brief 21 Small States— Big Worries Choice and Purpose in the Security Policies of the Baltic States brief 21

Contents The author

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder is Zusammenfassung 4 project leader at BICC and adjunct German summary professor for comparative politics at Humboldt University Berlin. His Acknowledgments 6 main fields of research are security politics in Eastern Europe, post- Interview Partners 7 Soviet politics, and comparative federalism. Introduction 8 When Words and Deeds Do Not Match 8 Summary of the Argument 8 Research Questions 8 Common Approaches 9 Linking Identities to Interests 12 Defining Security 13

Security Conceptions 15 ‘Hard’ versus ‘Soft’ Security 15 The Image of a ‘Russian Threat’ 16 The Russian Minority as an Alleged Fifth Column? 17 Russia’s Interests 20 Security Concepts of the Baltic States 20

Regional and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation 22 The Fragile Baltic Cooperation 22 Yeltsin’s Offer of Security Guarantees 25 Baltic Sea Region and Nordic Cooperation 26 Cooperation with NATO 28

Security Decision-making in the Baltic States 33

Build-up of Armed Forces 35 Absence of Blue Print 35 Territorial or ‘Total’ Defense 36 Estonia’s Armed Forces 36 Editing: Latvia’s Armed Forces 39 Lynn Benstead Lithuania’s Armed Forces 42 Cover photo: Weapons Acquisition 44 Children playing on a tank in Severny Gorodok, Lithuania. Conclusions 46 Ria Nowosti

References 49

2 B·I·C·C brief 21 Small States— Big Worries Choice and Purpose in the Security Policies of the Baltic States

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder

february 2002

B·I·C·C 3 brief 21

Zusammen-

wenigstens z.T. mit dem frühen fassung Stadium der Staatsbildung und entsprechenden Experimenten German Summary erklärt werden. Sicherheitspolitik ist währenddessen stark mit nationaler Identitätspolitik aufgeladen und er BICC brief Small States—Big auch durch die geringe Zusammenar- zeichnet sich durch ein Übergewicht DWorries. Choice and Purpose in the beit der baltischen Staaten untereinan- militärischer Aspekte aus. Security Policies of the Baltic States der bestätigt. Gleichwohl, die struktu- untersucht die Bestimmungsfaktoren rellen Bedingungen der äußeren Das Militär, insbesondere das der baltischen Sicherheitspolitik seit Umwelt erklären nicht die tatsächliche Offizierskorps, ist sowjetisch der Erringung der Unabhängigkeit im Entwicklung der baltischen Sicherheits- geschult und mental geprägt. Die Jahre 1991. Die Entwicklung von politik. Anstelle der neo-realistischen post-kommunistische Geisteshal- Sicherheitskonzepten und der Aufbau Annahme, dass es den baltischen tung äußert sich dabei vor allem von Streitkräften im Baltikum können Staaten primär um das staatliche durch kurzfristige Planung, in zwei Phasen unterteilt werden – ein Überleben ging, wurde der Aufbau der Entscheidungsfreude ohne Rück- anfängliches Stadium der Nations- und Streitkräfte entscheidend durch interne sicht auf Umsetzung, geringe Staatsbildung und eine zweite Phase, in Faktoren bestimmt. Darüber hinaus Koordination und schleppende der die Annäherung an die NATO entwickelte sich, entgegen der (neo- Informationsflüsse sowie ein bzw. an individuelle NATO-Staaten im )realistischen Annahme, Kooperation mangelndes Verständnis für öffentli- Vordergrund stand. Der Aufbau mit Russland. che Rechenschaftspflicht. Die militärischer Kapazitäten war in der sowjetische Militärkultur steht in ersten Phase vom organisatorischen Die baltischen Staaten haben für jene Konflikt mit der professionellen Eigeninteresse der neu geschaffenen Sicherheitsinstitutionen optiert, von Kultur von westlichen Militärbera- Streitkräfte bzw. der Verteidigungsmi- denen der größte Nutzen erwartet tern und baltischen Remigranten, nisterien, von institutioneller Unsicher- wurde, während andere Optionen an vor allem aus den USA und Kanada. heit, einer Ad-hoc-Politik und konkur- den Rand gedrängt wurden. Die rierenden Visionen über die künftige Kooperation mit der NATO verringer- Angesichts anderer Prioritäten des Rolle der Streitkräfte geprägt. Zwi- te das Unsicherheitsgefühl der balti- Systemwechsels ist das Militär schen deklarierten realpolitischen schen Staaten, zugleich half die NATO, finanziell und personell nur mager Absichten und der tatsächlichen die innenpolitisch labile Stellung des ausgestattet. Da die baltischen Sicherheitspolitik ergaben sich folglich Militärs zu kompensieren. Die NATO- Staaten Armeen von Grund auf erhebliche Widersprüche. Kooperation schränkte jedoch zugleich aufbauten, reichten die Militär- den künftigen Handlungsspielraum der haushalte in den 1990er Jahren In der zweiten Phase wurde die Balten ein. kaum für mehr als den einfachen nationale Sicherheitspolitik durch Unterhalt. Anforderungen der angestrebten In der Praxis ist die baltische Sicher- NATO-Mitgliedschaft bestimmt. Die heitspolitik stärker durch interne Zuständigkeiten zwischen dem Kooperation mit der NATO hat den institutionelle, kulturelle und ökonomi- Präsidenten, dem Sicherheits- bzw. Schwerpunkt des Streitkräfteaufbaus sche Faktoren geprägt worden als Verteidigungsrat, dem Verteidi- von der Territorialverteidigung zur durch „geopolitische Realpolitik“. gungsminister und dem Generalstab Interoperabilität mit der NATO und Einige interne Bestimmungsfaktoren sind nach wie vor unklar abge- der Teilnahme an „out-of-area“- für Sicherheitspolitik sind dabei in grenzt, insbesondere für den Operationen verlagert. vergleichbarer Weise prägend gewor- militärischen Ernstfall. den: Politikwissenschaftlich ist weder ein Die Kluft zwischen Sicherheits- neo-realistischer, noch ein Die Anfangsphase rief ein Gefühl rhetorik und mangelhafter institutionalistischer oder ein konstruk- der Überforderung hervor, es Sicherheitsplanung ist erheblich. tivistischer Ansatz hinlänglich in der erforderte die Ausarbeitung von Sicherheitsbedrohungen waren Lage, die Sicherheitspolitik der balti- nationalen Sicherheitskonzepten, offensichtlich nicht so ernst wie schen Staaten in den 1990er Jahren zu den Aufbau einer militärischen bisweilen deklariert. Wenn die erfassen. Die neorealistische Betonung Infrastruktur und von militärischen russische Gefahr tatsächlich so von Misstrauen wird durch die balti- Entscheidungsabläufen, die Annah- prominent gewesen wäre wie sche Wahrnehmung Russlands, aber me von grundlegenden Gesetzen bisweilen behauptet, hätte sich dies und die Rekrutierung eines neuen mutmaßlich im ergebnisorientierten Offizierskorps und von Wehrpflich- Aufbau effektiver militärischer tigen. Die Ineffizienz beim Kapazitäten niedergeschlagen. Sicherheitsmanagement kann so

4 B·I·C·C German summary

Angesichts der geringen Popularität der Die drängenden Sicherheitserfordernis- Streitkräfte und der randständigen se wie illegaler Grenzverkehr, Krimina- Bedeutung von Sicherheitsproblemen lität, Terrorismus, inter-ethnische im Kontext des Systemwechsels konnte Spannungen und ökologische Gefahren das Militär keine entscheidende Rolle legen eine enge Sicherheitskooperation für die Wiederherstellung von Natio- der baltischen Staaten untereinander nalstolz oder für die Kollektiv- und mit ihren unmittelbaren Nachbarn, identitäten spielen. Der Militärdienst ist darunter Russland nahe. Sollte das unpopulär, Sicherheitsthemen fehlen Streben der baltischen Staaten nach zumeist in Parteiprogrammen, schließ- NATO-Mitgliedschaft Ende 2002 nicht lich spielt die Militär- und Sicherheits- befriedigt werden, wäre erneut zu politik bei Verteilungsfragen nur eine bedenken, ob die Gemeinsame Außen- nachgeordnete Rolle. Vor diesem und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der EU Hintergrund wird mit der NATO- nicht eine langfristige Alternative Mitgliedschaft die Erwartung ver- verkörpert, zumal aus sicherheits- knüpft, die innenpolitisch angreifbare politischen Gründen keine Dringlich- Stellung des Militärs außenpolitisch keit für die NATO-Erweiterung kompensieren zu können. besteht. Für den höchst unwahrschein- lichen Fall einer militärischen Bedro- Das nach wie vor in allen baltischen hung der territorialen Integrität und Staaten gültige Konzept der „totalen staatlichen Souveränität könnten Verteidigung“ erfordert eine Personal- sowohl die NATO als auch die EU- stärke, die weit über dem liegt, was sie Mitgliedsstaaten Beistandszusagen sich vernünftigerweise leisten können. abgeben, die unterhalb der Schwelle Angesichts der defizitären Zusammen- der NATO-Mitgliedschaft liegen. arbeit unter den baltischen Staaten kommt das Konzept der „totalen Der Faktor, der die baltische Sicherheit Verteidigung“ einer Ressourcen- perspektivisch am stärksten beeinflusst, verschwendung gleich. Die NATO- besteht weniger in militärischen Mitgliedschaft wird in jedem Fall den Kapazitäten als in der wirtschaftlichen Schwerpunkt von der „totalen Verteidi- Vorbereitung auf die EU-Mitglied- gung“ hin zu kleinen, professionellen schaft. Für die EU und insbesondere Einheiten verschieben. die baltischen Staaten wird von herausragender Bedeutung sein, ob die Reflektionen über Kosten und Nutzen Grenze zu Russland und der Gemein- der NATO-Mitgliedschaft werden in schaft Unabhängiger Staaten sich den baltischen Staaten selten angestellt. angesichts starker sozio-ökonomischer Unbeschadet der offiziellen Betonung Gefälle physisch und politisch-kulturell einer Gleichwertigkeit von NATO- verhärtet oder die baltischen Staaten zu und EU-Mitgliedschaft verkörpert die einem offenen Tor sowohl in den NATO eher ein ideelles postsowjetischen Raum als auch in die Zugehörigkeitsversprechen, während EU hinein werden. die Vorbereitung auf die EU-Mitglied- schaft weitaus substantiellere Verände- rungen in Politik, Wirtschaft und Alltag hervorruft.

B·I·C·C 5 brief 21

Acknowledgments

Professor Dr. Manfred Kerner supported me in establishing contacts in Riga and Dr. Christian Wellmann introduced me to his cooperation partners in the Baltic states. My thanks go to Janis Keruss for his kind support and particularly for conducting standardized interviews with former officers in Latvia. I am also indebted to Janis Brugetajs for his assistance in Riga. Gundars Zalkalns in Riga provided invaluable insights. I enjoyed his sharpness and sense of humor. In Tallinn, I particularly benefited from my conversations with professor Dr. Aksel Kirch. Arend Wellmann helped in an early stage with compiling data on military personnel of the Baltic armed forces. Frank Möller provided critical reading of parts of the study, his comments are greatly appreciated. Finally, I am thankful to Margers Vestermanis, director of the museum “Jews in Latvia”, for his hospitality, friendship and spirit of human honor.

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, February 2002

6 B·I·C·C interview partners

Interview partners

Adamsons, Janis, Deputy of the Viksne, Ilmars, Head of the Latvian Latvian parliament (Saeima) of the Military Academy, Riga Republic of Latvia, Commission of National Security and Commission Voicehovics, Stanislavs, Lt. Colonel, of Defense and Internal Affairs Chief of Military Personnel Divisi- on, Ministry of Defense, Republic Czylyk, Julian, First Secretary, OSCE of Latvia Mission Riga

Heidenhain, Stephan, First Secretary, OSCE Mission Tallinn

Jundzis, Talavs, Baltic Center for Strategic Studies, Latvian Academy of Sciences , and former Minister of Defense of Latvia

Kirch, Aksel, Institute for European Studies, Estonian Academy of Sciences, Tallinn

Lejins, Atis, Head of Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga

Lukk, Toomas, Head of Department, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Noorkoiv, Tiit, Head of Department of Defense Policy and Planning, Estonian Ministry of Defense

Podnebesny, Jurii Vladimirovich, Social Services for Military Pensioners at the Russian Embassy in Latvia

Tsilevich, Boriss, Deputy of the Latvian Parliament (Saeima), Human Rights and Public Affairs Committee, Riga 16 June 2000

Vaares, Peter, Professor at European University, Tallinn

B·I·C·C 7 brief 21

Introduction

organizational needs of the security establishment. These interests emanate ‘Neo-realists’ treat security interests as from a specific organizational culture, When Words and which combines strong residues of Deeds Do Not Match the self-evident emanation of interna- tional structures, but fail to explain Soviet behavioral patterns, autonomy in deciding security matters, and a choices that do not conform to ollowing independence, the Baltic penchant for national security gains assumed interests. The ‘institutionalist’ states defined their security policies over common security gains. F argument stresses the socializing role ‘from scratch’, in an environment open of international institutions, but falls to institutional choice as well as to short in two crucial regards—why do Research Questions diverse perceptions of potential certain international institutions win threats. These states therefore over others, and how are approaches to My inquiry into the reasons behind represent a unique case for testing institutions shaped by domestic security choices in the Baltic states is common assumptions about the politics? Finally, ‘constructivists’ based on four lines of analysis. Firstly, sources of security policies. What are perceive security politics as the how is security policy perceived and the factors determining the Baltic emanation of transnational discourses constructed domestically? Secondly, states’ choice of security policies? The and national identities, but fail to how does the regional and trans- following study looks at the security explain discrepancies between words national environment affect security debates in and around the Baltic states and deeds. Ideas and actual conduct choices? Thirdly, how do domestic and relates them to the actual build-up may coincide, but often they do not. A structures influence decision-making in of armed forces in the 1990s. How are closer look at the domestic sources of security politics? And fourthly, how do policy deliberations and declarations security policies in the Baltic states may security preferences translate into the related to the actual pursuit of security help to fill these gaps. concrete build-up of armed forces? policies, and what does this teach us The constitution of security policies is about the determinants of security The story of the Baltic states’ security thus explained by the input of policies? policies in the 1990s will sharpen our conceptions, the external environment, understanding of the interaction patterns of domestic decision-making, The Baltic states are in a process of between proclaimed ideas and actual and the build-up of the armed forces. nation-state building. Their security deeds. The practical relevance of this preferences are part of an ongoing understanding is twofold. Actual The final part of this report evaluates search for, and manifestation of, policies can be measured against the the functionality of security choices in collective identity. ‘Collective identity’ security concerns of the people living relation to declared aims, and is not treated here as a given: it in the Baltic states. In addition, a sober speculates on the contribution of emerges through domestic look at self-images, interests, and actual security based on confidence-building deliberations, through common deeds may help to define outsiders’ among potential adversaries. The practices with the external actions vis-a-vis Baltic expectations. normative assessment in the environment, through domestic conclusion is ‘utilitarian’ in that it decision-making, and the build-up of Summary of the relates the conduct of security policies armed forces. to the reduction of identifiable security Argument threats. The evaluation is thus not The example of the Baltic states based on idealistic moral principles or demonstrates that common ‘neo- I argue that the autonomy of the linked to the maximization of state realist’, ‘institutionalist’, and security establishment in policy interests. I shy away from any abstract ‘constructivist’ explanations face formulation and decision-making is the juxtaposition of moralism versus serious problems in explaining the key to understanding the security Realpolitik (Hutchings, 1999, pp. 21 ff.). mismatch between security concepts policies of the Baltic states. I claim that What I am ultimately aiming at is an and the actual pursuit of security the decisive sources of security policies assessment of the possibilities of policies in the Baltic states. The lie in the domestic environment of the changing behavioral patterns that currently most frequently applied Baltic states, and that security reproduce the security dilemma instead modes of reflection about security conceptions as well as the actual of overcoming it. This, of course, policies do not sufficiently capture the pursuit of the build-up of armed implies that the security dilemma is contradictions between the forces are linked to the functional man-made, not an eternal given. epistemology of security policies, for needs and survival strategies of the example the security prose enshrined in military organizations (Katzenstein, doctrines and foreign policy 1996, p. 29). “Identities” and “norms” declarations, and the actual pursuit of are not treated as the absolute root security policies. causes of security policies, but seen rather as instruments to satisfy the

8 B·I·C·C introduction

The domestic setting, as I try to formative influences and not as a they help to understand the underlying demonstrate, plays a key role in conceptual blueprint which is ideas of actors and how they perceive distributing the impact of the security implemented in reality, the build-up of ‘facts’; they define the range of ‘facts’ establishment on preference armed forces demonstrates to what covered; and they have broad policy aggregation. Peter Hall argued that: extent words are reflected in deeds. implications.

“Institutional factors play two funda- The choice of security politics is Ideas in security policies enjoy a double mental roles . . . on the one hand, the explained by the input of conceptions, status. On the one hand, they express organization of policy-making affects the external environment, domestic the actor’s world views; on the other the degree of power that one set of decision-making, and the build-up of hand, they articulate academic modes actors has over the policy outcomes. the armed forces. I assume that some of reflection about the actor’s . . . On the other hand, organizational of these inputs, particularly security behavior. Any student of security position also influences an actor’s conceptions and domestic decision- politics should be aware of the definition of his own interests, by making, are causal in the sense that difference between an actor embracing, establishing his institutional they are antecedent to and independent for example, the rhetoric of Realpolitik responsibilities and relationships to of their effects, whereas others and scholars claiming that Realpolitik is other actors. In this way, organizational (resource allocation, external the only appropriate mode of factors affect both the degree of environment, and the build-up of understanding the actor. pressure an actor can bring to bear on armed forces) are constitutive of policy and the likely direction of this security policies. There are three major modes of pressure” (Hall, 1986, p. 9). reflection on security politics which I I share the ‘constructivist’ stress on the will briefly review—‘neo-realism’, Actors and institutions in the field of perception and interpretation of ‘institutionalism’, and ‘constructivism’. security politics understandably power, yet I contend that security ‘Neo-realism’ sees security policy as demonstrate a vital interest in securing policies are not exclusively driven by resulting from material structures their own existence against purely norms and “national identities” embodied in the international system. instrumental approaches, and it is (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, The ‘neo-realist’ school claims that the therefore of prime importance to 1996, pp. 52 f.). The organizational distribution of resources and power assess their voice in defining priorities interests of the security establishment among states determines security in security politics. have to be taken into consideration too. politics, thus critically diminishing the The projection of security norms onto freedom of action (on realism see In contrast to common wisdom, I treat the outside world is seen as a function Morgenthau, 1963, pp. 49–60; on neo- “security environment” not as being of self-images and the interests of realism Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, predominantly defined by the particular interest groups (for a 1994/95, pp. 5–49). The distribution of power and resources, contrasting view, see Kowert and ‘institutionalist’ strand assigns a but as the epistemological and Legro, 1996, pp. 462 ff.). civilizing role to international institutional environment created by institutions—security policies as a actors in security politics (Jepperson, Apart from official documents and function of the binding, integrating, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996, p. 33 f.). secondary literature, my findings are and socializing role of international I am thus departing from a view that based on interviews with institutions (Keohane, 1993, p. 271; sees the Baltic states’ security policies representatives of the respective Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp. 39–51; as intrinsic to their geographical Ministries of Defense, Ministries of Ruggie, 1992, p. 561; Ruggie, 1995, parameters. While not denying the Foreign Affairs, parliamentary pp. 62–70). Finally, the ‘constructivist’ impact of the distribution of power in commissions, armed forces, and school holds that the social international politics and of internatio- academic experts in the Baltic states construction and projection of identity nal institutions on state behavior, I (see Annex for full list of interview defines security policies which are a pursue a comparative ‘unit level’ partners). projection of self-images as well as analysis. I take a look at the domestic behavioral norms. sources of the security policies of the Common Approaches Baltic states and argue that the effects of material factors depend on Any study of security policies in the perception and on domestic Baltic states has to penetrate a thick institutional factors (Wendt, 1999, Part layer of fundamentalist claims. It is I, pp. 47–190). If we conceive security worth briefly reviewing common policies as the result of diverse approaches to security policies because they shape what count as ‘hard facts’;

B·I·C·C 9 brief 21

‘Neo-realism’ ‘neo-realist’ terms, security policy is pp. 291–310, esp. p. 296). The record thus embodied in the threat, use and of past relations with neighboring ‘Neo-realism’ makes five basic claims: control of military power. great powers and experiences with alliances seem to inform small states’ The international system is anarchic. The ‘neo-realist’ claim holds that the security perceptions in particular Baltic states are over-determined by (Knudsen, 1996, p. 17). The survival of States are potentially dangerous to external conditions, defined by their a small state may be more precarious each other. physical capabilities, betrayed by a than that of a major power. Fears of history of victimhood, threatened by being swallowed up by, or integrated They can never fully trust. Russia as a malignant great power, in into, greater powers may be more need of alliances, particularly with common. Given their sense of They strive for survival. NATO, and without any options other vulnerability, small states may like to than ‘realist’ ones. These kinds of counter the dominance of one great They act instrumentally rationally assertions serve as an explanatory power by joining alliances, by (Mearsheimer, 1994/95, p. 10). context for security, particularly demanding an “import” of security defense policies, although they are part guarantees, and by capitalizing on their Following a ‘neo-realist’ argument, the of the explanandum. The claims may smallness by producing “moral noise”. security policies of the Baltic states be right or wrong; what is problematic would represent just one embodiment is the status of the argument: Baltic A ‘neo-realist’ treatment of small states of a universal pattern, which would security politics are reduced to follows the logic of balancing in crucial follow from their geographic location, ‘geopolitics’. Agency supposedly does regards and is based on two disputable the resources available for defense, and not make a difference. The language of assumptions: neighboring great powers the impact of alliances. Waltz writes: geopolitical and historical self-evidence are expansionist, and cooperative “Definitions of structure must leave marginalizes the availability of possible security is almost impossible. Some aside, or abstract from, the choices, the consideration of domestic authors nonetheless claim that characteristics of units, their behavior, sources of security policies, and the compared with larger powers, small and their interactions . . . so that we very construction process of “national states are keen to reject confrontational can distinguish between variables at the interests”. A standard ‘neo-realist’ view norms (Sens, 1996, p. 87). The level of the units and at the level of the thus reinforces the security dilemma by consequences of an increased system.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 79). ‘Neo- declaring it unavoidable, and is perception of vulnerability are thus not realists’ claim that the lack of an therefore potentially dangerous as a as unequivocal as claimed by ‘neo- international central authority, policy guideline (Ruggie, 1995, p. 70). realists’. ‘anarchy’, determines the behavior of states as prime actors in international One particular branch of ‘neo-realist’ The dividing lines between ‘neo- affairs (Waltz, 1979, pp. 79–101). For writing highlights the peculiarities of realists’ on the one hand and ‘neo-realists’, the state’s behavior is the foreign and security policy of small ‘institutionalists’ or ‘constructivists’ on independent of domestic structures, states. It sees the conduct of small the other are usually well drawn. Yet, a political regimes, or party preferences; states as a function of measurable specific strand of ‘neo-realism’— it is a function of “objective” national criteria, such as population, territory, ‘defensive realism’—admits that interests and constraints imposed by resources or income. The usefulness of structural factors and perceptual international power configurations. the concept of ‘small states’ has been reasons conspire, that conflict among ‘Neo-realism’ treats security as the questioned from time to time: How states is often generated by interactive embodiment of objective structure, it should smallness be defined and how processes, and that international commonly dismisses “ideas” as dependent is it on the relationship with institutions can change behavior by epiphenomena of power relations in its exterior world? (Amstrup, 1976, providing more and better information. international politics. pp. 163–182). Notwithstanding these ‘Defensive realism’ is skeptical about reservations, small states seem to share the impact of institutions and changes ‘Neo-realists’ treat insecurity as an certain features. Due to their limited of mindset when it comes to vital, unavoidable expression of anarchy in means, small states are usually confined “irreconcilable” interests, though it international relations. Since anarchy is to their own region. A small state may acknowledges that institutions may armored, security is only conceivable as show an awareness on the part of its exert dynamic and even unforeseen an adequate balancing of powers by leaders “that it can never, acting alone effects. As Robert Jervis writes: “. . . means of armaments and military or in a small group, make a significant international arrangements can alter alliances. Under conditions of anarchy, impact on the system” (Keohane, 1969, the power, beliefs, and goals of groups well-informed mistrust would be the in society in ways that will affect only rational form of behavior. In

10 B·I·C·C introduction

foreign relations” (Jervis, 1999, p. 61). be assessed soberly. In contrast to and intentions of states, not their This insight is of particular importance standard ‘neo-realism’, ‘contingent participation in a collective security for the Baltic states because, contrary realism’ sees security as a mutual system” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995, to ‘hard-line’ realist thinking, structural relationship with the potential p. 57). factors and ensuing distrust and fears adversary, and it explicitly takes into vis-a-vis Russia could, at least account the anticipated effects of Relating these insights to the security theoretically, become subject to various policy options on the policies of the Baltic states, we would changes due to the international opponent’s domestic policies (Glaser, first have to look at varying interests in institutions in which the Baltic states 1994/95, p. 86). It would thus be the emergence of regional institutions participate. possible to argue, even from a ‘neo- (Baltic or Nordic), inter-regional realist’ point of view, that any institutions (including Russia), and Even authors who label themselves perceived increase in Baltic security Western institutions (including NATO ‘realists’ are beginning to question the would have to consider the desired and the EU). Only after an evaluation standard argument that “self-help” impact on Russia’s domestic policy. of interests could we begin to assess requires a striving for increases in Following the reverse logic of the the common ground of the actors relative power as the best way to security dilemma, increases in Baltic involved in security institutions as well increase security. Not competition, but security at the expense of Russia’s as the latter’s likely effects. The cooperation could be the best way to security would be counter-productive. ‘institutionalist’ stress on international increase security (Glaser, 1994/95, institutions is of less importance for pp. 50–90). Instead of producing arms ‘Institutionalism’ the study of Baltic security as long as races, the logic of the security dilemma the Baltic states do not belong to is seen as offering an opportunity. The ‘institutionalist’ school highlights NATO or the EU. Nonetheless, Charles Glaser concisely formulates: the importance of international preparation for NATO and EU institutions—they may mitigate fears membership may already be exerting “Increases in the adversary’s security of cheating, allow cooperation to socializing and constraining effects. often increase one’s own security emerge, alleviate fears of unequal gains because a more secure adversary has from cooperation, provide for ‘Constructivism’ smaller incentives for pursuing an reciprocal flows of information, create expansionist foreign policy, and issue linkages, and allow for more ‘Constructivism’ highlights the active therefore will pose a smaller” (Glaser, effective retaliation against cheats role of actors, for example the 1994/95, p. 76). (Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp. 45 f.). perceptions, politics of identity, and These rather broad characterizations socialization of actors through interna- The mutual gain in security would do not identify how institutions tional interaction. It treats security as a consist in a change in the adversary’s emerge, what kind of institutions are function of collective or national motives and not in relative gains in more efficient than others, and what ‘identity’. ‘Constructivists’ are therefore terms of military assets. Glaser kinds of problems are more amenable mainly interested in the process of consequently summarizes: to institutionalization than others. image formation. Norms of behavior, Leading ‘institutionalists’ such as defined as “collective expectations for “In short, contrary to the problem Robert Keohane are generally cautious the proper behavior of actors”, would identified by the logic of the relative- with respect to “institutionalization” as either constitute identities or specify gains problem, if cooperation increases encompassing conflict-solution the acting out of an already defined a country’s security, the increases in the strategy. Institutions only matter identity (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5). adversary’s security are usually “sometimes”, and they depend on an ‘Constructivism’ is unambiguous in its desirable, whether or not they exceed evident self-interest (Keohane and interpretation of ‘structures’ as a result increases in the defender’s security. In Martin, 1995, p. 40). Like ‘neo-realism’, of constructed meanings. “Material the security realm, instead of a relative- ‘institutionalism’ considers the interests capabilities as such explain nothing”, gains problem, we often have a mutual- of states as a pre-existing given. writes Alexander Wendt, “their effects gains benefit” (Glaser, 1994/95, p. 76). National interests can be tamed by the presuppose structures of shared civilizing effects of international knowledge, which vary and which are This kind of ‘realist’ thinking—labeled institutions (Keohane, 1984). Promo- not reducible to capabilities” (Wendt, ‘contingent realism’—is not naive in ters of ‘collective security’ argue 1995, p. 73). opting for cooperation at any price. likewise that systems such as NATO Dangers of cheating while cooperating, depend on compatibility among the abilities to respond to violations, and great powers and that this compatibility abilities to monitor agreements should is “a function of underlying interests

B·I·C·C 11 brief 21

‘Constructivism’ explains security ‘Constructivism’ assumes that the Following a ‘constructivist’ mood, politics as politics of identity—changes external environment—geographic “hard” or “soft” security would result of identity would affect interests and location, neighbors, regional from deliberations resulting either in the pursuit of national security policies. interaction, alliances, and possible confidence-building or harboring In this view, “identity” becomes a kind threats—is always processed by mistrust. Whereas ‘neorealists’ treat of code preceding security policies— domestic perception. Repeated distrust and “hard” security as a feature national interests are sometimes patterns of interaction have a of anarchy, ‘constructivists’ would reduced to the self-manifestation of socializing effect on actors, social argue that “trust versus distrust” or collective identities (Hall, 1999, pp. 26– ‘constructivism’ claims. “hard versus soft security” follow from 50, esp. pp. 41 ff.). ‘Constructivists’ hold that “material” probabilities and expectations factors such as geography and size produced by interaction (Wendt, 1992, States interact with one another on the depend on perception, for example p. 404). basis of meanings (Wendt, 1992, ideas about the relative significance of pp. 396 f.). Security calculations, as the various elements of security (Wendt, It seems safe to draw one conclusion basic ‘constructivist’ claim holds, 1999). “Security” is not defined as the with respect to the link between “depend on the intersubjective distribution of power and resources, identity and security—it is not mono- understandings and expectations of the but as a reflection of the dimensional, but reflects and reinforces ‘distribution of knowledge’ that epistemological and institutional relationship patterns. It is not, for constitute their conception of self and environment (Jepperson, Wendt and example, Russia’s military might per se, other . . . It is collective meanings that Katzenstein, 1996, p. 33 f.). its capacities or the distribution of constitute the structures which Expectations, interests, and power between Russia and the Baltic organize our actions” (Wendt, 1992 commitments are formed in the course states that cause concern, but the pp. 394 f.; Wendt, 1995 pp. 73 f.). From of interaction with the external image of Russia as a foe. Conflicting this perspective, the security choices of environment. identities may contribute to security the Baltic states could be explained by problems. At the same time, security threat perceptions, politics of history, According to the ‘constructivist’ concerns may not only derive from and the international setting for argument, identities result from social opposing identities, but may foster and deliberation and norm production. practices: even generate identities. These feedback loops may exert mutually ‘Constructivists’ such as Peter Katzen- “To analyze the social construction of reinforcing effects. Security concerns stein suggest that the foreign policy of international politics is to analyze how are sustained due to opposite identities small states is at least co-determined by processes of interaction produce and and opposite identities are sustained domestic factors—the openness of reproduce the social structures— due to security concerns. their economies and the inclusiveness cooperative or conflictual—that shape of their political systems (Katzenstein, actors’ identities and interests and the Linking Identities to 1985). Small states, it is assumed, can significance of their material contexts” Interests make a difference—they are not over- (Wendt, 1995, p. 81). determined by external factors, have ‘Constructivists’ make the argument choices, and their external “strength” Once established by repeated practice, that “identities are the basis of may be significantly influenced by it is usually difficult to overcome interests” (Wendt, 1992, p. 398; Wendt, internal weaknesses (Väryrynen, 1997, behavioral patterns. If, for example, pp. 41–75). In a similar vain the ‘realist’ notions dominate discourses, 1994, p. 385). We may assume a general “interest” in identity preservation, but argument has been made that the behavior and interaction over a period this would treat interests merely as a ethnicization of a small state’s foreign of some time, it is hard to substitute dependent, “motivational” function of policy and its ensuing proneness to them with cooperative ones. With the an otherwise irreducible identity. confrontation with the “motherland” repetition of signal games, patterns of Similar to the chicken-egg riddle, it of its minorities is, among other partnership as well as distrust turn into factors, dependent on ideology, informal or formal institutions, seems impossible to solve the interest- identity causation. Some authors have patterns of domestic politics, the defecting from which would be ever therefore opted for a “co-constitution” domestic distribution of power, elite more costly over time. In contrast to of “social process” by agent’s behavior, and the form of government the ‘realist’ determination of small preferences (interests) and structures, (Sheffer, 1996, p. 13). states’ security policy, ‘constructivism’ treating “identity” as a structural given opens up freedom of action—“security dilemmas are not acts of God: they are (McSweeney, 1999, p. 210). effects of practice” (Wendt, 1995, p. 77).

12 B·I·C·C introduction

In contrast to a certain stream of theoretically unlimited range of ‘state’ identity, yet it does not ‘constructivist’ literature, which treats security preferences shrinks in this encompass the whole of security security policies as driven by ideas, I process of interest aggregation. What policies. The projection of self-images consider security identities not as the causes this selection? It seems fair to (identities) is one source of security ultimate root cause of security policies, assume that identifications are unlikely policies, but not the only one. Reper- but as a means of providing to survive for long without an toires and socially meaningful role frameworks for sustaining the underlying self-interest. We can models for identity politics are usually organizational interests of the actors additionally infer that interests are limited by history, and not all engaged in security politics (Jepperson, informed by actors’ structural positions repertoires are equally accessible or Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 52 which channel the selection of security socially salient (Abrams, 1999, pp. 197– f.). This is not to deny the regulative options (Wendt, 1987, p. 359). 229, esp. pp. 201 f.). Whereas ‘neo- role of identities and norms, but to realism’ takes national interests as a stress their link to interests. Norms are The actor’s motivation to choose some given, the social ‘constructivist’ brand regulative when linked up to vital as friend, some as rival, and some as of international relations theory usually interests; otherwise they remain weak foe might be motivated by a desire to downplays the impact of domestic and at best a regulative for legitimizing maintain a positive self-concept, by interests. discourses. I contend that national favoring in-group mores over out- legitimization needs to be linked to group norms and by sticking to a The de-coupling of the emergence and interests—where there are no valid homogeneous negative out-group enforcement of international norms interests in specific forms of image (Operario and Fiske, 1999, from domestic interests, characteristic legitimization, a crisis of legitimization pp. 42 ff.). The construction of of both ‘institutionalism’ and will occur. The projection of security collective identity and security identity ‘constructivism‘, should make one norms on the outside world is seen as a respectively relies on one’s own sense suspicious. Norms demand obedience function of self-images and interests of equality and continuity in time and and loyalty and we should therefore ask rather than of the norms themselves the desire to be recognized by others whose purposes they serve. I contend (for the opposite claim, see Kowert (Erikson, 2000, p. 21). Wendt that epistemic communities, internatio- and Legro, 1996, pp. 462 ff.). To treat underlines the mutual interests in stable nal processes of deliberation, and the interests as a mere function of identity role identities, too: “Such interests are construction of ‘social meaning’ are would “essentialize” identity. Taking rooted not only in the desire to linked to interests. Interests are not “identity” as the fundamental building minimize uncertainty and anxiety, confined to material or ‘strategic’ block of security policies would display manifested in efforts to confirm interests; interests in sustaining and a certain naiveté with respect to existing beliefs about the social world, projecting favorable images of self ideology. ‘Constructivists’ (and most but also in the desire to avoid the may be equally powerful. Re-linking descriptive accounts) treat policy expected costs of breaking normative claims to interests is relevant declarations (military doctrines, security commitments made to others—notably on two accounts. The people living in conceptions, threat analysis, etc.) as domestic constituencies and foreign the Baltic states may like to see deeds, whereas they may belong to the allies in the case of states—as part of whether their security concerns actually “virtual” world of the imagination. past practices” (Wendt, 1992, p. 411). It match observable policies, and an might be that the most viable interest awareness of interests may assist in The reconstruction of security in security policy consists in its impact defining policy priorities. conceptions will not explain why some on social identity, in forging positive of them survive, whereas others do self-identifications pitched against Defining Security not. There must be some underlying negative out-group connotations. reasons. The repertoire of various The Baltic states share a dependence individual preferences contracts and International socialization, the on their geographical conditions, transforms into collective choices. Two ‘constructivist’ argument holds, leads limited capabilities, fears, and basic observations seem to be barely to shared norms and values which in perceptions of threat. The Baltic states disputable. Whatever actors prefer and turn structure and give “meaning” to represent a “security complex”, defined project to the outside world, they are international political life (Finnemore, as “a set of states whose major security constrained by available resources. On 1996, pp. 1–33, esp. p. 3). Security perceptions and concerns are so the other hand, it is equally obvious conceptions reflect and contribute to interlinked that their national security that structural conditions do not the formation of collective images of problems cannot reasonably be mechanically translate into behavior self and other, provide patterns of analyzed or resolved apart from one without the filtering and synthesizing legitimization for the military, and another” (Buzan, 1998, p. 12). of information as well as the domestic define the breadth of tasks assumed by aggregation of interests. The the military. The treatment of security policies as policies of identity may explain ingredients of ‘national’ or

B·I·C·C 13 brief 21

Nonetheless, their interdependence Promoting the aversion of armed Supporting the restoration of state does not mean that the Baltic states conflicts before they arise institutions and judicial systems actually interact as a regional security after conflicts (Adler, 1997, pp. 249– system. The relationship between a Elaborating procedures for a 278, esp. p. 270). national security strategy and different peaceful resolution of existing international security strategies will conflicts Along the continuum of national and therefore play a major part in the international security strategies, the following section. The two directions Forming a climate of mutual trust next section concerns the contribution of security policy should not be treated and transparency in the military field of Baltic security conceptions to as mutually exclusive, but as coexisting reducing or eliminating potential and competing at the same time. Supporting the formation of threats by political action. The problem democratic institutions and the faced by Baltic security policy seems to According to Barry Buzan’s definition development of market economies rest in the circular logic of the security that a national strategy attempts to and dilemma—defending oneself against increase strength and to reduce Russia by joining NATO may turn the vulnerability, joining alliances would be perception of Russia as a malignant part of a national strategy. National power into a self-fulfilling prophecy. security strategies are seen as a “self- help” approach which, according to Buzan, “makes less sense for lesser powers”, given their lack of sufficient resources (Buzan, 1991, p. 332). An international strategy “focuses on the sources and causes of threats, the purpose being not to block or offset the threats, but to reduce or eliminate them by political action” (Buzan, 1991, p. 334). An international strategy can take different forms: from more informal security regimes to “security communities” encompassing the security of the potential adversary. Karl Deutsch defined three indicators for the presence of a security community: “compatibility of major political values”; “capacity of the governments and politically relevant strata of the participating countries to respond to one another’s messages, needs, and actions . . . without resort to violence”; and “mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another’s political, economic, and social behavior” (Deutsch, 1968, p. 196).

Applying Deutsch’s concept, Emanuel Adler discerns seven functions of a “security community”:

Promoting political consultations and bilateral or multilateral agreements among countries

Elaborating liberal standards that can be applied to countries or to Map No. 3876, UNITED NATIONS, Department of Public Information, Cartographic communities Section, February 1996

14 B·I·C·C security conceptions

Security

institutions themselves. If this Conceptions observation holds true, the purposes of military institution-building are malleable according to the requirements of the military institutions for survival. It seems as if ‘Hard’ versus ‘Soft’ a “disbelief in one’s own abilities and only preparation for NATO Security forces, a tendency to substitute for membership gives the armed forces a one’s own ingenuity and collective concrete sense of purpose (more effort the support and tutelage of the ecurity conceptions spell out ends below), although this objective is great powers” (Varrak, 1998, pp. 76– and general ideas about the best defined from outside and only loosely S 83). Threats and risks are defined in means to reach these ends. The Baltic linked to identifiable security needs. broad terms, and it is therefore difficult states’ security orientation has been to get a precise idea of what is meant more or less stable and undisputed The realization of a state monopoly of when documents deal with security since the mid-1990s; one could even power was the key priority of early policies. The concept of ‘soft’ security say that discussions about possible state-building in the Baltic states. From is frequently dismissed, especially if alternatives are suspiciously lacking. the early 1990s, security concepts compared to so-called ‘hard’ security. Security policy has been highly therefore highlighted the following main sources of threat: the presence of consensual, regardless of the kind of Another feature of Baltic security government in place. Expectations and an alien army; uncontrolled foreign conceptions consists in their heavy interest in, and commitment to, espionage; extremist activities on the reliance on historical analogies: history security policy are determined by part of various communist and should not be repeated. National domestic institutional actors and in the “imperialist” groups; international defense is thought of in terms of course of interaction with the external crime; dependence on foreign energy “total defense”, whereas the internatio- resources; and a demographic situation environment. Regional and trans- nal security strategy primarily means national security cooperation pools that could be used by anti- joining the Western alliance (Neumann, national interests and reshapes them independence activists (Ozolina, 1999, 1995; Möller, 2001). Meanwhile, while experimenting with varying pp. 20 ff.; Raid, 1996, p. 11). The early national and international security forms of cooperation. Once stage of security policy has had a strategies are largely disconnected. established by repeated practice, it is lasting impact—regardless of the fact Furthermore, the wordy security that Russian troops stayed out of usually difficult to overcome patterns rhetoric is not matched by clearly of perception. With the repetition of conflicts surrounding the Baltic defined tasks of security agencies. signal games, patterns of partnership independence movements, or that it Finally, the group of actors dealing or of distrust turn into informal or was Yeltsin who immediately with security policy in the Baltic states formal institutions, defecting from recognized the Baltic states on 24 Au- is extremely small. These people are which becomes increasingly costly over gust 1991, following the failed August nonetheless often the only source of putsch. time. expertise on which domestic politicians can rely, or which outside observers Despite the end of the Cold War and Having started their quest for can use to build their image of the the significant demilitarization which independence with non-violent mass Baltic states. took place in Europe during the 1990s, movements against the Soviet center, military threat and risk rhetoric is still the Baltic states weighed various Baltic security concepts usually include security policy options after 1991. In dominant in the Baltic security a sweeping list of potential threats but discourse today. Baltic security policy is principle, small states can either opt for do not specify defense requirements. mainly perceived as state security and an isolationist policy of neutrality, pool The misbalance between military military defense policies. Baltic security resources, ally with a great power, or institution-building and security is usually understood as the physical opt for inclusion in larger alliances or conceptions turned into a heavy security of the state. Notwithstanding supranational organizations. burden because costs and benefits did Theoretically, the Baltic states could specific country peculiarities, the Baltic not coincide. The overall rationality of states’ self-images reveal certain have opted for: the build-up of armed forces is common features; they see themselves questionable if gain maximization not only as small states, but also as Self-reliance in the form of refers first of all to the military weak states. Addressing the self-image neutrality of weakness, Toomas Varrak of the Estonian Defense Academy discerned Non-military security policies

B·I·C·C 15 brief 21

Regional Baltic security regional security had “proven it as a kind of “clash of civilizations” unrealistic”, with membership of (Bajarunas, 1995, p. 14; Lejins, 1997, Expanded regional security (to NATO, the EU and WEU remaining p. 147). Furthermore, economic include the Scandinavian countries) the only way out (Bajarunas, 1995, dependence on Russia, for example for p. 11). From the mid-1990s, electricity supplies, is sometimes Close cooperation with Russia membership of NATO and the WEU interpreted as a potential menace (Raid, became the top priority of the Baltic 1996, p. 11). The Russian financial Reliance on the Organization for states’ foreign policy, temporarily even crisis in August 1998 seriously affected Security and Co-operation in replacing the quest for EU Latvia and Lithuania. Both countries Europe (OSCE) membership. There was a joint Baltic therefore define their dependence on foreign and security policy to establish foreign trade with Russia as a security Membership of the Western as much distance as possible to Russia. issue (Baur, 2001, p. 536). European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation The Image of a History figures as a prominent (NATO). ‘Russian Threat’ guideline for Baltic security conceptions. The main lessons are seen Each option would have suited in preventing a repetition of the different security perceptions and Whenever security concerns have been mistakes made in 1940 (lack of discussed during the last decade, a entailed different policies. The ensuing common security among the Baltic potential “Russian threat” has figured choice of options was determined by a states); in not once again allowing a as the key concern of Baltic defense mixture of self-images, images of revanchist turn in Russia to affect policies (Rebas, 1996, pp. 27–39). Baltic Russia, and the structure of decision- Baltic independence; and in integrating security has been portrayed as overlaid making. Whereas a policy of neutrality the Baltic states into the West militarily, ranked high on the agenda of the by the larger pattern of Russia’s great economically and politically. The power presence (see Buzan, 1998, p. 11 Baltic independence movements in the perception of Russia as a threat is on “overlay”). Russia figures as the late 1980s, the desire for EU and usually combined with heavily loaded main defining context. The Baltic NATO membership replaced the metaphors such as “no man’s land”, image of Russia usually features five original neutralist stand soon after “security vacuum”, or “gray zone”, claims: independence. Neutrality as pursued by which in turn are intended to justify the neighboring states of Sweden and the quest for “security guarantees” Finland could theoretically have The recent history of annexation from NATO. provides a possible pattern for the remained an option, but de facto the future. Baltic repertoire of security options In theoretical terms, one could say that has been contracting. There are four a ‘realist’ perception of Russia main reasons for this shift: Russia cannot abandon its prevailed in the first half of the 1990s. imperialistic thinking; it is inherently Extending the “democratic peace” expansionistic. A changed perception of the threats argument to Russia, it was assumed emanating from Russia that Russia represented a potential The Baltic states are of “strategic” danger to peace due to its shaky importance for Russia. Deficient regional security democratic credentials. From an arrangements ‘institutionalist’ perspective, the main Russian minorities can be obstacle to cooperation with Russia manipulated as a fifth column. Expected costs of neutrality and was seen in the lack of shared values and in opposing national interests. Russia will be unable to consolidate Expected gains from NATO its process of democratization. membership. The projected fear of an unpredictable Russia has to be seen in the domestic Neutrality, it was argued by some Baltic The sheer size of Russia is perceived context. According to opinion polls, by the Baltic states as a potential threat. authors, would be too expensive indigenous Baltic people are suspicious At times, Baltic politicians and security compared with alliance membership of Russia (Norkin and Russakov, 1998, experts even fundamentalize the hostile (Nekrasas, 1996, p. 69). Eitvydas pp. 8–11). The threat perception is relationship with Russia by portraying Bajarunas, then head of the multilateral nonetheless inconsistent with the relations division of the Lithuanian prevailing popular stress on home- ministry of foreign affairs, declared in made security threats. In summer 1998, 1995 that all options of national or

16 B·I·C·C security conceptions

1,000 adults were questioned about indicate an unwillingness or inability on Baltic Union Republics originally came their security concerns in each Baltic the part of the politicians to bridge the from the indigenous population. After state. Huge majorities (76 percent in gap between their own policy priorities independence, the weak internalization Estonia, 81 percent in Latvia, and the priorities of the citizenry” of liberal values among the indigenous, 72 percent in Lithuania) believed their (Möller and Wellmann, 2001, p. 106). but Sovietized elites found an countries would not be able to defend expression in the instrumental use of themselves effectively. Yet, more than How can we explain the misbalance history in justifying anti-Russian 95 percent of those questioned in each between the experts’ emphasis on the security policies. country were convinced that their state Russian threat and public concern did not face any real military threat about home-made insecurity? The The Russian Minority from another country—they obviously images of Russia represent a as an Alleged Fifth did not see a problem in the lack of cornerstone of the Baltic elite’s post- military capacity vis-a-vis Russia. By Soviet identity. Pointing in the direction Column? contrast, 35 percent of Estonians, of Russia became a way of distracting 62 percent of Latvians, and 45 percent from home-made political deficiencies The withdrawal of the former Soviet- of Lithuanians believed that there were and shortcomings in defining the tasks Russian military, altogether some domestic threats to security. From the of security agencies. The image of 120,000 troops, and their replacement perspective of Baltic citizens, the Russia contributed to a narrow by national armies featured high on the legitimacy problems of the post- understanding of security policies as Baltic agenda. The Conference on socialist system—due to dissatisfaction military defense policies, marginalizing Security and Cooperation in Europe with economic performance and the development of ‘soft’ security (CSCE) and the UN General Assembly distrust of the political system—were policies such as crisis prevention, supported the Baltic quest for troop evidently just as important as potential conflict management, or confidence- withdrawal in 1992 and 1993 external threats. Among the populaces, building measures. As Zaneta Ozolina respectively—the issue had thus been it was the weakness of domestic writes about the early stages of Latvian internationalized. Despite friction over politics and the polity that caused security policy: “The concept of the terms of the Russian withdrawal, major security concerns (Möller, 1998). security as such was left at the level of there was never a tangible threat to the political rhetoric or replaced by the Baltic states’ independence. The idea of defense” (Ozolina, 1996, p. 33). withdrawal of Russian troops was A similar mismatch between completed in Lithuania on 13 August unanimous elite opinion and public Ten years after independence, the 1993, and in Estonia and Latvia in ambiguity is found with respect to Baltic states still define their national August 1994, thus removing the last NATO membership. A bare majority and security identity to a significant remaining obstacle to full external (51 percent) of Lithuanians wanted to extent against the backdrop of Soviet sovereignty. join NATO in 1998, compared with rule. Anatol Lieven linked the image of 43 percent in Estonia, and 37 percent Russia to deliberate politics of history: The potential mobilization of the in Latvia (NOD & Conversion, 1998, Russian-speaking minorities and border p. 16). In 2000, a poll taken among “The need to defend the Baltic cultures disputes—particularly between Estonians revealed that 24 percent and traditions against Soviet influence Estonia, Latvia, and Russia—represent definitely opted for joining NATO, prevented Baltic intellectuals, both the two lasting issues of contention 30 percent were rather for joining, within and outside the states which I will consider briefly in the 14 percent rather against joining, themselves, from engaging critically following section. The significance of 7 percent definitely against joining, and with those traditions, as this would the Russian populace for the Baltic 25 percent answered “don’t know” have seemed to give help to the enemy. states’ security is far from unequivocal. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the The consequence was a conformism There were attempts to manipulate the Republic of Estonia, Press Releases and unreflecting nationalism which Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic and News, No. 2-BI, 13 March 2000). characterise so much of Baltic states in 1990/91, particularly by the Möller and Wellmann harshly intellectual life today” (Lieven, 1994, pro-Soviet ‘Interfront’ organizations. conclude: p. 83). But the pro-Soviet movements fell apart soon after the failed August “They [the polls] indicate nevertheless Past victimhood provides for moral putsch in 1991 and most Soviet that the unconditional support for righteousness; and blaming Russia for loyalists left for the Soviet Union. NATO membership allegedly existing the imposition of Stalinist rule allows Anatol Lieven provides an explanation: among the Baltic residents is a pure the denial of collaboration by political invention. Further, they significant parts of the contemporary political and technical elite in the Baltic states with the Soviet regime. Up to three-quarters of the Soviet elite in the

B·I·C·C 17 brief 21

“. . . the loss of overt support from system, the Russian troops were Although troop withdrawal was agreed Moscow and the Soviet armed forces, actually disintegrating. The Soviet in principle for Latvia and Estonia too, the destruction of much of their Russian military had never been a Yeltsin justified the postponement of structural base, the banning of the unified political force with a distinct troop withdrawal from these two states Communist Party and allied sense of purpose. Many groups felt like by claiming discrimination against local organisations, the confiscation of their leftovers of a crumbled imperial might. Russians. The Russian government’s property, and the nationalisation of the The only groups with particular pro- friendlier approach towards Lithuania ‘All-Union’ factories . . . It is precisely Soviet or later “Great Russia” rewarded the integrative treatment of because the Russian communities were sentiments are probably World War II the Russian minority there. In contrast so tied to the Communist and Soviet Red Army veterans and some military to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania had loyalist banner that, in Lithuania and pensioners. Members of both these granted Russians full citizenship Latvia at least, they now find groups are usually very old and without immediately, regardless of whether themselves so divided and leaderless” any significant powers to exert pressure they had belonged to the military or (Lieven, 1994, p. 200). on the Baltic governments. Parts of the not. The Lithuanian approach seemed Russian officer corps in the Baltic were to pay off. The Russian minorities in Latvia and engaged in the shadow economy, for Estonia have often been portrayed as example, using naval vehicles at the This Russian linkage between its an illegitimate result of Soviet ports of Tallinn, Liepaja (Latvia), and military presence and the status of annexation or as a Russian means of Kaliningrad for private business. De local Russians clearly interfered in the undermining independence. Yet, facto the Russian troops in the Baltic sovereign affairs of the Baltic states. A outright manipulation of the Russians states were more of a burden on than pattern of Russian behavior emerged in the Baltic states by pro-Soviet forces, an asset to Russia’s policy towards the in the course of troop withdrawal: Russian chauvinists, or Russian foreign Baltic states. differential treatment. policy has been limited. In the early 1990s, the Interfronts capitalized on Throughout the 1990s, the ‘Russian In contrast to Lithuania, Latvia and feelings about language discrimination threat’ was more a perceived than a real Estonia rejected the idea of among the Russian-speakers and fears one. The Russian community is far multiethnic citizenship on the grounds of unemployment (Lieven, 1994, from homogenous and most of the of their ethnicized concept of pp. 188–201). The language Russian groups in the Baltic states are nationhood. Russian-speaking non- requirements for acquiring citizenship, at odds with each other (Lieven, 1994, citizens were dissatisfied with Estonia’s for a whole range of official and semi- pp. 200 f.). The Russian minority could Citizenship Law of January 1995 and official jobs, as well as for managing a not be held responsible for instigating the Language Law of February 1995. business still cause feelings of Baltic-Russian animosity. The situation An Estonian author likened the denigration and discrimination among in Estonia differs from that in Latvia treatment of Russian non-citizens to “a Russians in Estonia and Latvia. and Lithuania. The north-eastern part sort of revenge for the humiliations However, the Russian-speaking of Estonia, the Narva region, is which Estonians had constantly minorities have not turned into a densely populated by Russians, and in endured in the Soviet period” (Vares, chauvinist, pro-Soviet force, or a ‘fifth the early 1990s it was feared that this 1999, p. 158). Estonia and Latvia column’. Most of the Russian migrant region might want to secede and join seemed to have an underlying fear of a workers were just as appalled by the Russia. But the majority of the local double loyalty on the part of the misuse of power under Soviet rule as Russians are against secession, and a Russian minority, although the the ethnic Balts and were therefore in referendum was never initiated on this Russians were far from homogenous in favor of independence. Even if the issue (Lieven, 1994, p. 201). their political outlook. It was feared claim by the Lithuanian and Latvian that the roughly 120,000 Russophone governments in 1991 that the majority Lithuania soon departed from the anti- residents without citizenship in Estonia of the Russians in their states were in Russian approach of the other Baltic and the 70,000 in Latvia could demand favor of independence was probably states after Algirdas Brazauskas of the protection from Russia. exaggerated, it seems safe to say that Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, Soviet loyalists represented a minority. successor to the former Communist Among their ethnically based concerns, Party and winner of the 1992 the Baltic states’ security services fear In 1992/93, the Russian government parliamentary elections, took over from the activities of the Russian intelligence used its military presence as a the conservative government under services most of all. The Russian bargaining chip for trying to improve Vyautas Landsbergis. In late 1992, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR), the lot of Russians in the Baltic states. Russia agreed with Lithuania to the Federal Security Service (FSB), and The impact was nonetheless modest. withdraw its troops by August 1993. military intelligence (GRU) are Having lost their strategic importance and purpose in the Russian defense

18 B·I·C·C security conceptions

expected to step up their operations Following a visit to Latvia by Russia’s transport sector. At times, business (Interfax, 3 August 1998; FBIS-SOV-98- Vice-Foreign Minister, Sergei Krylov, rivalry between Balts and non-Balts 219; Baltic News Service, 3 August 1998; in July 1995, disputes pertaining to the feeds prejudices, with Russians (and Interfax, 4 August 1998; FBIS-SOV-98- remaining Russian military personnel other non-Balts) being blamed for 220). Military veterans and Russians were settled through regular bilateral Mafia-like practices. Anatol Lieven associated with Soviet security agencies negotiations and consultations. An feeds these kinds of prejudices in his represent the most difficult cases for intergovernmental commission was set otherwise balanced account when he integration in the Baltic societies up with Latvia and contacts established writes: (Interviews with Aksel Kirch and Peter between the parliaments of both Vares). Some of the Russian military countries (Lejins, 1996, p. 46). The “The contrast between the Balts’ sober pensioners—their average age in 2000 remaining Russian military personnel cultural self-image and the enormous, was 68 years—complain about left Latvia on 31 August 1994, leaving visible wealth of flashy non-Balt discrimination on the housing market behind some 2,600 military pensioners. former black marketeers is clearly a (Interviews with Evteev and Czyzyk, source for future tension. The Baltic 2000). The Russian government The regulation of the citizenship issue governments are indeed faced with a assumed responsibility for former for Russians in the Baltic states—under dilemma. They have been much Russian military personnel residing in the mediating influence of the OSCE criticised, and often rightly, for the Baltic states, mainly military missions in Latvia and Estonia—has maintaining restrictions on private pensioners, who actually receive slightly defused the minority questions, business. Yet much of that business is higher pensions than their Baltic particularly with regard to retired in the hands of non-Balts, often of the counterparts. A 1994 study of retired Russian servicemen. Although the most unscrupulous kind” (Lieven, Russian servicemen in Estonia found OSCE missions in Latvia and 1994, p. 317). that the problems which alarmed them Estonia—and preparations for EU most pertained to residence permits, membership—have had a modifying Most Russians prefer to stay in their the privatization of housing, and the influence on the treatment of the Baltic host countries due to higher threat that they might be compelled to Russian minorities, this nonetheless living standards, and most of those leave Estonia (Institute of Internatio- remains a sensitive question in relations who are willing to integrate have good nal and Social Studies, 1994). Apart with Russia (Maibach, 1996, p. 266; chances of acquiring citizenship over a from the OSCE, the Baltic Sea Council OSCE, 1993). The OSCE also played a period of time (Lukas, 1998, p. 26). also intervened on behalf of the crucial role in monitoring the Russian With a few exceptions, the Russian Russian minorities (Fischer, 5 July troop withdrawal. minorities are not involved in politics 2000; Möller and Wellmann, 2001, of historical revenge. The prime p. 110). Visa requirements mean that In the long run, the prospect of concerns of military pensioners usually Russian non-citizens residing in Latvia minority integration is largely pertain to social issues, such as housing and Estonia still experience connected to employment and business and health insurance. Russians in the discrimination as far as their freedom opportunities for the Russian minority. Baltic states may feel a certain of movement is concerned. They also There is reason to believe that those denigration compared to their former face significant labor market willing to learn the respective native status of “masters”. Compared to their constraints. languages and to adapt to the dominant compatriots in Russia, however, they culture can, in time, expect to become enjoy considerable material well-being In Estonia, the issue of the more than fully integrated citizens (Laitin, 1998). and political freedom. Even at the 10,000 Russian military pensioners beginning of the 1990s, most of the remained a bone of contention Talks with officials and private Baltic Russians were already looking throughout the 1990s, particularly with conversations in Riga and Tallinn in more towards the West rather than respect to the social problems they summer 2000 conveyed the picture that expecting protection from Russia were facing. It is estimated that an a significant number of younger (Lieven, 1994, p. 377). additional 1,000 Russian former former Russian officers, who did not military personnel refused to return to return to Russia, occupy prominent Improvements in the situation of the Russia and remained in Estonia (Haab, positions in import-export businesses, Russian minority could probably have a 1995, p. 57). According to one in the service economy and in the positive influence on compromises in Estonian author, the minority disputes other areas too. The provision of remain “the only major issue to be assimilation incentives to defuse the solved with Russia” (Raid, 1996, p. 14).

B·I·C·C 19 brief 21

minority issue would stabilize Estonia Baltic states may lead to losses of fundamentalism, or the significance of and Latvia and prevent Russia’s foreign power among nationalist constituencies relations with EU states (Baur, 2001, policy from exploiting Russians abroad. (Sergeyev, 1999, pp. 20–28). Until 1995, pp. 537 f.). Discounting rhetoric from The prospect of EU membership Russia’s foreign policy attacked Estonia the Duma opposition or non-influential provides an additional incentive— and Latvia for violating human rights extremist forces, the policies pursued improvements in relations with Russia and for not integrating the Russian by Russia’s government in the 1990s are becoming more urgent (Vares, population. In the winter of 1997/98, indicate that it rather wanted to be a 1999, p. 164). Russian diplomacy once again raised partner in Baltic developments. The the issue of the discrimination of the lasting mistrust between the Baltic Apart from the minority issue, other Russophone minorities in Estonia and states and Russia is fed by the quest for disputes involved the Estonian-Russian Latvia. As ethnic tension grew in NATO accession on the one hand and and Estonian-Latvian borders. Estonia Latvia, the Russian government Russian conduct in the Chechnyan and Latvia requested the recognition adopted economic measures by wars on the other. of the post-World War I borders, diverting oil exports usually shipped whereas Russia stuck to the borders of through the Latvian port of Ventspils. Security Concepts of the USSR republics. In 1995, Estonia Nevertheless, the early stage of the the Baltic States began to give in over the border issue, Russian-Baltic “cold war” over the followed by Latvia. As Arkady Moshes treatment of the Russian minority is Until 1995, the Latvian Defense pointed out: “The border issue per se is largely over. Given the timing and Systems Concept stressed the presence becoming less and less important for inconsistency of Russia’s reaction to of armed occupation forces and anti- Russian-Baltic relations; in Russian- the minority issue, the prospect of the state groupings, foreign espionage, Latvian relations it has almost Baltic states’ accession to NATO and organized crime, economic instability, completely lost its political Russia’s domestic policies seem to be significance” (Moshes, 1999, p. 106). interlocked. The Baltic image in Russia and the demographic situation as major threats to its security (Ozolina, 1996, Russia has nonetheless postponed the is further tainted by signs of p. 41). It is interesting to note that both ratification of the border treaties as a indifference towards, or even tolerance this concept as well as later versions means of delaying NATO of, Baltic participation in the did not assume an imminent military enlargement. Holocaust. threat to Latvia. Once the Russian Notwithstanding the tension and troops withdrew, Latvia’s security policy diversified in four important stalemate over military non-alliance and Russia’s Interests ways: security is understood to be an the minority issue, the Baltic region has all-encompassing concept, not just never gained high foreign-policy Russia’s interest in the Baltic states is military defense; potential domestic priority in Russia; particularly if informed by a mixture of strategic, sources of insecurity are explicitly economic, and ethnic factors. The compared with the importance of the Commonwealth of Independent States, recognized; national and regional remnants of Russia’s imperial legacy security are seen as interdependent; and its perceived ‘humiliation’ by the the perceived threat of Islamic neighboring small nations seem to influence the mindset of parts of the Russian elite, which seek to prevent NATO membership of the Baltic states because they associate such membership with a further weakening of Russia’s “geostrategic” position. Russian foreign policy additionally wants to preserve access to seaports in the Baltic states as well as guaranteed communication lines with the Kaliningrad region (Godzimirski, 1999, pp. 29–54). There is a specific link between Russia’s domestic politics and its attitude towards the Baltic states: against the backdrop of Russia’s post- Soviet identity crisis, concessions to the

Estonian border guards check members of the Russian army returning to Russia on 28.08.1994. Photo: dpa

20 B·I·C·C security conceptions

and any hindrance to Euro-Atlantic The Estonian National Security The Lithuanian National Security integration is treated as a security Concept, adopted by parliament on Strategy of December 1996 (amended threat. 6 March 2001, defines security in an in June 1998) resembles the Estonian all-encompassing manner. It states that security concept. While sharing the On 7 April 1995, Latvia’s parliament “the danger of wide-ranging military goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, it adopted a Foreign Policy Concept and conflict has dropped sharply” and that focuses on domestic sources of on 12 June 1995, the cabinet of the “region as a whole remains stable” security, stressing “stable economic and ministers accepted the National (www.vm.ee/eng/policy/Security/ social development” and “political Security Concept. Apart from index.htm). It is acknowledged that stability”. With respect to Russians, it expressing the desire to fully integrate Russia has reduced its forces stationed simply states that Lithuania does not into the EU and NATO, the security in Estonia’s vicinity. The concept have any ethnic minority problems or concept admitted that there was no emphasizes the positive impact of the external territorial disputes direct military threat to the country. Intergovernmental Commission (www.kam.lt./balta/part_I/I_1.html). The main threats were seen in acts formed with Russia in 1998, as well as Lithuania’s Basics of National Security against independence and the cooperation between Estonian and identify as the main potential threats, democratic system; acts to make Latvia Russian border guards, customs and among others, political pressure and politically, economically or otherwise police authorities, and in the field of dictate, discriminatory international dependent on another country; to environmental protection. agreements, threatening military hamper Euro-Atlantic integration; to Furthermore, the security concept capabilities close to its borders, spying prevent the integration of various recognizes the positive impact of and subversion, interference in social and ethnic groups into one exchanges of military information with domestic affairs, economic pressure, nation; and to hinder the increase of Russia in accordance with the OSCE and international crime (The Basics of defense capabilities (National Security Vienna Document of 1999 and National Security of Lithuania, Part II, Concept, 1995, p. 1; Ozolina, 1999, defense cooperation with Russia within Chapter 9; Lithuanian Ministry of p. 27). It is remarkable that the capacity the framework of the Partnership for Defence, White Paper, 1999). to integrate different ethnic groups Peace (PfP). Security is treated as into one nation was seen as a key “indivisible” and its prime mechanism Despite the heavy rhetoric on security element of national security (Ulmanis, is seen in organizational cooperation, problems emanating from Russia, 1996, pp. 1–12). including collective defense, internatio- prudent Baltic politicians acknowledge nal peacekeeping operations, arms that the most vital security issues lie in In 1997, Latvia’s cabinet of ministers control and confidence-building homemade deficiencies, such as weak adopted another version of the measures (CSBM). political parties, corruption, organized National Security Concept crime, and inter-ethnic tensions (www.modlv/english/08akti/ With respect to minorities, the (Bajarunas, 1995, p. 12 f.). Looking at 02dk.php). This declared: “A threat to Estonian security concept departs from the changing threat perceptions, one one of the Baltic nations is a threat to the original idea of ethnicized can discern a clear shift away from all three.” For the first time, the citizenship by aiming at “a balanced threats emanating from Russia towards concept outlined an implementation and democratically multicultural threats created by socio-economic mechanism by assigning planning society” and “creating conditions for instability and the impact of authority to the National Security maintaining ethnic differences, based globalization. Yet, the Baltic states’ Council and foreseeing institutionalized on the recognition of the cultural security policy is still over-determined crisis management, including rights of ethnic minorities”. The by the desire for “security guarantees” consultation mechanisms with NATO, Estonian defense system is assigned to and NATO membership, mostly at the the EU, the WEU, the OSCE and the provide military defense capability, expense of regional security UN. The security concept covers participate in an international security cooperation. Aivars Stranga already domestic, regional, and international system and build up crisis management concluded in 1997 that: security simultaneously: it addresses mechanisms. social and ethnic integration, fighting “The Baltic states must devote much crime, border control, ecological greater attention to the non-traditional disasters. The civil defense system—as and non-canonical threats which they part of the overall defense system—is face (economic, social protection, etc.); assigned to protect civilians and the it is these threats that are currently the national economy as well as to assist in most significant, and if they are not the event of environmental dealt with, Baltic movement towards emergencies. Western European institutions will be impossible” (Stranga, 1997, p. 44).

B·I·C·C 21 brief 21

Regional and

Western advisors have often reminded Euro-Atlantic the Baltic states that unity among themselves was key to their security and stability. In 1995, the chairman of the International Defense Advisory Cooperation Board for the Baltic states (IDAB), General Sir Gary Johnson, put it bluntly: “If the Balts don’t stay together, they will hang separately” The Fragile Baltic As a matter of fact, the Baltic states (Quoted after Lejins, in Krohn, 1996, Cooperation have established a wide array of p. 60). Despite this strong wording, the common institutions: the Inter- regional outlook was superseded by an Parliamentary Baltic Assembly, the almost exclusive westward orientation. ollowing independence, the Baltic Baltic Council for Foreign and Security Intra-Baltic cooperation is a means to states declared that it was their aim F Policy Cooperation, the Council of another end—rapprochement with to cooperate closely with each other Baltic Presidents, and the Council of Western Europe. and with the Nordic states, as well as to Ministers of the Baltic States. The intensify cooperation with the EU Baltic Council of Ministers set up an At various times since 1994, there have (Park and Salmon, 1999, p. 105). The impressive number of 19 committees been proposals to form a Baltic following section will focus primarily and agreed to form a common free- defense alliance in case the Baltic states on the emergence of patterns of intra- trade zone, a common visa regime, a are not admitted to NATO in the Baltic interaction as well as interaction common customs union, and, since foreseeable future. The idea was with Scandinavian countries and 1995, to cooperate on defense and debated at the Baltic Assembly in 1995, NATO. military affairs. However, decisions for example, but met with no have only been partially implemented, significant support. The resources of Common values, external threats, or and intra-Baltic relations have the Baltic states are limited, particularly powerful economic interests usually remained competitive in many respects for defense spending, and it would not inform and reinforce regional (Maibach, 1996, p. 278). The common make a significant difference if their integration. Regional integration pools Soviet past and the camaraderie of the armaments were pooled. As far as values and goals, interests, and independence movements, similarities western security guarantees are resources for common purposes. The in elite composition, similar political concerned, cost-benefit calculations Baltic states are small both in relation systems, common basic values, and speak in favor of outward orientation to their immediate neighbors and in the homogenous foreign policy rather than intra-regional integration. larger European context. Their orientations—all these commonalties Initiatives to form a Baltic Security geographic proximity and a shared are obviously not sufficient for regional Pact, such as the one proposed by threat perception are factors which integration. Estonian actors (including General determine their interest in cooperation. Alexander Einseln, Arnold Rüütel and Furthermore, the Baltic states The dividend from Baltic “institution- E. Taro), therefore remain marginal represent similar political units and building” is only marginal (Lejins, episodes (Stranga, 1997, p. 32 f.). political regimes and exhibit 1997, pp. 162 ff.). Baltic security comparable security policy orientations. cooperation is, to put it briefly, more or Baltic intra-regional cooperation Conditions which help to further less a kind of window-dressing for includes a joint battalion (Baltic regional cooperation among the Baltic western consumption. The Baltic Battalion—BaltBat), a joint military states might therefore be seen in their Council may, for example, adopt academy (Baltic Defense College— geographical location, their smallness, decisions, but it has no implementation BaltDefCol) in Tartu, Estonia, a joint the distribution of power vis-a-vis mechanism of its own. radar network for air defense (BaltNet), Russia, their joint past as part of the Rapprochement among the Baltic and a minesweeper squadron project Soviet Union, a shared perception of states is restricted to the function of called BalTron (Baltic Naval Squadron) Russia, comparable problems in preparation for EU membership. (Alsauskas, 2000, pp. 33–37). BaltBat constructing security policies, and the “Existing trilateral institutions became was initiated at a meeting of outside view of the Baltic states as a semi-dormant” and instead of wordy commanders of the armed forces of region (Bailes, 1998, pp. 153–185; declarations of solidarity, trade the Baltic states in August 1993. It was Ozolina, 1999). All these commonalties competition set in (Park and Salmon, set up to participate in peace could point in the direction of regional 1999, p. 106). operations under the auspices of the security cooperation. UN or other international organizations. Coordinated by Den- mark, BaltBat training involves representatives from the Nordic states,

22 B·I·C·C cooperation

the US, Germany, the Netherlands and exclusively by Nordic, mainly Danish, borders and airspace is further limited the UK. The US has been the largest formations (Möller and Wellmann, by the lack of proper equipment in the financial contributor to BaltBat. 2001, pp. 102 ff.). BaltBat units have respective navies. Like BaltBat, BalTron participated in several peacekeeping therefore depends on outside support. At times, BaltBat has been portrayed as missions in former Yugoslavia and the The same holds true for the Baltic a major contribution to regional Lebanon, usually as part of Danish or Defense College, where western security as well as to peacekeeping Norwegian missions. The development experts provide training for officers operations. Yet, the projected image of of BaltBat thus depends on external and civil servants. The College opened BaltBat does not conform with reality. assistance in almost every respect. This in 1999 and is intended to contribute Its visibility stands in sharp contrast to includes donations of light mortars, toward the harmonization of curricula its actual security value. BaltBat has mortars, sub-machine guns, recoilless with NATO standards and to provide contributed to common Baltic training guns, anti-tank rockets, rifles, and light for NATO interoperability methods and operating procedures, but vehicles from Denmark, Sweden, (Clemmesen, 1999a). it has not had an impact on the Norway, and the US (Estonian Foreign development of self-defense Ministry, The Baltic Battalion, Cooperation among the Baltic states capabilities or on peacekeeping—the www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/1999/ depends on the assistance and battalion has never been deployed Baltbat.html). On the other hand, mediation of third parties. The BaltSea independently (Kazocins, 1999, pp. 50– BaltBat is probably the only unit in the Forum is a further example: apart from 54). Small wonder that the efficiency Baltic states which is interoperable with the Baltic states, this organization of sustaining a whole battalion just for NATO and capable of participation in consists of donor countries such as training purposes has been repeatedly peacekeeping operations (Sapronas, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, questioned (Austin, 1999). Military 1999, pp. 55–70). Even if military France, Germany, Iceland, the leaders of the Baltic states see the cooperation has been described as the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, BaltBat project as a purely political hallmark of Baltic integration, BaltBat Switzerland, the UK and the US. The gesture to NATO. is the best demonstration of the failure BaltSea Forum convenes thrice of multilateral efforts. After years of annually in order to define the Preparation for peacekeeping missions work, a Danish commander of the priorities of western military is a costly undertaking for the Baltic BaltBat training team concluded: assistance. Given the limited resources states. Intended to sell NATO the of the Baltic states, the main thrust for image of a “security provider”, the “Both the Baltic States and also some military cooperation stems from the contributions to peacekeeping of the supporting countries have desire to integrate into NATO and missions—mainly on the Balkans—are clearly shown a lack of interest and will pressures from donor countries to pool exhausting significant parts of the to support the project. . . . I have seen resources. However, at times donor defense budgets. For example, a tendency to go more and more countries and the EU stimulate intra- peacekeeping activities in 1998 bilateral. This is from a military and Baltic competition for donations rather amounted to 10% of Estonia’s annual economic perspective a better solution than encouraging cooperation. defense budget (Föhrenbach, 2000, but dangerous if we forget to set p. 114). common standards and interoperability An International Defense Advisory demands” (Möller, 2000, pp. 38–42). Board to the Baltic States (IDAB) was From a Baltic perspective, participation set up at the request of the ministers in peacekeeping operations is hardly an Interoperability among the Baltic states of defense of the Baltic states in aim in itself, not to speak of a priority would, first of all, require a joint March 1995. Involving high-ranking task for the build-up of armed forces. procurement strategy. But such officers from the Scandinavian states, The Baltic states, however, understand cooperation is rare. the UK, US, Germany, and France the that NATO membership requires a IDAB offered advice on general visible security contribution. At the In July 1995, the three Baltic army security policy as well as on the build- same time BaltBat is isolated from the commanders proposed a joint naval up of armed forces. After five years of rest of the defense forces. The main training group as an equivalent to work, the IDAB provided a critical motive for officers joining BaltBat are BaltBat. BaltTron is a combined naval final assessment (IDAB Report 1999, the financial benefits related to service force geared towards joint counter- www.mfa.gov.lv/eng/policy/security/ abroad. Furthermore, Baltic mine capabilities and aimed at idabreport.htm). With respect to peacekeeping contributions via BaltBat interoperability with NATO or other NATO expansion, the IDAB saw “no are channeled and coordinated international missions. Each Baltic virtue in arguments seeking state only owns a small number of warships, usually without meaningful armaments and communication systems. Joint surveillance of sea

B·I·C·C 23 brief 21

conclusively either to support or to Apart from the joint Soviet experience, As long as western security guarantees deny that aspiration in strictly military there are no common historical are perceived to be close at hand, cost- terms”. Despite noting growing skills legacies which form an overarching benefit calculations speak in favor of in cooperation with western identity among the Baltic states. The outward orientation rather than intra- institutions, the report refers to the Baltic states owe their individual regional integration. Individualistic imprint of a strong Soviet legacy on identities not only to differences in behavior is seen as a more favorable political culture, featuring “conformity language, cultural traditions and strategy than Baltic cooperation. not initiative, control not delegation, outward orientations, but also to Security cooperation is usually compartmentalisation not cooperation, various definitions of “self” and embedded in broader areas of and secrecy not transparency”. “other”, as strongly evidenced in the cooperation. But economic dissimilar status of Russian inhabitants interdependence, for example, has only The IDAB particularly stressed the as the defining “other”. Regional developed on a small scale among the need to practice mechanisms for the security cooperation would require a Baltic states. The same holds true for efficient functioning of government in change in features which the Baltic border crossings between the three times of crisis or emergency, to states owe to their post-Soviet identity, countries; in this respect the admini- broaden public information on defense mainly the discourse of self- strative system is “rudimentary and in a democratic society, and to secure victimization. Resistance to identity decision-making is slow and long-term defense planning. With changes supports the ‘constructivist’ inefficient” (Ozolina, 1999, p. 41). respect to international aid, the report argument—regional cooperation is made scathing remarks about “the unlikely to occur if it is not conducive If security remains the only significant plethora of advice and assistance, often to sustaining a certain self-image area of close cooperation, it lacks uncoordinated and short-term in (Wendt, 1992, p. 419). reinforcement from cooperative nature”. practices in other fields. The common Despite the Soviet episode, the interests of the Baltic states pertain to The state of regional cooperation was perception of Russia as a threat is membership of the EU and NATO, assessed at the annual meeting of the obviously not as decisive as often not to Baltic integration per se, and commanders of Nordic and Baltic proclaimed. The Baltic states speak cooperation is instrumental in reaching defense forces in January 2001. While different languages, with Russian—the these goals. From a Baltic point of the Baltic Defense College language of the disliked “other”—as view, there is no particular interest in (BaltDefCol) and work on the the only lingua franca. The Baltic states Baltic security cooperation per se. minesweeper squadron received good need a third language for cooperation. marks, the joint peacekeeping battalion If this third language is English, Baltic defense cooperation is (BaltBat) and the joint air surveillance English-speaking mediators or additionally inhibited by keeping open system (BaltNet) were said to leave facilitators are usually required. the option of individual NATO significant room for improvement membership instead of joint inclusion. (Defence Review, No. 05/2001, 24–30 Cooperation generally requires The existing forms of Baltic January). investments in manpower and financial cooperation do not envisage automatic resources for common institution- military assistance in the event that one Why is security cooperation among the building. Each Baltic state would have of the countries is under attack—a Baltic states so fragile and limited in to make its respective commitments. commitment the Baltic states expect scope? Answers can be found in Weak states can pool resources, but if from NATO, but obviously not from structural constraints, limited interests even the combined force remains weak, one another. and the content of security the relative gains of cooperation seem conceptions. Commonalties seem to be to be low. The region cannot produce Furthermore, security cooperation insufficient for institutionalized ‘hard’ security on its own. depends on trust. If distrust prevails, security cooperation among the Baltic Furthermore, the Baltic states are this actually means an increase in states. Their ethnic composition and aware that regional cooperation could potential vulnerability. Distrust among treatment of their (mainly Russian) become an alternative to admission to elites is a strong feature of the Soviet minorities differ, and pre-socialist NATO. The urgency of NATO legacy. The post-Soviet elites may models of the inter-war period point membership may decrease if regional espouse strong anti-Sovietism, but them towards different states. The integration is seen as a panacea. those socialized under socialism know degree to which the Baltic states better than to trust each other. perceive Russia as a potential threat also varies, with Estonia being the most concerned and Lithuania the least. A negative image of Russia is not a sufficient stimulus for Baltic unity.

24 B·I·C·C cooperation

Regional cooperation is additionally initiative, we propose that such “lasting” security could only be constrained by diverging—even guarantees should take the form of a ensured by NATO membership (Joint competing—national agendas, the unilateral undertaking by the Russian Declaration by the Presidents of inability to formulate a regional Federation, reinforced, probably, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, 1996, security agenda, limited economic and concerning international law, by the pp. 1–2). military resources, and inefficiencies of conclusion of an agreement of good- domestic decision-making. Some neighborliness and mutual security The meaning of Russian “security authors have stressed that Estonia and guarantees between Russia and guarantees” therefore remained Latvia share a different history from individual Baltic states or between unexplored. It could have meant a Lithuania: the former are Protestant Russia and the three Baltic states ‘positive’ guarantee—a promise to and belonged to the German Order together” (Quoted after Knudsen, assist in case of attack—or a ‘negative’ State or the Swedish empire, whereas 1998, pp. 29 f.). guarantee, e.g. a promise of non- Catholic Lithuania traces its statehood aggression. The Baltic states rejected back to medieval times (Gobins et al., The two open letters addressed to the the very idea that Russia could become 1998, p. 113). Baltic states invited further discussion part of a security regime without on a number of alternative ideas. further deliberating the meaning of the All the above reasons for weak regional Yeltsin called upon other states, such as offer. cooperation refer to domestic causes. the US, Germany, France and other The early stage of nation-state building western countries, to join the proposed The idea of Russian security could be held responsible for the agreements with the Baltic states. In a guarantees was obviously rejected on mismatch between the declared letter to President Clinton of 20 June two grounds—a joint guarantee with intentions and reality. But what the 1996, Yeltsin repeated the offer of the US or NATO would have replaced flaws in Baltic security cooperation security guarantees and asked the US unilateral NATO guarantees and would indicate most is a lack of urgency. administration to exert a moderating have given Russia potential leverage Contrary to all the rhetoric, problems influence on Latvia and Estonia’s over the kind of guarantees. The are de facto not perceived as pressing. treatment of Russian “compatriots” potential stabilizing effect of such an Instead of solving problems, the actors (Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet arrangement—the terms of which the are busy preserving their power status. Politics, June 1996, pp. 1–3). Yeltsin Baltic states could have negotiated— Whereas the presence of Russian explicitly suggested a multilateral was discarded. It would have implied a troops boosted efforts to cooperate, guarantee which “might prevent any major change in Baltic identity. The the eventual troop withdrawal one guarantor from exerting unilateral urge to preserve the image of Russia’s decreased the urgency for regional pressure” (Knudsen, 1998, p. 53). unpredictability outweighed the cooperation. The modest degree of While preferring trilateral security opportunity to reduce this very regional integration among the Baltic guarantees, Russia did not rule out unpredictability. states and in the larger Baltic Sea area guarantees by NATO that fell short of suggests that ideas alone are too weak force deployment and nuclear weapons Lithuania’s security concept justified an incentive for institutionalized (Knudsen, 1999, p. 95). Russia thus the rejection of the guarantees, but also cooperation. Institutionalization signaled its openness to security offered some space for negotiations. depends on a clear assessment of guarantees which included the US or The Russian proposals were based on national interests and their potential NATO. “giving up the path towards NATO common denominator. membership”, it was said, and this The Baltic states refused any Russian made them a priori unacceptable. On Yeltsin’s Offer of security guarantees, even if joined by the other hand, it was admitted, most Security Guarantees western states. It was feared that a of Russia’s ideas had the character of “deal” could be struck behind their regional Confidence and Security backs. The Latvian minister of foreign Building Measures (CSBMs). This In 1997, Russia undertook a major affairs took particular offense at conflicts with the basic premise of initiative vis-a-vis the Baltic states by Yeltsin’s letter, accusing the Russian Lithuanian security policy that security offering security guarantees to government of believing “that is indivisible and that there is no Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. someone is entitled to decide the “regional security” at all. However, it President Yeltsin particularly stated: fortunes of other nations behind their was said, “if brought up in a context back” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of broader than regional, some of the “On Russia’s side, we have already Latvia, 1996). Yeltsin’s letter instigated Russian proposals can be discussed declared that we guarantee the security a wave of Baltic activism in the US, within such forums as the OSCE” of the Baltic states. In developing this among NATO members and at home (National Security and Defence Policy calling for the rejection of “security guarantees” which would include Russia. It was underscored that

B·I·C·C 25 brief 21

of Lithuania, www.kam.lt/balta/ The search for allies soon led the Baltic dominance, which are common to part_I/I_4.html). In contrast to the states to look for trans-regional bilateral relations, can at least be yearning for western security partners: Estonia oriented itself partially offset by cooperation within guarantees, the three Baltic Presidents towards the Nordic states, particularly the framework of the whole Baltic Sea dismissed the Russian proposal, Finland; Latvia towards Sweden, region. declaring that “security guarantees do Germany, and Denmark; whereas not correspond to the spirit of the new Lithuania soon overcame older historic Until the mid-1990s, the CBSS was Europe” (Joint Communiqué: Meeting apprehensions and ethnic tensions and hampered by the lack of any of the Presidents of the Republic of inclined towards Poland. Lithuanian- implementation mechanism; it Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and Polish military cooperation thus represented a forum for deliberation the Republic of Lithuania, Palanga, intensified throughout the second half but not for policy implementation. 10 November 1997). of the 1990s, particularly in the form This changed with the CBSS summit in of a joint NATO-interoperable Visby in 1995, when the President of Baltic Sea Region and battalion (LITPOLBAT). the European Commission launched Nordic Cooperation the Baltic Sea Region Initiative. The Baltic Sea region and the Nordic Working groups were set up to deal countries are overloaded with a with economic and technical The Baltic region is related to wider plethora of regional ‘institutions’, the cooperation, nuclear safety and regions with different degrees of oldest being the Nordic Council. This democratic institutions, and a task institutionalization: the loosely has existed since 1952 and fosters force was established on fighting crime, integrated Nordic countries (including cooperation between Nordic following a German initiative (Ozolina, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, parliaments and governments and 1999, pp. 54 f.). The Baltic states also and Sweden); the Baltic Sea Region contributes to practical solutions, even regard the CBSS as a means of (the Nordic countries minus Iceland without a specific military agenda. The soliciting support for EU membership but with Poland, Germany, and Russia Nordic Council did not invite the from Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. added), and the so-called 5+3 Region Baltic states to join, thus leading to the (Nordic states plus Baltic states). separate formation of the Baltic Cooperative ties with Russia and Finally, one should also mention the Council in June 1994. confidence-building measures EU. The Nordic countries are shaped developed in a promising direction politically by both the recent The Council of Baltic Sea States following the withdrawal of the experience of joining the EU (Finland, (CBSS), which was founded on the Russian troops. Apart from the dispute Sweden) and common borders with basis of a German-Danish initiative in over NATO enlargement, there is Russia. In economic terms, they 1992, promotes cooperation on currently no security issue discernable represent possible models of a social economic, technological, environmen- that could not be negotiated with welfare state for the Baltic states. The tal, cultural, transportation, anti-crime Russia on a bilateral basis or in the Nordic countries are additionally faced and communication matters, but multilateral framework of the Baltic with the prospect of NATO explicitly refrains from military security Sea Council. Looking at these de facto enlargement. cooperation (Starosciak, 1999). It instances of cooperation with Russia, represents a forum for debate, a one may question the need to unite the The potential security partners consultative body. The advantage of Baltic states in the face of a common represent different security the CBSS consists in binding Russia security concern. In 1998, Toivo Klaar, preferences—some are neutral into a multilateral framework and in Estonian Deputy Chief of Mission to (Finland and Sweden), some are old providing a means for overcoming the NATO, summed up the improvement NATO members (Denmark, Germany, asymmetric bilateral relationships in Russian-Estonian relations: “It may Norway), and one (Poland) is a post- between the Baltic states and Russia. not reflect a fundamental meeting of socialist NATO member. What is minds, but it does represent a certain striking about this menu of potential Baltic-Russian cooperation in the CBSS infusion of normality in bilateral security partners is the selective way in covers the police forces, border guards contacts” (Klaar, 1997, p. 27). Publicly, which history is used as a guideline for and customs, as well as immigration Russian politicians consistently oppose making choices. Whereas Russia figures issues. Cooperation with Russia NATO expansion towards the Baltic as a kind of eternal threat, the legacy prevents confrontational politics and states, though Russian-NATO relations of the German occupation during establishes a framework for dialogue. have warmed up with Putin’s World War II plays no part in security The asymmetry in Russian-Baltic presidency and particularly in the considerations, and Poland’s historical relations and respective fears of aftermath of the attacks in the US of record of dominance in the Baltics is 11 September 2001. Putin even went so of no concern either. far as to say that:

26 B·I·C·C cooperation

“If NATO takes on a different shade new CFE Treaty specifications for the EU, starting with the Balladur Plan and and is becoming a political Baltic states would, in all likelihood, the Stability Pact negotiations in 1994, organization, of course we would significantly reduce the allowed upper to repeatedly express its wish for reconsider our position with regard to limits of troop concentrations and security cooperation with Russia. The such expansion, if we are able to feel extraordinary temporary dislocations in 1996 Action Plan for Russia of the EU involved in such processes” (Drozdiak, times of crisis (Schmidt, 2001). This Council of Ministers and the EU’s 2001). would undermine the Baltic Partnership and Cooperation Agree- expectations of strong US troop ment with Russia of December 1997 With the Vienna Document on support in times of military conflict. It explicitly included European security CSBMs, Russia has limited its military is therefore of particular importance and foreign policy matters (Danilov options by agreeing to extended and whether the Baltic states will request and de Spiegeleire, 1998; Knudsen, more frequent exchanges of increased “territorial ceilings” for 1998). information, more frequent military equipment in order to receive inspections, a political mechanism for foreign forces such as NATO troops Following EU enlargement, Russia, crisis management, the prevention of a (Bolving, 2000, pp. 31–66). The Baltic Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will destabilizing concentration of forces in states are unlikely to foreclose the become direct neighbors of the EU, the Kaliningrad and Pskov regions, a option of US conventional troop and it is therefore of key concern to limitation of forces in the Leningrad support before joining NATO. It has the EU to soften the impact of social, military district, a reduction in therefore been suggested that the economic, and political asymmetries flexibility limits, a decrease in military Baltic states and Russia and Belarus along the future EU border, movements in Belarus and, finally, could commit themselves outside the particularly with respect to minority troop withdrawals from Georgia and CFE framework to not using so-called questions, customs regulations, trans- Moldova (Adomeit, 2001, p. 116). Extraordinary Temporary Dislocations border traffic, and international crime (Schmidt, 2001, pp. 36–40). (Kempe and van Meurs, 1999). In November 1994, the Baltic Assembly proposed the Several areas which enhance The Baltic Round Table—another demilitarization of the Kaliningrad transparency, trust, and arms control regular gathering—includes the Baltic region, which would have eliminated could become important for CSBMs states and Poland. It deals with good- the problem of Russian military transit. with Russia: military-to-military neighborly relations as well as with The Russian government did not contacts between all the Baltic Sea minority and border issues among endorse the idea, though both the states; exchanges of information on states applying for membership of the value of conventional troops in this military presence; reciprocal limitations EU. There is also the Barents Euro- enclave as well as the “strategic” on certain types of military activity, Arctic Council which concentrates, importance of the Russian Baltic Sea especially in areas close to the borders; among other things, on the Arctic area Fleet have diminished substantially joint military training; cooperation in and covers environmental policy, (Nekrasas, 1996, p. 73). In 2000, peacekeeping missions; participation in economic cooperation, regional Lithuania and Russia agreed on maneuvers; cooperation between infrastructure and indigenous people. bilateral measures reinforcing mutual border guards, particularly naval forces; Finally, the Helsinki Commission is confidence by establishing verification disaster and relief cooperation dedicated to environmental protection visits to military forces stationed in (Norkus, 1996, pp. 68 f.). in the Baltic Sea area. Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region, which go beyond the ones already In 1997, Finland came up with an In 1993, the Baltic states submitted to foreseen by the CFE Treaty (Defence initiative for a Northern Dimension to the OSCE Forum for Security Review, No. 05/2001, 24–30 January). the EU’s Common Foreign and Cooperation the idea of establishing a Security Policy in order to enhance Baltic Regional Security Table. Since the first debates on Baltic NATO economic relations between Europe However, the proposal never got off membership in 1993, the Baltic states and Russia and transform the common the ground. Only Poland, Germany have hesitated to join the CFE Treaty. border between the EU and Russia and the United States reacted The build-up of their own armed “into a gateway for supportive positively; the Nordic states rejected forces gives the impression that there is cooperation with the new and the idea. They obviously feared that the no urgent need for this step. The democratic neighbor”. The Baltic region might become isolated from the reasoning behind postponing accession states, particularly Latvia, reacted rest of Europe, that Russia and to the CFE Treaty is closely linked to cautiously. It was feared that Russia Germany might play a dominant role, the prospect of NATO membership— could diversify its transit and trade by enhancing the role of Finland (Herd, 1999, pp. 259–273). It was up to the

B·I·C·C 27 brief 21

or that the national interests of the The weakness of intra-regional military Cooperation with participants were too diverse (Norkus, cooperation can be explained by the NATO 1996, p. 61). A Polish initiative on limited strategic weight of the Baltic Regional Confidence and Security Sea area. Any regional security strategy In December 1991, NATO formed the Building Measures for the Baltic Sea has to be seen in the light of the region, launched in March 1994 within expected benefits of future NATO North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which included the then 16 the framework of the OSCE, also met enlargement and the shape of the EU’s NATO members as well as most of with the same cold reception. Foreign and Security Policy. As long as the former Warsaw Pact member the scope of both options is states, including the Baltic states. The Generally speaking, one must note that undefined, a regionalization of security NACC engaged in providing expertise the Baltic states devoted little attention policy may forestall the transatlantic to the potential of the OSCE for and European strategy. Against this on defense planning, armed forces and command structures, civil-military cooperative security (Stranga, 1997, backdrop, the existing Nordic-Baltic relations, weapons procurement, air p. 38). It was, reluctantly, accepted as a institutions represent the smallest defense, emergency planning, crisis watchdog on minority issues and as a common denominator (Nyberg, 1994, management, and peace keeping. The mediator on issues pertaining to the pp. 529–540). NACC barely represented more than a consequences of Russian troop What holds true of Baltic cooperation withdrawal (Zellner and Lange, 1999). also applies to Nordic cooperation— discussion forum but, due to joint membership, probably contributed to a Whole-hearted OSCE orientation no institutionalized regional security rationalization of the debate between would have implied acknowledging system emerged. Zaneta Ozolina offers Baltic and Russian representatives legitimate Russian security interests and an explanation: (Föhrenbach, 2000, pp. 48 f.). would have been short on “security guarantees”. “. . . the efficiency of community- building depends on the gradual Baltic cooperation with NATO began at the 27th Session of the NATO At first glance, it seems irrational that development of three stages of Assembly in October 1991. Estonia the Nordic states rejected ideas to relations among political units, starting became a member of the NATO strengthen regional CSBMs. After all, with interaction, continuing through Cooperation Council (NACC) on their main concern is the same as that cooperation, and growing into 20 December 1991 following a meeting of the Baltic states—a integration . . . The failure of raising disproportionate share of offensive expectations can be explained by between the then Estonian Foreign Minister, Lennart Meri, and NATO weaponry and personnel is dislocated substituting the simplest forms of Secretary-General Manfred Wörner at along their borders with Russia. interaction with illusions of the NATO summit. On 3 February Russia’s military concentration in the integration” (Ozolina, 1997, p. 117). 1994, Estonia signed the Framework north-western military districts of St. Document of the Partnership for Petersburg and Pskow causes particular But what are the deeper causes of the concern in the Baltic States, Norway, poor institutionalization of Nordic Peace Program, and on 11 July 1995, its individual Partnership Program. It Finland, and Sweden (Maibach, 1996, cooperation? The Baltic states’ concern became an observer in the Western p. 270). However, the wide array of about Russia is obviously not shared by European Union (WEU) on 30 No- existing institutions seems to satisfy their Nordic neighbors. The Nordic vember 1993, a status which was cooperation needs from a Nordic states, particularly Sweden and Finland, replaced by “associate membership” in perspective. The idea of a Nordic- do not share the Baltic threat Baltic security zone—initially perception vis-a-vis Russia and adhere May 1994. The sequence of rapprochement with NATO and the supported by the US, the UK and to their traditional policy of military WEU was similar for Latvia and Russia—was rejected by Finland and non-alliance, regardless of recent EU Lithuania too. Sweden as well as by the Baltic states. membership. Given the effects of drug The former do not wish to burden smuggling, organized crime, trafficking Associated membership of the WEU is themselves with security guarantees for in human beings, the Nordic states’ the Baltic states, whereas the latter fear prime security concerns pertain to the largely seen by Baltic politicians as a means of facilitating membership of that the regionalization of security Baltic states’ capacity to fight crime and the EU, but is of limited significance would reduce the urgency of NATO to control their borders (Föhrenbach, for security politics. Associate membership and provide Russia with a 2000, p. 104). With their EU membership does not involve a voice in regional security affairs. membership, Finland and Sweden not guarantee of military assistance. The only accepted the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, but decided to actively participate in shaping it.

28 B·I·C·C cooperation

associate members are basically allowed NATO expansion followed political The importance of PfP consists mainly to participate in the WEU’s “Peters- reasoning rather than military in obtaining training assistance to berg” missions—humanitarian and considerations, NATO’s Strategic prepare commanders, staffs and troops rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and “crisis Concept of 1999 asserted the necessity for NATO-led “peace support” management”, but not collective for added strategic value on the part of operations, search and rescue defense (www.weu.int/eng/comm/92- new members (Kommunique der operations, and humanitarian aid petersberg.htm). Theoretically, Staats- und Regierungschefs, 1999, operations (Loemaa, 1999, pp. 1–4). In membership of the WEU could have pp. 233–240). the absence of a NATO security been perceived as an alternative to guarantee, the Baltic states value PfP NATO membership, but the WEU and Given the amorphous character of highly as part of an international its still amorphous “defense identity” ‘Nordic’ cooperation, NATO security strategy. PfP’s consultation depend on NATO logistics and membership signifies the easiest way to mechanism with NATO in the event decision-making. import ‘hard’ security vis-a-vis Russia of “a direct threat to its territorial and demonstrates a belonging to the integrity, political independence, or The Baltic states could have opted for West—particularly as long as the security” is perceived as a commitment an alliance with another great power. prospects of EU membership are by NATO not to leave the Baltic states But this could only have meant the mute. But apart from this identity- alone. Baltic officers are regularly United States, and the US has been related reasoning, NATO membership exposed to western teaching and reluctant to offer unilateral security is the easiest way to justify increased training methods within the framework guarantees independently of NATO. spending on the build-up of armed of PfP, but many PfP exercises do not The US-Baltic Charter of Partnership forces. concentrate on the given aim of of January 1998 offered consultations increasing interoperability. in the case of a perceived threat or risk Keen to be included in NATO as soon and “welcomed” the Baltic aspiration as possible, the Baltic states like to The NATO summit will decide upon to join NATO, but refrained from any demonstrate their efficiency and inviting new members in December tangible commitment (Charter of reliability as prospective NATO 2002. As with their rivalry over EU Partnership, in Föhrenbach, 2000, members (Gießmann, 1997). Preparing membership, the Baltic states are pp. 207–212; US-Baltic Charter of for NATO membership includes contemplating the pros and cons of an Partnership: Commission regular participation in military individual versus a joint NATO Communiqué, 1999, pp. 1–4). Despite exercises, particularly within the strategy. In May 2000, representatives strong words of support, the US framework of PfP (Daugherty, 2000, of the three Baltic states and of position on NATO enlargement is pp. 87–130). Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, uncertain and ambiguous in practice Slovenia, Bulgaria and Albania met in (Rhodes, 2000, p. 100). It was clear in Whereas PfP was initially designed as Vilnius in order to draw up a plan for mid-1995 that the Baltic states would an alternative to NATO membership, their joint inclusion in the second not be among the first to be invited to the Baltic states saw it as a way station round of NATO enlargement (the “big join NATO. The Baltic states therefore to full membership (Asmus and bang”). The “Vilnius Nine” group opted for a staged accession strategy. Nurick, 1996, pp. 121–142; Stranga, would like to create a climate suitable 1997, p. 25). In 1996, Asmus and to overcoming the objections to a NATO did not offer any military Nurick published a study for the second round of enlargement; though cooperation within the framework of RAND corporation outlining the US it is unlikely that NATO will decide in NACC. The Baltic states therefore double-track approach to NATO favor of a “big bang”, given the lack of began to ask for “differentiation” enlargement (Asmus and Nurick, active support for Baltic NATO among the NACC members, and, on 4 1996). It was recommended that, membership by major NATO January 1994, Lithuania submitted its although excluded from the first round countries (Kuzio, 2000, pp. 14–17). request to join NATO. The NATO of NATO enlargement, the Baltic summit in Brussels in January 1994 states should strengthen domestic Against the backdrop of the wars in reacted to the growing pressure to reforms and cooperate among each Kosovo and Macedonia and tensions “open up” for Eastern Europeans by other and with the Nordic states. between the US and the EU over launching the Partnership for Peace National Missile Defense (NMD), program as an alternative to NATO is shifting its priorities from membership (Föhrenbach, 2000, expansion to urgent conflict areas, to pp. 52 f.). Whereas the first round of cooperation with Russia and to defense

B·I·C·C 29 brief 21

burden-sharing. Desperately feeling membership. In the US, the Clinton The annual Membership Action Plans that NATO is impressed by capacities administration demonstrated restraint, (MAP) of the Baltic states formulate rather than moral noise, the Baltic regardless of rhetoric to the contrary. criteria for preparation for membership states—together with the “Vilnius The Bush administration and some without offering membership. The Nine”—are stepping up the pressure to Republican congressmen seem to be main goals of the MAPs consist in keep NATO expansion on the agenda. more supportive of the Baltic states, feedback mechanisms for applicants As NATO is now giving priority to the though their major concern is added and measures to harmonize various fight against terrorism following the military value (Föhrenbach, 2000, programs, improve combat efficiency attacks in the US of 11 September p. 39). Against the backdrop of the by means of joint exercises and 2001, efforts by the “Vilnius Nine” to conflicts on the Balkans and the training, raise defense expenditures, attract attention might be perceived as involvement of NATO troops in deliver arms and military equipment, a distraction rather than a contribution Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and and, finally, to build-up a military to a joint effort. The joint approach of Macedonia, NATO’s European military infrastructure that is interoperable with the “Vilnius Nine” will, with all interventionism is focused on South- NATO (Kuzio, 2000, pp. 14–17). likelihood, coexist with individual Eastern Europe, not the peaceful Baltic Among the Baltic states it is estimated strategies. Lithuania, for example, is Sea region. that Lithuania has made the most trying to vaunt its good relations with progress in fulfilling its Membership Russia and its Russian minority as well Regardless of this hesitancy, the Baltic Action Plan. as its advanced military reforms as an states and NATO have concluded asset. Membership Action Plans (MAPs), In 1999, NATO Headquarters which determine the ‘homework’ to be additionally presented the Baltic states Among the Nordic countries, only done. NATO experts evaluate progress with Partnership Goals, a long list of Denmark promotes Baltic NATO in preparing for NATO membership staged tasks to be fulfilled by applicants membership. Even Norway, as a by looking at the fulfillment of annual by 2006. NATO formulates very NATO member, has been reluctant to plans. The Baltic states have been told, concrete requirements which, if taken promote NATO extension towards the among other things, to settle their seriously, leave the applicants almost Baltic states. The Baltic states cannot international disputes by peaceful no leeway in defining priorities. therefore count on active support in means, to unite their efforts towards Estonia, for example, is asked to field building up an anti-Russian security collective defense, to provide forces for 25,000–30,000 men in the case of war, arrangement. Neither do Finland and NATO missions, to enhance to develop rapid reaction forces, an air Sweden, direct neighbors of the Baltic interoperability, and to significantly surveillance system, mines states, want to be responsible for the increase the share of military countermeasures, and to make Baltic states’ security, or to inhibit their expenditures, at least compared with communication systems compatible. relations with Russia by promoting the average for the 1990s (Membership Estonia is preparing for NATO NATO extension towards the Baltics Action Plan (MAP), membership by implementing the (Ozolina, 1997, p. 123). Poland to the www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/ Partnership for Peace Planning and west could, at least theoretically, play publikasjoner/andre/dokumenter/ Review Process (PARP), Initial the role rejected by Sweden and 4.htm). Each applicant has agreed an Partnership Goals (IPG), the Finland. After Denmark, Poland is individual national integration program Individual Partnership Program (IPP), indeed the most ardent supporter of with NATO. In Latvia’s case, for and, since 1999, its Membership the Baltic states’ inclusion in NATO. example, this includes the development Action Plan (MAP). of a realistic Total Defense Concept, There are some general objections to conformity with NATO’s command, Some NATO experts doubt whether further NATO enlargement. It is said control, and communications (C3) Estonia is defendable by means of that an enlarged alliance would be requirements, the formation and conventional forces due to its unwieldy, less efficient, mean only equipment of three Mobile Reserve geographic position. A NATO study additional burdens for NATO, and battalions, the development of a summarizes the skepticism: “Because it further alienate Russia. All in all, NATO-compatible logistics system, the is unlikely that NATO members would Finland and Sweden are committed to development of a quick reaction force wish to ensure a country’s protection their policy of non-alignment. The by the year 2003, and an overall through a nuclear guarantee alone, UK, the Netherlands, Norway and increase in the professionalization of these officials believe that Estonia’s Germany have been hesitant to actively soldiers (Kristovskis, 1999, pp. 7–13). membership is unlikely until alliance support the Baltic quest for NATO

30 B·I·C·C cooperation

relations with Russia improve Following an initial period of their self-perception. It might be dramatically” (Woehrel, Kim and Ek, amateurish experiments, the Baltic argued that an assured sense of 2000; Petrauskaite, 1999, pp. 15–25). states now realize that preparation for belonging to Europe would free the The major difference from Poland, early NATO membership—2002 or Baltic states from the necessity to Hungary and the Czech Republic 2006 are the currently debated time assert themselves vis-a-vis Russia. Yet, consists precisely in making the prior frames—requires modern command, the opposite might be true—a sense of fulfillment of Partnership Goals and control and communication systems, cooperation with Russia might have a the improvement of relations with efficient training, and additional positive influence on the prospects of Russia a prerequisite for later funding (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 13 EU integration as well as NATO membership. January 2000). Compared to the 1990s’ membership. average, the Baltic states will have to The build-up of national defense increase the share of military Apart from cooperation with NATO, capacities and cooperation with NATO expenditures in their budgets. The the Baltic states have also signed many poses a dilemma for the Baltic states. A Baltic states are thus hostages of their bilateral agreements on military very large number of PfP exercises are commitment to join NATO, the cooperation. Latvia, for example, has actually of limited value for the build- rationale of which seems to consist in signed agreements with the Czech up of armed forces. As Estonia’s the collective enforcement of national Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, participation in Partnership for Peace loyalties identified with NATO Norway, Poland, the UK, and Ukraine. exercises proved, NATO cooperation expansion. Cooperation with the US is particularly requires a re-directing of investments intensive in the field of training for the that inhibit the construction of an It has been argued by Baltic policy- paramilitary national guard. As Lejins effective territorial military makers and experts that NATO reports on Latvian-US cooperation, the infrastructure. Unintentionally, a membership is a precondition for “biggest problem in the Latvian Army dilemma has occurred between the improved relations with Russia (Lejins was that former Latvian Soviet officers requirements of national army and Ozolina, 1997, p. 41). This thesis thought in terms of Soviet military formation and NATO cooperation implicitly holds that only assurances doctrine, in numbers of tanks, artillery, prior to membership. Available assets from NATO will allow the Baltic states top-heavy staffs, vast armies, etc., and can either be allocated to to deal with Russia in a self-confident not in the new concepts of fast, small, interoperability with NATO or to manner. Once members of NATO, the mobile units” (Lejins, 1996, p. 55). strengthening national self-defense Baltic states would no longer have to capabilities. Although there is some fear intimidation from Russia. The Taking into account the wide array of overlap, in practice the tasks are not argument is speculative, implying that co-existing and overlaid institutions, it identical (Krivas, 1999, pp. 1–7). Civil- not only would tensions with Russia is not justified to talk of a “gray zone” military friction has emerged on several over NATO membership fade away or “security vacuum” (Kvaerno, 2000, occasions over putting NATO once the Baltic states joined the pp. 73–90). After a decade of regained membership, as promoted by the alliance, but that relations would independence, Baltic decision-makers civilian government, before territorial actually improve. The record of Polish, almost unanimously admit that: defense, as advocated by at least some Czech, and Hungarian relations with parts of the military leadership. Russia following NATO membership “The type of tension most likely to does not confirm this thesis. occur in the Baltic is not a military As in the cases of Poland and threat, but rather the highly charged, Hungary, preparation for NATO The almost exclusive westward tense political situation which could membership has revealed the depths of orientation of the Baltic states has turn into violent actions, extremist military inefficiency. Whereas NATO been detrimental to the development group actions, drug trafficking, membership was expected to import of a security community with Russia. smuggling, illegal migration etc.” security, it actually requires a re- The psychological border with Russia (Bajarunas, 2000, p. 45). direction of priorities away from is reinforced by implying that the Baltic national defense towards an internatio- states mark a civilizational margin. These threats seem manageable within nal division of military duties. Paradoxically, the exclusiveness of their the framework of the existing westward orientation and their institutions. They neither require negationism regarding everything NATO membership nor a Nordic Russian reflect the degree to which the Baltic states are still bound to Russia in

B·I·C·C 31 brief 21

military alliance. The difference between the Baltic states and Sweden and Finland, as non-allied states, is marginal in terms of external security challenges.

The factor which influences regional stability much more significantly is the economic and social preparedness of the Baltic states to join the EU. In the foreseeable future it would be advisable to strive for inclusive cooperative security arrangements, aimed at increased interstate security and based on conflict prevention and conflict resolution among potential adversaries. Tensions between Russia and the Baltic states are unlikely to be resolved by the Baltic states joining an exclusive alliance, but by increased institutionalized cooperation in spheres of common interest. The desire of the Baltic states to be affiliated with alliances or groupings which exclude Russia may actually inhibit rapprochement with the EU, and possibly NATO too, because the burden of mitigating the impact on EU-Russian relations is shifted to the EU. If it is the unpredictability of Russia which is the ultimate cause for concern (Vike-Freiberga 2000, pp. 198–2000), it would be reasonable to expect that security policy should be based on reducing this unpredictability.

32 B·I·C·C decision-making

Security

“ . . . the conflicts reflect the different Decision-making internal political ambitions of the opposing political powers of Estonia, and they reveal the danger that armed units whose loyalties are not clear can in the be more easily manipulated” (Haab, 1995, p. 3).

Baltic States Furthermore, the majority of the more Defense Council as an advisory body. than 400 Estonian officers were trained ll the Baltic states adopted Everyday decision-making is carried in the Soviet army and often retained Alegislation to ensure civil control out by the prime minister, the minister the latter’s role models and culture, over the military. Military of defense and the foreign minister. including abuse of, and violence interventionism has therefore not been Although the main institutions are in against, conscripts. The frequent a dominant issue. Instead, conflicts place, the process lacks structure; change of defense ministers—six alone have occurred over the delineation of information flows between the in the first three years after Estonia’s competencies between different ministries involved are particularly independence—seriously inhibited the branches of the government, primarily unsatisfactory (Raid, 1996, p. 2). build-up of an efficient defense the president, the prime minister, and administration too. Palace intrigues the defense minister. These inter- The unclear responsibilities of the inside the Ministry of Defense and institutional conflicts are a common president and the division of labor quarrels with the chief of the General feature in the Baltic states. Though the between the Ministry of Defense and Staff have been a constant feature of parliaments exercise their right to draft the General Staff of the armed forces Estonia’s military establishment. and control the budget and to adopt were a constant cause of dispute in security-related legislation, Estonia in the 1990s, most prominently In early 2000, Aare Raid, a renowned parliamentary expertise still does not in the case of open clashes between analyst of the Estonian military, allow for formulating security the minister of defense, Andrus Öövel, scathingly remarked: “The note of one guidelines and performing viable and the commander of the armed Russian military man that Moscow is control and accounting functions. forces, Aleksander Einseln, (which led satisfied with the development of the to the latter’s resignation in December Estonian Defence Forces because The president in all the Baltic states is 1995). The president has direct access nothing much has been achieved is the supreme commander of the armed to military command, and the situation probably no exaggeration” (Defence forces, advised by a Defense or has become complicated especially in Review, No.02/2000, 5–11 January). National Security Council. cases where the government and the Against this backdrop it comes as no Nonetheless, the everyday pursuit of president belong to different parties. surprise that the Estonian Defense security affairs rests largely with the Similar to the situation in Latvia, it is Ministry defined its priorities in 2000 prime minister, defense minister, and unclear whether the commander of the as follows: development of a legislative minister of foreign affairs. In instances armed forces or the commander-in- basis, long-term defense planning, where the president and the prime chief is directly subordinate to the reform of the command and control minister belong to different parties, as president in the event of an armed structure, and personnel policy (Eesti has happened, conflicts occur over conflict. Further ambiguities existed Kaitseministeerium, Estonian Defence security prerogatives. In such cases, the for some time between the Ministry of Budget 2000). Whereas Latvia and General Staff repeatedly finds itself Defense and the General Staff. The Lithuania over the last decade have instrumentalized in inter-branch General Staff accused the ministry of established a system of responsibilities conflicts. The build-up of armed interference in its jurisdictional and that meets basic Western standards—at forces suffered not least from constant administrative affairs (Institute of least on paper—Estonia is still working inter-branch conflicts. International and Social Studies et al., on a clear and suitable division of 1997, p. 5). defense responsibilities (Clemmesen, In Estonia, though a parliamentary 1999b, pp. 5–42). republic, the president is the supreme The division of tasks between the commander of the armed forces. government and parliament remained In Latvia, the president is assigned the Security decision-making involves the unclear too, thus causing conflicts in leading and coordinating role in parliament (through its defense and the military itself over lines of security politics and defense affairs; he foreign affairs committees) and the authority. As Mare Haab observed: chairs the National Security Council, president, who is assisted by the

B·I·C·C 33 brief 21

which reports directly to him. This defense and security policy issues body, at least in theory, monitors state without consulting the legislature security, evaluates internal and external (Nekrasas, 1996, p. 7). The Lithuanian threats, develops strategies for averting State Defense Council, consisting of threats, determines the operational the prime minister, the chairman of direction of security agencies, oversees parliament, the minister of defense and their structure and budget, and the commander-in-chief, and headed supervises the Constitutional Defense by the president, coordinates the Bureau (Ozolina, 1996, p. 8). An Ministry of National Defense, the institutional conflict is caused by the Ministry of Interior and the National unclear division of responsibilities Security Department; it is a between the president and the consultative body assisting the commander of the armed forces. president. Yet, de facto the State Defense Given that 90 percent of Latvia’s Council does not seem to play a armed forces stem from the national primary role in security decision- guard, which is divided in its making (Nekrasas, 1996, p. 7). Apart subordination between the president from the State Defense Council, the and the Ministry of Defense, crucial president formed a Coordination legislative clarification is missing. Council on foreign policy, which Although some people assume that the comprises, among others, the minister prime minister would become the of foreign affairs and the chairperson commander-in-chief in the case of an of the Seimas (parliament) committee armed conflict, the constitution does of foreign affairs. Like the Defense not mention such a role. Who would Council, it has little impact on be the actual commander of Latvia’s decision-making. armed forces in the event of a military conflict? The minister of defense, a civilian, is appointed by the Lithuanian president It has been suggested that the National and serves as the prime minister’s Security Council would be better senior advisor on defense policy. The placed under the prime minister commander-in-chief, also appointed by because this would greatly help to the president, is subordinate to the implement its decisions. Finally, it minister of national defense and might be argued that the division responsible for overseeing the armed between troops assigned to the forces as well as the ‘home guard’. The Ministry of Interior and to the border police is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense could be Ministry of Interior. Finally, there is a overcome by merging both in one civil defense department at the ministry of security affairs (Interview Ministry of Defense which is with Adamson, 14 June 2000). Two responsible for the protection of committees deal with security affairs in citizens in wartime and during crisis the Latvian parliament, but as these and emergency situations (Bajarunas, rely only on minor staff, almost no 1995, 20 f.). inquiries are made, not to speak of legislation initiated.

In Lithuania, the president is supreme commander of the armed forces and the highest political control organ. In the first years after independence, the president usually consulted with parliament on security policy-making, but President Algirdas Brazauskas changed this course in 1993 by deciding the majority of foreign,

34 B·I·C·C build-up of forces

Build-up of

other Soviet republics, and returning Armed Forces emigrants—mostly veterans from the US or Canadian armed forces or national guards. In 1990/91, Lithuania took the lead in building up voluntary forces for civil defense, border guards, Absence of Blue Print all kinds of police forces (on Baltic and emergency police (Gobins, defense budgets, see Möller and Ernecker, Kerner, Möller, 1998, pp. he Baltic states built up new armies Wellmann, 2001, p. 117). From the 126 f.). After independence, armies Tfrom scratch, without relying on mid-1990s, the initial aim of forming were formed under the newly those armies which already existed national defense systems began to clash established defense ministries. All the under socialism. The military build-up with the orientation towards NATO Baltic states opted for conscription- became part of an ongoing process of membership. Speeding up NATO based armies, but allowed alternative state- and nation-building and, later, integration involved a change in service for conscientious objectors. largely responded to NATO priorities, usually in favor of The conscription period was set at 8– requirements. In contrast to official interoperable command and 12 months. Two defense systems thus material stating intentions and communication structures and emerged in parallel, with separate achievements, the following section peacekeeping forces and at the expense command structures, budgets, and highlights shortcomings and of territorial defense. procurement. contradictions. Two major stages can be discerned: an ad hoc and largely Against the backdrop of the non- The voluntary defense forces felt like unplanned formation of armed forces violent independence movements, “guardians of the revolution”. Given lasting until the mid-1990s, followed by significant parts of the Baltic political their semi-official status, these forces active preparation for NATO elite initially questioned the necessity initially showed little enthusiasm for membership. Most of the initial of national defense forces, particularly civil obedience, which eventually led to ambitions came to a halt due to in Lithuania and Estonia. Border mutinies in all three countries in the financial constraints, institutional defense, a national guard and a strong period 1993–96 (Gobins, Ernecker, infighting, persistent Soviet military police force would suffice, it was Kerner, Möller, 1998, pp. 127 f.). An legacies, the misallocation of resources, argued in Lithuania’s parliament. Yet, additional problem related to the legacy and diverging priorities. this position was soon abandoned. In of the officer corps trained under Estonia, a similar debate evolved after Soviet rule. Not all the native Soviet Only by pressing for NATO independence. Estonian Social officers who joined the armed forces membership could the military Democrats and representatives of of the Baltic states originally identified establishment improve its otherwise some rural parties preferred a small, with the cause of independence and miserable position as far as domestic professional army, combining border some of them were not only Russified, financial allocations were concerned. guards, national defense forces, and a but belonged to the die-hard pro- Preparation for NATO membership rescue service. In 1994, a Law on Soviet forces, as for example the streamlined the chaotic military build- Service in the Defense Forces was Latvian officer Viktor Alksnis, member up, particularly as far as command adopted in Estonia foreseeing of the Presidium of the last Council of structures, the establishment of compulsory service for all men People’s Deputies of the USSR. education and training priorities, and between 18 and 27 as well as an Political identification did not acquisition policies were concerned. alternative service of 15 months—the necessarily coincide with ethnic debate had come to an end. In 1992, belonging, and ethnic belonging did The build-up of armed forces in the some actors in Latvia, for example not necessarily qualify for the military. Baltic states had a somewhat former Soviet KGB officer Janis Furthermore, the Baltic states have protracted start. The reasons are Adamson, later twice Latvian minister faced huge difficulties in attracting manifold: indecision over the kind of of interior, also proposed a purely soldiers and officers to their armed army to strive for, modest budgetary professional army, but this idea was not forces. Despite the official stress on allocations, lack of weapons, and an pursued either (Interview with threats emanating from Russia and calls unclear division of labor between the Adamson, 16 June 2000). for military service as a public duty, the various security agencies, that is, military has been unpopular among regular armed forces, border guard, The build-up of armed forces in the national guard, guard services as well as Baltic states was based on volunteers from the national movements, native Soviet officers who returned from

B·I·C·C 35 brief 21

both conscripts and officers. Many Over time, the build-up of armed civil disobedience and guerilla tactics young men evade conscription quoting forces in the Baltic states, including the (“total defense”); or a mixed territorial- health reasons, religious convictions, or paramilitary defense leagues or national field army defense (Clemmesen, 2000, enrolling in university studies. Draft guards, has been strongly influenced by pp. 115–121). The latter seems to be dodging and officers quitting service military cooperation with foreign the option regarded by most as immediately after completing training countries. Cooperation with Finland superior. The Defense Concept of in western countries have been wide- and Sweden probably plays the most Lithuania, for example, foresees “total spread problems. Additionally, the important role in Estonia (particularly and unconditional” defense, which in maltreatment of regular soldiers— the Estonian Defense League); with the case of aggression includes military called dedovchina in Soviet times— Denmark, Germany, and the US in defense, guerilla warfare, civil belongs to the unpleasant legacies with Latvia; and with the US and Poland in disobedience, non-collaboration and which the Baltic armies are still Lithuania. The military academy in the request for NATO assistance (The bestowed (Defence Review, No.12/2000, Lithuania, for example, has been Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet 22 March). Poor discipline, shaped on the US West Point Academy, Politics, 1997, January, pp. 84-121). drunkenness, and the beating of whilst the paramilitary units are inferiors have often been reported as fashioned on the US National Guards. In terms of defense capabilities, all the features of the newly built armed Baltic states combine concepts of forces. Territorial or ‘Total’ ‘territorial’ (or ‘total’) defense with Defense regular armed forces, based on The defense structure of the Baltic compulsory conscription. On states exposes certain commonalties. 21 October 1995, the defense guards There is a consensus in the Baltic All three have regular armed forces of the three Baltic states signed an states’ defense concepts that land (including army, navy, and air force), agreement foreseeing cooperation in voluntary paramilitary defense leagues forces should form the backbone of the fields of training, staff, and field national defense, based on a field army (SKAT, Zemessardze, Kaitseliit), and training exercises, as well as common with trained conscripts, territorial border guards. The air force and navy sports contests (ETA, 16 January defense units based on volunteers, and are of minor importance compared 2001). Yet, in practice cooperation a small “reaction force” capable of with the land army. The co-existence barely goes beyond ceremonial events participating in international of ‘regular’ armed forces, paramilitary and minor projects on cooperation in organizations, and the border guards operations. Behind this semblance of a the field of disaster control and youth joint model, there nonetheless exist strongly reflects the transitional training—a joint ‘total defense’ has different views on likely threats and the context and the competition between never been developed (ETA, 28 April way to respond to them. Should an outward-oriented regular army and 2000). national defense efforts counter an territorial defense aimed at ‘total invasion only by concentrating on a defense’ in the event of an invasion. Estonia’s Armed Whereas the formation of regular couple of strategic areas, or in the depth of the whole territory? Is it the Forces armed forces relies heavily on nationals task of the armed forces to maintain a who have served in the Soviet armed bridgehead for external assistance, or Preparations to set up an army began forces, the territorial defense leagues, should one follow a ‘Chechnyan’ immediately after independence in commanded by regional army scenario where the enemy will have to early fall 1991. The Fundamentals of commanders, represent paramilitary security services shaped largely by reckon with heavy losses from perma- National Defense, adopted by nent guerilla warfare conducted by fast parliament on 15 March 1993, call for ethnic nationalists. During peacetime, moving ‘hit-and-run’ squads (LaGrone, “total defense” based on professional professional servicemen, non- 2000, pp. 122–128; Zaccor, 1994, soldiers, highly trained reservists and commissioned officers, officers and pp. 682–702; Clemmesen, 2000, voluntary civilian forces—the defense volunteers make up these territorial pp. 115–121)? league. The term of conscription is defense guards. The semi-official status of the defense guards is still under- 12 months. The Estonian armed forces Several scenarios have been proposed consist of the regular armed forces, the regulated. Defense leagues act as under the general heading of “territori- defense league, the border guard, and private security firms as well as al defense”: for example a professional the regiment of the internal defense. performing state functions. The reaction force supported by a reserve; a overlap of governmental and private field army manned by mobilized functions almost inevitably invites misuse of power. conscripts; a purely territorial defense mobilizing the populace and involving

36 B·I·C·C build-up of forces

The main goal of the defense forces is not always legal) use. The defense With only three to four land force to occupy and defend strategically league relies additionally on auxiliary units, the peacetime composition of important areas in the case of an organizations such as the Women’s the armed forces is actually quite small. armed attack. The ground forces’ main Home Defense and the Home Their main task consists in mobile task consists in resisting an aggressor Daughters. In 2000, it was admitted at territorial defense throughout the by launching intermittent defense and the Estonian Ministry of Defense that territory in the event of an invasion counterattack operations as well as the defense league is a far cry from a (Öövel, 1996, pp. 7–10). In order to organizing guerilla operations real defense unit. Nonetheless, qualify for NATO membership, (Laaneots, 1999). The navy is to guard ambitions are literally flying high—the Estonia aims to increase the wartime and defend the coastal areas and Estonian defense league wants to strength of its defense forces, improve territorial waters, whereas the Estonian provide its members with flying its airspace monitoring system, develop air force is responsible for monitoring expertise. The Kaitseliit plans to build rapid reaction forces, increase its mine and controlling air space. At the end of up an air corps of its own based on countermeasure capacity, and unify and the 1990s, the navy had five small 17 powered aircraft and some improve its military training (0, ships, whereas the air force only existed 57 gliders originally belonging to the 19 January 2000). Anti-aircraft defense, on paper. The proposed wartime Soviet paramilitary organization, air surveillance, and anti-tank weapons strength of the armed forces is 25– DOSAAF, and handed over to the are the priority for the armed forces 30,000 people, although it is defense league by the Ministry of (Eesti Paevaleht, 18 January 2001). questionable to what extent the Defense in 2000. Sweden offered the defense league could be counted on as Kaitseliit used jet trainers several years The procurement of the respective a mobilization reserve. The Estonian ago, but the Estonian side declined the weaponry is not only expensive, but ground forces include six independent offer, explaining that it lacked the also complicated due to the security infantry battalions, an artillery funds for sustaining the aircraft concerns of the provider countries. battalion, an air defense battalion, and (Postimees, 30 January 2001). Currently, the Estonian armed forces a peace operations center. are mainly armed with light infantry The Estonian air defense units consist weapons and anti-tank weapons The main task of the defense league of radar units, air defense artillery, bought in Romania, China, Israel and (Kaitseliit) consists in preparing reserve missile units, and air squadrons. The Sweden. Additionally, the US donated forces and contributing to rescue naval forces are based on the coast some 40,000 M14 combat rifles, and operations. Of the officially reported guard, marines and the navy (Haab, Finland provided an unknown number 8,500 members of Kaitseliit, only some 1995, pp. 42 f.). In 1992/93, the of howitzers. 3,000 can be counted as active Estonian government planned a members (Interview with Tiit Norkoiv, combined force strength of armed The build-up of Estonia’s armed 20 June 2000). The rest are older forces and border guards of 5,000 forces met with serious obstacles, some veterans—aged between 60 and 70— men. In 1999, Estonia’s regular armed structural, some self-inflicted. Though who retain their guns for personal (and forces by far exceeded these initial the military budget was increased from figures. 3 percent of the state budget in 1993 to 5 percent in 1994 and 4.7 percent in 1995, most of the money spent in the early years went on the reconstruction of military installations, leaving only Figure 1: Estonia’s Armed Forces in 1999 small amounts for procurement. It is Source: Möller and Wellmann, 2001, p. 82 planned to reach the NATO target of two percent of GDP on military expenditures required for NATO Regular Armed Forces Border Defense Mobilization membership by 2003. Guard League Reserves Apart from an inadequate 5,456 2,913 8,500 14,000 infrastructure, the most serious problem facing the Estonian armed Army Navy Air Force forces is the shortage of officers, non- commissioned officers and trained 4,987 344 125 technical personnel (Laaneots, 1999). In 1998, the commander-in-chief of Estonia’s regular armed forces, Johan- nes Kert, reported that out of 1,200 posts for non-commissioned officers,

B·I·C·C 37 brief 21

only 400 were actually filled (Baltic personnel gap (Defence Review, regular armed forces resemble more a Times, 5–11 March 1998). In response No. 16/1999, 14–20 April). The ‘home defense’ model than a modern to this problem, the Estonian General Estonian laws do not permit non- Western army based on heavy Staff has on several occasions allowed citizens to join the army, and the idea weaponry or technology. The the rapid promotion of officers—some of drafting non-citizens is not popular prominence of the territorial defense following a mere 20-day reserve within the Estonian Ministry of guard in the overall security concept training course—in order to fill Defense. Surprisingly, Russians with reflects the adherence to “total personnel gaps (Defence Review, No. 13/ Estonian citizenship are, as a rule, defense” and “people in arms” 2000, 22–28 March). In January 2001, more willing to join the military than (Estonian Ministry of Defense, 1996). the Estonian defense minister, faced Estonians. A frequent problem, With Estonia preparing for NATO with strong criticism of the promotion however, is that these Russians do not membership, adherents of the “territo- practices, finally set specific understand Estonian (Defence Review, rial defense” concept have clashed on qualification standards for officers: all No. 16/1999, 14–20 April). A report several occasions with proponents of officers must have undergone at least on the first draft in January 2001 NATO requirements—for example secondary education, while officers provides some insight into the President Meri dismissed the acting holding the post of battalion structure of the draft cohort: out of commander-in-chief, Urmas commander or above must have 973 conscripts, four had undergone Roosimagi, in early 2000 on the received higher education at civilian university training, 483 secondary or grounds that he was not concentrating universities (Defence Review, No. 05/ specialized secondary education, 376 all his energy on speeding up NATO 2001, 24–30 January). A law on military basic education and 66 primary membership (Defence Review, No. 02/ service passed by the Estonian education. The number of men drafted 2000, 11 January). parliament, Riigikogo, in March 2000 annually is approximately 3,500 followed the same line of reasoning. (Postimees, 13 January 2001). Frequent conflicts between the regular The new law forces the army to armed forces and the territorial defense discharge less capable and poorly The figures reflect a larger problem— league mirrored the unclear division of educated non-commissioned officers the low level of education of members authority and lack of civil control. The who will not be allowed to command of the armed forces and the limited Kaitselliit’s combination of military, students. More intelligent students will attraction of the armed forces as far as civil, and business activities allowed the even have to serve a longer period as more highly qualified people are defense league not only to become conscripts—the full 12 months—while concerned. Like Latvia and Lithuania, involved in politics, but to misuse its the less able can be discharged after Estonia also has Russian-speaking powers (Institute of International and serving eight months (Defence Review, citizens serving in its armed forces, and Social Studies et al., 1997, p. 17). The No. 12/2000, 22 March). the question has been raised of Kaitselliit and the border guard in whether these ethnic Russians would Estonia gained a bad reputation for Service in the armed forces is switch sides in the event of a conflict proliferating insecurity through unpopular and draft dodging with Russia. A sociological study bullying, corruption, weapons thefts, widespread. Embarking on a professio- conducted in 1999 dismissed the mutiny, shoot-outs with the police nal military career is not an attractive assumption that most of the ethnic and—in the case of the border option for young Estonian males. Russians serving in the Estonian army guard—participation in car smuggling Conscription is reported to be very would turn against the Estonian state, (Kerner, 1994; Oll, 1996, p. 3). Some unpopular. Units of the regular armed but admitted that a certain percentage people obviously joined the defense forces often do not reach their nominal would do so (Defence Review, No. 16/ league only in order to acquire strength (Corley, 1996, pp. 107–111). 1999, 14–20 April). weapons and military training while Of those drafted in the mid-1990s, up assuming a “Rambo” mentality to 60 percent proved to be physically Most of the money spent on the (Interview with Tiit Norkoiv, 20 June unsuited (Raid, 1996, p. 14). There has formation of the armed forces in the 2000). Defense league members often been a debate for some time now on 1990s went on buying uniforms and work as auxiliary policemen. In 1999, allowing non-citizens—mainly individual weapons, and renovating for example, the city of Tallinn, Russians—to serve in paramilitary barracks. Budgetary means do not rescue units under the Ministry of allow for an effective procurement Interior in order to bridge the policy or for the buildup of a military infrastructure. Given the lack of significant funds for the formation of combat-ready armed forces, Estonia’s

38 B·I·C·C build-up of forces

concluded an agreement on hiring Latvia’s Armed Forces The Latvian government originally Kaitselliit security services (Defence aimed at a force of 9,000 men, Review, No. 05/2001, 24–30 January). The ad hoc formation of the Latvian consisting of 3,000 “volunteer Given the tensions over the status of armed forces began soon after the regulars” and 6,000 conscripts. These Kaitselliit, the Estonian government intervention of the Soviet special figures did not actually say very ultimately required approval of the forces (OMON) in Vilnius and Riga in much—it was not clear what the statutes of the defense league, its January 1991. The Latvian national relationship of conscripts, officers, structure, location, and procedure of guard, Zemessardze, and the state non-commissioned officers, reserve forming in December 1999 (Estonian security service were established on the officers, mobilization reserves as well News Agency, 21 December 1999). basis of these voluntary paramilitary as permanent and temporary home formations (Zalkalns, 1999, pp. 72–85). guard people should be. The Estonian armed forces’ goals for Based on legislation passed on 30 Au- the period until 2005 foresee, among gust 1994, the armed forces at this A national risk analysis and a military others, the further development of stage included border protection forces threat analysis were finally undertaken mine warfare capabilities, rapid reaction (3,662 men/300 officers), the army in 1994. These formed the basis for the forces, the modernization of logistics (1,630 men/166 officers), navy (899 National Security Concept and the and social amenities, and the men/59 officers) and air as well as air Defense Concept which were approved standardization of education (Luik, defense forces (234 men/47 officers). by the cabinet in 1995, though both 1999, pp. 27–34). The ultimate vision Similar to the old Soviet model, the concepts still failed as operable of the Estonian armed forces is Interior Ministry commanded planning guidance for the armed nonetheless under dispute. Major regiments for internal purposes with a forces. Neither the numerical strength General Ants Laaneots is promoting strength of approximately 2,100 men of the armed forces nor their future reliance on heavy arms along the (Viksne, 1995, pp. 64 f.). The regular equipment, for example, were lines of Swiss or Slovenian armory— armed forces are complemented by the determined on the basis of analyzed Switzerland has 556 modern Leopard national guard, Zemessardze, which is needs, and force structure plans such tanks and 812 armored personnel organized territorially and subordinated as the “NAF 2001” five-year plan were carriers (APC), whilst Slovenia has 100 to both the Defense Ministry as well as not backed by budgetary allocations tanks and 138 armored personnel the president. It represents a mixture (Zalkalns, September 2000). carriers as well as some 200 artillery of a rural self-defense, semi-private pieces. Laaneots justifies his proposal security guard, veteran nationalists’ In the year 2000, Latvia’s armed forces with the role model of the first organization, and training ground for allegedly consisted of 4,176 active Chechnyan war when the Chechens guerilla operations. troops, 14,500 reservists, 3,700 fought against Russia with tanks, APCs members of paramilitary units, and and cannon and mortars (Postimees, 16,000 members of the national guard 22 January 2001). (Föhrenbach, 2000, p. 34). Of the total number of 650 soldiers in the Baltic There has not been a significant public Battalion (BaltBat), some 200 soldiers debate in Estonia on the military serve in Latvia’s company. traditions of Estonia’s armed forces in connection with collaboration with Germany during World War II. There Figure 2: Military Personnel of Latvia 2000 are veterans organizations of (excluding Border Guard and National Guard) SS divisions which fought the Soviet army before and during the war, and Source: Möller and Wellmann, 2001, p. 82 about 1,500 such veterans met at a congress in the capital, Tallinn, on Personnel Number 11 July 1998. In contrast to their colleagues in Latvia, they were not Officers 634 supported by major political parties or parts of the Estonian government. NCO’s 1,033

Soldiers 469

Draftees 1,528

Civilians 1,512

Total 4,176

B·I·C·C 39 brief 21

The first obligatory service law, which The establishment of a National Against the background of a was passed by the end of 1992, Defense Academy (NDA) in 1993, mismanaged recruiting policy— mandated an 18-month service period, closely cooperating with NATO’s personal connections, bribes, and faked resulting in an annual draft pool of Marshall Center, was intended to train medical certificates greatly helped in about 15,000. Regardless of this a NATO-interoperable officer corps. draft evasion—a highly oversized staff formidable draft pool, the build-up of Yet, without clearly formulated was created that kept itself busy Latvia’s armed forces lacked an idea of requirements for personnel, training, throughout the 1990s with constant what purposes the army should serve operations, intelligence and logistics reorganization, fights over lines of for many years. Until the year 2000, from the Ministry of Defense, the subordination, and personal intrigues. recruits were drafted not only for the National Defense Academy had no The officer corps on which the Latvian defense forces, but also for the troops idea what the needs of the armed army was built consisted mostly of of the Ministry of Interior (the prison forces were. The NDA is currently indigenous Soviet officers aged guard brigade and the mobile police preparing platoon, company and between 45 and 60 who returned to brigade), the border guard (under the battalion commanders, relying on their homeland while retaining their Ministry of Interior) and the national NATO’s tactical handbooks and Russian pensions. When asked by the guard, Zemessardze. The first priority focussing additionally on English then minister of defense, Talavs of the build-up of Latvian armed language teaching (National Defense Jundzis, to give up their Russian forces was the establishment of the Academy of Latvia, Riga 2000; pensions or leave the armed forces, border guard which originally Interview with Ilmars Viksne, 21 June only seven out of a total of 70 officers performed not only border control but 2000; Viksne, 2000, pp. 17–29). The decided to stay. also border defense duties. Originally it NDA is just beginning to train was possible for conscientious personnel for non-military tasks, such Serving in the Latvian armed forces objectors to join an alternative service, as medical relief and international usually meant promotion in rank, and some 5 to 6 people actually did so. peacekeeping operations, though most quickly leading to the same top-heavy In the absence of a law on alternative of this training is performed in officer corps one finds in other service, this option was abolished in Denmark. Eastern European countries. The 1997. Latvian armed forces became a safe Officers often left the armed forces heaven for Soviet officers who would Emphasis during initial training was on immediately upon returning from otherwise have found themselves typical Soviet skills—physical training extensive training in the West. The unemployed. Out of 700 Latvian such as hand-to-hand combat and language and management skills officers who had served with the parachute training for special mission acquired in the West gave them far Soviet forces, some 300 found units, (though airplanes for an airborne better income opportunities in private employment with the Latvian armed reconnaissance battalion were lacking). industry. In 1998, out of 212 Latvian forces. It is estimated that in 2000 Highflying ideas to acquire jet fighters military personnel who underwent some 20–25 percent of the Latvian and missiles, to form a tank battalion training in the West, only seven officer corps were still of Soviet or to purchase battleships soon had to remained in the armed forces. The extraction (Interview with Stanislavs be abandoned. Approximately one brain drain from the armed forces was Voicehovic, 20 June 2000). This would third of the estimated annual draft stemmed somewhat after salary indicate that the majority of Soviet- pool are actually recruited, but without improvements came into effect in trained officers have retired over the adequate weapons, ammunition, 1999. Given this state of affairs in the last ten years and a new cohort has clothing, or even housing facilities they mid-1990s, the regular armed forces emerged with training experience in the remain—in the words of Gundars lagged far behind the national guard, US, Germany, Denmark, Italy or other Zalkalns—an “unarmed and untrained the army of the Ministry of Interior NATO countries. mob” (Zalkans, 2000). Soldiers with no and the state security service as far as more than a few months training often combat capacities were concerned. The Of the approximately 23,000 Russian act as instructors and basic armament state security service, an anti-terrorist military personnel demobilized in at the end of the 1990s consisted of a special mission unit, was transferred at 1994, only very few—probably less couple of thousand Kalashnikovs. The some point from the Ministry of than half a dozen—were recruited by national guard, at least, was able to Interior to the Ministry of Defense, the Latvian army. Most of the provide some, though by far not all, of and is since in search of a military demobilized Russians returned to its members with individual weapons mission. Russia or remained in Latvia as military after the US donated some 10,000 pensioners with alien status. These unused M-14 rifles to Latvia. former Russian officers do not

40 B·I·C·C build-up of forces

represent a social or political problem professionals, whereas the ground years—“only” 200 members were for Latvia, because they receive Russian forces will remain a mixture of discharged or penalized in the year pensions, which are much higher than professional soldiers and conscripts. 2000—of the three Baltic national the regular Latvian ones. An unknown guards, Zemessardze is probably the one number of demobilized Russian In the first years after independence, causing politicians and law officers, most of whom are reported to the national guard, Zemessardze, enforcement most concern. be engaged in retail business, remain in consisted mainly of patriotic farmers in Latvia illegally. the countryside, but as most Latvians Zemessardze had initially been under the were reluctant to join, it also had a formal control of Latvia’s Supreme Though there has not been a screening significant share of Russian-speaking Soviet—the predecessor of the Seimas. of former Soviet officers, the step-by- members, mostly ethnic Latvians from De facto it was controlled by its step replacement of the older cohort Eastern Latvia whose mother tongue is commander, the Rightist deputy Girts may mitigate NATO’s justified fears of nonetheless Russian. The initial Kristovsky, whom the defense and security leaks. Fifteen standardized patriotism soon wore off. Zemessardze interior ministers accused in 1992 of interviews with retired Soviet-Latvian assumed responsibility for “law and establishing a second army outside the officers, conducted within the order” in the countryside and state (Lieven, 1994, p. 326). In 1995/ framework of this project in Riga in performed guard duties, often 96, two Zemessardze battalions even July 2000, confirm that an identity competing with guard units under the declared that they would not change took place even among older Ministry of Interior. The Latvian subordinate themselves to the Ministry Soviet-trained officers. NATO police, in an attempt to establish a of Defense. Since the mid-1990s, the membership is generally favored; there public monopoly of power instead of control of the national guard has is no discernable inclination towards the national guard’s “self-help”, supposedly improved, particularly authoritarian rule; and most of these frequently accused Zemessardze of being following the creation of a unified former officers cope with the undisciplined, trigger-happy, ethnically defense system (Interview with Talavs hardships of system change prejudiced, and corrupt (Lieven, 1994, Jundzis, 15 June 2000). individually, not relying on veterans p. 324). Immediately after associations or the sharing of a unified independence, Zemessardze’s reputation Though the national guard was political worldview. was badly shaken by its criminal record. ultimately put under the Ministry of As Lieven reports: Defense and exposed to the training In February 1997, a new service law procedures of the Michigan National was passed, reducing the service period “In the first ten months of 1992, the Guard, the mixture of “total defense” to 12 months, eliminating the original National Guard was responsible for 54 and policing tasks remains a cause of exemption for farmers, allowing shooting incidents, in which seven institutional rivalry and unclear students to go directly into the people were killed and 31 wounded. command chains. The military part of reserves, thus bypassing the draft, and After one such occurrence in October the national guard is supervised by the replacing the often corrupt regional 1992 in the predominantly Russian Ministry of Defense, whereas the induction system with a centralized town of Ventspils, the town council nonmilitary functions are commanded one. The problems with the new called for the removal of the by the president. It is hard to say how service law are the lack of qualified Guardsmen, describing them as more many of the nominally 16,000 national reserve officers or of offers to non- dangerous than the criminals” (Lieven, guard members would actually be citizens to join the army, and the de facto 1994, p. 324). capable of contributing to “total elimination of alternative service for defense” in the case of an armed conscientious objectors, “a concept The frequent reports about both conflict. There are reported to be some that was included but was removed Zemessardze and the border guard’s 1,600 full-time members, although essentially due to the newness of such involvement in illegal activities point to other estimates number merely 1,000 a concept and due to pressure from the common problems: under-funding of (Interview with Talavs Jundzis, 15 June ‘big four’ religions which strive for the security services, unclear division 2000). Approximately 30 percent of monopoly on moral issues” (Zalkalns, of labor, deficiencies in framework the 16,000 nominal members are 2000). The shortage of officers was at legislation for the security agencies, armed with rifles. Others have pistols least partially remedied by hiring weak parliamentary oversight, and the or are unarmed. officers from the national guard. In the instrumentalization of security services longer term, there are plans to base the by representatives of the executive Throughout the 1990s, the Baltic air force and navy solely on branch for personal interests and armies’ military traditions linked to ambitions. Though Zemessardze’s collaboration with German forces criminal record has improved in recent

B·I·C·C 41 brief 21

often caused international concern. parade—16 March—as a day of force and a navy, which currently Apart from the Zemessardze, another commemoration for all Latvian soldiers consists of a flotilla of vessels and paramilitary force of radical Latvian “from all sides”. Jewish organizations patrol cutters, three radar stations, nationalists was formed after called for the cancellation of the maintenance and logistics, and the independence—the Aizsargi. The parade and the Russian government coastal defense battalion. The airforce Aizsargi was officially registered in strongly criticized Latvia. Under consists of 850 personnel, though it 1994 and derives its name from an pressure from abroad, President has neither combat units nor combat organization that existed in Latvia Guntis Ulmanis finally stated that aircraft. The voluntary defense service, before 1940. During the German making 16 March a day of created in 1991, enrolled a total of occupation in World War II, the commemoration for all Latvian soldiers some 12,000 volunteers, most of them Aizsargi served as a self-defense and was “wrong” (Huang, 1999). only loosely attached. The border auxiliary police unit. Once the Soviet guard and coastal guard account for troops occupied the Baltic states, Aizsargi was banned in the aftermath another 3,900 men. 27,700 men are in members were persecuted as of these events, but a Latvian National the Lithuanian reserve. In 2001, “supporters of the Germans”. Front (LNF) has been attempting to Lithuania had some 12,900 active revive the Latvian pro-Nazi movement troops, with 2,000 professional soldiers In 1994, the reborn paramilitaries from since February 1998. The and conscripts, and an additional Aizsargi were accused of bombing a parliamentary declaration “On 11,300 volunteers belonging to the World War II monument in Riga, of Legionnaires” of 29 October 1998 voluntary defense forces, the SKAT, infiltrating the national guard in order officially exonerated the Latvian which were renamed KASP in 1998 to obtain weapons and of even SS divisions from guilt as war criminals (FBIS-SOV-2001-0703). planning a coup d‘état (RFE/RL and mandated that the Latvian Newsline, Central & Eastern Europe, government begin a worldwide The peacetime task of the voluntary 11 June 1997; Lieven, 1994, p. 327). In campaign to clear their names. On defense service consists in preparing 1998, several mysterious explosive 18 March 1999, almost a year after the conscripts for the army; in wartime it devices were placed at the Russian bomb attack on the Riga synagogue, would be responsible for mobilization Embassy and the one remaining Lainis Kamaldins, head of the Office and territorial defense, including civil synagogue in Riga. Tension had arisen for the Defense of the Constitution, disobedience, non-collaboration and following a protest by mostly Russian even stated at a press conference that other forms of non-violent defense. pensioners outside the Riga City Hall perhaps “the Jews” themselves had The staff company that deals with on 3 March 1998. The protest became planted the bomb to create an interna- security and supplies is the only KASP disorderly and the Riga police used tional outcry and vilify the good name unit formed of regular servicemen. excessive means to disperse the elderly of Latvia abroad (Tel Aviv University, KASP consists of 10 combined teams crowd. The Stephen Roth Institute, 1998/99). and 2 aviation squadrons. Latvia’s international reputation took a Against the backdrop of these ethnic hard beating due to the government’s Apart from the official home guard, a tensions, the Aizsargi legion organized reluctance to distance itself right wing paramilitary volunteer force a public parade in 1998, similar to the unequivocally from extremist military was created too, the Sauliai. Sauliai was annual marches in Ulster. On 16 March traditions. backed by the then Lithuanian Defense 1944, the two divisions of the SS Minister Butkevicius and turned into a Latvian Legion in the German Lithuania’s Armed veritable threat to the stability of the occupation army engaged in a major Forces governments under Presidents battle against the Red Army at the Landsbergis and Brazauskas (Lieven, Velikaya River on USSR territory. Some 1994, p. 328). Lithuania began to form its armed 400 SS veterans held an annual parade forces without a national security on 16 March in Riga in 1998, 1999, and Lithuania is portrayed by some concept or a defense doctrine. The 2000 in commemoration of this event observers as the Baltic country most (Defence Review, No. 12/2000, Lithuanian ground forces have 4,300 advanced in preparing for NATO servicemen. At the core of army is the 22 March). The government and the membership. If this is actually the case, “Iron Wolf ” motorized infantry Seimas asked for officials and military it might be due to its focus on brigade (3,600 personnel) with eight leaders to stay away from the Latvian personnel training and improving battalions equipped with light weapons Legion parade. Yet, parliament servicemen’s living conditions, thus and armored combat vehicles proclaimed the very day of the causing a lower turnover of recently (Bajarunas, 1995, pp. 20 f.). In 1991/ 1992, the Ministry of Defense laid ground for the formation of an air

42 B·I·C·C build-up of forces

Members of the modern Lithuanian National Army. Photo: Ria Nowosti

qualified personnel than in the other 2006. NATO has nonetheless judged planning scheme (Möller, Wollmann, two Baltic states. Although relying that Lithuania’s national defense plans 2001, 93). To this end, Lithuania will heavily on former Soviet officers are too ambitious and lack adequate establish three military regions, form a during the initial stage, there has been a financing (FBIS-SOV-2001-0703). This rapid reaction brigade and obtain 67 massive “clean-up” in recent years. holds particularly true for weapons obsolete M-113 armored personnel With a new generation of western- acquisition, and Lithuania therefore carriers from Germany (ETA, 27 trained officers, the Soviet ones are plans to increase the procurement August 2000). Although there are plans treated as unwanted (Kauno Diena- share of its military budget up to 20 to increase the defense budget to ELTA, 17 July-15 September 2000). percent. Priority areas are purchases of 2 percent of GDP by 2001, this is not Lithuania profits from Polish anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry. certain since the New Union party in experiences with NATO accession parliament actually aims to cut the through its close cooperation with Lithuania is currently reorganizing its defense budget. Long-term priorities Poland. The Lithuanian-Polish ground forces with the aim of include furthermore the adoption of a battalion, LITPOLBAT, is preparing to strengthening the command and new force structure, systematic participate in peacekeeping operations control system, combat potential, education and training, logistics, and from 2001 onwards. A squadron of improving interoperability, and the development of infrastructure Lithuanian peacekeepers has already developing a long-term defense (Petrauskaite, 1999, p. 21). In terms of served in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military armaments, it is planned to reduce the plans see the “Iron Wolf ” brigade diversity of weapon systems and types, ready for joint NATO operations by

B·I·C·C 43 brief 21

to increase the cost-effectiveness of armament, including artillery, tanks and quote another example, donated five maintenance and to provide NATO- a combat airforce. 30-year old coast guard boats and compatible weaponry. The still weak air removed all firepower from the 13 defense system should be enhanced by Due to cost considerations, Latvia World War II-vintage armored establishing the Regional Air bought small quantities of Soviet-era personnel carriers which it donated to Surveillance Coordination Center light arms from Central and East Latvia (and which could not be used under BALTNET, the exchange of European states (Lejins, 1996, p. 56). because of Latvia’s sandy terrain) radar data with Poland and The basic equipment of its armed (Lejins, 1996, p. 56). improvements in the infrastructure and forces additionally includes sniper rifles logistics (Statkeviciute, 1999). bought from the UK, anti-tank systems Due to lack of funds for the and Soviet-era light arms. Anatol procurement of weapons, Estonia Weapons Acquisition Lieven holds that significant parts of relied to a large extent on defunct the Estonian stock of Makarov pistols weaponry donated by western Building their armies from scratch with and anti-tank rockets were confiscated countries that would have otherwise only minor production facilities for from illegal arms dealers who use been scrapped. Estonia bought assault military goods (boots and uniforms, Estonia for transit. In 1992, the then rifles, grenades, carbines, mines and for example), the emerging Baltic Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius grenade launchers from China; 3,000 armed forces face huge problems with Butkevicius cut a deal for automatic Kalashnikovs were purchased in modern equipment. Procurement in weapons and rockets headed for the Romania; Carl Gustaf grenade the early years barely covered the basic Caucasus. Lithuania received a large launchers were acquired from Sweden; needs for clothing, accommodation, part of the weaponry in return for some 40,500 M-14 rifles were bought training, and ammunition. Weapons allowing the weapons to pass through in the US; whereas Germany donated and equipment have been purchased its territory (Lieven, 1994, p. 321). 1,500 MG3 machine guns and Finland rather haphazardly during the last ten 19 105mm howitzers (Eesti Pevaleht, 13 years, according to the funds available. These shadowy methods of weapons July 2000). The German navy donated Due to the absence of a joint approach procurement in the early stages of two former East German navy ships to defense, it took almost ten years state-building were subsequently and two minesweepers to Estonia. In following independence to form a replaced by western sales and 2000, Germany also provided the Standardization Working Group and a donations and by the delivery of Polish mine-hunter Cuxhaven, built in 1959 Coordination Group in the field of (for example, for LITPOLBAT) or and modernized in 1978/79, this time combined production or the Czech weapons. Despite the after refurbishing the ship for nearly procurement of weaponry and legalization of arms acquisition, the DM 2.5 million (Defence Review, No. 12/ equipment. Nonetheless, coordinated Baltic states have played an infamous 2000, 22 March). procurement among the Baltic states role as transit countries for arms will, with all likelihood, only emerge trafficking throughout the 1990s. In A diplomatic row took place between after they have joined NATO. Estonia, for example, several General the Estonian Ministry of Defense and Staff officers have been standing trial the Polish government over ten T- Among the main providers of military since May 1997 (!) for the illegal import 55AM tanks presented by the Polish assistance to the Baltic states—mainly and sale of small arms. President Alexander Kwasniewski. The training and weaponry—are Denmark Estonian government could not decide (BaltBaT), Germany (BalTron), Western countries were hesitant about whether it actually wanted to have Norway (BaltNet), and Sweden supplying modern weaponry to the them. The idea of forming a Baltic (BaltDefCol). Whereas the early Baltic states, mostly donating old joint armored battalion with each state priorities for procurement consisted in equipment, such as vessels or armored receiving ten Polish tanks had been basic clothing, small weapons, and vehicles after stripping them of abandoned beforehand, and the training facilities, the next years will modern communication systems. This Estonian Ministry of Defense was thus concentrate on communications and “striptease” policy was adhered to by not sure why it should sustain these air surveillance (radar systems and Norway when it donated a Storm Class tanks at all. The only valid argument command, control and information fast patrol boat to Latvia. Sweden, to put forward for accepting the tanks systems), air defense weapons, anti- was that they could teach soldiers not tank defense, and mine-warfare to fear armored vehicles (Defence Review, equipment. All three Baltic states are No. 12/2000, 22 March). still debating the necessity for heavy

44 B·I·C·C build-up of forces

The well-published case of the Polish Generally speaking, the procurement tanks revealed several crucial problems policy often benefited the supply-side in the Estonian military establishment: more than the Baltic states. In 1993, the lack of a weapons acquisition the right-wing Estonian government policy that followed prior military sanctioned purchases of arms and planning; feuds between the Ministry military equipment for air defense of Defense’s logistical department and purposes worth about US $6–7 million the General Staff; and failure to (out of a total defense budget for 1994 coordinate the Baltic states’ acquisition of approximately US $20 million). efforts. Another episode in 2000 These arms purchases have not been confirmed the anarchy prevailing in beneficial for Estonia. The equipment Estonia’s planning policy. When bought was partially obsolete, creating receiving four Robinson R-44 light the illusion that Estonia was heavily helicopters from the US in May 2000, equipped (Haab, 1995, p. 44). Since the the air force commander, Colonel Teo Estonian budget for 2001 contains no Kerner, had to admit that the funds for weapons acquisitions, helicopters would remain without weapons in the near future can only pilots. Intrigues in the Ministry of come as gifts or aid from partner Defense and rows over priorities countries (Baltic News Agency, 25 January between the army and the air force had 2001). led to the cancellation of a pilot training program (Defence Review, All in all, the procurement of NATO- No. 12/2000, 22 March). compatible weapon systems makes the Baltic states dependent on the supplier At times, donations of military nations and leads to increased interna- equipment caused the receiving party tional liabilities and obligations to more problems than actually enhancing service debts. Western military military strength. The Estonian suppliers are already competing Defense Ministry, for example, rejected strongly for the Baltic market, as US and Swedish offers of old- evidenced, among others, by US, fashioned anti-aircraft missiles French, Italian and British bids for air (Chaparral and RBS-70) instead of the defense radar in Estonia. The Baltic more effective and mobile Stinger states are contemplating stipulating that missiles (Estonian News Agency, 25 producers make investments in local January 2001). Western suppliers—and industry in exchange for weapon particularly their governments—still purchases. The lack of modern consider certain sophisticated and equipment, especially communication highly effective weapons as provocative systems, represents one of the major to Russia, or question whether their obstacles to the Baltic states’ physical control can be guaranteed. interoperability with NATO. Estonia could thus not acquire Stinger missiles. In 2000, the Russian arms concern Rasvooruzhenie offered precisely the types of portable anti- aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons, ammunition and armored fighting vehicles which western suppliers were not willing to deliver. Although the Estonian Major General Laaneots visited the Russian producer, it is not known whether a deal was actually struck (Postimees, Eesti Pevaleht, 12 July 2000).

B·I·C·C 45 brief 21

Conclusions

Discourses and cooperative practices began to reshape the Baltic Q: “What are the greatest threats to themselves. Yet, the structural states’ security identities––from the Estonia’s national security and features of the external assertion of national sovereignty to sovereignty?” environment do not sufficiently a transatlantic and European commitment. Yet, transnational explain the actual construction communication did not undermine A: “The greatest threats are our own process of security policies or the corner stones of the Baltic states’ laziness and stupidity.” build-up of armed forces. There is a particular mismatch between the self-images: the overwhelming sense (Lenart Meri, President of Estonia, (neo-)realist worldview transpiring of vulnerability, historical in Eesti Pevaleht, 7 July 2000). from Baltic security conceptions victimhood, the negation of Russia’s Europeanness, and the primarily and the actual pursuit of security national instead of common Baltic 1) Baltic security conceptions and the politics. The build-up of armed identity. The friction between build-up of armed forces in the forces was critically shaped by Baltic states can be divided in two domestic factors, instead of transnational and national self- major stages—an initial state- and concerns of international power or understanding turned into a nation-building stage and, since the survival. Furthermore, contrary to systemic feature. second half of the 1990s, a neo-realist predictions, cooperation 5) Among the domestic conditions rapprochement with NATO and with the potential adversary, Russia, that determined the formulation of individual NATO members. Crucial though limited, did occur in vital determinants of the actual build-up fields. security policy and the build-up of of military capacities in the first armed forces in the Baltic states in stage were the organizational self- 3) The Baltic states opted for the the 1990s, some common factors stand out: a post-Soviet military interest of the newly established institution with the greatest expected establishment which faces financial armed forces and Ministries of benefit––NATO––while sidelining constraints due to differing Defense, institutional disarray, ad other institutional options. hoc policies, and competing visions Cooperation with NATO, even if priorities of economic transition; an of the future armed forces, resulting short of membership, lessened the overload of national identity-related in a mismatch between declared insecurity of the Baltic states’ status and military aspects in security conceptions; frequent changes of ‘realist’ intentions and actual policy. as well as the domestic vulnerability government, particularly defense In the second stage, cooperation of the military establishment. ministers; unclear lines of authority with NATO members and Confirming ‘institutionalist’ preparation for NATO membership reasoning, cooperation with NATO between the president, the security began to substitute the domestic shifted from being a functional (or defense) council, defense agenda-setting and to exert a means to an end––increased minister, and general staff; a strong Soviet military culture clashing with dominating external influence. security––to a constraining and the professional culture of ex- Cooperation with NATO and institutionalizing factor. One could patriates and western advisers; a qualification for membership shifts additionally argue that the Baltic the focus of the Baltic military states’ admission to NATO depends post-communist mindset, including build-up from territorial defense decisively on the pre-existing planning shortsightedness, towards interoperability in out-of- interests of the great powers. Yet, an avoidance of accountability, decision-making without regard to area operations. institutionalist explanation does not implementation, lack of capture the domestic reasons for coordination and information 2) Neither a ‘neo-realist’, opting for NATO, which are related ‘institutionalist’ or ‘constructivist’ to the organizational survival exchange, and a limited approach alone can satisfactorily interests of the military understanding of the value of capture the construction of Baltic establishment rather than security public relations. In practice, the Baltic states’ security policy was security politics in the 1990s. The concerns. determined more by domestic neo-realist notion of distrust is institutional, cultural, and economic confirmed by the lasting Baltic 4) Using ‘constructivist’ reasoning, one perception of Russia as a potential can argue that exclusive national factors than ‘realist’ notions in their threat as well as the limits of discourses about security altered security perceptions. cooperation among the Baltic states under the impact of increased international exchanges, both with NATO member states and Russia.

46 B·I·C·C conclusions

6) Given that the Baltic states built functions of the military seem to be and the EU are of equal their armies from scratch, the confined to the security importance, NATO membership defense budgets throughout the establishment itself. The identity represents an ideational inclination, 1990s barely allowed for more than connotations of security politics whereas informed Baltic politicians basic maintenance. The provided ‘diffuse support’ for realize that EU membership is more ineffectiveness in managing security orientations such as NATO significant in its consequences. affairs can additionally be attributed membership, but they did not mean Detached from concrete threat to the early stage of state-building ‘specific support’, as evidenced by assessments, NATO membership and the respective experimenting, the unpopularity of military service, became an end in itself. Against the particularly if one takes into the lack of security agendas in party backdrop of Russia’s objections, account the fact that the military programs, and the low priority of NATO orientation turned into a elite was fashioned Soviet-style. The military affairs in distributional national and political test of loyalty. initial phase created a sense of politics. In view of domestic overburdening—it required the vulnerability, striving for NATO 11) Against the backdrop of the most elaboration of national security membership became a means of urgent security problems, e.g. illegal conceptions, the build–up of improving the military’s weak trans-border traffic, crime, military infrastructure, decision– position in domestic policy. terrorism, interethnic tensions, and making procedures, the adoption of environmental hazards, it would be fundamental legislation, and the 9) The planned strength of the Baltic advisable in the foreseeable future recruitment of a new officer corps armed forces is excessive, given to strive for inclusive security as well as the drafting of recruits. what these states can afford to arrangements aimed at increased supply and arm. Though the inter-state security and based on 7) The mismatch between security concept of “total defense” has conflict prevention and conflict rhetoric and the lack of security never been abandoned, it is resolution among potential planning is striking. Security threats inefficient and amounts to a waste adversaries. Instead of increasing were obviously not as imminent as of resources in view of the moral noise about NATO publicly stated. The disorganization competitive nature of the Baltic enlargement, the Baltic states would mirrors a deeper lack of urgency. states. The Baltic states are too small be better off concentrating on Despite security rhetoric to the to launch “total defense” homemade insecurities. Tensions are contrary, no imminent sense of independently of one another. likely to be resolved by increased danger existed. The overwhelming Furthermore, the Baltic defense institutionalized cooperation in incrementalism in the Baltic build- leagues put a serious strain on civil spheres of common interest. If it is up of armed forces instead of a control over the military; they Russia’s unpredictability which designed approach resulted from frequently became a source of causes the ultimate concern, it under–institutionalization, the criminal activities, and are still not would be reasonable to expect that instrumental use of military well integrated into a unified security policy should be directed institutions and resources by its command structure. The prospect towards reducing this prime actors, and—over time— of NATO membership will in any unpredictability. Instead of shifting points of reference in the case shift attention away from the overloading the security debates external environment. If the “total defense” concept. Small, with highly charged notions of perception of a Russian threat had professional security services, national identity or loyalty, the really been the prime concern of unified under one security ministry military means should be linked in decision-makers, military capacity- would probably better suit the an accountable manner to building, intra-Baltic cooperation, tangible security needs of the Baltic identifiable security ends. and allying with NATO countries states. would probably have been more 12) NATO has entered a consolidation result-oriented. 10) Reflections on the costs and merits phase and it is therefore likely to of NATO membership, compared forestall a “big bang” enlargement 8) Given the limited popularity of the to other options, are rare in the in 2002. In contrast to the Visegard armed forces and the low ranking Baltic states. Regardless of official states’ past ability to foster an of security issues on the transition statements to the effect that NATO environment favorable to agenda, the military could not play a expansion, the current impact of decisive role in restoring national the Baltic states on public opinion pride or embody a collective in NATO countries is negligible. national ego. ‘Psychological’ Key to the applicant states’ NATO

B·I·C·C 47 brief 21

membership is the outright support 14) NATO as well as the EU may of the US. Yet, as of early 2002, develop strategies for those states Denmark and Poland are the only that are not included in the alliance. ardent supporters of the Baltic A promise to assist in the case of a states’ inclusion in NATO. If the military threat or aggression may logic of NATO consolidation holds suffice, without obliging states in true and if the momentum of transition to spend scarce resources NATO’s cooperation with Russia in on military build-up or to contribute fighting terrorism in Afghanistan is to NATO interventions in remote sustained, NATO enlargement will world regions. With interoperability be limited in scope and geared developing within the Partnership towards military value added. for Peace framework and membership Action Plans, the 13) If the striving for NATO dividing line between membership membership is not satisfied in the or non-membership may loose its foreseeable future, the question may salience. If NATO’s main mission is arise of whether the EU’s Common actually going to change from Foreign and Security Policy could collective defense towards pan- represent an alternative to NATO. European collective security, it is Elusive as it is, the Common reasonable to determine its division European Security and Defense of labor with the OSCE and the Policy may suffice as a future EU’s Common Foreign and Security conflict prevention and post- Policy before further enlargement. conflict management machinery for European purposes. The EU, 15) The factor most significantly through its CESDP, may perform influencing regional stability is the peacekeeping functions in European economic and social preparedness affairs—a framework that would of the Baltic states to join the EU, suit the applicants for EU not military capacities. The desire of membership too. Given that there is Baltic states to join NATO may no dire security need for NATO inhibit rapprochement with the EU enlargement, the candidates’ security because the burden of mitigating concerns could be dealt with in the the impact on EU-Russia relations is framework of their preparations for shifted to the EU. The question of EU membership. This would imply whether EU enlargement will lead participation of the EU applicant to a hardening or softening of the states in formulating and designing border with Russia (and the wider the CESDP. Political, economic, and Commonwealth of Independent military aspects of security could be States) is of key concern for the inter-linked far more efficiently than Baltic states as future EU members. in the case of NATO enlargement. NATO membership would no longer function as a substitute for the lack of European leadership in defining the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Against the backdrop of a NATO strategy of deferment, it might be reasonable and far less expensive for Eastern European states which are striving for EU membership to concentrate their efforts on participating in the design of the CFSP.

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B·I·C·C 53 The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

an independent non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the transfer of former military resources and assets to alternative civilian purposes

he transfer of resources from the military learinghouse. In its capacity as an T to the civilian sector represents both a C independent organization, BICC supports social and an economic challenge, as well as and assists international organizations, offering an opportunity for the states government agencies, nongovernmental concerned. The sustained process of organizations, companies and the media, as disarmament during the decade following the well as private individuals. It hereby mediates end of the Cold War has made defense conver- and facilitates the conversion process at all sion an important issue in many countries levels—local, national and global. BICC today. This process has now slowed down collects and disseminates data and information considerably, but the problems faced by those on conversion to practitioners in a wide range affected are far from solved. BICC’s main of fields and institutions. BICC strives to reach objective is to make use of the chances offered researchers and practitioners as well as by disarmament, whilst at the same time parliamentarians, the media, and the general helping to avoid—or lessen—the negative public by means of a variety of tools including effects. its library, its extensive on-line documentation services and its internet service (www.bicc.de). This issue concerns a number of areas: What Furthermore, the Center documents the course can scientists and engineers who were formerly of disarmament and conversion in its annual employed in weapons labs do today? What is conversion surveys and produces a variety of the fate of the roughly eight million employees publications. who lost their jobs in the defense factories? Why are so many defense companies faring The Bonn International Center for Conversion better today than they did ten years ago? Will was established in 1994 with generous support all demobilized soldiers or former combatants from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia find a future in civilian society? What action (NRW). The Center’s Trustees include the two must communities take when suddenly faced German states of North Rhine-Westphalia and with the closure of a huge military base? How Brandenburg as well as the Westdeutsche Lan- does one solve the problem of the ready desbank–Girozentrale (WestLB), Düsseldorf/ availability of small arms and light weapons? Münster and the Landesentwicklungsgesell- schaft NRW (LEG). It is BICC’s task to tackle these questions, to analyze them on the basis of scientific research, to convey the necessary information, Published by and to give advice to those involved—in short, © BICC, Bonn 2002 Bonn International Center for Conversion to manage disarmament. Director: Peter J. Croll Publishing Management, Layout: Svenja Bends An der Elisabethkirche 25 nternational think tank. BICC conducts D-53113 Bonn I research and makes policy Germany recommendations. In-house and external Phone +49-228-911960 Fax +49-228-241215 experts contribute comparative analyses and E-mail: [email protected] background studies Internet: www.bicc.de ISSN 0947-7322 roject management and consulting services. BICC provides practical Printed in Germany P All rights reserved support to public and private organizations. For instance, BICC staff advise local governments confronted with the difficult task of redeveloping former military installations. BICC also combines development assistance with practical conversion work by helping in the fields of demobilization, reintegration and peace-building.