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Transparency DIRECTORATE NATIONAL Public Disclosure Authorized Major Lessons from My Career By Farouk Al-Kasim Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized 1. Why Not Work Together? 2. The Importance of Resource Assessment 3. Input to Norway’s Approach 4. Sector Organization 5. Institutional Integrity 6. Developing Competencies and Capacity 7. Win-win Approach to Resource Management 8. Joint Research to Reduce Risk 9. Transparency 10. Revenue Management 11. Petroleum Linkage to Total Governance 1 Why Not Work Together? 2 Why not work together? >> After graduation in 1957, I joined the Iraq Petroleum Company 1(IPC), which was the operator for an incorporated consortium comprising BP, Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, and Partex. >> From 1957 to 1972, I followed the bitter negotiations between the Iraqi government and the IPC. I wondered why they could not agree. I was convinced they needed each other, but they simply could not find the way to work together. >> This made me wonder if there was a way for oil companies and governments to work together, rather than waste so much time and energy in conflict. There must be a way! 3 Norway offered a unique opportunity >> On the very first day I arrived in Norway in 1968, I walked to the Ministry of 2Industry in Oslo. I desperately needed a job, and the ministry needed somebody who knew how to assess exploration results. In 1965, Norway had licensed 78 blocks in the North Sea. The government made it clear that international oil companies (IOCs) were needed in Norway. >> Norwegians, however, were skeptical about petroleum operations in the North Sea. They feared negative impacts on both the environment and the economy. They dreaded the Dutch disease, and worse, the oil or wealth curse. >> On a political level, Norway was confident that it would find a way to mitigate the negative impact of exploration. Norway was determined to benefit from petroleum’s blessingsIn each. case, the host country must monitor operations to ensure compliance with legislation and the terms of the contract. 4 Licensing rounds 1965 to 2004 NUMBER OF BLOCKS ALLOCATED FROM 1965 TO 2004 9 3 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 197 1 197 3 197 5 197 7 197 9 198 1 198 3 198 5 198 7 198 9 199 1 199 3 199 5 196 5 196 7 196 9 199 7 199 9 200 1 200 3 • Following the large oil discoveries in 1970, the Norwegian Parliament imposed a virtual embargo on further licensing, lasting until the beginning of 1979. • In 1974, the Ministry of Finance issued White Paper no. 25, which warned against the oil curse and advocated a moderate pace in petroleum licensing. 5 Key issues for approval in a Field Development Plan (FDP) >> By controlling the pace of operations, Norway took time to understand and 4control petroleum operations, leading to the establishment of good petroleum governance. More importantly, Norway implemented its overall good governance theory. This helped the country overcome the threats of both the Dutch disease and the oil curse. It also helped manage the enormous petroleum revenue wisely. >> The lesson I have taken away from this remarkable success is that a host country that is determined to overcome the negative impacts of petroleum operations is also likely to succeed in harnessing its benefits. >> Norway developed a clear petroleum policy from the start and upheld social governance in implementing the policy. The glitter of high wages and rapid revenue were not allowed to destroy the national economy and social governance. 6 The Importance of Resource Assessment 7 Resource assessment is fundamental to petroleum governance • By the time I came to Norway in 1968, the oil companies had carried out extensive seismic surveys and had drilled 13 wildcat wells. They were, however, 5disillusioned. My first assignment from the Ministry of Industry was to assess the results to evaluate Norway’s future as an oil nation. • Within three months, my report to the ministry concluded that Norway was on the path to becoming a major oil producer. The oil companies had already made three oil discoveries. Drilled in relatively shallow water (less than 100 meters), they were not commercial discoveries. The technology to drill deeper wells was not readily available yet. • The regional seismic surveys indicated much thicker sediments and large structures in the southern part of the Norwegian North Sea. Fifteen months after my report, Phillips Petroleum Co. made a giant discovery at Ekofisk (December 1969). The field still produces. 8 Resource assessment is fundamental to petroleum governance • In the decades from 1970 until the present, our understanding of the North 6 Sea geology has changed continually and in different ways. • Several oil companies had found oil or gas in blocks that reputable oil companies had surrendered as hopeless. • Similarly, large discoveries were made in blocks that only one oil company had applied to explore. • Discoveries that were labelled oil-shows were later declared commercial, developed, and produced. • The role played by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) in promoting leads, plays, and prospects has been crucial in many instances. The diversity of licensees has been a major factor in increasing the number and size of discoveries. • It is, therefore, important for the host country to take a leading role in 9 exploring the full potential of the resource base in all areas. Input to Norway’s Approach 10 Sharing principles and attitudes 8• Following my report to the Ministry of Industry in 1968, key officials asked me about my recommendations. The message I provided was simple: Norway must prepare to become a major oil producer. It literally had no time to lose. • The reaction was surprisingly reserved. I was told that Norway had time to wait as long as its petroleum potential was not proven beyond doubt. • However, the Ministry of Industry was persuaded to increase personnel at the Petroleum Section gradually, from 4 workers in 1968 to 40 in 1972. • I arranged courses and workshops for our new recruits to teach them how to deal with various specific tasks. The main thrust of my efforts, however, was to discuss how the government administration of petroleum operations in Norway should be organized. 11 Sharing principles and attitudes 9 • I tried to offer ideas based on my experience in Iraq. Because I had worked for an international oil company, I was exposed to the oil companies’ perspective. But as an Iraqi, I was fully familiar with the government’s viewpoints and frustrations. I also knew the challenges facing the host country in developing its national capacity and competencies. • My new Norwegian colleagues had full faith in the traditional Norwegian approach. Their explanations, with my own international experience, provided the basis for selecting optimal ways for Norway to administer petroleum operations. • Discussions and workshops helped me understand and adopt the Norwegian approach. I also engaged in the free exchange of ideas and opinions without constraints or sentiments. 12 Sharing principles and attitudes • In retrospect, I consider the sessions at the Ministry of Industry 10 in Norway as fundamental in developing the positive relationship between the regulator and the licensees. • The sessions directly convinced the participants of a consistent and coherent set of principles and attitudes to be used in regulating the sector. • These principles and attitudes have helped to foster a good relationship between IOCs and national institutions as workshop personnel were appointed to several positions within the oil industry in Norway. • This has made it easier to build confidence between the Norwegian government personnel and the personnel working for 13 IOCs. Sector Organization 14 The state’s petroleum administration • When the time came in 1972 to decide on the optimal way to organize government institutions to govern the petroleum sector, I was luckily selected to write the first draft of a White Paper to the 11Parliament. • The subject had been covered in a proposal by a Special Committee appointed by the Ministry of Industry. My task was to prepare a proposal that summarized and explained the ministry’s comments and recommendations. • The first principle in the ministry’s recommendations was that the role of the ministry itself should in the future be focused on petroleum policy, legislation, planning, and licensing. • The recommendations suggested a regulation of operations to ensure compliance with the legislation, organized under a directorate called the NPD. The institution would be governed by the ministry but would have its own board of directors* to ensure fairness and neutrality in its decisions. The NPD operated independently from the state oil company. * The board was cancelled in the late 1980s 15 The state’s petroleum administration POLICY 12 MINISTRY IOC -1 • Administrative Separation • Fairness • Professional Integrity IOC -2 • Transparency REGULATORY BUSINESS IOC -n DIRECTORATE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY The state’s petroleum administration • Norway transferred the state’s commercial interest to a national oil company, Statoil,* organized as a share holding company that was 100% owned by the state. The company 13has no administrative role in governing the petroleum sector and is regulated by the ministry and the NPD, like all other licensees. • Apart from the privilege of receiving shares in the various licenses under the sole discretion of the ministry, Statoil has no advantage over the international oil companies. The government has restrained Statoil from exercising powers that would reduce the influence of the IOCs on licensing decisions. • Norway created a competitive environment in which the state benefitted from diversity among licensees to secure the full benefit of an oil company’s strength. This principle has secured great profit for Norway. * Statoil is now Equinor, which is 67% owned by government. 17 Institutional Integrity 18 Institutional integrity of the NPD • In the White Paper proposing the new state’s petroleum administration, there was emphasis on ensuring the institutional integrity and neutrality of the NPD, not only 14against the commercial interests of Statoil, but also against pressures that may be exerted from political groups.
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