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HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE ON WAR COALITION FORMATION - A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government by Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A. Washington, DC October 2008 Copyright 2008 by Alarik Morgan Fritz All Rights Reserved ii The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Center for Naval Analyses, the CNA Corporation, the US Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. iii HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE ON WAR COALITION FORMATION Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Nations usually go to war to defend against a threat (balancing) or gain some profit (bandwagoning). However, they sometimes join war coalitions without such motivations – or refuse to join them despite great pressure from the coalition leader. For example, the US-led coalition against Iraq in 2003 was largely composed of states that were not traditional US allies, were not threatened by Iraq, and had little to gain from the invasion. Furthermore, the US surprisingly failed to enlist key allies in the coalition. Are coalition formation dynamics different now than during the Cold War? This is an important question because such war coalitions may be more common in the future. This dissertation examines the impact of asymmetric security interdependence between minor states and a superpower vis-à-vis their war coalition choices. Shifts in the global balance of power, such as from bipolarity to unipolarity, can lead to shifts in security interdependence because the security motivations for the superpower and minor states can become ‘delinked’ from each other. Some minor states become less concerned about their relationship with the unipole (because they are no longer threatened by the other bipole) while others become more concerned with it because of long-term regional threats (they can no longer rely upon a bipolar ally to protect them). This shift, when combined with the fact that the superpower-as-coalition leader values the contributions of iv some minor states more than others (due to its warplans) can lead to situations of asymmetric security interdependence. Such interdependence is a source of power – thus it can determine which state is more likely to have greater bargaining leverage, which one pays for a coalition contribution, and how that contribution comes about. This explains many notable puzzles of coalition formation, including the failure of the US to enlist a Turkish contribution in 2003 and why states like Poland went to great lengths to contribute to US-led coalitions in 1990-91 and 2003. To test this, I examine three war coalitions (Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Korean War, and Desert Storm) and US efforts to enlist the support of four minor states (Turkey, Japan, Germany and Poland). v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my committee: Andy Bennett, George Shambaugh, and Dan Byman. I cannot imagine a more patient, insightful, and helpful set of advisors. Thank you for believing in me and this dissertation over the years. I remain forever in your debt. Thanks also to all my fellow students for their assistance, most especially Dan Baltrusaitis, Josh Busby, Tuba Unlu, and Troy White. I also want to thank my colleagues at the Center for Naval Analyses for their support: you are the most objective and brilliant analysts I have ever met. I would like to give special thanks to Christine Fox, Mark Geis, Barry Howell, Peter Swartz, and Maureen Wigge. Finally, I want to thank all those who allowed me to interview them for this research – without their assistance this dissertation would not have been nearly as worthwhile. There are a wide variety of other people who helped me get here: of course, my family – Judy Fritz, Frank Fritz, Jalene Fritz, and Patricia Zeman-Johnson – for my sense of right, my concept of purpose, and my orneriness. And my teachers throughout the years: Steven Brundage, for inspiring me in the first place without even knowing it. Patrick Cronin, for giving me my first chance to prove myself. Michael Green, for putting up with my ‘cold calls’ all these years. Bruce Dickson, for motivating me to go further. Harry Harding, for teaching me that “it all depends.” And Jolene Low, for being the best darn high school teacher imaginable. Jun Ma for giving me the advice that I should have taken. Henry vi Nau, for boundless encouragement. Jonathan Schwartz, for having faith in me when I didn’t. Jim Talmadge, for being the best darn elementary school teacher imaginable. And thanks also to all my friends in Tucson: you made me who I am. I have never met a more loyal, more interesting, or more fun group of people – no matter how far and away I travel I keep returning because you are, simply, the best friends a person could ever hope for. There are too many of you to list, so I won’t try. You know who you are. Lastly, thanks to the Wonderland Ballroom for timely and much needed libations, to the Georgetown Department of Government and Georgetown Library staffs for their assistance, professionalism, and willingness to put up with my demands, and to Snogger and Fruity for comic relief and unconditional affection. This dissertation would not have been possible in any way without the support of my wife Jessica Stewart. She kept me going, praised and encouraged me at the right moments, and kicked me in the pants when it was needed. She is everything I care about and love. It is dedicated to her. Inevitably, I have forgotten someone. Rest assured that is unintentional and solely because I have a bad memory. Of course, any and all errors with this dissertation are mine and mine alone. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 Asymmetric security valuations...................................................................................... 5 Chapter Two: Polarity, Coalitions, and Security Interdependence........................... 13 Coalitions and Alliances ............................................................................................... 15 Coalitions Under Unipolarity as a Field of Study......................................................... 20 Polarity and Security Interdependence ......................................................................... 56 Scope of my approach................................................................................................... 61 Chapter Three –Asymmetric Security Interdependence and Coalition Formation. 63 Bargaining leverage ...................................................................................................... 70 Expected outcomes of successful negotiations............................................................. 72 Type of contribution ..................................................................................................... 74 Impact of substitutability on negotiations..................................................................... 75 Relative influence of structural factors......................................................................... 77 Independent and dependent variables ........................................................................... 79 Research and testing ..................................................................................................... 83 A note on sources.......................................................................................................... 84 Chapter Four: The Coalition of the Willing................................................................. 86 Japan ............................................................................................................................. 92 Turkey......................................................................................................................... 120 Germany...................................................................................................................... 145 Poland ......................................................................................................................... 160 Summary..................................................................................................................... 172 Chapter Five: The Korean War .................................................................................. 178 Japan ........................................................................................................................... 187 Turkey......................................................................................................................... 217 Germany...................................................................................................................... 237 Summary..................................................................................................................... 268 Chapter Six: Desert Shield/Desert Storm................................................................... 274 Japan ........................................................................................................................... 280 Turkey........................................................................................................................