a unique opportunity >> On the very first day I arrived in Norway in 1968, I walked to the Ministry of 2Industry in Oslo. I desperately needed a job, and the ministry needed somebody who knew how to assess exploration results. In 1965, Norway had licensed 78 blocks in the North Sea. The government made it clear that international oil companies (IOCs) were needed in Norway. >> Norwegians, however, were skeptical about petroleum operations in the North Sea.
    [Show full text]
  • Low Probability High Consequences Oil Spill Response Plan: Promoting Cooperation and Networking Emergency Respond
    PAJ Oil Spill Workshop 2017 “Considerations for future oil spill response management and operations” Tokyo | 12 December 2017 Low Probability High Consequences Oil Spill Response Plan: Promoting Cooperation and Networking Emergency Respond Dr. I Gusti Suarnaya Sidemen Direectorate General of Oil and Gas (MIGAS) Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 1 1 Kementerian ESDM Republik Indonesia CONTENTS 1. Potential Risk of Oil Spill 2. Existing Oil Spill Response Strategy 3. Changing Circumstances 4. New Oil Spill Response Strategy 2 2 Kementerian ESDM Republik Indonesia 1. Potential Risk Of Oil Spill 3 3 Kementerian ESDM Republik Indonesia Indonesia Oil Outlook Crude Oil Balance Projection Key Issues: 1. Oil Still play Important Role in Indonesia Energy Supply 2. Import dependency growing 3. Sea-lane security will become more and more important 4. National capacity in securing sea lane security growing 5. Risk of oil spill is in place Fuel Consumption Projection 6. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation to secure sea-lane and supply security and is needed 7. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is need to combat oil spill Projection Source: BPPT IEO 2017 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Republic of Indonesia POTENTIAL RISK OF OIL SPILL EXPLORATION AND REFINING PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2. Existing Oil Spill Response Staretgy Oil Spill Response Development Ministry of Transport Regulation No.: 58/2013 Oil Spill in Waters and Port Preparedness Joint President Regulation No. 109/2006 Decision/Regulation concerning DGOG and DGSC: Oil Spill In Indonesian Water DKP/49/1/1 No. Emergency Response 01/KPTS/DM/MIGAS/1 981 Permanent 13 Procedure concerning 11 Protection of Strait 06 Malacca again Pollution.
    [Show full text]
  • Overview of CNPC Operations in Iraq
    CNPC in Iraq 07 Sustainability Report Overview of CNPC Operations in Iraq Iraq’s Reviving Oil Industry Iraq boasts abundant oil resources, with proven oil reserves ranking the 5th in the world. In 2009, the Iraqi government formulated a plan to increase crude oil production by utilizing international funds and advanced management and technical expertise. Under the plan, revenue from the increased production is earmarked for infrastructure construction for the benefit of the nation and its people. Some international oil companies, including CNPC, have invested in the production and operation of a number of large oilfields by virtue of technical service contracts. Under the technical service contract model, CNPC charges a service fee for each barrel of oil and gas produced, while ownership of the oil and gas is held by Iraq. The technical service contracts signed since 2009 have helped Iraq increase its crude oil production by more than 2.1 million barrels per day (a net increase of about 1.7 million barrels per day considering the declining production of mature oilfields). From 2009 to 2018, Iraq’s newly proven reserves hit more than 30 billion barrels, crude oil production increased by more than 80%, and crude oil export revenue increased by more than 140% at its peak compared with 2009. The thriving oil industry has laid a more solid foundation for the peace and security of Iraq. Nevertheless, due to factors such as oil and gas storage and transportation infrastructure, there is a great discrepancy between the country’s resource endowments and its oil and gas production and crude oil exports.
    [Show full text]
  • Statoil: a Case Study
    THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY STATOIL: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP BY RICHARD GORDON GORDON ENERGY SOLUTIONS THOMAS STENVOLL HESS ENERGY TRADING COMPANY PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN ENERGY STUDY SPONSORED BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER RICE UNIVERSITY – MARCH 2007 THIS PAPER WAS WRITTEN BY A RESEARCHER (OR RESEARCHERS) WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE JOINT BAKER INSTITUTE/JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER POLICY REPORT, THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS. WHEREVER FEASIBLE, THIS PAPER HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS BEFORE RELEASE. HOWEVER, THE RESEARCH AND THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WITHIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER(S) AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY NOR THOSE OF THE JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER. © 2007 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY ABOUT THE POLICY REPORT THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS Of world proven oil reserves of 1,148 billion barrels, approximately 77% of these resources are under the control of national oil companies (NOCs) with no equity participation by foreign, international oil companies. The Western international oil companies now control less than 10% of the world’s oil and gas resource base. In terms of current world oil production, NOCs also dominate.
    [Show full text]
  • Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf: Ministerial Powers and Controls
    LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources Volume 4 Issue 1 Fall 2015 11-1-2015 Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf: Ministerial Powers and Controls Greg W. Gordon Repository Citation Greg W. Gordon, Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf: Ministerial Powers and Controls, 4 LSU J. of Energy L. & Resources (2015) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol4/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf: Ministerial Powers and Controls Greg W. Gordon INTRODUCTION This article examines the conditions present in the oil production licenses granted for work on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) from the perspective of the powers given to the state in order to influence or control operational matters—a perspective of particular importance at the moment. Since Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments of the 1970s and 1980s implemented the progressive phasing out of direct state participation in the British oil business, the United Kingdom’s approach has been one of “light-handed” regulation.1 This model places the state in the largely passive role of a permitting authority assessing specific proposals brought to it by the licensees of particular blocks. Assumption of that role does not imply
    [Show full text]