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Sustained growth through diversification he INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA Quarterly Report and the INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA Issue TFocus series are published by the Centre for Social and Development Studies, based at the University of Natal, Durban. Opinions expressed in these publications are not necessarily those of the Editorial Committee and should not be taken to represent the policies of companies or organisations which are donor members of the Indicator Project South Africa. © Copyright for all material herein is held by INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA or individual authors, except in the case of short extracts for review or comment, which must be fully credited. © Sole copyright for all data bases rests with INDICATOR SOUTH AFRICA. Permission to republish or reproduce any part of this publication must be obtained from the publisher.

Editor Graham Howe Production/Design Rob Evans Conflict Research Antoinette Louw Secretary/Marketing Pat Fismer Marketing Assistant Charlene Nel

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Simon Bekker, Mark Bennett, Myrna Berkowitz, Rob Evans, Graham Howe, Mike McGrath, Valerie Miller, and Lawrence Schlemmer

• COVER ILLUSTRATION Jeff Rankin, Clear Pictures • REPRODUCTION WS Repro and Multigrciphics • PRINTING The Natal Witness

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Myths of the New Nation: Soviet/South African Parallels RW Johnson 7 Regional Tier Reforms Jeff McCarthy 11 Frying Big Fish: Campaigns against Corruption Robert Klitgaard 13 The CIP Broedertwis: Restanters and Volkstaters Janis Grobbelaar 17 PAC Politics after Codesa Evangelos Mantzaris 21 ECON The Fiscal Challenge: Avenues for Tax Reform Andre Roux 27 Economic Outlook McGrath and Holden 32 Monopolies: The Big Bad Wolf Smith and Brann 35

People on the Move: Migration Streams in the DFR Cross, Bekker and Clark 41 Case Studies of Shantytown: Upgrading Besters Settlement Taylor and van Horen 45 In the Land of Canaan Libby Ardington 47 Down Kennedy Road Stavrou and Luckin 49 Inward Development: Solutions to Urban Sprawl Behrens and Watson 51

Political Conflict in Natal, 1989 - 1992 Antoinette Louw 57 Mayhem in the Midlands: Battle for Bruntville Anthony Minnaar 60 The Ghosts of Trust Feed Mary de Haas 65 Slow Motion: Implementing the National Peace Accord Daniel Nina 69

Nationalisation: The Commanding Heights Jessica Schroenn 75 Growth Industry: Domestic Tourism in South Africa Karen Kohler 81 A Gender Agenda: The New Women's Coalition Pat Horn 85 A flurry of major events which began with the In other monitors, contributors prescribe practical Boipatong crisis led to the temporary collapse of cures and policy solutions to other ailments which negotiations at Codesa, a series of strikes, mass action complicate South Africa's condition: campaigns and renewed international pressure, in rapid succession in mid-1992 . As Indicator SA went 8 RW Johnson warns that ethnic and regional to print with this mid-year edition, South Africa interests cannot be submerged in the rhetoric of appeared on the brink of a worsening crisis facing 'nation-building', and that we face major what could aptly be described as our 'winter of challenges of national political and economic discontent'. integration. He draws some cautionary comparisons between the South African and Soviet The illustration on our main cover personifies the experience. body politic in a hoary state of ill-health. South Africa • Jeff McCarthy looks at NP and ANC proposals for in mid-1992 is afflicted by a complex of too many third tier reforms to democratise government and ailments. Do these social, economic and political balance the struggle between centralised and symptoms of transition reflect a society in the throes regional power blocs in South Africa. of a great rebirth or a slow decline? Are we in search of a quick fix for the patient when the cure • Janis Grobbelaar comments on CP demands for necessarily lies in a process of slow recuperation? regional self-determination and assesses the prospects for the revival of a non-racial Afrikaner We need a diagnosis of the basic maladies before we nationalism. can find the proper treatment. The single most • Bob Klitgaard identifies a culture of corruption in important statistic quoted in the media at present is the public sector, and mixes the kind of strong that more than 7 600 people have died in political medicine administered in other societies to root out violence since President de Klerk's landmark speech corruption. He argues that preventive systems offer on 2 February 1990: some 3 400 in 1990, 2 580 in the best cure in the long term. 1991 and 1 660 to date in 1992. The continuity of intense civil conflict over the last three years is • Smith, Brann and Schroenn reconsider the debates clearly shown on our political and urban monitor on the merits and disadvantages of industry covers (see data trends). The massacre at Boipatong monopolies and nationalisation, recognising the in mid-June 1992 brought home the severity of this evident tensions between economic rationality and ailment. socio-political objectives.

What causes public despair is that the profound It is obvious from these articles that there are no stresses in our society are increasing precisely at a simple solutions or quick fixes for South Africa. The time of reform and negotiation. The truism that ailments are long-established and the symptoms are periods of democratisation and transition are the most persistent. But there are long-term remedies which dangerous and unstable gives little succour. The might revive the body politic given the chance. We theory that a period of reform and heightened hope our readers find some consolation in the expectations followed by a period of recession and proactive solutions proposed by our contributors frustrated aspirations creates a volatile climate, along with their hard-headed realism! similarly brings no relief. The most such theories do is to contextualise and explain the high levels of Some exciting news on the publishing front. Indicator political violence. SA, in a collaborative venture with the Institute for Social Development at the University of the Western The urban monitor of Indicator SA carries a special Cape, will shortly be issuing a new special report in focus on political violence in the Natal region within our Issue Focus series. Entitled, 'Transforming the the national context. Four prominent analysts assess Economy: Policy Options for South Africa', this 250 inter alia the limitations of the National Peace Accord page report will make available a series of and the Goldstone Commission, judicial findings on international debates between eighteen leading the role of the security forces and vigilantes, the economists from the political, public and private struggles between hostel-dwellers and community sectors. It is divided into stimulating sections on residents, and the prospects for free and fair elections macro-economic, fiscal, monetary, social, labour, in the power struggle between Inkatha and the ANC. growth and development policy.

Graham Howe, Editor June 1992 OIlflCAL O N O R

FATALITIES IN POLITICAL CONFLICT JANUARY 1991 TO MID-1992

300 -i

250

200 -

1 50 -

100 -

50

o - I I i I I I I I I I JUNE JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY RSA TOTAL* TRANSVAAL 57 13 211 132 244 43 53 77 215 110 52 65 44 113 277 266 213 NATAL 82 135 128 125 94 115 96 100 65 66 106 78 89 120 162 86 79 223

I NATAL TRANSVAAL

Note: * This figure is for the period 01-06-92 to 23-06-92

Sources: Human Rights Commission Natal Monitor Black Sash, Pietermaritzburg Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg 'illinium, [[iiiiiiiiiiiniil

We at Johnson & Johnson prefer to take a long term view of things with an optimism borne of a sound reputation. A reputation based on superior levels of customer service and backed by personnel whose attention to product is equally uncompromising. By constantly reassessing, developing and setting higher standards we aim to continue to provide hospitals and their allied professions with an even more comprehensive range of professional products, serviced by our own specialized divisions: Critikon. Ethicon. And Surgikos. Look out for Johnson & Johnson. n j si n You'll discover a company setting new standards. Now. And in the future. ZttfiZL .«« MS Helping the hands that heal.

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(891 • (991 Together, we can do more Reg no — 01/02186/06 RWJohnson Department of Politics, University of Natal

The meeting between Boris Yeltsin and President de Klerk in Moscow in early June represented a historic dialogue between two of the great reformers on the world stage. Although they represent government and society which traditionally lie at opposite ends of the spectrum, both states are in the throes of a national crisis with broadly similar features. A visiting political analyst from Oxford teases out some of the parallels: nation-building myths, regional fragmentation, born-again ethnic movements, 50VIET/50UTH AFRICAN economic crisis and fierce political grievances. FARALLEL5

oulli Africans are being enjoined from pressure for the ex-Soviet Far East to •^all .sides to sink their differences of detach itself from its Western half in order race, ethnicity, religion and class in order to to gravitate towards Japan's zone of come logeiher as a 'new nation', to be influence. ruled. in ihe past, by a centralised state. Intellectually, this project dates back to the The application of this principle to South Cold War world of the mid- 1950s - a world Africa needs little emphasis but it might be of communist fronts and the Bandung noted in passing that nowhere else in the Conference, of McCarthyism and of third world has democratic government been world nationalism still in its euphoric phase achieved in a state the size of South Africa - and yet this project may now come to without resort to federalism. birlh in ihe vastly changed international eiiviroiimciii of the 1990s. For the old • the failure of state power world order changed irreversibly in 1989: Fragmentation is only one possible outcome the era born at Yalta and Bretton Woods within a wider contemporary phenomenon, now clearly lies behind. And already one the collapse of the state. The Soviet, may descry at least the principal features of Yugoslav and East German states not only (lie neu era: collapsed (as did all the other East European states) but are now actually J the fiut-furing of established states extinct. In Africa we have seen the Thus far we have seen the former USSR complete collapse of state power in Liberia, fracture into fifteen states and Yugsolavia Ethiopia (Addis Ababa was, by the end of into four (with the question of Macedonia 1991, the largest city in the world with no still pending). In Africa we have seen the police force) and Somalia. Zaire, birth of Eritrea and as multi-partyism Mozambique and Angola are close to the spreads (he OAU will probably have at last same fate. But reports of a breakdown into to surrender the notion that colonial banditry and warlordism now emanate not boundaries are sacred. It is difficult, for only from these states but from Albania, example, to imagine that either Sudan or Georgia and Rumania, and the real danger Zaire could survive the coming of exists that Russia could collapse back into democracy as single states. The same its pre-Romanov structure of great question must, at least, be posed in relation city-states (Kiev, Muscovy, Novgorod etc). to the advent of democracy in South Africa.

J In increasingly wide parts of the world the the emergence of smaller entities failing efficacy of state power is revealing There does appear to be a size principle at the medieval fundaments of the state, with work in this process: large states (as well as political power flowing to whichever local undemocratic states) are vulnerable to strongman is able to guarantee a supply of break-up simply because geography makes food and water and a modicum of security. that an option as a way out of deep-rooted This phenomenon is already visible in parts conflicts. One must expect fissiparous of South Africa. The real question here may tendencies to grow in India and China - and be not so much which political party is to for Russia to continue to fragment. Already control the future state but whether that one can find governors of major Russian state can prevent the further growth, at its cities like Vladivostock making their own own expense, of warlordism and petty foreign trade deals and there is increasing feudatories.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 7 msJZMXM ffiffiM South Africa, like J dominance of the G7 bloc of these had their own republics. Beyond the cx~USSR. is The large migratory flows occasioned by that there were twenty 'autonomous these political earthquakes have produced republics', eight 'autonomous national poised between regions' and ten 'national districts'. Under three political and strong reactive movements of racist nationalism within the highly-developed Stalin, however, federalism was almost commercial world of the 'Group of Seven' (G7). The wholly negated, stirrings of national supra-national greater reality is that the G7 states - Britain, self-assertion were crushed, there was a de- blocs in the global Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and facto Great Russian chauvinism and the the USA - are evolving at speed into three question of national compatibility was arena submerged, along with so much else, supra-national blocs which are ever more beneath the regime of terror. self-sufficient, both politically and commercially. These three blocs, both now and for the foreseeable future, will It took time for centrifugal trends to dominate the planet. became apparent even after de-Stalinisation and the relaxation of terror, and it was only The most striking effect of this G7 under Brezhnev that open agitation began dominance has been the ability of the among the Lithuanians, Crimean Tatars, highly developed states to dictate Jews, Armenians and Volga Germans. increasingly unequal terms of trade (despite Brezhnev dealt with the problem with his the 1973-80 OPEC revolution) with customary hypocrisy. The nationalities primary producers. This process - which problem was declared to be 'solved' and seems likely to continue - lies at the root of (some of) the latter three groups were the debt crisis and the governmental allowed to emigrate, while local elites collapse of many third world states. It has within the republics were bought off by also threatened to relegate down the Moscow turning a blind eye to their economic order those industrialised states growing corruption and nepotism. such as the ex-USSR, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa which are still In extreme cases local republican elites heavily dependent on the export of primary used their new autonomy to set up virtual commodities. The key question facing such mafia networks and to discriminate against states is what form of (subordinate) other minorities (including Russians) in relationship they will be able to build with their midst. But Moscow always insisted the three power blocs of G7, the choices that while a republic's First Secretary might ranging, in order of desirability, from be drawn from the relevant nationality The Bolsheviks incorporation through clientage to complete group, his second-in-command would long boasted of marginalisation. generally be a Russian or at least a Slav, their enlightened there to maintain a watching brief for recognition of Australia and New Zealand will doubtless Moscow. national be absorbed into the East Asian bloc but self-determination, South Africa, like the ex-USSR, is poised The fact that greater freedom had thus led cultural rights and between all three blocs. to corrupt and undemocratic government does not seem to have been a major extensive federal grievance: Soviet citizens were used to that arrangements anyway. And the claim, now often heard, The as® that the growing stagnation of Brezhnevism The question of South Africa's insertion led to a bitter festering of national into this tripolar system will only be settled grievances is only partially true. Really over the relatively long term. Of far more vociferous protest was heard from only two immediate significance is the question of directions: national fragmentation. Specifically, what • First, from groups such as the Crimean lessons for South Africa may be drawn Tatars, Volga Germans, Jews, Chechin from the fate of the USSR? and Yakuts, all of whom lacked the economic and administrative base for a The Soviet case is intriguing precisely separate institutional existence. Such because it was not a simple one of the groups demanded (unrealistically) their repression of national minorities: indeed, own republics or, alternatively, the right the Bolsheviks long boasted of their to emigrate. enlightened recognition of national • Second, from the Baltic states, where self-determination, with the full expression the legitimacy of the Soviet yoke had of cultural rights and extensive federal never been accepted. Ultimately, the arrangements. national revolutions here were far more akin to those seen in Eastern Europe and (Jl ilie I SSK\ 128 nationalities only 23 were fiercely anti-communist in a way Ikiw populaiions of over a million and 15 that was not true elsewhere in the

vsttmsmsaayjbs 8 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 cx-l'SSR, Independent Lithuania, Latvia federal handouts. Such Communist Regional HMonia did not apply for Party-based elites happily persecuted the grievances were membership of the new Commonwealth local nationalists whose dreams could only not acute in the threaten their own positions. of Independent States. Moldavia which, ex-USSR while like ilie Baltic states, was only incorporated into the USSR as a result U the Slavic republics local elites enjoyed of World War Two, represents an almost Russian was widely spoken in these autonomy, similarly straightforward case of republics, whose own languages were patronage and separatism in its wish to rejoin Rumania. anyway close to Russian. Ukraine was federal handouts always aware that it was a 'have' republic which lost from the process of federal redistribution and the Chernobyl disaster was a cause of bitter reproach against The sense of national grievance in the rest Moscow. Both republics felt they were of the USSR was far weaker. Again, two being culturally overwhelmed by Russia but differenl filiations may be distinguished: with only comparable levels of resentment: parents would, for example, voluntarily, if a j the southern (non-Slavic) republics little guiltily, put their children into Willi the exception of Kazakhstan these Russian-language schools to help them 'get republics are characterised by a high degree on'. of ethnic homogeneity. Autonomy not only mea/ii Ihe collapse into corrupt local Again, it would be wrong to speak of a I'ieldoms but the increasing use of the local burning sense of national grievance - and in language in a point where Russian was any case Ukraine, like Yugoslavia, is a often seldom spoken (and where each new recent construct and strongly divided: "cneraiion spoke it less than its western Ukraine, formerly part of Poland, predecessor). In practice such republics felt separate and looked west; eastern were fast slipping out of Moscow's control Ukraine contains 12 million Russians and and even 'central' institutions like the looked to Moscow. Here too a Party boss Arim and KGB had a tendency to 'go like Kravchuk felt no compunction about naliu'": when Edward Shevardnadze was harrying the local nationalists. given the task of cleaning up his native Georgia he had to call in the Moscow KGB In the complaisant atmosphere of The lessons from because the local KGB had become so Brezhnevism, official doctrine held that entwined with the local mafia networks separate nationalisms were withering away the Soviet case are who \\vre running the republic. in a process oisblizJienie (the drawing that regional together of peoples), preparatory to sliyanie secession will Many such republics accused Moscow of (a full fusion of peoples). By the 1970s occur if local elites inflicting environmental damage and Party theoreticians like Academician PN cannot see a future monoculture cropping on them, but there Fedoseev had begun to speak of a new for themselves was also a nagging resentment that the 'Soviet nation', an identity beyond nation within the national Russian language was exclusively used in or ethnicity: 'a new historical form of social all the central Soviet institutions such as the and international unity of people of system Army, the KGB, the central government different nations'. and in higher education institutions. A Georgian physicist, for example, could All this was swept away in 1991 as the speak Georgian in his local Academy of failure of Gorbachev's perestroika became Arts and Sciences but would know that to brutally apparent. The Party elites in power play in the big league - to become a in the republics saw the central government member of the Soviet Academy in Moscow collapsing, panicked at the thought that they - he would have to speak Russian. Elites in might share Gorbachev's fate and that the other fields were similarly conscious that hour of their local nationalists might finally the price of getting on was a degree of have struck, and so put themselves at the Russification. In the Asian republics written head of independence movements instead. languages were initially invented in an Nobody doubts that had Gorbachev made Arabic script but later a Cyrillic script was an offer of full federalism in 1987-88, the imposed upon them, as it was also in essentially conservative republican elites Moldavia. would have accepted it without difficulty and the Commonwealth of Independent These grievances mattered - but were not States (CIS) might never have been born really acute, certainly not while the local (though probably nothing could have held elites were allowed to feather their nests the secession of the Baltic states and, and hand out jobs to their families, and perhaps, Moldavia). There was little real while they all enjoyed local autonomy and anti-communist feeling and, indeed, the

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 9msJZMXM ffiffiM Economic failure new independent leadership was generally cohesive hitherto. It is more that when leads to political made up of the old Party bosses keeping confidence in the efficacy of the central fragmentation, their positions as born-again nationalists. state fails, these lower level identities simply become the natural repositories of even if social confidence and political organisation national/tribal People and elites alike fall back on them minorities have not jsesons for South Af because that is what there is. been particularly The lessons for South Africa have to be oppressed or seen within a context in which potential for No ideology of a 'common nationhood' is politically cohesive secessionist movements exists, even though proof against this - indeed, the very phrase the centre of the political stage is currently soon becomes treated as a provocation in held by those who preach the gospel of 'the itself. Nor is the much-haunted power of new nation' and 'the new South Africa', the central institutions (the SADF, SAP, local equivalents of slibzhenie and sliyanie. SABC, the parastatals etc) able to hold the situation for long: the world's biggest army In this high period of post-apartheid and secret police force, the Red Army and euphoria the arrival of glasnost is justly KGB, were unable to prevent the celebrated but the outcome of perestroika is dissolution of the USSR. yet to be seen. Already secessionist demands are on the table from one group Inevitably, the process of fragmentation is with a clear, if tenuous, economic and greatly assisted if political and administrative base - Bophuthatswana, and administrative divisions are already drawn from another (white CP-supporters) whose up along ethnic/linguistic lines, as was the territorial base is still unclear. A case in the USSR. In South Africa the old KwaZulu-Natal breakaway remains a threat provincial and homeland frameworks at one remove. The coming to power of a provide only a very rough-and-ready basis radical ANC government in which Africans for the forces of fragmentation; probably and communists play a preponderant role secessionist forces would see them as bases could well produce the potential for a from which to expand their territorial breakaway for an Afrikaans-speaking claims, a dangerous and messy option. coalition of whites and conservative coloureds in the Western Cape. Again, as in the Soviet case, a generous offer of federalism made in good time The lessons from the Soviet case are that could well be enough to reassure the crucial The process of such outcomes depend quite largely on the local elites on which so much hinges. It is fragmentation is extent to which local elites can see a future not enough for the central government to greatly assisted if for themselves within the system. Whether appoint unrepresentative token members political and such a future exists depends crucially on drawn from dissident minorities: in administrative the degree of economic success the pre-Gorbachev Moscow a number of major divisions are restructured central government can positions were held by radical Latvians, a deliver. fact which did nothing to assuage the already along grievances of the mass of Latvians who felt ethnic/linguistic Nothing de-legitimated the Gorbachev quite unrepresented by such figures. lines regime so much as its economic failure, just Having Joe Slovo or Jeremy Cronin in a as the economic failure of African future South African government would, nationalism up and down the continent for example, do nothing whatsoever to fatally undermined whatever new make whites feel better represented. institutions the newly independent states settled for. The South African case already As in the case of the ex-USSR, however, owes much to this factor - the collapse of one realises that while South Africa could the currency and falling real incomes under fragment at the edges, the overwhelming PW Botha fatally sapped the popular bulk of the population would be left in a legitimacy of an ancien regime which had, situation where territorial fragmentation until then, at least been able to offer growth offered no way out: those who live in the and stability. If a new post-apartheid Northern and Eastern Cape, along with regime were unable to offer as much, the most Free Staters and Transvaalers, would popular legitimacy and confidence it find themselves in their own version of the enjoyed would vanish very quickly indeed. Russian republic. For that is the final truth: the challenges of perestroika can only be In such an environment, the Soviet example evaded for so long by resort to nationalist suggests, the pressures towards political rhetoric and born-again ethnicity: in the end fragmentation are quick to develop, even if the challenges of political and economic national/tribal minorities have not been integration have to be met head on. |]G)(Jfi\ particularly oppressed or politically

vsttmsm saayjbs 10 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 REGIONAL TIER REFORMS Jeff McCarthy, Department of Geography, University of Natal, Pietermantzburg

/,,,,/„ around politically at the moment, who structures proposed for such regions. Rather, they simply became novel units of bureaucratic control, •'Clll\ mobilises regionally? Inkatha, the CP in the \\'"iicrn Transvaal, a number of bantustan elites ... administration and development planning. The political inputs into this administration and fPUackv. 1992) development planning process still came from bodies that were framed within the terms of a racially-based Roth the NP, DP and ANC have proposed new constitution (for instance, the racially exclusive local models for restructuring the lower tiers of authorities). Hence for example, the so-called aownment. A brief review follows on the key planning regions received inputs from homeland and challenqes facing metropolitan and regional provincial politicians, and the RSCs and JSBs were administered by representatives of white, black, government in the era of constitutional negotiations. Indian and coloured local authorities.

rry crisis of local and regional government With the advent of the de Klerk era little thought or X diirnu the 1980s centred upon a complex effort was initially devoted to issues of local and interdependence of legitimacy and fiscal regional government restructuring, either by the NP considerations. Put simply, racial divisions between or the ANC. Instead, the focus was on establishing local ami regional government structures were both processes of de-racialisation and negotiation at the politically unpopular and financially unviable. central level.

The legitimacy crisis of local and regional sioverninent deepened during the decade. Black Local ANG/Nlfp ,i

16INDICATORS A Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 government structures and longer term local Of course there need not ultimately be a choice constitutional change. between either the larger regional or the smaller metropolitan tier. Rather the issue is one of the At the regional scale there has been a remarkable relative emphasis and powers accorded to each. The convergence of thinking between the government and author's experience with local and regional the ANC. This consensus has not, however, been government challenges is consistent with reached without a measure of dissent within the ANC Wittenberg's view: that is, that priority ought to shift itself. A recently issued policy document, produced to the RSC/JSB or county scale of 'regional' by the Constitutional Committee of the ANC, government. However, new, empowered metropolitan suggests ten regions for South Africa's second tier of regions need not conform to existing RSC or JSB government (ANC, 1992b). These regions almost boundaries. Indeed, the first challenge we need to exactly mirror the 1981 Department ofPlanning's grasp in the restructuring of local and regional regional borders (the main differences are those that government is that of regional definition. occur in the Transkei/Border area so as to apparently achieve unity of the 'Xhosa' people). Criticism from It is possible to envisage an inclusive, popular within ANC-aligned circles of this stance is that the process of regional definition, in terms of which the so-called ten regions 'seem to be a negotiating tool to inside of regions (with fuzzy boundaries, if appease current sub-national power blocks' (Platzky, necessary) become identified first along with their 1992a). This is a thinly veiled reference to primary developmental and reconstructionist compromise with homeland governments and challenges. Only subsequently does one need to get right-wing groups, which could retain and even into the geographic and technocratic detail of expand some of their local power through the ANC's boundaries, perhaps bringing in the expertise of a regional proposals. non-partisan delimitation commission. If such a process is set in train, I will predict that we will find Although the ANC's Department of Local and that 'meaningful' regions, for the average citizen, are Regional Government has rejected the NP's Interim probably a lot smaller than the nine planning regions Measures for Local Government Act as a mechanism identified by government in 1981, and now being for achieving local government reform, its new policy emulated by the ANC's Constitutional Committee document on local and metropolitan government with their proposal for ten regions: that is to say, there indicates a modulated and considered position which would be smaller regions at the level of the rural is not very different from that which had been county, or the level of the metropolitan region. suggested, say, by centrist organisations such as the Democratic Party and the Urban Foundation. It is recognised that regional boundaries established in 1910, or later, through the creation of homelands, The new ANC local government document argues may seem a suitable 'practical' point of departure for however that racially-based local authorities must be striking political compromises. Yet, as Platzky 'disestablished' and that the boundaries of local (1992a) observes, if pragmatism alone is at stake the authorities must be drawn so that 'the entire question still arises 'why adapt the DBS A proposal functional area of a city, town or rural area is and ignore metropolitan areas and RSCs which are incorporated, including its industrial area and more viable functional units?' artificially created Bantustan and commuter towns'(ANC, 1992a). For the rest, it sees local There is of course much work remaining to be done government functions much as they are now, although on the future of the regional tier. A metropolitan or there is emphasis upon affirmative action, openness rural county focus upon local economic development and democratisation of the civil service, and post-apartheid reconstruction may provide a redistribution, local economic development, sensible point of departure. Most important of all, participatory community development and, of course, however, is the need for agreement upon a process for non-racialism. initiating metropolitan and regional government restructuring in a 'bottom up' way, and which allows for some autonomy from the restructuring of central institutions. There are many parties which claim to Relative Power Baflanee support decentralised government and/or a measure The former UDF activist, Wittenberg (1982), in a of local participatory democracy. The challenge of the critique of the ANC's proposals for regional 1990s will be to ensure that the commitment is not government, suggests that from a mass-democratic merely rhetorical. Qpdfii perspective, there is more to gain from a strong local and metropolitan tier than there is from strong REFERENCES regional ties, as previously proposed by the ANC's African National Congress. 'A New System of Local and Metropolitan Government for South Constitutional Committee (ANC 1992b): Africa'. Johannesburg: ANC Department of Local Government, 1992a. African National Congress. 'Ten Proposed Regions for a United South Africa'. Cape Town: Experience suggests that anything bigger than the Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1992b. areas currently covered by the RSCs/JSBs inhibits Platsky L. 'Regional boundaries: Is the ANC giving in to ethnic federalism?' WIP Sup 2,1992a. popular participation, 'this suggests that the Piatsky L. 'Regional Development Planning in South Africa -a Critical Look at Historical lundiiiiicnnd rational unit should be an entity akin Processes', Unpublished manuscript. Cape Town: Development Action Group, 1992b. to the English i nitiity. Wittenberg M. 'Regions and Regional Government in South Africa: a Critique of the ANC Policy document', unpublished manuscript. Pmb: Geography Dept, University of Natal, 1992. vsttmsm saayjbs 12 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Robert Klitgaard Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Natal

South Africans have been outraged by several recent corruption scandals in government. Popular reactions range from moralism to cynicism, as they do worldwide. 'Corruption is like sin, it's always there'. Will it take a moral revolution to eradicate this political disease? A visiting professor from Havard University looks at what citizens can do when the people on top are corrupt, or worse, when the whole system is corrupt.

I n )l>90, Tan/anians debated a proposed They take steps to break what might be Xnaiional campaign against corruption, called the culture of corruption and '['lie public was skeptical. On the front page irresponsibility, which means in the first of a government-run newspaper, a lecturer instance 'frying big fish'. at the ruling party's ideological college They strengthen systems to prevent wrote. 'Wehave the Anti-Corruption Squad corruption and inefficiency which under the President's office, the Permanent means more transparency and improved Commission of Inquiry, the Leadership incentives. Code, the Control and Discipline They involve public and civic Com mission of the Party and courts of law. organisations in the campaign for What else do we need?' Despite it all, responsibility and efficiency in corruption reigned supreme. government.

At about the same time, an article published in Guatemala illustrated another alarmingly Culture of Corruption widespread view. 'When in a society the shameless triumph', the author began, A culture of corruption and irresponsibility 'when the abuser is admired; when follows from years of abuse. People begin principles end and only opportunism to expect corruption and to perceive prevails; when the insolent rule and the corruption even when it is absent. A people tolerate it; when everything becomes pervasive cynicism develops about corrupt but the majority is quiet because government and big business. Indeed, a their slice is waiting ... perhaps it is time to characteristic of underdevelopment is the stop being a Quixote; it is time to review defeatist attitude that nothing can be done our activities ...' about such problems.

Corruption breeds moralism and despair. In Fortunately, we know from experience in my own work, I have tried to urge a many poor countries that corruption can be different approach. Instead of viewing reduced if never eliminated. An important corruption as a problem of individuals who lesson from such experience is this: one has need better morals, corruption is a problem to break the culture of corruption by frying of systems that need better information and big fish in public. incentives. Instead of despairing, we should be optimistic. Experience in other countries A cynical population does not believe mere shows that corruption can be controlled, words. It asks for actions. And it does not although sadly never eliminated. place stock in actions against the little guy, such as a low-level bureaucrat or a minor I ha\ 'e studied and participated in successful tax evader. For the public to believe that an anti-corruption campaigns in several effective campaign for responsible countries. Perhaps surprisingly, the government is truly underway, big fish strategies that yield results have some must be fried. common features:

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 13 msJZMXM ffiffiM Corruption is not An example is Mexican President Carlos DmeomfSv© Strategy so much a maltoi Salinas's bold prosecution of La Quina (the head of the powerful PEMEX labour union) But just as the best medicine is preventive, of ideology or and top members of his own party. In Hong so too a strategy against corruption cannot culture or even Kong's successful anti-corruption end with the prosecution of the guilty. In morality as it is one campaign in the early 1970s, a key step was the case of corruption, prevention means of motive and the extradition and prosecution of a corrupt analysing systems. opportunity former commissioner of police, who had retired with millions in the United Corruption is not so much a matter of Kingdom. ideology or culture or even morality as it is one of motive and opportunity. Public The big fish can be major tax evaders, servants have the motive when they are preferably from the party or parties in poorly paid, when pay is not linked to power. (If only opposition figures are performance, when the rewards from attacked, the culture of corruption will not corruption are high, and when the chance of be cracked.) Or the big fish can be being caught and the penalties if caught are high-level bureaucrats and officials in small. Public servants have the opportunity public enterprises, as in the Philippines and when they have monopoly power plus Singapore. The big fish may be people in discretion minus accountability. Therefore, government who are clearly living beyond the starting point for fighting corruption is their public salaries, even if it cannot be the systematic reform of the motives and proved that they achieved their wealth opportunities facing public officials. A corruptly. In Singapore and Hong Kong, campaign against corruption must improve where the burden of proof has been shifted, incentives, reduce government monopoly rich officials must prove, if asked, that their power, limit the discretion of officials, and wealth was achieved legally. improve systems of accountability and information. Big fish need not be strictly speaking 'corrupt'. They may be the friends or A similar analysis may be made of corrupt family of leading officials who themselves institutions in the private sector. Except for have been appointed to high office. The embezzlement and a few other forms of perception of nepotism is the enemy of corruption, it takes two to tango: someone change. It is worthwhile considering ways inside the government, and someone to change that perception by replacing outside. But for purposes of this article, let A campaign appointments perceived to be nepotistic us focus on public sector reforms. against corruption while simultaneously passing new rules that must improve forbid the hiring of close relatives without A campaign against corruption should not strict meritocratic checks. incentives, reduce be billed as an attack on civil servants but as a challenge to them. The government monopoly power, 'Frying big fish' may mean conviction in should work with officials in each ministry limit the discretion court. But it does not have to. It may be to create specific goals and measures of of officials, and enough that publicity is generated against success. Part of their pay and promotions improve systems of the big fish, that their names are ruined, to should be linked to achieving those accountability and send a powerful signal to the populace that measures. Officials should be enabled to information the rules of the game have changed. In the , earn an honest living and to show that they Philippines, the tax commissioner knew it are getting results. At the same time, we would take two years to convict corrupt must improve information and control officials. He went ahead with that legal systems so that both good and bad behavior process, but he also let the press have lots are more easily discovered. of information about the people and their offenses. The resulting torrent of Incentive problems in the public sector will investigative reporting led to shame (and become a key development issue in the three heart attacks), which both deterred 1990s. Change is underway. Many corruption and helped to change the countries are experimenting with incentives popular belief that the 'big boys' are linked to measurable results in the public exempt. sector. For example: • performance contracts with public How can South Africans crack down on big enterprises, where some part of pay fish? How can the government overcome depends on efficiency measured in the perception that big offenders, tax terms of pre-set goals; evaders, or bribe-givers go unpunished? • sharing user charges with government What kinds of 'frying' might there be, aside officials (this has enjoyed success in from the inevitably slow process of the law? Nigeria); • setting school-level performance

16 INDICATORS A Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 measures and then having other teachers of the level of government salaries. Rather, What incentives cvaiuaie how well schools are doing and it is the linkage between pay and can be created for achievement that is at issue. giving successful schools bonuses that the prevention, the are shared among employees (e.g. in the reporting, and the Us): Changing incentives involves several steps. One must begin to redefine the prosecution of • ajinpeiilion between the public sector organisation's objectives. Then one must fraud, waste, and ami ihc private sector in performing specify measurable results and collect abuse in L-crtain public services (such as job information on their achievement. Finally, placement, road repairs, auditing, etc.); government? some part of pay and other benefits, such as • shariii'J increases in customs revenues promotions or training or travel or office wi'ih customs officials; size, must be linked to the results. • sharing reductions in construction costs Successful efforts to fight corruption often for equal quality work (based on involve these same steps. jrdependent audits) with responsible officials. Often the reductions reflect To the South African government, one simplv a reduction or elimination in might pose several questions for high-level cxpen'siN e kickbacks; and, brainstorming. How might one initiate • sharing lax revenues or bill collection or experiments with public-sector incentives? savings from detected corruption with It is advisable not to begin with the whole ll-osc responsible. government at once, and remember the A recent book called Paying for issue is not a simple raise in pay. Instead, I'crforimince reviews the literature on one might start in key areas where incentive efforts lo link compensation with experiments could be self-financing - for measurable results (Blinder, 1990). It draws example, taxes, public works, customs, iwo general conclusions. First, linking pay public enterprises, detecting fraud and to performance does lead to greater corruption, and so forth. Can part of the efficiency. Second, it is important that those money saved through greater efficiency be doing Ihe w ork be involved in setting the promised to employees if and only if they measures of their own performance. The are successful? What incentives can be need for employee involvement is created for the prevention, the reporting, especially important in the public sector. and the prosecution of fraud, waste, and abuse in government? Linking pa\ to productivity is not easy, The greatest even in the private sector. Rosabeth Moss enemy of Kanler's book on business in the 1990s, Involving P"UDLILC O corruption is the When (Hams Learn to Dance, has a chapter people - this is why on the generic problems of incentive The greatest enemy of corruption is the systems in corporations. She says the five people. This is why almost every new almost every new ke\ [radeoil's in incentive systems are government - elected or not - justifies itself government individual vs group contributions, whole by promising to combat the corruption of promises to agenc\ \ s units, discretion of management the previous regime. It knows that the combat the vs automatic or target-based goals, relative people despise corruption and understand corruption of the to base na> vs relative to the value of the the corrosion of incentives that it entails. contributions to the agency, and a single previous regime system vs. multiple systems. Many of these Successful campaigns against corruption problems are even harder in the public involve the people. For example, take Hong sector, where outputs are more difficult to Kong's Independent Commission Against measure and politics are paramount. Corruption. The ICAC had three components. One concerned prosecution Despite the problems, sooner or later we and went after big fish. Another stressed must recognise that our public officials now prevention and worked with government iacc perverse incentives. In the public agencies to make systematic reforms. sector, working harder or better is not necessarily rewarded. Saving the The third component involved the people. governmenl money-cutting costs, raising Six citizen oversight bodies acted like quality, discovering and rooting out boards of directors over various of the corruption, teaching students more - does ICAC's activities. The ICAC also set up not result in a higher salary or better offices in the barrios. These offices joined benefits. Given low pay and no incentives, together employees of the ICAC, members it should be no surprise when government of the barrio council or local government, does not work well. and citizens, meaning housewives and business people but, importantly, The issue of incentives is not the old issue representatives of civic associations.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 15msJZMXM ffiffiM }

The corruption The civic associations brought both What about government-wide? Would scandals mean it is competence and credibility. Take auditors' make sense to create something like I Ion., time for South and accountants' associations, for example. Kong's Independent Commission Ag.iinsi Africa to rethink They know a lot about detecting corruption. Corruption? The ICAC was more than an They also have a strong reputation for investigatory body; it also took on the n>lt..s institutional honesty and, because they are not of the of prevention and of interacting with the strategies for government, for independence as well. public in a two-way flow of information. promoting Should South Africa also have an responsibility and The people can be an invaluable source of institution that saw its mission as going efficiency in information about where corruption and beyond the uncovering and prosecution o| scandals? government inefficiency occur. They can be tapped for reports of isolated cases as well as chronic problems - they know where government is 4 working and where it is not. This does not 3a m irni lofM in1bC A mean, of course, that every anonymous accusation of corruption is to be believed. South Africa is embarked on the road to a In fact, most are false. But a trustworthy new era of democracy. One challenge is the body with technical competence to managing of macropolitical reform. But the investigate corruption can sift through the corruption scandals remind us that it now reports it receives from the people, looking may be opportune for the government to for patterns and for cases that are important move at another level: to rethink and systematic. This is what the ICAC did institutional strategies for promoting in Hong Kong - with the people's responsibility and efficiency in government. involvement. The beginning of a practical approach is in In the case of South Africa, can one leave moralisms and despair aside, at least imagine a campaign against corruption that temporarily, and analyse corrupt systems ol involved civic associations, professional incentives and information. This means gremios of accountants and lawyers, local demystifying corruption and treating it as a councils, and labour unions? Could such an problem of public policy and management. effort work in South Africa? How might it be structured as an experiment? What parts To stimulate such a rethinking, South of the central government would participate Africans might work through several and how? clusters of questions: Should new offices • What can the government do to break be set up inside Inside allegedly corrupt agencies, is there a the culture of corruption, for example, government, which need for a credible, competent, central by frying big fish? would have the location where complaints can be made and • How can the government prevent power to abuses reported without fear of reprisals? corruption and promote efficiency by investigate Experience in other countries shows that redefining objectives, limiting such mechanisms can be effective. monopoly, clarifying discretion, corruption and to promoting accountability, and linking work on preventive For example, in the successful effort to public-sector rewards to results? reforms? clean up the Bureau of Internal Revenue in • How can the public be involved in the the Philippines, the new director created campaign for responsibility and such an internal body. He talked with many v efficiency in government? employees, who were not willing to name • Should new offices be set up (inside the corrupt but would readily say that Mr X government agencies and/or at the and Mrs Y were honest and good. He government-wide level) perhaps as an selected six of the honest heroes and experiment, which would have not only brought in six young CTA's to work with the credibility and power to investigate them. reports of corruption but to work on preventive measures and systematic This team carried out special studies for the reforms? director, investigated cases at random, and • In the battle against corruption, how can served as the place where employees could civic associations, unions, and report irresponsibility and inefficiency. In professional organisations be involved? IMS time, a public hotline was installed, where the people could also complain. Again, REFERENCES many reports of corruption are inaccurate Blinder AS (ed). Paying lor Productivity: A Look at the Evidence. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990. or self-serving, perhaps most; but the open Kanter RM. When Giants Learn to Dance: Mastering the Challenge of line of communication for people within Strategy, Management, and Careers in the 1990s. New York: Simon and and outside the organisation was crucial to Schuster, 1989. the reduction of corruption. Klitgaard R. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ot California Press, 1988:ch2,3.

i^aofflsaa sM!B©§ 16 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Professor Janis Grobbelaar Department of Sociology, Unisa

WRWS

What are the consequences of the referendum result for the Conservative Party and the future of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa? More significantly, how will internal struggles in the CP, as a result of the referendum, influence their position on national negotiations at Codesa and more importantly the future of Afrikaner nationalism?

Tl would lie foolish to suggest that the whites 'endorse[d] negotiations with a JLa-lcivnilimi result has once and for all future ANC-dominated government in shown thai the "ultra right-wing' is a mind' or that whites accepted the possibility lnr(-v 'n South African politics. that the NP would indeed 'negotiate itself Tins would he 10 discount the impressive out of power' (Indicator SA, Vol9/No2, irack record, historical role and resilience of 1992:7). Afrikaner naiionalism in South Africa. In the aftermath of the referendum and The weight aiul meaning of the numbers of Codesa Two, new splits in traditionally No referendum voters should be briefly white political formations and in particular, cons dered in iliis debate. The outcome of divisions and regroupings amongst the CP the 17 March I *)92 referendum on and its Afrikaner nationalist associates con.s'iiiiiiniiiil reform among South Africa's appear to be imminent. In this regard note legalh classjjh-d white voters is widely should be taken of comments in the CP known. Approximately 31% or 875 619 newspaper, Patriot, over the past few people exercised a No vote, months. Its intrepid editor, ZB du Toit, has notwithstanding the massive media and been gently hinting at political fusions and state campaign for a Yes vote. Such a reconstitutions around the notion of an si/.eable group of white No voters can Afrikaner nationalism which is obviousK pla\ a potentially significant role reinvigorated and stripped of all racial in llie disoiuisc and trade-offs of connotations. conlcmpoian. South African politics. The referendum result reflects If both I )oii;ild Simpson's (Citizen, 19/3/92) proportionately close numerical divides and CI' research estimates are to be amongst whites in the Transvaal, OFS and believed (personal communication, May North Western Cape areas when compared IW2). IS i (u)(i to 200 000 CP supporters with the rest of South Africa. Excluding the voted Yes in the referendum. This would commercial heart of the PWV, namely the translate into a CP support base of roughly geographically small referendum regions of 1,1 million people. How do we interpret the Johannesburg and Germiston, these areas nature of [lie dynamics involved in 200 000 reflect a potentially debilitating and tenuous 'shifting' CP supporters? Are they not a statistical cleavage between white reflection of the tensions, capriciousness powerholders: and transience wracking South Africa's white power holders in general and r Afrikanerdom in particular? YES NO

Pietersburg 56,8% Attempts to consider these questions should take cognisance of Lawrence Schlemmer's Pretoria 57,3% arguments (in the previous edition of this Roodepoort 52,3% journal) in relation to the existence and Kroonstad 51,5% significance of major contrasting Bloemfontein 58,5% interpretations of de Klerk's Yes Kimberley 54,4% referendum mandate, in the negotiations at (Source: Indicator SA, Vol9/No2 , 1992) Codesa. He suggests inter alia, that the Yes V vote cannot be interpreted to mean that

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 17 msJZMXM ffiffiM In consequence the NP is at present Considerable In short, these figures reflect a considerably higher proportion of No votes amongst the claiming the overwhelming and evidence exists as six aforementioned regions than in general. undifferentiated support of the white to the potential for The mean No vote for these regions - power-holding constituency. (This, ultra-rightwing 47,2% - indicates a 'positive' differential in notwithstanding the undeniable confusion destabilisation of the region of 15,9% (i.e. as compared with and contrary interpretations surroundiim ||)e the transition 31,3% of No votes for the country as a Yes mandate). Not only government and process in South whole). the public media but also the international lobby, the ANC and the other negotiaiois ;u Africa Whilst these results appear to exclusively Codesa Two have been able in comparable reflect on its regional strength and the fashion, to negate the significance oi t Ik- parameters of the main thrust of CP support CP. In a nutshell, in Afrikaner nationalist - as it crystalised in the first general terms, the decisive battle within the election the party fought (1987) and was parameters of the old South African consolidated in the 1989 general election - constitutional script for political pov. u has they also demonstrate uncertainty, been lost within this context. flexibility and political instability amongst white interests in these regions. The loss may well serve in a paradoxical sense to clear up some of the existin;.'. Moreover, throughout the referendum growing confusion in ultra-rightwing campaign the CP and its allies refused to politics. The rejuvenation of Afrikanet accept the political consequences of a nationalism in a new guise, together with majority Yes vote in terms of democratic the disintegration of its chief organisational practice. They argued and continue to argue infrastructure the CP, although an extreme that their fight for self-determination and option, is possible. Or alternatively and in survival would inevitably persist. In the the ringing words of an ultra-rightwing face of the NP's tenuous negotiation journal: 'we must accept the challenge of mandate at Codesa and the strength of the the great internal transition of becoming a No vote, the negation of the CP and more true national movement' (SA Observer, particularly Afrikaner nationalism would be Vol35/No7,1992:4). shortsighted, in at least the above geographically congruent and economically There has been rife press speculation on the significant areas. CP's future, particularly in the aftermath of the expulsion of two CP members of In the wake of the It may be argued that therefore that the NP parliament from the party since the referendum result government's control is proportionately as referendum. In a sense they have served to the CP is being well as ideologically fragile, and that promote the notion of the impending demise of Afrikaner nationalism and of the forced to confront considerable evidence exists as to the potential for ultra-rightwing destabilisation CP as relevant actors on the South African the fact that its of the transition process in South Africa (at stage. participation and least in the short term). showing has lost it Interviewed by the author, CP influence spokespeople agreed that the party was required to 're-evaluate its strategy' as a consequence of the referendum result. For Tensions around policy, strategy and their part, the excommunicated CP leadership already existent in the members of parliament, Koos van der Conservative Party and wider (post-1982) Merwe and Koos Botha are officially Afrikaner nationalist network, have viewed as individual problems rather than seriously worsened since the 1989 general as representative of long-seething policy, election (Grobbelaar, 1992). This despite leadership and strategy tensions. the often euphoric CP response to interim by-election wins such as Potchefstroom in early 1992. New Proposals In the wake of the referendum result the CP After the referendum, the party formally is being forced to confront the 'fact' that its appointed seven constitutional and strategy participation and showing has inadvertently committees to study the outcome as well lost it influence. The CP is as a result make recommendations on future strategy. unable, via its chosen constitutional and They reported to the parliamentary caucus parliamentary route, to institutionally focus as well as to the CP head committee which meaningful picssiire on government announced on 6 June 1992 a series of power sinn ing policies. In short, it appears policy proposals and future plans. to 11a\e lost iis mlluence in white politics.

©©nwasaii iAaasi&fciS 18 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 not, it should be pointed out, empowered to The volkstaters ri>\ new LonslVbesluite(suggested Tlic \ • ii'i- concerned with addressing make or change policy. It is only a general aim to promote and ^'^'"I's Cithi'i'lH- Party. They are congress, a biannual event, that can do this. bargain for 1 The congress could not break the impasse. fr' '" „,s v, hu ll it'accepted will change Afrikaner The strength of the rebels forced Treurnicht I i-lViins in South Africa. In principle nationalist S to devise a new holding strategy. '! "Liie for a (uncertain) revision of self-determina tion l!,Cy,i'T Lie,- the .so-called CP policy of CX* S)1 which la-clai.n to'1913/1936 by all possible i m Ac'i' South. -NlVica, i.e. in essentially The CP Divide means •Grand Apartheid" or Vcrwoerdian terms. Whilst the CP elite has been careful, clearly The new Iy arnouiuvd policy (Rapport, as a matter of pressing caucus discipline, not to promote division, it has become l l(l lait! claim in W/'P- H<' ' obvious through a series of recent somewhat dubious terms to a smaller interviews that the party is indeed reaching nortion of South Alt ica's land mass (than a point of crisis. The battle lines are was previous!v the l ase). The CP presently evidently drawn. In the language of party |i()]ds thirlN -nine parliamentary seats in the 'insiders', division has come to be Hou^e of AsscmbK thirty in the expressed by the notions, volkstaters and Transvaal, sca en in the OFS and two in the restanters. t'iipc. The communique essentially advocated that these areas (plus any other • volkstaters areas that wish to i. should become the The volkstaters (the 'homelanders') are the icrriu>r> in w hid) w hitc Afrikaners will rebels within the confines of the practice self-determination or political Conservative Party. Their discourse departs domination in a proposed confederation or from the notion that white Afrikaners have commonwealth of South African states. essentially lost their political power, their Towards this end. the party is only willing land and hence their ability to determine to negotiate w ith the recognised leaders of their own future. According to r#>/Ar (nations). I Ins policy excludes, for spokespeople in interviews with the author, example, the .W'. h allegedly does not their purpose is to promote and bargain for represent a i <>//!( It should be remembered Afrikaner nationalist self-determination by iliat a stralCL'\ oi \!i\ ide and rule' has (almost) all possible means. The restanters are served Afrikaner nationalism well in the the apartheid past). These means could singly or in traditionalists who combination include: In an ahoiil-inrn. the CP has recently begun • participating in Codesa; cling to the notion to talk to the XT on constitutional issues, • reconstituting Afrikaner nationalism so that political power lutcrestingh. tin- \T has allocated a high as to ensure its moral acceptability as a will remain in white powered team under the leadership of Roelf legitimate force both at home and hands Meyer, newly appointed minister of internationally (i.e., attempting to strip C'onsiituiioii;il I i.-velopment, to engage this away its racial base); task. The importance of this step should not • creating new alliances across existing be underestimated. Until now the CP has white Afrikaner party-political divides refused to negotiate with the NP outside of (e.g. incorporating Afrikaners from the the norms of parliamentary practice. The NP, DP and perhaps, even the ANC); NP is viewed as having sold out white • replacing the CP leadership with one Afrikaner interests to the enemy. better able to provide a new vision; • splitting the CP; Emotionally, the divide between these • incorporating more fully Afrikaner brothers ibroedcriwis) is extremely bitter, nationalist 'think tanks' such as the particularly since the day of de Klerk's Afrikanervryheidstigtmg under Carel landmark reform speech, Rooivrydag or Boshoff and the Eenheidskomitee 25; Red Friday (2 February 1990). Hence the • giving serious consideration to and CP's hitherto failure to take up any of de devising proposals within the context of Klerk s invitations to engage the NP or the a federal option which grants regional Codesa negotiation process. Afrikaner self-determination; • striving toward radical geographical One final significant point needs to be secession, including the noted about the CP's policy proposals. The Afrikanervryheidstigting's proposals for CP head committee statement issued on 6 the relatively uninhabited North Western June 1992 also announced the general Cape; and finally, congress subsequently held on 27 June • negotiating with the ANC in a spirit of 1992. Hie party's parliamentary caucus is 'reconciliation'!

•Vinter 1992 19 f?@(UKffl§Q& 'MM Ultimately, according to its spokespeople, These divisions within the CP acci mm i The CP will now r attempt to engage the volkstater group in the CP is committed the apparent inability on Andries " to working towards a 'viable' and Treurnicht's part to clearly spell out; all the significant 'reasonable' option for Afrikaner vision at the press conference on 6 .lnIK,. political players so nationalist self-determination within the well as the acceptance of a verbal piopo^i as to promote and parameters of the changed playing field in for further discussion at the congre^ |iL.|(| legitimate the South Africa. In the view of one of its on 27 June. There are nine out of a mui ()| notion of Afrikaner leading figures, Afrikaners need an ideal, a eighteen 1982 breakaway or charter CP nationalist reconstituted vision towards which they can members of parliament still in the caucus strive and fall back on - an Israeli opsie They form the kernel of the restanim. self-determination (Israel option). Ferdie Hartzenberg is seen as the instrumental leader of what is essentially The time frame is regarded by this group of the party's old guard. voikstaters to be extremely pressing. They fear that 'reasoned' opportunity is passing them by, and immense pressure is therefore building up within the CP. Violence is seen rrooiooess as a real but last option and understood to If the rebels, the voikstaters, are unable in be doomed to failure unless a morally take control or make real headway it is justified and 'fair' vision drives and likely that they will leave the Conservaiivc underpins it. Andries Beyers - member of Party's fold. No matter how effectiveh ihe parliament for Potchefstroom and CP restanters control the damage in the e\eni general secretary - is favoured by many for of such a split, the party is doomed to the position of leader either of a 'new' or of 'passively' fade away and disintegrate an alternative political formation. without a regenerating and dynamic vision.

• restanters The lack of a dynamic institutional and The restanters (the 'left-overs') are organisational framework like that of the REFERENCES essentially the apartheid traditionalists CP at present, will further alienate the large Afrikaner Freedom Foundation. 'Codesa and Afrikaner self-determination'. within the Conservative Party. Their mass of already alienated people on the Pretoria, 1992. position is rooted in the context of their rightwing (given that the CP will fail to Beyers A. Hansard, May 1992. history as powerholders in South Africa; in hold them). It will also most certainly 'live' Boshoff CWH, CJ Jooste, MR Marais en the notion that white people legally own those on the fringes. An increase in militant DJ Viljoen. 'Die volkstaat as Afrikanerbestemming'. Pretoria: SABRA, two-thirds of the land in South Africa and and politically destabilising action on ihe 1989. that political power, no matter how part of these people would surely be the Booysen H. 'Boerevolkstaat kort en tenuously, is still vested in their hands. consequence of such a scenario. kragtig'. Pretoria: Oranjewerkers Codesa is seen as doomed to failure. The Promosies, 1985. restanters plan to pick up the pieces and Bruwer PF, HF Verwoerd, BHA van den In the event of the voikstaters hijacking the Berg, M van Heerden, JW Fischer. reconstruct South Africa in their own image. party we are likely to see an almost 'Afrikanerland - 'n gebiedsaanduiding'. Morgenzon: Oranjewerkers Promosies, immediate attempt on their part to engage 1990. Party slang has labelled these claimants of all the significant political players in South Ebersohn W. 'Kodesa en die regse die erwe van ons vader (the land of our Africa, so as to promote and legitimate the opsie'. DieSuid-Afrikaan, No39. Cape forefathers) racists, to distinguish them notion of Afrikaner national Town, 1992. from the so-called volkstaat Afrikaner self-determination. Whilst success is highly Grobbelaar J. 'Ultra-rightwing Afrikaners: a sociological analysis', D nationalists. Perhaps the restanters' most improbable, these elites will moreover Littet Phil. Pretoria: Unisa, 1992. outstanding characteristic is their refusal initiate a process aimed at laundering and Grobbelaar J. 'Bittereinders: Dilemmas and/or apparent inability to accept that new reconstituting Afrikaner nationalism. and dynamics on the far right'. South African Reviews. Johannesburg: rules are regulating the South African Ravan, 1992. politics. Their intransigence appears to be Throughout its history, Afrikaner Jooste CJ. "n Volkstaat vir the most direct cause of the ongoing strife nationalism has proved its tenacity and Boere-Afrikaners'. Pretoria: within the CP. exhibited its considerable strategies of Afrikaner-vryheidstigting, 1991. Jooste CJ. 'Grondwetlike beskerming vir empowerment. All-encompassing power Suid-Afrika se minderhede'. Pretoria: At present, these more easily recognisable brings immense reward. White Afrikaners Afrikanervryheidstigtig, 1992. scions of apartheid are in control. Their have occupied such a position of power in Oranje-Perspektief. Lynnwoodrif: Vereniging van Oranjewerkers, 1992. command of the CP was illustrated by the South Africa for decades. If they are Raath AWG. 'Selfbeskikking en comminuque issued by the party on 6 June convinced that they will lose all, a sesessie'. Pretoria: 1992. These proposals do not cross the sufficient number in their ranks will fight a Afrikanervryheidsfigting, 1992. rearguard action. This will seriously Schlemmer L. 'Codesa after Ihe divide between the two groups. This referendum', indicator South Africa, 'compromise' is little more than one of destabilise South Africa's stumbling steps Vol9/No2. Durban: Centre for Social & appearance, which attempts to obfuscate towards a non-racial and more equitable Development Studies, University of the real issues and keep the party together distribution of wealth and power. Natal, 1992. or at least to limit the impending damage The South African Observer. 'Moment of Truth For Right-Wing Leaders'. under the guise of a moving equilibrium. Vol35/No7, Pretoria, 1992,

MMM WMH®S2 0 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Evangelofi Manlzaris, Department of Sociology, University of Durban-Westville With Codesa ihe keyword in the new political vocabulary of South Africa, there are many who prophesise the marginalisation of parties which remain outside its ambit - especially Azapo andPAC on the left' and the Conservative Party and others on the 'right'. If Codesa survives negotiations and delivers the goods, these organisations may be left out in the cold. Against this backdrop a review follows of the recent PAC national congress, where the movement affirmed its established policies and its commitment to armed struggle. r I \e I'ail \!i ic.mist Congress (PAC) has different conditions - e.g. outside the JL :. .er been against negotiations per se. country and with a neutral chairperson. The l'AC is on ivi ord as supporting a negotiated mcclumsm leading to a The popular belief that the PAC has been constituent assembly. But its supporters marginalised in the political arena because widely expect that the final outcome of of its anti-Codesa stance does not take into Codesa will be a compromise between the account key strategic realities identified by ANC and the NP that will not result in PAC supporters. Firstly, President de Klerk majority rule through the mechanism of a has so far strategically outmanoeuvred the constituent assembly. other Codesa 'heavy-weights' and has made significant tactical inroads into black The I'AC's walk-out from the Convention communities in terms of mobilising for a 1 temocratic South Africa at the support. Secondly, any compromise inaugural meeting of Codesa in December reached on an interim government is more IWI was debated at length at an likely to be in the power-sharing mould extraordinary congress of the PAC held in (rather than majority rule). If these realities the Transkei between 17-19 April 1992. mean that the PAC has been marginalised, The PAC affirmed its belief that even if an simultaneously they point to some sort of enlarged working group were to draw up an vindication for the movement. interim constitution for an elected parliament and an interim executive, the Outside the constraints of Codesa, the PAC machinery and apparatus of the state would hopes to increase its support remain in the hands of the NP government powerbase. The relative strategic freedom and the aspirations of the African masses allowed the PAC leadership and would be compromised. rank-and-file due to non-participation in Codesa has given the organisation impetus A I'AT: delegation led by new President in its strategic initiatives: Clarence Makwetu met with representatives • the Patriotic Front. Originating from the of the South African government in Nigeria PAC leadership, with the support of on 10 April 1992, prior to the PAC special Nelson Mandela, the Front was congress. This meeting was yet another revitalised on a mass level at the joint message from the PAC to African May Day rallies convened by opposition governments and other nations which groups this year. pressurise it to enter Codesa that • organisational evaluation. At the special negotiations could take place under PAC congress, organisational, financial

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 21 msJZMXM ffiffiM •

It is reliably and logistical strengths and weaknesses of society. APLA and AZANIA (the arm£ reported that the on the ground were debated and wing of the black consciousness PAC's strength has assessed. movement) have been described as 'armies • internal consolidation. The movement without teeth'. Such comments are actually swelled to around also consolidated its component tested on South Africa's urban terrain 410 branches structures nationally, e.g Azanian Youth almost daily. nationwide Unity (Azanyu) and the Pan Africanist Student Organisation (Paso) (see Indicator SA Vol7/No3:14-16). Political Debates • working-class support. Members debated the key relationship between the The relatively small crowds attending 1\\C working class and trade unions (e.g. meetings nationally have prompted Nactu), emphasising the necessity of journalists to question the contemporary forming a PAC-orientated general appeal of the PAC to the African masses workers' union. (e.g. see Weekly Mail, 31/1/92, 'PAC: • development programmes. The PAC put Power or Paper Tiger?'). Although the into practice several development, PAC has made significant inroads into health and other programmes which coloured and several Indian townships, include the participation of individuals there are several problems associated v\ iili and groups within the movement. Many the movement's concerted strategy to of them were successful but never increase its membership and ultimately its received publicity in the commercial or influence on a national scale. alternative press. • the armed struggle. Politically, the main It is reliably reported that the PAC's thrust of PAC's support - especially strength has swelled to around 410 amongst the young, poor and rural branches nationwide (Sowetan, 12/3/92). It people - is based on its continued is difficult, if not impossible to verify support of APLA's armed struggle. figures on PAC membership, but according to statements made at the latest congress: The armed struggle waged by the Azanian • The PAC has 32 staff members in People's Liberation Army (APLA) has headquarters, 12 national offices and 9 been examined in detail elsewhere regional offices (see box on PAC (Mantzaris 1991). The 1992 campaign has executive). This is a vast improvement moved swiftly from the Orange Free State on a 1990 Congress report when The PAC lacks the to the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal and General Secretary, Benny Alexander, financial resources, other areas of the country. The intensity of was running one office in Johannesburg so vital for the APLA's attacks on the security forces has used as the movement's headquarters. survival and drawn national attention from the NP, the • There have been organisational expansion of any Minister of Law and Order, the ANC and weaknesses in Natal, the Transvaal and the SACP. The attacks led to the Police and political the OFS. In the other regions, including Prison Wardens Civil Rights Union the Transkei and Ciskei, the PAC is organisation in a (Popcru) requesting a meeting at APLA much stronger. period of transition headquarters to negotiate a ceasefire. • The headquarters of the PAC in Johannesburg are poorly organised (Citv The strategy behind APLA's campaign is Press, 12/4/92). that the regime relies on the security forces and the army to stay in power: 'for a These details point not only to the democratic settlement and majority rule to organisational inefficiencies of the PAC but be achieved, the security personnel should also to the lack of financial resources, so be wiped out' (Sowetan, 3/2/92). The vital for the survival and expansion of any APLA attacks are mainly undertaken with political organisation in a period of hand grenades, scorpion pistols and transition. However, the appointment of AK-47's. The attacks are mostly a form of Maxwell Nemadzivhanani as the PAC's armed propaganda or psychological warfare national organiser and the recommended and not full-scale attacks as such on major appointment of at least six regional military or police targets. co-ordinators in the Far Northern, Western and Northern Transvaal, Natal, Western APLA has been used as a conduit for PAC Cape, Eastern Cape and Border, and the recruitment at the political level because it OFS should consolidate and expand portrays itself as a 'peoples' army' still in existing structures. operation. This call to action has been particularly attractive to young militants in The youth groups, Paso and Azanyu, are the townships where unemployment and now formal components of the PAC poverty has pushed them onto the margins movement's structure. Both groups have

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 22 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 ,.„. , Professional i, of ihe liberation movement who are S'iiiv ot political developments in the National President Clarence Makwetu country. First Deputy President Johnson Mlambo p.,sc. has developed into a strong on'anisation of students and pupils with Second Deputy President Dikgang Moseneke .vai'onal support, while Azanyu has faced ^•veral siructural problems over the last vear due to its new position as a component Secretary General/Spokesman Benny Alexander ol" the l'A('. Vzanyu has been instrumental Deputy Secretary General Thobile Gola in building a new cadre within the rank-and-file of the movement. Both youth National Organiser Maxwell Nemadzivhanani movements have national support, but it would be difficult to estimate their actual numerical strengths. Secretary for Economic Affairs Sipho Shabalala Secretary for Finance Thompson Gazo The lenders of the PAC, Paso and Azanyu were caught unaware in early 1992 by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gora Ibrahim extreme activities of the Paso/Azanyu Secretary for Legal & Constitutional Affairs Willie Sesiti "revolutionary watch-dogs', a splinter group led by the mi iitant 'East and West Rand Secretary for Political Affairs J Seroke Co-ordinating Committees'. Expelled from Secretary for Publicity & Information Barney Desai both PAC and Paso structures at 1991 congresses, this splinter group retained pockets of support in certain East Rand townships, \ct ing in the name of Paso, they attacked ami burned a white lecturer to business constituency, e.g. African death at a teachers' college located in their entrepreneurs in the informal sector, in stronghold, katlehong. Although the PAC order to present the new comprehensive has distanced itself from their actions, the economic policies devised by the PAC's mililanc> ot the self-styled watch-dogs Economic Planning Department, headed by The PAC's might attract the active support of Sipho Shabalala. In these and other economic disillusioned and angry township youth. seminars within the movement, there has guidelines been open debate on the history, concentrate on the performance and future prospects of the democratisation sC©[ 0 South African economy, as well as on the political economy of urban and rural rather than the The relocation of the exiled Azanian Trade community development. nationalisation {;nion ( n oi dinating Committee (ATUCC) strategy inside the country has played a significant The PAC's economic guidelines role in revitalising PAC structures, 'concentrate on the democratisation rather especially in the PWV area. PAC than the nationalisation strategy ... and supporters within Nactu also played an move the African people from the margins instrumental role in the 'unity in action' of economy and society onto its centre initiative with Cosatu which culminated in stage'. The key theme of the PAC's the common May Day celebrations of 1992 documents and discussions is a 'new and the Workers Unity Summit in late May. industrialisation strategy which through a process of socialisation and popular The Africanist Labour Co-ordinating participation would lead to economic Committee (aligned to the PAC) has also growth'. played a vital role in the movement's campaigns, but its labour wing may have Nationalisation has been described by key suffered due to its overtly politicised PAC economic figures as outdated and the activities. Further, LeskandaMakhanda's last pillar of the bureaucrats. One of the return to the country and his subsequent strategic interventions of the PAC in the election as the PAC Secretary for Labour economic debate is that private firms and will play a pivotal role in evolving companies should make significant share strategies on the labour front. allocations to their workers to promote equity within companies and enhance joint In the last few months the PAC has decision-making. Worker participation in organised several seminars to woo a black decision-making in management and

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 23 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM PAC initiatives) and the unity in action in The organisational investment is a key objective. It is not clear w hether this policy is explicitly part of the the political and labour fields in I992(.V]. , problems facing much debated 'social contract' between Day Celebration, Workers Unity Summit''"' the PAC's student, labour and capital. Nonetheless, PAC July General S trike). youth and labour Secretary for Hconomic Affairs, Sipho components of the Shabalala is on record that the PAC It became evident at the PAC's 1992 movement are supports the initiatives orchestrated by the congress that the finances of the considerable major unions and capital to create an organisation are dwindling by the da\: neVl. economic forum (Sunday Tribune, benefactors are hard to come by, sun i\ jn„ 29/03/91). revolutionary movements are on the defense worldwide, and even educational The PAC's economic policy favours bursaries granted by western countries have housing, education and health as the key been reduced. Financial stagnation, mainly spending areas of a future economy. Local due to the movement's rejection of ('odes'a. skills and resources will be primarily if not could prove to be the major exclusively used in all sectors of the stumbling-block for a movement winch is economy. attempting to find its feet inside the country, organisationally and logistical!). The PAC's land policy advocates In the short-term, for instance, all of 'de-commoditisation' of the land with an APLA's infiltration corridors through the end to private land ownership. The front-line states face closure due to the dispossessed masses in the rural areas are PAC's anti-Codesa stance. in dire need of the land which was taken away from them many years ago. State land The organisational problems facing the will be redistributed but the nationalisation PAC's student, youth and labour of private land will be achieved through the components of the movement are also payment of equitable compensation to considerable. Nactu has recorded present owners. The PAC has indicated, considerable advances in areas such as the however, that the practical problems Western Cape but it faces substantial associated with nationalisation and administrative and organisational problems redistribution of private land are open to in other areas of the country. It is highly negotiation (Sunday Tribune, 29/03/92). questionable whether the PAC will succeed at a practical level in its political efforts to PAC members on the ground have initiated marry agrarian Africanism with the Will the PAC be various small and medium scale economic militancy of the urban working classes. capable of development programmes such as the challenging Mthuthulelo Upholstery Project, Will the PAC be capable of challenging (politically and/or Sinethemba Sewing Project, etc. (politically and/or militarily) a future militarily) a future Programmes of self-reliance are of transitional or interim government which is importance to the PAC leadership and possibly the outcome of negotiations at transitional rank-and-file and various efforts in rural Codesa? If not, what are the movement's government which and semi-rural areas to build up alternatives? These are burning questions may emerge from cooperatives are under consideration. The indeed. With the process of a negotiated Codesa? ideological and practical guidelines for settlement already well in motion without these development efforts have been in PAC participation (at least at this stage), existence for several months and debated new, innovative and bold strategic extensively within the movement (Malatsi, initiatives will be required if the Congress 1991; Shabalala and Shinners, 1991). is to come in from the cold in the wintry months ahead. Q®3£\

Quo Vadis? REFERENCES Malatsi. 'Some reflections on rural community development possibilities and Many challenges face the PAC after limitations: Possible lessons for PAC policies in liberated Azania', Discussion Codesa Two and beyond. Several PAC Paper, 1991. attempts to mobilise its supporters Mantzaris E. 'Pan Africanist Visions: The Impossible Revolution'. Indicator (especially the 'Death to Codesa' SA Vol7/No3 (Winter edition). Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1990,13-16. campaign) were not at all successful. Mantzaris E. 'The PAC and the Armed Struggle'. S4 Foundation Review, However there are signs of considerable August 1991. achievements in the process of the Shabalala S and M Shinners. Ideological Foundations of Development revitalisation of the Patriotic Front, the projects and programmes, PAC Oiscussion Paper, 1991. anti-violence boycott of the trains (both

E*SXI9TO2SA '.FFASKE© 24 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 COMPARATIVE TAXATION IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES Percentage of GDP

Portugal Greece South Africa Chile Mauritius Other American Malaysia Argentina Brazil Turkey Thailand Mexico Korea Weighted Average 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Source; See cover article in this monitor by Andre Roux on 'The Fiscal Challenge',

professor Andre Roux, Department of Economics, University of the Western Cape

fjt;cal chattenoe of the future is to satisfy the JmJrainQ claims on the budget while aintaininq macro-economic balance and Un dent levels of taxation and expenditure. This r daunting task, in which trade-offs between political imperatives and economic efficiency are at the forefront. At issue is not only the level of taxation and expenditure, but also the structure of taxation and the composition and management of expenditure.

rl 1hc revenue ol the South African exchequer, government in South Africa was only very marginally except lor a In ief period of relative fiscal above the weighted average for middle-income austerity in the seventies, has been growing steadily countries for which comparable data is available (see for the last l'ort\ \ears (see Graph 1). The expansion Graph 2). during the prc\ ions decade was, however, particularly rapid, u ith revenue rising from 19,8% of Subsequently, however, South Africa's fiscal GDI' in tl-c allermalh of the gold boom, to a peak of experience began to depart from the norm. Whereas 25.8'/f in lie liscal year ending 1990. The eighties other middle-income countries, with a few also witnessed a sharp upsurge in the income of exceptions, managed to reduce, or at least to curb general government, i.e. from around 27% in the further tax increases, in South Africa exactly the opening years oi the decade to 32,1% in 1990: opposite happened. This fact is overlooked in the recent IMF document on South Africa since the report focuses on the average level of taxation over the period 1980-88. There is, however, no doubt that South Africa is now placed among countries with a high tax burden. Moreover, none of the other economies experienced anything remotely close to South Africa's 5% expansion in the tax-to-GDP ratio:

Portugal Greece South Africa Chile Mauritius Other American Malaysia 19-17 1952 1957 19e2 1967 1972 1977 1g82 1987 1992 Argentina Brazil GRAPH 1 Exchequer Ordinary Revenue: % of GDP Turkey Thailand I lie subsequent decrease in the revenue-to-GDP ratio Mexico \\'as largely the result of discretionary cuts contained Korea in the 1990 and 1991 budgets, although the cyclical Weighted Average downturn and the unexpected revenue shortfall due to 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) pushed the ratio down further. It must, however, also be GRAPH 2 Taxation in Middle-Income Countries: % of GDP noted that the overall trend is again moving in an upward direction. The possibility that it might be inadvisable for South Africa to continue to move against the international South Africa's post-war fiscal history is by no means trends tempts one to conclude that there is little room unique. In fact, a comparison with other countries for augmenting the level of taxation in the foreseeable reveals that by 1982 the level of taxation by general future. However, whether South Africa has actually

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 27 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM

IV' »m company tax tend to fluctuate in can be negotiated. The latter is improbable in the The receipt [o economic conditions, with the effective short-run since each of the contending parties have fL^(>r risiii'' to approximately 25% during periods painted themselves into a corner over the issue. ,mn- earnings growth and falling to 18% during .. sions. 'I'll- decline in its yield during the last Viewed from a medium-term perspective it is also ^•Hnancial years can therefore be attributed to the clear that tax reform is pointing in the opposite

lh,Lt' recession. direction. The introduction of social security contributions in the not to distant future must be a Tl > 'fleets of fiscal drag are clearly reflected in the distinct possibility. There are also political pressures, •irin" contribution of individual income tax, which and sound economic reasons, for introducing property Ms climbed from a low 16% in 1981 to an taxes such as a land tax and a capital gains tax. The irdinaiely hi;rh 40% at present. Over this period a question that arises, however, is whether the proceeds four person household with a single income of would be used to effect a reduction in the rates of RftO 000 al today's prices will have experienced an company and personal taxes, or to extend the overall increase in income tax from an average rate of 10% tax yield. The answer is not obvious. What is clear, lo ''V/f. Despite the concessions contained in the however, is that much of the political economic budiiel. average rates of income tax will continue to debate of the future will hinge on issues such as these. rise Yuri her during the current financial year. The case for tax reform along the lines recommended In terms of a political economy perspective, the by the Margo Commission cannot be dismissed recent upsurge in the contribution of income tax lightly, however. As the IMF report shows, income provides a foretaste of policy dynamics at work in the taxes on both individuals and companies are South Al'rkan transition. Within this power play, substantially above the levels which exist in income lav since it is open to covert manipulation comparable countries. Raising marginal income tax through fiscal drag, is in danger of becoming the soft rates, or imposing new taxes which fall essentially on largcl w hich is available to offset deficiencies in more middle- and higher-income earners, could have contentious ie\enue sources. negative incentive effects.

The proceeds of GST, after rising sharply in response In addition, it is arguable that the revenue side of the to succcssisc increases in the rate, reached a plateau budget is not an ideal instrument of redistribution of around 27', of total revenue by 1985. Whether the since the distributional impact of changes in tax intention Ivhind the switch to VAT was to extend the structure are largely confined to altering the scope of taxes i n domestic goods and services is not disposable income shares of the top half of the tax entircK clem. I:t any event, the fiasco over the paying population. The poorest sections of society, introduction ol VAT has evidently had the opposite who ought to be the real targets of redistributive effect, and will certainly inhibit further increases in interventions, pay relatively small amounts of tax, the contribution of VAT. and do not as a result benefit appreciably from changes in the progressivity of the tax structure. This Recent additions to the fuel levy were meant to offset suggests that the tax structure should be designed the revenue shortfall in relation to VAT. The revenue primarily to raise revenue as efficiently as possible. deriu'd lioni i ustoms and excise duties is, however, severely constrained by the excessive transfers which Accordingly, the best way forward would be to are paid to other members of the Customs Union, broaden the tax base through indirect taxes, since the thus curtailing the considerable discretion which existing base is narrow, and to correct for the excise duties usually provide in other countries. One regressive nature of indirect taxes on the expenditure must nevertheless expect that further increases in the side of the budget. The VAT experience illustrates, fuel levy may be used in future to compensate for a however, that a programme of tax reform based on possible withdrawal of the import surcharge. these principles cannot be implemented without public consent, appropriate planning and a credible I'fom the above discussion it should be abundantly commitment to a redistributive expenditure agenda. clear that the present budget failed to resolve the conflict between the government's tax reform strategy and various political imperatives. The jqn short-term prospects for the tax reforms advocated by trough the Margo Commission have therefore receded, The upward trend on the revenue side of the budget specially since the trends which have emerged over must obviously also be mirrored in terms of the last three years are completely contrary to the expenditure. Between 1951 and 1991 exchequer ( I'inmission's recommendations. issues doubled from 15,1 to 30,0% of GDP (see Graph 5). Expenditure by general government is One cannot, for example, envisage where the currently in the region of 36% of GDP. This reflects government would be able to find the revenue to an increase of some 6% over and above the level of make up for a significant cut in the rate of company expenditure during the opening years of the eighties. The promised elimination of fiscal drag is not Some evidence of restraint does, however, emerge very likely either, unless an increase in the VAT rate from the previous and present budget.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 29 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM Reallocating Spending For the present it is more important that all panics seem to recognise that social backlogs and othei emerging demands on the budget can only be nK.t through a redirection of expenditure between categories, and a re-organisation of spending within each category.

Considerable progress towards reallocating expenditure has already been made. As is evident from Graph 7, social spending is up from 31,3'i in 1986 to 38,5% in the present budget. The bulk o| ihjs increase has gone into education (from 15,5 to 18,4%), although the other social services are also

1957 1982 1992 receiving larger allocations.

GRAPH 5 Exchequer Issues: % of GDP

11986 Ed:. 1993 Cross-country comparisons of expenditure by general government again reveal that South Africa is out of step with the middle-income developing world. The expansion of the eighties occurred against a background of international austerity in which comparable countries contained expenditure growth, and in most cases cut back successfully. South

Africa's ranking in the middle-income expenditure 15.5 16.2 15.7 stakes therefore rose from eighth to third position: 11.6

Greece Portugal Admin Security Social Economic Interest Other South Africa Brazil GRAPH 7 Allocation of Expenditure: % of Exchequer Issues Malaysia Chile The cut-backs to pay for this additional social Other American spending have not, as is expected, come from the Argentina security budget since the reallocation of defence Turkey spending has largely gone into improving the police Mauritius force. This is an unfortunate development, and it is to be hoped that some saving on security spending can be made in future. It is also a matter of concern that Thailand administration seems to be receiving a growing share Weighted Average of the budget. The allocation for economic services, 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 80 on the other hand, has decreased significantly, with agriculture, transport and other economic services bearing the brunt. GRAPH 6 Expenditure in Middle-Income Countries: % of GDP The 'other' item in the graph, which includes There is fortunately a high degree of consensus transfers to the TBVC homelands, has also decreased. among major participants in the policy debate that Whether this will have an adverse effect on social further growth in expenditure will be difficult to services in these areas remains to be seen. effect. No-one, for example, any longer argues for parity in social spending at existing white levels. An The restructuring on the expenditure side and the excessive increase in expenditure, whether financed relatively high social spending base from which these through taxation or borrowing, would undoubtedly changes were initiated have enabled South Africa to retard growth as it would heighten the prospects of surpass most other middle-income countries in terms macroeconomic instability, thereby inducing a loss of of the level of spending on education, health and confidence. Disagreement still remains, however, housing. The resources devoted to welfare provision, with regard to the exact target level for expenditure. on the other hand, are well below average. Although Some would like to see certain spending cuts, while extensions to the welfare net in the form of, say, others Mill perceive a need for incremental increases. special employment programmes, have become

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 30 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 •, | -niil w ill require additional spending, South Bureaucratic procrastination at the implementation cou(,uue lo focus primarily on education, phase further compound these problems; in the health Africacit ^ i these are redistributiv;K t; e Afi"' (|1.j,.1M servicescrv ccs aass these are redisf- " "° sphere, for instance, even though the government has health a (^ ^unoort economic growth. announced new priorities, little seems to be LS, w hich support economic growth. nicaM« happening on the ground in terms of improving primary health care. 10 _H, • rica 1SS3 HB Other Countries 1987 8 7

¥fi lite >1 Want Not A reallocation of spending priorities is, however, in the final analysis not the complete answer. The eighties, for example, tell a story of rapidly rising educational expenditure without commensurate results. Educationists are at one that fairly inexpensive reforms, such as providing an adequate supply of textbooks, may improve efficiency more than some of the costly alternatives, including teacher upgrading, which are being pursued by the education authorities at present.

Education !l".tth Housing Welfare Defence The time has perhaps arrived for South Africa to GRAPH 8 Crcn;;-country Social Expenditure Comparison: consider the introduction of an independent % of GDP performance audit as they have in Germany. A suggestion along these lines has also recently been It is also impni l.mt to recognise that the reallocation voiced inside the ANC. The purpose of such a value in spending has been at the cost of infrastructural for money audit is to assess the efficiency of public investment. This has provoked some reaction in the spending and to ensure that government expenditure pages of the financial press. But the criticism is achieves its objectives. The performance audit used in misplaced. In the present juncture it is appropriate to Germany has been identified as one of the critical cut public fixed investment as South Africa may have ingredients of successful fiscal management. Indeed, overinvested in physical infrastructure in the past. It the World Bank argues that inadequate fiscal is. however, imperative that adequate provision for management is a significant cause of Africa's maintaining existing assets is made, especially since economic failure. some doubts on this score have recently surfaced.

The main task that remains is to reorientate spending Cones us§® si within each item as the present performance indicators for social spending are unacceptably poor. On the expenditure side then, we have made progress. South Africa's infant mortality rates, for instance, are There is still much ground to cover, however. The well in excess of other countries, many of whom emphasis in future will have to fall on the •spend far less on public health. The experiences of management and efficiency of public spending. The other countries, however, also suggest, and this is total allocation is probably close to the level South confirmed by micro-studies focusing on particular Africa can sustain at present. Whether we succeed in budgetary items, that we ought to be able to improve satisfying expectations will depend in large measure the situation relatively quickly by targeting basic on our capacity to harness these resources efficiently. education, health and housing. In the case of health, it is readily apparent that even a moderate redirection of On the revenue side, the outlook is less promising. the health budget towards primary care would enable What should have been a search for the most efficient South Africa to provide good quality basic public system of raising revenue is in danger of health. degenerating into a conflict over distribution at the margin. This is rather futile, as study upon study has Although the government has begun to move in this shown that taxation is a relatively inefficient direction, very little progress has as yet been instrument of redistribution, achieved. The reallocation of education spending, for example, is proceeding at a snail's pace. Adverse REFERENCES political conditions are undoubtedly obstructing the International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1990. process as is illustrated by the continued stalemate in Lachman D & K Bercuson. 'Economic Policies for a New South Africa', IMF Occasional Paper relation to housing provision and urban development. No 91,1992. Nevertheless, it is also clear that a lack of Landau D. 'Government and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries', Economic commitment, exemplified by the unnecessary delay in Development and Cultural Change, 1986. Moll P, N Nattrass & L Loots. Redistribution: How can it Work in South Africa. Cape Town: equalising social pensions, as well as the absence of Oavid Philip, 1991. coherent medium-term strategies are critical factors Ram R. 'Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence', holding back essential fiscal reforms. American Economic Review, 1986.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 31 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM Professor Mike McGrath and Professor Merle Holden, Department of Economics, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg and Duiban RETROSPECT The expectation that the South African economy low in recent months, e.g. the annual rate of increase would enter a period of recovery in 1992 has not been of producer prices of imported goods rose ai 4.1 foreign exchange earnings from agriculture to fall there as a long term investment' (Sunday Tribune, and the import bill to rise, and the surplus on 1/7/84). It is ironic that he should have quit at the current account of the balance of payments for commencement of the delicate Codesa negotiations, 1992 may be R2,5bn lower than had earlier been when there is a desperate need for an experienced predicted. Finance Minister to give guidance within the • The South African inflation rate remains high at negotiations and later, to an interim government. an annualised rate of 16% for the first four months of 1992. Although a mild easing of interest rates Du •Plessis' term of office coincided with probably the has been allowed, the Reserve Bank has remained most disastrous period in South Africa's economic committed to its restrictive monetary stance. The history recorded this century. GDP grew by a mere seasonally adjusted nominal annualised growth of 0,8% per annum during his term of office, and per the broadly defined money supply for the first capita incomes slumped in real terms back tow aids (M3) quarter averaged 11,8%, resulting in a the 1960 levels. During his term employment in the continuation of the decreasing trend in the real manufacturing sector of the economy sagged In o\cr money supply which had commenced in 1991. 2%, and in mining and construction employment • The application of restrictive monetary policy in contracted by over 6 and 8% respectively. Despite du 1991 and 1992 has been much more severe than it Plessis' claims to limiting government sector grow ill. was in the earlier 1976, 1982 and 1984-1985 it was largely increases in employment in general periods of tight monetary policy. But even with government which prevented the economy's negative real growth of the money supply, the employment levels from falling absolutely between growth rate exceeded the target range of 7 - 10% 1984 and 1992. Du Plessis repeatedly committed indicated for 1992. This suggests the need for himself to reducing the size of the bureaucracy and to continued restrictive policies to lower liquidity in restraining government spending. In reality, the share the economy. of government rose from 25% to 28,1% of GI )l' during his years of office. There still remain several developments on the positive front for the economy. The rate of increase of The Minister of Finance cannot be held responsible prices of imported goods has remained exceptionally for the many adverse economic developments which

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 32 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 h's peri"') in office. The debt crisis of 1985, the economic consequences of protests over the Africa's increasing international isolation and implementation of VAT on food. 'S •-Vl'li' lit-lllici weak commodity prices in world nri'lcf"'^ restricted the policy options open to him. His replacement is Mr Derek Keys, a neophyte to Nevertheless he did identify several of the policy politics who comes from a successful career in which are necessary to lay the foundations business, and a brief spell as Minister of Economic jI'l^hcalthier economy: by associating goverrernmentn Coordination and Trade and Industry. His record in • ih the Marsio Commission's recommendations for the Trade and Industry post is already controversial, i^idpnis: emphasising the need for privatisation as he is associated with the motor industries and 1:1 j tjL.lvuulali"n; and by stressing the need for textile industry policy bungles (discussed below). restraining I he growth of government sector. From Mr Keys' performance after a few months in government he would appear to be too closely allied Unl'ortunalch lie failed in the timing of implementing in his policy choices to sectoral big business interests VAT. which was the most important of the Margo to function efficiently in such an important portfolio proposals, ami he abandoned privatisation as a policy as Finance. If Codesa is put back on track soon, Mr after its half-hearted implementation and pressure Keys may not even get to prepare one budget as from the ANC. He leaves his successor to deal with Finance Minister. RRENT TRENDS

Trade policy in South African has shifted its emphasis headed by the chairman of the South African in recen! wars, particularly with the introduction of Chamber of Business's industrial policy committee the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS). Before and director of Barlow Rand would have been able to die GEIS ii was estimated that the policy of import arrive at a solution which could have been pleasing to substitution had imposed hidden costs on the all parties including the consumers of lower price economy in the form of export taxes amounting to clothing. At the present time those smaller clothing between 70 and 40%, depending on whether gold is manufacturers whose interests were not included in the basket of exportables. The GEIS went accommodated are threatening court action to block part of the way towards correcting this bias although the proposals of this committee. as tin GKIS favours those activities which are higher up in the chain of production, mining and agricultural Meantime, textile manufacturers point to the expotls still bear the costs of import protection. protection of the cotton growers as a major factor in their inability to compete with imported fabric. Local Last year (he Industrial Development Corporation manufacturers pay R4,72/kg, as against the world reported extensively on trade policy, recommending price of R3,86/kg while the subsidised price in that import tariffs and the GEIS be phased out over a Pakistan, India and China is R2,72, The Minister is of period of lour to five years. The IDC also took the the view that it would be too costly to directly view that selectivity in the protection or subsidisation subsidise cotton farmers again demonstrating either of imports ;md exports was not to be encouraged. In extreme naivety or attempting to pull the wool over countries u here the state and business enjoy a close the eyes of the taxpayer and consumer. Although relationship there is no doubt that the costs of economic theory shows that the costs to the economy selecli\ ii\ have also been added to by the resources are higher with import protection than they are with w hicli ha\ c been expended on rent seeking. Up to direct subsidisation it is easy to hide these costs with now this has probably been the case in South Africa import protection. as well. If there are any benefits to be had from M.'lccii\it\ it is quite likely that they will be Smaller clothing manufacturers also feel that the outweighed by the costs. It is still business as usual in agreement reached by the Hatty Committee is a South \l i ik a with the state completely unable to deal conspiracy against them by the larger producers to with the fiascos which have been of its own creation force them out of the domestic market. Minister Keys with the help of vested'interests. refers to the representations which he expects to receive on the committee's proposals, which suggests Phase six of the structural adjustment programme in that the official attitude will be generally flexible until the motor industry is a good example of government the matter can be resolved. In order to establish bungling. Although it stimulated exports, it also business confidence, Mr Keys should also state what reduced jobs locally, increased prices and led to resources manufacturers will be required to allocate massive fraud. The new Minister of Finance admits in order to influence this 'flexible' approach. that protection of 110% is excessive where protection oi the motor vehicle industry elsewhere has usually Current attitudes admit that lower tariffs are a good resulted in increased costs of 40%. idea but 'don't reduce ours' too soon and if it hurts too much not at all'. Unfortunately, if this attitude The feud between the clothing and textile industries is prevails South Africa will remain uncompetitive another example of poor decision-making. It was internationally with little prospect of developing a extraordinarily naive to believe that a committee sustained outward orientation for the economy.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 33 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM the meat price is extremely difficult to undei si • „l Food /'riccs and Inflation an Farmers are increasing the supply of livestock'fn't Tlit.- annual inflation rate has remained stubbornly slaughter as the drought escalates, and prices lih'h near !(>' ' in ihe last year, despite reduction in at abattoirs are falling. These diverging trends VL'd the level of ihe real money supply. The increase in the indicate that there may be a breakdown of producer price index, representing the cost of inputs competition in the distribution chain. The rccenilv in the economy, has however fallen to levels well increased concentration of ownership at the below 10% per annum in recent months. Food price wholesale level in the meat industry may be plavin.,. inflation at the retail level has been approaching 30% role in raising the retail prices of meat. ' 11 per annum, and this has been the major factor preventing a very considerable fall in the CPI. The In the case of supplies of fruit and nuts and certain rates of price increases of different food types are: types of vegetables, the opening up of foreign ' Table 1: Annual Rates of Increase of Retail Prices of markets has reduced the supply to the domestic Food as at April 1992 economy and the drought has also reduced the domestic supply of vegetables. With conditions of Food % Weights in Food rapidly decreasing supply and relatively ine I a si it- pa Index of CPI demand, the sustained price increases of 65' < in the Grain Products 16,9 15,7 Meat 27,4 33,1 case of vegetables can be explained. Fish and Other Seafoods 20,0 3,8 Milk, Cheese and Eggs 25,1 12,2 The preliminary report of the Board of Tarills and Fats and Oils 26,1 4,7 Fruit and Nuts 50,9 6,3 Trade which was commissioned to investigate the Vegetables 64,8 10,1 causes of food price inflation has proposed sweeping Sugar 13,2 2,6 Coffee, Tea and Cocoa 10,4 3,2 reforms in agricultural marketing in South A! i ica: Other 16,3 8,4 • that Control Boards be deprived of their statin i>ry All Items 28,4 18,6 powers to set prices and control marketing; • that agricultural marketing should be deregulated Source: Computed from Consumer Price Index, April 1992, Statistical x News Release, pl41,i, Central Statistical Services. at the government and municipal level; • that there should be greater scope for importai ion The impact of the drought, and the collection of VAT of food; and on foodstuffs, cannot be blamed exclusively for this • that the stringent health and hygiene standards widespread range of increases. The introduction of which are enforced in the marketing of food arc VAT on fresh food has worked itself though the not appropriate in our economy. economy, and thus cannot explain radical increases in the price of meat, dairy products and vegetables. The report finds that Control Boards add Drought is clearly playing a role in increasing prices, approximately 1,5% to the level of food price in but note that the prices of grain prices are only rising South Africa. Preliminary reactions by the Minister of at 17% per annum, even though certain subsidies Agriculture indicate that government has not have been reduced further this year. The behaviour of responded creatively to the recommendations. PROSPECTS The prospects of a marked recovery in the third and With a healthy balance on the current account of t he fourth quarters of 1992 are not promising. Consumer balance of payments and renewed access to demand is likely to remain depressed as the financial international lines of credit, this no longer need situation of consumers will remain under pressure in feature as the major constraint on economic policv 1992 (even though interest rates have fallen by 1% choices. There is an indication that the OECD and hire-purchase regulations have eased). Fixed economies will grow at a faster rate later in 1992, and investment is also not likely to increase rapidly given it seems appropriate now to ease monetary policy to the positive level of real interest rates and the climate accommodate any upswing which follows in the of uncertainty which has been developed around the South African economy. political talks and threats of mass action. The 1% reduction in bank rates announced on 30 Monetary policy has been relaxed in recent months in June and consequential reductions in interest rate will the USA and Japan, and in the South African not restore investor confidence or consumer economy the core annual inflation rate is falling confidence or real purchasing power, and this will not towards 10%. The demand side of the price equation provide the catalyst to recovery at this stage . in South Africa has been successfully lowered by the However, we do believe that the Reserve Bank is restrictive monetary policies of the last 18 months, correct in its decision to further loosen its grip on the and the remaining major element of inflationary economy now to reduce the burden of high interest pressures are coming from the marketing and rates to business and hopefully keep them afloat in production of food. These pressures will not be these recessionary times, and prevent further declines countered by monetary restraints. in employment. 1M&

Erratum: Figure 1 in the last Economic Outlook was inverted, see Indicator SA Vol9/No2:30.

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS3 4 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Andrew Smith and Grant Brann, Department of Economics, University of Natal, Pietermaritzhurg

Should the high degree of seller concentration in the South African manufacturing sector remain intachvhen the desirability of most elements in the apartheid economy are under review? Are ihnse concentrations monopolistic or do they represent some greater form of efficiency thni nhould be encouraged? Smith and Brann develop a new econometric model to measure whoiher monopolies and concentrated market structures are synonymous.

I\/I osl: tlic controversy surrounding purchase at higher prices. In this case, 'big J.T Athe organisation of the is bad' because it is society which is [iKiiiiifaeuii in_" sector in South Africa ultimately left to foot the bill for these focuses on the nature of ownership and misallocative wastes. Seller concentration is control. Sonic .1; -;ue that conglomerate used as a proxy measure to summarise the cross-holdings and interlinking degree to which markets have been directorships afford the capital blocs a monopolised. monopolism- mi anglehold over future imcstment decisions and performance But is big necessarily bad? High seller outcomes. Whilst ownership and control are concentration need not be tantamount to politically significant, they have largely monopolisation. Large-scale production overshadowed the traditional monopoly offers cost efficiencies that might not problem concerned with the organisation of otherwise be realised in less concentrated sellers within a particular market or structures. Scale economies represent an industry. important competitive advantage that South African manufacturers must exploit as they Mainstream economic theory maintains that gear up to compete on world markets and the relative number and size of firms defend local markets from low-cost operating within a market determines the imported goods. magnitude of their market power. A spectrum of market structures is envisaged, Does big necessarily threaten the ranging from the ideal Of "highly competitive process? Provided that 'leconcentrated, perfect competition to the potential rivals are able to enter profitable single seller monopoly. Fewer competitors markets there is no reason to believe that and larger size raise the potency with which excessive profit-making will persist. incumbent dominant firms are able to abuse Excessive profitability acts as a signal to their market power and neutralise attract outsiders to enter a market and competition. Without the regulatory effects contest these profits. The competitiveness °f competition to check them, dominant of a market hinges on the condition of 'inns are able to set prices above entry. Markets which are characterised by competitive levels and extract excessive high barriers to entry, for instance, tend to profits. be less competitive because they prevent newcomers from entering profitable In comparison with competitive markets. Without this entry mechanism to alternatives, consumers in monopolistic regulate their conduct, incumbent dominant markets are left with fewer goods to firms can continue to act unchecked.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 35 msJZMXM ffiffiM aorl! y dull or strengthen the competitive Are high levels of have been identified and measured concentration Whilst relatively few studies have indicative of examined the organisation of sellers in the monopolistic abuse South African manufacturing sector, each New E©@n©m@t£rfe or do they concludes that local industries are highly mm represent some concentrated. In its review of the old Only two other studies in the Sui ih, greater efficiency Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act context have attempted to link market'' structure to performance. Reekie < |oiid the immediate accounting profit measures How should the evidence be interpreted? and make explicit some of the broader Are these high levels of concentration opportunity costs incurred by firms. indicative of monopolistic abuse or do they Second, the model tries to capture a broader represent some greater efficiency that set of explanatory variables which would not otherwise be realised in less influence market profitability. These concentrated markets? This ambiguity can variables are classified into three categories: only be resolved once those factors which

Table One: Distribution of Gini Coefficients at the C3 Level 1979-1985

Gini Level 1979 1982 1985 No of % No of % No of % Industries Industries Industries 0,9-1,00 0 0 0 0 1 4 0,8-0,89 17 65 16 64 15 58 0,7 - 0,79 6 23 9 36 10 38 0,6 - 0,69 2 8 0 0 0 0 0,0-0,59 1 4 0 0 0 0 Total No of Industries 26 100 25 100 26 100 Average gini coefficient per industry 0,796 0,815 0,817

Source: Table complied from gini coefficients derived from the 1985 Manufacturing Census.

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 36 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 m EM

MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE An Econometric Model

IND. VAR. COEFF STD ERR. T-VALUE SIG.LEV CONSTANT -0,492565 0,559895 -0,8797 O3906 NUM -0,00007 0,00005 -1,4095 0,1757 GINI 0,90263 0,683408 1,3208 0,2031 EFF 1,295241 0,276953 4,6768 0,0002 PROT 0,063277 0,001539 4,1120 0,0007 CAt-'LAB -0,064408 0,040901 -1,5747 0,1327

R (ADJ) = 0,5674 DurbW = 2,038

KEY: NUM Number of Firms GINI Coefficients EFF Efficiency PROT Tariff Protection CAPLAB Capital/Labour Ratios

DIAGNOSIS

The model separates the contributory effects Gini, firm numbers, tariff protection and capital-labour ratios have on the dependent profit variable (.see text). The results of the regression analysis reveal that neither Gin! nor the absolute number of firms in individual industries have any bearing on profit rates:

® The respective t-values of 1,3 and -1,4 gained for Gini and NUM are statistically insignificant, The results, therefore, reject the hypothesis that structure facilitates profitability.

o The results also indicate that capital requirements have no significant impact on the level of economic profits attained and hence do not deter market entry.

• • Efficiency and tariff protection, however, do have a positive impact on profits, other variables held constant. The i respective t-values of 4,7 and 4,1 are both significant at the 99% confidence interval.

• The R2 coefficient implies that the five explanatory variables together account for approximately 57% of the variation in profit levels across industries. In this respect, the results should be treated with some caution.

• Approximately 43% of the variation in profits remains unexplained. This incomplete specification, suggests that there are other potentially important variables which have significant impact on industry profit rates and need to be identified and quantified.

• A correlation coefficient matrix of the regression analysis reveals no important multicollinearity, whilst the plot of residuals against predicted values portrays no evidence of heteroscedasticity. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2 and hence if may be assumed that there is no first order autocorrelation.

16INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 The evidence does • Structure profit implications. Furthermore. eanii- not support the Two structural factors are included in the start-up costs do not appear to ,n.-iVis traditional view that model. Gini coefficients (GINI) were used deterrent to market entry. Like tin.-' size and number of to measure the degree of seller structural considerations, capitul/Iulioi concentration in markets. However, the gini ratios were not statistically sigm | i^-mt' firms determines regressed against profitability. the degree of is not a perfect measure. It measures the distribution of output between firms but market gives no indication of the number of firms competitiveness accounting for the particular inequality. Dealing witlh IMfor The number of firms in each industry is iifiil included as an explanatory variable to If the validity of these results can be compensate for this weakness (NUM). accepted, then two broad polic\ prescriptions must be made: • Efficiency A purported advantage of the competitive Size alone is not a sufficient criiei ia aaaiiisi process is that it spurs firms to greater which policy intervention should be levels of efficiency. Driven by the profit initiated. The evidence presented dots not motive, firms endeavour to outmanoeuvre support the traditional view thai m/o ami competitors through improved efficiency. number of firms determines the demvc »|' Whilst many measures of efficiency can be market competitiveness. If authorities used, changes in the gross output per unit began to break up large firms into smaller cost of labour was selected (EFF). units, the pro-competitive efficiencie- highlighted above could be lost \\ on Id the • Barriers to entry South East Asian economic mil acle ha\ e Without the threat of entry dominant firms taken place if anti-trust policy had brokei their large firms up, thereby prevent! are at liberty to reap excessive profits. An them from capturing world expmi markets? important determinant of profitability and the degree of competitiveness is thus the nature of the condition of entry. The pragmatic abuse principle cm icntly adopted by the present Competition Hoaid Two measures are used to summarise these should be maintained. The Boaul onl\ barriers to entry. First, Bain (1968) initiates action once some form of abuse maintained that significant capital start up has taken place. In this regard structure Would the SE costs prevent outsiders from entering should only be of concern to regulatory profitable markets. These start up costs are analysts when it acts as a source to Asian economic prohibitive barriers to entry. miracle have taken summarised by industry capital/labour ratios (CAPLAB). Second, South Africa is place if anti-trust an open economy which has raised various Barriers to entry into local markets must he policy had broken forms of protection to promote its policies scrutinised. This investigation highlights their large firms up, of import substitution. These barriers have that tariff barriers add to the profitabiliu of thereby pre venting insulated local industries from foreign local industries. Surely these measures them from competition. Holden's (1991) effective should only be used to protect fledging rates of tariff protection are used to industries as they develop a comparative capturing world summarise the height of these entry barriers advantage? It is time that these export markets? (PROT). anti-competitive measures were seiecti\cl\ phased out and the onus placed on local The model (see box) highlights that a weak industry to pay its own way. iPOfii positive relationship exists between the REFERENCES efficiency measure, the effective rate of Bain J. Industrial Organisation, Second edition. New York: Wiley an - tariff protection and profitability. A 1% rise 1968. in efficiency levels raises industry Du Plessis PG. 'Concentration of Economic Power in the South Afrt profitability by 1,3%, whilst a similar Manufacturing industry', Unpublished Thesis, Stelienbosch Univers'ty. 1977. Fourie FC vN and MR Smit. 'Trends in Economic Concentration in 5 increment to the effective rate of protection Africa', South African Journal ol Economics, 57:241-256,1989. raises profitability by 0,06%. Holden M. 'The Structure and Incidence of Protection in South Africa', m Biack and Dolley's forthcoming Readings in Microeconomics, Oxfor Even with the high degree of local University Press, 1991. concentration in the manufacturing sector, Leach D. 'Concentration and Profits in South Africa: Monopoly or Efficiency?,' Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Economic the model suggests that the structural Society of South Africa, Stelienbosch University, 1991. considerations have no bearing on Mouton Commision. Report of Inquiry info the Regulation of Monopolistic profitability. Neither seller concentration Conditions Act (1955), RP64. Pretoria: Goverment Printer, 1977. nor the absolute number of firms is Reekie WO. 'The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm in a South Africa setting', South African Journal of Economics, 52:146-155,1984. significantly related to industry Smith A. 'Future Directions for Competition Policy in the Post-Apartheid profitability. This would infer that big is not Economy', Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Economic bad because concentration has no adverse Society of South Africa, Stellenbosch University, 1991.

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 38 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992

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Catherine Cross, Simon Bekker and Craig dark, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal

Recent research in informal settlements of the DFR suggests that the migratory process is more complicated and multifaceted than is commonly believed. The authors demonstrate that an understanding of the changing dynamics in the target community is crucial to understanding migratory choices and processes. A number of planning and policy-making implications emerge from their research which calls for a revised model of urban development.

n South Vfrica, the issue of urbanisation It is becoming apparent that the planning is a \ ilal one. Both the component of process needs to take into account the Inatural increase in population change, as insights of the researchers and to well as the spatial mobility of people within communicate more effectively with the and between regions, are fundamental if implementation agencies, and that all three adequate planning for effective service must be informed by the input of the delivers is I'1 be possible. Moreover, we communities receiving development. The know that the South African spatial case of Mariannhill illustrates one means econonit is dominated by a few whereby this process might be made to metropolitan regions which draw people work, through the deliberations of a from rural aieas and outlying towns. committee of both planners and residents.

In I WW. the population of the Natal region comprised about 21% of the total South Mig African population, and by the year 2000 its proprrlion v. ill have grown to 23%. The Some of the main results flowing from the Durban 1 unctional Region (DFR) will also authors' two migration research projects ha\e jrow n iclative to the rest of the Natal may be summarised as follows: region. 1 rom comprising some 45% of the Natal population in 1989, this proportion Who are the recent migrants settling in will have ^rown to some 54% by the turn of informal settlements of Durban ? the ccntuiN. New in-migrants tend to be the middle Common w isdom regarding the spatial poor, i.e. young nuclear families with inobilitN nl South Africans is that migration comparatively few dependents, headed by a streams aa ord to the gravity flow man, who is often already employed or at principle: people leave rural areas for least employable. In short, these families peri-urban areas or small towns, and are not the very poor or destitute. subsequent l\ leave those areas for the iiietropole v. here they tend to remain in one The recent migrants may be a group of lixed dwelling. It is also often assumed that people with specific needs to be addressed migration into, and within, metropolitan in development interventions. For both areas takes place in an unstructured way, Inanda and Mariannhill, recent in-migrants where a | vi son or family simply occupies tend to be younger than the settled whalcuT land is found to be available. It is population, and to have somewhat higher rare that either the receiving community rates of employment. As a result, their into which these migrants enter, or the priorities in regard to service delivery may institutions within that community, are differ. Though there was little difference in systematically addressed in migration service priorities at Inanda, at Mariannhill anal) vs the new in-migrants gave schools and transport provision significantly higher Of considerable importance among these priority than did the older residents. implications is the changing roles of the planners, the implementation agencies, and These findings indicate that development the social science researchers. initiatives must be tailored to meet the Traditionally, the planners specify the needs of both the established residents and nature of the development intervention; the the new in-migrants: it is incorrect to 'implementation agencies carry out the work assume that these needs are identical in on the ground; and the researchers evaluate every respect (although there may be a the success (or lack thereof) of the initiative. considerable degree of overlap).

indica )R SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 41 mmmmmmMs Development How do recent in-migrants enter these The implications of tenure situations as informal settlements ? perceived and experienced within in|{)Vni initiatives must be settlements are often glossed over by the tailored to meet the Although trends are beginning to emerge, planner and the practitioner community needs of both the routes of entry into informal settlements who concentrate on the legal tenure established depend on the situation on the ground. situation. This ignores the fact that control residents and the over the allocation of land to established new in-migrants In spite of crowding, both Inanda and residents and prospective new-comers is Mariannhill are still relatively attractive the principal structuring mechanism of areas for settlement by disadvantaged most community organisations. people. For Inanda, accommodation is relatively cheap by comparison to formal What are the relationships between those townships, and places are still available in wishing to enter and to settle, those i\ ho certain areas. Transport and location have recently entered and settled, and the regarding jobs are also relatively good. established residents of the settlement'.' However, local institutions are weak and tenure is unclear. The research results A complex picture emerges, particularly in indicate that most residents do not know Inanda, of scouting by rural migranis to who owns the land they are living on. find their first urban base, often within a formal township. This transforms, however, Where Inanda's Released Area 33 was into indirect migration within the DIR. as formerly a freehold area inhabited mainly the recently arrived rural migrants tend to by tenants renting plots from landlords, the move around within the DFR, from formal violence of 1985 has effectively to informal settlements, and from one overthrown large-scale formal ownership informal settlement to another. Once a rural and with it the institution of rent tenancy. migrant family is established within an With the flight of most landlords and the informal area, it becomes possible for sonic pressure exerted by the emergent youth and direct migration from rural source areas to civic structures against rent tenancy, take place. Inanda's inhabitants today occupy the area almost entirely on ad hoc informal tenures. In Bambayi at Inanda, a Xhosa-speaking With civic structures not yet consolidated, network of long standing has helped other local institutions are unable to control the Transkeian migrants to find endemic violence in the area. accommodation in the community, \\ hile at Violence and the outlying Amatikwe area such chain instability are Under these conditions, Inanda's settlement migration connections appear to link Inanda driving significant process is turbulent. Following the collapse informal settlement with areas on the Natal streams of families of tenancy, new people wanting to move North Coast. out of the Inanda into the area need only personal region into informal connections to neighbouring families Mariannhill shows the importance in the prepared to make room for them. Given eyes of residents of control over settlement settlements Inanda's extreme crowding, obtaining a by local committees (comprising both place is reported to be very difficult for adults and youth), and the screening of families headed by women and nearly applicants. This suggests a principle impossible for single young people. Such> whereby all existing communities recognisc conditions are now common to many their obligation to accommodate the informal settlements. homeless whenever possible, but also insist on the right to approve outsiders who vv ish At the same time, continuing violence and to settle, to ensure the preservation of their instability are driving significant streams of (largely peaceful) community climate. families out of the Inanda region. Many are relocating to informal settlements such as The key finding in this regard of both Canaan and Kennedy (see case studies). research projects relates to the role of community organisations. In areas with In Mariannhill, in contra-distinction, order strong community organisation, in- rather than ambiguity prevails. In most migration may be kept down to levels areas, strong community organisations which make management of the manage the process of in-migration, development process possible. This is typically offering insiders (i.e. the children particularly true in most areas of of established residents who now seek Mariannhill, where the interaction bctv ecu accommodation of their own) new plots strong community organisation and first. Entering as tenants offers outsiders a effective service delivery has proven to be way of graduating - over a two to three year mutually supportive. period - to insider status.

16 INDICATORS A Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 - i euininittees under the civic umbrella community; and In most areas, -itcfor the community in supervising • to ensure that new families arrive at a strong community °'1C-t-migration process; and second, rate which the community can organisations ihe m peacefully absorb1. stroiin„i community leadership facilitates the manage the delivery ot services Here it is important to see that the entry of process of in-migration, r|,i, piocess of delivering desired strangers implies greater demand for essential services, which is also related, in typically offering . clopinent benefits may be central to the .sUihl^hment of solid and effective residents' minds, to competition over scarce insiders new plots leadership institutions in informal resources. The history of at least one first settlement at Inanda is characterised by Communities. Where no such institutions conflict over access to a water tap. Nor are ^•e in place, violence easily escapes groups of outsiders assimilated easily. In eoiiin'iimity control. Where this happens, the case of Mariannhill, attempts to move results are tragic for the community and groups of people from overcrowded or frustrating for the planners. conflict-torn areas have several times in the past caused flare-ups of violence that were These trends have important implications defused with difficulty. There is currently a for the role of the development process in perception that should the residents of the relation to community leadership. They Canaan informal settlement in the siingeM that actors in the development northwest of the DFR be relocated to process need to consult civic organisations Savannah Park in Mariannhill - which has and w ork closely with them in both the been mooted by the Greater Pinetown design and the implementation of Steering Committee - this will lead to development interventions. violence and conflict over the few resources which currently exist in the area. Wlmi role do perceptions of violence and the actual violence itself play in these relationships, and in the ways in which The implications in this regard for the settled and migrating families perceive development process are clear. The migration? viability of a development project goes beyond the issue of the internal costs. The The tragedy of continuing violence in the wider consequences of development initiatives need to be considered closely, DI'R becomes critical at this point. In areas The entry of which have been wracked by violence, the and the possible problems which might research reveals that conflict is a major arise from development interventions in strangers implies factor in determining both in- and areas where a scarcity of resources could greater demand for out-migration. generate conflict need to be examined. essential services, which is also fn near-peaceful Mariannhill, one What may we conclude from the related to settlement is dogged by violence and preliminary answers to these questions ? competition over disorder. In this sub-district, a warlord has established operations and the civic In the first place, families do not settle scarce resources committee has collapsed. Rapid permanently as soon as they enter the DFR. in-migration due to selling of sites has Migration into the DFR is complex, and the followed, sparking off further conflict as characteristic pattern is one of households local groups line up in opposition to new which move around within the peri-urban entrants. In the less organised settlements at zone of the DFR, rather than establish Inauda. conflict over resources regularly themselves in one permanent location. precipitates violence, and studies now in progress clearly show the role of this Second, to understand migration streams violence in triggering out-migration. into and within the DFR, one needs to study communities and families at the community Accordingly, residents and community level. Simple generalisations about organisations perceive control over the migration and urbanisation in the DFR are enti> strangers to be directly linked to inadequate. So too are generalisations about the prevention of violence. Outsiders individual clusters of informal settlement. fleeing from violence are perceived to bring In Inanda, each of the settlements with them the very troubles which they are demonstrates its own unique internal escaping. Mariannhill's civic committee dynamic which governs diverse aspects of \Wcin supervises the settlement process for community life, from negotiation over two main reasons: service delivery to control over settlement. * to monitor whether or not persons seeking residence in the area are likely Third, it would seem, particularly in the to disrupt the peaceful state of the light of the Inanda results, that population

INDICA )R SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 43 mmmmmmMs Project exchange - that is, migration streams into • Project management must include management must and out of the subregion - are high between community participation throughout ihL» include community informal settlements in the DFR, and are development process. participation likely to remain so, if not increase. A • When addressing the viability of a development project, planners must lon|< throughout the variety of factors would appear to account beyond the internal costs and aims of development for this high rate of population exchange: the project and include the wider process the high incidence of violence (often external costs and consequences. related to weak local institutions) and the • In analysing a proposed project, uncertain tenure status of many informal planners must move beyond an anah sis settlements would probably be among the of three traditional parties: the planners and state officials on the supply side, most important. and the target community on the Fourth, studies such as these of Inanda and demand side. In many communities, it is Mariannhill suggest further broad trends in essential to differentiate between new the DFR's migration process: in-migrants and established residents. • most adult in-migrants are still of rural • Similarly, planners need to move origin but the rural percentage is falling; beyond an analysis of legal tenure iu • families moving into informal their areas of operation. The settlement more and more often come implications of perceived and from closely adjacent communities; experienced tenure 'on the ground' in • informal communities want control over Inanda, for instance - need to be the settlement process and are moving addressed in future projects. to achieve it; • large-scale landlordism may be • It would seem necessary to involve weakening in the region generally. social scientists more often in the formulation of development projects, rather than using them solely as IW y focus e valuators. It is clear that the policy focus cannot Two difficult challenges emerge from this remain on general urbanisation issues at the proposal to amend the dominant South macro level, and on parallel broadbrush African urban development paradigm: quantitative responses to these macro issues. The differences and similarities The first challenge is a simple one: planners Planners need to between different local communities and policy-makers are faced with crisis move beyond an regarding migration and organisation need management - a seemingly never-ending analysis of legal to be identified. The household should be series of projects under fire. They have tenure in their recognised as a significant unit of analysis. developed a knee-jerk reaction, often falling back on past policy and practice. areas of operation It is also clear that 'orderly urbanisation' Quite simply, planners require more time to has become a catch-phrase, and its use think, discuss and plan. often reflects loose thinking and fuzzy conceptualisation. In particular, more The second challenge relates to the knowledge about the preconditions for development of community organisations, orderly urbanisation and about and the clear need for the development circumstances under which community process to create credible community institutions develop, are required. organisations where they are absent, and to nurture those - inter alia, through resource A more complex policy matrix needs to allocation - where they are established and emerge which is able, simultaneously, to growing. Simultaneously, the planning firm up overall policy, and to enable greater community must address the development flexibility at local level. In particular, a problem on scale and with scarce resources. policy regarding what policy makers should The dilemma thus created is a difficult one. and should not do regarding community organisations is needed. REFERENCES Bekket S, 'Oemogtaphic Scenarios'. Monitoring Migration'. Indicator SA, Vol8/No2, Autumn edition. Durban: Centre for Social and Development This suggests the need for a number of Studies, University of Natal, 1991. amendments to the prevailing urban Clark C. 'A Civic Accord: Service Deliver/ in Greater Pinetown', in Indicator development paradigm which is used by SA, Vo!9/No1, Summer Edition. Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1991. many developers and planners in the Cross C, S Bekker, C Clark and C Wilson. Searching lor Stability: country. Residential Migration and Community Control in Mariannhill. Rural-Urban • It is becoming clear that the planning Studies Unit, Working Paper No 23. Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, 1992. process and the implementation process Cross C, S Bekker, C Clark and R Richards. Moving On: Migration streams need to be re-integrated. into and out of Inanda. Durban: Report for the Town and Regional Planning Commission of the Natal Provincial Administration, 1992.

vsttmsmsaayjbs 4 4 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Hob Taylorand Basil van Horen Informal Settlements Division, The Urban Foundation

The in-situ upgrading project at the informal settlement of Besters on the outskirts of Durban is an ambitious pilot endeavour in Natal. The project arriving at decisions that are acceptably has several objectives beyond the installation of representative of community sentiment at a general basic services, such as the promotion of level and at a specific local level. (This is particularly participation in planning and implementation, and so in the context of the very parochial and secular skills development so that the resident community nature of sub-community areas.) can administer its own environment in the future. The degree to which the resident population is One ol ihe primary purposes of town planning is to equipped to deal with some of the complex planning guide future settlement and development through a issues in the in-situ upgrading context provides both process which is prescribed by statutory procedure. In problem and opportunity. It is problematic insofar as llic context of in-situ upgrading of informal the danger exists that communities starved of settlements such as Besters, however, planning resources will accept almost any 'development' interventions are concerned with how to most proposal, out of sheer desperation. effectively address situations in which settlement has alreadv occurred. The contrary approach, which has been adopted at Besters, has been to attempt to 'dejargonise' and In procedural terms, the planning process that has deprofessionalise the planning process where evolved in the Besters project is considerably more possible. Training exercises have included complex and time consuming than in conventional discussions on site, formal development meetings and •givcnl iolds' projects. This is because community workshops which have the specific objective of involvement is required at every stage in the process, adequately equipping the community to make firstly in terms of approval but secondly, and more informed decisions. Clearly, this is an objective easier importantly, in terms of the substantial contributions stated than achieved. The existence and building of which invariably imply lengthy reworking of plans. strong community structures as well as funding packages that are supportive of community-based Experience at Besters has indicated that the planning planning and development are important. exercise in the in-situ upgrading of informal settlements is most appropriately conducted so that: The tension between the de jure and de facto has been problematic at Besters settlement which is located • Planning is literally conducted from-the-ground partly within Durban, Ntuzuma, KwaMashu and up - it is not a desktop exercise which is imposed Released Area 33. Each jurisdictional authority has its on the settlement. The planning process must own regulations and procedures (which are generally accommodate both physical and social changes on designed for 'greenfields' situations anyway). an ongoing basis. Community opinion is that people are generally • Planning is conducted with community neither interested nor aware of the administrative involvement at all levels. It ranges from making boundaries which arbitrarily bisect the community. decisions on planning principles, through to fixing the alignments and location of services An explicit objective of the project has been to pursue infrastructure (transport network, refuse points, the route that makes sense on the ground: i.e. to work water points, etc). towards a uniform set of legislative procedures and • Planning is an integrative process such that the regulations. This raises an important point of 'ideal end state' evolves from the process, rather principle - informal settlement policy, generally, and than being an initial imposition on the process. planning policy, specifically, should be strongly Layout plans, for example, are arrived at towards influenced by development experience on the ground the later stages of implementation, rather than and thereby, by the communities most directly preceding upgrading. affected. • Planning is only one part of a multi-disciplinary approach to the upgrading process. It is a process • Tenure Delivery that continues throughout implementation. The tenure delivery process as stipulated by existing legislation, apart from applying differential treatment Participation in planning occurs at a variety of levels to various jurisdictions, does not accommodate some depending on the nature of decisions, discussions or of the unique characteristics of informal settlements. inputs made by the community. It includes informal liaison at the grassroots level of individual One of the primary problems with the rigid households, local area committees, umbrella civic imposition of conventional procedures and forms of structures, mass public meetings and workshops. This tenure in informal settlements relates to the fact that multi-layered set of structures has been important in an informal land transfer market already exists in

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 45msJZMXM ffiffiM such areas Informal settlements such as Besters take control of community. Community participation in no account of formal registration of title or transfer of decisions is therefore effectively prescribed bv t|1c ownership. The c\isiin;J system is based on de facto environment. For example, land must be sen iVeil a ,i site occupation which is perceived to translate into de formal tenure must be delivered, notwithstanding ' facto security for site occupants. community opinion in favour of water and housi^,,. basic needs. " Js Whilst the delivery of legally acceptable title is an integral and important aspect of the upgrading This denies the ability of the community to process, greater consideration needs to be given to the effectively control the funding resource and deploy form of title available, and to the timing of tenure that resource in such a manner as to address its delivery. The following problems have been raised by perceived needs in an appropriate manner. the community regarding the scenario at present: Participation, as a consequence, occurs within a framework of limited room for negotiated Firstly, in a context where de facto security already manoeuvre. It also makes effective evaluation of exists, many residents express the opinion that legal needs and options an almost unnecessary debate, or at title is problematic. For example, alternative forms of best, a debate around matters of detail rather than title such as superblock, communal tenure cannot be principle. accommodated in terms of the alternatives that currently exist in the area. Clearly, however, the funding environment is conditioned by the current level of knowledge about Secondly, many residents of informal settlements community opinion. It is also conditioned by the such as Besters have paid a sum of money to a established administrative and legal environment, 'shackfarmer' or 'warlord' for access to the sites they which tends to assume unto itself the basic right of presently occupy. Any suggestion of additional prescription, often placing development agencies in payment for legal title meets with an understandably the role of a patronising benefactor, frustrated by; negative response. transparent pretense to negotiate the non-negotiable.

Thirdly, the Deeds Registry (80km away in The design of engineering work represents an Pietermaritzburg) is inaccessible and the expensive, opportunity to facilitate public participation in the complex registration procedures and transfer fees delivery of product. This necessitates the associated with legal title are quite unaffordable to co-operation of the design consultant whose many informal settlement residents. These are documents become not only the blueprint for additional strong disincentives of the conventional implementation but also a means of community system, particularly in respect of future transfers of education relative to construction industry procedures site ownership. and operations.

Fourthly, the above factors imply that even if the In implementation terms, the role of the Besters conventional system is established - where individual community as paid provider of direct labour and sites are surveyed and title is registered as sub-contractors, has been beneficial. These beneficial legislatively required - the system is vulnerable to effects have not only been direct, in the sense of skills potential collapse upon first point of ownership acquisition and development, but also indirect, in the transfer, since the formal recording of future sense of community involvement in the realisation of ownership transfers at the Deeds Registry in the infrastructure. The longer term benefits remain an Pietermaritzburg is highly improbable. avenue for further training input.

Experience at Besters suggests that, at the level of It is important that skills acquisition leads to some principle, a more appropriate approach to tenure form of real empowerment for the individuals would be one which provides sufficient flexibility to concerned. A lesson emerging from Besters is that the allow a staged transition from the existing informal transition from sub-contracting in a project such as market based on de facto site occupation through to this one to a position of competitive operation in the an 'ideal end state' where conventional title is high risk business of the housing industry, is not an possible as one of a number of options. A staged easy transition. tenure delivery system has been devised at Besters which takes cognisance of this transition, in addition For those familiar with the vagaries of construction, to accommodating the longer-term imperatives this is a restatement of conventional wisdom. For associated with the in-situ upgrading of high density communities who have participated in a construction informal settlements. process in a 'hands-on' manner, this is not within the realm of their experiences. For the development • Community Participation agency, the challenge is to create momentum for The funding environment, which is currently on-going contractor development. Participation, in dominated by the Independent Development Trust, is this aspect, also involves creation of opportunity geared to the rapid delivery of product. This can only beyond the project. This is especially true when the be delivered on the basis of certain pre-determined project objectives include a desire to create capacity rules, tin: establishment of which lies outside the where very limited capacity previously existed.

vsttmsm saayjbs 46 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 CASfc IN tiM Aldington, Centre for Social arid Development Studies, University of Natal

ranaan an informal settlement of over 400 shacks here some 2000 people live within the municipal hnundaries of Durban, provides interesting evidence nfthe nature of migration patterns and urbanisation in the DFR in the 1990s. It moreover illustrates the own home in an informal settlement) accounts for leaacy of the apartheid era and the failure of the much of the balance. Average house occupancy rates in the area have dropped from approximately 10 to 6. authorities to act innovatively to meet the clear Canaan households' average occupancy rate was only needs of the informally or illegally housed. 3,5 persons which is to be expected in a newly established settlement. Canaan has had an extremely high public profile. It is clearly \ isible to the thousands of people who daily That Canaan residents were part of this intra-urban use lhe N- ring road around Durban. It has been migration was indicated by the finding that 93% of acknow ledged as an area requiring urgent attention household heads had lived within the DFR (for an by all ihe authorities involved, not only on the average of 15 years) prior to relocating to Canaan. A grounds ol its illegality and lack of services but also recent cause of the influx into informal settlements because il is situated on unstable and dangerous has been the violence which has forced families to ground. flee their former accommodation. Sixty percent of households in Canaan had left their previous place of Over lw o years have elapsed since the settlement accommodation for this reason. grew up v irtually overnight and it is almost two years since Ihe first eviction notices were issued, yet the Reflecting the sources and causes of the growth of people remain there and the authorities have been Canaan, two-thirds of Canaan households were found unable lo point out a location to which they might be to consist of nuclear families and levels of mmed. lei alone taken any steps to provide shelter or unemployment were relatively low (90% of services in such an area. Nor, with the recent households contained at least one person in exception of water, have the community's immediate employment). Canaan residents are generally not new needs in Canaan been addressed. arrivals from the countryside in search of employment but whole families who have lived and J Urban Needs worked in the DFR for some time but been forced to Ilmnelessness, long a problem in the DFR, became relocate as a result of violence or inadequate housing one of immense and ever increasing proportions conditions. following the heaviest period of urbanisation which occurred in the 1970s and coincided with a drop in Although these facts might be held to imply that the the rate <>l low income housing provision by the state. residents of Canaan were permanently urbanised The last ^lib-economic houses in the area were built two-thirds still maintain a rural home and the hj the state in Umlazi in 1977. Generally, in the majority have dependents at their rural home. Their 1980s the only formal housing activity that has insecurity and unsatisfactory lifestyles have led them occurred has been the provision of middle and upper to maintain their rural homes as a backstop. income houses by the private sector. Many children of schoolgoing age are not living with A comnioi ily held view is that homelessness and their parents in Canaan - probably because of the increasing informal or squatter settlements are the absence of schools. There are also few old people or result ot the continuing influx of people from rural non -nuclear household members, reflecting the areas in search of employment in the metropolis. inadequate size and nature of the home and its recent Closer analysis of these settlements (and here the establishment. Although some of the young and old Canaan population provides interesting evidence of may have been left at 'their other home' where the recent migration patterns within the DFR) and the risk of violence may be perceived to be less, the fact older and more formal ones within the DFR, that there are the expected number of children under however, reveal that the majority of the residents of the age of 5 and over the age of 19 implies that it is i lie recently established informal settlements have the absence of schools in Canaan that has led to the llieir origins within the DFR. Natural population disruption of family life. Half the 5 - 19 year olds in growth has provided the source of many of these Canaan are not attending school. settlers, and the reduction in the average number of members of a housing unit (which has occurred Canaan residents said they would only be prepared to where adult children have left home to establish their uw move to a place where schools were available. The n homes and others who rented a room within a chances of such a place being found are negligible house or a backyard shack have left to establish their and yet such amenities appear crucial to the

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 47msJZMXM ffiffiM successful relocation of communities both with (both areas within the municipal boundary ) lx\-i USc regard to their own development and the development the former fell under the control of the House 0| of relations with their new neighbours, with whom Delegates and the latter first the House of \ssomi, relations would become unnecessarily strained if the and then the House of Representatives. 1' 'immigrants' were to put additional pressure on already inadequate facilities. Councillor Watterson argued that as the kind v us owned by the government it was the government's Merely to allocate sites or notify the DET that schools responsibility to supply water, not the ratepayers of will be required for a site and service development is Durban and that 'we' cannot encourage people U> st. , not adequate. Negotiations with the authorities to there. The state department was threatening to provide temporary or emergency facilities would be prosecute them if they did not move the people nf [' encouraged if schemes such as the IDT 'R7 500 He placed the 'blame' for what had been allowed to Scheme', rather than leaving it to the new happen on the state department - he saw it too ;is a 'community' to motivate for a school, made it a regional problem, not one for the city. He said -One condition for the granting of loans that schools (along of the main problems... is there are too mam. with other essential services) should be available in authorities and you can't get sense out of ,m\ body the area. because they pass the buck to another authority.' Thai comment was made 18 months ago. The bucUs still • Passing the Buck being passed. The histories of local governments or civics in informal settlements are usually chequered. Prior to With the exception of the supply of water b\ the the repeal of the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts and Corporation through two fire hydrants positioned just the Local Authorities, formal local government for outside Canaan's boundary the settlement remains blacks could only be established in areas specifically without services. They have not been removed hv the set aside for black settlement within the RSA or Corporation and the latter has not been prosecuted by homelands. the state. Neither the state, the Corporation or the NPA have been able to identify an acceptable Canaan is part of a former Indian Group Area within alternative site. the boundaries of the Municipality of Durban and is owned by the Department of Transport. Although the • Civic Organisation municipality is made responsible for squatters within In August 1990 when a notice was erected outride the its boundaries by the Prevention of Illegal Squatting settlement, eviction notices issued and removal Act No 52 of 1951, the same Act does not allow the seemed imminent, the first committee was lonned in Council to permit squatting except under very Canaan. Until that point there had been no specific conditions. The zoning of Clare Estate as organisation in the community and households had Indian under the Group Areas Act made it the lived as individual units dealing with theii pcisoual responsibility of the House of Degelates. The needs and problems on a day to day basis. Department of Transport as the owner of the land is accountable for what happens on the land but does There were no services in Canaan and, accepting that not have the authority to allow settlement on road there was no one to approach to provide them, the reserve land. settlers coped as well as they could on their ou n. The people in Canaan were generally unknown lo one However the only authority which appears to have another. The majority had relocated to Canaan on accepted any responsibility for the settlement is the account of violence and were understandably Community Services Division of the NPA which unwilling to become involved in any form of (initially as agent of the Department of Development organisation which would result in the airing of Aid - the department responsible for the political affiliations which could lead to tensions in administration of blacks in white areas) has attempted their new home. One of the attractions of Canaan was to find a suitable site and facilitate relocation. its situation in an Indian Group Area where it was felt Complicating matters further, the Pinetown that no black political grouping would exercise any Municipality has also become involved in Canaan as particular sway. an agent of the NPA! The threat of imminent removal, however, forced the An interview with Councillor Watterson, at the time community to organise themselves to speak with one Chairman of Durban's Management Committee, voice to the authorities. A committee emerged to indicated that there was as much confusion at official represent the interests of the settlers against the level as to legal responsibilities as there was in the prospective developer of the land, the Department ol community. At the same time as claiming that the fact Transport and the Durban Corporation. The that the land was owned by a state department made it community was united in its desire to resist eviction, impossible for them to supply water or health to obtain some form of secure title to the land on services, he stated that the Council would be which they were living and to obtain basic services. prosecuted if it did not take action to remove the squatters. He also stated that the Council was unable However once the community had been forced to to plan for the squatters at Cato Manor or Block AK accept that removal was inevitable, the committee

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 48 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 • prime task of obtaining secure title to their Stavros Stavrou, Centre for Social and Development l S • ' ' 'I" lis subsequent distinct lack of success in Studies, and Leanne Luckin, Data Research Africa 1)Mlc l' "'jni, services further restricted the development "m"' ciiinmittee's credibility and ability to act as a 1,1 Vni" 'orce f'ie community. Despite the urgent People live in two shack settlements to be found on "'"•universally expressed need for water they did not one of Durban's municipal garbage dumps. The • -ecd in obtaining this for over a year - and then it origins of three waves of in-migrants, the impact of supplied because all parties had agreed that official recognition of one of the camps, and the - piy need only be temporary as the community attempts at community upliftment provide a unique 'vould move as soon as a suitable location was insight into the fringes of shackland. The authors available. draw on sun/eys they undertook at Kennedy Road between 1991 to 1992 which gathered information The vci\ first meeting with the developer in August on all the households. jtjQO s;tv, the committee agree to stop residents clioppi'i- down the gum trees for building poles and fuel'. '<) prevent any further persons from building The shanty camps on the garbage dumps at Upper shaek> in the area and to attempt to look for alternate and Lower Kennedy Road are situated 1,5 kilometres land, fhe committee was asked to perform certain apart on land owned by the Durban City Council. At policing functions at the same time as it was denied present there are about 75 homes in each of the anv resources to meet the needs of the community it camps, with an average household size of three a'prc^ciiicd. The result was that its status in the persons in Upper Kennedy and four persons in Lower coiniuuniiy was undermined. It persuaded the people Kennedy. in desist from chopping down trees but was not given assislance to help meet the community's need for The land on which both settlements are situated was building materials and fuel. The ban on building once farm land owned by Indians. Agricultural required (lie committee to prevent people from activities began to give way to shack farming and by erecting toilets at the same time as then requests for the mid-1980s two distinct shanty camps had water and refuse removal were refused by the emerged at Kennedy Road. Most of the first wave of authorities. settlers were single persons from rural areas who were drawn to the area in the hope of seeking access The ban on further shack building in Canaan led to employment opportunities in Durban. ine\ iiahK to the situation where the leadership was tempted into selling the sites and houses of people During the latter part of the 1980s, following the who lor one reason or another left the community. repeal of influx control in 1986, a second wave of This in turn led to charges of corruption and claims settlers migrated to the area. In contrast to the first that people were intimidated into departing from settlers, this group comprised family units, who came Canaan and their homes subsequently sold for the from both urban and rural areas, primarily because profit of the Chairman. they sought access to land for residential purposes. The need to find land for residential purposes became The 01 iL'inal threat to the people of Canaan led to the a more powerful motive for migrating into the area uniting of a peaceful community and the election of a than the search for employment opportunities. committee which quickly grew in stature and credibility and was in a position to negotiate on The escalation of violence in Durban's townships and behalf of the entire community. The change in the peri-urban shanty areas during the early 1990s nature of the leadership task, and the use of the resulted in a third wave of settlement. The most committee's credibility as a control mechanism by the recent arrivals at Kennedy Road came primarily authorities, at the same time as the authorities denied because they were pushed out of their previous place the committee the resources they needed to retain of residence due to the ongoing political conflict. This their credibility, undermined the committee and last group, therefore, came almost exclusively from introduced tensions into the community. urban areas and were drawn to the area because of its relative calm and apolitical environment. Chairmen and committee members have been replaced; some have had then houses burnt and have Both communities at Upper and Lower Kennedy been chased out of the community; suspicion and fear Road are extremely poor. Many people survive by have replaced respect and authority. The authorities foraging on the dumps for food which has been may have succeeded in resisting the demands of the rejected by the market, or for cardboard and plastics community but in so doing they have removed the which, along with the food that is not consumed, they credibility of the leadership and they no longer have sell. access to accepted representatives with whom they can negotiate. Canaan, which appeared well on the A common fallacy about residents of shantytowns is v > ay to developing a strong civic authority, is weak, that there are very few people who are formally divided and unable either to press its own demands or employed. However, one-quarter and one-third of all react to those of the authorities. O0O& the economically active adults in Upper Kennedy and Lower Kennedy, respectively, are employed in the

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 49 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM formal sector. These employment levels do not differ • Tenure Issues from those in the formal townships. The importance of tenure relationships and the issu of private property cannot be over-estimated. Most • Pride of Recognition black peri-urban residential settlements display The community in Upper Kennedy is a despondent, specific characteristics of a lack of investment in poorly motivated group who are biding their time private homes and general income leakages out oft|lc either until someone or some organisation improves area. This is a direct result of the paucity of their lot, or until they find a better place to go. Almost opportunities to spend or invest money on the home all the residents interviewed at Upper Kennedy cited and within these areas. Lower Kennedy as, relatively speaking, the ideal place to live. The reason for this is that the Durban In the absence of clearly defined and marketable City Council has accepted the presence of Lower property rights, not only is there little incentive to Kennedy and has formulated an upliftment policy. invest in the purchase or improvement of property, Their de facto recognition of the settlement, when but it is also impossible to obtain bank finance. A\ a formalised, will result in the residents having legal result, money is not invested in homes and income is tenure. not recycled within the local economy but instead spent outside, at nearby towns, suburbs, and the An interesting phenomenon is the fact that the elected central business districts. Both home-owners and area committee at Lower Kennedy is comprised of black entrepreneurs are accordingly disadvantaged. non-party political persons. Indeed, this is a prerequisite for membership of the committee. One of Shanty towns are at the extreme end of this scale. the first acts of the committee after winning Council Feelings of impennanence and of breaking the law recognition was to restrict any further migration into give rise to a transient philosophy which is clearK the settlements. The community itself is now reflected in the physical appearance of most responsible for the policing of new arrivals. (Further residential dwellings. growth has occurred along the periphery of Lower Kennedy but the newcomers are not considered part The extension of tenure and property rights to the of the settlement.) residents of Lower Kennedy has brought about the nascent development of home building and This feeling of acceptance has been a strong binding improvement. Although wealth is limited, all the factor for the community of Lower Kennedy, and the residents in Lower Kennedy have a strong desire to residents have geared themselves towards invest in their homes and properties, and are v, illing participating in the upliftment plans. to put effort into upgrading the area at large. In contrast, only one-tenth of the households sun e\ed in The differential degree of official recognition of each Upper Kennedy are willing to invest in their area of these camps has had a profound impact on the regardless of other options; a further 50% would nature of the areas and the residents' attitudes towards invest in Upper Kennedy only if they were not able 1o their homes. The Upper area, on the one hand, move into Lower Kennedy. resembles a stereotypical shack settlement with tightly-packed, ramshackle dwellings squatting in the Caution must be exercised, however, when mud. There are no structured pathways, no collection attempting to negotiate the sale of property rights to of litter, no ablution facilities nor any semblance of the current residents: order. • The average total savings of tenants is R30 in Upper Kennedy and R190 in Lower Kennedy. The Lower area, on the other hand, resembles the • By borrowing money from relatives and friends, beginnings of an established settlement. Dwellings the average deposit that residents can afford is are more permanent and durable than those in the R310 in Upper Kennedy and R415 in Lower Upper area, and most have been beautified inside and Kennedy. out. A better grade of furniture and household • On average, households can afford R50 in Upper accessories are evident as some residents have Kennedy and R160 in Lower Kennedy towards managed to obtain hire-purchase accounts. monthly mortgage payments. Televisions and radios are not uncommon. • The amount that people can pay towards the upgrading of their properties and homes is limited The notion of private space is clearly evident. This and by implication this must be done on an sets Lower Kennedy apart from Upper Kennedy, and, incremental and controlled basis. indeed, from most other shantytowns. Perhaps the most prominent feature of Lower Kennedy are the To brifely conclude, shanty settlements can be fences that clearly demarcate the individual shacks formalised to great advantage for the settlers and and surrounding properties from others. Fences range society if there is a will to do so by both the residents from chicken-wire, picket fences, planted hedges and and the authorities in charge. A prerequisite, however, plain wooden structures. Lines of demarcation were is that tenure arrangements are formalised and that agreed upon by the residents themselves, and where a the financial limitations of shanty settlers are taken difference of opinion existed, arbitration was set up into account. MJ& \ ia (lie area committee.

vsttmsmsaayjbs 5 0 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 M Solutions to Urban Sprawl Roger Behrens and Vanessa Watson Urban Problems Research Unit, University of Cape Town

plans aie currently underway to dispose of various state land holdings in South African cities. This would represent the loss of an opportunity to provide a large number of poor, disadvantaged households with an environment that would address the massive spatial inequalities left by apartheid. The authors comment on the role that vacant and underused state land should play in future urban development and urge that larger, well located parcels remain in public ownership. w mitli African cities all have one and expansive spaces of dispersed urban (^important feature in common - urban growth generate unnecessarily high costs «i\)\\lli lias taken the form of dispersed for the operation of road-based public reside 11 lial accretion at the city edge. While services (e.g. solid waste collection) and the part of this growth has occurred as a result maintenance of public open spaces. Dispersed urban of market forces, in which higher income growth has families seek privacy and amenity in Of particular importance is the cost of suburban environments, much of it has been subsidising the public transport services adverse financial, the result of either a deliberate government necessary to move workers from peripheral social and policy of land acquisition for large-scale residential areas to more central industrial environmental lower income development, or spontaneous areas. The annual subsidy of bus routes to impacts, especially anil often unauthorised settlement by those and from Khayelitsha (a township on the for the poor seeking proximity to urban labour markets. periphery Cape Town) for instance, amounted to R20 million in 1989 (R1 300 Il is now increasingly accepted that this per commuter). This subsidy accumulated form of dispersed urban growth has adverse at the rate of inflation (15%) over the financial, social and environmental impacts. period of a housing bond (20 years), would These impacts are particularly great for represent a public cost of approximately poorer families living some distance from R2,35 billion - a figure equivalent to the employment centres, commercial services purchase cost of 50 000 small serviced anil public facilities. dwellings or 200 000 small serviced sites, at current prices (Cape Town's existing housing backlog is in the region of 120 000 units). Rail subsidies are double bus of Urfoan 'Ml subsidies (Clark, pers comm). 'flic impacts of urban growth in meln ipolitan Cape Town are perhaps Thus the excessive financial resources representative of most South African cities. necessary to meet the capital and operating Tlie\ can be clustered according to costs of dispersed urban growth obviously capital/operating costs, individual/consumer prevents the use of these critical resources costs, environmental costs and for more urgent capital investments. economic/productivity costs. Thirdly, in terms of individual costs, one of Firstly, in terms of capital costs, dispersed the most serious impacts of dispersed urban urban growth makes the provision of utility growth for consumers is the amount of services expensive. In the case of higher money spent on travel. International income 'one house - one plot' standards suggest that commuting costs to developments, the cost'of providing work should not consume more than 2,5% services is increased as the great distances to 5% of an individual's income (Clark and between dwellings necessitate long pipe Naude, 1986). A Khayelitsha resident in and cable lengths. In the case of large-scale 1988 spent roughly 11 % of his or her lower income developments beyond the city income on travel (UPRU, 1990). edge, either separate service production is necessary (e.g. a new sewage treatment New housing developments are continually works), or very long pipes and cables are located on the edge of the city, while the required to link these developments to distribution of shops and factories remains existing points of service production, both relatively unchanged. Consequently, at considerable cost. commuting distances are steadily increasing. In metropolitan Cape Town Secondly, in terms of operating costs, the (one-way) trip lengths have reached an excessive distances, low levels of support average of 16 km (Liebenberg and Stander,

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 51 msJZMXM ffiffiM m

Policy should aim 1992) - a figure comparable to the continual location of most new hnusii „ to reduce renowned car dependant cities of the First some distance from major shop pi n.^- World (e.g. Los Angeles: 15,3 km). For industrial areas, concentrates mo\ ciiicli. • unnecessary one direction during rush-hours. IXees • low-income bus commuters located in expenditure, trip lengths generate a huge deni.md IW Ve conserve Khayelitsha the average trip length is a movement, and commuters are lorccd. u> agricultural lands staggering 35 km (Clark, pers comm). use cars and combi-taxis because on the urban edge, The time spent commuting to and from low-density developments cannot supn|v the number of passengers necessai v ui ' and settle poorer peripheral townships has a substantial impact on daily living - reducing the time support efficient public transpon m!t\ |l_-cs groups closer to available to supervise children, attend night town school, generate additional income, etc. In Lastly, in terms of economic pnnhi, •ijyjtv Khayelitsha commuters spend dispersed urban growth is inhibiii\e. approximately 2 hours and 40 minutes Excessive commuting time leads to travelling a day (UPRU 1990), in the PWV tiredness and lateness, both of v. Inch black commuters can spend up to 6 hours a negatively effect worker produciK ity. The day travelling (Naude 1987). cost of excessive transportation increases production costs and reduces consumer Fourthly, there are the environmental costs. spending. Dispersed environmenis inhibit Dispersed urban growth inevitably small business activity because die number consumes large amounts of valuable of consumers necessary for viable market agricultural land. On the periphery of Cape thresholds is seldom reached - ibis situation Town between 1960 and 1981, almost 1 ha is worst in poorer areas where a\ erage of farmland was lost a day (Gasson, 1989). disposable incomes are low. This loss has a significant impact on economic growth, both in terms of agriculture's share (9%) of the region's trueturirug gross geographic product, and its attractiveness as a tourist destination - an The impacts and costs of dispersed uiban industry identified as the most important growth indicate that there is an unvnt need source of potential economic growth to physically restructure the way South (Wesgro, 1992). African cities are growing. It is suggested that central objectives of this strategy 'Inward' If the low-density residential expansion of should be to: reduce unnecessary capital Cape Town continues, the city will double and operating expenditure, conserve development would in size over the next 15 to 20 years (UPRU, sensitive natural and agricultural lands on promote a physical 1990). Dispersed urban growth is also the urban edge, and provide pooler, restructuring of having a significant impact on levels of disadvantaged groups with residential areas urban growth pollution. Levels of photochemical smog in closer to existing urban facilities and based on higher the city have risen dramatically over the employment opportunities. residential densities past three years (Cape Town City Council, 1991/1992). Photochemical smog primarily It is now widely accepted that one of the effects the respiratory system and may actions necessary to achieve this, is to result in emphysema, asthma, chronic direct urban growth - at higher residential bronchitis and lung cancer. The main cause densities - inward (Dewar and of the recent rise is attributed to an increase Uytenbogaardt, 1991; Smitand lodes. in vehicular emission, as a result of 1990; Urban Foundation, 1990. W ..rid increased average trip lengths. Bank, 1991). A process of 'inward' development would promote a physical Fifthly, the nature of urban growth restructuring of urban growth in the inevitably influences the efficiency with following ways: which a city operates. Indicators of city • It would enable a more efficient use of efficiency include: levels of congestion and existing infrastructural investments. A economic productivity. study of the comparative costs of service provision in Cape Town, In terms of congestion, the average indicates that savings of up to 36% per morning rush-hour travel speed on major erf are possible in locations where the roads in 1980 was 40 km/hr. The equivalent cost of primary services has already speed in 1990 was 34 km/hr - a speed been met (Patterson, 1988). reduction of 15% (Liebenberg and Stander, • It would reduce the rate of land 1992). As a result trips in the morning consumption beyond the urban edge. An rush-hour take almost double the time of important benefit of this would be the the same trips in off-peak periods. This is conservation of agricultural and natural aggravated by dispersed urban growth. The lands.

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS5 2 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 OUIII reduce average trip lengths. TABLE: Vacant and Under-used State Land in Cape Town ' This would reduce the need for POSSIBLE POSSIBLE ,Nci ient, alleviate congestion, restrain SITE OWNERSHIP AREA POPULATION POPULATION II!" deterioration of air quality, and 100 du's/ha 50 du's/ha •lieu" eNpenditure on travel, gross gross n would boost levels of support for ' tr11sei vices and small business •Culemborg Transnet/Portnet 600 ha 270 000 135 000 Joll, j( j. ()f particular importance would Yards be the potential for increased support on •District Six Public/Private 50 ha 22 500 11 250 •Marconi Telkom 213 ha 95 850 47 925 public transport services. Beam # |l would 1 educe per capita public •Wingtield SADF 350 ha 157 500 78 750 cxpendiuiie on the operation and Military Base maintenance of public services, through •Youngsfield SADF 210 ha 94 500 47 250 the development of unnecessary open Military Base spaces, the shortening of (per •Ysterplaet SADF 209 ha 94 050 47 025 household i distances covered by Military Base TOTAL 1 632 ha 734 400 367 200 road-based services, and a reduction in per capita public transport subsidy. The latter u ould be possible through a adjacent higher income areas. Secondly, decrease in average commuting informal operators would gain access to the superior spending power of adjacent distances. higher income communities. A process of 'inward' development which provided lower income groups with well located residential areas, would in fact 3>fej present a powerful mechanism to address the massively unequal access to urban Attempts at 'inward' development in other f'acilit ies and employment opportunities, cities of the world have proven that the imposed by 'group areas' segregation. greatest potential exists in the development 'Inward' development would benefit lower of well located vacant or under-used land. income households in the following ways: Attempts at increasing residential densities • It would situate lower income within existing built areas (e.g. through households closer to employment provisions which make the sub-division of centres. A significant portion of a erven easier) have proven slow and sometimes unpopular with existing We need to household's income would then be address the released for other investments as communities (Behrens and Watson, 1992). commuting costs to work decline, and The implication of this is clearly that any massively unequal less time would be spent on commuting, vacant or under-used land parcels offer access to urban enabling more time for family tremendous potential. Most South African facilities and interaction, education arid economic cities have such parcels, often centrally located, and frequently state owned. employment activities iii/the home. opportunities, • It would situate lower income imposed by 'group households closer to public transport It is within this context that attention is now services and therefore improve their being turned to state owned urban land in areas' segrega tion access to various parts of the city. This the metropolitan centres. They usually is of particular importance given that represent areas cleared under the Group levels of car ownership are extremely Areas Act, buffer areas, or areas where low amongst poorer groups. functions are no longer appropriately • It would situate lower income located. Of greatest importance are those households closer to established larger, central parcels, most suited for lower higher-order public'facilities and income residential development. Cape amenities. In addition lower income Town has six such parcels (see table). groups would be located next to higher income groups, making it possible for Public ownership of urban land would offer the poor to benefit from the commercial the following advantages to a strategy services generated by the superior which provided lower income groups with spending power of the rich. well located residential areas: • It would provide the most favourable • It would enable a subsidisation of the conditions for the emergence of small land acquisition costs that would informal businesses. There are two main normally exclude lower income reasons for this. Firstly, informal households from inner city housing. operators would be able to benefit from Centrally located land, by virtue of its the customer flows attracted by greater access to infrastructure and higher-order commercial activities in facilities, is usually more expensive than peripheral land. In an open land market

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 53 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM Plans are currently therefore, activities or households able urban activity. In addition, these parcels underway to to pay most, usually gain access to it. need not be developed exclusively fol- lower income groups, as it is often dispose of various It would negate the necessity for extensive public land acquisition in beneficial to integrate income groups. Tlie parcels of vacant central areas. This process would bulk of residential development should and under-used probably prove to be either extremely however accommodate lower income state land within expensive (perhaps unaffordable), or households. South African cities politically sensitive. It would enable public authorities to For this to happen it is essential that lIn actively promote a more desirable bulk of state-owned urban land remains in pattern of urban development. public ownership, so that the land cosis ih;,( would normally exclude lower income groups from these developments can be subsidised. SI :ats Land Plans are currently underway to dispose of It is clear that should centrally locate d state various parcels of vacant and under-used land fail to be developed for lower income state land within South African cities. The groups, the opportunity of providing a huge current fiscal pressures facing both central number of poor households with an and local government have prompted many environment that will begin to address ilic public authorities to contemplate the sale of massive spatial inequalities that have- their land holdings to private developers in resulted from decades of apartheid policies, an attempt to provide an additional source will be lost; and a pattern of urban growth of revenue. that has proven extremely costly, will continue unchanged. The Urban Problems In Cape Town, for instance, the Department Research Unit and the Development \ction of Public Works and Land Affairs has been Group are currently undertaking research to instructed to dispose of tracts of public land illustrate that the development of this laud occupied by the South African Defence for lower income groups is not only Force (including Youngsfield), and feasible, but critically necessary as u ell. planning consultants have put forward proposals for the SA Navy's holdings in As a matter of urgency, efforts should be Wingfield. The sale of further public land is made to prevent the sale of these tracts of also under consideration. land to private developers. The state laud These land parcels issue is of national importance, and should be In addition, recently 'privatised' state effective decisions regarding their disposal developed into bodies are planning to dispose of some of should be made. mixed-use urban their land. Transnet has invited engineering REFERENCES environments, consultants to tender proposals for the development of the Culemborg railway Behrens RB and Watson V. 'The Compact City?: Evaluation olthe Costs of primarily Urban Growth in Metropolitan Cape Town'. Working Paper No 46. Cap yards, and the Marconi Beam site Town: Urban Problems Research Unit, UCT, 1992. accommodating (controlled by Telkom) has been identified Cape Town City Council. 'Annual Report ol the Medical Ollicerol Health'. lower income by the Milnerton Municipality as a possible Health Department, Vol 1 and 2,1990/1991. location for new 'higher-order' Clark P. Personal communication, Transport Section, Town Planning households Branch, Cape Town City Council, 1992. development. Clark P and Naude A. 'Bus Subsidisation in South Alrlcai. Pretoria: National Institute for Transport and Road Research, CSIR, 1986. This process of land disposal is occurring Dewar D and Uytenbogaardt RS. 'South African Cities: A Manifesto foi Change'. Cape Town: Urban Problems Research Unit, UCT, 1991. without adequate consultation, over what Gasson B. landscape Attributes and Capacities: The South Western Cape', are essentially public assets. It is unlikely Part 2. Landscape Southern Africa: July/August, 1989. that sale to private developers will be in the liebenberg and Slander Consulting Engineers. 'Public Transport Study lor broader public interest. Certainly there is no Cape Town Metropolitan Area - The Metropolitan Road Network: Travel Demand, Operation and Performance'. Report T8/91 (Draft), 1992. consensus as to the appropriate role these Naude A. 'Urbanisation and Transport in the PWV Region: Implications of strategic land parcels should play in future Alternative Urban Structured, report for the Urban Foundation, 1987. urban development. Patterson J .'Cost Comparison of the Development ol Infill Areas Against the Development of New Peripheral Areas in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area'. Unpublished report to the Urban Foundation (Western Cape), 1988. These land parcels should be developed Smit DP and Todes A. 'An Evaluation of Approaches to Metropolitan Spatial into mixed-use urban environments, Management in South Africa'. South African Geographical Journal, 1990. primarily accommodating lower income UPRU. 'An Overview of Development Problems in Metropolitan Cape Towri. Working Paper No 40. Cape Town: Urban Problems Research Unit, UCT, households. Not all land need be developed 1990. for this purpose however, as it may be Urban Foundation. 'Cape Town: Future Options?. Urban Debate 2010. necessary, for instance, to either provide Johannesburg: The Urbanisation Unit, 1990. additional land for industrial activities Wesgro. 'South Africa's Leading Edge? A Guide to the Western Cape incompatible with residences, or large Economy. Cape Town: Wesgro, 1992. green open spaces for release from intense World Bank.' South African Urban Sector Reconnaissance: Urban Land Issued. World Bank Mission, Section 2, Part 2,1991.

vsttmsmsaayjbs 5 4 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992

POLITICAL CONFLICT IN NATAL, 1989-1992 Antoinette Louw, Indicator SA Researcher, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal

Wis overview of conflict trends in Natal is based primarily on material collected from local newspapers, the Indicator SA's newsclipping bank and the records of various monitoring agencies. The collection of data on oolitical conflict forms part of a joint CSDS-lndicator SA-HSRC research project which investigates patterns of collective action in South African society (see discussion in Indicator SA, Vol9/No1:43-45). "Dctween 1987 to mid-1990, Natal became the residents making claims of intimidation and attacks 1 lashpoint of conflict in South Africa. During by these parties. this period, the violence spread to communities around Pietermaritzburg, who saw massive In the townships around Durban, the conflict was destruction of life and property in 1987, and again in shaped by clashes between United Democratic Front eurl\ 1990. The violence occurred in peri-urban (UDF)-aligned youths and Inkatha vigilantes, shack settlements and townships marked by hardships competition over scarce resources, problems in the such as squalid living conditions, inadequate education system and high crime levels (Natal facilities, rapid urbanisation and physical conflict Monitor, 1989). Here also the activities of the over limited resources. Between 1990 and 1991 the KwaZulu Police (KZP) were often criticised, while clashes spread from the Pietermaritzburg/Durban South African Police (SAP) and Defence Force corridor to the coastal regions of Natal and inland to (SADF) actions varied from area to area. The rural areas, where the violence is embedded today. perception of security force bias and the lack of arrests and convictions, is a persistent trend which Periods of political transition are the most volatile for has contributed to the overall breakdown of law and ati) society. This overview presents conflict trends order throughout Natal. since 1989, focusing on 1990/91, when the »o\ eminent set the transition process in motion. Political events at the national level probably shaped While the conflict can be attributed to a wide range of the pattern of collective action in the first few months factors, recent violence has a distinctly political of 1990. Figure 2 shows the dramatic increase in the flax our. What has developed into a battle for political number of incidents of both violent and non-violent hegemony, exacerbated by random killings, has (marches, rallies, etc.) actions immediately after the caused widespread death, destruction and unbanning of organisations on 2 February and the homelessness for thousands of ordinary people. With release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990. negotiations underway, the conflict has escalated, While the expectation was that celebration rallies making the political climate in the region quite would probably contribute significantly to this unsuitable for free and-fair elections. increase, only one march was recorded in the Durban area on 11 February.

rsiRos in The so-called 'Seven Days War' broke out in the Pietermaritzburg area on 25 March 1990, with In the six year period between 1986-1991, the fewest Inkatha launching massive attacks and incidents and fatalities were recorded in 1989 and in counter-attacks on residents of surrounding 1986 (the latter when unrest levels were relatively townships. The scale of these attacks was low in Natal). Collective action in 1989 was unprecedented in Natal, as the most common form of concentrated in the Durban region where 60% of conflict until then had been small-scale attacks on incidents occurred, while 37% were recorded in the people and property. By the middle of 1990 the Midlands region. Mpumalanga (outside frequency of events had declined to pre-1990 levels, I lammarsdale) and the Durban area were flashpoints, while in the Transvaal unrest simultaneously began to with violence reaching cxfreme levels in increase with the first Inkatha-ANC clashes at Mpumalanga between July to November 1989. While Sebokeng which left 24 people dead. this study found that in 75% of cases adequate explanations of the events were not possible, Another important feature of the 1990 conflict was monitors have identified certain features in these the spread of violence to the coastal areas of Port areas: Shepstone in the south and Empangeni in the north (see map on this monitor cover). Levels also hi the Pmb-Dbn corridor, Mpumalanga and remained high in the metropolitan areas where 47% Shongweni, areas once totally dominated by Inkatha, of collective action was recorded in Durban and 34% became contested regions (Aitchison, 1989), in the Midlands region. characterised by conflict originating out of lung-standing clashes between youths and local Possible reasons for the increase in violence are the authority structures. The KwaZulu Police and attempts by actors to establish and consolidate their 'kitskonstabels' were also linked to the unrest, with political positions in communities after the unbanning

MMMMMMMS indica )R SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 57 Figure 1: Protest and Conflict in Natal: Frequency by Year Trends In 1991=1992 , 2000 • Fatalities The frequency of collective action in the regh,n No ot Events decreased in 1991, with 1 201 events recordeiI

1500 compared with 1 694 in 1990. Total fatalities U|M) Due to the sporadic declined from 1 685 in 1990 to 1 094 in 1991 <' , supply of material from Vt the monitoring Figure 1). Unrest levels were nevertheless hiuh I'm,, agencies and time constraints, data for the month to month, and while conflict continued in n,. I 1000 years 1989 and 1992 coastal areas, the violence spread inland to ruuil -m- was drawn solely from press sources. Levels like Richmond and Mooi River (see Minnaar m ih^ of collective action and issue). The Durban and Midlands regions experienced fatalities presented in S 500 the accompanying equally high levels of collective action in 19<)() figures for these years are consequently (39%), while 12% of incidents occurred in Souther,] under-eounts. Natal. In the second half of 1991, unrest escalated in

• First Quarter the informal areas around Durban, such as Maluka/i \ 1989 1990 1991 1992 Uganda and Ekuthuleni (RMG Bulletin, March 1Wj

of national political organisations. The conflict was The first three months of 1992 have seen fatality largely between the youth and trade unionists on the levels climbing, with 371 deaths compared w itli one hand, and the Inkatha-dominated tribal over the same period in 1991 (RMG Bulletin. Nkircli authorities on the other (Natal Monitor, 1990). In 1992). Since 1990, fatality levels have escalated fmni January, reaching a peak in March each year. This some cases action against the recently unbanned indicates that while the country-wide upsurge in groups was unprovoked; the 'Seven Days War' is conflict during March this year may be linked to the such an example. This destructive set of events came referendum, it inadequately explains the annual just over a month after an ANC peace mission led by upsurge in Natal. Almost one-third of Natal lutalities Mandela had visited the unrest areas of Natal. in March 1992 occurred in Umlazi (Natal Monitor. March 1992), during clashes at the Uganda shack The actions of the security forces were of particular settlement (see Nina in this issue). importance in 1990. Predictably, the reported presence of the police during unrest situations increased from 22% in 1989 to 34% in 1990, as the In a similar trend to 1990, the most common upe of level of collective action increased. The highest violence in 1991 and 1992 involved small-scale number of security force fatalities were also recorded attacks on people. An increase in assassinating mid in 1990 (39), as were the highest number of civilians the targeting of key individuals (who according to the deaths as a result of security force actions (120). press are predominantly Inkatha officials), well-planned attacks and the involvement of kc\ community leaders has been documented (R \l() It is likely that the presence of the police is Bulletin, March 1992). The lack of detail in many under-reported, and that police activity is reported press reports is the crucial factor which inhibits more more often when their actions are conspicuous. The specific classification of events in this study. statistics show that the most common form of security force activity in 1990 tended to aggravate the situation, in the form of inter alia, intimidation, The 1991-92 period has also seen an increased harassment and illegal raids. mobilisation and politicisation of hostel dwellers in Natal, although not on the scale experienced in The use of lethal weapons by the police also featured certain Transvaal hostels in mid-1990 (see Seekings, considerably: 117 of the 120 civilian deaths in police Indicator SA, Vol8/No3) and in June 1992.. 1 he SA action occurred in the first six months of 1990, Hostel Dwellers Association was launched in Umlazi compared with the 49 civilian deaths which occurred on 19 May 1991. It was addressed by several local Inkatha leaders, who urged resistance to attempts at in police action in the whole of 1991. The inability of converting single-sex hostels into family uniis'i \,iial the government to control the actions of the security Witness, 20/5/91). Violence in Bruntville between forces during this turbulent period has been 1991-92 (see Minnaar in this issue) and more recently recognised (Nathan and Phillips, 1991). in Umlazi was centred on the antagonism between hostel dwellers and residents, while in KwaMashu, The actions of the KwaZulu Police continued to be a hostels have been a factor in much of the conflict in cause for concern in 1990, in Umlazi and recent years. KwaMakhutha in particular, where allegations of KZP participation in attacks were not uncommon. As was the case in 1989, perceptions of the SAP and SADF differed, although the SAP were widely believed to favour Inkatha (Natal Monitor, 1990). The continued presence of criminal gangs, Peace accords were a major feature during 1991, but comtsotsis, warlords and vigilantes, especially in the the impact of these on violence levels has been Durban area, was evidence of the failure to maintain limited. Figure 2 shows that the rate of collective law and order. action actually increased after the ANC-Inkatha

vsttmsm saayjbs 58 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Figure 2: Protest and Conflict in Natal: Frequency by Month . vci'il reached on 29 January 1991. A second '\\;l'/hikatha meeting in Durban on 30 March which Seven Days Ji'l'V* llP a five~P°int peace plan was followed by War in Pmb Jjshisi [evels of conflict. 250

The National Peace Accord signed on 14 September I w I also had little effect in the short-term, with the rale of collective action increasing in Natal in Oetober and November. In terms of this accord, a Regional Dispute Resolution Committee was ^(•ihlished in Natal, but despite several attempts at 100 forming others, the only Local Dispute Resolution Committee (LDRC) which meets regularly is that in I'mla/i (RMG Bulletin, March 1992).

Initiatives are underway to establish LDRCs in JAN JAN seventeen other areas throughout Natal, although in 1989 1992 places like Bruntville and Tongaat, these efforts have been unsuccessful. Several components of the Accord most serious allegations made against the KZP are: which would help resolve disputes arising in the • harassment and intimidation, sometimes in the |,DK(', enable the more efficient conviction of form of shootings and assaults; perpetrators, and allow for special investigations of • collusion with Inkatha elements and/or police activity, have still not been implemented by the participation with these elements in attacks; government (see Nina in this issue). Inaction by the • disruption of political activity, e.g. at meetings; authorities reduces the likelihood of success for • failure to assist complaints and investigate structures like the LDRCs. matters; and • complainants are usually non-lnkatha people. Positive trends in policing are now reported more (LRC, HRC, Dec 1991:5). often, and in certain areas the arrests of notorious perpetrators of violence has resulted in a decrease in A crucial factor facing Natal is the breakdown in law conflict (RMG Bulletin, March 1992). Some and order due to years of mistrust of the security monitoring agencies have praised Durban's Riot forces and a lack of faith in the legal process, which Police unit, among others, for responding rapidly and collectively have failed to prosecute the perpetrators elfeeli vely to calls for assistance (Natal Monitor, of violence. The recent Trustfeeds convictions of a August 1991; RMG Bulletin, March 1992), while SAP Captain and four special constables illustrate more icstrained police behaviour at protest marches, that the legal system can function effectively. increased convictions and the attendance of the SAP Nevertheless, the attempts by senior policemen to at community meetings has been recognised (Nathan cover up the incident shows that little has been done and Phillips, 1991). It is interesting to note that to improve the relationship between ordinary people statistics (1989-1992) show that of the small and the police (see de Haas in this issue). percentage of events (33%) where the victims were identified as belonging to a particular group, the Some changes in policing are nevertheless evident, security forces were most often targeted. and certain components of the Peace Accord have the potential to improve policing still further. The Peace Despite the security reforms introduced by President Accord and related structures have a vital role to play de kk rk in 1990, and sections of the National Peace in facilitating conflict resolution in Natal. Success Accord which aim to improve policing of unrest, will depend not only on the cooperation of political certain security force activities are still cause for parties and their supporters, but also on participation concern. Although the police may not be the main by the government and its agencies. perpetrators of the violence, the nature of policing may well contribute to rising levels of conflict. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Research carried out in the PWV area over the The Black Sash Repression Monitoring Group (FtMG), the Centre lor Adult Education (CAE) 1970-1984 period shows that the mere presence of (Natal University, Pietermaritzburg) and the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee made significant security forces at events increased the subsequent rate contributions to the data for 1990/91. Small contributions were also made by the Inkatha Institute and the Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit at CSDS (Natal University, Durban). of collective action by 39%, compared with events where they were absent (Olivier, 1990). REFERENCES Aitchison J. 1989. 'Natal's Wastelands', in Indicator SA, Vol7/No1 Summer 1990. Durban: The role of the KwaZulu Police has become Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal. increasingly problematic, both as perpetrators of Black Sash. Repression Monitoring Group (RMG) Bulletin. Durban, March 1992. violence and through neglecting to protect people and Natal Monitor. 1989,1990, August 1991, March 1992. make arrests. The extent of this problem has been Nathan L and M Phillips. 'Security Reforms', in Indicator SA, Vo!8/No4, Spring 1991. Olivier JL. 'Causes of Ethnic Collective Action in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand Triangle, 1970 to well documented by the Legal Resources Centre and 1984', in South African Sociological Review, Vol2/No2,1990. Human Rights Commission in Durban, in a major The Role of the KwaZulu Police: Impartial Law Enforcement or Obstacle to Peace?' Report by report based on case studies, which finds that the Legal Resources Centre (Durban) and Human Rights Commission (Durban), 13/12/91.

indica )R SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 59 MMMMMMMS nitfil; Anthony Minnaar Centre for Conflict Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council

The conflict in Bruntville, on the outskirts of the small town of Mooiriver in the Natal Midlands, made frontpage headlines in the 1990s. It was bypassed by the political violence which had engulfed the bigger urban townships of Natal in the 1980s. Bruntville was often described as a model township, progressive and peaceful. This case study, based on firsthand interviews conducted in February 1992, indicates thai no community appears to be immune from the endemic conflict in the region.

I he conflict at Bruntville began with lose the confidence of the comnuiniiv JL the usual youth versus parents divide. amidst various allegations about It soon progressed to a confrontation widespread corruption. The Council was between political activists in the perceived merely to be a rubber Mamp Ibr community and the elected town council of the Natal Provincial Administration. Bruntville. When a civic association entered the fray, existing social tensions The mobilisation Residents of Bruntville complained that between the community and the hostel council posts had not been properl \ andpoliticisation of dwellers led to open clashes. The conflict advertised but were given to council the youth caused a was further politicised when the hostel supporters, that housing sites wcie build-up of dwellers turned to Inkatha for support while allocated to friends, and that households tensions between the civic openly aligned itself with the were paying different amounts every month them and their ANC. for electricity and water without receiv ing any receipts. Eventually, a community parents meeting in January 1990 demanded thai all councillors should resign. When they Til® Youth obliged, the NPA appointed a new. w liite The youth of Bruntville, like elsewhere in township administrator on 1 Apn! 1990. Natal, inevitably became caught up in the tide of general revolt against authority. The mobilisation and politicisation of the During the school boycotts, they youth caused a build-up of tensions established the Bruntville Progressive between them and their parents. A certain Association but this early initiative did not degree of estrangement was evident survive for very long. In 1987 they started between the two groups. In an effort to the Bruntville Youth Congress (Bryco) resolve certain difficulties, Bryco organised under the mantle of the United Democratic a 'reconciliation' party in the Bruntville Front (UDF) as a new vehicle for the Community Hall on 31 March 1990 which expression of their aspirations. was attended by approximately 600 parents and an equal number of youth. In October 1988 Bryco organised a peaceful march through Mooiriver where a petition dealing with national issues was The SH handed to the town clerk. They also exerted pressure on the Bruntville town councillors There are two hostel compounds situated to resign. Towards the end of 1989 adjacent to the township - the railway numerous attacks (stonings and hostel for employees of the railways and petrolbombings) on houses of people the NPA hostel. The NPA hostel is identified as supporting 'the system' were commonly referred to as the 'Mooitex' carried out by the youth. There were also a hostel since most of the inmates were number of attacks on the police barracks (a employed by the Mooitex factory in house near the railway hostel). Mooiriver (the biggest employer in the district, though it remains open on a In the leadup to local elections for the temporary basis only at present). Bruntville Town Council in October 1988, two of the councillors, David Mhlaba (the There has always been a certain amount of mayor) and Dereck Majola, resigned under social tension between the community and pressure from the youth and Bryco. After the hostel dwellers. Bruntville residents the elections the town council appeared to accuse the hostel dwellers of interfering

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS6 0 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 ., (|K. women of the township while the which were broken down by the police who There has always hlstel dwellers maintain they are proceeded to chase the youth, eventually been a certain liiiiially denigrated and excluded from resorting to firing live ammunition. amount of social t0 "mllljty life. The youth are antagonistic tension between A stand-off developed between the police L.|Uious towards these 'uneducated, the community and 311 j (nuiitionalists' who find employment and the group of youths, and two youths not diilc they [the educated youth] remain in the toyi-toying group inadvertently came the hostel dwellers ^V.jjjploved. These simmering tensions between them and the police. One was shot '.'xplodcd into open violence when national by the police commander while the other p0|il',(.> c.une to town. managed to get away. The youth killed was a popular local matriculant and soccer [11 April 1some youths from Bruntville player. At his funeral a week later various ,eiuo\ cd a number of gas cylinders from speeches were made, with the the hostel to use to burn down a certain representative from ANC headquarters Majola's house (not ex-councillor, Dereck urging the community to take action. \lajola). Vlajola (an Inkatha supporter) had a|le»cdl\ been killed in the Howick After the funeral the civic issued a call for township of Mpophomeni by ANC cadres. Bruntville to come out solidly in support of During die burning of his Bruntville house the ANC. The hostel committee held a the poke killed one of the youths. Bryco's meeting with the civic and objected to this call for a work boycott to protest the killing call. They pointed out the difficulty for led lo disagreement between the hostel them of being 'ANC' during the week but dwellers and the youth. under Inkatha-controlled tribal authorities when they return over weekends to their The hostel committee (formed in late 1989 rural homes. under the chairmanship of Walter Mchunu) wanted a meeting to discuss the work After this meeting relations deteriorated boycott which they felt was unfair since it between the civic and the hostel dwellers. alfectcd mainly them and other workers in Rumours abounded that preparations were Hruntville. A Parents' Committee was being undertaken to attack anybody who formed and a meeting held with the hostel did not support the ANC-aligned civic. committee. At the meeting the hostel dwellers maintained that the killing should At this stage, the civic demanded that they These simmering have nothing to do with work. They also should take over the right of site allocation demanded that the gas cylinders stolen from from the town council. They also demanded tensions exploded the hostel be returned. They felt that if the that all administration rights be abrogated to into open violence \ outh had not been seen removing the them, so that they could act like a legitimate when national e\ linders the hostel dwellers would have town council. Their requests were refused politics came to been blamed for the burning of Majola's by the administration. The civic now town house. decided that only members of the community had the right to make use of facilities like the community hall. This stance led to a further deterioration in IIS USVD© relations between the community and the The Parent's Committee soon legitimated hostel dwellers. themselves by holding elections, and a Hruntville Civic Association officially came into being on 1 June 1990. When the h@ Olai civic held their elections, they excluded the T hostel dwellers entirely, ^s the hostel The hostel dwellers advertised a meeting dwellers had a hostel representative voted for 7 November 1990 in the community hall onto the town council. This exclusion was to discuss their problems. But the civic keenly felt by the hostel dwellers, however, opposed the holding of this meeting in and a definite rift began developing 'their' community hall and publicly warned between them and the community. of the possibility of violence if the meeting went ahead. The hostel committee were just Soon after the establishment of the civic the as adamant that the meeting would proceed youth held a 'June 16th' commemorative as planned. meeting in the community hall. The meeting was typical with loud noise, many Just before the meeting was to take place it slogans and the singing of political songs. was discovered that all the chairs had been After the meeting, against the wishes of the moved and packed away and that the police, the youth went toyi toying through electrical wires had been cut. Police Bruntville. The youth erected barricades permission was granted to the hostel

msJZMXM ffiffiM 'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 61 committee chairman, Mchunu to hold the leaving the township solidly in the A\i The assassination meeting outdoors. After the meeting the camp.) of the chairman of hostel dwellers were escorted back to the the Bruniville civic NPA hostel by the police. In May 1991 the civic instructed the in 1991 inflamed residents to ignore the township the community and However, the railway hostel dwellers, on administration and not to pay their u(i|jlv raised the stakes approaching their hostel which was further accounts. In any case, there was an away from the NPA hostel, found the effective boycott of payments since the entrance blocked by a crowd of youths. municipal offices were right alongside \lK. Some managed to get through the crowd NPA hostel and township residents w^e into their compound but incidents of afraid to pass the hostel and pay their stone-throwing occurred. The help of the accounts at the municipal offices. NPA hostel dwellers was called in and they drove the youths away. This heralded the Both sides in the conflict now accused [he- start of open conflict between the youths other party of provocation. The hostel and the hostel dwellers. Apparently shots dwellers maintained that the ANC would were fired from a white kombi at the hostel bring in armed people from outside who dwellers, injuring one of their number. fired potshots at the hostel and then left bv Later that night, one of the railway hostel way of the backroads. The hostel dwellers units was burnt down. warned that they would launch a retaliatory attack on the township dwellers. But the The next day the hostel dwellers, fearing ANC claimed that the hostel dweller-' another attack, left their hostels and attacks were unprovoked and aimed at congregated on the hill behind the hostels. destabilising the township and dri\ ing the Tensions increased throughout the day with ANC activists out. rumours that the hostel dwellers were arming themselves for an attack on the township, and vice versa, that armed ANC As supporters were being bussed in to attack the hostels. Late on the afternoon of 8 In the midst of this conflict came the November 1990 the hostel dwellers swept assassination of the chairman of the down on the township and in the ensuing Bruntville civic, Dereck Majola. (>11 the attack fifteen people were killed. The hostel night of 24 April 1991, both he and his wife dwellers claim that their attack was meant The public display were gunned down in his house by three to pre-empt an encircling movement from men masked with balaclavas who got awa\ of spears by hostel the township while the township residents in a waiting car. This assassination dwellers in the claim that the attack was sudden and inflamed the community. They turned their centre of Mooiriver unprovoked. wrath on the hostel dwellers since they was seen as suspected that the hostel chairman Mchunu provocative and Afterwards, continual sporadic violence was behind the killing. intimidatory occurred between the hostel dwellers and the township residents, in particular the At the end of April, Mchunu's son was shot youth. The conflict became more overtly and injured while attending class at the political in March 1991 when the hostel Eminyezaneni High School. Two youths dwellers and a small number of township came into the classroom and shot him in residents began to join the Inkatha Freedom front of the other pupils. It was claimed that Party (IFP). There was also open the shooting was in retaliation for the antagonism between the chairman of the assassination of Majola since Mchunu's hostel committee, Walter Mchunu, and the son was suspected of being the driver of the chairman of the civic, Dereck Majola. getaway car. This incident led to the Mchunu allegedly threatened Majola's wife disruption of the school, which remained and although a charge against him was laid effectively closed until the beginning of with the police nothing came of it. 1992.

An official branch of the IFP was Sporadic incidents of violence and established in Mooiriver on 14 July 1991. intimidation were perpetrated by both sides It soon claimed a membership (excluding throughout 1991. In May 1991 the hostel the approximately 1 000 hostel dwellers) of dwellers began openly carrying spears, 600 in Bruntville. Unfortunately, the new even in the centre of Mooiriver. They members soon found themselves to be claimed that the weapons were for their targets and a number had their houses protection but the act was seen as firebombed or stoned. (By September 1991 particularly provocative and intimidatory, most of the IFP supporters in Bruntville had not only by the ANC but also by many of been driven out or left of their own accord, the town's white inhabitants.

MMM WMH®S 62 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 The conflict 3>ft week they issued an ultimatum of their own - they threatened to dismiss any of their between the

, L-oiillict between the community and workers who did not return to work. This community and the L boycott brought most business activity to a ' |1()s1l4 dwellers also spilled over into the hostel dwellers or! place. At this stage the Mooitex textile virtual standstill. While embittering many also spilled over 111 Bruntville residents who felt that the white ^icli'i'V Mooiriver (owned by AngloVaal) into the workplace die major employer in Mooiriver with a community were being unsupportive of lorUiuve of 1 150. In 1990, 55% of the their demands, the boycott also alienated total workforce were hostel dwellers, 35% large numbers of whites. from Biuntville and the balance from the lU1ll\ ing areas (i.e. farms). But this ratio The continuation of the violence between laicr changed to 65% from the hostels, only the hostel dwellers and the Bruntville I mm B runtville with the rest from residents had led to whites becoming totally knsdia and farms. unsympathetic towards either side. The Mooiriver Town Council had also enraged |-or manv years the SA Clothing and the ANC by applying to have Bruntville Textile Workers Union (Sactwu) were the declared an official unrest area. The ANC onlv union recognised by Mooitex maintained this did not address the crux of management. At the beginning of 1990, the problem, namely the carrying of spears %','( ol the workforce belonged to Sactwu in public. hut in September/October 1991 there occutied a sudden changeover to the The extent of white disillusionment with the Inkalha-aligned union, the United Workers situation became apparent when the I'nion oi South Africa (Uwusa). Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) visited Mooiriver. On 26 October 1991 the Since the trouble began, Mooitex have AWB made a show of strength when 30 found themselves inadvertently becoming a armed and uniformed rightwingers from selective employer. At the beginning of various parts of Natal came to town to June 1991 between 400 to 500 Mooitex 'show solidarity with Mooiriver'. workers refused to return to work, citing Mooiriver, a traditional bastion of white workplace intimidation (one worker was liberalism, welcomed their presence, with killed in the canteen). The company sent many townspeople expressing disquiet at out ultimatums that they must return to the continuing lawlessness and violence in w ork. When only 200 workers returned the their town. The ANC business rest were replaced by temporary workers and work boycott w ho queued at the factory gates for The tensions created by the boycott spilled carried on for three employment (all of whom were Inkatha over in another full-scale attack by the supporters). This perceived bias hostel dwellers on Bruntville. On the night weeks, with considerably added to the tensions within of 3 December 1991 shots were fired at the allegations of the community. hostel. In the early hours of 4 December large-scale 1991 the hostel dwellers swept down on the intimidation In late July 1991 two separate incidents of township in a well-organised attack, killing \ iolence led to more attacks. In the first a 18 people, nine males (one over sixty, group of seventy people were fired on in another in his thirties, the rest youth of the township by two gunmen who drove off 18-20 years old) and nine women (the in their vehicle. Later on the same day, five elderly and children). hostel dwellers on their way home from work on the late shift at the Mooitex factory On 3 June 1992 the management of were ambushed and two injured by Mooitex announced that the plant would be gunmen. The next day the hostel dwellers temporarily closed because of the ongoing launched a revenge attack^ against conflict between ANC and Inkatha Mruntville in which four people were killed supporters in Bruntville. Aftex, the holding and four houses burnt down. company, alleged that the violence had led to 'ongoing disruption to production, high (hi 13 October 1991 the ANC called for a absenteeism, cancellation of orders, business and work boycott. The boycott financial losses and general lack of was to protest the public carrying of spears cooperation' despite discussions between and other dangerous weapons by the hostel union, worker and employer representatives. d\\ ellers. Originally called for three days, the boycott carried on for three weeks with The local ANC branch in Bruntville alleged allegations of large-scale intimidation. that the closure of Mooitex was prompted by a 30 per cent wage demand and the The Mooiriver business community also threat of strike action. The workers who formed an Action Committee. After the first stayed in the hostel feared that the move indica )R SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 63 MMMMMMMS It seems that both was a ploy to close down the hostel and threatened and marginalised. the warring thus eliminate the physical point of friction protagonists, in Bruntville. They were convinced that the Matters were not helped by the temporary closure would fulfil demands by Inkatha and ANC, inflammatory and provocative speeches the civic and the ANC that the company made and newspaper interviews given b have become v should only rehire township dwellers and both sides. The failure of the Local I )iSpu(, isolated from exclude outsiders (i.e. hostel dwellers). The Resolution Committee to get off ihe s; round grassroots support company denied all of the above was almost inevitable considering hem- in Bruntville allegations, and re-opened the plant on a deeply embedded the antagonisms are in trial basis on 20 June 1992. the psyche of the community.

Practical ways of breaking out of the e\elc loldstone Com of violence are needed. One obvious solution would be to ban the carrying of In response to the ongoing violence, the dangerous weapons in public and at Goldstone Commission of inquiry into political meetings. Another would be lo Violence had held a special sitting in remove the NPA hostel from the Mooiriver during January 1992. The boundaries of the Bruntville township (ihe chairman, Justice Goldstone, made railway hostel has already been vacated). concerted efforts to get the participants to The development of recreational facilities commit themselves to the peace process by (Bruntville only has one abandoned soccer making them publicly state their field) would also help in occupying the willingness to participate in establishing a energies of the youth more profitably. Local Dispute Resolution Committee Discipline in the schools needs also io be (LDRC) for Mooiriver. reasserted while job creation is a priority since unemployment levels are exticinely The first meeting of the LDRC was held on high in the township. 21 January 1992. Unfortunately, the ANC made a number of demands which were The community at large is tired of the published in the press. At the second violence and would like to be left alone lo meeting on 29 January the Inkatha carry on with their lives. It seems that both delegation withdrew, stating that they could the warring protagonists, Inkatha and ANC, not take part in the light of the public have become isolated from grassroots demands made by the ANC. support. The community should elect their The struggle own leaders to serve on their civic or tow n between youth and The interim chairman of the committee, council without having an ANC or Inkatha hostel-dwellers in MC Pretorius, arranged to meet Inkatha leadership imposed upon them. Even then, Bruntville is by no supporters in the community hall on 3 the violence will not abate until the means an isolated February to discuss their future supporters of both parties in the conflict case in the saga of participation. On arrival at the community show an open commitment to work for political violence in hall, however, he found a crowd of toyi genuine reconciliation and peace. At South Africa toying ANC supporters who refused to present this sentiment is sadly lacking on allow him access to the hall. Both sides said both sides. in interviews that they had been 'press- ganged' into participating in the committee Bruntville is by no means an isolated case before they were ready to take part. in the saga of political violence in South Africa. The polarisation between the politicised youth and hostel dwellers has been fully exploited by various political groupings in the struggle for power within The fact that legitimate socio-economic specific townships. However, in the process problems were exploited in order to it is always the community itself which establish hegemony over the township has bears the brunt of the violence and suffers led to Bruntville becoming locked into a the most. It is not enough merely to try t< > cycle of violence. The youth had tried to manage the conflict through committees, by mobilise themselves in order to improve, deploying extra security forces or by among other things, the educational fencing in the hostels. The root causes of facilities. The civic had tried to take over the underlying socio-economic problems the administration of the township from the need to be actively addressed. NPA in order to eliminate what they perceived as inefficiency and corruption. In the process, however, the hostel dwellers Acknowledgement found themselves excluded from An abridged version of an article in Patterns of Violence: Case studies of conflict in Natal, edited by the author community decisions and their leaders felt and published by the HSRCin 1992, forthcoming,

mmm WMH®S 64 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Mary de Haas, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Natal

The findings in the Trust Feed trial in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court raise serious Questions about the dynamics of political violence in Natal/KwaZulu, particularly insofar as the administration of law and order is concerned. This report looks at the implications of the revelations about security force complicity, the controversial role of the KwaZulu Police in law enforcement and the corruption of power and justice.

T n March 1989 Cosatu released a report leading up to this massacre unfolded in the Xentitled 'The role of the police in Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court during the viiiilante violence in the Pietermaritzburg five month trial. area' which detailed incidents of violence in Imbali township over a 28 day period Trust Feed was one of many 'black spots', between December 1988 and January 1989. i.e. black freehold land areas demarcated by At a press conference held to coincide with the 'bantustan' policy for white occupation. the release of the report a Cosatu lawyer Faced with the threat of removal a Crisis Committee consisting primarily of tenants alleged collusion with Inkatha 'at the The Trust Feed liiuhest echelons' of the South African of the landowners was formed in 1986, and Police (Weekly Mail, 23-30/3/89). set about resisting removal and upgrading trial produced the facilities in the area. Their successful proof which so A call for a Commission of Enquiry was efforts won them overwhelming community many had claimed ignored, and there were predictable support, but aroused the ire of the did not exist responses to the Report from the police and landowners. Inkatha. The Commissioner of Police announced that they were investigating Through local Inkatha Chairman Jerome whether Cosatu had, in holding the press Gabela, the landowners argued in 1987 for conference, broken restrictions placed upon control and the imposition of the 'tribal' the organisation (ibid). Categorically structure of rule of a chief and indunas den\ ing collusion between Inkatha and the which was absent in the area. A police, the General Secretary of Inkatha Development and Services Board report pointed out that no court of law had ever issued in November that year concluded, tried, let alone convicted, SAP members for amongst other things, that the call by such collaboration. Inkatha and the landowners was in 'direct conflict with the wishes of the people of 1 low ever, to those closely involved in Trust Feed' and that 'That there is no monitoring the violence in other areas the evidence that these men have any support, repot i simply confirmed what they nor that they could engender any support lhcm-.elves had been told by victims, and given an open election' (Natal Witness, reports which had filtered through to the 7/12/88; Sunday Tribune, 2/2/92). 'allei native' media. Their protestations were widely dismissed as resulting from It was this situation of lack of Inkatha political bias and/or as lacking in evidence. support which Captain Mitchell conspired, Three years after the release of the Cosatu together with Inkatha leader Gabela, to report, and several thousand deaths later, remedy. As station commander at New the 11 ust Feed trial produced the proof Hanover, Mitchell was chairman of the which so many had clainied did not exist... Local Management Committee, a sub-division of Joint Management Committee (JMC) structures. The JMC's, set up in terms of the National Security The Management System, involved members of In April 1992 five members of the South the security forces, along with ordinary African Police (SAP) - Captain Brian civil servants, at all levels of government, Mitchell and four 'special' constables - and all chairmen were senior officers of the Were found guilty of having murdered military or police (Weekly Mail, 3/8/86). eleven people - two men, seven women and two children - during an all night funeral A committee of Inkatha members, under vigil on 3 December 1988, at house T83 Gabela, was formed in April 1988 in Trust Feed in the New Hanover district of opposition to the non-aligned Crisis the Natal Midlands. The story of events Committee. A major recruitment drive was

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 65 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM How many other launched, and, towards the end of 1988, two policemen, Captain (now Maion p.. , ineffectual and/or attacks on members of the Crisis Dutton and W/O Wilson Magadla. wh() | , Committee started taking place. Four stumbled upon startling evidence of p,,];,!, unpopular Inkatha involvement during their investigations j,!j persons had died in such attacks just days officials have crimes committed by KwaZulu Mp received this type before the massacre took place at Trust Psychology Ndlovu. The court heard how of support? Feed on 3 December 1988. the launching of their investigations Was The Supreme Court found that the massacre met with attempts at a cover up. iim>lvjn„ was the end result of this planning - senior members of the SAP and KxvaZulu planning which had taken place in Police (KZP). That the prosecution was, Pietermaritzburg between Inkatha successful, and justice was, sonic three and leadership there (KwaZulu MP David a half years after the massacre, >een to he Ntombela) and Major Deon Terblanche, done, is a testimony to the professionalism commanding officer of the and perseverence of these two police Pietermaritzburg Riot Unit (subsequently officers and their team of detect i \ es. killed under suspicious circumstances by one of his own policemen). The plan hatched had been to attack and/or kill »@©ynii opponents of Gabela who were seen to be UDF supporters. To this end a cloak of Clearly, the case presents a crisis of secrecy had been thrown over the area credibility for the police, and begs the which was declared, in terms of the question of how many other Trusi feeds Emergency Regulations then existing, a have occurred and have been cox ercd up. 'police operation zone', and, to minimise How many other ineffectual and/or resistance, members of the Trust Feed unpopular Inkatha officials have rcccixed Crisis Committee had been detained the type of support which Gabela did? immediately prior to the attack. Indeed, why was such support for an organisation claiming a huge follow ing A war of words erupted after the killings of necessary? 3 December over the political affiliations of the victims (it seems they were Although the authorities claim that it was non-aligned) and the identity of the an isolated instance, everything points to attackers, with Inkatha President Buthelezi the fact that it was the tip of the proxvrbial threatening legal action if blame was iceberg. During the trial it was clear that Although the directed at his organisation. Fingers were Mitchell himself did not find the authorities claim pointed at the actions of the police, who deployment of special constables lor such that it was an had (not surprisingly in terms of the tasks unusual, saying that 'the special isolated instance, revealations at the trial) failed to heed constables had been used before", and were everything points warnings by Greytown MP Pierre Cronje accustomed to help in taking ox cr l' 111 • about an impending attack. areas {Sunday Tribune, 2/3/92). I LIE 19X9 to the fact that Cosatu report alleging police complicity in Trust Feed was the At Trust Feed itself, events in the week the violence in Pietermaritzburg has already tip of the proverbial after the attack point to the success of the been referred to. There are numerous other iceberg operation from the planners' point of view. incidents of alleged collusion - particularly Responding to warnings by Inkatha people, * insofar as omitting to act against Inkatha residents, in fear of their lives, either members involved in violence is concerned flocked to join the organisation or fled the - in the Pietermartizburg area (see area (Weekly Mail, 9/12/88). In the ensuing Aitcheson 1989; 1991). months over 1 000 persons fled the area {Weekly Mail, 18/5/89) and many of the More recently, Father Tim Smith, a Uoiuan houses were looted and destroyed (Sunday Catholic priest based at Elandskop between Tribune, 2/2/92). 1983 and 1990, has challenged police attempts to portray Trust Feed as an A call by Pierre Cronje for a Commission 'isolated instance', with a description of his of Enquiry into the massacre was ignored. own observations during the period he Trust Feed seemed set to join the spent in the area. Not only did he see police ever-increasing list of unsolved (and operating together with KwaZnlu Ml' uninvestigated) murders in black areas, in David Ntombela (who had met with spite of a New Hanover Inquest held in Terblanche and others in Pietennaritzburg), 1989 having found possible police but was advised that investigations by the complicity in the massacre. riot police into the role of Ntombela in a number of murders had been stopped That Trust Feed did not disappear into because 'the security police will not allow history seems due entirely to the efforts of it' (Smith, 1992).

VSTTMSM SAAYJBS 66 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 jr reports of security force collusion During 19861 had been informed that two It is quite 'lb I nkatha have been a feature of men whose names have been linked to reasonable to Icnce in the Durban townships since repeated attacks on non-lnkatha persons, suppose that the i')85 and, more recently, in reports received viz the late Winnington Sabelo of Umlazi 1 security networks ! )nl |'|ie North and South Coast areas. This and Thomas Shabalala of Lindelani were . Illusion takes the form of either open members of the Joint Management established during Committees. Upon questioning a local the JMC years jn\()l\cment jn attacks, and/or a failure to prosecute. Nationalist Party MP about this allegation continue to operate he did not deny it, but suggested that, given informally their positions of leadership, it was only to Overt involvement of the KwaZulu Police be expected. is conspicuous in attacks carried out by persons associated with Inkatha - a recent (.•sample being the raid on the Uganda On 28 February 1992 an Ntuzuma-bound sliack settlement on 13 March 1992, in bus was boarded by armed men, and the which 28 persons died (NatalMonitor, passengers were taken to a shack at March 1992). However members of the Lindelani, where they were imprisoned S \P also continue to be named in assaults until they either paid a certain sum of jihI allacks on persons who are money, or promised to do so by a certain ANC-aligned; e.g. there are affidavits date. According to an affidavit by one of linking several members of the SAP to the the passengers, Thomas Shabalala himself murder of Ntuzuma activist I Malembe in spoke to the prisoners. One of the March 1991, and reports of SAP passengers had been warned to pay the in vol \ cment in assaults on Sipho Cele, amount demanded by noon on 4 March, at a Regional Secretary of Cosatu, in certain point near the border of Lindelani, P.mpangeni (Natal Monitor, 1991, 1992). or face dire consequences.

Although the security police no longer On the appointed day, together with two officially exist, their successors, now journalists I accompanied the above person know n as the Crime Information Service to the Inanda police station, approximately (CIS), continue to be implicated in attacks 5-10 minutes' drive from the prearranged on non-lnkatha persons, e.g. Thinzi Dludla, meeting place, to obtain a police escort, in Cliaii person of the Congo (Inanda) ANC, order to trap the extortionists. In spite of the has. since July 1991, been subject to a urgency of the matter we were delayed series of assaults by policemen. In the first there for two hours and we finally arrived at Trust Feed has of these attacks, after which he required our destination over a half hour after the pointed to the roots hospitalisation, the assailants were five deadline, to find that a' Hippo' with of the political armed men travelling in a vehicle with no security force personnel had been moved to violence and the spot. Two members of the CIS, regisnation plates. Several of his attackers exposed the myth were positively identified as members of including a person named in assaults on CIS t IJMAG report, May 1992). Thinzi Dludla and other activists, were that it is a black- amongst the police escort, as was one of the on-black conflict The question as to whether these policemen policemen named in the Malembe murder. are acting on behalf of security structures, as they were in Trust Feed, or as a result of This type of police support for Inkatha in personal inclination, is difficult to answer. the form of their presence at attacks or Although the JMC's have officially been failure to protect victims is more visible disbanded, there are reports of a new than the type of covert support evidenced in National Coordinating Mechanism (NCM) cover up attempts. What has become which continues to deal, amongst other painfully apparent as a result of the Trust things, with 'counter-insurgency' (Sunday Feed judgment is the fragility of the Tribune, 8/7/90). Former Military investigative process. Intelligence officer Nico'Basson alleges that the state's strategy continues to support Trust Feed, it seems, would not have Inkatha (Carlin, 1991). happened without the intervention of two key detectives. Not only had the findings of the Inquest not been followed up, but when m 3>ver Opi the investigation recommenced in July 1991 immediate efforts were made to effect a Whilst such allegations are difficult to cover up at all levels. The special prove, it is quite reasonable to suppose that constables, who had joined the KZP after the networks established during the JMC the massacre, were instructed by a senior years continue to operate informally - and a member of the KZP (Colonel Mzimela) to recent incident in which I was involved go into hiding, and an official driver from suggests that they do. Ulundi had been sent to take them to the

INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 67 OKBOPSIFIAMI WMFLSS South Coast home of a prominent (personal communication, Pierre Croni Inkatha-aligned Chief (himself named in and Peter Kerchoff of PACS A). reports of violence). After they had been apprehended they were allegedly offered On the positive side, however, Trust I 'e > | money to accept that one lawyer should act together with other recent revelations abm. for all the accused, which would have been security force involvement in the murders to their disadvantage. of political opponents (e.g. see Pauw. |(jc)| has undoubtedly raised public aw areness |t Again the question arises, how many other has reinforced confidence in the hi»h Trust Feeds have been covered up - and in standards and independence of the South how many other cases have irregularities African judiciary. Also, most importantly occurred during the investigative process? it has, like the conviction of Kw a/.ulu This is a crucial question since, as the Deputy Minister Samuel Jamile (in w hieli Cosatu report pointed out, even by 1989 '5 the same officers were involved) made a crucial start in the long process of restorin» or 6 vigorous prosecutions in 1987 would e have saved the lives of over 1 000 people'. confidence in the police in black " communities. For the police themselves, the During his evidence at the Trust Feed trial, ghost of Trust Feed will linger on. and must for example, one of the accused, van den surely act as a deterrent to similar COUT ups Heever (who was acquitted) claimed that he - even if only to avoid the opprobrium of could have changed the bridge mechanisms being caught out. of the guns used by the special constables if he had wished to cover up. Furthermore, In a sense, of course, the policemen the Judge expressed his lack of trust in involved in such behaviour have been police documentation, noting that 'files corrupted by the awesome power they have provided by the police have either been been allowed to exercise, and the racist suspect or completely inaccurate' (Sunday nature of our society which has allowed Tribune, 23/2/92; Daily News, 22/4/92). " them to operate, in such secrecy. primarily against black people. There arc w clcomc It is up to the police to gather sufficient signs that this lesson has been learned, and evidence to pursue prosecutions - let alone that their power is becoming diluted, with procure convictions. If they fail in their the repeal of legislation prohibiting duty, justice is not done. In other words, reporting, and the establishment of cover up through omission is fatally easy, structures facilitating more interaction and difficult to detect. The problems of bias between the police and communities. This creeping into the investigative process are can only further the cause of justice. compounded by existing arrangements, of dubious legal status, which allow the Trust Feed is not yet over, howc\ cr. and the KwaZulu Police to investigate crimes in spotlight remains focused on how senior which they themselves may be implicated. members of the police force wil 1 respond lo events arising out of this case. REFERENCES Aitchison J. 'The Civil War in Natal' in Will Major Dutton, who has been lelt with G Moss and I Obery (eds), South far fewer men after the disbandineni of his African Review 5. Johannesburg: Ravan, 1989. Trust Feed has provided proof of the degree Wartburg base, be given a full complement Aitchison J. 'The Seven Days War: of complicity between the police and of detectives in order to tackle numerous 25-31 March 1990'. Pieiermaritzburg: Inkatha and apparent cover up at high important cases of political violence'.' What Centre for Adult Education, University of the open Commission of Enquiry into the of Natal, 1991. levels in both the SAP and KZP. In so various irregularities which were Carlin J. 'SA Military giving arms to doing it has pointed to the roots of the Inkatha', The Independent, London political violence in which so many lives uncovered, called for by Justice Wilson'.' 11/6/91. have needlessly been lost, and exposed for Unpalatable as the truth may be, it is Cosatu. 'The role ol the police in once and for all the myth that it is a imperative that it comes out if the root vigilante violence in the Pietermaritzburg area'. Released 'black-on-black' conflict. causes of the violence are to be addressed. March 1989. An internal police enquiry is already Natal Monitor. Summary of political As a result of the revelations it is underway, and the Minister of Law and violence in Natal compiled by Roy Order is in the process of deciding whether Ainslie, Mary de Haas and Linda reasonable to suppose that many other areas Mkhize, March 1991 and March 1992. which were, like Trust Feed, 'peaceful or not to opt for a judicial enquiry. Nothing Pauw J. In (he Heart of the Whore. havens', have been turned into war zones, less will satisfy the demands arising from Halfway House: Southern Books, the Trust Feed case. UJQfii 1991. with all the consequences for the Smith T. 'Trust Feed wasn't a one-off individuals concerned and our society as a massacre', Weekly Mail, 15/5/92. whole. Like so many other war zones, Trust UMAG (Unrest Monitoring and Action Feed has not returned to normal. Most of Acknowledgement Group), Democratic Party. Report on The author has benefitted from discussions with events in Congo, Inanda 1-17 May the residents who fled have not returned, 1992. and their houses stand empty or destroyed Dr Paulus Zulu of the Centre for Social uiu! Development Studies in writing this article.

®5IIMI3WA3S3E>S 68 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 Nc I o O f I O N

IMPLEMENTING THE NRTIONAL PERCE FlCCORD

Daniel Nina, Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal

The level of political violence in South Africa is worse today than it was a year ago: in Natal/KwaZulu, for example, the death toll in political violence has increased steadily between 1991-92. In March 1992, 140 political killings were reported in Natal, more than in any of the preceding 18 months. This report highlights some of the issues that are impeding a peaceful transition in one community, Umlazi. It also addresses some of the shortcomings in the implementation of the National Peace Accord in this region.

ganda, a squatter camp in Umlazi on The story of Uganda is not too different to the outskirts of Durban, is located in a that of other parts of Umlazi, where Upri\ ik'ged position: the Indian Ocean is political violence has torn apart the daily visible from any of the shacks located on lives of many of the inhabitants. Reducing the top of a hill. Moreover, nature is at its the problem mainly into an Inkatha/ANC best and can be felt and appreciated by conflict would be at this stage too residents of this settlement: the birds, simplistic, however. To conclude that the huiici Hies, trees and even fresh air. National Peace Accord (signed on 14 Perhaps, nature is trying to compensate September 1991) has failed in preventing these -.hackdwellers for what the 'old' violence, consolidating peace and fostering South Africa never provided their a culture of reconciliation and political community with: adequate houses and tolerance, would also be premature. resources, education, health services and respect for their hurhan -integrity, regardless of their race.

But nature has proven not to be enough for The National Peace Accord (NPA) is the the residents of Uganda. For several days in culmination of an initiative launched by early March 1992 this squatter camp came religious leaders and members of the under violent attack from a neighbouring business community who were concerned hostel, Unit 17 (also known as T section) - with the level of political violence in South an Inkatha controlled hostel. In this Africa since the mid-1980s. It represents onslaught 25 shackdwellers were killed, the first multilateral agreement between all mainly women and children. Peace is not the major political organisations that are reigning in Uganda any more; the residents contesting power in the country. Indeed, the are vigilant and have no time to relax or Accord is a comprehensive document enjoy the seaview. which addresses many of the problems

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 69 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM Local dispute related to violence; it also creates or defines account. For such purpose the \ecord resolution a series of structures that should help to re-defined the role of the Justices . >f u)e committees do not implement the agreement. The government Peace in order to provide the necessary resources to the local dispute resolution is to take responsibility in financing its have ihe committees. The Justices of the Peace due necessary power implementation. to the authority conferred on them by iaw'^ to enforce peace or A code of political conduct, a code of could help in the process of in\ cmi>;aiin.>' investigate violence police behaviour, regional dispute violations of the Accord and iclerrm» tlu,Sc resolution committees, local dispute cases of violations, when appropriate, to tiie 1 resolution committees, special criminal Attorney-General; also, the Justices o|'thL. courts, a police board and a police reporting Peace would intervene in mediating officer, were defined by the NPA. To between parties in dispute, and would activate some of these clauses requires enforce principles of natural justice funds and state resources (for example, the (sections 7.5.2.1 to 7). special criminal courts), on the one hand. To develop and consolidate the political However, at the time of writing the culture and reign of tolerance requires the government has not enacted the proposed voluntary participation of the political legislation that would empower the .lustices parties signatories to the Accord, on the of the Peace to conduct the dul ics defined other. in the Accord. This certainly is depriving local dispute resolution committees of Un- The statutory changes that are necessary to necessary power to enforce peace or implement the NPA require state investigate violence. intervention. The government is able to decide at its own pace, however, when and The same applies to the special criminal how to make operational aspects of the courts that were defined in the NPA agreement. For example, one section of the (sections 10.1 to 7). These courts were NPA establishes the police board: a body intended to facilitate speedy trial of composed of members of the public and the perpetrators of political violence. a\ oiding police force that will make dealing with the delays of the ordinary recommendations to the Minister for Law criminal courts. It is important lo raise the and Order in relation 'to the training and fact that this was agreed by all the efficient functioning of the police, with a signatories to the Accord. How c\ er. the view to reconcile the interests of the government has not launched such courts, The special courts community with that of the police' (section and instead has indicated its intention to intended to 3.3.3). extend the business hours of the ordinary facilitate speedy criminal courts in order to deal w iih these matters. So far even this has not Ivcn done. trial of perpetrators The police board is of fundamental importance to the agreements reached by of political the different political parties in the NPA. The [Goldstone] commission of inquiry on violence, have not Due to the dubious record of the South political violence was established by an been implemented African Police on basic human rights, such independent statute of Parliament a body becomes of extreme importance. (Prevention of Public Violence and However, it took seven months for the Intimidation Act, 1991), and w a- aUo government to convene this monitoring incorporated into the NPA (chapter 0). body (Kriel, 1992). Much public criticism However, this commission has show n. so has arisen over the slow pace of far, its limitations in preventing political government implementation of this clause. violence in the country. The commission has been conducting fact-finding missions The same conditions apply to the on the causes of political violence establishment of the Police Reporting throughout the country but it is not Officer (sections 3.2.4.1 to 4), a position empowered to bring individuals or groups that would serve as a liaison between the responsible for such actions to conn. communities and the police in order to report any grievance against a police The Goldstone Commission has an officer. This clause of the NPA has not important role to play. In the meantime, been implemented. This has precluded something must be done proactively to stop communication between communities and the escalating violence. Power could be the police in certain areas where political conferred on this commission to prosecute violence has demanded speedy contact with those who have been found in breach of the the security authorities. law and responsible for political killings. Also, the recommendations suggested by A fundamental objective of the NPA is to the commission to the Minister of Law and bring violators of this agreement to Order should be taken into consideration

vsttmsmsaayjbs 7 0 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 I implemented; if this is not feasible, The practical effect of reducing the number The Goldstone 'crimps the law should be modified to of parties participating in this committee, is Commission of -nipower the commission to implement to reduce the possibility for Inkatha or the Inquiry has shown, sonic of its own recommendations. ANC to be made accountable to other so far, its sectors of the population that ordinarily would not be represented by either party. limitations in •[•|iese are some of the factors that should be preventing political considered in assessing why the NPA has This problem should be addressed in the yet had a sustainable impact on violence future. violence in the levels throughout the country. There are country certainly some important achievements, for Another fundamental problem in Umlazi, e,\ample: to have a multilateral national however, concerns the control of resources. agreement: to establish the foundations for The KwaZulu government, by controlling conscilidating a culture of political the local council and the allocation of lolerance: and to create the means to make material resources, wields a great deal of ihe security forces more accountable. power in a polarised community which is However, due to the level of political more aligned to the ANC than to Inkatha. \ iolcnce and the lack of speed in This political division is reflected in the implementation, if at all in some aspects, policies of the local council of benefiting the general assessment of the National those settlements in which their political Peace Accord some nine months later is a constituency lives, rather than the whole of negative one. the community.

In implementing the Peace Accord and in establishing the sub-committees of the LDRC (dealing with socio-economic One of Natal's only two local dispute development and reconstruction), obstacles resolution committees (LDRCs) is based in have been encountered when dealing with Imilazi. The duties of this committee, are Inkatha and the local council. In short, the inter alia: LDRC emerges as a competing political • to create conditions in the community force for the financial and material conducive to political tolerance and resources controlled by the local council. In peace; an implicit contest for constituencies, • to reconcile community leadership in Umlazi's councillors are not prepared to disputes, including the security forces; relinquish the power of patronage. The commission and, conducts fact- • to facilitate long-term socio-economic The security forces are the other major development and reconstruction in the problem. The lack of implementation of finding missions on community. certain aspects of the NPA is definitely the causes of precluding the LDRC from making the political violence I he I ,DRCs differ in composition to the security forces more accountable in this but it is not Isc.'ional Dispute Resolution Committee region. However, Umlazi also raises the empowered to i l\l )|

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 71msJZMXM ffiffiM Pressure must be of Umlazi have of the KZP is that of a the transitional period. The launching ^% brought on the terrorising force. Where people prefer not police board is just a beginning. More has ° government to to contact the police, crime (whether to be done to discipline and prosecute those 'ordinary' or politically orientated) goes members of the security forces who \ iolaie speed up the the law. process of unreported and is not investigated. A breakdown in law and order follows, implementation of criminal activity increases, the perpetrators In the case of Umlazi, the conflict between the National Peace of political violence are not prosecuted, and the local administration and the Loc? I Accord an environment of chaos reigns in the Dispute Resolution Committee might need community (BSRMG, 1992). to be resolved at another political level: where the future of the 'homelands' should Finally, much more effort is needed from be discussed. Also, it would be necessary ui either the LDRC in Umlazi or by the integrate more representatives of the political organisations themselves to broader community into the proceedings of educate the community about the dispute resolution. implications of the NPA. There is a real problem of communicating what is In Umlazi, so far, everything is undertaken discussed behind closed doors in the LDRC at one level, behind closed doors and w ith to the community at large. Neither Inkatha the participation of only two of the political nor the ANC have sufficiently developed groups: Inkatha and the ANC. There is no systems of community structures to connection between conflict at the publicise the substance of agreements grassroots level and the structures created among their grassroots membership. by the National Peace Accord. Different Furthermore, there is an evident need to means of communication should be used lo create a formal mechanism to deal with the disseminate information about the Accord diffusion of information to other sectors of and the proceedings of the Local Dispute the community. Resolution Committee. Also, local structures should be established to ensure the wider participation of all community sectors.

Since 1982 almost 12 000 people have been At the national level, serious consideration killed in politically related violence should be given to the idea of bringing in throughout South Africa. To blame Inkatha, an international peace-keeping force, to he The actions of both the security forces, the ANC or other involved in communities where political the security forces agencies, is not enough. What is necessary violence is endemic. This police/military of the central today, and in particular after the signing of force should be attached to the United government and of the National Peace Accord, is to bring the Nations and should be locally accountable the homelands (in forces that are terrorising the communities to the [transitional] government and to the particular, the KZP) to book and to discipline them. communities where it would be located. It will have to be could play an important role in creating closely monitored Pressure must be brought on the conditions for stability and reconciliation in in the transitional government to speed up the process of a society currently wracked by political period implementation of those aspects of the violence and intolerance. OPOa Accord that require legislation to be enacted by parliament. Also, the control of Acknowledgement state resources has not yet become more The author would like to thank the Hitman accountable to the whole of society, hence Rights Commission (Natal Office) and the the need to demand from the government Independent Law Enforcement Facilitation (the National Party) a change of attitude in Office for their cooperation in supplying relation to the implementation of the information. National Peace Accord.

The actions of both the security forces of REFERENCES the central government and of the Black Sash Repression Monitoring Group (BSRMG). Final Report. 1992. Human Rights Commission (HRC). 'Bulletin No 1', 1992. homelands (in particular, the KwaZulu Kriel H. 'Press release by the Minister of Law and Order1,27 Apnl 1992. Police) will have to be closely monitored in

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Jessica Schroenn, Department of Economics, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg

The economic policies associated with political reform play a central role in the national debate about the shape of the 'new South Africa'. The ANC's initial proposals for nationalisation of industry as a means of attaining socio-economic objectives generated heated discussion, although its stances and statements have not been consistent and appear to have moderated. The fluidity of the political debate invites a reexamination of this policy from an economic perspective.

he question of nationalisation - in their undersupply to lower income Tgovernment takeover of an industry or markets. Further opposition to privatisation business previously in the hands of private stems from its being seen as a means of citizens, with or without consent of the diminishing the economic power base of a former owners, and with or without fair post-apartheid government. compensation - is highly emotive, and has provoked strong responses from across the Arguments opposing nationalisation, on the political spectrum. other hand, are drawn largely from property rights and X-efficiency theories: public Important motives underlying the calls for firms are likely to be less efficient than nationalisation in South Africa, on the one private, since the former are sheltered from hand, include the desire for state control of capital market disciplines (that is, they strategic industries, the expansion of cannot go bankrupt or be taken over) and investment and its direction to are regulated by politicians and civil developmental priorities, redistribution of servants who (unlike their private sector wealth, employment creation, affirmative counterparts) do not have direct vested action, and the reduction of concentrated economic interests in enhancing efficiency. economic (' monopoly')-power. As well as this productive or Another motive is the need for provision or X-inefficiency, nationalised firms are extension of basic services and frequently accused of allocative infrastructure. Nationalisation calls made inefficiency. Misallocation of resources on these grounds may be seen as a response results from failure to pursue optimum to the state's (now stalled) privatisation pricing and production policies - for initiatives. As the economy stands at example, producing at a loss, average present, these calls are not for the cost-pricing, or cross-subsidising. nationalisation of existing private firms: rather, they amount to demands that the Opponents of nationalisation argue that state halt the privatisation of essential goods there are two major impediments to and services, which would arguably result reducing misallocation and cutting costs.

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 75msJZMXM ffiffiM Nationalised First, owing to the nature of public firms. The records of individual pub|u- enterprises in the ownership and the size of the nationalised enterprises may be cited to Mippoi i u,;. UK performed industries, issues related to the running of view, for example: dismally in terms of these enterprises are politicised, and economic decision-making is constrained. growth in output, • In the USA, the Tennessee Valley Second, public ownership raises Authority (TVA) - a nationalised firm employment, expectations: consumers expect 'fair' prices controlling the water and natural labour productivity and the provision of unprofitable services, resources of the Tennessee River basin and total factor while workers believe they have an and adjoining region - is anions- the productivity unassailable right to jobs and wages. Both cheapest sources of pov\ cr in the groups are confident that the government country. The TV A operates under will, if necessary, supply the public competitive market conditions, and uses corporations with money. private sector pricing criteria.

• In France, the car manufacturer. Regie w Renault (confiscated by the state in 1945 on charges of collaboration with Most of the relevant literature from Germany) followed a path of bold industrialised countries deals with the expansion and export promotion. By comparative efficiency of public and 1975 it was the largest 1 rcncli car private enterprise. The issue of efficiency is manufacturer and the leading seller of especially important for South Africa, cars in the (then) EEC. Renault received because of its implications for long-run no privileges by virtue of state economic growth - a factor upon which this ownership, relying largely on country's economic and political future self-finance and independent borrowing. hinges. • Another French exampIc is the oil Some of the most comprehensive studies of company, Elf-Aquitainc - 70'; of which the performance of state enterprises have was state-owned through the ll)70s and been undertaken in the United Kingdom. early 1980s. The French oil industry is These studies have focused on nationalised characterised by competition among industries in public utilities, transport and subsidiaries of the multinational oil communications, and manufacturing and companies, the private) rcnch Total extractive industries, a sector accounting group, and the state company However, some for around 10-11 % of GDP through the Elf-Aquitaine. Though a latecomer, the evidence from the 1970s and early 1980s. Their findings latter achieved industrial success USA and France generally indicate that public firms are less rapidly, pursuing a dynamic exploration efficient than private firms. policy, acquiring large interests abroad, contradicts the and developing its refining capacity to assertion that For instance, in a major study of British account for a quarter of the I rcnch productive industry post-1968 (Pryke, 1981), market in 1980. efficiency is nationalised enterprises were found to necessarily lower compare dismally with the manufacturing So it seems that public firms are not in public firms industry as a whole in terms of growth in > necessarily inefficient. The performance of output, employment, labour productivity state-owned enterprises in and total factor productivity. Although gas, semi-industrialised countries is far more telecommunications and airways seemed disturbing, however. Evidence from Africa notable exceptions, in general the and Latin America shows that, in most nationalised industries failed to exploit cases, earnings from public enterprises arc marketing and product development low; many run losses; and in some opportunities, and did not improve staffing countries, cumulative public enterprise standards, efficiency, or the utilisation of deficits have reached substantial plant and equipment. Their inherent proportions. (In a study of nineteen African inefficiency offset or dissipated any gains countries, for instance, public enterprises from the use of new, more productive were found to average an overall deficit of technology. This dismal performance was around 4% of GDP - Short, 1983.) attributed to bad management, inappropriate investment planning, and the Thus, far from generating the hoped-for obstructive attitude of excessively powerful surplus for investment, public enterprises trade unions. have had difficulty financing their own operations, and have become increasingly However, some evidence can be presented dependent on central government to contradict the assertion that productive resources. These firms have also become a efficiency is necessarily lower in public burden on domestic banking systems,

vsttmsmsaayjbs 7 6 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 . Liiiir up credit and crowding out private Additional problems arise with regard to By standard tor investment. Public enterprises often employment, where public enterprises are economic and * ci hoi i ow, because their debts are (tacitly likely to face strong socio-political financial criteria, ^((•ficially) government guaranteed, and pressures to raise wages substantially or to hire more employees than is strictly public enterprises mgement is not held accountable for necessary. This reduces any surplus have on the whole !h;,VJ loans. This in turn leads to high jeht-equhy ratios and a hefty debt service generated, while overstaffing may depress performed poorly biiuicii. morale and productivity. Overstaffing at the lower levels of public enterprises in developing countries frequently coexists with severe shortages of skilled labour and raise nils especially trained and experienced llllillllt'*' management. Higher private sector So by standard economic and financial remuneration, and bureaucratic hindrances criteria, public enterprises have on the to the efficient running of public firms, u hole performed poorly. Nor do they seem reduce the supply of competent managers to he attaining non-commercial goals (which is in any case scarce in these (Nellis, 1986): there is little evidence that countries) to the public sector. these firms have provided the expected benefits in employment creation, income redistribution, technology transfer or Illiquidity of public enterprises has been impi oving regional equity. Further, another problem, particularly in Africa countries claiming positive results in these (Nellis, 1986). Many are not paid at all, or areas have not investigated whether similar paid very late for their services; few or better results could have been attained by government bills are paid on time, and oilier, lower cost methods. many enterprises do not pay taxes or each other. 1 his disappointing performance can be traced to several factors. Firstly, as public Furthermore, in public enterprises in many organisations, state-owned enterprises may semi-industrialised countries, accounting he required to meet non-commercial or practices are questionable, lack of social objectives. Governments often fail to standardisation makes comparisons order objectives in terms of priority, and difficult, and accounts are often completed seldom evaluate the social costs and only after lengthy delays. This lack of South Africa will benefits of non-commercial activities. This relevant, up-to-date information may not escape all of is compounded by a general lack of produce arbitrary and damaging the problems incentives or penalties for fulfilment or management decisions. It also shelters the encountered by non-fulfilment of targets. So enterprise operations of the firm from the pressures of public enterprises managers often attempt to pursue all goals public scrutiny and hinders any attempt to at once, or effectively determine their own hold management accountable for in semi- goals. enterprise performance. industrialised countries Secondly, frequent and arbitrary None of these problems is an inevitable interference by politicians in the running of result of state ownership of enterprises; public enterprises is another cause of poor theoretically, all of them may be resolved performance. This is exacerbated by highly by appropriate policy measures. It is centralised governments and the emphasis disturbing to note, however, the number of of procedures and regulations over countries which have suffered serious productivity and profitability. economic damage because of their failure to resolve one or more of these difficulties. Thirdly, price controls, implemented for The efficiency of public enterprises in socio-political reasons, have contributed to developing countries, and the"- "bility to i nefficient resource allocation, operating generate a surplus, will to a large extent losses, diminished financial responsibility, determine the amount of resources available and greater reliance on central government for future investment, the productivity of resources. that investment, and the growth prospects of those economies. Poor investment decisions are a further cause of dismal performance, reflecting the scarcity of managerial and technical skills, Domestic C and the weakness of incentives - if subsidies are readily available to prop up There seems little cause to believe that ailing enterprises, it does not matter if South Africa will escape all of the problems projects are unprofitable. encountered by public enterprises in semi-industrialised countries. A policy of

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 77 msJZMXM ffiffiM The evidence from nationalisation that is recklessly • compensation costs elsewhere implemented would be accompanied by at The question of compensation of suggests that, at least some of the negative effects dispossessed shareholders is likely m he a least in a encountered elsewhere, the most significant further constraint on the scope of" nationalisation in South Africa. Although competitive of which include: the government would have the option of context, private is • loss of efficiency confiscation, by the ANC's own admission more efficient than The balance of evidence from elsewhere the devastating effects of such a strategy on public production suggests that, at least in a competitive investor confidence would make this an context, private production is more efficient unlikely choice. than public. Nationalisation would do nothing to increase competition or Compensation would thus have to be paid contestability; in fact, it would be most at or near market prices. The first question likely to diminish existing product market this raises concerns the source of the vast competition. This, together with the amount of capital which would be required. protection from capital market disciplines The second issue is the immense which public ownership affords, could give opportunity cost of nationalisation with rise to characteristic public enterprise compensation: scarce public resources inefficiency. would be spent purchasing private industries from (relatively wealthy) • sapping of fiscal resources shareholders, when they could be employed Reduced government revenue from instead in building up the countr; 's nationalised industries and a drain on fiscal infrastructure, or in eliminating inequalities resources are typical of nationalised in the provision of basic services. industries in developing countries. Increased taxation is a further possibility: if major concerns are nationalised and their former pre-tax profits used for welfare, the Til iGTC state would be likely to maintain the level The preceding review confirms that there of its fiscal resources by raising taxes on have been many disappointments in the remaining private returns. results of nationalised industries elsewhere, and that the objectives sought by the • disinvestment and capital flight proponents of nationalisation hav e South Africa's ability to attract new frequently been frustrated. Howes cr. the If major concerns investment would not be enhanced by the evidence is not entirely damning: some are nationalised threat of expropriation; state ownership of successes have been recorded, and it is and their former key sectors may further discourage possible to identify some of the ma jor pre-tax profits used investors, since state enterprises are factors contributing to the success or failure notorious for providing poor service and of state-owned enterprises. for welfare, the generating fiscal deficits for taxpayers to state would raise carry. Capital flight and a continued lack of Nationalised industries are established for taxes on remaining new foreign investment would be different reasons, operate under different private returns disastrous for the economy's growth circumstances, and follow different prospects, and the implications for policies. This suggests that ownership is an unemployment, poverty, and economic and inadequate explanation of performance: it is political stability would be accordingly necessary to look beyond public \ s private grim. ownership of an industry, to how that industry functions, and the environment in • flight of skilled personnel which it operates. The 'brain drain' is another likely consequence of nationalisation. Skilled The most important variables affecting a personnel are typically fairly mobile nationalised industry's chances of success internationally, and substantial numbers include the nature of the industry, the would be likely to leave if events in South degree of competition in the market, the Africa threatened their interests. In fact, the incentives and controls governing existing shortage of technical and management behaviour, pricing policy, ami especially managerial skills may act as a labour policy. Although these are major constraint on the extent of nationalisation. issues in their own right, we can summarise The ANC acknowledges that serious the broad impact of each on the problems may arise in finding skilled performance of nationalised industries and personnel who are loyal to their aims and derive some guidelines for minimising the can run nationalised industries. economic damage associated with such a policy.

16 INDICATORS A Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 first, state-owned industries which have budget for any additional costs incurred by A public firm in been notably successful, or at least on a par pursuing such goals. direct competition with comparable private enterprises (UK with private gas and telecommunications, Canadian rail The degree of managerial and financial producers or facing and airways, French oil and cars, US autonomy/accountability also affects the threat of performance. Bureaucratic interference electricity and the TVA's natural resource potential new development), are all characterised by should be avoided; managers should have large-scale operations which suggest the control over daily operating decisions, and entrants is likely to existence of economies of scale. In be held accountable for results. Financial perform far more addition, their costs and outputs are easily autonomy requires that budget constraints satisfactorily measured, facilitating the exposure of be enforced, and public enterprises made to unsatisfactory performance by individual borrow largely from banks and to pay the enterprises. This type of industry is opportunity cost of capital (as Renault has). therefore easily regulated, so the The transparency of public enterprises is government is able to compensate for the another important pressure for efficiency. absence of market disciplines by imposing This is well illustrated by the policies of the standards of performance. TVA, which makes information on all of its activities freely available to the public in Second, the degree of competition or detailed, inexpensive annual reports and contestability faced by firms in their regular public board meetings. product markets is a well-established determinant of performance, which applies Ensuring competent management is also to public firms as much as to private. essential; inept management has been a Competitive product markets will increase problem in public enterprises in both pressures for allocative efficiency (firms industrialised and developing countries. will have to equate price with marginal cost Selection is a crucial issue, better and thus allocate resources efficiently). undertaken by technical supervisory Pressures for productive efficiency are also agencies or boards of directors than by increased: a firm facing strong competition political authorities. Further, a clear linkage will afford its managers little scope to should exist between performance and pursue personal objectives conflicting with remuneration. Finally, dynamic and profit maximisation. innovative management responses to a changing market environment should be emphasised, rather than procedures and 1 lence, while a protected public monopoly Expecting public will probably be inefficient, a public firm regulations. operating in direct competition with private enterprises to producers or facing the threat of potential Fourth, pricing policies adopted by public employ more new entrants to its markets is likely to firms have a direct impact on their workers than perform far more satisfactorily. (Thus performance. This is potentially necessary, or to British Airways under public ownership problematic, because public enterprises - raise wages was regarded as inefficient, whereas Air particularly those providing essential substantially, Canada is considered highly efficient; but commodities - are likely to be constrained damages while most of the former's routes were by social objectives. But it is worth stating strictly regulated, Air Canada operates in an the general finding: where marginal cost productivity and extremely competitive market.) pricing is followed, enterprises have often profitability Governments may enhance efficiency by been successful by economic/financial promoting competition (by nationalising criteria. Conversely, price controls have only part of a market), or contestability (by contributed to inefficient resource putting licences to operate state-owned allocation and operating losses, have enterprises out to bid every few years). reduced financial responsibility, and caused public enterprises to become a on Third, there are a number of issues fiscal resources. Moreover, price-fixing concerning management incentives and does not allow managers the flexibility to controls. Vague or conflicting objectives respond to competition. have given rise to poor public enterprise performance. To promote efficiency, the Lastly, expecting public enterprises to objective of public firms should be profit employ more workers than necessary, or to maximisation (or cost minimisation). raise wages substantially, damages Where a government is intent on using the productivity and profitability. It also tends enterprise to pursue social goals (which are, to raise wage expectations in both public however, often better served by other policy and private sectors, jeopardising instruments), these goals should be made international competitiveness and slowing explicit, their costs calculated, and public job creation. enterprises compensated from the state

INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 79 OKBOPSIFIAMI WMFLSS Art exception is the In the interests of improved performance, the first set of lessons indicates that other provision of basic public enterprises should follow fair but policies may be used to reach the same services, which disciplined labour policy. Management ends with lower costs and fewer risks. should be allowed flexibility in hiring, would be firing and setting wages, and efforts should The second set is directed at a government undersupplied to be made to shed redundant workers. (This intent on nationalisation, despite the lessons lower-income implies that if economic growth alone mentioned above. It suggests that the markets if cannot generate sufficient employment hazards associated with nationalisation m;iv provision were left opportunities to absorb the labour force, be minimised if the policy is employed only to the private sector other means - for example, public works in industries where economies of scale arc programmes - should be found for large, costs and outputs are easily alleviating unemployment, so that the measured, and competition exists from performance of state-owned enterprises is international or domestic providers of not compromised by the pursuit of social similar commodities. objectives.) The efficiency of nationalised enterprises can be enhanced by government promotion of competition or contestability, and by appropriate managerial incentives, Lessons for South Africa come in two sets. autonomy and accountability, transparent The first points to the failings of accounting and other private sector-type nationalisation elsewhere - non-fulfilment performance standards, as well as b\ of its intended goals, together with requirements for marginal cost pricing and diminished efficiency, reduced government disciplined labour policies. If revenue and an increasing drain on fiscal nationalisation is limited to those sectors or resources. It also predicts capital flight, the industries where these variables are drying up of new investment, and an conducive to efficient performance, or may exodus of skilled personnel. Moreover, be made so by appropriate policy measures. policy-makers favouring nationalisation in South Africa may be able to avoid many of this country would be severely constrained the pitfalls which have been associated with by the shortage of managerial and technical nationalisation elsewhere. skills and a lack of funds for compensation purposes. REFERENCES Coleman K. Nationalisation: Beyond the Slogans. Johannesburg: Ravan, If nationalisation is 1991. While the importance of the social Dreyfus P. 'The efficiency of public enterprise: lessons of the French limited to sectors objectives of nationalisation is recognised, experience', in WJ Baumol (ed), Public and Private Enterprise in a Mixed this set of lessons suggests that Economy: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic or industries where Association in Mexico City. London: Macmiilan, 1980. it is conducive to nationalisation may not be the best Millward R. 'The comparative performance of public and private ownership', efficient instrument for their attainment. An in E Roll (ed) The Mixed Economy. London: Macmillan, 1982. exception here is in the provision of basic Nefe JR. Public Enterprise in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank Discussion performance, services, which would be undersupplied to Paper No 1. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1986. South Africa may lower-income markets if provision were Pryke R. The Nationalized Industries: Policies and Performance since 1968. Oxford: Robertson, 1981. be able to avoid left to the private sector. The ANC is Schroenn JL. An Economic Analysis of Nationalisation Proposals for South many of the pitfalls resolute in its opposition to the privatisation Africa in the 1990s, unpublished Masters mini-thesis. Pietermaritzburg: of public utility corporations, and on this Department of Economics, University of Natal, 1992. Short RP. 'The rote of public enterprises: an international statistical issue its stance is supported by theory as comparison', in RH Floyd, CS Gray and RP Short, Public Enterprise in Mixed well as international precedent. As regards Economies: Some Macroeconomic Aspects. Washington DC: International the other goals of nationalisation, however, Monetary Fund, 1984.

msODsfFBiml 'SfQAmss 80 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Karen Kohler, Tourism Research Unit, University of Duitan-Westville

Ag please Daddy won't you take us DOM6STIC TOURISM IN SOUTH RfRICfl down to Durban Its only eight hours in a Chevrolet... Dramatic new developments and opportunities in the tourist industry have followed on the heels of reforms in South Africa in the 1990s. Trends in domestic tourism have also been changing since the mid to late 1980s, with the emergence of a lower income tourist market. This review stresses the importance of tourism to the economy and identifies the new challenges and opportunies offered by tourism.

I ourism has, for a long time, had a In the last decade there has been a JL critical role to play in the economy of significant change, not only in the type of South Africa. As a country offering tourism in South Africa, but also in the wildlife, wide open spaces and 'the African social and racial composition of tourists. Experience', along with many first world Tourism used to be a long-duration services, South Africa offers a great deal to phenomenon in which holiday-makers the foreign tourist. moved into hotels at their destinations for a month or so during the summer. Durbanites For the greater part of its history, South were well aware of the coastal migration of African local and international tourism was the 'Vaalies' (see Diagram 1). In those the domain of the white middle class. But, days, it was unaccompanied by significant since the middle to late 1980s, the players problems of over-crowding, inappropriate in the domestic tourism game have behaviour or social confrontation. changed. Wide-ranging developments have affected the domestic tourism scene and The summer tourist migration to Durban redefined its patterns, problems and future. was even popularised in the song by Jeremy Taylor (quoted above) which went on about the wonders of sand and sea and sun, IMew Tourist Class emphasising elements which, at least in the South African mind of the time, were of Domestic tourism in South Africa was an absolute necessity for a successful summer activity in which relatively few people holiday. The problems were few - the city participated in the early days. It was was well able to cope with the tourist restricted mainly to members of the white numbers of the day because it was precisely middle-class who had the time, the those numbers for which it had planned for economic means, the social mobility and in the first place. the inclination for travel and tourism. Since the mid- to late 1980s, however, the I n itial tourism structures set up within the significant and far-reaching changes in country were created within the spatial South African society have led to dynamic of apartheid. Various controls large-scale developments in the tourism were exerted in terms of where tourists industry. The greater amount of freedom might go and what they might do, and number of opportunities in all spheres depending upon who they were in terms of has meant that domestic tourism has state race classification of population become a boom industry. Growth has been groups. This did not have far-reaching accompanied by serious changes which implications at the time as South Africa's hold significant implications for managers, tourist class was small - those few who planners and professionals in the industry. could afford to pack up and head for the coast for a month or so every summer. With each new study carried out by the Nevertheless, tourism patterns were Tourism Research Unit, it has become more primarily determined by apartheid ideology. apparent that the new tourist class of the

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 81 msJZMXM ffiffiM Diagram 1: Origins of Tourists to Durban creation of a limited number of so»re»aie1 facilities. The result was highl\ unequal access and opportunity.

By the early 1990s however, the internal dynamics of South Africa had chatmcd' dramatically. Apartheid legislation was largely set aside, and beaches and other facilities around the country were opened to people of all races. Large numbers of people, who had been denied access to facilities, saw those facilities become available for the first time. Naturally, the pressure on the existing resources, created for quite a different and very limited market, is enormous, more so as \ crv litde was done to upgrade tourism facilities in terms of the real but unrealised level of demand.

The results have been markedly c\ idem, particularly during high holiday season at the main holiday destinations along the 1990s is both different and in some ways coast, and specifically in Durban t see similar to the original group. However, it is Diagram 2). This city strongly rcllccts the also larger than the old tourist class. magnitude of the change, particularly in Behaviour patterns are, interestingly, numbers of tourists. It has had to cope with remarkably similar. the results of enormous crowds and far loo few facilities, a legacy bequeathed by Ihe At present, a substantial volume of old apartheid ideology. domestic tourism is comprised of short duration rather than, as before, month-long This dichotomy - massive increases in duration. Large numbers of the new tourists tourism and insufficient tourism stay with friends or family, camp on the infrastructure - is proving to be one of the Massive increases beaches, or stay in tour buses. Tourists to greatest challenges to the tourist industry. in tourism and Durban used largely to be white, The result appears to be that Durban is insufficient tourism Afrikaans-speaking, lower- to beginning to lag behind Cape low n as the middle-income families from the country's chief summer seaside resort. infrastructure are Transvaal. Now, the tourists who arrive in proving to be one the city are mainly black, Zulu-speaking, Further, the areas which are pro\ ided w ith of the greatest lower- to middle income individuals or tourism facilities tend to be those areas challenges to the groups, and 64% still hail from the which could do with less, while the area- tourist industry Transvaal. with few or even no facilities are desperate for them. The black township of I'mla/i. oil The tourism structures set up and the outskirts of Durban, boasts one developed within the apartheid ideology are functioning swimming pool to cope w ith clearly unable to cope adequately with roughly 40 000 children, for instance. A these social changes. In dealing with the lifeguard who was interviewed remarked. problems which have arisen, a number of 'They swim like sardines ... and they ha\c challenges have to be identified and met. time limits - after ten minutes they have to get out and the next wave of kids jump in" (interview, Mr Eric Radebe). Apartheid! at Leisure KwaMashu, on the north side of Durban In terms of spatial location, the vast and with an even larger population, has no majority of tourism facilities were formerly functioning municipal swimming pool. available only in white areas with access Other townships exhibit more or less the largely limited to white people, as they same dramatic lack of recreation facilities, constituted the tourist market. The majority a factor which has resulted in even more of the country's inhabitants were denied people attempting to use the existing access to these facilities on apartheid and facilities elsewhere. Thus, the pressures on economic grounds. The economic resources the Durban beachfront area and facilities of the country, which were set aside for have increased enormously, largely due to recreation and tourism, were used for the spatial disparities.

mSODSFFBimL 'SfQAMSS 82 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Diagram 2

Politically, the changes within the country ure having effects on the tourism industry which are primarily (although not solely) positive. This is particularly so in the city of J (urban, the nearest coastal resort to the largest population concentration in South Africa, that of the Witwatersrand area in the Transvaal.

As facilities have opened up to people of all races, the tourism opportunities available have increased enormously. The removal of most, if not all, of the laws pertaining to racial restrictions, has meant that tourism has become a real possibility to literally Addington Battery Laguna millions of people who had been denied The diagram shows an almost 'mirror image' change in beaches used before and after the opening of | access to many areas of the country. The Durban's beaches to people of all race groups. ( changes in terms of residential and travel DURBAN BEACH USE ON 1 JANUARY FOR SELECTED YEARS I possibilities have meant that tourism has the \ chance to grow into one of the most YEARS 1977 1984 1988 1989 1990 I important domestic industries in South PEOPLE 20 227 42 882 110 111 150-250 000 40 350*1 Africa. \ * This figure is thought to be highly unlikely despite the inclement weather of that day /

Internal political changes are also having 1970s to continue. Nowadays, the original strong effects on the international tourism tourist class, made up in the main of white market as South Africa begins to attract South Africans, restricts its holidays to two overseas visitors once more with over one weeks and often less. million foreign tourists entering the country during 1991 (see diagram on cover of this On the other hand, a relatively new sector monitor). On the negative side, the of the tourist class has grown dramatically continuing violence has succeeded in with improvements in their economic increasing the idea of risk to foreign circumstances. As wages for the South investors, including the larger hotel chains African working class have increased in Many working such as Hilton and Sheraton. real terms in, particularly since the 1960s, class and many working class and lower-middle class lower-middle class people, who are largely black, have recently Furthermore, the economic benefits to people, who are international tourists are not as great as discovered 'the tourism experience'. Easy before in South Africa, according to Mr and widespread access to radio and largely black, have John Auren, UK Tourist Agency Director television (one study puts it at 88%) have recently and guest speaker at a meeting of the encouraged active or passive participation discovered the Tourism Association of Natal/KwaZulu in tourism for the first time. tourism experience (March 1992). Mr Auren said that he has noticed very large increases in the cost of Compared to the old tourist class, the new accommodation, restaurant meals and other tourists display different ways of dealing tourist facilities over the many years during with the expenses incurred when they go on which he had been bringing tourists to this holiday. In some cases, married partners country, but particularly during the last five will go on holiday alternately as, although years. there are insufficient resources to enable them to go together, the tourism experience is too important to miss entirely. In other cases, a couple may save for several years and then spend a short time in a luxury On the one hand, the substantial increase in hotel, for a real treat. the cost of living experienced during the past ten years or so, has meant that the Interviews revealed that a significant original class of tourists who used to number of low-income tourists, often migrate coastwards for a month or more travelling with families, would sleep in the during the summer is in danger of Durban Station - it was free as well as being becoming extinct. The amount of close to the beach. The main feeling disposable income has not been sufficient expressed by respondents was that they to allow the types of extended holidays were determined to get to the seaside or to common to the 1950s, 1960s and even have a holiday, no matter the cost (in

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 83 MSJZMXM FFIFFIM The tourism economic, social or other terms) nor the A Growth [El/ experience is sacrifice. And such tourists, those earning a already proving total annual income of often substantially That domestic tourism is a growth industry less than R2 000 per month, made up 57% in South Africa is certain. Every year important in of an interview sample of almost 800. greater increases in the numbers of local allowing, even tourists are in evidence; more and more encouraging, Mostly, however, the new tourist, often South Africans join the tourist class. If to social links to together with family and friends, travels by this number is added the rapidly incivasin» & develop in South minibus taxi or bus, often to the coast, number of foreign tourists who choose South Africa as one of their destinations, Africa arriving in high season with no booked accommodation, willingly sleeps on or tourism can be assured of its place as oik- of under the bus, or on the beach until it is the most important, growing industries in time to return home. A visit to the bus the country. parking area beyond the Blue Waters Hotel late at night during the holiday season will Tourism also holds the possibility of other, provide evidence of the determination of direct and indirect benefits. It is an area fur mothers and children, young and old conflict resolution through the provision of couples, who bed down on thin mattresses a non-threatening arena for social on the ground for another night of their interaction and for job creation in a growth holiday. industry badly needed by the ailing economy of South Africa. The new tourists are willing to make enormous sacrifices and put up with a great However, the rapid rise in numbers of deal of uncertainty or even danger for their domestic tourists has also posed a number share of the tourism pie. of significant challenges for the industry. As political changes permit and even encourage social mobility within the country, tourism numbers will increase. The tourist class also increases with Socially, the sphere of tourism remains an economic growth, spatial changes and area of possible conflict between people changes in the number of employees who who have a long history of the tourism earn paid annual leave. experience on the one hand, and the As political newcomers, on the other. But it also The ever-increasing tourist population is changes permit remains an area of great potential for the placing heavy demands upon the existing and even development of links between people who tourism structures, particularly in coastal have been spatially and socially separated. areas, more specifically in Durban. In order encourage social The tourism experience is already proving to keep up with the rapidly increasing mobility within the important in allowing, even encouraging, demand for tourism facilities, careful but country, tourism social links to develop in South Africa. rapid planning will have to be put into numbers will effect. Further, continuing violence both in increase Although tourism for a white middle-class townships and in the broader society has South African from Johannesburg has, in the effect of scaring off potential foreign the past, had a substantially different tourists and investors in the tourism meaning than for a black farm worker from ' industry. Until serious and successful Zululand or the far northern Cape, the attempts are made to bring lawlessness growth of the tourism experience could under control, the major investors will be mean a convergence in both behaviour and unwilling to take risks in South Africa. understanding of tourism.

Butler-Adam suggests that although REFERENCES Butler-Adam JF .On the Need lor Recreation within Specific Communities. recreation (or tourism, for that matter) has Durban: ISER, University of Durban-Westville, 1989. meant different things to different people in Kohler K & JF Butler-Adam. New Horizons: Lower-Income Domestic Tourism South Africa, it is increasingly coming to in South Africa, Vol 2: Behaviour. Pretoria: SATOUR, 1989. mean something common (Butler-Adam, Kohler K. Durban City Beaches: Use and Abuse. Durban: Tourism Research 1989:2). He concludes that recreation (or Unit, University of Durban-Westville, 1991. Kohler K. 'The Development and Socio-Spatial Meaning of the Two Day substitute tourism), 'has ... a socio-political Phenomenon: Weekend Tourism in Durban', unfinished MA Thesis, facet which, in South Africa, is bringing University of Durban-Westville, 1992. about convergence while diversity certainly Lundberg D. The Tourist Business, CBI Publishing, USA, 1980. remains' (ibid). It is this very convergence Royeppen L & JF Butler-Adam. AfeivHorizons: Lower-income Domestic Tourism in South Africa, Vol 3: Present Perceptions and Future Needs. of views and behaviour in at least one Pretoria: SATOUR, 1989. sphere of activity in South African society Silva P & JF Butler-Adam. New Horizons: Lower-Income Domestic Tourism which is encouraging in terms of conflict in South Africa, Vol 1: Socio-Economic Profile. Pretoria: SATOUR, 1989. resolution. Tourism - can it help save SA's economy? Bulletin, Vol 4 (1), Jan/Feb 1992, Pretoria: Centre for Scientific Development, 1992.

vsttmsmsaayjbs 8 4 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 Pat Horn, Member, Women's National Coalition and ANC Women's League A (Durban Central) GENDER The first campaign of the new Women's National Coalition will be to formulate a Women's Charter which will bridge the AGENDA needs and demands of women across the class and race divides. This report looks at affirmative action and organisational strategies to advance and The New recognise the role of women in the workplace and in national politics in Women's South Africa. It is written by a participant Coalition at the launch who is a former trade unionist with CWIU and PPAWU.

n Sunday 26 April 1992, a Women's The national co-ordinating structures of the ONational Coalition was launched at a WNC were agreed upon, and a Steering workshop in Johannesburg by Committee was elected, consisting of a approximately 300 representatives of 56 National Convenor and Co-Convenor, organisations, four regional women's National Secretary, two Co-Treasurers and alliances and three areas which are in the ten additional members. This elected process of forming alliances. Steering Committee now takes over the reins from the interim steering committee The Women's National Coalition (WNC) which acted as the midwife from the time agreed that its main objectives would be to that the WNC was first conceived of in prepare a document of women's rights September 1991. (some call it a Women's Charter) for inclusion in the new constitution of South Africa. The process to be used to prepare this document was also agreed upon. In the Sisters in ' words of one of the workshop documents: Women are always arranging meetings The process of developing a document of nationally and internationally, getting women's rights is as important as the J together to discuss their joint concerns, product itself. The educational research sometimes to moan about their oppression, process and the legal documentary sometimes to re-examine their role in product must .together expose the causes society, politics, the communities, etc. of the subordination of women and not What is new about the Women's Coalition? only the symptoms. To be valid, the campaign must seek the views of the broad range of South African women, Firstly, the WNC succeeded in bringing not only those of the educated or of the together a remarkable range of South Africa deprived. It must not prescribe to ' women: women about what they want. In • Women across the spectrum of political women's own words it must elicit their parties, women's organisations, trade needs, demands, and aspirations. The unions, churches, etc (see box). campaign must reflect the perspective of ® Women workers, women from rural all urban and rural women. It must areas, disabled women, professionals engage in a process of consultation and and businesswomen, housewives, participation, not top-down but church women, communists. bottom-up. • Women on both sides of the racial divide - those who have struggled for

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 85 msJZMXM ffiffiM the fact that the economic dependance of WOMEN'S NATIONAL COALITION the majority of poor (mainly black) women List of Participants at Launch, 23 April 1992 in South Africa stands in the way of fighting for their rights as women. Thai NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS such a wide range of women have been African Women's Organisation (PAC) • ANC Emancipation able to agree on a single campaign as a Department • ANC Women's League • Anglican Women's focus for co-operation is remarkable, and Fellowship • ATKV - Dames • Bahai Community • Black new» Housewives League • Black Sash • Bophelo Impilo Community Secondly, it is important to note that the Association • Black Social Workers Association • Business & WNC workshop was not merely a one-oi l' Professional Women of SA • Catholic Women's League • event. It was a consolidation point in an Central Islamic Trust • Conservative Party • Cosatu • organic process which has been Democratic Party • Executive Womens Club • Fabcos/Sabta • spontaneously emerging, almost Five Freedoms Forum • Gender Advisory Committee (Codesa) • simultaneously, in several different areas of Girl Guides Association of SA • IDASA • Ikageng • Inkatha our country. Freedom Party • Kontak • National Council for the Blind • The Western Cape Women's Alliance, the National Council of Physically Disabled • National Council of Women's Charter Alliance of Southern Women of SA • National Assembly of Women • National Party • Natal, the PWV Women's Coalition and National Women's Chapter • Planned Parenthood Association • the Transkei Women's Coalition all started Rural Women's Movement • SA Black Social Workers' within the last year from completely Association • SA Communist Party • SA Council of Churches • different initiatives. All independently decided to focus wholly or in part on SA Democratic Teachers Union • SA Association of Independent developing a charter of women's rights. Schools * SA Association of Occupational Therapists • SA These are now all affiliated to the WNC. Association of University Women • SA Black Business & Initiatives to form similar regional Professional Women's Network • SA Catholic Bishops women's coalitions/alliances are already Conference • SA Association of Early Childhood Education • under way in the OFS and Northern Cape. Soroptimist International of SA • The Women's Lobby • Udusa • It is anticipated that the launch of the WNC' will further promote such initiatives in Union of Jewish Women • Western Cape Workers College • regions where this has not yet happened. Women's Legal Status Committee • Women for Peace • Women for Peaceful Change Now • Women for SA • Women's Bureau of The launch of the Women's Coalition SA • Women's Development Banking • World Vision • YWCA therefore represents the formalisation of something which is in fact an emerging social movement on the South African REGIONAL COALITIONS/ALLIANCES: scene. Northern Cape • OFS • Pietermaritzburg • PWV Region • South Natal Alliance • Transkei • Western Cape Alliance T!hi@ Absent Majority years against apartheid and also those South Africa is entering a period of a who have in the past felt comfortable negotiated transition from apartheid to with the benefits brought to them by democracy. In the period of apartheid, apartheid. racism and exploitation have been • Women on both sides of the class divide institutionalised, and layered upon a highly in our society - domestic servants and patriarchal society. The experience of also employers of domestic servants. institutionalised racism and oppression has • Women who have suffered harsh led to a fairly widespread recognition that economic oppression in the rural areas, we have to make very fundamental changes in the factories or in impoverished black in attitudes as well as in almost all the communities, and also those who have institutions of our society. Codesa is the taken their more comfortable standard national negotiating forum where issues are of living for granted. now being hammered out in the search for negotiated solutions. The women at the workshop acknowledged the substantial differences between the However, women have been missing in this position of different women in South political process. The majority of the South Africa, who are further divided by cultural African population is female, yet hitherto, differences. These are further aggravated women have been noticeable by then- by the high level of illiteracy among black absence in the delegations of all the parties women, the different education background engaged in the negotiation process. In our of black people as a result of apartheid, and society women are allocated to the private

MSODSFFBIML 'SFQAMSS 86 INDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 domestic domain, and in the economy broader range of South African women; In the negotiation women are marginalised. Political it will aim to address the needs of process, there is organisations and the most powerful women in a post-apartheid South Africa, no organisation organisations of civil society are something which it was almost which can claim to male-dominated. Women have therefore impossible for women to address in found themselves and gender issues 1954;and represent or marginalised in the political process. while the planned document of women's negotiate on behalf rights may contain many of the issues of the women of The first problem, in the negotiation mentioned in the 1954 Women's Charter South Africa process, is that there is no organisation (as many of them have still not been which can claim to represent or negotiate rectified) it aims to address women's on behalf of the women of South Africa, interests and concerns in much more although the majority of South African detail. women are by no means entirely unorganised. Most of them belong to This coming together by South African organisations such as stokvels, mcmyanos, women from such different backgrounds in burial societies, etc. which are not involved order to ensure that women's interests are in political debate or the constitutional represented in the new South Africa, process. But political organisations, which potentially puts the cat among the pigeons have many female members, are not in the delicately-balanced political scenario adequately representing the concerns of It introduces a new political actor onto the those members. scene.

Even women's organisations, constituted Women's determination to transcend race,; specifically with all-female membership to class, religious, political and cultural deal with women's interests and gender differences in order to be able to oppression, have not managed to spread significantly influence the future themselves widely enough to be able to dispensation, indicates a shared strategic : represent the vast and complex constituency perspective rather than the more of South African women. short-sighted pursuit of only the most immediate concerns which is norm illy In Canada in 1969, when Canadians were attributed to women. Once the women or involved in drawing up their own federal South Africa have started to co-operate Women are constitution, the Royal Commission on the across these divides, and have produced a determined to Status of Women was formed to reach the document containing their needs, demands transcend race, and aspirations, they are likely to want to women of Canada to find out what their class, religious, needs, demands and concerns were. In fight hard to have this incorporated into the South Africa in 1992, we are at a very new South Africa. Instead of being a political and similar political moment. However, if meaningless piece of paper understood by cultural differences women were to wait for the government to only the most intellectual women, it can be in order to set up a similar commission, we would wait something which is owned by all women influence the future forever, and miss the opportunity to have who contributed to its creation. dispensation any influence in the new constitutional dispensation. Affirmative Action The women of South Africa have therefore initiated the process of collecting the needs, Don Mkhwanazi argues, in 'Corporate demands and aspirations of women, Outsiders Coming on Board' (Indicator SA realising the need for a new constitution Vol9/No2:76-80), that the process of with provision for traditionally political transformation in South Africa can disadvantaged groups,of people such as never be complete without simultaneous women to exercise their general rights as democratisation of the economy. So we can contained in the Bill of Rights. cxpect the common concerns of women in the economic sphere, who have experienced In 1954, a Women's Charter was drawn up marginalisation at different levels of by the Federation of South African Women, industry, in the informal sector, in domestic a women's organisation connected to the service, etc. to start being expressed more Congress Alliance. That document and more as women campaign for a bigger therefore represented the particular say in the political future of this country. concerns of women in the Congress Alliance. The document which the WNC Mkhwanazi talks about the need for now aims to develop will go much further affirmative action and positive in that: discrimination in order to 'accelerate the • it will represent the interests of a process of black and women representation

'NDICATOR SA Vol 9 No 3 Winter 1992 87 msJZMXM ffiffiM Employers can on South Africa's corporate boards'. He the workplace. Employers are going to expect more and says that: have to negotiate affirmative action more to have to fundamental change must take place in programmes whether they like it or not. deal with demands corporate South Africa. It must be transformed and democratised. There Trade unions will, as before, not accept the for affirmative must be a fundamental shift in attitudes, argument that they should wait for the laws action in order to behaviour and value systems in order to to change, which employers are fond of eliminate sexual create an environment responsive to the suggesting as a desperate alternative to discrimination at needs and abilities of black and women negotiating difficult issues. Like many the workplace employees. other issues such as May Day, the Labour Relations Act, etc., the collective The Women's Coalition does not have a bargaining process around the removal of position on affirmative action, or in fact on gender discrimination is going to have to any issue which is likely to form part of the shape the laws around affirmative action to content in the planned document of achieve this in industry. women's rights. Such positions are yet to be developed out of the campaign to elicit the views of South African women. sizing Miornsf However, as a result of the historical Now that trade union women have joined disadvantages which have been caused by forces with other women in our society in apartheid and hitherto unchallenged the Women's National Coalition, we can patriarchal traditions in South Africa, expect resistance against gender employers can expect more and more to discrimination in specific instances to have to deal with demands for affirmative become part of a wider effort to eliminate action in order to eliminate discrimination all forms of discrimination against women. at the workplace. This would apply at the level of directors, on which Mkhwanazi No doubt the process will not be all easy concentrates, right down to unskilled going in the WNC. Different constituencies workers, temporary and casual workers, etc. of women in the WNC have different priorities. Some women in South Africa are Most of the current arguments for and so preoccupied with the mere problem of against affirmative action are very crude. survival, that they will not feel so strongly As a result most employers have an about the rights issues for which other The collective extremely limited understanding of what is women will fight so passionately. At times bargaining process meant by affirmative action. In their view it the differences between women in the around the simply means employing people in jobs WNC will no doubt loom larger than the removal of gender they are unable to do just because they are common ground. And no doubt there will be many, sitting on the sidelines, who will discrimination is black or female or handicapped. However, a more creative approach is going to be hope for the differences to degenerate into going to have to needed in order to affect any meaningful divisions and split the WNC into many shape the laws change to the current status quo in the ineffectual pieces. around affirmative economy. Employers will have to get away action from token or single-factor approaches to However, the imperative which has drawn the removal of discrimination at their women from all these different workplaces. They will be increasingly organisations together remains - the need under pressure to implement creative, for women to act now while there is the multi-pronged and effective affirmative opportunity to influence the new South action programmes. Africa. This has thus far provided the incentive for women to transcend their Trade unions, even though they themselves differences in order to build women into a suffer the effects of decades of gender more effective collective force. For women, discrimination in their own structures, are the hope of a democratic South Africa is starting to go on the offensive with regard the hope for democracy, human rights and to the scrapping of gender discrimination at equality for all, including women.

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