Contents List of Figures and Tables vii Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii List of Abbreviations xv 1. Bad News Travels Fast 1 2. MIDAS 11 3. Vindication 33 4. Nurrungar and Buckley 49 5. DSP’s First Decade 63 6. Surviving World War III 85 7. Slow Walkers, Fast Walkers, and Joggers 95 8. Evolutionary Developments and Suicidal Lasers 123 9. Australia, Germany, and New Mexico 137 10. Desert Storm 157 11. False Starts 177 12. The Unwanted Option 189 13. High Now, Low Later 211 14. Future Missions 223 Epilogue 237 Appendices A. Space-Based Infrared Detection of Missiles 275 B. Chronology 281 C. Satellite Launch Listing 289 Notes 291 Bibliographic Essay 359 Index 363 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. Figures and Tables FIGURES MIDAS detection probabilities 15 Approximate Earth coverage of DSP satellites 70 View of Earth from F-7 80 Simplified Processing Station 90 Model of a MIDAS satellite 111 Early 1960s launch of a MIDAS satellite from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida 112 Sensor carried on the Program 461 satellites launched in 1966 113 DSP satellite in the cargo bay of the space shuttle Atlantis 114 Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colorado, 1986 115 Joint Defense Facility–Nurrungar 116 Soviet Tu-22 Backfire bomber in flight 117 Sensor Evolutionary Development sensor 118 Two Soviet-built Iraq-modified Scud-B missiles and their launchers 119 Patriot air defense system deployed in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield 120 SBIRS-Low system being proposed by Lockheed Martin and Boeing 121 SBIRS-Low system being proposed by TRW and Hughes 122 Survivable DSP-1 concept 132 MGT, MCT operations 152 Mono versus stereo coverage 172 BSTS operations concept 182 Launch of DSP-23 236 DSP vs. projected SBIRS capabilities 259 A Geosynchronous SBIRS Satellite 274 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. viii AMERICA’S SPACE SENTINELS Ballistic missile flight trajectory 276 DSP onboard processing 279 DSP ground processing 280 TABLES Satellite stations after launches F-4 through F-8 79 Stations and satellites after launch of F-10 100 DSP constellation, June 1, 1985 126 DSP constellation, August 10, 1988 128 DSP primary satellite positions, November 1, 1990 162 Scud Launches During Desert Storm 164 DSP-II Versus FEWS cost data 200 ALARM requirements comparison 214 © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. Preface On Friday, November 18, 1995, a group of present and former industry and Air Force of¤cials gathered for a black-tie event at the Los An- geles Airport Marriott Hotel. The event was a twenty-¤fth anniversary gala in celebration of the Defense Support Program (DSP). The DSP satellites that had been launched into orbit for the previous twenty-¤ve years could detect the infrared emissions of missile plumes from their stations 22,300 miles above the earth. They would have provided the ¤rst warning of a possible Soviet missile attack (as well as a means of con- ¤rming the accuracy of subsequent radar reports that missiles were headed toward the United States). By eliminating U.S. reliance on a single means of warning and extending the warning time that U.S. leaders would have in the event of a Soviet attack, they represented one of several technological achieve- ments that had helped stabilize the precarious U.S.–Soviet nuclear standoff during the 1970s and 1980s. The evening began at 6:00 p.m. with cocktails, followed by dinner. The attendees had been scheduled to hear a 9:00 p.m. address by General Thomas S. Moorman Jr., the Air Force vice chief of staff. Moorman had served in a variety of intelligence and reconnaissance assignments since joining the Air Force in 1962, including a stint as the staff director of the supersecret Na- tional Reconnaissance Of¤ce. More recently, in 1990, he had become com- mander of the Air Force Space Command, whose responsibilities included operating the DSP satellites. Moorman was to be there to praise the DSP program. However, many of those who had been involved in that program were not happy about either his prospective presence or the event’s focus. Some felt the anniversary event slighted the contributions of those involved in the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) and 461 programs, DSP’s forerunners. Others were dis- pleased at Moorman’s presence, for they felt he had been among key Air Force of¤cials who were denigrating the capabilities and accomplishments of DSP, in order to push for a new, costly infrared satellite program. Because of events in Washington, Moorman never made it to the din- ner. But the schisms that revolved around the event, including Moorman’s © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. x AMERICA’S SPACE SENTINELS planned address, represent part of the history of MIDAS and DSP—one of intense debates, disagreements over technical feasibility and proposed pro- grams, and, at times, hard feelings. America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security tells that story. But it also tells several other, far more important, stories. One of these concerns the creation and evolution of the MIDAS/DSP programs, which has involved design of the original satellites and sensors, the establishment of the original ground stations and subsequent ¤xed and mobile terminals, im- provements in the sensors carried on the satellites, and upgrades of the ability to process and disseminate the data collected. The consequences of these improvements and upgrades have included more accurate estimates of missile launches and impact areas, the reduction in coverage gaps (some of which resulted from changes in foreign missile ca- pabilities), as well as the ability to employ DSP in support of theater con®icts such as Operation Desert Storm. In the near future the DSP system will be replaced by the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), whose satellites will have different infrared sensors and a greatly reduced dependence on overseas ground stations. As will become clear, much of the evolution of the U.S. satellite early warning system has occurred in response to changes in the international po- litical and military environment, as well as changes in U.S. strategic policy. Thus, the development of improved sensors and mobile ground terminals was the direct result of a shift in U.S. strategic nuclear policy initiated by the Carter administration and vigorously pursued by the Reagan administra- tion. More recent changes, such as the Air Force Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater (ALERT) and Army-Navy Joint Tactical Ground Sta- tion (JTaGS) programs, are the product of a world in which intermediate- range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) ¤red by Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, with their short ®ight times and theater targets, are considered a more pressing threat than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) sitting in Russian or Chinese silos. The history of the DSP program also serves as a case study of a system that performs well beyond expectations. It is not simply that DSP satellites exhibited far greater lifetimes than had been expected as well as greater ac- curacy in identifying the location of missile launches, even prior to sensor upgrades. DSP satellites also proved to be valuable in a variety of missions beyond their primary mission of detecting Soviet or Chinese intercontinen- tal or submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their secondary mission of monitoring nuclear detonations in the atmosphere. DSP satellites, even the earliest generation, would prove useful in detect- © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. PREFACE xi ing and monitoring the launch of IRBMs (such as Scuds), detecting aircraft ®ying on afterburner, monitoring the movements of other spacecraft, and providing data on events such as explosions at weapons depots, airplane crashes, the detonation of meteorites in the atmosphere, and raging forest ¤res. Some DSP capabilities are only now beginning to be fully exploited. When a system proves to be so versatile and able to satisfy the data re- quirements of a much wider range of consumers than anticipated, complica- tions can arise; this, in fact, did occur with DSP. More customers can pro- duce fear on the part of the system “owner” (in DSP’s case, the Air Force) that the system will be diverted to other missions and compromise the origi- nal, primary mission. As a result, the owner may prove reluctant to see the system’s capabilities fully exploited. Thus, the Air Force was uninterested when one of the DSP contractors suggested employing DSP data to detect the movements of Soviet Back¤re bombers that might threaten the U.S. ®eet. Years later, the Air Force was also concerned that Army and Navy involve- ment in the DSP program might dilute DSP’s primary mission of warning of Soviet missile launches. The DSP’s history also illustrates how such a program, because of the need to locate ground stations on foreign territory and the value of the data produced to other governments, can play a role not only in U.S. foreign rela- tions but even in the domestic politics of a number of governments. A ground station may become a target for protesters and a national political issue, which the host government may seek to manage through a policy of secrecy. Issues concerning the host government’s role in ground station operations may be- come a point of contention between the host and guest.