Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals and the Mediation of Cultural Islam in Indonesia

[CIS 7.1-2 (2011) 105-136] Comparative Islamic Studies (print) ISSN 1740-7125 doi: 10.1558/cis.v7i 1-2.105 Comparative Islamic Studies (online) ISSN 1743-1638

Carool Kersten

King's College London

carool.kerstenigkcl.ac.uk

ABSTRACT Carool Kersten's article describes how Indonesia plays a key role in connecting East and Southeast Asia with the Middle East and the rest of the world. Aside from progress in scholarly research on the his- toricity of these relations, Kersten analyzes contemporary developments. As the largest Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia has positioned itself in the vanguard of ASEAN as the main architect of the region's relations with other parts of Asia, the Islamic world and the West, while simultaneously avoiding overtly political Islamic agendas, relying instead on a notion of "cultural" or "civil Islam." This article discusses the alternative discourse of civil or cultural Islam developed by a cosmopolitan Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia who was given a space by the consecutive regimes following the ousting of Sukarno. Kersten identifies this uniquely Indonesian Islamic discourse as the outcome of the compounded efforts of three generations of Muslim intellectuals, loyal to the Pancasila ideology and embracing the slogan "Islam Yes! Islamic Party: No!" In defiance ofthe growing antagonism following the re-emergence of Islamic political parties in the post- Suharto era, also the youngest generation of "liberal" and "post-traditional" Muslims continue to give shape to this cosmopolitan Islam.

Keywords Indonesia, ASEAN, Civil Islam, Pancasila, Cosmopolitan Islam, Nurcholish Majdld

Since the fall ofthe Soeharto regime in 1998, there has been increased interest in the role of Islam in restructuring Indonesian public life. Although bomb attacks on Bali and in Jakarta have diverted much of this attention towards radical forms of political Islamism, a quick browse of the shelves in bookstores or catalogues of publishers in the South- east Asian region confirms that this interest for Islam and Muslims goes beyond the acute concerns (real or imagined) of security special- ists triggered by these incidents I have mentioned.' In this respect it is also important to guard against the too hasty conclusion that, because of their sheer vocality and confrontational attitude, the "Radical-Con- servative" camp has the upper hand over proponents of a more "Liberal- Progressive Islam."^ I would argue that in Indonesia's case it is almost the opposite. At the launch of his most recent book, author Nasir Tamara explained that he had put "Islam" first in the subtitle of his book Indonesia Rising: Islam, Democracy and the Rise of Indonesia as a Major Power, because he con- siders it a key constituent in the country's trajectory towards democratic success since the beginning of the Reformasi a decade ago.^ This statement is backed-up in the book's introduction with a citation of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, saying that "if you want to know if Islam, democracy, modernity and women's rights can coexist, go to Indonesia."" The present account too is guardedly optimistic in regards to Muslim Southeast Asia's potential to contribute to a rethinking of the Islamic heritage in contemporary Muslim societies and its contributions to an increasingly interconnected world. In a speech given at the London School of Economics in the fringes of the G20 summit in April 2009, the main protagonist of Tamara's book. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoy-

1. cf. for example the following titles released by National University of Singapore (NUS) in the past year: Jeffrey Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs: Cultural Resilience in Minangkabau through Jihad and Colonialism; Patrick Guiness, Kampung, Islam and the State in Urbanjava; Edward Aspinall, ¡slam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh. 2. M. Syafi'i Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Contest between 'Radical-Conservative Islam' and 'Progressive-Liberal Islam'," in Southeast Asia and the Middle East: ¡slam. Movement and the Longue Durée, ed. Eric Tagiocozzo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 349. 3. National Library of Singapore, 27 August 2009. 4. Nasir Tamara, Indonesia Rising: ¡slam. Democracy and the Rise of indonesia as a Major Power (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2009), xii. The fact that President Obama sent the secretary of state to Indonesia on her first major international mission is also indicative ofthe president's own interest in Indonesia, cf. Tamara, indonesia Rising, xi, 15-16.

ono (a.k.a. SBY), confidently positioned his country as a bridge between the Muslim World, Asia and the West.^ However, this potential is not only informed by developments in Indonesia, but also by the assertiveness displayed by Muslims from other Southeast Asian countries. Witness the remarks made in 2002, by Surin Pitsuwan—the current Secretary General of ASEAN, but at that time still foreign minister of Thailand.' In an interview with Newsweek's Fareed Zakaria he observed that "for all Islam's history. Southeast Asia was considered a backwater. But the flows of globalization now need to be reversed. Islam must learn not from the center but rather the periphery."' Two years later, the Malay- sian Arts, Culture and Heritage Minister Datu Seri Rais Yatim came out against the "Arabization" of Malay culture, encouraging his countrymen to "challenge those who condemn deep-rooted practices of the Malay community as unlslamic {sic\."^ In this context it is also important to be mindful of the fact that this display of self-confidence by Southeast Asian Muslims results from a growing awareness that their region is historically embedded in the greater ecumene ofthe C/mma or global Muslim community. This is also evident in recent scholarship - not least by academics indigenous to the region—on the connections between the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and the centers of Islamic learning in West and South Asia through mer- cantile and intellectual networks using the Indian Ocean as a contact zone.' These findings form an important correction of (l) persistent and

5. The text of this speech is available online at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/ LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20090331_BambangYudhoyono.pdf 6. An interesting fact in itself: a Muslim serving as the chief diplomat of a Buddhist Kingdom. 7. Eareed Zakaria, "Look East for the Answer," Newsweek, November 4, 2002. 8. J.H.L. Wong, "Stop 'Arabising' Malay Culture," The Star April 17,2004. Accessed http:// thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2004/4/l7/nation/7779945&sec=nation. Developments in Southeast Asia have also caught the imagination ofthe political establishment in Washington. Cf. Missouri senator Christopher Bond's very recent publication. The Next Frontier: Southeast Asia and the Road to Global Peace with Islam. I thank Prof. Raymond Scupin of Lindenwood University (MO) for drawing my attention to this publication. 9. Eor example, R.Michael Eeener and Terenjit Sevea, Islamic Connections: Muslim Soci- eties in South and Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009); Joseph Liow Chinyong and Nadirshah Hosen, Islam in Southeast Asia: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastem-Ulamä in the Seven- teenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004); Huub

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 108 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals long-held views that because it is located on the geographical periphery of the Muslim world, the Islam practiced in insular Southeast Asia must be a watered-down version of the original; a "thin veneer" over a much older Buddhist-Hindu heritage of Indian origin; (2) the view that Southeast Asian Muslims are only recipients of knowledge and lacking in agency instead of interlocutors actively participating in intellectual exchanges through which knowledge travels back and forth. This revi- sionist account of the history of Southeast Asian Islam also forms the backdrop for the present narrative on alternative Islamic discourses developed in Indonesia. The propensity towards promoting a "substantive-inclusive" approach whereby Islam provides an ethical guideline rather than a concrete set of rules with the force of law is not a recent phenomenon.'" As someone working on the intellectual history of the modern Muslim world rather than political and security issues, I draw on my research into what I call "new Muslim intellectualism," which has been steadily evolving over the last half a century or so.

Southeast Asia's integration into the Muslim world The contributions of the intellectuals examined here are therefore to be regarded as an integral part of sustained contacts between the Malay- Indonesian archipelago and the Middle East which led to the formation of a Malay-Muslim civilization—one of the main, in Marshall Hodgson's terms, "Islamicate" cultures." Starting relatively late, the Islamization of Southeast Asia was not achieved by conquest but through what now would be called "networking," involving Sufi orders—the "transnational" Islamic mystical brotherhoods holding together the social-cultural fab- ric of the Muslim world after the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate—and less institutionalized contacts among religious scholars.'^ Although the

de Jonge and Nico Kaptein, Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia (Leiden: KILTV Press, 2004); Michael F. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the Winds (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Fred von der Mehden Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainsville: Uni- versity of Florida Press, 1993); Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001). 10. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 352. 11. Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam/ Volume 1 The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 57 12. cf. Martin van Bruinessen, "The Origins and Development of the Naqashbandi Or-

first written evidence only dates back to the sixteenth century, when Hamzah Fansuri produced an impressive body of Sufi poetry merging Malay, Persian and Arabic styles and motifs, in the ensuing centuries an imposing body of knowledge in the Islamic sciences written in Arabized Malay or Jawi was built up; including mystical texts by religious scholars such as Shamsuddin of Pasai, the first Quran commentary in Malay of Abd al-Ra'uf al-Singkili, as well as question and answer compendia on a variety of religious topics compiled by expatriate Southeast Asian jurists and theologians based in the Hijaz, Yemen, the Indian Subcontinent, and later also in Egypt." Moreover it was a rebellious seventeenth-century Muslim leader from the island of Sulawesi sent into exile by the Dutch, who was instrumental to spreading Islam in Sri Lanka and later in South Africa.'"" Another important factor in the preservation and transmission of this religious knowledge is the emergence of an institution unique to Muslim Southeast Asia: the pondok or pesantren, usually translated as "Islamic boarding school" led by charismatic teachers called guru or kyai, found throughout the Malay-Indonesia archipelago and peninsula, and quite different from the Quran schools and madrasas elsewhere in the Muslim world.'^ In the course of the nineteenth century, as technological advances including the steam ship and printing press improved communications so that traffic of both people and texts between West, South, and South- east Asia only intensified, increasing numbers of Indonesian Muslims became conversant with ideas developed by Muslim reformists and

der in Indonesia," Der ¡slam 67 (l990): 150-179; Van Bruinessen, "Origins and Devel- opment of the Sufi Orders (Tarekat) in Southeast Asia," Studia Islamika l(l), (1994): 1-23; Van Bruinessen, "Najmuddin al-Kubra, Jumaldin Kubra and Jamaluddin al- Akbar: Traces of a Kubrawiyya Influence in Early Indonesian Islam," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- and Volkenkunde 150 (1994): 304-329; Anthony H. Johns, "Sufism in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations," Jouma! of Southeast Asian Studies 26(1), (1995): 169-183. 13. Cf. Riddell, ¡slam and the Malay-Indonesian World, 125-132. 14. Cf. R. Michael Feener, "Shaykh Yusuf and the Appreciation of Muslim Saints in Modern Indonesia," Joumai of Asian Studies 18-19 (1998/99): 112-131. 15. Excellent studies of the phenomenon have been made by: Taufik Abdullah, "The Pesantren in Historical Perspective," in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, ed. Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (Singapore, ISEAS, 1986), 80-107; Zamkhshari Dhofi- er, "The Pesantren Tradition: A Study in the Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of the Traditional ideology of Islam in Java" (PhD diss. Australia National University, 1980) and Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Recente Ontwikkelingen in Indonesisch Islamonderricht (Meppel, Krips Repro, 1974).

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 lio Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals modernists in Mecca, Medina, Cairo, Istanbul, Persia, India and Singa- pore.*' By 1900, with Western imperialist incursions reaching their peak, Indonesians and other Southeast Asians faced increasingly complicated negotiations between the cultural specificities of their native lands, their communal identity as Muslims, and the introduction of novel concepts such as pan-Islamism and nationalism into the region's political-cultural repertoire. A major consequence of this development was the emerging schism between two types of Muslims. On the one hand, there were the kaum tua or the "old group": traditionalists loyal to the positions held by their kyais and gurus as "Guardians of the Traditions of the Prophet and the Consensus of the Scholars" (Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-jama'a, in contemporary Indonesia often referred to with the acronym Aswcy'a). On the other hand, there emerged the kaum muda or "new group," initially enthused by earlier reformists such as Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab in Arabia, and later by the ideas of peripatetic activist-intellectuals like al-Afghani, Abduh and Rida." Later generations of kaum muda or modernist Muslims were either educated at schools founded by modernist organizations or the product of a secular state-controlled education system while often autodidact in religious knowledge. In both cases they became divorced from the traditionalist learning they considered as atrophied by taqlid or "blind imitation." In the face of the secular transformation of Indonesian society under Dutch rule, modernists such as Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), Agus Salim (1884-1954) and Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923) deployed important initia- tives for advocating the economic and educational interests of Indone- sia's Muslims by establishing emancipatory Islamic organizations such as the Sarekat Islam (1912) and Muhammadiyah (1912), To counter this modernist challenge to their authority, prominent traditionalist Mus- lims associated with Javanese pesantrens led by Hasjim Asj'ari (1875-1947) responded in 1926 by founding an organization of their own called Nah-

16. For extensive discussions of the development of Islamic modernism in Southeast Asia, cf. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia; William R. Roff, "The Ma- lay-Muslim World of Singapore at the Close ofthe Nineteenth Century," Joumai of Asian Studies 24(l), (1964): 20-39; Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920," Indonesia 9 (1970): 73-87; Roff, "Islamic Movements: One or Many," in Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse, ed. William R. Roff (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987): 31-52. 17. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia, 17lff.

dlatul Ulama (NU) or "Rebirth ofthe Religious Scholars." In the course of the twentieth century both the Muhammadiyah and NU expanded their support bases among the population to a numerical magnitude that turned the NU and Muhammadiyah into mass organizations unique in the Muslim world. Commanding the loyalty of tens of millions of adherents, they became very well-positioned to exercise exceptional political influence, operating more effectively than conventional political parties of Islamic signature. Aside from their social-political influence, they have also colored the canvas on which to depict Indonesian contributions to the shaping of contemporary Islamic intellectual discourses.

A new Muslim intellectual This historical dimension aside, Indonesia's present-day Muslim thinkers, scholars and activists also are exponents of a wider contemporary phenomenon. Tamara's mention of parallel experiments with democratization in Morocco, Turkey and Iran is a convincing and concrete indication that the narratives I am trying to map in my new research project on cosmopolitan Islam must be treated as a global trend which, is not only unfolding in what is geographically considered as the Islamic world but also the Muslim diasporas in Europe and North America. The authors of these alternative Islamic discourses constitute a new Muslim intelligentsia, distinguishing themselves by their intimate familiarity with the cultural-religious heritage ofthe Muslim world and an equally solid acquaintance with the advances in the human sciences achieved in Western academia. Occupying what I have elsewhere called a "Third Space" on the interstices of traditionalist Islamic learning, Islamic modernism and the Western academe, they are uniquely positioned to rethink, reconstruct and "reactualize" Islam." On the one hand, it can be argued that for that very reason their significance is limited because it confines their audience to those echelons of Muslim societies with access to higher education. However, if we can take seriously a recent statement by a very senior Indonesian government flgure, then the signiflcance of these intellectuals lies in the ambi- tious projections for Indonesia's future demographics. According to this official, if the political and economic objectives ofthe incumbent administration are to be viable then Indonesia must quadruple its middle class

18. Karel Peter Leonard Gerard Kersten, "Occupants of the Third Space: New Muslim Intellectuals and the Study of Islam (Nurcholish Madjid, Hasan Hanafi, Mohammed Arkoun)," (PhD diss.. School of Oriental and African Studies, 2009), 35.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 112 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals from 15% to 60% over the next twenty five years.^' The concomitant surge of student numbers entering institutions for tertiary education to be anticipated will result in an commensurate expansion of the potential audience for the bold and often controversial ideas of these intellectuals, because this middle class can only function as a "transmission belt" for material wealth and political power between the elite and the less fortunate segments of society if this is supported by the necessary intellectual transformations.^" I believe that cosmopolitanism and its adjective adequately reflect the liminality and cultural hybridity of the intellectuals in question. In fact, this notion of cosmopolitanism is used with increasing frequency in much wider contexts by anthropologists, political scientists, legal scholars, historians, theorists of postcolonial studies, philosophers, and literary critics as "embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism."" This 'new cosmopolitanism' has expanded into an exploration of possibilities beyond those of classical cosmopolitanism, which draws primarily on the ancient Hellenic legacy and is very much associated with the fig- ure of Kant.^^ Moreover, in an early and seminal text on this resurgent cosmopolitanism, Ulf Hannerz underscores the central role of individual agency associated with this phenomenon, reflected as both a "state of readiness" and "built-up skill."" Hannerz's essay has the additional attraction of singling out intellectuals as an apt illustration of this cosmopolitan disposition. Informed by the recent theorizing of cultural hybridity, this new cosmopolitanism may be regarded as a further sophistication of a "proc-

19. The statement was made in the UK under Chatham House rules which prevent me from attributing the source. 20. On the significance of a developing middle class, cf. Eickelman and Anderson, New Media in the Muslim World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), xiff., and Vali Nasr's Forces of Fortune: The Rise ofthe New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for the World (New York: Eree Press, 2009). 21. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1. 22. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, Cosmopolitanism, 10. Martha Nussbaum has provided an excellent discussion of these two strands, cf. Joshua Cohen, for the love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriatism. Martha C. Nussbaum and Respondents (Cam- bridge: Beacon Press, 1996). 23. Ulf Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture," Theory, Culture & Society 7(1990): 237-251, 239.

essual theory of hybridity."^^ Transcending the inadequacy of modern Western insights associating cultural hybridity with liminality, margin- ality, and the interstitial—allocations of space which renders such modernist understanding of hybridity static—it is more accurately presented as a "constant process of differentiation and exchange between the centre and the periphery and between different peripheries."^^ This revised notion of hybridity challenges "blind conformity to the European model" and is marked by a "dialectic of adaptation and transformation."^' These elaborations and corrections affirm the plausibility of what Ulrich Beck has characterized as the second age of modernity, the most important characteristic of which—for the present account—is that "the guiding ideas, the foundations and ultimately, the claim to a monopoly on modernity by an originally western European modernism is shattered."" The consequences that can be extrapolated from this is that such a paradig- matic shift in the understanding of modernity emerging in the post-Cold War world order breaks down assumed binaries oppositions, dichotomies and boundaries, such as tradition vs. modernity, centre vs. periphery, and "the West" vs. "Islam" is also gaining momentum in the Muslim world thanks to the efforts of these new Muslim intellectuals.^'

The genealogy of cosmopolitan Muslim intellectualism in Indonesia In the case of Indonesia, I suggest that the development of this new Mus- lim intellectual profile can be tracked through three—one also could argue four—generational shifts in postcolonial Indonesia, producing

24. Pnina Werbner, "Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity," in Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism, ed. Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (London: Zed Books, 1997), 21. 25. Nikos Papastergiadis, "Tracing Hybridity in Theory," in Debating Cultural hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism, ed. Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (London: Zed Books, 1997), 274. On liminality and interstitiality, cf. also Homi Bhahba's seminal The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994). For a suc- cinct discussion of cultural hybridity, cf. Peter Burke, Cultural Hybridy (Cambridge and Maiden: Polity Press, 2009). 26. Nikos Papastergiadis, "Tracing Hybridity in Theory," 262. 27. Ulrich Beck, "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology in the Second Age of Moder- nity," in Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice, ed. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 70. 28. Cf. Suha Taji-Farouki, Modem Intellectuab and the Qur'an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3; R. Michael Feener, "Cross-Cultural Contexts of Modern Muslim Intel- lectuals," Die Welt des Islams 47(3-4), (2007): 264-282, 273.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 114 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals thinkers who combine a confident grounding in the Islamic heritage (both local and global) with a solid knowledge of Western achievements in the human sciences. The earliest intellectual reformers in Muslim Southeast Asia were referred to as kaum muda or "new people." Influenced by the ideas of reformists from South Asia and the Arabic-speaking world, such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, they fit into the category of what Fazlur Rahman called the "classical" Islamic modernists.^' Predominantly interested in reviving the in their view authen- tic Islamic ideas of the "Pious Ancestors" [al-Salaf al-Salih], or the early Muslim community in seventh-century Medina, in order to defy the hegemonic onslaught of western modernity, their political heirs played a prominent role in Indonesia's independence struggle. However in their attempts to have the Shariah included in the country's constitution these modernist Islamic politicians were eventually outmanoeuvred by the secular nationalists around the new republic's first president Soekarno. Instead of the so-called "Jakarta Charter," which states that Indonesia Muslims must adhere to Islamic law, Soekarno proclaimed his Pancasila doctrine, which only included a tenet on the necessary belief in one but unspecified God.^" In spite of such political setbacks, leading modernists exercised considerable influence on the formation of Indonesian society in the early decades of its independence: the legal scholar Muhammad Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy (1904-1975) tried to conceptualize an Indonesian fiqh; the author known as HAMKA" (1908-1981) left his mark on public discourse through his religious and literary writings; Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993), a self-educated man of letters from Sumatra who as head of Indonesia's main Islamic party known as Masyumi briefly served as prime minister (1950-1951) and then as the leading opposition politician; and, finally, the academic and diplomat Mohammad Rasjidi (1915-2001), who worked on the crossroads of diplomacy, politics and scholarship. when continued clashes between the left-leaning Soekarno regime and the Masyumi party led to the latter's ban from politics in the 1960s as punishment for its association with secessionist movements in West Java and on Sumatra, Masyumi politicians developed a Middle-East inspired

29. Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chi- cago, IL: University of Chicago, 1982), 85. 30. For a detailed account, cf. Bernard Johan Boland, The Struggle of ¡slam in Modem ¡n- donesia (The Hague: Nederlandsche Boek- en Steendrukkerij, 1971), 25-27. 31. An acronym of Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah.

missionary organization called Bewan Bahnah Islam Indonesia (DDIl) and began focusing on proselytization in civil society to drive their "legal- exclusive" agenda.^^ The leadership ofthe NU and Muhammadiyah, Mus- lim academics and other intellectuals, meanwhile, concentrated their activities on safeguarding and expanding the Islamic education system uniquely adapted to the specific circumstances in Indonesia, which are characterized by cultural and religious pluralism. Aside from sustaining the traditionalist education provided in the pesantrens and the modern Islamic schools initiated by organizations such as the Muhammadiyah, one ofthe first acts ofthe post-independence government was the establishment of a system of higher Islamic education. As early as the summer of 1945, Vice President-designate Hatta (1902-1980), Masyumi chairman Natsir, and NU leader Wahid Hasjim^^ (1914-1953) had launched the initiative for a "Higher Islam School" or Sekolah Islam Tinggi (SIT), renamed in 1948 into Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII). Following the elevation of Yogyakarta's secular Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) to state university level, the Islamic bloc was appeased with the establishment of a "State Islamic Higher Learning Institute" or Per- guruan Tinggi Agama ¡slam Negeri (PTAIN). Eventually, in 1960, PTAIN was merged with the Ministry of Religious Affairs' own "State Academy for Religious Officials" or Akademi Dinas llmu Agama (ADIA) into the first two State Institutes for Islamic Studies or Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), located in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.'" Reflective of the then still prevail- ing influence of classical Islamic modernism, three of their five faculties were modelled after the reformed al-Azhar University in Cairo.'^ This government-supported system of higher Islamic education began producing a Muslim intelligentsia which also included growing numbers of individuals who had received a state education in combination with a traditionalist pesantren or pondok-based Islamic upbringing and then

32. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 352. 33. Son of NU founder Hasjim Ash'ari and father of Abdurrahman Wahid, who himself took the helm at NU in 1984 and eventually became president of Indonesia (1999- 2001). 34. Abdullah Saeed, "Towards Religious Tolerance Through Reform in Islamic Educa- tion: The Case ofthe State Institute of Islamic Studies in Indonesia," Indonesia and the Malay World 27(79), (1999), 182-183. 35. Johan Meuleman, "The Institut Agama Islam Negeri at the Crossroads," in ¡slam in the Era Globalization: Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and ¡dentity, ed. Johan Meule- man (London: Routledge, 2002), 284.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 116 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals moved on to this state-run system for higher Islamic learning. This setting provided the preconditions for the emergence of the new Muslim intellectuals who have developed and who continue to articulate what is alternately called Indonesia's "civil" or "cultural" or even "cosmopolitan" Islam \lslam sipil, Islam kultural, Islam kosmopolitan], forming the basis for the policies designed and adopted during the Soeharto years and further developed in the post-1998 Reformasi. General Soeharto's Orde Bam or "New Order" regime, which effectively ousted Soekarno in a military coup in 1965, redirected not only Indonesia's political trajectory but also caused a sea change in Muslim intellectual discourse. The new government's first priority was to improve Indonesia's economic situation. This required the involvement of a "new type of intellectual, who could be expected to participate in government-directed development efforts."^* Since this policy appeared to allow a certain public space for a non-political, cultural Islam, a number of progressive-minded Mus- lim intellectuals were inclined towards a degree of cooperation with the new government." Having matured in the postcolonial era, they were mentored by two key figures from the transitional generation, who regarded a further reformation ofthe Islamic education system as crucial to the successful development of this civil or cultural Islam. The biographies and ideas of these two mentors reflect the cosmopolitanism which, I argue, is the hallmark of these emerging new Muslim intellectuals and the alternative Islamic discourses they produce. With classical modernists such as Natsir and Rasjidi increasingly sidelined, the stars of Abdul Mukti Ali (1923-2004) and Harun Nasution (1919-1998) were on the rise under the New Order. Although Mukti Ali was born on Java as Boedjono and had received a secular education at a Dutch state school and his Islamic for-

36. Taufik Abdullah, "The Formation of a New Paradigm? A Sketch on Contemporary Islamic Discourse," in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in ¡ndonesian ¡slamic Thought, ed. Mark R. Woodward (Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 49. 37. Robert W. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," in ¡slam in an Era of Nation-States: Political and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, ed. Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 79; Fauzan Saleh, Modem Trends in ¡slamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century ¡ndonesia: A Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 240. For detailed studies, providing profiles of the intellectuals involved, cf. Howard Federspiel, Muslim ¡ntellectuals and National Development in ¡ndonesia (Commack: Nova Science Publications, 1992); Federspiel, ¡ndonesian Muslim ¡ntellectuab ofthe 20th Century (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006).

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 Carool Kersten 117 mation at East-Java's Pesantren Termas,'* while the Sumatran Nasution was trained at a Dutch-run Modern Islamic Teachers' College, their subsequent career paths and views on the role of Islam in modern Muslim societies showed remarkable parallels.'' After attending SIT in Yogyakarta and performing Hajj in 1950, Mukti Ali went for further studies to Pakistan and then to the Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS) at McGill University in Canada. There he not only appreciated the fact that the programme was not associated with Middle Eastern Studies, but also was much in favour ofthe "holistic" approach introduced by the institute's founder and director, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, envisaged to introduce the attending Muslim students to issues such as intellectual freedom, the concept of the state, women's rights and interfaith dialogue.^" Mukti Ali's personal relationship with Cantwell Smith would later become instrumental in establishing a longstanding programme of cooperation between the IAINs and McGill." Specializing in comparative religion, Mukti Ali was the flrst Indonesian Muslim scholar to become an expert in that fleld. When, upon his return from Canada, he took positions at the newly formed IAINs in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, he introduced courses on comparative religious studies into the curriculum. To counter the negative effects of the dualism caused by the educational policies of the colonial era, which had either led to a wholesale adoption or outright rejection of Western learning, Mukti Ali also advocated the development of a new discipline called 'Occidentalism' or "Western studies" to better prepare Indonesian Muslims for engaging in a dialogue with the West.""^ Aside from his academic work, between 1967 and 1971, Mukti Ali hosted a special study circle at his home in Yogyakarta,

38. Karel Steenbrink, "Recapturing the Past: Historical Studies by IAIN-Staff," in Toward a New Paradigm, ed. Mark R. Woodward (Tempe: University State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 156. 39. Saiful Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim community: An Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution," Studia Islamika l(l), (1994): 93-99; Richard C. Martin and Mark R Woodward, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism fi-om Medieval School to Modem Symbol (Oxford: OneWorld, 1997), 161-163. 40. Ali Munhanif, "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Po- litical Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali," Studia Islamika 3(l), (1996), 85-93. 41. Euad Jabali and Jamhari, IAIN & Modemisasi Islam di Indonesia Oakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002), 20-22. 42. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modem Indonesia, 208.

Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 118 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals called "The Limited Group" [Lingkaran Diskusi]. Two core participants, Djohan Effendi and Dawam Rahardjo, were destined to become leading Mus- lim intellectuals and activists during the New Order era and thereafter." Eollowing his appointment as Minister of Religion in 1971, Mukti Ali began defining a "Weberian" religious policy in which all religions in Indonesia would become involved in socioeconomic development."^ In the face of a spectacular growth in conversions to Christianity during the 1950s and 1960s, he also initiated an interfaith dialogue by establishing a Musyawarah Antar-Umat-Beragama or "Eorum for Inter-Religious Consul- tation" in 1972."^ As part of his educational reform policy, he called for a revamping of the values underlying the pesantren system so that these schools too could become agents of social change in Indonesia."' These reformed pesantrens were to become the seedbeds for the new cultur- ally hybrid or cosmopolitan Muslim intelligentsia emerging at the end of twentieth century and in the early twenty-first century."' The hands-on overhaul of the Islamic higher education curriculum during Mukti Ali's tenure as minister fell to the newly appointed rector of IAIN Jakarta, Harun Nasution. After completing his studies in Indonesia and a brief spell in Saudi Arabia, Nasution had transferred to Cairo in 1938, where he attended the American University and spent the war years as a translator. In 1945 he joined Indonesia's embryonic diplomatic serv- ice in the Middle East, serving as consul in Cairo under Mohammad Rasji- di."^ When his Sumatran origins and fiercely anti-communist convictions became a liability, Nasution took a leave of absence and enrolled at McGill where he flrst obtained an MA based on a study of the Masyumi party and then a PhD with a thesis on the rationalist aspects in the theology of the

43. Munhanif, "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia," 100. 44. Karel Steenbrink, "The Pancasila Ideology and an Indonesia Muslim Theology of Religions," in Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 285. 45. Munhanif, "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia," 106-107. 46. Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 89-90. 47. Ronald Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad: Negotiating Identity and Modernity in Muslim Java (New York and Bassington: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Hairus Salim and Muham- mad Ridwan, Kultur Hibrida: Anak Muda NU dijalur Kultural (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999); AbdurrahmanWahid, Islam Kosmopolitan: Nilai-Nilai Indonesia Transformasi Kebu- dayaan Oakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2007). 48. Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim Community, " 93-99: Martin and Woodward, Defenders of Reason in Islam, 161-163.

Egyptian Muslim reformist and modernist Muhammad Abduh. Back in Indonesia, Nasution's redrafting of the IAIN curriculum was grounded in an integral conceptualization of Islam as a culture and civilization. His historicist and ethical approach stressed the importance of distinguishing between absolute and relative Islam, that is the doctrines contained in the Scripture, and the unfolding of these principles in human history respectively. The new programme comprised not only the study of the various legal and theological schools, but also philosophy and Sufism, including the "deviant" works on controversial philoso- phies such as the rationalism of the Mu'tazila school and the monist or pantheist leanings of the mystic Ibn al-'Arabi (1165-1240). This inclusivist approach was grounded in an appreciation of Islam's comprehensive civilizational heritage or turath.'^^ IAIN's indigenous and Middle Eastern modes of Islamic education were also augmented with aspects of West- ern academic methodologies, affecting both the contents and the ways of instruction.^" These included new reading lists containing the writings of Western philosophers. Orientalists and Muslim scholars of Islam who drew on Western scholarship in the human sciences, such as Fazlur Rah- man, Mohammed Arkoun, Hasan Hanafi, and Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri. Nasution's reforms did not go unchallenged and were heavily criticized by classical modernists such as Rasjidi, who accused his former protege of an unquestioned reliance on Western Orientalist scholarship."

Nurcholish Majdid and the renewal of Islamic thought By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a younger generation of Muslim intellectuals began joining the debate, making its own contributions to the alternative Islamic discourses emerging in the early New Order period. The most prominent voice was that of the student leader Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005). Also known under the nickname "Cak Nur," he has become emblematic of this new cosmopolitan Muslim intellectual who 49. cf. Armando Salvatore, ¡slam and the Political Discourse ofModemity (Reading: Ithaca Press), 24; Leonard Binder, ¡slamic Liberalism: A Critique ofDevelopment ¡deologies (Chi- cago and London: Chicago University Press), 298, and also Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', ¡ntellectual Origins of ¡slamic Resurgence in the Modem Arab World (Albany: State Uni- versity of New York Press, 1996), 40-61. Issa BouUata, Trends and ¡ssues in Contempo- rary Arab Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 3-4, 25. 50. Meuleman, "The Institut Agama Islam Negeri," 85-86. 51. Azyumardi Azra, "Guarding the Faith of the Ummah: The Religio-Intellectual Jour- ney of Muhammad Rasjidi," Studia ¡slamika l(2), (1994): 114; Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim Community," 105-112.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 120 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals defies easy classification in existing categories. In his case this can be traced back to his hybrid upbringing in the Eastern Javanese district of Jombang, a traditionalist stronghold where his father ran a modernist Islamic school while simultaneously trying to remain loyal to the Masyumi party and maintain cordial relations with the NU. After completing his studies at the renowned progressive Pesantren Pondok Modern at Gontor, Cak Nur continued his education at the IAIN Jakarta, where he did not specialize in one of the traditional Islamic disciplines, but opted instead for the department of Arabic Literature and Islamic Culture at the Faculty of Cultural Studies. Here he became involved in student politics and was elected chairman of the national Islamic Students Association or Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMl). He was the first IAIN student to hold that post, serving an equally unique two terms (1967-1971). Launched into the vortex of a politically turbulent time, the modernist establishment associated with the defunct Masyumi party who initially pinned their hopes on Madjid, even hailing him as the "Young Natsir," soon considered him an enfant terrible.'^ This drastic reversal in opinion was caused by the positions Madjid took between 1968 and 1972 in a number of publications and speeches, which were diametrically opposed to those of the classical modernists. Aside from the latter's advocacy of conflating religion and state ever since the restoration of the 1945 Constitution, the old Masyumi leadership also was hesitant to join a new government-endorsed Islamic Party, Partai Muslim Indonesia (Parmusi). Whereas the HMI supported such a merger, the Masyumi establishment was opposed to what they regarded as an undesirable accommodation with the new regime. Frustrated by the political intransigence of Natsir and his peers, Mad- jid concluded that change would have to come from a new generation of Muslim intellectuals and he therefore decided to write a manifesto containing a more "substantive-inclusive" rather than 'legal-exclusive' Islamic ideology." Dissatisfied with the inadequacies of Sarekat Islam leader Tjokroamoto's book on Islam and socialism, and envious of the ideological clarity of the young communists, Madjid used a text by the German SDP politician Willy Eichert to compose his "Basic Values for Struggle" [Nilai-NilaiDasarPerjuangan].^^ In an essay entitled "Moderniza-

52. Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Respor\ses to "New Order" in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 1980), 124. 53. Cf. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 352-354. 54. Nurcholish Madjid, "The Issue of Modernization Among Muslims in Indonesia:

tion is Rationalization not Westernization," Madjid argued that rational methodologies needed to modernize Indonesian society are not incom- patible with Islam as it does not necessarily mean traversing the same intellectual trajectories as the West." Even more explosive were what have been called Madjid's two "para- digmatic" speeches of 1970 and 1972,^' in which he launched the notori- ous slogan "Islam yes, Islamic party no!" and invoked the Indo-Pakistani poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal's characterization of Islam as "Bolshevism plus God."" Once again, the critics were led by Mohammad Rasjidi, who dismissed Madjid's reasoning as "sophistry," ignoring the fact that the views of what was now becoming the "Renewal of Islamic Thinking Movement" [Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam] consisted of a subtle framework in which political and theological ideas are grounded in a new epistemol- ogy. What particularly antagonized many Muslims was his use of controversial terms such as liberalization, secularization, and desacralization.^^ In his capacity as HMI chairman, Madjid had namely also opportunity to travel overseas to the United States and the Middle East, obtaining not only first-hand acquaintance with the ideas current among Muslim reformists, but also Western scholars of religion, such as the progressive theologian Harvey Cox and the sociologist Robert Bellah. Madjid's interpretation of secularization as a process separating tran- scendental from temporal values which effectuates the full consumma- tion ofthe Quranic injunction that humans must act as God's vicegerent [khalïfa] on earth, and secularism as "the name for an ideology, a new closed world view which functions very much like a new religion" were inspired by Cox.^' Such readings also imposed an inescapable need for the "desacralization" of this-worldly existence, divesting it from all divine

From a Participants Point of View," in What is Modem ¡ndonesian Culture? ed. Gloria Davies (Madison-Wisconsin: Indonesian Studies Summer Institute, 1979), 150. 55. Nurcholish Madjid, ¡slam Kemodeman dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987) 171-203. 56. Ann Kull, Piety and Politics: Nurcholish Madjid and His interpretation of ¡slam in Modem ¡ndonesia (Lund: Department of History and Anthropology of Religions, Lund Uni- versity, 2005), 106. 57. Nurcholish Madjid, Pembahaman Pemikiran ¡slam (Jakarta: Islamic Research Centre, 1970), 2, 6. 58. Madjid , ¡slam Kemodeman dan Keindonesiaan,171-203. 59. Madjid , Pembahaman Pemikiran ¡slam, 4.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 122 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals connotations. Failing to do so would namely constitute a violation of Islam's core tenet of tav^hid or the absolute transcendence and unity of God. In a clever inversion ofthe argument used by his opponents to condemn secularization, Madjid retorted that sacrahzing the Islamic state is not only a "distortion of the proportional relationship between state and religion," but such preoccupation with the political reduces Islam to "a structure and collection of laws," which he referred to as fiqhism.^ In Madjid's view this boiled down to a denigration of God. The distinction in Madjid's theology between a human's "transcen- dental life" [kehidupan uchrawi], represented by the vertical axis of an individual connection with God, and the horizontal relations maintained with nature and fellow human beings in this-worldly existence [kehidupan duniawi] has important epistemological consequences, not- withstanding the fact that these two aspects of human existence merge in individual lives.'^ The horizontal domain of temporal matters or the realm of the secular [duniawi] is namely inaccessible to the spiritual methods drawing on revealed knowledge, while the eschatological law [hukum uchrawi] governing the vertical spiritual dimension of humankind's relation with God cannot be comprehended in a rational manner." Moreover, if the 'absolutely transcendent' were not beyond this-worldly (rational) human comprehension, but could be brought into the realm of human understanding that would imply that God can be relativized, which contradicts tawhid.^^ This epistemological theory is not only reflective of what Rahardjo has called Madjid's "radical monotheism,"" it also has the same Barthian ring as the early writings of Peter Berger, another leading social scien- tist working on secularization. In one of his early theologically-inspired works, the latter had argued that by "denuding the cosmos of its divinity and placing God totally beyond its confines, the biblical tradition pre-

60. Madjid, Islam Kemodeman dan Keindonesiaan, 255-256. 61. Madjid, Islam Kemodeman dan Keindonesiaan, 245-248. 62. Nurcholish Madjid, "Sekali Lagi Tentang Sekularisasi," in Koreksi Terhadap Drs. Nur- cholish Madjid Tentang Sekularisasi, by Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi Üakarta; Bulan Bintang, 1972), 40-42. 63. Madjid, Islam Kemodeman dan Keindonesiaan, 242-243. 64. Dawam Rahardjo, "Islam dan Modemisasi: Catatan atas Paham Sekularisasi Nur- cholish Madjid, in Islam Kemodeman dan Keindonesian, by Nurcholish Madjid Oakar- ta: Mizan, 1987), 22.

pared the way for the process we now call secularization."" Soon Madjid also began drawing international attention and when two leading scholars of Islam from the University of Chicago, Leonard Binder and Eazlur Rahman, visited Indonesia in 1973, they invited the young IAIN scholar to participate in their "Islam and Social Change Pro- gramme." This experience stimulated Madjid to do his postgraduate studies in Chicago. During these years (1976-1984), he developed a more sophisticated understanding and appreciation for the value of Islam's intellectual heritage that would inform his future writings and solidify scholarly and intellectual credentials.

The reactualization of cultural Islam in Indonesia In Madjid's absence Indonesian society underwent a profound transformation, which was partly set in motion by his own Renewal Thinking. In contrast with the political turmoil which began to affect the wider Mus- lim world between 1978 and 1988, Indonesia witnessed a further retreat of Islamic political parties combined with a "great leap forward in the social and intellectual vitality of the community."" Improved socio-economic conditions as a result of a massively increased influx of oil money enabled the energetic new minister of religion Munawir Sjadzali (1925- 2004) to drive what he called a "reactualization agenda" (1983-1993), envisaged to give the country's development policies a new substantive- inclusive theological underpinning, emphasizing the "dynamism and vitality of Islamic law" while at the same time taking into account "Indo- nesia's own local and temporal particularities."" Sjadzali's policies were a response to the emergence of a relatively prosperous urban Muslim middle class, which had become uncomfort- able with what they regarded as the narrowing or "privatization" [pnb- adisasi\ of moral concerns in the 1970s. Searching for a new anchoring in religion, they brought about a broad resurgence of Islamic sentiments in civil society and it was therefore in these circles that cultural and civil Islam began to manifest itself most spectacularly. Not surprisingly, a further expansion of the country's Islamic higher education system formed

65. Peter L. Berger, The Precarious Vision: A Sociologist Looks a Social Fictions and the Chris- tian Faith (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 177. 66. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," 86. 67. Bahtiar Effendy, "Islam and the State in Indonesia: Munawir Sjadzali and the Devel- opment of a New Theological Underpinning of Political Islam," Studia Islamika 2(2), (1995): 110-111.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 124 Cosmopolitan Míislim Intellectuals an important part of Sjadzali's policy.'^ By the late 1980s also the number of talented young scholars sent overseas to obtain advanced degrees in Islamic or Religious Studies was surging, creating a new Muslim intellectual elite mainly concentrated at the IAINs in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.'' Returning to this dramatically changed Indonesia, Nurcholish Madjid rejoined the faculty of Jakarta's IAIN and eventually inherited Nasu- tion's mantle as the leading proponent of "a version of Islam that was acceptable to the New Order Government."'" At the university Cak Nur developed a following among a group of slightly younger scholars who subscribed to the methodological approach and way of thinking he had further refined in Chicago. Many of them had also either returned with degrees from abroad or would go on to pursue advanced studies overseas. They are called the Mazhah Ciputat or "Ciputat School," named after the district in the south of Jakarta where the IAIN is located. Its fourteen "members" include two future rectors of LAIN: the Columbia-educated historian Azyumardi Azra and the philosopher Komaruddin Hidayat, who had obtained his doctorate in Turkey." In the late 1980s and early 1990s, expressions of Islamic faith in the public sphere became ever more prominent, with even Soeharto and the political elite joining in what is referred to as the "greening" [penghijauan]—green being the symbolic colour of Islam." Also a revi- talized cohort of classical modernists and radical-conservative Mus- lims around Natsir and Rasjidi was allowed to play a rol again, using

68. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," 90-92. 69. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indoneisa," 86-89; Michael R.J. Va- tikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 127. 70. Malcolm Cone, "Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto's Indonesia," 54. 71. KuU, Piety and Politics, 201-202. The other ones are: Bahtiar Effendy, Badri Jatim, Hadimulyo, Irchamni Sulaiman, Ali Munhanif, Ahsan Ali-Fauzi, Ahmad Thaha, Nanang Tahqiq, Saiful Muzani, Muhamad Wahyuni Nafis, Nasrulah Ali Fauzi, Jamal D. Rahman. Azra is also the founding editor of the bi-lingual academic journal Stu- dia ¡slamika, published by the IAIN Syarif HidayatuUah in Jakarta. 72. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," 89; Hefner, Civil ¡slam: Muslims and Democratization in ¡ndonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universty Press, 2000), 122; Karel Steenbrink, "Nurcholish Madjid and Inclusive Islamic Faith in In- donesia," in Muslims and Christians in Europe. Breaking New Grounds: Essays in Honour of Jan Stomp, ed. Gé Speelman (Kampen: kok, 1993), 29. Soeharto adopted the name "Muhammad" and performed Hajj in 1991, cf. Vatikiotis, ¡ndonesian Politics under Suharto, 135-136.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 Carool Kersten 125 a revamped DDII as its main vehicle for advocating an Islamic revival grounded in more literalist interpretations ofthe Quran and Traditions of the Prophet inspired by similar efforts in the Middle East and South Asia." In spite of this competition, Madjid managed to remain "at the forefront of this newly robust cultural Islam," using and creating new platforms from which to disseminate his ideas.'^ Fine-tuning his Renewal Thinking ofthe 1970s with an even more confidently assertive and sophisticated interpretation of the Islamic tradition, Madjid focused his activities outside the university on the afflu- ent urban Muslim middle and upper classes." As a vehicle for this urban proselytization he founded the Yayasan Paramadina or Paramadina Foun- dation in 1986. This "think tank" also included a special unit called the Klub Kajian Agama (KKA) or "Religious Study Group," which organized exclusive workshops and conferences targeting the "nominal Muslims" among the elites dominating the government bureaucracy in order to turn them into "pious Muslims."'^ With the establishment of Universitas Paramadina Mulia (UPM) in 1994, the foundation expanded its activities into private higher education.'' Madjid was also deeply involved in the "Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals" (ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or ICMl), for- mally launched in late 1990 under the chairmanship of Soeharto's key political protege. Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie. With eight cabinet members already serving on his Paramadina board, Madjid had apparently acquired the necessary political clout to be invited to draft the ICMI mission statement and to be appointed vice-chairman of its advisory board. This body provided him with the most high-profile platform to present himself as Indonesia's leading Muslim intellectual, enabling him to become part of a transnational conversation, in which 73. For detailed discussion, see R. William Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia," in Toward a New Paradigm, ed. Mark C. Woodward (Tempe: Arizona State University Program of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 323-356. 74. Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization," 93. 75. Zifirdaus Adnan, "Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic (Political) Ideology: No! Islam and State in Indonesia," in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. A. Budiman (Clay- ton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990) 459; Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology and Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim Community," 123; Saleh, Modem Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse, 246-247. 76. Kull, Piety and Politics, 164ff. 77. Kull, Piety and Politics, 183.

© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2012 126 Cosmopolitan Muslim Intellectuals also scholars such as Robert Bellah were involved, and joining an international network of like-minded Muslim intellectuals, including the Egyptian philosopher Hasan Hanafi and the French-Algerian historian Mohammed Arkoun. The extent of influence derived from this amalgam of positions became clear in 1998, when Nurcholish Madjid was instrumental in persuading Soeharto to step down as president in the face of growing opposition to his regime and hand over power without bloodshed, thus opening the way for the Reformasi ofthe past ten years. Madjid declined the calls to stand for the presidency himself, enabling another key exponent of Indonesia's alternative Islamic discourse: NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009), also known as "Gus Dur," to become the country's new leader. We should namely not lose sight ofthe fact that formulating this new progressive-inclusive discourse was not a solo project of Nur- cholish Madjid. During the "Opening Up" {Keterhukaan) in the later New Order period (1988-1994), Cak Nur and Gus Dur formed a tandem of sorts plotting the course for what in the literature on Islam in contemporary Indonesia is often called "Islamic neomodernism" (neo-modernism).'^

Cosmopolitan Islam in twenty-first century Indonesia Like their predecessors Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution, also the biographies and views of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid share a number of commonalities fitting under the rubric "cosmopolitanism." Hailing from pious East-Javanese families of religious scholars, both received a hybrid secular and Islamic education and attended universities abroad." This created a degree of conformity in methodological

78. cf. Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, MerambahJalan Baru ¡slam: Rekonstmksi Pemikiran ¡slam ¡ndonesia Masa Orde Bam (Bandtmg: Mizan, 1986), 169ff; Syamsul Bakri and Mudhofir (2004) Jombang Kairo,Jomhang Chicago: Sintesis Pemikiran Gus Dur dan Cak Nur dalam Pembaruan ¡slam di ¡ndonesia (Solo: Tiga Serangkai, 2004), Greg Barton, "Neo- Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia," Studia ¡slamika 2(3), (1995): 1-75; Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholish Mad- jid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Tradi- tionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought," Studia ¡slamika 4(l), (1997): 29-81. Elsewhere I have expressed my reservations regarding the accuracy ofthat designation, Kersten, "Occupants ofthe Third Space," 124-133. 79. In Abdurrahman Wahid's case al-Azhar University in Cairo and then the University of Baghdad, where he enrolled in the department of Arabic literature, cf. Greg Bar- ton, Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President (Honolulu: Univer- sity of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 123.

approach, with Gus Dur's empiricism bearing an affinity with the induc- tive methodology practiced by Madjid.'" Aside from sharing a similar humanist outlook, they were both also acutely aware of the need for reviving the spiritual aspects ofthe religious life of modern Muslims." But there are also differences: In contrast to Cak Nur's academic pre- occupations and historical interests, Gus Dur's concerns as leader ofthe world's largest Muslim NGO and later as the first democratically elected president of the Republik Indonesia were more pragmatic and contemporary. His interpretation of the Aswaja doctrine has been described as an 'intellectual improvization of traditional doctrine', suffused by the "universal spirit of humankind."'^ And where Nurcholish Madjid had some hesitation in drawing parallels, Abdurrahman Wahid's concern with issues of poverty and justice were directly influenced by Latin American liberation theology. However, perhaps the clearest reflection ofthe multifarious legacy of their pluralist or cosmopolitan Islam is their latest intellectual offspring. On the one hand, an upcoming generation of city-based young intellectuals born in the 1960s and early 1970s, with proflles not dissimilar to the slightly older Mazhah Ciputat, has begun organizing themselves in internet-dependent set-ups such as the "Liberal Islam Network" or Jar- ingan Islam Liberal (JIL). Intellectually indebted to Nurcholish Madjid, this initiative of Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (b. 1967), a former staff member of NU's Human Resources Development and Study Institute, *^ now pursuing a PhD at Harvard, and Dr. Luthfl Assyaukanie (b. 1967), a faculty member of Paramadina University educated in Jordan and Australia, appeals mainly to university students in big cities.'"" For this reason JIL is perhaps less well-equipped to penetrate into other segments of society.

80. Kull, Piety and Politics, 215-223. 81. Ali.and Effendy, Merambah Jalan Bam ¡slam, 171,185. 82. Ali and Effendy, Merambah Jalan Bam Islam, 186-187. 83. Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia or Lakpesdam. 84. Kull, Piety and Politics, 223. Cf. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "Apa Setelah Nurcholish Mad- jid?" in Menembus Batas Tradisi: Menuju Masa Depanyang Membebaskan: Refieksi atas Pemikiran Nurcholish Madjid, ed. Abdul Halim (Jakarta: Universitas Paramadina and Kompas, 2006), 143-161. Cf. also JIL website: http://islamlib.com/en/. Although they do not seem to be actually maintained at present both initiators also maintain personal websites. Eor Abshar-Abdalla, cf. http://ulil.net/; for Assyaukanie, cf. http://www.assyaukanie.com/.

On the other hand, there are the "Young NU Members" {Anak Muda NU), sometimes also referred to as Postra or "Post-Traditionalists" consisting of NU activists and sympathizing intellectuals, including such individuals as Ahmad Baso, Hairus Salim, Muhammad Ridwan and Rumadi.*^ Originat- ing from smaller towns in rural areas they are more readily identifiable with Abdurrahman Wahid's outlook. They are exponents of a new hybrid culture which is the product of their moving back and forth between their roots in reformed pesantrens associated with NU, exposure to an academic Islamic education at IAINs located in the country's major cities, and subsequent employment in NGO's and think tanks active in the interstices of urban and rural Indonesia. Consequently, they tend to be better positioned for establishing a rapport with less privileged social classes. Due to their pesantren backgrounds the young intellectuals associated with NU Muda or active in organizations such as JIL'* have a good com- mand of Arabic and therefore direct access to the Islamic canon and other original texts from the Arabic-speaking parts of the Muslim world. They often develop this knowledge further at universities in the Mid- dle East or augment their academic formation through Western human sciences approaches acquired during further studies in North America, Australia and Western Europe. Their articulations of progressive, liberal and pluralist approaches to Islam are often more sophisticated and also provocative than the contributions of their mentors." Eor example, Sulawesi-born Ahmad Baso (b. 1971) has made critical analyses of Mad- jid's ideas, drawing on the work of other Muslim intellectuals influenced by poststructuralist philosophy, such as Mohammed Arkoun, Muham- mad Abid al-Jabiri and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd.*' Then there is Yudian Wahyudi, an Islamicist and legal scholar educated at McGill and former

85. Cf Ahmad Baso, NU Studies: Pergolakan Pemikiran antara Fundamentalisme Islam dan Fundamentalisme Neo-Liberal Qakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2006) and Rumadi, Post Traditionalisme Islam: Wacana Intelektualisme dalam Komunitas NU (Cirebon: Fahmida Institute, 2008). 86. Other important promoters of a progressive and contextualized interpretation and implementation of the Islamic teachings are the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LkiS: Lembaga Kajian ¡slam dan Sosial), Indonesian Society for Pesantren and Community Development (P3M: Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyar- akat), Young Muhammadiyah Intellectuals Network (jaringan ¡ntelektual Muda Mu- hammadiyah) and the Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), cf. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 368. 87. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 352, 373. 88. Saleh, Modem Trends in ¡slamic Theological Thought, 285-294.

researcher at Harvard and Tufts University, who returned to Indonesia to translate the writings of the Egyptian philosopher Hasan Hanafi from Arabic and French into Indonesian. Because it adopted a comparable confrontational style in respond- ing and countering the agendas of the radical-conservative Muslims, JIL has become a target for these "Shari'a-minded" Muslim revivalists.'' On various occasions the latter successfully lobbied Indonesia's Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia) to issue legal opinions or fatwa's against the positions of JIL and its inspirers.'" More ominous was the issue of a "death fatwa" against JIL leader Ulil Abshar-Abdalla in 2003 by a group of West-Javanese clerics claiming to represent the "Indonesia Muslim Forum of Ulama" (FUUI or Forum Ulama Ummat Indonesia).^^ In spite of such extreme and controversial incidents, the proponents of progressive and inclusivist interpretations of Islam, whether we call it "civil," "cultural" or "cosmopolitan" Islam, have allies not only among the leadership of organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and NU, but since 2004, their views have been implicitly adopted by the SBY government.'^ Returning with an even stronger mandate in 2009, the second SBY administration will in all likelihood persist on this course, although it will certainly continue to face challenges from the radical- conservatives whose support base among the general population must not be underestimated and who have taken advantage of the devolution of power to regional and local authorities under the government's own decentralization policies to enforce their Islamist agendas in certain

89. This term, used by Anwar (p. 263ff), is borrowed from Marshall Hodgson's The Ven- ture of ¡slam. 90. Including Nurcholis Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo and Djohan Effendy. For detailed studies, cf. Pierre Gillespie, "Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No. 7 Opposing Liberalism, Pluralism and Secu- larism," Journal of Islamic Studies 18(2), (2007): 202-240; Ahmad Ali Nurdin, "Islam and State: A Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia," New Zealandjoumal of Asian Studies 7(2), (2005): 20-30. 91. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 374. A more detailed discussion is found in Nicolaus Teguh Budi Harjanto, "Islam and Liberalism in Comtem- porary Indonesia: The Political Ideas of Jaringan Islam Liberal (The Liberal Islam Net- work)" (MA diss, Ohio University, 2003), 99-103. 92. In 2001 both NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi and Muhammadiyah Syafi'i Maarif had voiced their opposition against the adoption of the Jakarta Charter, cf. Anwar, "Po- litical Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 364. Maarif and ICMI intellectual Dawam Rahardjo also rallied behind Ulil Abshar-Abdalla after he received death threats, Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 374-375.

Conclusion Between 1968 and 1998 Muslim discourses in Indonesia showed a progressive move towards a cultural reading of Islam. Building on the work of a first generation of pioneering scholars with advanced degrees from Western universities, such as Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution, subsequent generations of Muslim intellectuals, led by Nurcholish Madjid and his disciples in the Mazhab Ciputat, developed an increasingly sophisticated understanding ofthe Islamic heritage or turath by using methodological and theoretical insights derived from Western scholarship in the human sciences. This formed the basis for a cosmopolitan attitude which was translated into a shift away from overtly political Islamic agendas towards an appreciation for Islamic values as the moral compass guiding the development of a civil society under the continued guidance of Nurcholish Madjid and NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid. In the wake of a breakdown in political stability following the fall ofthe Soeharto regime, at the close ofthe second millenium this civil Islam faced new challenges of a re-emerging radical, and frequently violent, Islamist activism. In spite of these adversities, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new generation of Muslim intellectuals continues to uphold and give new direction to this cosmopolitan Islam, plotting a two-tier course that steers away from Islamic party politics while at the same time instilling the civil or cultural Islam from the last century with a deeper appreciation of Indonesia's Muslim traditionalism grounded in self-reflective and critical examinations inspired by postmodern and postcolonial thinking. They focus either on the urban intelligentsia or opt for more engaged grass-root level activism. In spite ofthe uncertainties during Abdurrah- man Wahid's ill-fated presidency, there is now again reason for cautious optimism as it appears that—under the present government—this Indo- nesian strand of Muslim cosmopolitanism has not merely received a new lease on life, but is even show-cased to the rest of the Muslim world as the right way forward.

93. cf. Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 367; Tamara, ¡ndonesia Ris- ing, 37-38.

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