DOCSLIB.ORG

CEE Countries in NATO's Non-European Missions

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
CEE Countries in NATO's Non-European Missions Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 351–362 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Communist and Post-Communist Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud Between willing and reluctant entrapment: CEE countries in NATO’s non-European missions Péter Marton a,*, Jan Eichler b a Corvinus University of Budapest, Room 503, Kozraktar utca 4-6, 1093 Prague, Budapest, Hungary b Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic article info abstract Article history: The article focuses on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ experiences related to Available online 12 July 2013 Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, three non-European theatres of Western military operations, in predominantly Muslim lands, in the decade between 2001 and 2011. CEE countries Keywords: readily became involved in two of these foreign missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) because of Iraq their deep ties to Western politico-economic structures, without direct security interests Afghanistan compelling them to do so, but not without normative convictions regarding what were Libya seen by them as virtues of the two missions. In Libya, however, they were reluctant to join Intervention Military operations the Western intervention. In light of this, the article is interested in examining how po- Hungary litical elites within the region relate to the generally constrained security policy agency Foreign policy that they have. A key argument advanced is that such agency may be located in how Neorealism external hegemony is mediated in elite discourses of threat and legitimacy construction. Alliances This as well as the three case studies outlined in the article show that the seeming changes in CEE countries’ behaviour in fact boil down to a simple set of rules guiding their behaviour. Having identified this “algorithm” as an implicit pattern of CEE foreign policy behaviour, originating in the intra-alliance security dilemma within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the article formulates its conclusions about the alliance policy of these countries largely within a neorealist framework. Ó 2013 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. CEE countries in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya Central and Eastern European countries1 supported the invocation of NATO’s Article V in the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001. At the beginning of 2003 they declared their support to the United States against Saddam Hussein’s regime in two waves; first representatives of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became signatories of the Letter of Eight document at the end of January (Lo8, 2003),2 and subsequently the rest of the countries of the region joined by signing the so- called Vilnius letter (Vilnius, 2003).3 A decade later, in 2011, they supported NATO’s action in the enforcement of United * Corresponding author. 1 In this article we are looking at Baltic, Visegrád and two Southeast European countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria as post-communist CEE countries, thus excluding countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania from the inquiry. 2 This document called for transatlantic unity in the fight against terrorism and over the need to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. It stated that Iraq failed to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (on cooperation with weapons inspections), and that this required an appropriate response from the international community. 3 This document reiterated all of the conclusions of the Letter of Eight, and spoke of “compelling evidence” the United States presented in the Security Council about Iraq’s weapons programs and its material breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, along with the “clear and present danger posed by the Saddam Hussein’s regime” requiring a “united response from the community of democracies”. 0967-067X/$ – see front matter Ó 2013 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2013.06.002 352 P. Marton, J. Eichler / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 351–362 Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. However, when it came to carrying through with these commitments, they offered meaningful contributions to military operations in only two of the three cases above. In Libya they were very reluctant to participate at all. Figs. 1 and 2 show the steady increase in CEE troop contributions to the International Security Assistance Force/ Afghanistan coalition (ISAF), up until mid-2011, the official end date of the U.S. “surge” there and the official starting date for the beginning of troop withdrawals. Figs. 3 and 4 capture the CEE share of the burden in the Multinational Forces/Iraq (MNF-I) coalition, from different aspects, namely that of peak troop contributions and casualties suffered. Table 1 shows the time period in which CEE countries deployed their troops in Iraq. One shall take note of Polish forces’ presence already at the time of the invasion, in March 2003, as an exceptional contribution. The run-up to the war in Iraq and the early period of stabilisation operations there coincided with several CEE countries’ NATO accession process, including Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic Republics. Leaders of these countries, for whom the road even to the EU seemed to lead through Washington, such as the Slovak President Robert Schuster, readily adopted the rhetoric of the U.S. administration about a division of Europe into Europes “New” and “Old,” and about the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Lansford and Tashev, 2005: 229). The above data clearly demonstrate the resulting significant commitment and the generally reliable behaviour of CEE countries in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their contributions went beyond mere troop presence (Hynek and Marton, 2011:16–18). CEE countries provided important support to operations in the two countries, as well as to the larger war on terror in multiple ways, from providing trainers and training facilities, and military materiel support to fledgling Iraqi and Afghan security forces, to leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. A major share of their emerging international development assistance programs has been calibrated to the needs of these missions. In Libya, NATO took over a Franco-British-initiated mission from a coalition of the willing, including the United States as a key contributor. In this case, CEE countries disappointed some observers by not voicing unambiguous support to the cause of the intervention. Some saw this as surprising change in their foreign policy after the 2003 war in Iraq and what they saw as CEE enthusiasm for spreading democracy to the Middle East (MacDonald, 2011). Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were believed by observers to be in a position to participate in air operations with their respective fourth-generation mul- tirole aircraft, F-16Cs in the case of Poland, and JAS-39C Gripens in the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic. Yet none of these countries was eager to join the coalition. Bulgaria and Romania were expected to provide naval assets, and they did so only grudgingly. This came after much criticism of the principles and the assumed motives behind the intervention (Basescu, 2011; IBT, 2011), views voiced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland as well (Tusk, 2011). The open questioning of the reasons behind the Libya intervention may appear on the surface as a puzzle: as atypical alliance behaviour on the part of generally loyal countries. The literature offers us contrasting interpretations of CEE countries’ alliance policy. Two distinct lines of reasoning may be identified; neo-realist and constructive framings of CEE foreign policy behaviour, focused on the role of interests and ideas, respectively. The former suggests that CEE countries, especially in terms of their economy’s size, are relative dwarves within the North Atlantic Alliance, and as such, can generally be expected to try and “free-ride” or save as much money as possible on defence. They are thus expected to commit a proportionally smaller share of their GDP for defence purposes, and thereby “consume security” or “exploit the alliance” of greater partners (Olson,1965; Ringsmose, 2009). Some take issue whether this is the right CEE troop contributions in Afghanistan 8000 7000 Slovakia 6000 Romania Poland 5000 Lithuania 4000 Latvia Hungary 3000 Estonia Troop contributions Troop 2000 Czech Republic Bulgaria 1000 0 January 2007 February January 2009 February June 2011 2008 2010 Fig. 1. CEE troop contributions in ISAF, aggregate change, 2007–2011. Source: The authors’ own diagram, based on ISAF, 2011. Download English Version: https://daneshyari.com/en/article/1046484 Download Persian Version: https://daneshyari.com/article/1046484 Daneshyari.com.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • European Union Page 1 of 10
    European Union Page 1 of 10 HOME ARCHIVE CONTACT EUROPEAN UNION Europe Sales Recruitment European Union Looking to set up in Europe? We recruit Everything to do with European Union items. Country Managers Yahoo.com The European Union or EU is an intergovernmental and supranational organisation of European countries, which currently has 25 member states. The Union was established under that name by the Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992. However, many aspects of the EU eu training existed before that date through a series of predecessor EU Directives, ICH, EMEA organisations, dating back to the 1950s. The European Two training locations in Union's activities cover all policy areas, from health and Europe! economic policy to foreign affairs and defence. www.cfpie.com However, the nature of its powers differs between areas. Depending on the powers transferred to it by its member states, the EU therefore resembles a federation (e.g. monetary affairs, agricultural, trade and environmental policy), a confederation (e.g. in European Union social and economic policy, consumer protection, Find European Union internal affairs), or an international organisation (e.g. Maps at Great Prices. in foreign affairs). A key activity of the EU is the www.Pronto.com establishment and administration of a common single market, consisting of a customs union, a single currency (adopted by 12 of the 25 member states), a Common Agricultural Policy and a Common Fisheries Eu Communication Policy. On 29 October 2004, European heads of A study about the government signed a Treaty establishing a Constitution Institutional for Europe, which is currently awaiting ratification by Communication of the individual member states.
    [Show full text]
  • Europe: Searching for Its Strategic Compass
    Europe: Searching for its Strategic Compass. Emmanuel Macron’s Vision Author: Jānis Eichmanis Associate Fellow Latvian Institute of International Affairs 2020, Rīga Europe: Searching for its Strategic Compass. Emmanuel Macron’s Vision Jānis Eichmanis Associate Fellow Latvian Institute of International Affairs Riga, 2020 Executive Summary Compelled by the shifting global power relationships which can, at various levels, act as threat multipliers, the European Union, collectively and at the level of member states, seeks geopolitical understanding of these shifts and their consequences for European security; metaphorically, one could say that it is a matter of finding Europe’s ‘strategic compass’. The result, after a process of analysis and debate, would be a common threat analysis and a common strategic culture. Two parallel processes have been initiated; one by the French President Macron that is based on an exclusive group of countries, including the U.K., and the other inclusive, initiated by the Union’s Defence Ministers. From a Latvian perspective the French initiative is the one more fraught with ambiguity, as it is embedded in an attempt to come to terms with the Union’s relations with the United States, Russia and China. In the French understanding of these relations Europe should not become an object of contention but should maintain an independent and autonomous foreign policy course that serves Europe’s interests as an integrated entity that upholds the principles of the ‘rules-based international order’. How President Macron makes his case for his version of the EU’s strategic compass is the subject of this paper. It raises the question of whether Macron’s attempts to refashion the Union’s strategic focus will merge with that of the inclusive EU strategic process or whether the French maintain its separate identity.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Article
    HUnGAry’s Post-2001 rAtiFiCAtion CHAllenGes: lessons ConCerninG tHe V4-nAto relAtionsHiP Péter Marton Abstract: Hungary and the other Visegrad countries (V4), over the past decade, participated in coalition military operations in Afghani- stan and Iraq, but not Libya. This article examines how this has impact- ed Hungary’s standing in the North Atlantic Alliance, and to this end deploys the concepts of “two level games” and “ratification” as deployed throughout the political sciences, particularly in Putnam’s works. This work adapts these concepts to show how a key challenge of Hungarian foreign and security policy post-2001 was the multi-pronged ratifica- tion of the country’s path in its foreign affairs to indirectly provide for the country’s security, through sufficient “macro-adaptation” to the -Al liance’s needs. There are lessons that can be gleaned from this experience concerning the other V4 countries and the V4 group as a collective. Keywords: Hungary, V4, Libya, North Atlantic Alliance, game theory Introduction Hungary, along with the other Visegrad countries, has, in the past decade, participated in coalition military operations involving combat1 in Afghanistan and Iraq, but has refrained from doing so in Libya. This article examines how this decision affects the coun- try’s standing within the North Atlantic Alliance and, to this end, deploys the concept of “two level games” and “ratification” as used in the political sciences largely in Robert Putnam’s footsteps. It will adapt these concepts to show how a key challenge of Hungarian for- eign and security policy post-2001 was the multi-pronged ratifica- tion of the country’s path in its foreign affairs to thereby indirectly provide for the country’s security, through sufficient “macro-adap- tation” to the Alliance’s needs.
    [Show full text]
  • View/Open: Fritzalarik.Pdf
    HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE ON WAR COALITION FORMATION - A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government by Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A. Washington, DC October 2008 Copyright 2008 by Alarik Morgan Fritz All Rights Reserved ii The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Center for Naval Analyses, the CNA Corporation, the US Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. iii HOW SUPERPOWERS GO TO WAR AND WHY OTHER STATES HELP THEM: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE ON WAR COALITION FORMATION Alarik Morgan Fritz, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Nations usually go to war to defend against a threat (balancing) or gain some profit (bandwagoning). However, they sometimes join war coalitions without such motivations – or refuse to join them despite great pressure from the coalition leader. For example, the US-led coalition against Iraq in 2003 was largely composed of states that were not traditional US allies, were not threatened by Iraq, and had little to gain from the invasion. Furthermore, the US surprisingly failed to enlist key allies in the coalition. Are coalition formation dynamics different now than during the Cold War? This is an important question because such war coalitions may be more common in the future. This dissertation examines the impact of asymmetric security interdependence between minor states and a superpower vis-à-vis their war coalition choices.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rift Between America and Old Europe
    THE RIFT BETWEEN AMERICA AND OLD EUROPE This book strives to explain the opening of the great political rift between America and Old Europe in 2002–2003. Following the wave of solidarity with America in 2001, most of America’s European allies enthusiastically joined the war in Afghanistan, but for some of them enthusiasm soon gave way to pacifist reactions to the American switch from the common war on terrorism to regime change in Iraq, to American rejection of international treaties and to hostility to the UN. The evolution of American foreign policy from earlier multilateralism to the neo-conservative unilateralism of the Bush administration thus caused hostility in some of America’s traditional allies, among them France and Germany. French and German public opinion polls, media opinion, and the context of past foreign policy supply the background for this analysis in a year of major parliamentary elections in both countries in 2002. Early in 2003, the European-American estrangement led to an open break as Washington plunged ahead, overriding UN and allied support for weapons inspections in Iraq, to launch a blitzkrieg operation against Saddam Hussein. Ultimately The Rift Between America and Old Europe analyses how this decision, combined with the rejection of Kyoto and other international treaties, all clearly related to the conservative Republican revolution in domestic policies, widened the rift by undermining the role of America as a democratic model. The book ends with a critical assessment of the 2000 presidential election and its significance for America’s leadership abroad. This book will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students in international relations and security studies as well as to journalists and policy-makers.
    [Show full text]
  • Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States
    Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States Edited by Tony Lawrence Tomas Jermalavičius 1 Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States Edited by Tony Lawrence Tomas Jermalavičius International Centre for Defence Studies Toom-Rüütli 12-6 Tallinn 10130 Estonia Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States Edited by Tony Lawrence Tomas Jermalavičius © International Centre for Defence Studies Tallinn, 2013 ISBN: 978-9949-9174-7-1 ISBN: 978-9949-9174-9-5 (PDF) ISBN: 978-9949-9174-8-8 (e-pub) ISBN 978-9949-9448-0-4 (Kindle) Design: Kristjan Mändmaa Layout and cover design: Moonika Maidre Printed: Print House OÜ Cover photograph: Flag dedication ceremony of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, Ādaži, Latvia, January 1995. Courtesy of Kalev Koidumäe. Contents 5 Foreword 7 About the Contributors 9 Introduction Tomas Jermalavičius and Tony Lawrence 13 The Evolution of Baltic Security and Defence Strategies Erik Männik 45 The Baltic Quest to the West: From Total Defence to ‘Smart Defence’ (and Back?) Kęstutis Paulauskas 85 The Development of Military Cultures Holger Mölder 122 Supreme Command and Control of the Armed Forces: the Roles of Presidents, Parliaments, Governments, Ministries of Defence and Chiefs of Defence Sintija Oškalne 168 Financing Defence Kristīne Rudzīte-Stejskala 202 Participation in International Military Operations Piret Paljak 240 Baltic Military Cooperative Projects: a Record of Success Pete Ito 276 Conclusions Tony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavičius 4 General Sir Garry Johnson Foreword The swift and total collapse of the Soviet Union may still be viewed by some in Russia as a disaster, but to those released from foreign dominance it brought freedom, hope, and a new awakening.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Identity in Support for Supranational Integration in EU Foreign and Security Policies’, European Integration Online Papers (Eiop), Vol
    EIoP © 2015 Osman Sabri Kiratli European Integration online Papers ISSN 1027-5193 Vol. 19 (2015), Article 7 How to cite? Kiratli, Osman Sabri (2015): ‘The role of identity in support for supranational integration in EU Foreign and Security Policies’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 19, Article 7, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-007a.htm, pp. 1-37. DOI: 10.1695/2015007 The role of identity in support for supranational integration in EU Foreign and Security Policies Osman Sabri Kiratli Bogazici University, School of Applied Disciplines, International Trade Department Abstract: This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the European Union on the level of governments’ willingness to consent to supranational reforms of foreign and security policies. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on a series of statistical analyses based on data provided by Eurobarometer and state positions prior to the three major EU treaties (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), this paper concludes that higher levels of European identification by citizens greatly increase domestic support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies which in turn pushes governments to adopt more integrationist positions during negotiations. Keywords: European identity; CFSP; supranationalism; public opinion; political science. http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-007a.htm 1 EIoP © 2015 Osman Sabri Kiratli Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Politika English Final.Indd
    Enlarged European Union and its Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges, Perspectives David Král, Lukáš Pachta EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy Rytířská 31, CZ 110 00 Praha 1 Tel: +420-221 610 205 Fax: +420-221 610 204 E-mail: [email protected] Proof reading: Patrick Lyons Graphic design: (v) design, Vít Šmejkal Published by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2005 ISBN: 80-903237-7-4 We would like to acknowledge a generous support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung to this publication. ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, PERSPECTIVES David Král, Lukáš Pachta Europeum Institute for European Policy, July 2005 2 Table of Contens TABLE OF CONTENS David Král ENLARGING EU FOREIGN POLICY THE ROLE OF NEW EU MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES Executive Summary . 9 1. Introduction . 11 2. Setting the Stage – New Member States during Accession Negotiations, Convention and Intergovernmental Conference . 15 3. New Europe’s Atlanticism – An Ever Lasting Love? . 21 3.1 Security Considerations and Atlanticism . 22 3.2 Political Elites and Atlanticism . 24 3.3 Public Opinion and Atlanticism . 28 4. Geographical Priorities in the Activity of the New Member States . 33 4.1 Russia – Will the Balts Be Able to Prompt a Common EU Stance? . 35 4.2 Poland – Paving the Way for the Ukraine to Join the EU . 40 4.3 The Central European Countries – Pulling South Rather than East? . 43 5. Idealism versus Pragmatism in Foreign Policy – An Enduring Cleavage between Old and New Europe? .
    [Show full text]
  • VÁCLAV HAVEL and the INVASION of IRAQ (With Constant Reference to the Soviet-Led Occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968)
    Contradictions A Journal for Critical Thought Volume 2 number 2 (2018) VÁCLAV HAVEL AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ (with Constant Reference to the Soviet-led Occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968) Peter Steiner Th e fact that I’m not you doesn’t free me – at least before my conscience – from the obligation to assume a position and inform you of it… Haveľs letter to Alexander Dubček of August 9, 19691 Skimming over the front page of their favorite newspaper on Wednesday, August 21, 1968, and skipping the all too familiar masthead “Proletarians of all lands, unite!” the readers of Moscow’s Pravda came across news that suddenly made the meaning of that slogan quite relevant: “TASS was authorized to announce,” the offi cial communiqué stated in typical Soviet newspeak, “that the representatives of the Party and the gov- ernment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic addressed the Soviet Union and other allied governments with a request to provide their brothers the Czechoslovak people with urgent help, including military force.” 1 Václav Havel, „Dopis Alexandru Dubčekovi z 9. srpna 1969“, in Václav Havel, Do různých stran. ed. Vilém Prečan (Prague: Lidové noviny, 1989), pp. 428–441, here 435. Th e abridged English translation of the letter does not contain this passage; see Václav Havel, “Letter to Alexander Dubček,” trans. A. G. Brian, in Václav Havel, Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990, ed. Paul Wilson (New York: Vintage, 1992), pp. 36–49. 81 Peter Steiner Th is appeal was made because of the threat to the existing socialist order in Czecho- slovakia and to established constitutional statehood by contra-revolutionary forces in collusion with external forces inimical to socialism.
    [Show full text]
  • European Media Representations of US Foreign Policy Making
    Loughborough University Institutional Repository Framing the neocons : European media representations of US foreign policy making This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository by the/an author. Additional Information: • A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fullment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University. Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/12167 Publisher: c George Tzogopoulos Please cite the published version. This item was submitted to Loughborough University as a PhD thesis by the author and is made available in the Institutional Repository (https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) under the following Creative Commons Licence conditions. For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ ~~~-~-------~-,---~---",--,------.--------.--.--.--- ....-- ... ~ ....., ~l r. ., ~ ~ ~ f ;~:~: ''-' "'.' ,. --,.~'.J ,] -: ~.. 1 .: .. : ;~ ~ ~ :.; ~"..(~,;;~:;:-;, ~;~ -~.- ~. ,:.:--' ~.-:r:'- -. .....:t·.. _;,;::..... _-.. ~',· .... '~~:J;·-.-'t'.u=-"- :'. ,-". -',";:V." -"" .:_'~ ,l.:.:.. _~.~~...... '~~.-•.:..J;I! ...........~ l J.~,VV j r!~~i\10. - k - - ~ ,I t ~ ~ ~."7'1.~_~~_\W.. .._.. i ....~ r __ ~.."'"-"_~I IDat3 I !':r-,.:; ,'v·_- ••. "-'.-.:..:~.~..v..... - •.".,,'l._:.: __~-,:.-:.: ... -;-' .,._y~·.~.'"-r.:', ..-._~·>;....:.T .• "-,-~;:::,~;.:: ... ~..:.;.:~...I.~~Cl<C-~~ 'Framing the Neocons: European Media Representations of US Foreign Policy-Making' by George Tzogopoulos A Doctoral Thesis Submitted in partial
    [Show full text]
  • European Union (Part 2)
    Finansist | The fi nancial world European Union (part 2) uropean Communities: European Atomic Energy Community (also known Community plus Euratom. The term as Euratom) — each founded pursuant to EEuropean Communities refers col- a separate treaty in the 1950s. A third en- lectively to two entities — the European tity, the European Coal and Steel Commu- Economic Community (now called the nity, was also part of the European Com- European Community) and the European munities, but ceased to exist in 2002 upon 36 FEVRAL 2014 The fi nancial world | Finansist the expiration of its founding treaty. Since are increasingly administered by the Com- 1967, the European Communities have munity (as they are built up from mere con- shared common institutions, specifical- cepts to actual practice). Effect of Constitu- ly the Council, the European Parliament, tional Treaty. If it is ratified, the proposed the Commission and the Court of Justice. new Treaty establishing a Constitution for In 1992, the European Economic Commu- Europe would abolish the three-pillar struc- nity, which of the three original communi- ture and, with it, the distinction between ties had the broadest scope, was renamed the European Union and the European the "European Community" by the Treaty Community, bringing all the Community's of Maastricht. European Union: European activities under the auspices of the Euro- Communities plus CFSP and PJCC. The pean Union and transferring the Commu- European Communities are one of the three nity's legal personality to the Union. There pillars of the European Union, being both is, however, one qualification: it appears the most important pillar and the only one that Euratom would remain a distinct enti- to operate primarily through supranational ty governed by a separate treaty (due to the institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • European Identity Formation in Central and Eastern European Countries After Accession by the European Union
    ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 4th Quarter 2010 European Identity Formation in Central and Eastern European Countries after Accession by the European Union SOFIYA Y. T SVETKOVA* uropean identity, a notion with vague delineations, has been con- ceptualized in multifaceted ways. As a deriving point for analysis, this definitional divergence entails clashes among different schools that explain the phenomenon of European identity for- mation. Still, the sociopolitical notions of collective identity and multiple Ecollective identities underlie every conceptualization of European identity. That is, its content framing in terms of culture, civic involvement, or com- mon history changes, but its structural core as either of the two basic ty- pologies remains. In Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper’s threefold categorization of collective identity, European collective identity falls under the group membership heading.1 Juan Diez Medrano clarifies the notion of multiple collective identities as a multitude of group identities that can exist in two structural positions to one another: horizontal (not exclusionary, coexisting) and vertical (mutually exclusive).2 Although some scholars claim that the relationship between European identity and national identi- ties is horizontal, others provide evidence that it may be vertical.3 Regard- less of their precise structural correlation, scholars agree that the two collec- tive identities influence one another (e.g., European identity brings about Europeanization of national identities and collective memory as a result of expected solidarity with other member states).4 The majority of scholars view the Eastonian model of affective and utilitarian loyalties as relevant to European identity.5 Thus, it provides a *Sofiya Yuliyanova Tsvetkova graduated from the American University in Bulgaria in May 2010 with a BA in European studies and political science / international relations.
    [Show full text]