2020 Poland Country Report | SGI Sustainable Governance Indicators
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Opposition Behaviour Against the Third Wave of Autocratisation: Hungary and Poland Compared
European Political Science https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-00325-x SYMPOSIUM Opposition behaviour against the third wave of autocratisation: Hungary and Poland compared Gabriella Ilonszki1 · Agnieszka Dudzińska2 Accepted: 4 February 2021 © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract Hungary and Poland are often placed in the same analytical framework from the period of their ‘negotiated revolutions’ to their autocratic turn. This article aims to look behind this apparent similarity focusing on opposition behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that the executive–parliament power structure, the vigour of the extra- parliamentary actors, and the opposition party frame have the strongest infuence on opposition behaviour, and they provide the sources of diference between the two country cases: in Hungary an enforced power game and in Poland a political game constrain opposition opportunities and opposition strategic behaviour. Keywords Autocratisation · Extra-parliamentary arena · Hungary · Opposition · Parliament · Party system · Poland Introduction What can this study add? Hungary and Poland are often packed together in political analyses on the grounds that they constitute cases of democratic decline. The parties in governments appear infamous on the international, particularly on the EU, scene. Fidesz1 in Hungary has been on the verge of leaving or being forced to leave the People’s Party group due to repeated abuses of democratic norms, and PiS in Poland2 is a member of 1 The party’s full name now reads Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance. 2 Abbreviation of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice). * Gabriella Ilonszki [email protected] Agnieszka Dudzińska [email protected] 1 Department of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest, 8 Fővám tér, Budapest 1093, Hungary 2 Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland Vol.:(0123456789) G. -
Poland-Report.Pdf
© Faith Matters, 2017 London, United Kingdom All rights reserved Material from this publication may be reproduced for teaching or other non-commercial purposes. No part of it may be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copyright holder. For further information please contact Faith Matters +44 (0) 207 935 5573 [email protected] Twitter: @FaithMattersUK Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/FaithMattersUK Published 04 December 2017 Lead researcher: Steve Rose Get involved and support our work at www.faith-matters.org Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 2 Review of Existing Literature ............................................................................................. 3 The Tatar Muslims of Poland............................................................................................. 7 The Politicisation of Catholicism ...................................................................................... 11 Catholicism & Ethnonationalism under Communism ....................................................... 14 Notable anti-Muslim activists in Poland and Britain ......................................................... 18 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 26 Introduction The size of the nationalist march in Warsaw on 11 November 20171 brought renewed interest in far-right -
Poland's 2019 Parliamentary Election
— SPECIAL REPORT — 11/05/2019 POLAND’S 2019 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse Warsaw Institute POLAND’S 2019 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION Held on October 13, 2019, Poland’s general election is first and foremost a success of democracy, as exemplified by crowds rushing to polling stations and a massive rise in voter turnout. Those that claimed victory were the govern- ment groups that attracted a considerable electorate, winning in more constitu- encies across the country they ruled for the past four years. Opposition parties have earned a majority in the Senate, the upper house of the Polish parliament. A fierce political clash turned into deep chasms throughout the country, and Poland’s political stage reveals polarization between voters that lend support to the incumbent government and those that question the authorities by manifest- ing either left-liberal or far-right sentiments. Election results Poland’s parliamentary election in 2019 attrac- try’s 100-seat Senate, the upper house of the ted the attention of Polish voters both at home parliament, it is the Sejm where the incum- and abroad while drawing media interest all bents have earned a majority of five that has over the world. At stake were the next four a pivotal role in enacting legislation and years in power for Poland’s ruling coalition forming the country’s government2. United Right, led by the Law and Justice party (PiS)1. The ruling coalition won the election, The electoral success of the United Right taking 235 seats in Poland’s 460-seat Sejm, the consisted in mobilizing its supporters to a lower house of the parliament. -
Poland by Piotr Arak, Andrzej Bobiński
Poland by Piotr Arak, Andrzej Bobiński Capital: Warsaw Population: 38 million GNI/capita, PPP: $25,930 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 National Democratic 3.25 3.50 3.25 3.25 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 Governance Electoral Process 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 Civil Society 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 Independent Media 2.25 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 3.00 Local Democratic 1.75 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 Governance Judicial Framework 3.25 2.50 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 and Independence Corruption 3.00 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Democracy Score 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 2.14 2.18 2.18 2.21 2.32 2.57 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. -
Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in Central Europe
Program on Central & Eastern Europe Working Paper Series #52, j\Tovember 1999 Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in Central Europe Anna Grzymala-Busse· Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University Cambridge, lvlA 02138 Abstract The study examines the formation of coalitions in East Central Europe after the democratic transi tions of 1989. Existing explanations of coalition formations, which focus on either office-seeking and minimum wmning considerations, or on policy-seeking and spatial ideological convergence. However, they fail to account for the coalition patterns in the new democracies of East Central Europe. Instead, these parties' flrst goal is to develop clear and consistent reputations. To that end, they will form coalitions exclusively within the two camps of the regime divide: that is, amongst par ties stemming from the former communist parties, and those with roots in the former opposition to the communist regimes. The two corollaries are that defectors are punished at unusually high rates, and the communist party successors seek, rather than are sought for, coalitions. This model explains 85% of the coalitions that formed in the region after 1989. The study then examines the communist successor parties, and how their efforts illustrate these dynamics . • I would like to thank Grzegorz Ekiert, Gary King, Kenneth Shepsle, Michael Tomz, and the participants ofthe Faculty Workshop at Yale University for their helpful comments. 2 I. Introduction The patterns of coalition fonnation in East Central Europe are as diverse as they are puzzling. Since the ability to fonn stable governing coalitions is a basic precondition of effective democratic governance in multi-party parliamentary systems, several explanations have emerged of how political parties fonn such coalitions. -
Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Ombudsman in Poland
List of Commissioners Ewa Łętowska Tadeusz Zieliński Adam Zieliński 1987–1992 1992–1996 1996–2000 Summary of the Report Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Ombudsman in Poland on the Activity Andrzej Zoll Janusz Kochanowski Irena Lipowicz 2000–2006 2006–2010 2010–2015 of the Ombudsman in Poland in 2017 Adam Bodnar from 2015 On 15 July 1987 Sejm passed the Act on the Commissioner for Human Rights On 1 January 1988 the Commissioner for Human Rights was established Commissioner for Human Rights 2017 al. Solidarności 77, 00-090 Warszawa CIVIC HELPLINE 800 676 676 www.rpo.gov.pl 17 Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Commissioner for Human Rights in 2017, with Comments on the Observance of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms 1 COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS BULLETIN 2018, No 2 SOURCES Summary of the Report on the Activity of the Commissioner for Human Rights/Ombudsman in 2017, with Comments on the Observance of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms Editor-in-chief: Stanisław Trociuk Edited by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights: Irena Kumidor Translation: COMTEX JOANNA WYKRĘTOWICZ Published by: Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights al. Solidarności 77, 00-090 Warszawa www.rpo.gov.pl Helpline 800 676 676 © Copyright by Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich Warszawa 2018 ISSN 0860-7958 Submitted for typesetting in August 2018 Authorised for publication in August 2018 Edition: 250 copies Proofreading, printing and binding: Grafpol Agnieszka Blicharz-Krupińska ul. Czarnieckiego 1, 53-650 Wrocław tel. 507 096 545; mail: [email protected] 2 Table of contents Table of contents ................................................................................................ -
Poland at a Crossroads? Analysing the 2019 Parliamentary Election
UCL SSEES Press Briefing Poland at a crossroads? Analysing the 2019 parliamentary election Press briefing 15 October 2019 BACKGROUND TRIUMPH OF THE RULING PARTY On 13 October 2019, Polish voters went to Professor Aleks Szczerbiak (University of the polls to re-elect the 460-member Sejm Sussex) (the lower house of pArliAment) And the 100- member SenAte (the upper house). KEY POINT PiS Achieved this remarkable electoral success As they were the sole pArty The ruling nAtionAlist-conservative LAw And not only campAigning about, but Also with a Justice (PiS)-led coAlition retAined its majority record of delivering on, the sociAl needs thAt in the lower house, winning 235 seAts, but, many Poles care most About. with 48 seAts, lost its majority in the SenAte. It wAs the PiS-led coAlition’s second electoral 1. PiS wAs Able to score A victory despite victory After gAining An Absolute majority in Accusations About undermining Polish both houses in 2015. democracy put forwArd by both domestic And externAl Actors. The main opposition bloc, the Civic CoAlition, came second with 134 And 43 seAts in the 2. PiS populArity wAs predicated on its lower And upper houses, respectively. The success in fulfilling its generous Left coAlition Also gAve A strong enough welfAre pledges while in office. Also, performance to enter pArliAment. the pArty “redistributed prestige” by providing A sense of importAnce to the Voter turnout wAs A record 61.7% – the sociAl groups previously highest of the post-1989 pArliAmentAry condescended to by the governments elections in PolAnd. led by liberal urbAn elites. -
Poland by Piotr Arak, Piotr Żakowiecki
Poland by Piotr Arak, Piotr Żakowiecki Capital: Warsaw Population: 38 million GNI/capita, PPP: $23,930 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 National Democratic 3.25 3.50 3.25 3.25 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 Governance Electoral Process 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.50 Civil Society 1.50 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 Independent Media 2.25 2.25 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 Local Democratic 2.25 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 Governance Judicial Framework 2.25 2.50 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 and Independence Corruption 3.00 3.00 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 Democracy Score 2.36 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 2.14 2.18 2.18 2.21 2.32 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. -
Polish Senate
Directorate-General for the Presidency Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments Factsheet: The Polish Senate 1. At a glance Re-established after the democratic transformations of 1989 the Senate consists of 100 senators elected for 4 years by direct universal suffrage, by secret ballot, in single-member constituencies. In accordance with article 10 (2) and article 95 of the Constitution of 2 April 1997, the legislative power is exercised by the Sejm and the Senate. In specific cases, both chambers may have joint sessions as the National Assembly. The Chamber has the right to initiate legislation. The Senate examines bills passed by the Sejm within 30 days of their submission, unless a bill is urgent, in which case it is examined within 14 days. The Senate may accept, amend or reject a bill passed by the Sejm. The Senate’s resolution to reject or amend a bill is deemed accepted when it is not overruled by the Sejm by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half the statutory number of deputies. Parliamentary elections to both the Sejm and Senate were held in Poland on 13 October 2019. Since December 2017 Mateusz Morawiecki from PiS is the Prime Minister. Next elections are to be scheduled for October 2023 at latest. 2. Composition SENATE Parties EP % Number of seats PiS - Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 48% 48 (Law and Justice) KO - Koalicja Obywatelska 43% 43 (Civic Coalition) PSL - Polskie Stronnictwo 3% 3 Ludowe (Polish Peasants’ Party) SLD - Sojusz Lewicy 2% 2 Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) Independent Senators 4% 4 100 3. -
The Protection of Human Rights in the New Polish Constitution
Fordham International Law Journal Volume 22, Issue 2 1998 Article 2 The Protection of Human Rights in the New Polish Constitution Ryszard Cholewinski∗ ∗ Copyright c 1998 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj The Protection of Human Rights in the New Polish Constitution Ryszard Cholewinski Abstract This Article examines the extent of human rights protection under the Constitution of the Re- public of Poland of April 2, 1997 (”new Polish Constitution” or “Constitution”), adopted on April 2, 1997, by the Polish National Assembly and approved by the Polish people in a referendum on May 25, 1997. The Constitution, a lengthy document composed of 243 articles, came into force on October 17, 1997, and is one of the last constitutions to be adopted in Central and Eastern Europe since the start of the political and socio-economic transformations of the post-communist era. This Article emphasizes the importance of the new Polish Constitution in light of the long tradition of constitutionalism in Poland. Part I surveys some of the earlier constitutional texts, with particular focus on the provisions concerning the protection of human rights. After briefly discussing the difficulties encountered in drafting the new Polish Constitution, Part II analyzes the protection of rights and freedoms in the Constitution in light of the most recent developments. This part focuses on the general principles underlying rights and freedoms in the Constitution, certain prominent civil and political rights of particular importance in their specific Polish context, the debate surrounding the constitutionalization of economic and social rights, the protection of so-called ”third-generation rights” such as the right to a clean and healthy environment, and lim- itations on rights and freedoms. -
The Rafto Prize 2018 Is Awarded to the Polish Lawyer Adam Bodnar and the Institution He Leads, the Office of the Commissioner F
Award statement 27.09.2018 THE RAFTO PRIZE 2018 IS AWARDED TO THE POLISH LAWYER ADAM BODNAR AND THE INSTITUTION HE LEADS, THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FOR THE IMPORTANT STANCE TAKEN IN THE FACE OF CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. - Defender of minority rights and judicial independence in Poland A key function of the Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Human Rights, is to ensure that the public authorities secure and respect the human rights of all members of Polish society. As Commissioner, Adam Bodnar has highlighted the crucial role played by independent Ombudsman institutions in safeguarding human rights in Poland - and other countries - where such actors and institutions come under attack. To guarantee fundamental human rights for all, it is necessary to maintain the independence of the judiciary, a free press, and an active civil society. Protection of the interests of minorities is a significant democratic value. Democracy is fragile when it is reduced to the will of the majority and when human rights, minority rights and the rule of law are undermined. Since Law and Justice (PiS) won the Polish election in October 2015, the party has used its majority in the National Parliament to adopt legislation that reduces the independence of the courts and centralizes state powers. New laws grant the government control of state media and place severe limits on freedom of information and political lobbying. The rights of vulnerable groups have been repeatedly ignored. In this situation, the Commissioner for Human Rights is an important defender of judicial independence and minority rights. As an independent ombudsman, Adam Bodnar stands out as an advocate of democracy, a defender of minorities and fundamental human rights. -
View/Open: Fritzalarik.Pdf
HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE ON WAR COALITION FORMATION - A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government by Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A. Washington, DC October 2008 Copyright 2008 by Alarik Morgan Fritz All Rights Reserved ii The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Center for Naval Analyses, the CNA Corporation, the US Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. iii HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE ON WAR COALITION FORMATION Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Nations usually go to war to defend against a threat (balancing) or gain some profit (bandwagoning). However, they sometimes join war coalitions without such motivations – or refuse to join them despite great pressure from the coalition leader. For example, the US-led coalition against Iraq in 2003 was largely composed of states that were not traditional US allies, were not threatened by Iraq, and had little to gain from the invasion. Furthermore, the US surprisingly failed to enlist key allies in the coalition. Are coalition formation dynamics different now than during the Cold War? This is an important question because such war coalitions may be more common in the future. This dissertation examines the impact of asymmetric security interdependence between minor states and a superpower vis-à-vis their war coalition choices.