Vysoká škola CEVRO Institut
DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE
Bc. Iva Štverková
Praha 2016 Vysoká škola CEVRO Institut Katedra bezpečnostních studií
NATO AFTER 9/11: THE CRISIS FROM THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
Bc. Iva Štverková
Studijní program: Bezpečnostní studia Studijní obor: Bezpečnostní studia Vedoucí práce: RNDr. Alexandr Vondra
Diplomová práce
Praha 2016
Prohlašuji, že jsem diplomovou práci zpracovala samostatně, uvedla v ní všechny použité prameny a zdroje a v textu řádně vyznačila jejich použití.
V…………………dne……………………………….
Poděkování Na tomto místě bych ráda poděkovala vedoucímu práce RNDr. Alexandru Vondrovi za rady a čas, který mi věnoval při řešení dané problematiky.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1 Literature Review 2 Structure 3 1. Theoretical Framework for International Security Institutions 4 1.1 International Relations Theories Applied to International Institutions 4 1.1.1 Realist Theory 5 1.1.2 Neoliberal institutionalism 6 1.1.3. Critical Theory and Constructivism 7 1.1.4 Collective Security 8 1.2 Behavior of alliances and individual states within an alliance 8 1.2.1 The Capability Aggregation Model 9 1.2.2 Benefits an Alliance Can Offer 10 1.2.3 Symmetric/Asymmetric Alliances 11 2. NATO before 9/11 13 2.1 NATO: More that a Mere Security Alliance 13 2.2 History of Crises in the Alliance 15 2.3 Searching for a New Purpose: NATO after the Cold War 17 3. NATO after 9/11 22 3.1 US Perspective 24 3.1.1 NATO from the US perspective 24 3.1.2 9/11 and the United States 27 3.2 9/11 from European perspective 29 3.2.1 Case Study #1: the United Kingdom 32 3.2.2 Case Study #2: Germany 36 3.2.3 Case Study #3: the Czech Republic 41 3.3 NATO Survived 47 Conclusion 49 List of Acronyms 54 Sources 55
Resumé
Severoatlantická aliance (NATO) prošla po útocích 11. září 2001 krizí, jež vznikla zejména kvůli odlišnostem ve smýšlení jednotlivých členů Aliance o vhodné reakci na teroristické činy. Zasazení krize do kontextu a pochopení jejích příčit je klíčové pro chápaní Aliance a výzev, kterým NATO bude v budoucnu čelit. Cílem této diplomové práce je vysvětlit proč krize vznikla, co vedlo jednotlivé členy k určité reakci nebo postoji a jak se Alianci podařilo krizi překonat. Práce představuje různé přístupy k chápání bezpečnostních aliancí, jejich cílů a chování. Zkoumá je z pohledu realismu, neoliberalismu, konstruktivismu a dalších teorií mezinárodních vztahů. Snaží se vysvětlit události po 11. září v souvislostech a zahrnuje případové studie postojů Spojeného království, Německa a České Republiky k NATO a americké zahraniční politice po teroristických útocích. Krize v Alianci se vystupňovala kvůli válce v Iráku, kdy se Evropa rozdělila na dvě frakce: první vedená Spojeným královstvím, která válku a Washington podporovala, a druhou protiválečnou vedenou Německem a Francií. Nejednalo se ovšem o první krizi v historii NATO a Alianci se ji podařilo překonat. Navzdory odlišným názorům na válku v Iráku nebo jiné jednotlivé témata, Evropa a Severní Amerika stále sdílí hodnoty a zájmy. Navíc Evropa a Severní Amerika se staly navzájem tak ekonomicky provázanými, že rozchod v politické či bezpečnostní oblasti by znamenal ohrožení životních zájmů všech. Washington si uvědomil cenu spojenců, a že nemůže sám vést dvě války. Volby a následná změny ve vedení Německa, Francie a USA napomohly zlepšení vztahů. V neposlední řadě rovněž sehráli důležitou roli noví členové NATO a země usilující o vstup do Aliance, protože přinesli novou energii a víru v NATO. Resumé The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) underwent a crisis in transatlantic relations during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. It arose especially due to differences in members’ opinions about the appropriate response to the assault. Understanding the reasons for the crisis and seeing it in a context is crucial for understanding the Alliance and the future challenges NATO may face. The goal of this master’s thesis is to explain why the crisis emerged, why individual members of NATO acted in certain ways, and how the Allies overcame the crisis. The thesis presents different approaches to security alliances, their goals and behavior. It examines security alliances through lenses of realism, neoliberalism, constructivism, and other
international relations theories. The thesis puts 9/11 in a context and it includes case studies of attitudes of the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Czech Republic toward the Alliance and U.S. foreigner policy after the 9/11. The crises escalated over the Iraq War when Europe split between UK-led wing, which supported the US, and anti-war wing led by Germany and France. It was not the first crisis in NATO’s history and the Alliance managed to overcome it. Europe and the US continue to share values and interests, in spite of differences over Iraq or other individual issues. Furthermore, Europe and the United States became so interdependent economically and financially that a political or security break would put vital interests of both at risk. Furthermore, Washington realized that it cannot lead two wars alone and that it needs allies. Changes in leadership in Germany, France, and the US also helped to improve relations. Last but not least, the new NATO members and countries aspiring to gain membership proved vital for the Alliance.
Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization went through one of the worse crisis in its history in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Shortly after the assault on the United States, the Alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its 52-year history. The Article V contains the principle of collective defence as it calls on all member states to assist each other in case of an attack on one of them; however, it does not fully commit either of them to act. The European members wanted to show solidarity with the United States but they also wanted to make sure that the United States would not bypass them in its response. Even though, the Europe almost completely supported the US efforts in Afghanistan, it did not adopt American „war mentality“. The split in opinions escalated and reached its peak with the War in Iraq. The division wasn’t only between Europe and the United States but also among European states. This thesis will attempt to prove that the crisis in transatlantic relations was not as grave as it might seem at a first sight. Despite the arguments and opposition to each others’ foreign policy on certain issues, NATO members still share impressive amount of values and norms, on which the Alliance stands. There might altercations from time to time due to the Alliance’s democratic nature, but the member states are intertwined to such an extent that neither of them can allow NATO to perish. 9/11 brought new challenges to the security environment as well as to the functioning of the Alliance. NATO was searching for its purpose and role in the new world order since the end of Cold War and it underwent a fundamental transformation. Nevertheless, especially realist and neo-realist scholars believed that the Alliance was no longer relevant and that it had been past its prime. The foreign policy of US President George W. Bush, who had been influenced by this school of thought, was aggressive and is often described as one of the reasons for the transatlantic crisis. However, it is important to realize that European world powers had to give up control of international politics after the world wars and
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were reduced to only regional powers. Since then, Europe transformed, gained confidence, and slowly found its voice again. Furthermore, European Union became economic power as well due to the economic and political integration, which has bolstered its power as a whole as well as power of its individual member states. This paper will examine the position of European NATO members toward the Alliance after 9/11 and their perception of US actions. Through case studies of United Kingdom, Germany, and the Czech Republic, three main currents in European foreign policy will be identified. The aim of this thesis is to examine what were the goals of foreign policies of European NATO members, what they had in common or how and why they differed, and whether there was a common European policy. It is important to realize that NATO is a democratic institution, and therefore crises will always exist. Close examination suggests that the crisis after 9/11 wasn’t as severe as it might have seemed. The willingness of the member states to overcome it suggests that NATO is still relevant today. Seeing the crisis in a context and examining the reasons that drove the members to act as they did is important in order to understand the Alliance today. Furthermore, there is not enough studies focused on the dilemmas the Czech Republic faced. Such evaluation is necessary to better understand the role CR plays in the Alliance and it can help determine future goals and priorities.
Literature Review
While writing this thesis I derived from a number of books, articles, and newspapers to create comprehensive analysis. The articles The False Promise of International Institutions from John Mearsheimer and Alliance and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances from James Morrow were very useful for the first chapter focused on theory. The first one examines the rationale behind international institution, the second one focuses solely on security alliances. The monograph NATO in the “New Europe” from Alexandra Gheciu helped me understand the Alliance in the period since its beginning to its transition in the 90s. Stanley Sloan’s Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama describes the Alliance to operate on bargaining between Europe and the United States. It also explains why 2
NATO has been and will be relevant. Monograph All for One: Terrorism, NATO, and the United States from Tom Lansford focuses on the role of the Alliance in the war against terrorism. The articles The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq from Christoph Bluth and Parting Ways: The Crises in German-American Relations from Stephen Szabo gave me a valuable inside into UK’s and Germany’s perspective. Not many scholars concentrate on Czech Republic in relation to the transatlantic crises, therefore I had to base my research on information provided by Czech Ministry of Defence and local newspapers.
Structure
The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first one contains theoretical framework for international security institutions, and examination of behavior of alliances and individual states within an alliance. The second chapter, which is called “NATO before 9/11”, provides historical and ideological context of the alliance. The first part points out the principles upon which the Alliance was built. The second part named “History of Crises in the Alliance” demonstrates that it is a democratic institution and therefore there have always been disagreements, disputes and arguments among members. The third part assesses the situation in 1990s after the end of Cold War, and the state in which NATO was before the attacks. The third chapter “NATO after 9/11” forms the main part of this work. First of all, it examines American position toward NATO and what 9/11 meant for the US. The second part focuses on European perspective. It scrutinizes European attitude toward NATO and common steps of European states after the attacks. It also demonstrates that Europe was not united, which is visible on three case studies: the first one of the United Kingdom as the leader of the states which supported the US, the second of Germany which together with France supported the US war on terrorism but were against the War in Iraq, and third of the Czech Republic as a newly admitted state which was not truly persuaded about the War in Iraq but did not want to turn its back on the leader of the Alliance and the main advocate of its admission to NATO.
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1. Theoretical Framework for International Security Institutions
To be able to explain attitudes of the NATO members toward the Alliance after 9/11 and different reactions, it is necessary to explain phenomenon of international institutions, especially security international institutions, in the context of international relations theory. The concept of international institutions does not have a clear definition. For the purpose of this paper, I will borrow the definition from Mearsheimer, who defines institutions in international relations as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. These rules are negotiated by states, and according to many prominent theorists, they entail the mutual acceptance of higher norms, which are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. These rules are typically formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets.”1 In the first part of this chapter, I will apply international relations theory to international institutions, which means to international regimes and international organizations including security international organizations. The main focus will be on examination of international institutions from the perspectives of realist and liberal approaches but constructivism and historical materialists will be also mentioned. The second part of this chapter focuses on the behavior of alliances and individual states within an alliance. I will explain two main models: capability aggregation model based on the balance-of-power theory and autonomy-security trade off based on the rational choice theory.
1.1 International Relations Theories Applied to International Institutions
For many centuries, realism has been the dominant paradigm of international relations area; however, in the 20th century and especially after the Second World War Western policymaker have tried to create a security system based on international institutions. In this chapter, I will assess the realist theory
1 MEARSHEIMER, John J. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security.
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against other major international relations theories that employ institutions as a core concept: institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory. I will point out the view each of them has of the international institutions. Institutional theories are largely a reaction to realism. The main disagreement between realists and institutionalists is whether institutions have the ability to significantly contribute to the international stability.2
1.1.1 Realist Theory
Realism has been the dominant approach to international relations theory for a centuries and it operates on several assumptions such as anarchical international system, rational states and power struggle. Realism, with roots already in the fourth century BC, stands on several main premises.3 The first one is that without an overarching political authority, international system operates in anarchy.4 The second one is that the main actors in international relations are states. These states behave rationally and each state struggles for power. Therefore, there is little reason for trust among states as they are engaged in eternal competition for power. 5 Possibility of war is omnipresent because international relations are “a state of relentless security competition” and thus the cooperation always has its limits.6 According to realist, everyone plays for himself and international relations are “self-help“ system because each states is dependent on its own power and resources to secure its survival, the most basic motive driving each state. This stands on premise of anarchy in international relations and that there is no authority above the nation-states, which would be able to step in and punish the aggressor.7 States fear each other and they tend to view themselves as deadly enemies since they cease to exist as a consequence of war.8 Realists do not consider institutions to have a significant influence on international relations, instead they conclude that they are created only to serve
2 Ibid., p. 7. 3 LANSFORD 2002, p. 9. 4 GHECIU 2005, p. 211. 5 Ibid., p. 211. 6 MEARSHEIMER 1994-1995, p. 9. 7 LANSFORD 2002, p. 9. 8 MEARSHEIMER 1994-1995, p. 11.
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interests of the dominant state. According to this theory, institutions are unable to have substantial capabilities and that is why they cannot enforce a set of universal rules. Moreover, institutions do not meaningfully impact states’ behavior.9 While realist acknowledge that states form alliances they believe that this action is based on the balance-of-power logic and they mostly exist only to cooperate against a common enemy. States also operate through international institutions; however, realists are highly skeptical about them and suggest that they merely reflect calculations of self-interests and the international distribution of power.10
1.1.2 Neoliberal institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism is patterned on liberal or idealist school. Idealism is an attempt to introduce legal and moral standards to the state behavior. Some of the famous advocates of this approach are Immanuel Kant, who attempted to enforce international law, and Woodrow Wilson, probably the most vocal supporter of the League of Nations after the World War I.11 While neoliberalism operates on some of the same premises as realism, it refuses its definition of power. Neoliberal institutionalists do not question realists premises that the character of international relations is anarchical and that the main actors are individual states.12 Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalists agree that states act rationally and employ cost-benefit analysis to its decision-making process. On the other hand, they reject realist definition of power as too narrow because it considers only military strength but it does not include “economic strength, the attractiveness of one’s ideas and economic system, and one’s willingness to spend resources on foreign policy”.13 In other words, it does not include the tools for soft power. Moreover, neoliberal institution theory does not focus on the role of institution in securing stability of international system, and instead concentrate on cooperation when states do not have contradictory interests. It divides
9 LANSFORD 2002, p. 10. 10 MEARSHEIMER 1994-1995, p. 13. 11 LANSFORD 2002, p. 10. 12 GHECIU 2005, p. 216. 13 LANSFORD 2002, p. 10-11.
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international politics into security and political economy and focuses mostly on the latter, specifically economic cooperation and environmental issues. 14 Neoliberal institutionalists regard the threat of cheating as the main obstacle to cooperation, which creates the “prisoners dilemma”. While realists regard international relations as zero-sum game, meaning that a gain of one actor is a loss of another, institutional theory suggests that one state’s gain can possibly benefit another state. This logic can be applied to security area too as institutionalists suggest that “a nation’s security gains can also benefit its neighbors by strengthening regional security or stability”.15 Neoliberal institutionalism suggests solving the cheating problem with institutions that set rules and which can alter calculations of a state. Nevertheless, the use of institutions is considered to be limited in security area because the fear of cheating is much greater as it can have much graver consequences and can be even deadly.16
1.1.3. Critical Theory and Constructivism
Critical theory stands on social constructivism and is based on a believe that discourse, or how people think and talk about things, and ideology shapes international relations. According to constructivists material structures gain meaning entirely within the social context in which they are interpreted. It follows that states pursue interests that are associated with a certain socially constructed identity.17 It does not offer options of how the future will look or should look; it is rather focused on the process of change. Critical theory recognizes that realism has been the leading approach and it tries to alter the current discourse about international system so the actors stop thinking according to realism. It attempts to change the idea of self-help and self-interest, instead critical theory supports the notion that states think about their national interests in a context of international system and identify their national interests with international interests.18 Critical theory thus assesses the role of international institutions to be important because
14 MEARSHEIMER 1994-1995, p. 15-16. 15 LANSFORD 2002, p. 11. 16 MEARSHEIMER 1994-1995, p. 18-19. 17 GHECIU 2005, p. 221-223. 18 MEARSHEIMER 1994-1995, p. 37-39.
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institutions can shape perception, preferences and interests of individual actors as well as the whole identity.
1.1.4 Collective Security
The main concern of collective security theory is a way how to produce stabile international environment and peace. This theory originates in 1920s and it was crucial for the creation of the League of Nations as well as for the political arrangement after the World War II. It recognizes the central role military power plays in international environment and therefore it sees the solution in its proper management. International institutions are the key instrument for the management of military power. 19 The collective security theory agrees that states act in line with realism; however, its goal is to accept three main norms, which are anti-realist in its core. It demands that states renounce violence, or the use of military force, to the ends of altering status quo. In other words, it bans wars of aggression and instead supports peaceful solutions. To add to that, states must act “responsibly” and they have to collectively and through automatic obligations confront a potential aggressor. Last but probably the most problematic is the third norm, which suggests that states must trust each other because the collective security wouldn’t work if states were afraid of each other. Critiques of the collective security point out that this theory is incomplete since it does not suggest how states are supposed to overcome this fear and how they are supposed to start trusting each other. Another problem is that it is not always clear who is the victim and who is the aggressor in a conflict. Issue of burden-sharing is also omitted.20
1.2 Behavior of alliances and individual states within an alliance
The study of behavior of alliances and individual states within an alliance is neglected by many scholars but it is key in understanding how alliances work. This subchapter examines capability aggregation model, how alliances benefit individual actors and what is the motivation of states to form them. Additionally,
19 Ibid., p. 26-29. 20 Ibid., p. 26-29.
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it focuses also on differences between symmetric and asymmetric alliances, and balance of power versus power transition models.
1.2.1 The Capability Aggregation Model
The capability aggregation model views an alliance as a “tool for aggregating capabilities against a threat”. That means that alliances are formed strictly for the purpose of accumulating capabilities against a common threat or enemy. In broader view, this model stresses the common interests of allies, which does not always have to mean a common enemy but the alliance could also be formed to advance diverse but compatible interests. In this view, the state will always decide whether to form an alliance based on the potential ally’s ability to advance state’s interests in comparison to the costs for the state in advancing ally’s goals. In order for an alliance to be formed, the benefits have to be greater than costs. The capability aggregation model unfolds around military assistance as it surmises that allies value it the most. Therefore, it concludes that alliances last only as long as the ally is able to provide it or as long as it is needed, meaning that when the threat or enemy disappears, the alliance have no purpose anymore and it breaks up. This thinking led many to assume that NATO would dissolve after the end of Cold War as the threat, the Soviet Union, against which NATO was built disappeared. Professor James D. Morrow points out that that allies need to share not only common or compatible interests but divergent ones as well, otherwise the alliance would be unnecessary, as an ally would help the other automatically in order to promote its own interest, which would be identical. An example of such a condition is Israel and the US, whom do not have a military alliance because nobody doubts American readiness to aid Israel in case of need.21
21 MORROW, James D. Alliance and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliance. American Journal of Political Science. 1991, 35 (4), p. 904-907.
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1.2.2 Benefits an Alliance Can Offer
There are basically two possible benefits of participating in an alliance: autonomy and security. The autonomy-security trade-off model of alliance behavior is based on two assumptions. First, nation’s preferences and strategies how to reach desired outcomes are based on 1) ideal state of matter; 2) nation’s position and strategies to how to pursue its preferences; 3) the status quo, which is determined by all states’ positions. And second, winning coalitions do not exist. Winning coalition means “a coalition that can determine the status quo regardless of the actions of other actors”. Therefore, the state of absolute security does not exist either. It follows that there isn’t a state of perfect security. Except few exceptions when status quo is also an ideal point for a state, all nations are dissatisfied with status quo. They could modify its positions by either supporting or opposing the status quo. The concept of autonomy is then characterized as “the state’s ability to determine its own policies” and it can be measured by “difference between its ideal point and its position over the issues in the status quo that it would like to change”.22 One possible way how to view alliances is as a trade off where one state receives more security, while the second one increases its autonomy. Security benefits come primarily from the military capabilities of allied state and are determined by the location of an ally, the agreement allies have, and also by the level of third parties posing a threat to status quo. On the other hand, an alliance can increase state’s autonomy by proving some kind of assistance that allows the first nation to pursue its desired alterations.23 According to neoliberalist, a leading state creates institutions because of the long-term benefits. International institutions reduce transaction costs and commitment problems because the leading state does not have to spend its resources all the time to incessantly coerce others.24 If applied to NATO and assuming that US provides security guarantees while Europe renders US with autonomy to act through legitimization of its
22 Ibid., p. 907-909. 23 Ibid., p.910-912. 24 IKENBERRY, John G. State Power and the Institutional Bargain: America’s Ambivalent Economic and Security Multilateralism. In: US Hegemony and International Organizations. 2003, p. 51-52.
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actions than a question whether the split in the Alliance was caused by not fulfilling this “commitment” comes up. It is also possible that all the parties to an alliance are trading off autonomy for security. Proportionate balanced level of both are usually preferable to high level of security with low level of autonomy or vice versa high level of autonomy with low level of security. As Morrow points out, the paradox can occur when a state trades off autonomy for higher security, allowing another ally to adopt controversial actions to pursue its goals because of increased autonomy, resulting in decrease in security for the first state because of the need to defend the second ally’s interests. In this thesis, I examine whether this was the case between US and its European allies regarding the War in Iraq. This situation is called “entrapment”. Alliances, which increase autonomy of all parties, are possible as well especially when all of them share a desire to change status quo and their goals are compatible or the same. Example of such an alliance is the Axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan during Second World War.25
1.2.3 Symmetric/Asymmetric Alliances
There is a difference in what major and minor powers desire in an alliance. Minor powers have usually low level of security while they enjoy high level of autonomy and therefore they are looking for ways to increase their security. Major powers usually possess high level of both security and autonomy, therefore they don’t search for exclusively autonomy or security based alliances. The bottom line is that alliance’s attraction is determined according to the level of autonomy and security each nation is able to provide and the value it attaches to them.26 Institutional bargaining between potential allies stands on the amount of “currency” available to a state which is determined by its ability “to potentially dominate or injure the interests” of another state and “its ability to credibly restrain itself from doing so“. The incentive of the second state to participate in an institution is that it places some restrains and limitations of the behavior of its
25 MORROW 1991, p. 910-912. 26 Ibid., p. 913-916.
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potential ally.27 An alliance can be symmetric or asymmetric. In asymmetric alliance each state receives different benefits and in a symmetric one each nation receives the same type of benefits. Symmetric alliances are more difficult to form because they require “great harmony of interest”. Also more of the alliances are between allies that are unequal in power than between those who are equal in power.28 Generally, the nineteenth century is viewed more as a balance of power period whereas twentieth century is better described with the power transition model. The balance of power theory assumes that nations form alliances to maintain or restore balance. As such, the alliance deals only with the immediate threat, it is therefore non-ideological and in general shorter. This theory corresponds with capability aggregation model as it sees allies only as possibility to increase capabilities against a threat. The balance of power theory ignores minor powers because they do not have means to be able to shift the balance of power. Therefore, it only takes into account major powers and it postulates that they are relatively equal in power. It follows that only symmetric alliances can be formed. The question is whether several minor powers acting together cannot substitute a major power or for example whether it is possible to see NATO as an alliance between US on one end and the European Union (or Europe) as a whole on the second side. On the other hand, the power transition theory is based on the assumption that international system is dominated by one major power and therefore alliances are asymmetric. They are formed by lesser powers around one dominant power or against it. They are ideological and long-lasting.29
27 IKENBERRY 2003, p. 52-53. 28 MORROW 1991, p. 913-916. 29 Ibid., p. 928-929.
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2. NATO before 9/11
2.1 NATO: More that a Mere Security Alliance
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), transatlantic international military pact founded April 4, 1949 by signatories of the Washington Treaty, was never a mere military alliance. The purpose of the Alliance, put very simply, is best described by the words of the first Secretary General of NATO Hastings Ismay that it was created to “keep the Russians out [of Europe], the Americans in and the Germans down."30 For one thing, NATO has stood in the center of the transatlantic relations since its beginning. This relationship helped stabilize Europe after the Second World War and encouraged European integration.31 To add to that, the Alliance was aimed to counter internal as well as external threats. While the Washington treaty does not explicitly mention the Soviet Union as conventional military threat to the member states, the Alliance was formed in order to react to any potential military confrontation with the Soviet Union, or rather to discourage the Soviet Union from any such actions. Thus far, the logic coincides with the traditional understanding of security alliances. Where NATO differs from realist approach to alliances is its internal dimension. In addition to goals states above, the Alliance was also supposed to counter the threat to the liberal democratic values and norms of its members. Signatories of the Washington Treaty proclaim their determination “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” in the preamble.32 Professor Gheciu even argues that this inner dimension was more important that the conventional military threat: “In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded less worrisome than the danger of Communist subversion
30 LANSFORD 2002, p. 2. 31 REICHARD 2006, s. 23. 32 The North Atlantic Treaty [online]. NATO. Apr. 4, 1949, updated Mar. 21, 2016. [cited 2016- 04-20].
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within the weakened societies of Western European states.” That is the reason why member states „declared the protection of common values rather than just the preservation of national autonomy and territorial integrity as the basic purpose of NATO.33 Therefore, NATO was more that a security alliance, it was “Atlantic political order” and “a community of values” shared among its members. Each member state claimed allegiance to the principles such as liberty, democracy, and rule of law.34 International relations theorist John Ikenberry claims that NATO was “the most elaborate and consequential institutional bargain” between Europe and the United States after the Second World War. First of all, it provided much desired security commitment of the reluctant US to Europe. Second, it brought Western Europe together and fuelled regional integration. Connected to it, it reduced nationalist and imperialist tendencies. Furthermore, it strengthens commitment to united Europe of two strongest states at the time, France and Great Britain. Fifth, the Alliance addressed European, especially French, fears of German military power by incorporating German military into multilateral system. Last but not least, the Alliance became a mechanism for integration of West Germany into Western system and its rehabilitation.35 The importance of shared values is visible in the debate over Portuguese membership in NATO and in the process of enlargement during the 1950s. While the inclusion of Portugal was considered a strategically necessary, many countries opposed it because, in their opinion, Portuguese political institutions and values would weaken the Alliance as they directly clashed with their democratic values. Geostrategy prevailed also in the decision to admit Greece and Turkey to the Alliance despite the fact that especially Turkey was thought to have very different political ideals. All three states were key in providing security for Europe and therefore the idea of political homogeneity was pushed back.36 Nevertheless, the doubts about their inclusion in the Alliance in spite of their strategic importance show that ideology and values were very important to NATO.
33 GHECIU 2005, p. 35 and 38. 34 REICHARD 2006, s. 26. 35 IKENBERRY 2003, p. 61-64. 36 GHECIU 2005, p. 39-42.
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2.2 History of Crises in the Alliance
To be able to assess the crisis in transatlantic relations after 9/11 it is necessary to understand that long-term cooperation within the Alliance was not always easy and that NATO had gone through several crises arising from different interests. The Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from NATO’s military structures, the Vietnam War, or the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are just few examples of the most important conflicts of interests and opinions. The words of Lionel Jospin, French premier between 1997 and 2002, about the relationship between France and the United States can be applied to all transatlantic relations: “It is true that it is not always easy to broach the subject of this relationship between the US and France [or European allies in general] in a balanced and reasonable way. We idealize its past and blacken its present.”37 The invasion of Egypt first by Israel and then followed by the United Kingdom and France in 1956 was the first serious crisis among the members of the Alliance. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which was owned almost entirely by French investors. This action also threatened British economic and military interests in the region. Despite warnings from the United States, the United Kingdom and France secretly agreed with Israel to use military actions in order to regain control of the Canal. Israel invaded the Egyptian Sinai and France together with UK demanded cease-fire. When the ultimatum was ignored, their troops joined the fight on Israel’s side. They demonstrated military predominance but they were forced to withdraw because of the joint pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States was angry that the UK ignored its warning but above all it was afraid that this crisis could develop into much greater, possibly even nuclear war. If Soviet Union attacked France or UK, the US would not have been able to stay neutral because it was bounded by the Washington Treaty. The US was also torn between an effort to maintain good relations with European allies and a desire to create friendly ties to the Third World nationalists. Protecting what was regarded as an effort to maintain colonial dominance would not send the right message. France on the
37 JOSPIN, Lionel. The Relationship Between France And The United States: Reflections for an American Audience. French Politics, Culture & Society. 2004, 22 (2), p.118.
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other hand expected sympathy from its ally, especially as it decided to remain faithful to NATO. Shortly before the Suez Crisis, Kremlin was persuading Paris to become neutral in exchange for Soviet termination of its support to the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria but France resisted. Moreover, “The Suez crisis is widely believed to have contributed significantly to Britain's decline as a world power.” 38 To conclude, this Crisis left Europe shocked by American unresponsiveness to Soviet nuclear threats against two of the NATO members the UK and France. Paris withdrew from the Alliance’s integrated military structure in 1966, which does not mean that it had left NATO completely but it was nevertheless very significant. France was unsatisfied for years with what it perceived as Anglo- American domination of NATO. Re-elected French President Charles de Gaulle did not agree with change in strategy from “Massive Retaliation” to “Flexible Response” pushed through by the US as he regarded it as a weakening of the American commitment to Europe. France also managed to acquire its own nuclear capabilities and it wished to take over some control of American nuclear weapons located on its territory. Allies unsuccessfully tried to persuade France to change its position. As a consequence, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had to be moved from Paris to Belgium and France remained outside military structures of NATO until 2009.39 NATO members backed American involvement in Vietnam War at first; however, the support decreased as the war became more and more Americanized in 1965. US support to South Vietnam against Communist North Vietnam served a common caused as it tried to stop Communist expansion. Later on Washington sent more and more troops there, launched airstrikes on North Vietnam and took over the lead. European allies witness it grudgingly because they thought that more US soldier in Asia meant less US soldiers in Europe. Moreover, they criticized the war because it was very harsh on civilians. Washington on the other hand felt that Europe should support them, as the US was the one who carried the
38 PEDEN, George C. Suez and Britain's Decline as a World Power. The Historical Journal. Cambridge University Press December 2012 , 55 (4). P. 1073. 39 1966-1967: SHAPE Finds a New Home. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. [Cited 2016-06-1].
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burden of the common defense against Communism. Instead, in American eyes, the European NATO members were being ungrateful.40 These few examples demonstrate that the interest of NATO allies are not always identical and that they sometimes can be even opposite. Even if the interests are the same or if they at least don’t stand in each others’ way, the allies do not have to approve of means used by one state to attain its goals. This does not mean that NATO would fall apart when an argument comes up between members; it only signifies that the Alliance is a democratic institution and while it is united in a bigger picture, it differs on individual issues from time to time.
2.3 Searching for a New Purpose: NATO after the Cold War
In 1990s, NATO showed again that it is more than a typical security alliance known from before the Second World War. According to realist and neo- realist theory, the end of the Cold War should have caused the end of the Alliance because there was no longer an enemy or a threat. Many realist scholars argued that if member states would not dissolve the Alliance, NATO would slowly fall apart and disappear.41 In other words, the members of the Alliance would either terminate it themselves, or they would slowly grow apart as their interests would differ more and more and eventually were in contrast in some areas. They weren’t completely wrong and it has happened to some extent. For example in the area of security “European defence had been synonymous with American defence” during the Cold War; however, especially Europeans realized in the post-Cold War period that their interests worldwide are not the same as American.42 Furthermore, it became clear during the 90s that American and European approach to security is fundamentally different. Professor Hanspeter Neuhold aptly describes these distinctions by saying that:
The USA defines security primarily in military terms (…) If need be, it will also resort to pre-emptive self-defence (…) Furthermore, it attaches rather little importance to international organizations [and]
40 History: The 40th anniversary of the Harmel Report. NATO Review [online]. [Cited 2016-06- 15].
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is reluctant to be bound by international treaties. These principles are regarded as inherent in the American approach to foreign affairs… By contrast, European states tend to adopt a multilateral approach in their external relations. They are guided by a comprehensive concept of security, which also emphasizes the economic and ecological dimension of international problems. European nations tend to be reluctant to resort to military force and rely more on political ad economic means.43
Socialization practices enacted by NATO in Central or East European countries, exceeded rational expectations. As professor Gheciu points out “as a socializing institution seeking to do more than just negotiate with or manipulate Central/Eastern Europeans, NATO did not limit itself to a minimal, reactive role involving the manipulation of instrumental incentives and ‘self-socialization’ by targeted actors.”44 The inside dimension with community-building practices became central to the strategy of NATO and it justified Alliance’s role in the new world order. Since its creation, NATO has embodied “the inside and outside dimensions of the double logic of international security”. While the outside logic, or geostrategic dimension, predominated during the Cold War due to the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union, the situation changed in 1990s. The end of the Cold War meant that the immediate conventional threat evaporated and on the other hand new unconventional risks appeared.45 It was argued that the threat to the member states in 1990s was springing from potential domestic instability of the former Communist countries due to the transition process.46 In order to stay relevant, the Alliance had to be able to promote stability within Central and Eastern European states. Thus the “community building” was emphasized while military dimension was pushed to the second place.47 Some of the officials, especially from European NATO members, expressed concerns about the Alliances ability to create tools and mechanisms
43 NEUHOLD, Hanspeter. Transatlantic Turbulence: Rift or Ripples? European Foreign Affairs Review. 2003 in REICHARD 2006, s. 31. 44 GHECIU 2005, p. 224. 45 Ibid., p. 76. 46 Ibid., p. 60. 47 Ibid., p. 62-63
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necessary for the post-Cold War era, in which political dimension of NATO needed to be emphasized. Especially French President Francois Mitterrand thought that NATO wasn’t the best choice for security arrangement in this new world system because the Alliance had been associated with “military confrontation with the Soviet Union”. Therefore, he reasoned, politicians should had been looking for more pan-European security system rather than a transatlantic solution.48 Nevertheless, the member states of the Alliance agreed that the main risk to European security lays in possible domestic instability of its neighbors to the East and thus the projection of democratic values beyond NATO’s borders became key.49 Former Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner considered the Alliance to be the right tool for the West to help with the transition of former Communist countries in the area of security because as he points out “the Treaty of Washington of 1949 nowhere mentions the Soviet Union” and it emphasizes permanent cooperation of Western democracies. The US President George Bush (sr.) agreed that cooperation between NATO and Central and Eastern European states would lead to promotion of “peaceful democratic change”.50 Even though, the West decided to be directly involved in the transitions, it was reluctant to enlarge the Alliance. Instead it created different platforms to interact with the former Communist countries in Central and East Europe as for example the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The goal of the PfP was to socialize defence sectors of mentioned countries into the practices of NATO, teach them Alliance’s norms and procedures, and help the governments of Eastern/Central European countries to develop or strengthen democratic control of their defense forces. This initial reluctance to enlarge the Alliance or even to consider it led to speculations that the members of the Alliance only sought to promote their own interests and that they did not want to enlarge NATO because it would bring financial burdens and also because they feared that it would weaken the Alliance. International relations specialist Alexandra Gheciu argues that the members of the
48 Ibid., p. 62-63 49 Ibid., p. 69. 50 Ibid., p. 64.
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Alliance were, however, not convinced that any of the former Communist states shared their democratic values. They did not claim that the new governments weren’t “anti-Communist” but they concluded that these political actors are still far from being democratic. This view eventually evolved and the members of the Alliance began to consider it a “special duty” to help those countries that demonstrated a “commitment to the norms of liberal democracy”. 51 Then Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana even described it as “a moral obligation [of NATO] to help them fulfill their legitimate aspirations”.52 The reality is that the West, especially the United States, found itself in a newly advantaged position after the end of the Cold War. International politics do not always follow moral obligations. More often than not, it is the other way around and moral norms serve only to justify certain policies. According to the theory of institutional bargaining, major powers are likely to seek institutional agreements in the period of time after the major wars. That is because the old institutional order has been destroyed and new winners and losers emerged. This puts a new leading state in a position where it has to decide how to use its new power while other states seek assurances about future behavior of the leading state. Therefore the lock-in capacity of leading states to lock the secondary states into a long-term policy orientation is very high. To add to that, wars have a potential to disrupt domestic institutions and the leading state is often in a position to help secondary states to rebuild them.53 This wasn’t any different after the end of the Cold War. The United States as a new global hegemon moved toward unipolarity and it strived to build new institutions or expand already existing ones. Except the expansion of NATO, it signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or was one of the founding members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). International relations theorist John Ikenberry argues that the administration of former US President Bill Clinton used the institutional-building agenda in the Central and Eastern Europe. The “strategy of enlargement” used “multilateral institutions as
51 Ibid., p. 67-71. 52 SOLANA, Javier. Preparing for the Madrid Summit [Online]. NATO Review. 1997, 45 (2). [cited 2016-04-20].
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mechanism to stabilize and integrate the new and emerging market democracies into the Western democratic world”. Furthermore, he claims that NATO helped to lock in domestic transitions in Eastern and Central Europe and that already the prospect of membership was an “incentive” to pursue domestic reforms.54 To summarize the role of NATO in the 1990s, the disappearance of enemy and conventional threat led some experts to believe that the Alliance was no longer necessary and that it would be ended or that it would step by step fall apart. Distinctions in approach to security between Americans and Europeans became more and more clear during the 90s. Europeans were more reluctant to resort to military force and promoted more multilateralist approach, while the United States were not against using pre-emptive strikes and did not consider international regimes as important. Nevertheless, NATO overcame these problems and transformed itself. It played a central role in the transition of former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It pushed the military dimension to the second place and behind institution-building and focused on projecting its values beyond its borders. The end of 1990s is marked by the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary entering the Alliance.
54 Ibid., p. 64-67.
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3. NATO after 9/11
“Nous sommes tous Américains” meaning “We are all Americans”.55
The now famous headline of French newspaper Le Monde captures the sentiment in Europe after the attacks on 9/11. They were a shock not only for the United States but for the whole Western world. Europeans immediately expressed their compassion and support. They considered it to be attack also on them because they regarded it as an assault on whole Western community and its values. Spontaneous candlelight and procession erupted all over Europe. Political leaders did not stay behind and immediately expressed support, offered assistance and pledged to cooperate on counterterrorism efforts. Apart from expressing support individually, members of NATO united and shortly after the assault invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance condemned the attacks only hours after they happened, and member states agreed already on September 12 to invoke Article V in case the attacks were initiated from abroad.56 The decision is recorded in the statement of the North Atlantic Council:
The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe of North America shall be considered an attack against them all.57
After investigation and a number of classified briefings, NATO officially announced that all evidence point out to terrorist organization al-Qaida being responsible for planning and executing the attacks and therefore it would be
55 Nous Sommes Tous Américains. Le Monde, Sept 13, 2001. p.1. 56 BENSAHEL 2003, p. 6. 57 NATO. Statement by the North Atlantic Council [Online]. NATO Press Release. 2001, 124. Sept. 12, 2001. [cited 2016-04-20].
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considered as an attack covered by the Article V.58 Interestingly enough, it was the first invocation of this Article in the Alliance’s 52-year history.59 NATO was however allowed to only take a back seat. European members of the Alliance were aware of American tendencies to act unilaterally. They hoped that the invocation of Article V would cause that the United States would not act alone; on the contrary, they wanted Americans to use the Alliance to conduct any military actions or at least consult the issue with other member states. Americans saw it differently and already in October 2001 refused any possibilities of NATO- led military actions in Afghanistan. They did ask for NATO’s assistance but they made it clear that the Alliance would not be the one to plan and conduct the operations. As a result, “NATO did not contribute any of its collective assets to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.”60 The Alliance was able to help in certain areas as it granted a request of the United States to take eight measures:
• enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it; • provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism; • take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory; • backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism; • provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism; • provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against
58 Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson [online]. NATO On-line Library. Oct. 2, 2001 [cited 2016-04-20].
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terrorism, including for refueling, in accordance with national procedures.61
Furthermore, the Alliance also announced that if requested, it is “ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve [and it] is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against terrorism.”62 This chapter is divided into three parts. The first subchapter examines the US attitudes toward NATO, what 9/11 meant for Americans, and what reasons Washington had not to act through the Alliance. The second subchapter explores European views. The first part focuses on common steps and attitudes. The second one contains three case studies of UK’s, German, and Czech response to the terrorist attacks and to the US retaliation. The case studies were chosen in a manner to represent the main streams or approaches in European foreign policy. The last part of this chapter summarizes reasons why NATO has not disintegrated during the transatlantic crises.
3.1 US Perspective
3.1.1 NATO from the US perspective
NATO has been founded over fifty years ago with the main goal to provide security guarantees for the war-torn Europe; nevertheless, the first time the famous Article V of the Washington Treaty about collective defence has been activated was right after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The assault was a terrible shock for the US and American feeling of security has been destroyed. Investigations showed that the attacks were organized by al-Qaida, whose leader Osama bin Laden was hiding in Afghanistan. Taliban, Islamic fundamental movement in power there, refused to extradite him.
61 Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision On Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States [online]. NATO On-line Library. Oct.4, 2001 [cited 2016-04-20].
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The US decided to strike; they resolved to get bin Laden and to remove the terrorist-friendly Taliban from power. Political science professor Tom Lansford points out that with the attacks on 9/11 “the myth of American security invincibility was shattered and the episode demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States to the same type of substate and state-sponsored terrorist groups that have operated in other areas of the world since 1960s.”63 Political as well as military support of Europe was demonstrated by the prompt invocation of the Article V on October 2nd, 2001, which confirmed that the terrorist attacks on the United States were, in fact, attacks on all the members of the Alliance. Nevertheless, the United States was in turmoil and people as well as many politicians shouted for revenge. It is not that the importance of NATO in transatlantic relations has diminished but that the interest of the US has been shifting away from the transatlantic relations and Europe for some time. According to specialist on EU- NATO relations Martin Reichard, “NATO is still regarded as the core and the most important expression of the transatlantic relationship which should remain its primary forum.”64 However, the US interests began to shift away from Europe and toward emerging Asian markets already before the Cold War, and with China rising as a global player it has been gaining security dimension too.65 In 1990s and especially in the new millennium, Europe’s strategic importance decreased. There was no reason to expect in near future “a conflict of a medium to major scale involving US troops”. American security planners were more concerned with Afghanistan, North Korea, and the Middle East, particularly Iraq. Furthermore, American trade with Asia was exceeding its trade with Europe approximately by half.66 It became visible already during the late 1990s that the United States are less and less interested in multilateral approach, and the Presidency of George W. Bush witnessed a clear step toward unilateralism. In the second term of President
63 LANSFORD, Tom. All for One: Terrorism, NATO, and the United States. Burlington, USA, 2002, p. 8. 64 REICHARD, Martin. The EU-NATO Relationship: A Leagal and Political perspective. Burlington, USA, 2006, p. 23. 65 Ibid., p. 21-22. 66 Ibid., p. 29.
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Clinton, the US administration became less occupied with anchoring its foreign policy in multilateral institutions. For instance, the Operation Desert Fox, in which the US bombed Iraq in December 1998; and NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999, in which the United States took part, were not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The United States also cut its financial aid for developing countries and it was not willing to support international regimes which were not explicitly in its interest, for example establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).67 Under President Bush, the United States went even further and refused important international agreements as Kyoto Protocol, the Biological Weapons Ban, and the Trade in Light Arms treaty. It also fully rejected participation in the International Criminal Court and Washington was signaling possible unilateral withdrawal from 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence treaty.68 The assault exposed divisions among officials in the administration of George W. Bush about how rules and institutional agreements fit into US foreign policy and campaign against terrorism. While the whole post World War II era and the presidencies of George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton were marked by liberal multilateralism, the administration of President George W. Bush adopted “unilateral, even imperial, grand strategy based on a starkly realist vision of American interest and global power realities.” 69 In this view, international institutions supporting cooperative security and arms control had very limited impact and therefore they were not important. Instead, due to its preponderance, the US can engage in Europe and Asia selectively, and it can “dominate world politics with military forces that are both unchallenged and less bound to United Nations or alliances control”. The United States foreign policy should not be isolationist but unilateralist, which would allow the United States “to act on the world” without “being entangled by the world”.70
67 HODER, Lukáš. Transatlantické vztahy v doě krize: Hegemonie USA a emancipace Evropy po 11. září 2001. Brno, 2009, p. 17. 68 IKENBERRY 2003, p. 67-69. 69 Even though the second term of President Clinton showed signs of declining interest in multilateral approach, the foreign policy under his presidency is altogether more in line with liberal multilateralism. 70 IKENBERRY 2003, p. 67-69.
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Proponents of neorealist approach to international relations have claimed that NATO has lost its purpose after the dissolution of the Soviet Union due to the emergence of a unipolar world in which the United States is the only global power. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz has argued that while the Alliance did not disintegrate, it became only a tool of promoting American interests. Professor Gheciu summarizes Waltz’s position by saying that “NATO [was] being used as the hegemonic tool through which the US project[ed] its egoistic interests in Europe. For instance, actions taken in the name of ‘nurturing democracy’ in Eastern Europe reflect[ed] the interests of the American military-industrial complex in securing access to the markets of the former socialist states.”71
3.1.2 9/11 and the United States
On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability – even to threats that gather on the other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America. (Gergorge W. Bush)72
The nation, as well as the Congress, united behind its leader, which gave the President and his administration a blank cheque to deal with the crisis. The approval rate of President Bush skyrocketed from 51 % before the attacks to 90 % in the first two weeks after the attacks.73 Furthermore, on September 18, 2001, the Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force against Terrorists” which granted president the authority “to use necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons”.74 The military response to
71 GHECIU, Alexandra. NATO in the „New Europe“. Stanford, USA, 2005, p. 214-215. 72 President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat [online].The White House. Oct. 7, 2002. [cited 2016-04- 20].
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the attacks came in the form of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which was launched on October 7, 2001. OEF is the official name for the Global War on Terrorism, and consists of a number of subordinate operations. Among them is the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with the aim to dismantle al- Qaida and to deny it safe heavens by removing the Taliban from power. While the US was assisted by its allies, it wasn’t until August 2003 that NATO became involved as an alliance. The administration of the President Bush had several reasons to bypass NATO. The first, already mentioned earlier, is that realists or neo-realists were in power, who in general do not believe in the utility of international institution, and prefer cooperation on bilateral basis. The second reason was that public was pressuring the government for swift actions. Even though NATO acted quickly, it wasn’t until October 2, 2001 when the invocation of the Article V of the Washington Treaty became official. 75 Further cooperation talks and military planning would take time, which the US was not willing to sacrifice. Third and probably the most important reason is that the United States had had bad experiences with decision making and finding consensus within NATO from Kosovo. “The Bush administration did not initially ask that NATO run the military actions in Afghanistan because they did not want to repeat the Kosovo experience, where the conduct of military operations was complicated by allied criticism of US targeting strategy.”76 Too much was at stake and the US preferred to keep tight control of conducted military operations. Fourth reason why the US did not ask NATO to conduct the military operations is because Washington was aware of the dilemmas this decision would mean for many of its allies. At the end of 1990s, there were discussions within NATO about its area of operations.77 The Washington Treaty restricts the use of Article V to attacks conducted in the allied territory north of the Tropic of Cancer; however, it does not specify whether the
75 Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson [online]. NATO On-line Library. Oct. 2, 2001 [cited 2016-04-20].
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answer to such an attack can be carried out elsewhere.78 The US was not willing to reopen this discussion in the time of a crisis. To summarize, the United States questioned the utility of NATO even before the attacks. The assault on 9/11 was extremely traumatic for the United States and exposed vulnerability not present since the end of the Cold War or maybe even since the Second World War. The United States went to Afghanistan and later on to Iraq without NATO but instead with the so called “Alliance of the Willing”. They had four main reasons for that: 1) Realists or neo-realists, who did not believe in utility of international institutions, were in power; 2) the public pressured the government for swift action; 3) the United States had had bad experiences with decision making and finding consensus within NATO from Kosovo; 4) the allies were not in agreement about the area, where the Alliance could take actions.
3.2 9/11 from European perspective
Probably for the first time in history European countries acted together as they honored victims of the attacks by three minutes of silence on Friday September 14, 2001. Europeans were invited to this silent tribute by their governments, the EU, and the Council of Europe.79 This unity did not last long because each country had a different opinion about the proper reaction. The Alliance reached unanimous decision to consider the events of 9/11 as an armed attack on the whole Alliance and it thus activated Article V of the Washington treaty but it did not do so without any objections from its member states. Among the strong supporters for the invocation were Great Britain, France, Spain, and Italy; on the other hand, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway expressed reservations. For example, politicians in German government already in September 2001 warned against the dangers of American overreaction.80 Most
78 The North Atlantic Treaty [online]. NATO. Apr. 4, 1949, updated Mar. 21, 2016. [cited 2016- 04-20].
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of the European states were reassuring their public that they were not in war while still supporting the US. High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU Javier Solana warned against the impression that we stand face in face with the clash of civilization.81 The only country, which immediately followed the Washington’s lead and talked about being in war after 9/11, was the United Kingdom.82 European countries took some common steps and they made an effort to act collectively. They decided to reinforce the European Police Office (Europol) and strengthen its cooperation with non-EU members to the East. Another steps were to create a common European warrant or for example to establish uniform penalties for terrorist acts. To do that, the EU had to adopt single definition of terrorism.83 European members of the Alliance supported the efforts to dismantle terrorist groups; however, most of them were not prepared to include independent states as its adversaries. In January 2002, President Bush outlined the course of the US foreign policy in the State of the Union Address. He stated that there were two main goals: first one was to “shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorist to justice” and the second was to stop terrorists and regimes that had sought weapons of mass destruction. 84 While Europeans supported Americans in the War on Terror, including the war in Afghanistan and overthrowing Taliban, they were not ready to broaden the scope to state sponsors of terrorism. The tough stance of the US administration toward Iraq and its rhetoric’s caused more and more concerns in Europe, which was becoming aware that Washington has decided to overthrown the regime in Iraq disregarding the opinion of its European allies or UN Security Council unwillingness to sanction it.85
81 MOCEK, Michal. Evropa ještě nechce konflikt. MF DNES. Sep. 17, 2001. ISSN 1210-1168. P. A3. 82 MOCEK, Michal. Evropa chce v nadcházejícím tažení hrát samostatnou roli. MF DNES. Sep. 19, 2001. ISSN 1210-1168. P. A3 83 MOCEK, Michal. EU se sjednotila proti teroru. MF DNES. Sep. 21, 2001. ISSN 1210-1168. P. A6. 84 President Delivers State of the Union Address. The White House. Jan. 29, 2002. [cited 2016-04- 20].
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European criticism toward the US was not focused only on the content of its foreign policy but also on the process of making it. Europe regards the process to be often strongly influenced by interest groups. Furthermore, it is sometimes seen as unreasonable, ill-advised or even foolish. The mistrust in Washington’s decision-making is a contributing factor in the transatlantic crisis.86 Furthermore, the presidency of George W. Bush had not inspired confidence and trust in Europe since its beginning. The President himself was perceived in negative light as conservative Republican with low intelligence and even lower knowledge of international relations. Europeans were concerned with his tendency toward unilateralism, which was already seen during his presidential campaign and especially during his first months. The anti-missile defence system, refusal to sign Kyoto Protocol, or reluctance to internationally restrict trade with conventional weapons are just examples of issues that worried Europe. This lack of confidence in American administration did not suddenly change after the attacks on 9/11.87 In addition, European concerns about American actions were supplemented by unease regarding their own inability to act collectively.88 The Europe split between Great Britain, which revived its special partnership with the United States; the group behind Germany and France, who opposed the war in Iraq; and the other states, which might have expressed support to one side or another but were not prepared to act on it or had trouble to justify its position in front of its own public. The division between European states regarding Iraq can be clearly noticed in “The Letter of Eight”. The letter named “Europe and America Must Stand United” published on January 30, 2003 was signed by eight European countries, which gave it its latter nickname. While Germany and France loudly opposed any use of military force against Iraq, other EU states decided to demonstrate their support. Representatives of the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Denmark signed and publish the letter, which decisively marked
86 Ibid., p. 14. 87 Ibid., p. 20-21. 88 Ibid., p. 24.
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split in EU and made it impossible to implement the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, three countries in the process of entering the EU and the newest members of NATO: the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, also signed.89 This reflected the attitude of the Eastern and Central Europe. The Vilnius letter issued by the Vilnius group, which was even more outright support for the US, soon followed it. The Vilnius group composed of Baltic States Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and also Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Republic of Macedonia.90 The “Letter of Eight” acknowledged American role in European security and emphasized the common values. It also pointed out that the United Nations itself had had already recognized the threat represented by Iraqi regime and its WMD programs. It emphasized that “all of us” were bound by the UNSC Resolution 1441. The letter concluded that the UNSC had been tasked with “preserving international peace and security” and thus must ensure compliance with its resolutions.91 To summarize, by lending its support, Europe wanted to prevent unilateral, massive response of the US to the terrorist acts because it was afraid that it could turn against the whole Western world.92 European countries and especially the EU tried to take common steps but the split in foreign policies between individual states became quickly apparent. Europe was not ready to give the US blank cheque, especially when confidence in American decision-making regarding foreign policy was relatively low.
3.2.1 Case Study #1: the United Kingdom
The situation was different for the United Kingdom than for other European countries after the attacks. UK had the highest number of victims aside
89 MILLER, David. World Opinion Opposes. In: Global Policy Forum [online]. Nov. 21, 2001. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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from the United States with 67 people killed.93 British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the first one to proclaim the attacks to be aimed not only at the United States but at all democratic countries.94 Furthermore, it stood in a unique position strategically when it became clear that Afghanistan is hiding the instigator of the assault Osama bin Laden because it already had over twenty thousand men as well as many ships and bases located in Indian Ocean.95 The UK became major ally of the US in Afghanistan and provided very significant number of troops that included Special Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, Ground Forces and other contributions. The UK Special Forces were deployed as soon as November 11, 2001 and played critical role in Operation Enduring Freedom. UK, for instance, contributed also a large number of support aircrafts; in particular British tankers were very helpful to the US.96 UK Ground Forces deployed in the first year of the Operation Enduring Freedom between October 2001 and October 2002 comprised of 1700-person infantry battle group. Several British submarines, an aircraft carrier, an assault ship, and many other capabilities were also used in this operation.97 While the support for actions in Afghanistan was wide spread among international community, the situation was different regarding Iraqi regime. The UK’s goal there was to reintegrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not have weapons of mass destruction and which does not threaten its neighbors and international community. The British government officials suggested already in March 2002 in their interdepartmental document on policy toward Iraq that this won’t be possible with Hussein in power and that containment is only “the least worst option”. While it should have constrained Iraq’s endeavor, it wasn’t expected to stop it completely in its efforts to rearm and to gain weapons of mass destruction.98 The UK’s government saw the confrontation with Iraq in 2003 as a
93 9/11 Attack Victims with Foreign Nationalities. BroadyESL. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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consequence of the Gulf War and the decision of allies to keep Saddam Hussein in power.99 After 9/11, the UK had to face Washington’s decision to remove Hussein from power, and it had to choose whether it would help or let Americans do it alone. Contrary to American “hegemonist realism” when US was aware of its military power and it was not reluctant to use force, the UK aimed at international order founded on international norms and institutions. Nonetheless, British Prime Minister Tony Blair shared Bush’s view that it is necessary to deal with “rogue states”, especially those which strive to acquire weapons of mass destruction.100 Blair is often credited with pushing Bush to seek agreement of the UN Security Council. US Secretary of State Colin Powel also made a case about going through the UN but Bush finally agreed when British prime minister promised him support if he chooses the UN route. Blair told him that otherwise he would not be able to gain support at home for deploying British forces.101 UK under Blair denounced containment, which has been its policy since the First Gulf War. It wasn’t possible to sustain it much longer as international support for containment was declining. Especially Russia pressured for lifting sanctions. Furthermore, sanctions were not really effective as Hussein was able to extract money illegally from oil-for-food program. More importantly, Iraqi people suffered the most because the government shifted the burden of sanctions to them.102 The British and American threat perception differed considerably. The US assessed that Iraq possessed an imminent threat. The government officials were also persuaded that Iraq and al-Qaida cooperated, especially on chemical and biological weapons.103 The US attitude is well summarized by President Bush saying, “We cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that comes in the form of a mushroom cloud.”104 On the other hand, Blair never claimed that Iraq
99 Ibid., p. 871-892. 100 Ibid., p. 875. 101 Ibid., p. 879. 102 Ibid., p. 877-878. 103 Ibid., p. 880-881. 104 JEFFERY, Simon. We cannot wait for the smoking gun. The Guardian [online]. Oct. 8, 2002. [Cited 2016-06-12].
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posed an imminent threat to the UK or anyone else but the Iraqi people. The strongest words he used were “serious and current” threat. Professor Christoph Bluth summarizes government officials’ statements, including Blair’s, between 2002 and 2003 by assessing that in their view “The first element of the threat consisted in Saddam Hussein’s propensity for aggression,” and Bluth supports this statement by argument often used by Blair that “He [Saddam Hussein] has twice before started wars of aggression. Over one million people died in them.” The second issue was Iraq’s possession of WMD. According to British government, Hussein recognized “no norms or restraint other than those imposed by military force”. Despite UN resolutions, he possessed weapons of mass destruction, established programs to develop them, and he did not hesitate to use them against Iraq’s own population. Thirdly, while the UK’s government did not claim that Iraq has ties to al-Qaida, it did not rule out future cooperation between states that develop WMD and terrorist groups.105 The debate within the UK about Iraq was primarily from legal perspective whether the “repressive nature of the Iraqi regime justified military action”. Liberal Democrats failed to address moral consideration and thus they came out looking as defence lawyers on Hussein’s side. They all together failed to suggest any solutions to human rights abuses in Iraq. Legality issues brought up by opposition explain why the government focused on the failure to disarm, which was a breach of UN resolutions and thus provided legal arguments for intervention. Professor Bluth argues that “In reality, the full force of the argument for military action rested not on the threat itself, but on the absence of an acceptable alternative and the consequences of permitting Saddam Hussein to remain in power.” He points out that the chosen policy cannot be compared to an ideal situation but the alternatives, in this case to the consequences of taking no action.106 Even thought the intelligence was often weak and unreliable, the decision of British government for a regime change in Iraq rested more on the nature of Iraqi regime rather than certainty that it has weapons of mass destruction.
105 BLUTH 2004, p. 881-882. 106 Ibid., p. 884-885.
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According to assessment of the United Kingdom, Iraq was determined to acquire WMD, it was unwilling to accept limitations established by international community or any at all except those imposed by force. Furthermore, Baghdad indicated a potential and implied willingness to cooperate with terrorist organizations.107
3.2.2 Case Study #2: Germany
As previously mentioned, the split in European foreign policy or between some European states, especially Germany and France, and the United States were not about the immediate reaction and the war in Afghanistan but mostly over how to deal with Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein. The discussion about Hussein’s regime went on at the same time as campaigns for federal elections in Germany. Even though, it was understood between German Chancellor Schroeder and American President Bush that the topic of war in Iraq would not be used in the elections, Schroeder broke this unwritten agreement because his social-democratic party had been losing in the pools. The opposition to the war was one of the few topics to gain more voters. This however, brought conflict in German-American relations. Nevertheless, after Schroeder won the election, he mitigated his rhetoric and despite the public opposition to the war, Germany indirectly assisted in overthrowing Hussein’s regime. For instance, it provided military bases, German air force participated in surveillance flights AWACS, and German soldiers guarded American military bases in Germany to allow American units to relocate.108 Yet, Germany remained in political, if not military, opposition to the war in Iraq until its end. Its long-term policy has been the whole time in support of multilateral approach through the United Nations. Together with Germany, France was the leader of opposition to the war in Iraq within NATO. France has traditionally defied American strong position of “superpower”. Furthermore, it considered forced change of regime in Iraq to be dangerous because it could lead to very long war and to strengthening of terrorist groups. Nonetheless, France was sending mixed signals as it ensured the US about
107 Ibid., p. 890. 108 HODER 2009, s. 67-68.
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its willingness to proceed united to disarm Iraq, and it mobilized its aircraft carrier, fifteen thousand men, and send officer to United States Central Command in Tampa, Florida.109 France struggled between decisive German opposition to the war and the position of the US and the UK. Paris strived for stronger role of the UN Security Council, where it had a veto power and thus ranked among global player. Siding with Germany would push the US toward more unilateralist position, which would diminish the role of the UN Security Council and as a consequence of France.110 Germany It is indisputable that people in Germany had great sympathy with Americans; however, they were at the same time concerned that Washington may overreact, use military power excessively, and engage the whole West in a long- term war beyond Afghanistan.111 The German-American relations deteriorated already with a change in leadership, as George W. Bush was not regarded favorably in Germany and his relationships with Schroder were from the beginning rocky. Nevertheless, Germany proclaimed “unlimited solidarity” not excluding military support after the attacks on 9/11.112 It also agreed with the invocation of Article V of the Washington Treaty. German Chancellor believed that the United States would reciprocate by consulting Germany but that did not happen. Bush promised to consult with Schroeder but he kept insisting in the beginning of year 2002 that there were no war plans for Iraq, even though he asked Rumsfeld to prepare it as early as November 2001.113 It was not until August 2002 when the final deterioration in German- American relations occurred due to escalating rhetoric on both sides. Schroeder in
109 United States Central Command (USCENTCOM, or CENTCOM) has responsibility over countries of the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. 110 HODER 2009, s. 69-70. 111 SZABO, Stephen F. Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations. Brookings Institution Press, 2004. ISBN 0815782446. P. 16-17. 112 DALEY, Suzanne. A NATION CHALLENGED: THE ALLIES; European Leaders Voice Support. International New York Times [Online]. oct. 8, 2001. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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his pre-election campaign stated that Germany will refuse any participation in the war in Iraq, it will provide neither military support nor funds. Schroeder’s words were: “We are ready [to give] solidarity. But this country under my leadership is not available for adventures.” and he also condemned the position of previous governments, which he described as “We stay out, but we pay up.”114 Dr. Szabo, a scholar of German-American and transatlantic relations, points out that as it was part of the campaign it was “more political rather that foreign policy decision, made by Schroeder himself” without a full discussion within German government, or even within Chancellery or Foreign Office.115 Situation tensed even more because Bush administration also escalated its rhetoric against Hussein’s regime and in favor of regime change. For example Vice President Richard Cheney stated in his address to war veterans at the end of August that:
A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his [Saddam Hussein’s] compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow ‘back in his box’. (…) What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness, We will not simply look away, hope for the best (…) The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action (…) the entire world must know that we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our freedom and our security.116
According to Szabo, this speech could be understood as American “vice president calling for regime change in Iraq, with or without a UN mandate”. Furthermore, in the eyes of Germany, it indicated a shift from controlling weapons of mass destruction to regime change.117 One of the last straws for Americans in dealing with Germany over Iraq was the comment made by Schroder’s minister of justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin. She supposedly compared tactics of the American President Bush to those of Hitler’s. To add to that, Chancellor did not fire the minister, which maybe could of saved the situation. The US was angry and
114 HOOPER, John. German leader says no to Iraq war. The Guardian [online]. Aug. 6, 2002. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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blamed Schroeder for creating an atmosphere which gave a way to such remarks.118 Even though it was very close, Schroder won the elections in September, and it was in part due to the topic of the War in Iraq. Many Germans were concerned about American behavior and motives, and they were also mostly in opposition to war and to the use of military force in general. The focus on Iraq not only took the focus of domestic policy and poor performance of economy but it also helped win votes of women and voters in East Germany who opposed the use of military force or were suspicious of the United States as they ascribed them the same role the Kremlin used to have there.119 For countries opposing the war in Iraq, Germany included, the principle of preemptive war was especially worrying. Its implications under the international law were troubling, as setting such precedent would make it easier for other countries to do the same. They were simply not persuaded that the United States had a case for a war. The struggle about Iraq on UN soil was regarding a disagreement about necessity for explicit permission to use force. Permanent members of UNSC France, Russia, and China wanted two separate resolutions so they would avoid any “automacity” of use of force. In November 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 stating that Iraq has been breaching standing resolutions and it gave it the last chance to comply. The second resolution was supposed to state what to do in case Iraq would continue to violate previous resolutions to avoid automatic trigger for use of force by Americans, and therefore it would ensure that the UNSC made the final decision. However, the wording of the Resolution 1441 was ambiguous and thus postponed the issue whether to have one or two resolutions for later.120 There was a split also in the US government regarding whether Washington should seek new resolution from the UN, which would explicitly sanction the use of force if Hussein’s regime failed to comply with UN weapons inspectors. Foreigner minister Colin Powell was persuading the
118 Ibid., p. 29. 119 Ibid., p. 31. 120 Ibid., p. 36.
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president to work toward multilateral approach to Iraqi situation through UN. The British Prime Minister and main American ally Tony Blair also needed the second resolution to get domestic support to sent troops to Iraq. On the other hand, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld were in favor of declaring that the US did not need the second resolution because Baghdad violated already existing UN resolutions.121 The President decided to go through UN and, after listing Hussein’s violations he called upon the UN delegates to act in his speech on September 12, 2002:
We have been more than patient. We’ve tried sanctions. We’ve tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.122
The UN Security Council adopted unanimously the Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, which acknowledged the breach of obligations under standing resolutions on side of Iraq, and gave Baghdad “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council”.123 It, however, failed to address whether member states were to use force if Iraq does not comply or another resolution would be needed. Once Washington realized it couldn’t win Germany over, it decided to follow the strategy of divide and conquer. Schröder’s strong refusal to participate in the War in Iraq, apparently even if the UN Security Council would issue a mandate, not only cleared the way to unilateralist acts by Great Britain, Spain and other EU members, but his calling for “German Way” raised concerns in Europe and pushed some of the European countries, namely Poland, on the side of the United Stated. The US took advantage of divisions in Europe, despite the effects it
121 Ibid., p. 32. 122 Statement by President Bush, United Nations General Assembly, UN Headquarters, New York, 12 September 2002. United Nations [online]. Sep.12, 2002. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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had on overall transatlantic relations. Washington used dichotomy of old-versus- new Europe, where France and Germany were portrayed as backwards countries while European supporters of the US policy in Iraq, especially newer members of the Alliance, were described as Europe’s vital bright future.124 To summarize, German position was highly influenced by the fact that federal elections were coming up. Public opinion was mainly against the War in Iraq in whole Europe but it had an enormous impact on foreign policy in Germany due to the elections. Furthermore, Germans were aware of American tendencies to overreact. Bad personal relations between Schroeder and Bush also played a role but more importantly Berlin felt betrayed by Washington’s unwillingness to consult and inform Germany about its plans.
3.2.3 Case Study #3: the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic as well as the other two countries, which entered NATO in March 1999, faced different dilemma than the rest of the members. As a new member, it did not want to turn its back to the leader of the Alliance. On the other hand, there was unwillingness of the political elites to promise concrete military help as it was highly unpopular step in the eyes of the public. Czech people and elites showed compassion and support in the hours and days immediately after the attacks. The Czech Republic offered help with dealing with the disaster, for instance it offered blood as there was shortage of it in the US In the evening on September 12, 2001 people gather at the Wenceslas Square despite appeals of Minister of the Interior Stanislav Gross not to participate due to higher security risks. The government also announced that Friday September 14 would be a national day of mourning and invited all the citizens to honor victims of the attacks by three minutes of silence.125 Not even two days after the attacks, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kavan outlined possibility of deploying soldiers as contribution of the Czech Republic to the US efforts to deal with those
124 SZABO 2004, p. 10-11. 125 UNGER, Jakub, and JEŽEK, Petr. České vojsko je připraveno pomoci. Idnes.cz [online]. Sep. 13, 2001. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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responsible for the attacks aside from logistical support or permission to overflight in the Czech airspace.126 Political struggle and support Emergency committee of the Czech government met on September 12, 2001 and the administration decided that it will support NATO’s decision about collective defense in case the attack originated from abroad.127 This was later endorsed by all political parties except Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and also by President Václav Havel.128 The Defence Minister Jaroslav Tvrdík, already a day after the attacks, confirmed that the Czech Republic would join Alliance’s efforts against countries or terrorist groups which attacked the United States. This statement was affirmed by the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Václav Klaus.129 Speculations about involvement of Czech service men in the war appeared few days after the attacks and they proved to be true. Czech ambassador to NATO Karel Kovanda estimated on September 13, 2001 that the chemical defense unit from Liberec would be the most probable Czech contribution to allied efforts as it was part of NATO’s force of immediate reaction. The Czech Republic fulfilled its commitments to NATO and it supported its ally the United States. After all, as the Ministry of Defence later reviews the decision, “Only a completely unreasonable person would not consider the terrorist attack on New York to be an attack on the whole civilized world and thus also a threat to the Czech security.”130 The first contribution started in March 2002 when a unit specialized on chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense was sent to Kuwait. A month later, the CR also sent its medics to Afghanistan and in spring 2004 it deployed its Special Forces there. The public and politicians were; however, more split in the opinion regarding Iraq. The Czech Republic faced a dilemma, one very similar to other
126 Česko podpoří NATO, připraveno pomoci USA. MF DNES. 14.9. 2001. P. A7. ISSN 1210- 1168. 127 Česko se připojí k útokům NATO. MF DNES. Sep. 13, 2001. ISSN 1210-1168. P. A2. 128 Česko podpoří NATO, připraveno pomoci USA. MF DNES. Sep. 14, 2001. ISSN 1210-1168. P. A7. 129 Česko se připojí k útokům NATO. MF DNES. Sep. 13, 2001. ISSN 1210-1168. P. A2. 130 ARMÁDA ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY Symbol demokracie a státní suverenity 1993-2012. Prague, CR: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2013. ISBN 978-80-7278-614-5. P. 112.
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Central and Eastern European members of NATO or countries aspiring for membership. On one side, the United States became the strongest advocate of enlargement and thus the biggest advocate of admitting the Czech Republic to NATO. To add to, the US were regarded as the only country able to act in case of emergency and therefore the most reliable ally in defence area. On the other, public was strongly against the War in Iraq and so was the newly elected President Václav Klaus. 131 According to the poll made by CVVM agency published in MF DNES, the attack on Iraq was supported by 39 % of Czech people in spring 2002 and dropped to 24 % in January 2003. Furthermore, 68 % of people absolutely disagreed with the war.132 President Václav Havel signed the “Letter of Eight” in his last days in office and thus he formally demonstrated support for the United States; however, his action may have been regarded more of a personal decision as his term was ending. His successor Václav Klaus took on strongly anti-war view and even asked that the Czech Republic would be taken of the list of allies when speaking with the American Ambassador in Prague Mr. Stapleton. Even though, president does not make foreign policy in the Czech Republic, his words and actions certainly do carry some weight, especially with the influence the office gained because of prestige the former President Václav Havel had. Furthermore, the government made of different parties, which is usual for the Czech Republic, was also very divided and inconsistent. Especially as the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Minister of Foreigner Affairs were from two different parties. Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla and Minister of Defence Jaroslav Tvrdík were from the Social Democratic party which tended not to support allied actions. On the contrary, Minister of Foreigner Affairs Cyril Svoboda was a member of Christian Democrats who, as well as Freedom Union, often endorsed Alliance's actions. David Král from the EurActiv think-tank observes that:
131 KRÁL, David. The Czech Republic and the Iraq crisis – oscillating between the two sides of the Atlantic. EurActiv.com [online]. Apr. 29, 2003, updated Jan. 29, 2010. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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Most of the discussion has focused on technical matters rather than on broad political issues (i.e. do we actually support the strike politically and morally). The government position was actually never made too explicit and could be read probably as follows: we don’t actually think that the strike is necessary but if the US decides for the military action, we will support them.133
Military contributions The contribution of the Czech Republic can be divided into two groups: the contributions made through NATO and contributions made to US-led coalition against terrorism outside NATO. Between 2001 and 2005, Czech soldiers were sent to Afghanistan, Iraq and also to Kuwait. Aside from that, a group of paramedics was provided to Pakistan after devastating earthquake in 2005. Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (OEF-A), also known as the American War in Afghanistan, began in October 2001 and lasted until the end of 2014 when it was replaced by Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is an official name used by the US government to describe the Global War on Terrorism and it is not limited to Afghanistan but also includes Operation Enduring Freedom in Philippines (OEF-P), Operation Enduring Freedom in Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), and others. International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) was a military operation in Afghanistan created on December 20, 2001 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) based on the decisions made at Bonn Conference in December 2001. The leadership was entrusted in the hands of NATO but many countries outside of the Alliance also participated. Its initial goal was to assist the recently established Afghan Transitional Authority, support the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and to create a secure environment in the Kabul area. In 2003, NATO assumed the complete leadership and became responsible for the coordination, command, and planning. In October 2003, the UNSC also
133 KRÁL 2003.
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authorized expansion of the area of the mission from the Kabul and its surroundings to whole Afghanistan.134 The Czech Republic supported American efforts in Afghanistan and participated in NATO-led ISAF mission since spring 2002. The Czech Army sent its 6th Field Hospital in April 2002 which was later replaced by 11th Field Hospital. The contribution to the Allied efforts in Afghanistan in 2002 contained 269 personnel of Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AFCR). In January 2003, Field Surgical Team made of eleven people arrived in Afghanistan and stayed for a four-month rotation. Between March 2004 and February 2007, 350 Czech soldiers were allocated to ISAF Forces in Kabul in order to provide operation and security of Kabul International Airport.135 Furthermore, the Czech government agreed to provide Special Forces for a four-months rotation between March and August 2004 directly to OEF-A. Hundred and twenty members of 601st Special Forces Group were deployed in that period. They focused on special surveillance and small scale strikes in difficult high-mountain terrain and populated areas.136 Czech CBR defense unit in Kuwait Czech Republic participated in the Global War on Terrorism even earlier than Afghanistan. Already in March 2002 specialist on chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense landed in Kuwait where they were responsible for the protection of allied forces from weapons of mass destruction. The Czech operation lasted till June 2003 and comprised of 612 people.137 Iraq As previously mentioned, the Allies within NATO as well as members of the UN and especially members of the UNSC were divided in their opinions regarding Iraq. NATO as an institution did not participate in Operation Iraqi
134 History. Afghanistan Resolute Support [online]. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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Freedom led by the United States. Some of the countries who formed a coalition with the United States were part of the Alliance, others were not. United States and its coalition partners began military actions against Iraq on March 19, 2003 and Czech Armed Forces joined in April 2003.138 It provided 526 personnel from the 7th Field Hospital until the end of the year and another 1273 officers of Military Police between December 2003 and December 2006. Czech soldiers were part of Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR), which was later renamed Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) based on UN Resolution 1546. Since the end of 2003, one of the responsibilities of deployed Czech soldier was to train their Iraqi counterparts.139 To sum up, the Czech Republic did not have comprehensive foreign policy toward Iraq and rather dealt with each issue and request one-by one. It managed to maneuver between support for the US, its own public, and German-French pressure. Czech soldiers were sent to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait where they were appreciated as highly professional units. The overall policy is however accurately captured by Král that “the Czech government actually managed to sit with one back on two chairs”.140
Table 1: Missions of the Czech Republic in Afghanistan 2001-2005 Name When Number of Description Personnel ISAF 4/2002 - 01/2003 269 6th and 11th Field Hospital ISAF 01/2003 - 04/2003 11 Field Surgical Team ISAF 03/2004 - 02/2007 350 Operation and Security of Kabul International Airport Operation Enduring 03/2004 - 08/2004 120 Special Forces Group 601. Freedom
Table 2: Missions of the Czech Republic in Iraq 2001-2005
138 NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq (Archived). NATO [online]. Updated Sep. 1, 2015. [Cited 2016-06-11].
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Name When Number of Description Personnel SFIR 04/2003 - 12/2003 526 7th Field Hospital SFIR 12/2003 - 12/2006 1273 Military Police
Table 3: Other Missions of the Czech Republic against Terrorism 2001-2005 Name Where When Number of Description Personnel Operation Kuwait 03/2002 - 612 Part of the Combined Joint Enduring 06/2003 Task Force – Consequence Freedom Management (CJTF CM) Winter Race Pakistan 10/2005 - 29 Humanitarian Operation 01/2006
3.3 NATO Survived
Reputation of the US in Europe dropped to its historical lowest point in modern history at the time of the Iraq War and NATO members actively critiqued and opposed each others’ policies. How it happened that it did not undermined the Alliance to the point of breaking up? First of all, while all of the European governments faced public opposition to the war, many of them maintained their support for the US policy in the Middle East. The United Kingdom stood by US side in both wars but it was not alone. Poland also proved to be a significant ally. Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Hungary also decided to support the US efforts. In its second term the Bush administration realized that it needed allies. In the middle of two lengthy wars, Washington recognized the merit of NATO’s ability to obtain allied contributions. Also, as weapons of mass destruction were not founded in Iraq, the US turned down its aggressive rhetoric and it had to reassess its intelligence gathering abilities. Bush tried to set the stage for possible improvement of relations with Europe by his “fence mending” visit in February 2005. The US also made efforts to show that NATO is still important for American security. Elections in Germany and France, the two leaders of the opposition within NATO to the War in Iraq, also contributed to improvement of relations. Angela 47
Merkel became German chancellor in 2005 and Nicolas Sarkozy French president in 2007. They both brought significant change in attitude toward NATO and the US Moreover, election of democratic candidate Barrack Obama as next US president in 2008 definitely marked a new chapter in transatlantic relations. Eastern and Central European countries proved vital to NATO. New members and countries aspiring for membership showed a strong commitment to NATO. For them, the Alliance provided a link to the US and offered security guarantees not present in just European Union membership. Moreover, the case against Saddam Husain, one of the world’s worst dictators, was more compelling to them as they still had in recent memory long years of Soviet control. Another factor was the failure of the EU Constitution. European Union aspired to become a “balancer” of US power in the world but it became clear that it won’t be possible in near future. Europe remained split about development of the European integration and unable to create a common foreign and security policy. Most importantly, Europe and the US continues to share values and interests, in spite of differences over Iraq or other individual issues. Furthermore, Europe and the United States became so interdependent economically and financially that a political or security break would put vital interests of both at risk. The final blow to the crisis was Russian aggressive foreign policy, which reminded NATO members of threats, which led to the creation of the Alliance. Russo-Georgian War in 2008 caused NATO to pull together. Russian military intervention in 2014 had the same effect on the Alliance.141
141 SLOAN 2010, p. 253-257.
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Conclusion
NATO should have disappeared after the Cold War but it didn’t. Capability-aggregation model comes to a conclusion that alliances last only as long as military capabilities of an ally are needed because when a threat disappears, the alliance have no purpose anymore. If applied to NATO, the Alliance should have disappeared when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Since its foundation in 1949, as is visible from the discussions about Portuguese and Turkey’s membership, the Alliance weighted ideology and common values against geo-strategic importance. The fact that the Alliance did not only seek as many allies and capabilities as possible shows that it differs from ordinary security alliances known before the WWI. The refusal of European allies to provided legitimacy in case of the War in Iraq could have led the US to consider NATO as of no value for Americans because Washington did not get back enough out of it. Based on security- autonomy trade off model, the US gains autonomy and legitimization from the Alliance and in return it provides security guarantees for smaller and weaker members. This mechanism failed in case of Iraq. On the other hand, the European member states may have regarded US policy in Iraq as rash and risky with possible negative consequences for Europe. When security-autonomy trade-off allows the dominant state to take controversial steps due to bestowed legitimacy, it might result in lowered security. Either the actions of the dominant state can destabilize the system and lead to more violence, or worse its steps provoke a war and then the allies, whom originally yearned for higher security, end up entangled in military conflict defending the dominant ally. The period after 9/11 wasn’t the first crisis NATO went through. Looking at the Suez Crisis, French withdrawal from NATO’s military structures, or the Vietnam War; it is evident that NATO members did not always share interests and they did not automatically approve of each others’ actions. The Alliance is a democratic institution in which members argue once in a while. They, however, still share common values such as democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, which form strong foundations.
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Even though NATO survived the end of Cold War and managed to transform, differences in foreign policy between Europe and the United States became evident. NATO overcame a crisis of identity after the Cold War resulting from disappearance of threat against which NATO was originally created. The Alliance transformed and replaced the stress on military dimension with an emphasis on institution-building agenda. Nevertheless, distinct approaches to foreign policy became obvious between Europe and the United States during the 90s. The Old Continent endorsed multilateralism while international regimes weren’t that important in the eyes of Washington. Moreover, Americans weren’t as reluctant to use force as Europeans were. The US lost interested in multilateral approach and became less involved in international institutions since the Cold War. Presidency of George W. Bush definitively marked a shift toward unilateralism. That does not mean that Americans went back to isolationism but that the US should act on the world without being entangled by it and that it should not be ashamed to use military force. Washington permitted NATO only to take a back seat after 9/11. Europeans expressed their support right away individually and through NATO. The Alliance announced as early as a day after the attacks that it would invoke Article V in case the assault originate outside of the United States. Americans; however, refused already in October 2001 that NATO could lead military actions in Afghanistan. As a result, NATO as an alliance did not participate in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The US was assisted by its allies since the beginning of the war; some of those allies were NATO-members, others were not. Nonetheless, the Alliance participated on reconstruction measures first in Kabul and later on in wider area only since 2003. The US administration had several reasons why it did not have recourse to NATO. The administration was full of realists and neorealist who thought that international institutions in general are useless. Furthermore, public and Congress pressured for rapid reaction and they gave Bush a blank cheque to deal with the crisis. It was highly important for the US and therefore Washington was not willing to go through another “war by committee” experienced in Kosovo because the decision-making process there was dreadful. On top of that, it was not clear where the Alliance can be employed
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and Washington did not have time to reopen this discussion in time of a crisis. Importance of NATO in transatlantic relations has not diminished but the relation has weakened in general as America has started to turn toward Asia. The US questioned NATO even before 9/11 and the assault was extremely traumatic for Americans. It destroyed American feeling of security and the myth of its invincibility was shattered. Europe tried to act united but it did not work. Objections appeared already when activating Article V. By lending US its support, Europe tried to prevent massive unilateral actions of Washington partly because it was also afraid that it would turn against the whole West. Nonetheless, most of the European states were not ready to include independent states as its adversaries and America’s unbending tough stance toward Iraq was a cause for concern, especially when Europe was aware that Washington is willing to act without UN’s approval. Europeans also lacked confidence in American decision-making process regarding foreign policy and they were just not willing to give the US blind support. The UK revived its special relationship with the US and stood on Washington’s side right away and for the whole time. It was in a unique position as it already had ships, bases and a large number of men located in Indian Ocean. Regarding Iraq, containment had been the least bad option for London. It wanted Baghdad without WMD and not posing a threat to its neighbors and to the whole world. There are indications that the British government reached a conclusion as early as in spring 2002 that this would not be feasible with Hussein in power. Apart from that, containment was no longer possible. Russia pressured for lifting sanctions and there was lack of international support to keep them. Furthermore, sanctions effected especially civil population not the government and, to add to that, Hussein cheated oil-for-food programs so the sanctions weren’t functioning as they were supposed to. At the end, the UK had to face Washington’s decision and had to choose whether it will help or just watch. The foreign policies of the US and the UK stood on different foundation and their threat perception also differed. The UK supported international norms while the US was dominated by hegemonic realism. Washington saw Iraq as an
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imminent threat while London considered it danger especially to Iraqi people. However, they shared the view that it is necessary to deal with rouge states seeking WMD. Blair is often credited for pushing Bush toward the UN. The UK regarded Iraq as threat because of its propensity for aggression, probable possession of WMD, and willingness to cooperate with terrorists. Also, it did not see any other feasible alternative how to deal with the regime. German’s position regarding Iraq was heavily influenced by federal elections and strong anti-war moods of German public. Moreover, Berlin was not persuaded that the US had a case for war. Germany supported the US in Afghanistan but regarding Iraq it focused its efforts on blocking the US in the United Nations. It held the view that Washington needed another resolution specifically permitting use of force when Iraq would not comply with previous resolutions. The wording of the first UN resolution was ambiguous and Germany did not succeed in pushing through the second resolution, which would establish clear conditions for military solution. The Czech Republic fulfilled its commitment and supported its ally in need but it did not do more than necessary. Prague supported NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan; however, both public and politicians were divided regarding Iraq. For example President Havel spoke up for the US when he signed the „Letter of Eight“; on the other side, newly elected President Klaus adopted an anti-war attitude. On top of that, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence came from different parties and sought different policies. The Czech Republic was torn between support for the US, who had been the strongest advocate for Czech accession to NATO, regarded as only country able to act in time of crises, and the most important ally in defense area; and public anti-war mood as well as pressure from Germany and France. Most of the discussions were rather technical and Prague did not adopt a clear stance on whether it really supported the War in Iraq. The majority opinion leaned toward a view that the war was probably not indispensable but it decided to back its important ally. NATO overcame the crisis because, despite public opposition to the war, many member-states manage to maintain their support for the US. Washington also realized that it cannot “go it alone” and that it needs allies. Change in
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leadership in Germany, France and the US between 2005 and 2008 contributed to improvement of relations. New members and countries aspiring to join NATO proved to be vital and brought new blood to the Alliance. The European Union attempted to become a balancing power to the US but with the failure of the EU Constitution it became apparent that it wouldn’t manage it in near future. Most importantly, Europe and the US continue to share values and interest. They are so entangled with each other politically and economically that they cannot afford to split up in security area neither. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Georgia and later on in Ukraine brought about the complete end of the crisis.
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List of Acronyms
AFCR Armed Forces of the Czech Republic APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CBR Chemical, biological and radiological CR Czech Republic EU European Union Europol European Police Office ICC International Criminal Court ISAF International Security Assistance Forces KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia MNF-I Multi-National Force Iraq NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NLF National Liberation Front OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OEF-A Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan OEF-HOA Operation Enduring Freedom in Horn of Africa OEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom in Phillipines PfP Partnership for Peace SFIR Stabilization Force in Iraq SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Sr. senior UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States WMD Weapons of mass destruction WTO World Trade Organization
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ZADÁNÍ ZÁVĚREČNÉ PRÁCE
Akademický rok: 2014/2015 Příjmení a jméno: Bc. Iva Štverková Telefon / e-mail: 728608864 / [email protected], [email protected] Studijní obor: Bezpečnostní studia (Kombinované)
ÚDAJE O ZÁVĚREČNÉ PRÁCI Typ práce: Diplomová práce Název práce: The Role of the US in the NATO after 9/11: European Perspective Název práce anglicky: NATO after 9/11: The Crises from the European Perspective Charakteristika a cíle Under the President George W. Bush and especially after the attacks of 9/11, the North Atlantic práce: Treaty Organization faced probably the worst crisis in its history. The actions taken by Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq and the reluctance of European allies in supporting U.S. War against terrorism resulted in escalation of relations in the Alliance. I chose this topic to explore why the crisis began, what made it worse, and how the NATO survived it. All of this will be examined in the context of the ongoing discussion about the role of NATO. The goal of this thesis is to examine President Bush´s policy after 9/11 from the perspective of European members, and its implications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This paper will examine the position of European NATO countries toward the Alliance after 9/11 and their perception of U.S. actions. Výzkumná otázka: Literatura a zdroje: Davis, Jacquelyn K. "NATO after 9/11: A US Perspective." NATO Review Magazine. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Web. 31 Jan. 2015. http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2011/11- september/NATO-US-Perspective-9-11/EN/index.htm.
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