The Role of Personal Relationships in German-American Relations The history of international relations is fraught with encounters and correspondences between individuals to discuss the state of affairs within and between their respective countries. First accounts of what would only be defined as ‘diplomacy’ thousands of years later, can be found from as early on as the 14th century BC in Egypt. Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, written in the 8th century BC, bear traces of Greek diplomacy. In the 12th century, Byzantium sent out first professional diplomats and in the 15th century the first embassies were set up by Italian city-states during the Renaissance.1 Evidently diplomacy has been applied consistently and in all corners of the world through the ages and thereby become an essential component of international politics. In the process, much like the countries that practiced it, diplomacy has been in flux. Whilst it was often the prerogative of those educated to exercise it, modern diplomats, politicians have not shied away from using it as a means to their ends. That is not to say that foreign policy was once, or ever, made solely by diplomats, but rather that politicians have discovered diplomacy as an effective strategy for themselves.

There has emerged a trend of heads of states forging personal relationships with those of other nations, both of enmity and of amity. The friendships between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, as well as the consultations between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan - though arguably more tense - for example, have spurred the title of a Special Relationship between their nations. Though perhaps most prominent in the British- American alliance, these personal contacts were by no means limited to their bilateral ties. John F. Kennedy won African support during the Cold War, amongst other things by having unusually cordial meetings and inviting leaders like Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré to spend time with his family.2 His successor Lyndon Johnson met repeatedly with Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos in order to successfully put an end to the Chamizal dispute.3 All of these were instances of what can be called ‘personal diplomacy’.

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Diplomacy.” Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009. 2 Philip Muehlenbeck, “Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 19 (2008). 3 Eberhardt Victor Niemeyer, Personal Diplomacy: Lyndon B. Johnson and Mexico, 1963-1968 (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988).

1 Theoretical Background Personal diplomacy is defined as a type of diplomacy conducted largely in private “by means of direct human contact … by those who are not diplomatic agents … but whose personal standing ensures that they will be heard. A head of state … may engage in such activity”.4 The motivation behind its use is to avoid involving the public in foreign policy- making, as “engaging the public raises the stakes, creating public demand that may be unpredictable over time, and may have small payoffs in terms of national security or electoral favor”.5 Personal diplomacy is therefore different from ‘public diplomacy’, which as its name suggests takes place in the open and is aimed at foreign publics, rather than one’s own national population, and has therefore been likened to propaganda (though there exist various, and at times, contradictory definitions of the term).6 Of course, though the two types differ in their nature and stand in opposition, one does not exclude the other. A president may choose to apply whichever he considers more fitting case by case. To appeal to a public may at times not be feasible, while personal contact may have the desired effect, and vice versa. Alternatively, it is possible to use both types of diplomacy simultaneously. Indeed, historically presidents have typically used a combination to achieve their goals.

While the occurrence of personal diplomacy has been acknowledged by academia, it has thus far been treated foremost in singular cases, rather than as a perpetual theme. Thus, there exist scattered historical works on instances in which especially American presidents are believed to have used personal diplomacy, as mentioned above, but not a single one devoted to the phenomenon itself. It has not been conceptualized or been treated as a deliberate strategy. However, as the circumstances and manners in which personal diplomacy can be said to have taken place indicate that it is not incidental, the aim of this thesis shall be to demonstrate that it is in fact a foreign policy method that has been applied fairly consistently in transatlantic relations and thereby become a standard practice.

4 Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, s.v. “Personal Diplomacy,” Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 5 Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha, Encyclopedia of Political Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008): 633. 6 Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, s.v. “Public Diplomacy,” Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

2 As indicated, few have treated personal diplomacy as a recurring, or ongoing, phenomenon. In the field of diplomatic studies, professor at the University of Maryland Elmer Plischke does acknowledge its existence as such, though he devotes far more attention to ‘summit diplomacy’. As its title implies, summit diplomacy regards only the encounter of politicians in the scope of a conference and is therefore limited to a few, predominantly public, meetings between individuals. As Plischke remarks about its longevity however, “it is erroneous to maintain that personal diplomacy at the summit and ministerial levels is a new phenomenon … (there is a) remarkable resurgence since the 1930s”.7 Furthermore, he considers personal diplomacy somewhat of an extension of summit diplomacy, in arguing that the former “has been broadened in scope and currently encompasses … personal presidential communications, the use of presidential personal representatives or special agents, visits of world leaders to the United States, presidential visits and tours abroad”.8 The question of which came first deserves an entire debate of its own, but what transpires from Plischke’s analysis is that the two are closely interlinked and that summit diplomacy is essentially a form of personal diplomacy. Having said that, there is an argument to be made that summit diplomacy may also be linked to public diplomacy due to its publicity. Jan Melissen of the Clingendael Institute characterizes the ambiguous nature of summit diplomacy, by pointing out that “focusing on the physical meeting without much reference to the wider diplomatic context does tend to reinforce the cliché of the summit as an example of improvised diplomacy,”9 when in reality there are text writers, rehearsals and many other preparations involved. He also specifies that the reporting media impacts on the event as “diplomacy at the highest level thrives in the limelight (and) involves an important element of drama”.10 This suggests that meetings at the summit, as they are essentially staged, may be less indicative of personal relationships than could be assumed.

7 Elmer Plischke, “American Ambassadors – An Obsolete Species? Some Alternatives to Traditional Diplomatic Representation,” World Affairs 147 (1984): 5. 8 Elmer Plischke, Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979): 69. 9 Jan Melissen, Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age: Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2003): 7. 10 Idem, 13.

3 Academic literature on summit diplomacy will certainly be taken into consideration, though it will be treated with caution and as one element of its encompassing superior, personal diplomacy. To focus only on summit diplomacy would be to magnify what is in most interpersonal relations a minor factor, meetings during conferences, and to overlook personal correspondences and one-on-one visits, which are arguably more important in the making of a personal relationship. Oddly enough, there exists more literature on summit diplomacy than on the broader phenomenon of personal diplomacy, perhaps due to its visibility and prominence in the news (see the G8 summits). As it sheds light on specific events, it will be contemplated where individuals’ meetings in the setting of a conference were instrumental in their friendship or possibly, enmity.

Whereas personal diplomacy is largely overlooked in the fields of study in which you would expect to find references to it, namely political science, international relations and diplomatic studies, some attention has been devoted to this topic in the field of political psychology (though it draws on some of the other fields). As the name suggests, political psychology analyses political behavior (both of politicians and the people in general) from a psychological point of view, with the main goal of understanding the motivations behind individual and group decision-making. Political scientists Margaret and Charles Hermann for example focus on different presidents’ ‘leadership style’11 and contributor to Foreign Affairs Lloyd Etheredge analyses the emotional base of their policy decisions.12 Theirs and their colleagues’ research thus focuses foremost on personality traits and how they impact on politicians’ policies, but some attention has nonetheless also been devoted to the idea that interpersonal influence may well do the same. Naturally, their emphasis on single politicians requires an interpretation of politics in which individual actors matter and thereby they distance themselves from the realist school of international relations, according to which states are the most important actors and ones who operate with a unitary voice. This may give rise to criticism.

11 Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann, “Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical inquiry,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989). 12 Lloyd Etheredge, “Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory,” The American Political Science Review 72 (1978).

4 Firstly, political psychologists’ focus on individuals could be interpreted as approval of, and alignment with, the Great Man Theory. Popularized in the 19th century by Scottish writer Thomas Carlyle, its supporters claim that history is predominantly made by ‘great men’. Although political psychologists indeed contend that “explanations of many consequential historical events give considerable weight to the role of individual political leaders” and that therefore “who leads matters”,13 they distance themselves from the Great Man Theory.14 The purpose of their research is not to explain political realities entirely through the involvement of individuals nor do they consider it the decisive factor. Rather, they seek to contribute one element to the larger analysis of political processes. As Jack Levy, Professor at Rutgers University, specifies in the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, “individual-level psychological variables cannot by themselves provide a logically complete explanation of foreign policy, which is a state-level dependent variable. Psychological variables must be integrated into a broader theory of foreign policy that incorporates state-level causal variables and that explains how the preferences, beliefs, and judgments of the leading decision-maker (along with those of other key actors) get aggregated into a foreign policy decision for the state”.15

Secondly, as Professor Dumbrell of Durham University points out with regards to personal relations between British prime ministers and American presidents, “concentration on personal relations … risks over-simplifying a complex web of interests and multi- layered connections … Prevailing interpretations of international politics emphasize power considerations and national advantage, rather than personal relationships”.16 True as this may be, he himself goes on to argue, that “the fact that the study of leader relations is notoriously susceptible to sentimentalism and over-simplification is not, in itself, a reason for abandoning it”.17

13 David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 14 Jeanne Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973): 208. 15 David Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 16 John Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations between prime ministers and presidents,” in Anglo- American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (New York: Routledge): 82. 17 Idem, 83.

5 The same caution shall be applied in this thesis. Though the focus lies on personal relationships and their potential impact on politicians’ policies, this should by no means be understood as an attempt to explain the history of transatlantic relations solely through personal ties. Rather, it is assumed at the outset that an examination of politicians’ personal diplomacy can contribute to the understanding of historical events. However minor it may be, the personal diplomacy factor remains noteworthy.

Methodology Bertram Raven, Professor at UCLA and contributor to Political Psychology, explicitly backs the idea that interpersonal relations between politicians have an influence on policy outcomes. As he argues, “there have undoubtedly been many major political events which have hinged on the successful or unsuccessful attempts of one major political figure to influence another”.18 In collaboration with John French, Professor at the University of Michigan, he established the so-called ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’, in which social influence is defined as “a change in the belief, attitude or behavior of a person (the target of influence) which results from the action, or presence of another person (the influencing agent).19 The power applied to achieve such an outcome can be divided into different strands of social power, namely informational, coercive, reward, legitimate, expert and referent power.

Informational power occurs when the influencing agent uses information (for example intelligence reports) or logical argument in order to influence his target. Naturally, in order for informational power to be effective, its target must be open to alternative positions and accept the other’s arguments. It is unlikely to work on a stubborn partner. Coercive power involves the threat of punishment and can thus only be effective if the target of influence is under the impression that the announced threat is likely to be carried out. Its use also risks alienating the target, as he or she may develop negative feelings towards the influencing agent. As implied, reward power takes place where the target is promised some type of perk in turn for their compliance. It should be noted that although

18 Bertram Raven, “Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power,” Political Psychology 11 (1990): 494. 19 Idem, 495.

6 “we usually think of coercion and reward power in terms of tangible rewards and real physical threats, we should recognize that the possibility of personal approval from someone whom we like, can provide considerable coercive power”.20 Legitimate power is exercised when the agent reminds the target of his or her obligation to comply with his demands. Expert power is based on the target’s assumption, whether correct or not, that the agent ‘knows best’ due to having superior knowledge or more experience regarding a specific issue. Referent power is based on the agent’s appeal to a sense of mutual identity with his target. That is to say that he will seek to emphasize their similarities in order to create a bond. Out of these types of power, especially coercive, reward and referent power are likely to be relevant to this research, as they are the least antagonizing exercises of influence.

In the analyses of personal relationships to follow, Raven and French’s model can be applied to seek out which type of power individuals have applied, or at least attempted to, in their personal relations with others. The underlying premise of this research is thus that politicians do apply some strategy in their meetings. That is not to say however that the modus operandi is to approach a partner with the conscious agenda of exerting particular types of power. Presumably, politicians do not think: “I will apply informational power”. Personal diplomacy does however entail meeting with others with the specific aim of having altered their viewpoint by the end of the encounter, by pointing out information the other may have been unaware of. Such meetings are not random, instead they are planned in advance and both participants enter the dialogue with a goal in mind.

Besides pointing out the applied types of power, the analysis of interpersonal relationships will also be framed in the historical political context. A personal relationship between senior politicians is of course largely dependent on their countries’ bilateral relations. In the case studies to follow, these will therefore constitute a starting point and thereby provide the necessary background knowledge to understand the potential impact the personal relationship may have had on the evolution of their respective countries’

20 Bertram Raven, “Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power,” Political Psychology 11 (1990): 499.

7 foreign policies towards each other. Thus, when analyzing the selected pairs, the procedure shall be to briefly describe the political context in which the personal ties between two individuals formed, the evolution of their relationship itself, including where applicable the exercise of power as defined in the Power/Interaction Model and lastly, the impact thereof on their respective countries’ bilateral relations.

Case Studies In order to demonstrate the validity of said model as well as the usage of personal diplomacy in foreign policy making, it will be necessary to examine in detail the historical personal relationships pertaining to one bilateral political partnership. For obvious reasons, it would be impossible to attempt tracing the use of personal diplomacy in world history in the scope of a thesis. Equally, the standard practice of personal diplomacy can best be proven to exist by examining historical instances between the same two countries throughout. For this reason, the case study of this thesis shall be the German-American relationship since the end of the Second World War. While much has been written about the Special Relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the personal relationships amongst their representatives, far less has been said about those within the German-American relationship. Besides expanding on the topic of personal diplomacy, this research thus also has the potential to improve the understanding of the historical bilateral ties between these countries.

The personal relationships to be discussed are those between German Bundeskanzler or where applicable Aussenminister and American presidents or secretaries of state. Noticeably, at times German chancellors had contrasting relationships with presidents and their secretaries of state. That is to say, they may have enjoyed good relations with the secretary of state while simultaneously having a more problematic relationship with the president (or vice versa). Of course, at other times the German representative may have enjoyed good relations with both. These issues will be analyzed as they arise. The relationships to be examined are those between: Adenauer and Dulles, Schmidt, Ford and Kissinger, Kohl, Reagan and Bush Senior, Schröder and Bush Junior, Merkel and Obama.

8 An examination of these relationships requires the use of different kinds of sources. Next to the general literature on German-American relations, which will provide the historical context, the bibliography will further include in-depth descriptions of specific events or individual pairs, as well as personal correspondences. Where available, these will be offered as evidence of a couple’s contact and relationship. Predictably, more correspondences will be accessible for the personal relationships that date back more years, due to having meanwhile been published as well as having been the standard means of communication. As of late, the exchange of letters for example has become less prominent and therefore may not be available in the examination of recent personal relationships. Adding to this, biographies and autobiographies will be used as they bear the potential of reporting on what went on ‘behind closed doors’. They are however prone to flaws and will therefore be treated with caution. Especially autobiographies are inherently biased and thus “offer a special kind of biographical truth: a life, reshaped by recollection, with all of recollection’s conscious and unconscious omissions and distortions”.21 This implies that the information contained therein may be flawed, making it an unreliable source. However, as long as there is an awareness of this possible deficiency, it is nonetheless possible to include this genre of literature and to draw from it only that information that is deemed historically accurate and otherwise verifiable. Sentiments expressed here may also be included, as these emphasize feelings of enmity or amity, provided that they are consistent. In the first case study for example, the relationship between German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Adenauer’s elaborate memoirs have proven to be an essential source for the analysis of their personal as well as their nations’ bilateral relations.

21 Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Autobiography.” Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009.

9 Pioneers of the Alliance: Konrad Adenauer & John Foster Dulles The end of the Second World War was closely followed by the onset of the Cold War, a long-lasting conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. While the world around them was ideologically divided, former Nazi Germany was itself de facto split. Out of four parts became two when in 1949 the allies France, the United Kingdom and the United States combined their three parts to found the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) or simply West Germany, while the USSR made their section the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), otherwise called East Germany. It was within this historical context that Konrad Adenauer and John Foster Dulles came to cooperate, amongst other things to discuss West Germany’s reconstruction, rearmament and European integration.

Adenauer and Dulles met prior to Germany’s East-West division in 1947 at the World Church Congress held in Amsterdam. Given that it took place at a summit, their first encounter was so brief only to allow for a superficial evaluation of the other. Nevertheless, Dulles, then serving as republican presidential candidate Dewey’s foreign policy advisor, evidently made an impression, as Adenauer later stated about this meeting that he came away from it sensing that his new acquaintance would one day play an important role in US foreign policy-making.22 He was not mistaken. Six years later, Dulles became the secretary of state of the Eisenhower administration. Meanwhile, Adenauer had himself become the first chancellor of the newly founded Bundesrepublik.

Before their second encounter in these new capacities, Adenauer, who had also had a good relationship with Dulles’ predecessor Dean Acheson of the Truman administration, mentioned his concern over the change of government.23 Due to his mediation of the Treaty of San Francisco (1951) between Japan and the Allied Forces, he perceived Dulles to be far more interested in Asia than Europe. Nevertheless, the chancellor of West Germany expressed his interest and openness to working together with the new secretary of state. In fact, prior to meeting the man himself, he met with Dulles’ younger sister Eleanor, who was

22 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 161. 23 Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 83.

10 working at the State Department of German Affairs. She recalls the chancellor’s curiosity about her brother John in her memoir.24 He also gained some idea about Dulles’ character through their mutual friend and later fellow founding father of the EU Jean Monnet, who had been friends with the American since meeting him in Paris in 1919. Arguably Adenauer thus approached Dulles differently than he might have done otherwise. That is to say, having been given a positive attitude towards Dulles by his friends and especially Monnet, whom he incidentally credits with having contributed to ensuring that their relationship got off to a good start,25 their first meetings were bound to be friendly in nature. Once these initial encounters also made them aware of their many similarities, in particular in their ways of thinking, nothing stood in the way of a personal friendship. As they soon discovered and historians have since considered the foundation for their friendship, what connected the two was especially their devotion to Christian values. They both founded their political doing on their beliefs: The catholic Adenauer and founder of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) “saw in Christianity one of several bases for the union of Europe”26 just as the protestant Dulles, the son of a Presbyterian minister who was known to quote the bible in his press conferences saw in religion an organization with the ability to “cut across national boundaries”.27 Thus, they shared an understanding of religion in terms of its practical utility. Beyond that, they were both ardent opponents of communism (so much so that Dulles found containment to be too weak a policy and promoted ‘roll-back’) and totalitarianism (Adenauer had in fact briefly been imprisoned during the Nazi regime).28 They were also supporters of Westbindung, a deepening of West German-American ties.29 Indeed, given Adenauer’s atlanticism and Dulles’ emotional attachment to Germany, stemming amongst other things from his father’s accounts of his studies in Göttingen, his travels to the country and “his admiration for Germany’s centuries

24 Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York: Times Books, 2013): 154. 25 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 161. 26 Frederick Marks, Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (Westport: Praeger, 1995): 121. 27 Idem, 122. 28 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 145. 29 Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York: Times Books, 2013): 155.

11 of achievement and the rigor of its social order”,30 it was only a logical conclusion that the two should seek a closer a cooperation between their respective countries. Not only did they agree on the BRD’s positioning towards the United States, but also about its future within Europe. Following in Acheson’s footsteps, Dulles advocated for a political reorganization of Western Europe in the form of a commonwealth, 31 in which the Bundesrepublik was to play an important part. For this reason, like Adenauer, he too saw the necessity to restore a strong position for West Germany, if only for the sake of European integration. Of course, to argue that their resemblance (which incidentally further applies to their character as both were known to be stubborn yet flexible if their tactics required it and possessed extraordinary willpower)32 by itself accounts for their good relationship and fruitful collaboration would be a simplistic statement to make. However, their mutual understanding did allow for open and immensely honest talks and made sure that they often saw eye to eye. Not only in their personal lives but also in their political negotiations, they almost always agreed with each other. Naturally, as is common in any friendship, they did need some time to get used to one another (as well as their political roles) and arrive at a state of mutual trust. This can be said to have taken place in the early years of John Foster Dulles’ tenure.

Shortly after becoming secretary of state in 1953, Dulles travelled to Bonn to meet Adenauer. On this occasion, Adenauer perceived his visitor to be withdrawn and very serious,33 quite unlike Acheson who had a more informal style. From then on, the two warmed to each other. Later in the same year, Adenauer went on his first trip to the USA, which came to be regarded as an essential milestone in the reconciliation of West Germany and America. Besides pushing for the BRD to be given a larger role in international affairs in his personal discussions with Eisenhower (for example in Korea), Adenauer used the occasion to initiate negotiations for a German-American trade and shipping contract with Dulles. But most of all, the two worked together on the European Defense Community. The

30 Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York: Times Books, 2013): 49. 31 Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 86. 32 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 146. 33 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 161.

12 EDC was a project initiated in 1950 by French prime minister at the time René Pleven that aimed to create a European-wide military made up of national groups. It was to include Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Ideally, it would at once contribute to European integration and keep German militarism in check. Adenauer and Dulles, both proponents of the EDC, exerted great pressure on France to ratify the treaty and closely cooperated on this. Initially, they communicated through US ambassador to West Germany James Bryant Conant but found him to be inept in his professional role and thus Adenauer “repeatedly bypassed the high commissioner’s office and dealt directly with Dulles”34 or met him in person. In fact, Dulles and Eisenhower later chose to replace Conant a mere three days after Adenauer had requested this.35 Despite their efforts, the EDC failed to reach ratification in France due to fears that it would threaten its national sovereignty and rebuild a German military, however limited it would have been. Nevertheless, their endeavors were not entirely in vain. They were themselves the sign of growing mutual trust and essential in that very growth. In fact, when France announced its ‘no’ on the 30th of August 1954, Dulles came to Adenauer’s aid knowing that the flop had put the chancellor in a precarious position domestically and with his neighbors alike. To do so, Dulles held a speech the following day stating: “the Western nations now owe it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies in their power to restore sovereignty … It would be unconscionable if the failure to realize the EDC through no fault of Germany’s should now be used as an excuse for penalizing Germany”.36 But most importantly, besides announcing continued American support for West Germany, Dulles personally made a flying visit to Bonn for some much-needed crisis management and thereby ultimately cemented his friendship with the grateful Adenauer.37 As shall be discussed below, even later predicaments in the German-American relationship could not unmake the trust thus gained – the silver lining to the downfall of the EDC.

34 Suzanne Brown-Fleming, “Personalities and Politics: The American Ambassadors to the Federal Republic” In The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War 1945-1990: A Handbook, Volume I, ed. Detlef Junker et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 150. 35 Idem. 36 Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 36. 37 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 146.

13 From then on, Adenauer and Dulles cooperated even more closely. Together, they sought West Germany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Whilst unthinkable in the immediate aftermath of WWII, when even the mention of the possibility of German membership was met with such stark criticism that it could hardly be pursued, in the early 1950’s the United States made it increasingly clear that they backed the German NATO bid. Dulles personally exerted tremendous pressure on the French government to allow for German accession, which proved to be a successful strategy when the country was permitted to join in 1955.

At the same time, Dulles and Adenauer’s friendship reached its peak. After ‘getting rid’ of Conant, Adenauer continued to attach great importance to his personal contact to Dulles, telling for example the newly elected Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Heinrich Von Brentano in 1955 that he reserved the right to communicate with Dulles himself.38 Whenever Dulles travelled to Bonn, and he did so often, Adenauer personally called for him at the airport. Habitually, “the two men would start talking business as soon as they stepped into the Chancellor’s waiting Mercedes, with Heinz Weber, Adenauer’s able personal translator, sitting between them. They scarcely waited a moment in amenities. They made maximum use of the half-hour drive in complete privacy from the airport to the Palais Schaumburg … [Dulles] made it a habit of conferring with Adenauer with only Weber present in the room”.39 When they were apart, the two corresponded regularly through letters, as Adenauer refers to in his memoirs. There, he also describes their relationship as follows: I appreciated Dulles dearly. Once you had gained his trust, won his friendship, you could be sure not to lose it again. We became close friends. This friendship was based not least on the fact that we always spoke openly to one another.40

38 Siegfried Westphal and Joachim Arendt, Uncle Sam und die Deutschen: 50 Jahre deutsch-amerikanische Partnerschaft in Politik, Wirtschaft und Alltagsleben (Bonn: Aktuell, 1995): 100. 39 Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’ Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 41. 40 “Ich schätzte Dulles sehr. Hatte man einmal sein Vetrauen, seine Freundschaft gewonnen, so konnte man sicher sein, sie nicht wieder zu verlieren. Wir wurden enge Freunde. Diese Freundschaft basierte nicht zuletzt darauf, dass wir stets sehr offen zueinander sprachen.” Erinnerungen, 1955-1959, Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 161-162.

14 As mentioned before, “the Dulles-Adenauer relationship was not always a bed of roses” though.41 Much like any friendship, theirs too had its ups and downs. In particular, in the coming years there occurred two misunderstandings that would have an impact on both their personal and political relationships (which are intertwined). In August 1956 the Radford Plan was announced, which set out to reduce the American military presence in Europe and increase the American reserve of nuclear weapons as part of Eisenhower’s preventive war strategy against the Soviet Union. If realized it would thus make Adenauer’s worst fears come true. Having just returned from a visit to the United States and subsequently assured the German people that relations with the Eisenhower administration were good, when a plan was announced a week later that indicated the opposite it made Adenauer look like a fool. Given that Dulles had failed to make any mention of Radford’s proposals Adenauer felt deceived, so much so that he continued to mistrust him for half a year even after the solution of the crisis, which was incidentally done through a prime example of personal diplomacy. Dulles’ first reaction was to send Adenauer a letter explaining the American position, in which he reassured him that the United States had no intention of launching an atomic war and that he personally fully agreed with Adenauer’s concerns. Therein, he also proclaimed his friendship: This letter is kept very personal and expresses what moves me at the moment. It does not constitute an official explanation of my government, but is a manifestation of my deep personal convictions; I am writing as a friend to a friend, whom I hold in high esteem and admire.42

Adenauer on his part, rather than to mail them, sent German Ambassador to the USA Heinz Krekeler to the department of state to communicate his concerns over the Radford plan in person. He further arranged for Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Adolf Heusinger to travel to the States to discuss the issue with the leaders of the military.43 This only goes to show that Adenauer was not only himself a practitioner of personal diplomacy but a great believer in the concept too. Evidently so was Dulles, as he sent his brother

41 Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’ Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 45. 42 “Dieses Schreiben ist sehr persönlich gehalten und will ausdrücken, was mich im Augenblick bewegt. Es stellt keine offizielle Erklärung meiner Regierung dar, sondern ist Ausdruck meiner tiefsten persönlichen Überzeugungen; ich schreibe als Freund an einen Freund, den ich zutiefst achte und bewundere.” Erinnerungen, 1955-1959, Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 211. 43 Idem, 206.

15 Allen, head of the CIA, to meet with Adenauer to settle both the political and the personal crisis. Allen vouched that no final decision had been taken yet.44 In the end, Eisenhower let go of the Radford plan and Adenauer forgave his friend.

Two years later, a similar incident caused a further rift in their relationship. In July 1958, as a civil war threatened to break out between the Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon, president Eisenhower launched Operation Blue Bat despite premier of the Soviet Union Krushchev’s threat to use nuclear weapons should the US intervene. The Bundesrepublik was inadvertently involved in the conflict, because “the United States’ blitz in landing marines at Beirut involved the use of American air bases in West Germany … (and) these steps were set in motion before Adenauer was informed”.45 Adenauer who was critical of Dulles’ Middle East policy as it were was all the more enraged when his country was dragged into it. Nevertheless, this dispute too could be settled. Dulles purposely flew to Bonn to meet with Adenauer and again, managed to regain his trust.

As the nadirs of their relationship demonstrate, in their case the political was personal. The two misunderstandings were neither understood nor treated merely as an international issue, but as personal attacks. Taking Dulles’ actions to heart is thus not a sign of sensibility on Adenauer’s behalf. Rather, there was a mutual understanding on both sides that given the special nature of their honest and open friendship, an omission of information, whether political or not, was an offense to their relationship. Furthermore, the fact that the statesmen chose to straighten out their political misunderstandings through private negotiations, and most importantly that it worked, is a decisive indicator that personal diplomacy proved to be an effective tool in the Adenauer-Dulles era. This begs the question: did they use personal diplomacy strategically?

44 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 212. 45 Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’ Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 48.

16 Much has been written about what contemporaries nicknamed Adenauer and Dulles’ ‘love affair’.46 Though historians agree that their friendship was genuine, there is no consensus about whether or not it had an impact on either statesman’s formulation of foreign policy. According to Felken and Schwabe, it would be wrong to assume so. They find that both Dulles and Adenauer knew how to separate their personal sympathies from their national interests and so their friendship supposedly had no bearing on their policies.47 Paradoxically, both authors go on to say that it was Adenauer’s great fortune that he should have had a good relationship with the American secretary of state at such a crucial time,48 thereby contradicting their earlier statements. Indeed, given the evidence, it is hard not to agree with Dulles’ assistant Roderic O’Connor who asserted that, as his superior had supposedly been well aware of, “the personal relationship provided him with a great international political advantage”.49 The same goes for Adenauer of course. It is no coincidence that he should become friends with one of the most influential secretaries of state in history. Indeed, “the overwhelming consensus among analysts of United States foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration is that it was dominated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles”50 and Adenauer too believed this to be true. In his evaluation Dulles was almost solely responsible for the implementation of US foreign policy whilst Eisenhower occupied himself with domestic politics. 51 Debatable as this is, what is important to note is that Adenauer perceived Dulles to be very powerful which explains his motivation for wanting to forge a relationship with him. For obvious reasons, to influence someone who has a significant say bears a large potential to achieve one’s intended goal. Arguably their friendship is thus unlikely to have been incidental. Nevertheless, this in itself does not clarify whether they strategically employed personal diplomacy strategies to achieve their goals. As shall be explained, there is evidence to suggest that they did though:

46 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 146; Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’ Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960): 38. 47 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 148; Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 84. 48 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 149; Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 84. 49 Klaus Schwabe, ed. Adenauer und die USA (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1994): 84. 50 Richard Immerman. “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who made the decisions?.” Political Psychology 1 (1979): 21. 51 Gero Von Gersdorff, Adenauers Außenpolitik gegenüber den Siegermächten 1954: Westdeutsche Bewaffnung und internationale Politik (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1994): 134.

17 When applying the ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’ to the case study, it is noticeable that both Adenauer and Dulles exerted most of the types of influence previously defined. With regards to informational power, as shown, the two corresponded through letters and therein updated each other on the latest news. Especially the older Adenauer would frequently lecture Dulles on political developments,52 (which is also a sign of the use of expert power) though this was not always welcome. However, due to their similitude in thought, informational power may not have been as relevant in their relationship as it is expected to be in those to follow. Noticeably, Adenauer also used coercive power. Just after the publication of the Radford plan for example, he sent undersecretary Von Eckardt to the USA to “start building bridges to leading Democrats”,53 a not-so-subtle threat to the republican Eisenhower administration with which he was disgruntled, that he may shift his support elsewhere. Despite the fact that this was not conducted by himself or directly addressed to Dulles, the latter was without a doubt intended to find out about the talks. Dulles on the other hand mostly applied it with his French counterparts, whom he threatened with an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of their transatlantic relationship after they failed to ratify the EDC. With regards to reward and coercive power alike, it must be stated that both Dulles and Adenauer quite clearly wished to be liked by the other (as their efforts to reconcile in times of discord demonstrate) and thus, are bound to have factored it in to their deliberations. The extreme pressure Dulles put on the French to ratify the EDC and his actions in the aftermath of their rejection for example, admittedly foremost a means to his ends, can however also be regarded as a demonstration to Adenauer how far he was willing to go to support West Germany and its chancellor. In fact, throughout his time in office he focused his attention solely on Adenauer and did not mind that in so doing he alienated especially his French and British peers.54 Furthermore, Adenauer allowed John’s brother Allen “to proceed with one of his most ambitious early projects, the digging of a tunnel from West Berlin to a point in the

52 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 148 53 Steven Brady, Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953-1960 (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010): 172. 54 Detlef Felken, Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-1959 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1993): 147.

18 East from which the CIA could tap Soviet-bloc communication systems”.55 Former New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer attributes this authorization to Adenauer’s friendliness with the Dulles family. Most likely neither of the two exercised legitimate power, though it is possible that in their private talks there occurred more examples of the aforementioned means to exercise influence.

Evidently, both Adenauer and Dulles thus exerted influence on one another, and not just subconsciously either. The fact that they did should by no means be understood as a trivialization of their friendship however. Theirs was not a friendship of utility as much as an authentic bond from which both knew they (as well as their counterpart) could benefit politically, and did. Beyond advancing their individual careers, with Dulles her b becoming as powerful as he did because of his ties and Adenauer potentially being re-elected (repeatedly) because of his ability to influence the United States, their bond had a lasting impact on their individual nations and their transatlantic relationship: Their collaboration in Dulles’ six years in office was essential in the German rearmament process, which would have been impossible or at least delayed had it not been for Dulles’ strong endorsement. If Germany resurged and thrived under Adenauer, this was also due to the good ties to the USA that he established and which would set the stage for what has since been called a ‘special relationship’. As Professor Grabbe states, “the alliance with America has been called the ‘second Grundgesetz’ of the Federal Republic. This foundation … is to no small degree the result of the relationship between Dulles and Adenauer … The ‘personal factor’ must be considered exceptional in the German-American relationship”.56

However, Dulles and Adenauer’s friendship also had less positive implications. As previously stated, it marginalized other European heads of state and consequently bilateral ties suffered, especially those between America and France. Furthermore, it was to some extent due to his loyalty to Dulles that Adenauer would later have an exceptionally bad relationship with president John F. Kennedy, who arranged for both of Dulles’ siblings

55 Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York: Times Books, 2013): 155. 56 Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, “Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles and the West German-American Relations” In John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, edited by Richard Immerman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): 110.

19 Eleanor and Allen to be fired on accounts of the latter’s involvement in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba. Granted, their mutual dislike mostly stemmed from ideological differences, their age gap of 40 years (Adenauer, now in his eighties, had since long been nicknamed the ‘Old Man’ while Kennedy was the youngest president ever to have been elected) and JFK’s faux-pas in prematurely declaring in 1957, still as senator, in a Foreign Affairs article that “the age of Adenauer was over”.57 Their animosity even extended to members of their administrations like Diplomat Wilhelm Grewe, selected by Adenauer and disapproved of by Kennedy (who preferred his admirer from the CDU’s counterparty Willy Brandt) and thus “the German-American relationship experienced an era of diplomatic discord, produced by … personalities that failed to comprehend each other’s policies”.58 Evidently, there were many reasons for the poor personal relations (which were later in part to blame for the critical 1961 Berlin Crisis), but it certainly did not help that that Kennedy let go of the very Americans to whom Adenauer felt most connected. Incidentally, after her resignation Eleanor continued to travel to Germany, amongst other things to attend Adenauer’s funeral in 1967.59 Prior to this, the two mourned another death together in Washington in 1959 though, namely that of Eleanor’s brother. If there was any doubt left about the authenticity of Dulles and Adenauer’s friendship, the latter’s description of their last meeting in February and his sorrow at hearing of John’s illness and death should easily sweep it away. Noticing Dulles’ weakness during the visit to Bonn, Adenauer arranged for his cook to make groats. After his departure, the chancellor had the recipe and ingredients delivered to his friend in the USA; it was the last thing he ate before he passed away. 60 Dulles died in May and was clearly missed by Adenauer, who wrote in his memoirs: John Foster Dulles’ death was a heavy blow to the entire Western world, but especially for us Germans and for me personally.61

57 Frank Mayer, “Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust in German-American Relations?,” German Studies Review 17 (1994): 83. 58 Idem, 98. 59 Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York: Times Books, 2013): 304. 60 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 478. 61 “Der Tod von John Foster Dulles war ein sehr schwerer Schlag für die ganze westliche Welt, insbesondere aber für uns Deutsche und für mich persönlich.” Erinnerungen, 1955-1959, Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 537.

20 The ‘Old Boys’: Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford & Henry Kissinger Between the end of the fruitful collaboration between Adenauer and Dulles in 1959 and the beginning of the cooperation between Schmidt, Ford and Kissinger in their highest capacities,62 lie fifteen years. In this interim period, the cold war had not eased off; Instead there had been the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises. The West German political landscape too had changed dramatically. After Adenauer retired from his fourteen-year chancellorship in 1963, he was succeeded by a series of politicians who unlike the ‘old man’ failed to hold on to their position for long. Until Schmidt became chancellor, there had not only been three different holders of the office, Erhard, Kiesinger and Brandt, but also a change of government from CDU to SPD, the Social Democratic Party. Beyond the internal change, there also occurred a shift in West Germany’s foreign policy. While Erhard had concentrated almost solely on domestic economics (which was only to be expected from the former Minister for Economic Affairs), Kiesinger and Brandt focused their attention foremost on the East, thus successfully reducing tensions with Soviet bloc countries and through Ostpolitik also with its immediate neighbor, the DDR, from whom they were now physically separated by the wall erected in 1961. All in all, although they were by no means neglected (as previously mentioned, Willy Brandt had quite close ties to Kennedy), in the post-Adenauer era transatlantic relations were not at the forefront of West German politics. Under Helmut Schmidt however, the Bundesrepublik once again played a prominent role both in and outside of Europe, for which his predecessor had paved the way. Though he would work with three US administrations during his tenure that began in 1974 and it could be assumed that his ability to collaborate with overseas counterparts would only increase with experience, by his own accounts it was the first administration that he was most in tune with: The combination Ford/Kissinger was ideal for the German chancellor. In the two and a half years overlap of our times in office there has never been a problem that we could not solve within little time through trustful openness ... The Atlantic alliance was stable again.63

62 It should be noted that they had previously worked together in other functions, as shall be discussed below. 63 “Die Kombination Ford/Kissinger ist für den deutschen Bundeskanzler ideal gewesen. Während der zweieinhalb Jahre unserer gemeinsamen Amtszeit hat es niemals ein Problem zwischen uns gegeben, das wir nicht in vertrauensvoller Offenheit binnen kurzer Zeit gelöst haben … Das Atlantische Bündnis war wieder gefestigt.” Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen, Helmut Schmidt (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 301f.

21 Personal relations were key in this success. Schmidt befriended both the president and his secretary of state, though these friendships differed in their scope and longevity. While noticeably closer to the like-minded Ford during their governments’ cooperation, he continues to stay friends with both him and German-born Kissinger, despite their somewhat more tense relationship at the time. Typically the chancellor tends to be on good terms with either the president or the secretary of state, but in the case of the Ford administration Schmidt was thus exceptionally close to both, as demonstrated for instance by him dedicating a chapter each to the two statesmen in his book Weggefährten (1996).

As he describes there, Helmut Schmidt and Gerald Ford met in 1975 when the latter visited West Germany. Their friendship grew rapidly over the year when they reconvened at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (which resulted in the Helsinki Accords) and the first G6 Summit, thought up and launched by Schmidt and his friend and French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,64 which by his own account was a political and psychological success as it fostered trust between the involved politicians. Evidently Ford agreed with this evaluation, since he organized the following world economic summit, now with seven members due to the addition of Canada’s Pierre Trudeau to the original six heads of state of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA. It was in the aftermath of this G7 summit held in Puerto Rico in 1976 that Ford proved his loyalty to the West German chancellor. After Schmidt shared with journalists that if the Italian government were to include communists, the big four (England, France, West Germany and the USA) would cease to grant the country credit, those involved were naturally outraged. Italians heavily criticized the intended meddling with domestic issues and in France, thousands protested with posters of the ‘ugly German’ chancellor. Though they usually portrayed him rather favorably (in no small part due to his friendship with publisher of the weekly paper ‘Die Zeit’ Marion Dönhoff) the press too turned against Schmidt. Ford however, though it in no way benefitted him bar gaining the chancellor’s trust, came to Schmidt’s defense and thereby sealed the friendship.65 The fact that he thereby put himself at risk of being condemned and disliked by others yet was willing to stand by Schmidt’s

64 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 303. 65 Hans-Joachim Noack, Helmut Schmidt: Die Biographie (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2008): 166f.

22 side nonetheless, clearly indicates that there had developed a bond between them. Having said that, Ford is known to have had a forgiving nature since he also pardoned Nixon despite the obviously negative implications thereof for his reputation, an act of bravery that Schmidt had incidentally admired greatly.66 It was not the only time that Ford, whom Schmidt later affectionately called ‘Jerry’,67 helped him out.

As writer for Foreign Affairs Barbara Heep points out, the friendship between Schmidt and Ford led to the dismissal of what had long been a contentious issue in the transatlantic relationship, namely foreign exchange offset agreement payments (Devisenausgleichszahlungen).68 In 1976 the chancellor managed to convince the American president to discontinue the renewal of further offset agreements, which had up to then taken place biannually. After having paid an estimated eleven billion US dollars to the USA between 1961 and 197569 to contribute to the costs arising from stationing soldiers in their country, West Germans were naturally relieved to know that this significant cost would no longer come up. Not only would the FRG’s economy benefit but also the country’s image abroad, as it no longer appeared to be the only European nation to co-finance American troops, which were at the time just being pulled out of the controversial Vietnam War. Though it was also a logical conclusion of the fact that the American government no longer required the West German payments,70 both Heep and contemporary news outlets identified the personal relationship between the statesmen as the decisive factor in this development.

Ford also listened when Schmidt gave him political advice. Amongst other things, the two came together during the Détente era to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the development of NATO. The dialogue on SALT between the USSR and the USA was launched as a result of the ongoing nuclear arms race, with the aim to limit each of the superpowers’ accumulated nuclear arsenals, necessary for peace efforts just as much as for these two nations’ suffering economies. The Nixon administration already finalized SALT I in 1972, which resulted in the agreement to limit anti-ballistic

66 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 302. 67 Idem, 304f. 68 Barbara Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990): 243. 69 Ulrich Schiller, “Bonn wird nicht mehr zur Ader gelassen, ”Die Zeit, July 23, 1976. 70 Idem.

23 missiles (ABMs) in both countries. After his resignation over Watergate, his successor Ford wished to go further with SALT II, by not only reducing ABMs but also preventively banning new missile programs from being established in the first place. In his private conversations with the president in 1975 and 1976, from which Kissinger was exceptionally excluded, Schmidt pointed out the danger of the recently deployed Soviet SS-20 medium- range missiles that had not been included in the SALT talks, which merely accounted for long-range ones. Thereupon the American president promised to account for the risky weapon in future negotiations, though given that he was in the middle of an election campaign it would have to be done after his re-election, which never took place; Neither did the addition that the West German chancellor had demanded (though the SS-20 weapons were in fact later destroyed as agreed by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty), as the Carter administration with which he was faced as of 1976 was far less open to foreign advice, or at least Schmidt’s. Ford’s assurance was never put into writing as, given their relationship of mutual trust, neither he nor the Bundskanzler had deemed it necessary to do so. 71 As Heep asserts, whether Ford would realistically have pushed for the banning of the SS-20 is open for debate. Nevertheless, it remains notable that Ford took into account Schmidt’s advice and was inclined to arrange for it, admittedly by Schmidt’s accounts, without his secretary of state’s consent (or anybody else’s for that matter) who was expected to be critical of any amendments that would further slow down the already lengthy SALT negotiation process.72

Although he bypassed the secretary of state on this occasion, Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kissinger were otherwise good friends. In fact, the argument could be made that it was in part due to their cordial relationship that Ford would strike up a friendship with the German chancellor, about whom he would of course have heard from his secretary of state. Indeed, though they disagree on where and when exactly they first met, Kissinger and Schmidt met some time in the 1950s. According to Kissinger, the two met in 1957 in the scope of a panel discussion at the Amerikahaus in Hamburg. Prior to their meeting

71 Herbert Dittgen, Deutsch-Amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen in der Ära Helmut Schmidt: Vorgeschichte und Folgen des NATO-Doppelbeschluss (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1991): 138; Barbara Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990): 243. 72 Barbara Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990): 243.

24 Kissinger had mistakenly expected to be acquainted with the academic and politician Carlo Schmid as he had never previously heard of Schmidt.73 Schmidt on the other hand believes to have met Kissinger at Harvard University in the United States in 1953.74 Be that as it may, it was their political work that brought them together again. At the end of the 1960s, both were appointed to similar positions in their respective governments, Kissinger as Nixon’s National Security Advisor and Schmidt as Brandt’s Federal Minister of Defense. Though little is known of their contact during this time, as Kissinger affirms, “we stayed in touch over the years”.75 This statement and their ease at communicating once they reached their highest official postings must lead to the belief that the two met on several occasions. Indeed, as Kissinger’s description of their talks in his office prior to the Energy Conference in Washington in 1974 (at which Schmidt incidentally backed the American proposals)76 demonstrates, the two had meanwhile become trusting friends: There were two key conversations before the opening of the conference … The first was … with my old and cherished friend Helmut Schmidt … Our friendship soon transcended the tasks that destiny imposed on us. We both knew that we served our countries not by imposing our views but by seeking solutions both of us could believe in. 77

Noticeably, their cooperation was one in which both sought compromise. Now that one was the secretary of state of the United States and the other the Bundeskanzler of West Germany, their functions required them to meet all the more, especially to negotiate on behalf of their respective nations regarding issues such as armament control and the oil crisis. As mentioned before, the cooperation between the Ford and Schmidt administrations could not have been more harmonious and Kissinger of course helped create said environment. As the case of the SS-20 goes to show however, Schmidt and Kissinger did not always think alike. On various political issues their opinions differed tremendously. One before anything else a scholar, the other foremost a politician, their approaches to international politics were bound to diverge and neither made a secret out of their disapproval of the other’s policies.

73 Matthias Naß, “Ich finde Helmut ziemlich sentimental,” Die Zeit, June 25, 2009; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982): 908. 74 Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin: Siedler, 1987): 168. 75 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982): 908. 76 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998): 459. 77 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982): 908.

25 Kissinger for example had been very skeptical about the aforementioned Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, which had been negotiated for the past two years. Because it “was born of the Soviet desire for legitimacy”78 and although it was backed by most West Europeans, including the German chancellor, it was not welcomed in the United States. The summit aimed to create a joint security system for Europe, which is precisely why the Americans who perceived it as a potential threat to the ever-developing NATO were critical of it, first of all Kissinger as transpires from a 1974 memorandum of a conversation between him, Ford and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Scowcroft: Kissinger: On CSCE -- we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans. It includes some basic principles … The Soviet Union wants it as a substitute for a peace treaty … It is meaningless.79 If he later changed his mind, it was foremost because of the realization that it could serve as a forum “for attacking Soviet human rights policies”,80 but also because Schmidt’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher closely consulted with him on each and every step in the CSCE’s development. Thereby Schmidt managed to gain his approval, despite the members of the counter-party CDU’s efforts to get Kissinger on their anti-CSCE side.81 A feud was avoided. Later however, in the 1980s, the two did clash over the aforementioned INF Treaty regarding the destruction of the SS-20 missiles, which proved to be a recurring point of issue in their relationship. Although they thus disagreed on several issues, they nonetheless consulted each other, knowing perhaps very well that to be aware of possible counter-arguments could turn out to be helpful. Even the risk of thereby upsetting the inter- institutional balance, for example the relations between Schmidt and Genscher, did not hinder them from proceeding with their private consultations.82 Furthermore, for all their ideological differences, there were several things (notably not per se political beliefs) on which they did agree and which ultimately connected them with each other as well as with others: Firstly, neither Kissinger nor Schmidt founded friendship on similarity. Whereas it

78 John Holmes, The United States and Europe after the Cold War: A New Alliance (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997): 40. 79 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, August 15, 1974. 80 John Holmes, The United States and Europe after the Cold War: A New Alliance (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997): 40. 81 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 286. 82 Idem, 284.

26 had been the very basis of the Adenauer-Dulles ‘love affair’, this duo interpreted friendship as something entirely independent from affinity, as demonstrated not only by the case study at hand but also by other relationships the two fostered. Kissinger for example maintained a close relationship with the Kennedy loyalist Arthur Schlesinger Jr., from whom he differed in various aspects besides the obvious disparity in political party.83 The two Harvard colleagues may have had similar backgrounds (both Jewish, Harvard graduates and professors who made the switch to a career in government), but they had fundamentally different perspectives on how to deal with the USSR, with Schlesinger being outspokenly critical of Kissinger’s Détente policy. Thus, “if friendship had depended on a sharing of political opinions, Kissinger and Schlesinger would never have become friends”84 and yet, he counted Schlesinger among his closest ones. Despite disagreeing with him on issues such as taxation or his ‘simplistic’ approach to foreign affairs in general, Schmidt was later on good terms with Ronald Reagan, a friendship that extended to their wives Loki and Nancy.85 Though perhaps quite common elsewhere, in the political sphere friendships tend not to form among those who disagree with each other and are much more likely to occur between those who adhere to the same party. For obvious reasons, it is rare to find politicians who are able to put such fundamental differences aside, though the pair under scrutiny did. Ironically the fact that neither Schmidt nor Kissinger attached much importance to commonalities is thus what they were especially similar in.

Secondly, both Schmidt and Kissinger were avid supporters and practitioners of personal diplomacy: Kissinger had been a networker par excellence since his Harvard days. As biographer Bruce Mazlish indicates, his acquaintances played a vital role throughout both his academic and political career: “If any single trait can be said to have carried Kissinger to the secretary of state, it is, I believe, his careful and astute cultivation and adroit use of connections”,86 especially those to one Nelson Rockefeller and the contacts he in turn provided. Rockefeller, businessman turned politician and later vice president to Ford, sought out talented thinkers, among them the ambitious Henry Kissinger.

83 Having said that, Kissinger was himself by no means bound to the Republicans (nor was Schlesinger to the Democrats) and had himself served as a special advisor to the democratic Kennedy administration. 84 Stephen Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973): 176. 85 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 301. 86 Bruce Mazlish, Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1976): 113.

27 Of course, it is one thing to network amongst academics and another to apply personal diplomacy with politicians. Yet, arguably, these approaches are not all that dissimilar, merely the goals. It was through his experience of asking and getting what he wanted, be it articles or summer lectureships, from others in the Ivy League community, that he gained the confidence to mediate treaties on behalf of the USA. In his academic work on the 19th century politician and at the time prime diplomat Metternich, Kissinger, “the most psychologically minded of all foreign policy thinkers and actors, … reduced international relations to a classic example of interpersonal relations”. 87 It appears as though in practice, he attempted and succeeded (depending on whom you ask) in following this model. Contested as the personality and foreign policy-maker Kissinger may be, few contradict that he was a superb negotiator. In his exercise of diplomacy, he adapted his style to whomever he was faced with, though he generally preferred to hold private talks, a tactic that made him some friends among foreign statesmen but perhaps even more enemies among local peers. Former Assistant Secretary of State of the Johnson administration Thomas Hughes for example “attacked him for substituting personalism … for institutional and policy-oriented handling of America’s international relations … in place of issues we have had a man; personality has upstaged policy”.88 Foreign governments only believed to be dealing with the USA when they were dealing with Kissinger,89 who had thereby essentially obliterated the role of the State Department, which purposely remained untold of his doings. Kissinger’s foreign policy was thus dominated by personal diplomacy and evidently his use of it was at once destructive and effective, for one must not forget that his approach, for all its flaws, did work. In his friendship with Soviet Ambassador to the USA Anatoly Dobryinin for instance, “both men gained significant professional benefits from the relationship and colluded together to protect and advance those benefits”.90 His good working relationship with another West German politician, the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Egon Bahr too is known to have been prolific. However, one can question whether in this case such relationships benefited foremost the power-hungry man or the nation he represented.

87 Bruce Mazlish, Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1976): 195. 88 Idem, 4. 89 Norman Graebner, Richard Burns and Joseph Siracusa, America and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist Interpretation (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010): 371. 90 Barbara Keys, “Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman,” Diplomatic History 35 (2011): 604.

28 In the German-American relationship, Kissinger arguably served both. By being in direct contact with Schmidt, he could influence the chancellor more than a correspondence through foreign minister Genscher would have permitted him, which in turn provided him personally with significant power. Even if Schmidt had a favorable stance towards the United States as it were (the self-proclaimed atlanticist once stated that if he were ever forced to move, he would head straight to America),91 this in itself did not secure his support of American policies; Kissinger did. Throughout the SALT negotiations, Schmidt almost always sided with the USA. Successful as Kissinger’s personalization of foreign policy thus was, it also made him susceptible to Schmidt’s pressures, as the latter was no stranger to personal diplomacy himself. As his strategy regarding the CSCE demonstrated, when need be, he too could put pressure on Kissinger to achieve his goals.

As Schmidt discloses in Weggefährten, he gave considerable thought to the notion of forged and genuine personal relationships between politicians. Downplayed by others as a myth, Schmidt defended the idea that a ‘true’ friendship can exist among statesmen, naming his bond to Giscard d’Estaing, with whom he had pushed for the NATO Double- Track Decision, as an example of such a connection.92 Not only that, but he further comments on the impact of personal relationships, arguing that they can blind the involved parties and most certainly be exploited, provided both are open to it. His example for utilization is precisely his relationship to members of the Ford administration.93 Evidently, at the time personal diplomacy was a potent two-way street. But they did not limit their interaction to personal political discussions alone. In the détente era diplomacy at the summit proved vital. Next to SALT talks, CSCE and G7 summits, Schmidt, Kissinger and Ford were also known to frequent the mysterious Bilderberg Conferences as well as the ‘Bohemian Club’ meetings.94 But perhaps most emblematic of their proximity were their

91 Theo Sommer, Unser Schmidt: Der Staatsmann und Publizist (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2010): 230. 92 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 251f. 93 “Auf die Frage ob international Freundschaften nicht auch blind machen können, muss ich antworten: Ja, dergleichen ist nicht auszuschließen! Und auf die Frage ob solche Freundschaften auch instrumentalisiert werden können, gibt es aus meiner Erfahrung die Antwort: Ja das ist möglich, wenn beide Freunde dies wollen. Dafür gibt es eine Reihe von Beispielen des bewussten international Zusammenspiels … [es] wären mancherlei gegenseitige Hilfen nicht möglich gewesen ohne meine freundschaftlichen Bindungen zu Gerald Ford … und Henry Kissinger.” Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen, Helmut Schmidt (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 306. 94 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 281.

29 private, non-work related meetings at each other’s homes. Already during their time in office but even more so afterwards, the three met frequently at ‘Jerry’ Ford’s home in the Rocky Mountains for example, where his wife Betty was a great hostess and Schmidt felt so comfortable he would wander to the fridge in the middle of the night without any inhibition.95 Here they were occasionally further joined by other mutual friends such as Giscard d’Estaing, former prime minister of the UK James Callaghan and secretary of state under Reagan George Shultz. Notably, there developed a clique of elderly statesmen over time, ‘old boys’ as Schmidt calls them, who continued to enjoy discussing politics with one another;96 and football. With Schmidt supporting Hamburg (HSV) and Kissinger his hometown Fürth (SpVgg), there has always existed a friendly rivalry between them, an inside joke.97 Since Kissinger is quoted as saying, “I hope to die before Helmut, because I do not wish to live in a world without him”,98 clearly even a HSV victory against SpVgg would not impair their bond. Together with Ford, Schmidt established the AEI World Forum. Schmidt had himself remarked that genuine bonds would only be exposed when retired politicians chose to spend time with one another.99 Evidently, he was right.

The truthfulness of their friendship no longer requires proof, but its impact does. Applying the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence indicates just how much of an effect the personal relationships had on German-American relations and each of the countries’ foreign policies in the 1970’s. Ford used coercive power to get Schmidt to like and support him, when, although it damaged his reputation, he backed him after his controversial comments about Italian domestic politics. The dismissal of offset payments was directly related to their friendship too. In turn, Schmidt could exert informative power when he pointed out the lack of provisions on SS-20s. With Kissinger, it’s a mixed bag. Again, Schmidt enjoyed informative power as through his close ties with Kissinger, he could exert pressure at the very top. Because they disagreed politically, there was only so much he could achieve through ‘Henry’. Nevertheless, having made friends with the Kissinger-Ford duo undeniably paid off.

95 Helmut Schmidt, Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996): 304. 96 Idem. 97 “HSV-Fürth würde auch zum Duell Schmidt gegen Kissinger,” Hamburger Abendblatt (May 5, 2014). 98 “Ich hoffe, dass ich vor Helmut sterbe. Denn in einer Welt ohne ihn möchte ich nicht leben.” “Henry Kissinger will vor Helmut Schmidt sterben,” Flensburg Online, December 20, 2008. 99 Idem, 252.

30 There was however one statesman whom Schmidt could never become friends with, namely Ford’s successor Jimmy Carter. Much like Adenauer had disliked the Kennedy administration that had booted out the Dulles family, Schmidt too resented the Carter one that replaced Ford and Kissinger, although even more passionately so. Indeed, as former Ambassador and biographer Hans Dieter Heumann stated, the personal dislike between Schmidt and Carter was unprecedented and aggravated the German-American political relationship considerably.100 Carter on his part could not relate to the Bundeskanzler and Schmidt considered the new American administration ‘mentally deficient’.101 During their joint time in office, Schmidt on occasion even raised his voice over issues such as the 1977 neutron bomb, human rights policy and the president’s tendency to ‘go it alone’. Carter later wrote in his diary, “not having to deal with Schmidt … was the only positive aspect to losing to Ronald Reagan in 1980”.102 After the dip in German-American relations it was up to his successor Helmut Kohl to regenerate the transatlantic relationship.

100 Hans-Dieter Heumann, Hans-Dietrich Genscher: Die Biografie (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2011): 203f. 101 Idem, 204. 102 Klaus Wiegrefe, “No Love Lost: Carter Diary Reveals Rocky Relationship with German Chancellor Schmidt,” Spiegel Online, October 12, 2010.

31 The Other Special Relationship: Helmut Kohl, Ronald Reagan & George H. W. Bush By the time the CDU’s Helmut Kohl was elected in 1982, the international sphere had changed again. After the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, America boycotted the Olympics held in Moscow the following year. Tensions were running high. In the UK Margaret Thatcher assumed the office of prime minister and in the US Ronald Reagan that of president. Jointly, they replaced détente for the Reagan doctrine and containment for rollback. On this and other issues, the two famously cooperated during the ongoing cold war and thereby cemented the ‘special relationship’ between their allied nations. Though it is theirs, a much-debated and commented on, friendship that is often remembered of the era, throughout his sixteen-year tenure the West German Chancellor Kohl too maintained good relations with the American president and his vice president and later successor George H. W. Bush. This is in no little part due to his actions before reaching his prime position.

In 1978, when Schmidt was still chancellor and Kohl chairman of the CDU, Reagan visited Europe. When he arrived in the FRG, the former governor of California now campaigning for presidency was all but ignored by Schmidt, who talked with him for barely half an hour. Kohl however had the foresight to have the red carpet rolled out for him at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and saw to it that Reagan enjoyed his stay. After having experienced the same thing earlier in 1976 when he was practically only granted to leave his business card with Kissinger, when Kohl returned to Reagan’s USA in 1981 he treated him as if he were already in office. Besides personally taking the time to talk to him, Reagan also ensured that he could meet with Vice President Bush with whom Kohl conversed for over an hour.103 Given that he was neither the chancellor nor the foreign minister, this was exceptional, though Reagan of course considered the possibility that Kohl would become Schmidt’s successor. Even before he did, it was no secret in Bonn that the Reagan administration, which had been on lukewarm terms with the SPD incumbent, placed their hopes on the counter-party’s Kohl. Cunningly, the latter had thus already paved the way for a good future relationship in the late 1970’s.104

103 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biographie (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012): 262. 104 Idem, 263.

32 Just months after becoming the Bundeskanzler, Kohl returned to the White House on the first of many US trips as chancellor (first of West Germany, then of the reunified one). As he states in his memoirs, it was his warm meeting with Reagan in 1982 that confirmed to him the benefits of friendship, candor and cooperative spirit between politicians, which inspired his approach to personal diplomacy throughout his time in office.105 Furthermore, he states upfront that his relationship to Reagan was a genuine one: What connected me to him was far more than the often-zealous friendly relationships that incumbent politicians like to cite.106 The feeling was mutual. As Reagan remarks about Kohl in his diary on the day of the visit, “he is entirely different than his predecessor – very warm and outgoing”.107 Both came away from their meeting optimistic about their future cooperation. Though they only met a total of ten times throughout their times in office, either on state visits or at summits, as both of their memoirs and diaries demonstrate, their telephone contact was thorough and few major international political decisions were taken without first running it by the other. So it was also in the next year when, following Reagan’s appeal, Kohl headed to the USA for a flying visit to discuss the scope and format of the upcoming G7 summit to be held in Williamsburg, Virginia.108 Evidently, the American president valued Kohl’s advice. After this, the ninth world economic summit in 1983, which focused on widespread unemployment worldwide and the difficult financial situation in various countries from Brazil to Poland, Reagan and Kohl shifted their attention to the ongoing negotiations on the NATO double-track decision, in which already their predecessors had participated. The central issue was the deployment of Pershing II (ballistic missiles) on German ground, which the West German public, the SPD and even members of his own party vehemently protested against. Although Kohl thus had much to lose domestically by going against their wish, he fully supported Reagan’s decision to go through with it. Granted, Kohl himself believed this to be the right way forward, but his unremitting support for Reagan’s strategy naturally also won him his favor. Just as Kohl stood by him in this instance, Reagan later stood by Kohl during the Bitburg Fiasco.

105 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 63. 106 “Mit ihm verband mich weit mehr als die häufig bemühten freundschaftlichen Beziehungen, wie sie unter amtierenden Politikern so gern zitiert werden.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 64. 107 Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2007): 113. 108 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 133f.

33 In 1985, the eleventh G7 summit took place in Bonn. Kohl invited Bush to combine the trip with a commemoration for the 40th anniversary of V Day, which was to take place at the Kolmeshöhe military cemetery near Bitburg, Germany. A year earlier Kohl had met the French president at Douaumont graveyard in Verdun, a visit that produced the iconic photo of the two men holding hands where once their countrymen had fought a battle leaving 700,000 dead during WWI. Now Kohl hoped to do what he had done for Franco- German relations with Mitterrand in Verdun, for the transatlantic relationship with Reagan in Bitburg. Instead, the proposed visit caused what was in both statesmen’s time in office an unprecedented media furor. Upon being announced by the White House, the trip that had been conceived as a symbolic gesture of German-American reconciliation was widely criticized due to the fact that the selected cemetery contained the graves of former members of the Nazi Waffen SS. To worsen the matter, Reagan had turned down Kohl’s invitation to follow up the cemetery trip with another one to the Dachau concentration camp memorial site. Consequently, “the symbolism was truly horrendous: Reagan would be honoring not Kohl’s country but Hitler’s henchmen, while ignoring the holocaust”.109 Their well- intentioned and in fact not entirely crude plan (as Kohl explains in his memoirs, Bitburg had been chosen because of the many thousands of Americans living there and because it was most easily reached by plane)110 had become “a serious public relations blunder [that] turned into a political crisis”, Reagan’s Dreyfus as he called it.111 Many demanded that the American president call off the trip. Much as he initially pushed Reagan to go through with it, since the polls indicated that the German public wanted it so and he feared that a cancellation would bring down his government,112 Kohl finally called his friend and offered him a way out by delaying his visit. As he remembers: At the other end of the phone line it was silent. After a short pause Ronald Reagan said to me, and I will never forget this: “I will not cancel the trip, I will come”.113

109 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Collins, 2008): 210. 110 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 349f. 111 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Collins, 2008): 210. 112 Steven Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980-1989 (New York: Crown Forum, 2009): 435. 113 “Am anderen Ende der Telefonleitung wurde es einen Moment lang ganz still. Nach einer kurzen Pause sagte Ronald Reagan zu mir, und das werde ich ihm nie vergessen: ‘Ich sage die Reise nicht ab, ich werde kommen’.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 355.

34 Although it won him the heart of the German people114 and that of their grateful chancellor, in the United States “the affair left permanent political scars”.115 Undeniably, even if he considered attending the commemoration the right thing to do and felt indebted to his friend ‘Helmut’ for backing him at NATO, Reagan must have cared for his personal approval and friendship or else he would not have been willing to risk his own popularity when he did not necessarily have to. It was a matter of principle as much as a proof of friendship. Besides, even though Kohl’s invitation and insistence had put Bush in such a precarious position, he in no way resented him for it.116 Two years later, on the morning after more than 30,000 Berliners had protested violently against Reagan’s upcoming visit, Kohl in turn stood by his side when he uttered his famous words “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” in front of the Brandenburger Tor, 117 a speech for which the Bundeskanzler again expressed his deep gratitude.118 While fellow politicians like Margaret Thatcher with whom Kohl had a rather tense relationship and his friend Mitterrand wanted nothing to do with the question of German unity,119 both Reagan and his successor Bush did not shy away from getting involved. By being in close contact with both Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and Kohl in West Germany, the American statesmen frequently served as a go-between. Any developments were quickly transmitted to Kohl, often the first port of call for Reagan (even before Thatcher) and for Bush anyway.120 Thus, they played an essential role in the east-west negotiations and when the issue came around, German unity was one of the first and most important things on which Kohl and Bush cooperated. Before the latter took over from Reagan however, Kohl travelled to the USA in the fall of 1987 for a parting visit.121 Simultaneously, the trip served the purpose to personally congratulate the newly elected George H.W. Bush (as the first foreign statesman no less). Peculiarly, while others before and after him expressed great regret over American changes of leadership, Kohl thus immediately moved on, which may give rise to doubts over how close him and Reagan realistically were.

114 Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2007): 321. 115 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Collins, 2008): 210. 116 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 356; Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2007): 321. 117 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 521ff. 118 Idem, 523. 119 Idem, 871. 120 Idem, 355. 121 Idem, 792-795.

35 Historian Hans-Peter Schwarz points out that Kohl met with the French president a total of sixty-eight times compared to his ten meetings with Reagan, who incidentally did not get along with Mitterrand. Though this can be explained by the simple fact that the two were geographically closer, this did not stop Margaret Thatcher from seeing him more often.122 However, it is perhaps precisely because of his close ties to ‘Maggie’ as he affectionately called her, that Reagan’s friendship to Kohl was less intense. Furthermore, the German-American duo made up for their lack of visits through phone calls. As Kohl writes in his memoirs: In the first months of my chancellorship the telephone almost naturally became the instrument for confidential exchanges of ideas. Thus, I had direct access to the most important political partners – a practice that I maintained during my sixteen years in office with great success and which influenced my style of governance. 123 Just like he did with others, he made many phone calls to ‘Ron’ though to Bush, he would make even more. As shall be demonstrated below, the closer friendship was indeed most likely the one to Reagan’s successor, though this should not undermine the previous personal relationship either. After all, one does not exclude the other, especially with Reagan and Bush having themselves been friends and co-workers rather than opponents. Of course, his contact with the Reagan administration throughout the 1980’s had also often put Kohl in touch with Bush. By the time he became the American president, the two were thus already well acquainted and had joint memories to look back on, especially of an incident that took place in 1983.

On the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the emigration of 13 local families to the United States, Chancellor Kohl and then vice president Bush met in Krefeld. The encounter left an impression due to the event’s complete chaos and dramatic ending. Kohl suspected sabotage throughout, as neither lights nor microphones worked. To Kohl’s dismay things got even worse as protesters started throwing stones at him and Bush (in fact, about one hundred people were injured in the demonstration against the VP’s visit) so much so that

122 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biographie (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012): 507. 123 “In den ersten Monaten meiner Regierungszeit wurde das Telefon wie selbstverständlich zum Instrument vertraulichen Gedankenaustauschs. So hatte ich unmittelbaren Zugang zu den wichtigsten politischen Partnern – eine Praxis, die ich während meiner sechzehnjährigen Amtszeit mit großem Erfolg pflegte und die meinen Regierungsstil beeinflusste.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 86.

36 the two were forced to hide in a gloomy underground parking lot. To his utter surprise, Bush reacted calmly, saying: “It’s just like in Chicago. We’re celebrated and pelted with stones, here and there”,124 a composure that impressed Kohl. Living through this dire situation together has been credited with being the founding moment of their trusting relationship.125 Since, Kohl had also repeatedly seen Bush at summits, during trips to Washington or his to Bonn and made no secret of his preference for him as Reagan’s successor.126 It was a smooth transition. Once Bush assumed office on January 20th, Kohl could quite easily pick up where he left off with Reagan. In spring, the duo focused on preparing the NATO summit held later that year in Brussels, which through their direct contact the German government could also influence.127 In autumn, a few days after happily announcing the opening of the Hungarian border on the tenth of September 1989, which allowed thousands of East German refugees to leave, Kohl was briefly hospitalized and operated. As he remarks in his memoirs, he received a telegram from Bush saying: “Dear Helmut, you are in my thoughts and prayers. All the best, Your George”.128 From then on their contact only increased in the lead-up to the fall of the Berlin wall and its aftermath.

The first crack in the Iron curtain as the Hungarian border opening has been called, set in motion ‘die Wende’, though at the time politicians did not yet want to call it that. After the DDR’s peaceful revolution followed the opening of the border checkpoints between East and West Germany on the 9th of November 1989. Kohl’s first call was to Thatcher, if only because he deemed it the hardest to make, then followed his calls to

124 “George Bush reagierte auf die Steinwerfer mit dem Satz: ‘Es ist wie in Chicago. Wir werden bejubelt und mit Steinen beworfen, hier wie dort’. Ich schaemte mich.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 194. 125 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biographie (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012): 506. 126 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 675. 127 “Anfang Mai 1989 begannen mit einer ausführlichen Korrespondenz und mit direkten Gesprächen die wir führten wann immer wir es für nötig hielten, unsere vertrauten Abstimmungen zur Vorbereitung des NATO Gipfels … wir waren voll und ganz in alle Überlegungen der Vereinigten Staaten einbezogen und brachten unsere Interessen in jeder Phase ein.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 871f. 128 “Am Krankenbett erreichte mich ein Telegramm von George Bush. Der US Präsident schrieb: “Lieber Helmut, du bist in meinen Gedanken und Gebeten. Alles Beste. Dein George.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 940.

37 Mitterrand and Bush, who wished him good luck.129 Shortly after, they and others met in Paris to discuss the issue of German reunification to which Thatcher was fiercely opposed and which worried the French, Dutch and Italian heads of state out of fear of the resurgence of a powerful German state. Solely Bush who had always said that no country should be split,130 fully supported German unity. Kohl drafted and announced his 10-point-program in which exactly that was the final step. At the Soviet-American Malta summit in early December, Gorbachev and Bush declared an end to the cold war and discussed the sequence of events, with the general secretary of the communist party of the Soviet Union voicing his concern over Kohl’s suggestions, in particular the speed at which the political situation was developing. Bush assured him that Kohl knew what he was doing,131 as he told the latter days later when they met in Brussels for dinner ahead of the NATO summit. During his speech in the headquarters in front of the gathered heads of state, Bush reiterated his support for German reunification in return for which he expected Kohl to later ensure the united country’s NATO membership, without which the organization itself would most likely collapse. Kohl welcomed this deal.132 As he wrote in his memoirs, the summit and especially Bush’s endorsement were key in persuading Western Europe to accept his proposal.133 Afterwards, when Kohl had returned to Bonn and Bush to Washington, the chancellor sent the president some German delicacies as a thank you, for which in return he received a friendly letter from Bush that to Kohl “belongs to the cornerstones of the German-American friendship”,134 in which he expressed his anticipation of his and his spouse Hannelore’s upcoming visit to Camp David. In February 1990, Kohl first travelled to Moscow to further negotiate with Gorbachev for which he prepared in close cooperation with Bush via telephone and then to see him and the first lady in person. Notably, Hannelore Kohl was good friends with Barbara Bush, more so than with any other politician’s wife.135 The four dined together and exchanged stories about their lives, families and children during a walk before the president’s helicopter brought them to

129 Helmut Kohl, Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 95. 130 “… ein land darf nicht geteilt sein! Das empfand er schlicht und einfach als Verbrechen.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 1004. 131 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 1005. 132 Idem, 1007. 133 Idem, 1007. 134 “Dieser Brief zählt für mich zu den Marksteinen der deutsch-amerikanischen Freundschaft.” Erinnerungen: 1982-1990, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 1061. 135 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 1080.

38 Washington.136 A few weeks later another meeting in the capital served the purpose of consulting each other on how to proceed in their dealings with Gorbachev. The American government was contemplating whether to impose sanctions against Moscow over the Lithuanian crisis (their strive for independence was met in April with a cutoff of oil and natural gas by the USSR), which Kohl by his own accounts could dissuade Bush from, because he feared that Gorbachev would otherwise reject Germany’s membership in NATO.137 In May Bush and Gorbachev met in Washington, where the American president fully backed the German interests and even managed to develop some kind of ‘bond of trust’ with the Soviet leader.138 As soon as their summit was over, Kohl was eager to see Bush as “sometimes there is simply no alternative to a personal meeting”.139 On July 6th, the duo and the other heads of the NATO member countries made the important London Declaration. Then, they met again at the sixteenth G7 summit in Houston from the 9th to the 11th of July 1990. Amongst other things, the heads of state discussed the issue of whether or not to financially support the USSR, which Bush and his American peers considered a waste of money. Again, Kohl (with Mitterrand) could sway his opinion.140 Personal diplomacy played an important role not only in this decision but, as Kohl recalls, in the summit as a whole: All in all, the world economic summit was characterized by a human harmony like I had never before witnessed it. There had developed a very personal relationship between the participants so that the G7 summits since Houston have obtained a type of familiar atmosphere. What contributed a lot to this relaxation was that it became common to address each other with our first names. I myself introduced the custom that the participants of international summits increasingly travelled by bus together.141

136 Idem, 1083. 137 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen: 1982-1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005): 291ff. 138 Helmut Kohl, Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 302. 139 “Nach diesem Washingtoner Gipfel wollte ich so schnell wie möglich mit dem amerikanischen Präsidenten zusammenkommen. Manchmal gibt es einfach keine alternative zur persönlichen Begegnung.” Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 302. 140 Helmut Kohl, Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 324f. 141 “Alles in allem war der Weltwirtschaftsgipfel von einer menschlichen Harmonie geprägt, wie ich sie bis dahin noch nicht erlebt hatte. Es war eine sehr persönliche Beziehung zwischen den Teilnehmern entstanden, so dass die Weltwirtschaftsgipfel seit Houston eine art familiäre Atmosphäre bekamen. Zur Entkrampfung hatte viel beigetragen, dass man sich schon bald mit Vornamen anredete. Ich selbst führte die Sitte ein, dass die Teilnehmer an internationalen Gipfeln immer häufiger gemeinsam im Bus fuhren.” Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 325f.

39 After this series of summits and personal meetings, topped off by another trip to Russia on July 14th, where Kohl was even presented with flowers by Gorbachev’s wife, nothing stood in the way of German reunification. One having secured his precondition of German NATO membership and the other billions in financial help for the withdrawal of troops, they and the United Kingdom, France and the USA came to terms on the Two Plus Four Agreement in September and the German country was officially reunited on October 3rd. Though the final days were thus foremost in the hands of Kohl and Gorbachev, the American involvement throughout was both considerable and absolutely essential; and so was personal diplomacy. Historians on both sides of the Atlantic agree that it was the close cooperation between individuals that rendered possible the transition.142 As Schwarz writes: Granted, the landslide in the soviet bloc would not have come about without Gorbachev. But without the remarkably close interplay between Bush and Kohl the quick, peaceful reunification of a Germany anchored in the western camp would not have been possible either.143 Kohl himself, and this should not be considered arrogance (if anything, compared to others he underplays his own role), regards the fast process of German unity, achieved in less than a year after the fall of the wall when initially commentators expected it to last up to five, the result of a number of circumstances amongst which the personal factor: Not the desire for freedom of the people in the DDR, not Glasnost and Perestroika, not détente between east and west, not US President George Bush, not the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, not the German Bundeskanzler alone – nobody would by themselves have sufficed to bring about the fall of the wall and reunification. Rather, it took a lucky and I would say historical constellation of people and events.144

142 Stephen Szabo, “The United States and German Unification” In The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War 1945-1990: A Handbook, Volume II, edited by Detlef Junker, Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach and David Morris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 104. 143 “Gewiss wäre der Erdrutsch im Ostblock ohne Gorbatschow nicht zustande gekommen. Aber ohne das bemerkenswert enge Zusammenspiel zwischen Bush und Kohl wäre die rasche, friedliche Wiedervereinigung eines im westlichen Lager verankerten Deutschland gleichfalls nicht möglich gewesen.” Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biographie, Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012): 144 “Nicht allein der Freiheitswillen der Menschen in der DDR, nicht allein Glasnost und Perestroika, nicht allein Entspannungspolitik zwischen Ost und West, nicht allein US Präsident George Bush, nicht allein der sowjetische Generalsekretär Michail Gorbatschow, nicht allein der deutsche Bundeskanzler – niemand allein hätte ausgereicht, um die Mauer zu fall und die Wiedervereinigung zustande zu bringen. Es bedurfte dazu viel mehr einer glücklichen, ich möchte sagen einer historischen Konstellation von Personen und Ereignissen.” Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 8.

40 And yet, it is clear from his memoirs that if one person stood out within that constellation it was his friend George Bush, “a stroke of luck for us Germans”,145 another statement with which historians who deem these years Bush’s “finest hour”, would agree.146 Evidently, individuals were essential to the success of the East-West negotiations.

Having established this, applying the ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’ to the case study can indicate how exactly Bush and Kohl influenced one another and Gorbachev to accomplish a peaceful resolution: A clear indicator of the use of informational power is that, following in Reagan’s footsteps, Bush constantly updated Kohl via phone or in person, and vice versa. In the aforementioned examples in which Kohl could sway Bush, first with regards to the American government’s threat to impose sanctions against the USSR over Lithuania and then when it came to financially supporting the Soviet Union (notably against Bush’s advisors’ opinion),147 the German chancellor thus ably achieved his goals even when they were not necessarily beneficial for the USA. Kohl inadvertently also used expert power, in that Bush was known to consider his German counterpart more well read on international affairs and trusted his evaluations. As Schmidt had found, Bush had a fairly simplistic approach to foreign affairs and was thus open to suggestions. The argument could also be made that referent power was used by all three statesmen (Bush, Reagan and Bush) since they considered themselves the West and through ‘othering’ distinguished themselves in speech from the East. Coercion was most definitely at play when Kohl and Reagan backed one another to gain the other’s sympathy, which in turn promised to make for a good political relationship. For the same reason Bush likewise managed to acquire the Soviet Leader’s trust. In another respect, Kohl also mastered the use of coercive power when in his talks with Gorbachev he mediated Germany’s membership in NATO for financial support in the height of billions, negotiations that Bush in turn backed in his meetings with Gorbachev. What he had to gain from this and what was equally in the Bundeskanzler’s interest, was NATO’s stability. Though potentially a sign of

145 “George Bush war ein Glücksfall für uns Deutsche.” Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinung: Meine Erinnerungen, Helmut Kohl (Munich: Knaur, 2009): 82. 146 Michael Cox and Steven Hurst, “’His Finest Hour?’ George Bush and the Diplomacy of German Unification” Diplomacy & Statecraft 13 (2002): 126. 147 Michael Cox and Steven Hurst, “’His Finest Hour?’ George Bush and the Diplomacy of German Unification” Diplomacy & Statecraft 13 (2002): 126.

41 reward power, given that it was a win-win-situation it may be misleading to identify it as such. Be that as it may, there is considerable evidence to suggest that personal diplomacy was at play and historians equally contend that the contemporary personal relationships had a great bearing on foreign policy outcomes. Again, the fact that these politicians influenced each other is not to be interpreted as the forging of a relationship for purely ‘selfish’ motivations. By all accounts, their friendships were genuine. Indeed, the personal correspondences between Bush and Kohl, their visits to each others’ homes (Mitterrand, Bush, Gorbachev were all at one point or another at Kohl’s humble bungalow home in Oggersheim)148 and their wives’ friendship can only be interpreted as amity. What is more, their bond did not end with their time in office. When Bush, Kohl and ‘Gorby’, as Germans nicknamed the former Soviet Leader, were brought together on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall for example, there was no sign of estrangement.149

148 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biographie (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012): 122. 149 Erin Kirschbaum, “Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl mark Berlin Wall’s fall,” Reuters, October 31, 2009.

42 From Friends to Foes: Gerhard Schröder & George W. Bush The long period of harmony in German-American relations did not end with Bush Senior’s defeat against Clinton in 1993. On the contrary, the nations were almost continuously on good terms throughout Kohl’s sixteen-year chancellorship. Incidentally, Kohl also developed a friendship with Bill Clinton in the mid 90’s, who by his own accounts often “followed Helmut Kohl’s lead” since “he knew what the right thing was”.150 They too met in Oggersheim. When Kohl’s sixteen-year tenure ended in 1998 and he was succeeded by the SPD’s Gerhard Schröder, the transatlantic relationship also did not worsen over night. Though the German politician was by no means best friends with Clinton, whose relationship with Tony Blair on the other hand has even been dramatized,151 the two did get along. In the beginning of Republican George W. Bush’s presidency (2001-2009), him and Schröder too hit it off. But as their countries’ interests diverged, so did they, until, through their political disaccord and personal feud German-American relations hit what was perhaps an all-time-low.

Shortly after Bush was elected in January 2001, Schröder was the third foreign leader to travel to Washington and meet him after prime ministers Blair (UK) and Chrétien (Canada). During the visit in March, they discussed the issue of environment protection on which the countries stood on opposite sides. As the leaders declared in a subsequent press conference, their disagreement on the United States’ intended withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol would however “not affect the friendship between the two nations”.152 With regards to whether or not there might develop a personal one among the statesmen, Schröder’s remark that “the chemistry is right”153 was cause for optimism. Though it had the potential to do so, even the short-lived scandal over a protocol of a conversation between the two politicians154 that ended up in the public eye did not significantly agitate either of the statesmen, who simply considered it an unfortunate incident. By all accounts, for all their differences in opinion, the relationship between Bush and Schroeder was off to a good start.

150 Steve Kettmann, “Bill Clinton says he followed Helmut Kohl’s lead,” The World Post, May 17, 2011. 151 In the film ‘The Special Relationship’, an American-British production released in 2010. 152 “Kyoto überschattet Treffen Schröders mit Bush,” Die Welt, March 30, 2001. 153 “Bush bleibt stur,” Die Welt, March 31, 2001. 154 Private conversation on Gaddafi’s potential involvement in the 1986 bombing of a Berlin nightclub.

43 On September 11th, 2001, the Islamic fundamentalist organization al-Qaeda hijacked four passenger planes and crashed two of them into the twin towers in New York City and a third into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The terrorist attacks against the United States were met with shock by governments and their citizens worldwide, among them Germany. In his memoirs, Chancellor Schröder portrayed his reaction as follows: I turned on the television. The images that I saw upset me deeply … I remember people, who were running for their lives on the street and my own tears, shed out of empathy with the innocent people who were exposed to this inferno. Disbelief and consequential anger at the culprits were my first reaction. I did not stop to think about the deeper political implications.155 Stephen Szabo of the Brookings Institution however, paints another picture: He watched the images of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and quickly realized the significance of what was happening. He remained typically cool and analytic, methodically assembling his crisis reaction team. He senses the longer-term implications of these acts of terrorism and considered calling new elections, given his concerns over the demands his government would now face and the fragility of the coalition [of SPD and the Greens].156 Whichever of the two accounts is more accurate is hard to say. Whereas Schröder might describe his reaction as he wishes others to perceive it (the flaws of autobiography have previously been mentioned) and thus may have exaggerated his sentimental state of mind, it is also unknown on what Szabo bases his description, in which Schröder appears more concerned about his political standing. Though unverifiable, it remains notable to point out the contrast, as Schröder’s concern about domestic politics would later heavily influence his foreign policy. Furthermore, the truthfulness of his autobiography would itself become an issue too. Though his initial response to the news is thus up for debate, his and others’ statements on how he proceeded coincide, also because his actions took place foremost in public. Within hours, Schröder sent a letter of condolence via telegram to Bush in which he announced Germany’s ‘unlimited solidarity’ with the United States.157

155 “Ich schaltete den Fernseher an. Die Bilder, die ich sah, erschütterten mich zutiefst … Ich erinnere mich an Menschen, die auf den Straßen um ihr Leben rannten, und an meine eigenen Tränen, geweint aus Mitleid mit jenen unschuldigen Menschen, die dem Inferno ausgesetzt waren. Ohnmacht und daraus folgende Wut auf die Täter waren meine erste Reaktionen,” Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik, Gerhard Schröder (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 163. 156 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 15. 157 Dieter Dettke, Germany Says ‘No’: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009): 116; Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 165.

44 The following day he reiterated this statement in front of the members of the Bundestag, repeating the term for emphasis and further stating that these attacks were “a declaration of war against the entire civilized world” as “in reality … we are already one world”.158 In the evening, Schröder called Bush to once again express his sympathies and to communicate Germany’s willingness to contribute to the American counteraction without reservation, for which Bush thanked him.159 If anything, in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, Schröder and his country (as underlined by the gathering of 200,000 people in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin) stood by the USA more than they had at any point in the previous months in which they were divided over the climate talks. In early October (too late, some commentators said) Schröder flew to New York to witness first hand the destruction at the hands of the terrorists in Ground Zero, before meeting president Bush in Washington. At the press conference following their private talks, Bush announced: “There is no more steadfast friend in this coalition than Germany”.160

Meanwhile, the first actions had been undertaken. The UN adopted Resolution 1368 a day after 9/11. On the 7th of October 2001 began ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. Schröder announced that Bush had informed him of the intervention ahead of time and that the “era of second-rate assistance” was over.161 Out of his strong conviction that it was Germany’s duty to support America and knowing that not do so would isolate his country, Schröder “put his government on line” when he forced a vote of confidence regarding participation in this mission on November 16. By a slim majority, his government won despite reservations within about the German Bundeswehr’s involvement. Up to 3,900 German soldiers would be deployed. “It was to be the high point of German cooperation with the George W. Bush administration”.162

158 “Die gestrigen Anschläge in New York und Washington sind nicht nur ein Angriff auf die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika; sie sind eine Kriegserklärung gegen die gesamte zivilisierte Welt … In Wirklichkeit … sind wir bereits eine Welt.” Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik, Gerhard Schröder (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 169. 159 Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 173. 160 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 16. 161 Dieter Dettke, Germany Says ‘No’: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009): 117. 162 162 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 17.

45 In December 2001, Schröder held the International Conference on Afghanistan in Germany, during which anti-Taliban allies were appointed as leaders of the interim government. As Bush later stated in his memoirs: “I appreciated the leadership on Afghanistan, especially his willingness to host the Loya Jirga [or Grand Assembly] in Bonn”.163 On the 29th of January 2002, president Bush held the annual State of the Union Address, in which he made some key announcements that were met with criticism in the German Bundestag (and elsewhere): Some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will … States like these [Iraq, Iran and North Korea] and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.164 By his own accounts, Schröder, despite having concerns about the speech, attempted to counter his government’s internal disapproval by remarking that Germany “will not be partaking in adventures – but that we also do not expect any adventures from the Americans”. 165 On the 31st of January 2002 he flew from Berlin (now the seat of government) to Washington for a flying visit to discuss the Iraq strategy with Bush in person. Besides the two statesmen, only the secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and head of the White House Iraq Group Andrew Card were also present in the Oval office meeting. As Bush recalls in Decision Points, Schröder stated: “Nations that sponsor terror must face consequences. If you make it fast and make it decisive, I will be with you”.166 Bush understood this as a statement of support. As Schröder writes in his memoirs, he did say that Germany would be on the American side, but only provided that military action was backed by the UN and was in accordance with its provisions. According to him, Bush also ensured him “that in this question nothing had been decided and that the allies would naturally be consulted before every decision”.167 Later, this meeting and their individual interpretation of it would become crucial in their personal and political relationship.

163 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway, 2011): 233. 164 “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post, January 29, 2002. 165 “Ich versuchte nach Bush’s Rede, innenpolitisch mit der Bemerkung gegenzusteuern, dass sich ‘Deutschland nicht an Abenteuern beteiligen’ werde – dass wir allerdings von den Amerikanern auch keine Abenteuer erwarteten.” Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik, Gerhard Schröder (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 196. 166 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway, 2011): 233. 167 “Bush versicherte, dass in dieser Frage nichts beschlossen sei und dass man die Verbündeten selbstverständlich vor jeder Entscheidung konsultieren werde.” Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik, Gerhard Schröder (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 197.

46 When he travelled to Berlin in May 2002, Bush visited a city in uproar over his foreign policy plans. As hundreds of thousands protested outside, he and Schröder met in the chancellery and over lunch had fairly informal talks about that year’s FIFA World Cup and their teams’ performance more than politics.168 Nonetheless, Bush supposedly repeated his intention to deliberate with other statesmen before initiating military action in Iraq.169 Afterwards, the duo held a press conference, as described by Szabo: Their personal relationship seemed warm and relaxed. The president appeared to go out of his way to praise the chancellor, saying, ‘I’m here to let the German people know how proud I am of our relationship, our personal relationship … We’ve got a reliable friend and ally in Germany. This is a confident country, led by a confident man’.170 The two men appeared to be in unison. Over the coming months however, there were more and more signs that the Bush administration was considering the use of force and the German government perceived this with alarm, above all Schröder. In July, he had to make a decision about his election campaign, which it appeared he would lose not because of a lack of personal popularity but because his party was doing badly in the polls. “A combination of frustration and opportunism thus led Schröder to draw Iraq, and by implication the Bush administration, into the campaign”.171 In the beginning of August, his stance became clear when he announced in public what he had previously only said among peers in the Bundestag, that Germany would not be available for ‘adventures’ and that “the time of checkbook diplomacy is finally at an end”.172 At the end of August, vice president Dick Cheney held a speech interpreted in Germany as a call for an Iraqi regime change, be it with or without a UN mandate. Schröder, agitated by the speech as he had not been informed of any new developments, only increased his public opposition to military intervention. The fact that in early September, when he met with foreign minister Joschka Fischer, Bush asked: “When is your damn election over?” demonstrates that the US was well aware of the chancellor’s motivations.173

168 Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 200. 169 Idem, 210. 170 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 19. 171 Idem, 22. 172 Idem, 23. 173 Idem, 29.

47 In the last week of the election, minister of justice and member of the SPD Herta Däubler-Gmelin in the presence of a journalist compared Bush’s strategy with that of Adolf Hitler, a scandalous statement. Bush writes: “I was shocked and outraged. It was hard to think of anything more insulting than being compared to Hitler by a German official”.174 Though it was no fault of Schröder’s, he subsequently wrote a personal letter in which the wording was unmistakably maladroit: I am taking this means to let you know how very much I regret that through the alleged remarks of the Justice minister an impression was left which deeply wounded your feelings. The Minister has assured me that she did not make these alleged statements. She has also stated this publicly.175 As Szabo points out, his message only aggravated what was a dire situation in the first place. “It was viewed in the White House as justifying what had happened rather than apologizing … His letter to the president was insulting … Bush felt personally betrayed”.176 It did not help that Schröder did not call or fire the justice minister (who admittedly he did not find guilty) either, which undermined the sincerity of his words. After a series of negative statements about the American government in the run-up to the election, this was the final straw. Bush’s trust had been violated.177 Indeed, “the damage was deeper in Washington than in Berlin, largely because of George W. Bush’s highly personalized approach to foreign policy”.178 When Schröder went on to win the election shortly after, it was thus at the cost of their friendship. Bush did not congratulate the German chancellor on his victory. What followed after was a “period of non- communication at the top”.179 To worsen the matter, their dispute extended to their staff. When German defense minister Struck approached US Secretary of Defense at a NATO meeting in September 2002, the latter asked for others to draw him away as he had been instructed by the White House not to talk to him. Later that day he would walk out on Struck’s speech.180 The only contact remaining between the two governments was that between their foreign ministers Fischer and Powell.

174 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway, 2011): 234. 175 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 30. 176 Idem. 177 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway, 2011): 234. 178 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 32. 179 Idem, 34. 180 Idem.

48 In November, the two leaders were forced to meet at the NATO summit in Prague, where watchful onlookers noted that even though they were seated at the same table, they did not make contact.181 Out of necessity and because whether or not it would take place had become a much-raised, “grotesque” question in the media, which in itself epitomizes just how bad their personal relationship had become, the two shook hands in front of the cameras though.182 Their meeting occurred in the midst of the United Nations negotiations on Resolution 1441. After being approved by the Security Council, this resolution had been accepted by Iraq. Shortly after, the UN weapons inspectors investigated suspicious areas but found no trace of weapons of mass destruction on location. This in turn raised the question of whether it was feasible to invade the country even when it had complied with the UN provisions, which the ambiguously worded resolution left open.

In January 2003, Schröder stated that Germany would by no means support a UN resolution that legitimized war, notably again on the campaign trail. Though some academics argued that at this point “friendship could no longer be spoken of”, Szabo finds that the Bush administration had by then already given up on it anyway;183 and this was before Rumsfeld’s controversial statements: You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe … Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem.184 It is true that by this time Germany and France had joined forces and so did other European nations after them. In February other countries announced their support for the USA first in the ‘Letter of Eight’ (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK) and then the ‘Vilnius Letter’ (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, the Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria). Their publications angered French president Jacques Chirac and Schröder, who were now increasingly drawn together and to the Russian president Vladimir Putin too.185 A new alliance was born.

181 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Threats and Responses: The Allies,” The New York Times, November 1, 2001. 182 Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 232. 183 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 38. 184 Tom Lansford and Blagovest Tashev, Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post 9/11 Era (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005): xxii. 185 Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 241f.

49 On the 5th of March, Chirac, Schröder and Putin vowed to oppose a new UN resolution if it backed military action against Iraq. Just over a week later, the United States hinted at the possibility of going it alone, without UN approval. And just two weeks later, they did. On the 20th of March 2003, the United States and its coalition members (UK, Australia, Poland) surprisingly invaded Iraq. As the war went on, Schröder continued to condemn it. Later that year, Bush and Schröder made steps towards reconciliation, of their countries as well as their persons. For the first time since Bush’s visit to Berlin in May 2002, they met in a hotel in New York in September 2003. Even if their reunion was not the main purpose of the trip (it took place during the UN General Assembly), they did use the occasion to hold a ‘mini-summit’ of sorts. As Szabo summarizes: The meeting went well, and the president referred to the chancellor by his first name, declaring, ‘we’ve had our differences and they’re over, and we’re going to work together’. The chancellor responded, ‘we very much feel that the differences there have been left behind and put aside by now’. Television cameras filmed the handshakes and smiles.186 Though the New York meeting was followed by a Washington one in 2004, it is hard not to conceive of them as ‘just for show’. After all, for the remainder of their time in office it was in both of their interests to be civil. To encounter one another was unavoidable. Thus, they for example met with other leaders in Moscow to commemorate the end of WWII on the 9th of May 2005. But once the two politicians left their office, first Schröder in November then Bush after another term in 2009, there was no need to continue upholding pretenses. In their memoirs they settled the score. In Entscheidungen, Mein Leben in der Politik (which translates to ‘Decisions, My Life in Politics’ and was published in 2006) that has been used as a source throughout, Schröder did not paint a favorable picture of Bush. He depicts a man so fearing of god that his political decisions are made almost entirely out of religious belief. 187 While there is arguably some truth to this and Bush made no secret of his faith, to state that his policies were based on it is tantamount to saying that they were not founded on careful consideration, research or knowledge. Five years later, Bush released Decision Points, in which the aforementioned oval office conversation was recounted and Schröder accused of breaking a promise. Thus, the feud was rekindled during their retirement.

186 Stephen Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 131. 187 Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 200f.

50 Schröder, having read Decision Points was enraged and essentially accused the former president of lying. Incidentally so did others, who in particular refute Bush’s assertion that the torture method ‘waterboarding’ was successfully applied to prevent further al-Qaeda attacks.188 Which one of them lied is not discernible. What is however is that their publications were both the consequence of their personal enmity and the reason it extended beyond their time in office. Nevertheless, their mutual dislike does not exclude that they attempted to use personal diplomacy. Applying the ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’ demonstrates that the leaders did exert power, but also that their enmity made applying some forms of interpersonal power impossible: With regards to reward power, the main reason for the disaccord may be considered a failed attempt at exercising it. If Schröder’s statements were assumed to be true, German support in Iraq would have been a reward for being consulted and getting UN approval. The other types of power were exercised in public, rather than in private, though that is not to say that an individual cannot be the target audience. Of course, when Schröder applied referent power in stating that “we are one world” just after 9/11, it was aimed at the German and American public but also at the president, as a sign of solidarity. His insistence on compliance with the United Nations’ provisions, though also in public, was equally aimed at none other than the president. As there was little contact between the administrations in the first place and it was later discontinued entirely, informational power was minimal, which is in part why Schröder would have resorted to public diplomacy. Largely, his use of public diplomacy was motivated by the ongoing elections though. Evidently, personal diplomacy, even if there was no complete lack of it, failed to enhance political relations. That is not to say that Bush and Schröder were incapable of exercising it however. They were both believers in, and capable practitioners of, personal diplomacy. Bush explains on the website of his art exhibition adequately entitled ‘The Art of Leadership: A President’s Personal Diplomacy’, in which he presents his paintings of foreign leaders: I place a high priority on personal diplomacy. Getting to know a fellow world leader's personality, character, and concerns made it easier to find common ground and deal with contentious issues. That was a lesson I had picked up from Dad, who was one of the great practitioners of personal diplomacy. 189

188 Charles Hawley, “The Legacy Battle: Bush- Schröder Enmity Continues In Memoirs,” Spiegel Online International, November 20, 2010. 189 “The Art of Leadership: A President’s Personal Diplomacy.” George W. Bush Presidential Center, 2014.

51 If Bush ever painted Schröder, and it is hard to imagine so, his portrait did not make the cut (when even Putin and Chirac’s did). In office, Bush used personal diplomacy foremost with the United States’ long ally, the United Kingdom. By closely cooperating with Blair he could ensure British involvement in Iraq. Schröder teamed up with Chirac and Putin to attempt to stop the outbreak of war. 190 Simultaneously he improved Franco-German relations and arguably secured a chairmanship at Nord Stream AG, a project by the Russian company Gazprom, which he assumed mere weeks after leaving the chancellery in Berlin.

As neither politician managed to exert interpersonal power successfully in the German-American relationship however, does it follow from this that their personal relationship did not have an effect? On the contrary, their dispute made more damage than personal diplomacy can often hope to achieve good. The impact was not limited to politics either. As of 2001, trade and investment between Germany and the USA dwindled considerably and only picked up again in 2004.191 Public opinion of the United States as whole went down and Anti-Americanism in Germany was on the rise. Politically, the consensus at the time was that the relations between the countries would take years to recover, if at all. Of course, to argue that this dip was caused solely by the personal dispute would be to overstate its importance. Indeed, trade relations would most likely have suffered somewhat anyway (due to recession in the early 2000’s) and Anti-Americanism arisen due to Iraq, but both developments were amplified by the political situation and the latter personally spurred by Schröder and the media. Equally, if it assumed that these phenomena had occurred even without the enmity between Bush and Schröder, their proportions would have differed because the two administrations that must have been aware of the trends would have exercised damage control. Because of their lack of communication, this did not materialize until the two nations’ economic and cultural relations had already deteriorated. Thus, when Angela Merkel became chancellor in 2005, she had a difficult legacy to take on.

190 Luke Harding, “Schröder and Chirac flaunt love affair at summit,” The Guardian, October 16, 2003. 191 Alexander Höse, “Sea Change? Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in der Ära Bush,” In Weltmacht in der Krise? Die USA am Ende der Ära George W. Bush, eds. Söhnke Schreyer and Jürgen Wilzewski, (Trier: WVT, 2010), 237ff.

52 At Arm’s Length: Angela Merkel & Barack Obama Though deemed impossible in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq fiasco, German- American relations did recover, most of all because of the change of leadership. In Angela Merkel, who became the first female chancellor of Germany in 2005, Bush had a new ally with a much more similar mindset to him than her predecessor Gerhard Schröder had had. In her previous position as leader of the CDU, she had backed the US invasion of Iraq and advocated for German military involvement, as well as accused the chancellor of anti- Americanism. Adding to this, the daughter of a pastor who has even published a book about the importance of Christian values and her personal faith,192 naturally showed no signs of irritation at Bush’s “biblical” speech that Schröder had criticized so.193 Unsurprisingly, the duo made up of the son of George H.W. Bush and the mentee of Helmut Kohl (the two elder statesmen who were themselves friends) formed a friendship. Their personal relationship included get-togethers at each other’s homes with their spouses, first at a barbecue in Trinwillershagen, a one thousand people village in former East Germany about which Bush said “Laura and I are from Texas, and to invite us to a barbecue is the highest compliment you can pay us”, and later at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. Anecdotes about her childhood in the Communist DDR fascinated Bush and with wife Laura he “thought of Angela at Camp David when we watched The Lives of Others”.194 Unlike Schröder, her portrait does hang in the George W. Bush Presidential Center in Dallas. When he left the office, he wrote about her in Decision Points, she “was trustworthy, engaging, and warm. She quickly became one of my closest friends on the world stage”.195 The feeling was mutual. “Merkel put loyalty before public opinion with Bush, given that 77 percent of Germans rated him a bad president,”196 and it paid off. Together they turned around the negative trends197 and set up the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007. Nevertheless, on the issues of climate change, Guantanamo Bay and conflicts abroad they disagreed.

192 ‘Daran glaube ich: Christliche Standpunkte’ (in English: That is what I believe in: Christian points of view), released in 2013. 193 Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2006): 200f. 194 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway, 2011) 412f. 195 Idem. 196 Alan Crawford and Tony Czuczka, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2013): 105. 197 Idem, 103.

53 In 2008, various politicians started competing for Bush’s succession. Merkel who “felt a female leader’s kinship with Hillary Clinton” supposedly had a preference for the former first lady.198 Meanwhile, her and Obama were in contact as the latter envisioned making an appearance where Kennedy and Reagan had once made their iconic speeches, at the Brandenburg Gate. Merkel objected, saying that “while Obama was welcome, not every place in Berlin was appropriate for a campaign rally”.199 Instead, Obama stood at the Victory Column when he spoke out to the 200,000 people crowd infected with Obamamania (unlike their chancellor) on the 24th of July 2008. Half a year later, the much- hyped Democrat became the 44th president of the United States. Of course, Merkel called to congratulate him and as Journalist Jonathan Alter describes, they bonded over a little story. After Obama first pronounced ‘Angela’ with a hard g, Merkel gently corrected him by saying it was pronounced with a soft g, as in Angela Davis, the fiery African American revolutionary whom she remembered hearing about as a young girl growing up in Communist East Germany. Obama, who had read extensively about the black power movement, found this amusing.200 After their conversation, there is some confusion about their interaction later that year. While Alter discerns that Germans resented that the White House did not invite Merkel,201 Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe points out that it was Merkel who seemed in no hurry to initiate a personal relationship with Obama.202 According to her, when he invited the chancellor to the White House in March 2009, she declined. Be that as it may, there were several summits coming up in April at which they would meet, which is perhaps why there was no urgency. At the NATO summit in Baden-Baden, the two joked (as transcribed): President Obama. Dankeschön. My German is not as good as Chancellor Merkel’s. [Laughter] Chancellor Merkel. What a surprise, Mr. President. My English also not – President Obama. No, your English is great. Chancellor Merkel. – as yours. [Laughter] President Obama. Thank you.203

198 Alan Crawford and Tony Czuczka, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2013): 98. 199 Idem. 200 Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011): 239. 201 Idem. 202Judy Dempsey, Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten (Hamburg: Körber- Stiftung, 2013): 52f. 203 “The President’s News Conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in Baden-Baden, Germany, April 3, 2009,” In Public Papers of the Presidents: Barack Obama, 2009 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), 429.

54 During these and the upcoming months, Obama and Merkel’s main focus was economic policy, on which they disagreed as they saw different reasons for, and solutions to, the Eurozone crisis. “The Obama administration berated her publicly and privately for failing to act sooner, not doing enough when she did and for withholding sufficient resources to stop the turmoil from spreading worldwide”.204 Arguably, there was a lack of recognition for what Merkel was doing. The Bundeskanzlerin meanwhile saw the ‘Anglo- Saxon capitalism’ of the UK and the USA as the problem. Given that the United States had themselves triggered the financial crisis, its advice on how to handle it was not always welcome; That was true for Germany as well as other European countries. In June 2009, Merkel travelled to Washington where they discussed Iran and climate change in a private meeting. Afterwards, Obama announced: “Part of the warmth I feel toward Germany is because I like Chancellor Merkel a lot … I’ve very much enjoyed my interactions with her”.205 She said nothing about her sentiments for him in return, but the mood at the press conference was otherwise amicable.

Later that year, the biggest issue in German-American relations was the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp. Closing it had been one of Obama’s main campaign promises, but in order to do so he now required Europeans’ consent to take up some of the former inmates that were seen as being relatively harmless. After heated discussions in the Bundestag, Germany decided against receiving nine Uyghur people out of fear that to do so would have implications for relations with China. It was an opportunity missed to express her personal support for Obama, by exerting political pressure. As Dempsey explains: In the years before Obama’s election, Merkel had used any opportunity to distinguish herself in front of the US-critical German audience by denouncing this camp. But when Obama made a serious attempt to respond to such criticism and close Guantanamo, she turned her back on him.206

204 Alan Crawford and Tony Czuczka, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2013): 98. 205 “The President’s News Conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, June 26, 2009,” In Public Papers of the Presidents: Barack Obama, 2009 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), 916. 206 “Schließlich hatte Merkel in den Jahren vor Obamas Wahlsieg nur allzu gern die Gelegenheit genutzt, sich durch Kritik an dem Lager beim US-kritischen deutschen Publikum zu profilieren. Als Obama aber dann den ernsthaften Versuch unternahm, auf die Kritik einzugehen und Guantanamo zu schließen, ließ sie ihn im Stich.” Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten, Judy Dempsey (Hamburg: Körber- Stiftung, 2013): 55f.

55 Nevertheless, after her re-election in September 2009, Merkel was invited back to Washington to speak in front of the U.S. Congress as the first German leader in fifty years. There followed an introduction by Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, whom incidentally she had also not paid much attention to despite being offered a meeting during her 2007 trip, 207 as ‘Her Excellency Dr. Angela Merkel’ accompanied by a standing ovation. It was a great honor and Merkel, visibly moved, was aware of it. Then the German chancellor recalled how growing up in East Germany she had had a “craving for American denim”,208 which was met with more applause. It was an exceptional occasion and certainly Obama had some involvement in it, yet it seemed to have no effect on her stance towards him. During the coming year, in which they could not reach a consensus on the stabilization of the Euro, Merkel and Obama met foremost in the scope of summits, namely the G8, G20 and the Nuclear Security Summit. As Dempsey evaluates their personal contact there: Both had learnt to get along with one another, but their relationship was deemed neither particularly close nor especially cordial.209 Besides their meetings at conferences, there was little contact between the two administrations until 2011. That summer they disagreed over military intervention in Libya though. In particular, Obama wished to enforce a no-fly zone (as it was known that leader Gaddafi had conducted earlier airstrikes against rebels) but sought UN approval. It was put up for a vote by the Security Council, of which Germany was currently a member. Reflecting the mood in the Bundestag, Minister of Foreign Affairs Westerwelle initially intended to vote against it, but Merkel managed to persuade him to abstain, 210 still making Germany the only NATO and EU member with voting rights to disapprove of the no-fly zone. Thereby it isolated itself within NATO and to the present day, is not considered an entirely reliable member. Furthermore, while Merkel backed Obama’s call for Gaddafi to step down, German participation in the military mission was out of the question.

207 Judy Dempsey, Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten (Hamburg: Körber- Stiftung, 2013): 56. 208 Alan Crawford and Tony Czuczka, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2013): 101. 209 “Beide hatten gelernt, miteinander auszukommen, aber ihre Beziehung galt weder als besonders eng noch als sonderlich herzlich.” Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten, Judy Dempsey (Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung, 2013): 57. 210 Judy Dempsey, Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten (Hamburg: Körber- Stiftung, 2013): 59.

56 In the midst of the Libya talks, Obama awarded Merkel with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the “diplomatic highlight of the German-American relations in the last decade” on June 7th.211 The last chancellor to have been given this honor was her mentor Helmut Kohl. After the elaborate ceremony, including her speech in which she again highlighted her ‘American dream’ growing up in the DDR, followed dinner at the White House and much praise by Obama, despite their disagreements. Indeed, given the political situation, “it is surprising, how much Obama continued to seek Merkel’s approval – almost as surprising as the fact, that she resists this courtship tenaciously”.212

During her visit to Camp David for the G8 Summit in May 2012, which focused amongst other things on the European sovereign debit crisis and Iran’s nuclear program, Merkel, Obama, Cameron, Hollande and others could be seen watching the Champion’s League Final together. By all accounts, the tense relationship had eased up somewhat as the politicians had gotten to know one another better. In November, Barack Obama was re- elected for a second term and Merkel naturally congratulated him and appeared genuinely elated that he would continue to be in office. Thus, she invited him to visit Berlin, now as president of the United States. However, when he did in June 2013, their meeting was overshadowed by the revelations made by whistleblower Edward Snowden on the surveillance carried out by the National Security Agency (NSA) just weeks before. Obama attempted to reassure Merkel about the scope of the NSA’s actions and announced at the subsequent press conference: This is not a situation in which we are rifling through the ordinary emails of German citizens … This is a circumscribed, narrow system directed at us being able to protect our people.213 Over the coming weeks and months, new information surfaced that refuted precisely this statement. As it turned out the NSA had spied not only on German citizens, but also on the German Chancellor Angela Merkel herself.

211 Thomas Cieslik, “A Relationship of Hope and Misinterpretation: Germany and Obama,” In The Global Obama: Crossroads of Leadership in the 21st Century, eds. Dinesh Sharma and Uwe Gielen (New York: Routledge, 2013), 160. 212 “Es ist erstaunlich, wie sehr sich Obama trotzdem immer wieder um Merkel bemühte – fast genauso erstaunlich wie die Tatsache, dass sie diesem Werben hartnäckig widerstand.” Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten, Judy Dempsey (Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung, 2013): 57. 213 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-and-german-chancellor- merkel-joint-press-confere

57 Naturally, when Merkel discovered that her personal phone had been tapped in October 2012, she considered it “a grave breach of trust”.214 What worsened the matter was that the president had previously explicitly excluded this possibility, saying that if he wanted to know what Merkel was thinking, he would simply call her.215 Thus, that October it appeared that “either the NSA had gone rogue or the president had not been informed of this highly sensitive activity: one option as unpalatable as the other”.216 In Germany, Merkel also looked bad. After the initial disclosures, she had attempted to minimize the impact, having after all always condemned anti-Americanism, which was once again flaring up (thousands had demonstrated that September in Berlin). For that very reason her Chief of Staff Ronald Pofalla had declared the NSA scandal to be over in August. After the new information transpired though and she condemned it, she looked “like a head of government who only stands up to Obama when she herself is a target of the US intelligent services”.217

It was an international and domestic crisis for all involved. Most of all, the trust Obama had attempted to build up for five years was unmade within days. In response to the scandal, Germany and America had been in talks for a bilateral ‘No-Spy-Agreement’, like the one the U.S. has with Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, but they were discontinued in 2014. In July, a CIA chief of station working at the US Embassy in Berlin and most likely responsible for espionage on location was asked to leave the country.218 The drastic measure, which is probably not the end of the affair, constitutes a new low in the diplomatic relations between Germany and the USA. Nevertheless, Obama and Merkel are working together to impose measures against Russia in the form of sanctions in its energy, arms and finance sectors over its involvement in Ukraine and continue to cooperate on Iran and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It remains to be seen whether their cooperation will result in a personal friendship.

214 Robert Dover, “The World’s Second Oldest Profession: The Transatlantic Spying Scandal and its Aftermath,” The International Spectator 49 (2014): 122. 215 “Bugging Mrs Merkel: Not even the German chancellor is safe from American snoops,” The Economist, October 26, 2013. 216 Robert Dover, “The World’s Second Oldest Profession: The Transatlantic Spying Scandal and its Aftermath,” The International Spectator 49 (2014): 130. 217 “Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin,” Spiegel Online International, October 27, 2013. 218 “Germany expels CIA official in US spy row,” BBC News Europe, July 10, 2014.

58 Opinions diverge about Angela Merkel and Barack Obama’s personal relationship, ranging from the classifications ‘best friends’219 to ‘dislike’.220 The historical analysis however suggests that it is neither a particularly pronounced friendship nor an enmity. Granted, at times the relationship has been closer to one or the other, but these were momentary highs or lows. Of course, there is a straightforward explanation for this: Germany is no longer America’s number one foreign policy priority and vice versa. Under Obama, U.S. attention arguably shifted towards Asia-Pacific and, if he can be said to have applied personal diplomacy anywhere (if with mixed results), it is with China’s Leader Xi. Yet Xi is the exception, as in general Obama has been criticized precisely because of his apparent inability to exercise personal diplomacy. This is in part perhaps because he himself is not convinced of its value,221 but also because he has put all his efforts into public diplomacy. Merkel is capable of personal diplomacy as demonstrated by her close ties to Sarkozy, even if she uses it sparsely. Bush for example was the only leader invited to her hometown. If she did not use personal diplomacy with Obama, it was for the same reasons as his. Her foreign policy efforts were addressed elsewhere, especially India and Israel. Given that American and German interests lie in other places, it is only to be expected that on a personal level, the leaders would also redirect their attention. After all, why invest time and effort into a friendship from which currently neither sees much benefit?

If either of them made some attempts at a personal relationship, it was foremost to uphold the historical German-American relations. Thus, as the results of the applied Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence demonstrate, neither politicians made any great attempts at exerting influence. Informational power was largely ineffective. Neither Obama nor Merkel budged much on economic policy, even if the other attempted to convince them of their solutions with logical arguments. One can speculate whether allowing Merkel to speak in front of Congress and rewarding her the Medal of Freedom

219 Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011): 239; John Davis, ed., The Barack Obama Presidency: A Two Year Assessment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 112. 220 Judy Dempsey, Das Phänomen Merkel: Deutschlands Macht und Möglichkeiten (Hamburg: Körber- Stiftung, 2013). 221 David Jackson, “Obama: Personal Relations have limited value in politics,” USA Today, January 23, 2014.

59 were attempts at getting her on the American side (though some would say she was already there), or indeed just an appreciative gesture. If that was the case, this too was unsuccessful. With regards to referent power, what comes to mind is Merkel’s mention of political activist Angela Davis, perhaps an attempt at demonstrating that she too had looked into the civil rights movement. But this is merely an assumption. Overall there is little to indicate an exertion of power between the politicians and where they worked together it was because they had the same point of view from the outset (see Russia and TTIP). Naturally, to gain a greater understanding of the interpersonal influence in the Obama-Merkel constellation, it is necessary to have access to information that has not yet been released, but given the little contact between them it is not exaggerated to say that there was a clear lack of personal diplomacy. The first female chancellor of Germany and the first African-American president of the United States have kept their distance and German-American relations are none the better for it.

60 Conclusion The aim of this research has been to demonstrate whether the use of personal diplomacy by American and German statesmen has had an impact on each other’s foreign policy-making and the political relationship between their countries. In so doing, the historical study has spanned over almost seventy years from the end of WWII to the present day and included in-depth analyses of a number of the relationships that have played out in Bonn, Berlin or Washington and wherever else summits and visits have taken them. Thus, it should be noted that this is but a sample of personal relationships and a selective one at that. Besides the obvious limitation in time and the focus on one bilateral relationship, the research is further restricted with regards to the individuals studied. The briefly acknowledged bond between Brandt and Kennedy in the 1960’s for example, could have been elaborated on. Next to describing the friendship between Schmidt and Ford in the 1970’s, it would have been just as feasible to outline the enmity between Schmidt and Carter.222 Both had major implications for the transatlantic relationship. Equally, in the 1980’s the pair Kohl and Reagan were accompanied by the duo James Baker, secretary of state of the United States and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign minister and vice chancellor of Germany. Much like their superiors, in public they cooperated closely on NATO and in private, they and their spouses dined together.223 This only goes to show that there are many more examples of personal relationships between politicians and the practice of personal diplomacy not only occurred in the few instances described above. Nevertheless, it is possible to point out some general trends observed in the presented case studies, which encompass the three possible types of relationship: friendship, enmity and indifference.

Logically, how politicians perceive personal diplomacy affects whether they themselves use it. Noticeably those politicians who consider it valuable, apply it and generally skillfully so (with the exception perhaps of George W. Bush). Adenauer, Kohl, Bush Sr. and Kissinger were all avid supporters of the concept and gave it considerable thought. Evidently, they were also its most apt practitioners, above all Kissinger whose personal diplomacy is arguably precisely what got him the job in the White House.

222 Klaus Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch- amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2005). 223 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995): 593ff.

61 Furthermore, its proponents execute personal diplomacy differently, in some part because of personal style but mostly because of technological advances. Thus, in Adenauer’s ‘love affair’ with Dulles, their correspondence via letters was essential, whereas in Kohl’s friendship with Reagan and Bush Sr. the telephone became a vital tool. Others relied most heavily on diplomacy at the summit and others again preferred one-on-one meetings. Of course, despite preferences, it always ended up being a combination of the four (with letters eventually replaced by telegram). Unfortunately, these modern advancements would be used not just to interact with one another and improve relations, but eventually also to spy on one’s supposed ally.

It is not just the perception of personal diplomacy that had an impact on a politicians’ resolve to build friendships (or not), but also their perception of the other country. Strikingly, those German statesmen (and women) who identify as pro-American or even Atlanticist, namely Adenauer, Schmidt, Kohl and Merkel were particularly prone to making friends with their American counterparts. In fact, the only one who did not was Schröder, who is quoted as saying: For me personally I have to say that I do not know America very well, nor would I want to live there. I am a convinced European, I could live in any European city, preferably in the south, but not in America.224 Of course it is one thing to like the United States and another to be Atlanticist, but the two do frequently go hand in hand. It could be considered contradictory to include Merkel in the group of Atlanticists who seek Americans’ friendship, since she has done no such thing with Obama. However, she did seek out Bush Jr. who is in many respects ‘more American’ than Obama, be it in his rhetoric, manner or mindset. In fact, if Obamamania spread in Europe it was precisely because Barack Obama was regarded as an “honorary European”, much closer in his way of thinking to those across the Atlantic than back home.225 Of course, someone’s nationality is not an a priori reason to forge a friendship (unlike perhaps their position in the White House), but to an Atlanticist it is appealing.

224 “Für mich persönlich muss ich sagen, dass ich Amerika nicht besonders gut kenne, dort auch nicht leben wollte. Ich bin überzeugter Europäer, ich könnte in jeder europäischen Stadt leben, vorzugsweise im Süden, aber nicht in Amerika.” Klare Worte: Im Gespräch mit Georg Beck über Mut, Macht und unsere Zukunft, Gerhard Schröder (Freiburg: Herder, 2014): page number unknown. 225 Marie des Neiges Leonard, “Obamania in Europe,” In The Obama Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment, edited by Robert Watson et al. (New York: University of New York Press, 2012): 70.

62 Generally, this only goes one way though. With the exception of John Foster Dulles, whose father had studied in Germany and who himself had travelled the country,226 and Kissinger, born and raised in Bavaria, American presidents and secretaries of state rarely show much of an affinity for the country; their interest is political. Arguably, to some extent this one-way-street also goes for the friendships formed. The German statesmen were often much more invested in the relationship, as epitomized by the fact that while German autobiographies contain references to their American peers throughout, the Americans’ mentions of their German friends often amount to a few sentences. Of course, if Germans strived for good personal relations and highlighted them in their works it is because they had more to gain from them. Furthermore, given their country’s superpower status in the world, Americans entertain a whole row of bilateral relations, whereas the USA has historically been Germany’s most important one. Thus, if Americans make fewer references to their German friends it is not necessarily a sign of less affection.

There is another American trait that is worth mentioning: amicability. Though it has been interpreted as a sign of proximity when Americans offered to address one another on a first-name basis and even shared their nicknames (like ‘Jerry’ Ford and ‘Ron’ Reagan), this may be misleading. Not to stereotype, but it is known that in their professional interactions Americans tend to be more informal. In particular as in German the familiar personal pronoun ‘du’ has to be offered, it is unusual for Germans to experience such friendliness shortly after meeting. Thus, to be on a first name basis may have carried more weight for the German politicians than the American ones. Furthermore, with regards to this cultural difference, it should also be pointed out that it has developed over time. Throughout the years, Adenauer and Dulles for example remained on a last name basis. It was only when the latter became ill and after ten years of friendship that Adenauer offered to be on first name terms;227 and yet, theirs was one of the most pronounced bonds. Incidentally, with regards to welcoming someone at one’s home, this should be regarded a great honor in both countries and still a privilege reserved to friends. As demonstrated, it has become quite the tradition in German-American relations.

226 Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and their secret world war (New York: Times Books, 2013): 48f. 227 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967): 248.

63 Personal Diplomacy: A considerable factor in German-American Relations? What goes on behind the closed doors of the oval office or the chancellery is largely unknown until politicians retire and grant us a glimpse. That is why it has been possible to get a fuller understanding of the first relationships under analysis compared to the last ones. Nevertheless, what is clear throughout is that politicians not only form personal relationships but that they do have an impact, whether in the post-war era, at the height of cold war confrontations or in the present day. The fact that a lack of personal diplomacy for example leaves the political relations at best unchanged but more likely damaged only goes to show its value. Indeed, if the analysis has shown anything it is that interpersonal influence is a potent force, most of all when its practitioners are on the same wavelength. As applying Raven’s Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence has shown, the closer two individuals were, the more types of power they could exert on one another. Adenauer and Dulles’ openness has allowed them to exercise numerous types of influence with positive results, whilst Obama and Merkel’s distance has impeded them from personally affecting the other’s foreign policy entirely. Going by this, there is much to gain (but of course also some to forfeit) through personal diplomacy. Therein also lies its risk. To make personal promises in private can backfire (see Bush and Schröder) and thus, any personal relationships, however genuine and pure they may appear, require utmost diligence. Historically, some Bundeskanzler, Aussenminister or presidents and secretaries of state have been more skillful in doing so than others.

Adenauer and Dulles’ cooperation was essential in the negotiations on the European Defense Community, which, though never effectuated, were key to advancing the greater cause of the European Union. Along the way they laid the foundation for a long-lasting and at times crucial transatlantic relationship. Under Schmidt, Ford and Kissinger, perhaps the most evident example of interpersonal influence was the dismissal of German offset payments to the United States. Thereby their chemistry had allowed to happen what others before them had tried to get the Americans to do in vain. Admittedly along with Gorbachev, Kohl, Reagan and Bush saw through the demise of the Iron Curtain and the fall of the Berlin wall. American support is what made it possible for the country to reunite in a matter of months rather than years, and Kohl had mustered that support. However, all the

64 good friendship can do can be undone by enmity, perhaps even more powerful, and destructive. After years of cooperation, Schröder and Bush’s joint time in office and personal feud translated into a worsening of bilateral ties, which arguably also affected intra-European relations; so much so that many predicted (and continue to foresee) the European Union’s disintegration. After Merkel and Bush could undo some of the damage done, with Obama’s entrance into office the soaring relations have grinded to a halt.

As Professor Joseph De Rivera has remarked: “Whatever relationship exists between … governments, greatly affects the interaction between government representatives. If the relationship is a friendly one, officials within the executive will be attuned to the other nation’s needs … and a general atmosphere of trust will cause decision makers to cooperate with the other nation”.228 True as this may be, so is the opposite. Personal relationships have the potential to strengthen intergovernmental relations where they are weak, but also to worsen them where they are good, indeed to make or break the political bilateral relationship between the actors’ respective countries. The history of German-American relations has proven this.

228 Joseph De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1968): 387.

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