How Does the US Influence EU Foreign Policy? a Comparison Between the Iraq War and the Syrian Crisis

OSSERVATORIO SUGLI AFFARI STRATEGICI ED INTERNAZIONALI

How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

Federica Fazio Edizioni Machiavelli Novembre 2015

www.strategicstudies.it L’Osservatorio sugli affari strategici ed internazionali costituisce, all’interno dell’Istituto Machiavelli, il principale centro di analisi delle dinamiche e delle tendenze strategiche nel campo degli affari internazionali.

L’Osservatorio elabora con continuità, autonomamente e su commissione, analisi, scenari e studi previsionali su temi politici, militari ed economico- finanziari di rilevanza strategica per l’interesse nazionale italiano e per il decisore pubblico e privato.

I pareri espressi in questo documento sono personali dell’autore e non rappresentano necessariamente le opinioni dell’Istituto.

È vietata la riproduzione non autorizzata, anche parziale, realizzata con qualsiasi mezzo, compresa la fotocopia, anche ad uso interno o didattico.

II Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” AUTORE

Federica Fazio Junior Fellow

Researcher in International Relations who deals extensively with foreign and security policy problems and issues related to NATO, European defense and wider security and defense cooperation, including European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Western European Union (WEU), transatlantic relations and systemic change since the end of the Cold War.

She has a Master of Science (MSc) in Politics and Government in the European Union from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and a Master’s degree with distinction in Law from the University of Naples Federico II.

Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” III How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

Objectives and Method1 Sources

The aim of this study is to show how the US As for Iraq, a critical assessment of published influence on EU foreign policy has changed due literature and online newspaper articles from to a shift in US foreign policy itself. In order to 2003 to present has been performed. As for prove this change, a Qualitative Comparative Syria, considering that the events in question Analysis (QCA) has been conducted over two are relatively recent and not much is available case studies: the war launched against Iraq by on the topic yet, an innovative interpretation former President George W. Bush in 2003 and of such events has been offered. Published the crisis experienced in Syria under the Obama literature from 2011 to present was reviewed administration ten years later. The choice of but the limited amount available has forced these two case studies has been driven by the the writer to rely mainly on online newspaper fact that both public opinion and media - but not articles. This is the reason why there is a need yet the academic world - have made parallels to include more quotations in part II, to produce between them, beginning with the “casus belli”: more compelling arguments. In addition, expert the alleged possession and use of weapons of opinions have been requested. In particular, mass destruction (WMDs) by the Hussein regime professor emeritus Michael Cox from the London in the case of Iraq and of chemical weapons by School of Economics and Political Science the Assad regime in that of Syria. These two (LSE) was interviewed in July 2014 as an expert events have been compared from three different on transatlantic relations and American foreign perspectives: I. Causes, II. Venues of influence policy. and III. Results.

1. I must express deep gratitude to Dr. Claudio Neri for expressing interest in my work and giving me a chance to publish it, and to my former professors at LSE for past guidance and stimulation. A special thanks goes to professor Michael Cox for taking the time to address all of my questions despite his busy schedule and to professor Fawaz A. Gerges. Completing this work would have been all the more difficult were it not for the advice and assistance he gave me in reference to part II on the Syrian crisis.

This manuscript is largely mine; hence I must assume full responsibility for all erroneous statements and other shortcomings.

Updated to: October 30, 2015.

IV Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

Part I: THE IRAQ WAR

Introduction

Western powers have long tolerated authoritarian longest and costliest war (when taken together regimes considered essential for the stability of with the war in Afghanistan) in all of American the Middle Eastern region. This attitude, however, history (Bilmes L.J. 2013 p.1 and 20, Coyote changed in the light of the terrorist attacks of C.E. 2013 p. 295-296). At first, the pretext to September 11, 2001, as undemocratic states invade Iraq was found in its refusal to cooperate like Afghanistan and Iraq began to be identified with the United Nations Special Commission on with Islamic terrorism and became, according to Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors sent to the region the American view, legitimate targets of military to verify compliance with UN Security Council intervention (Fawcett L. 2013 p. 328). resolutions (UNSCRs) on WMDs. Yet, the truth In February 2002, two months after claiming is that Saddam Hussein never expelled the UN victory at Tora Bora, the Bush administration inspectors but that they were evacuated from Iraq began shifting intelligence resources and by the prior Clinton administration in anticipation special operations forces to Iraq, starting the of Operation Desert Fox aimed at hampering the

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region’s ability to produce WMDs (Fawn R. and Hinnebusch R. 2006 p. 22, Coyote C.E. 2013 p. Alleged possession of WMDs 186-187). Yet, it would be misleading to suggest The administration insisted Iraq possessed that regime change was already central to US WMDs and might use them against the US foreign policy during the Clinton’s presidency or transfer them either to terrorist groups or (Coyote C.E. 2013 p. 186, Baker P. 2013 p. neighboring countries like Iran, part of an “axis of 91). Despite the passage of legislation calling evil” together with Iraq and North Korea (Coyote for regime change in Iraq (the Iraq Liberation C.E. 2013 p. 159, Baker P. 2013 p. 179, 181 and Act) and the bombing campaign that followed, 186). The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) Clinton’s policy was still one of containment, as made clear that “to forestall or prevent…hostile the Act set no strategy to achieve that liberation. acts by our adversaries, the United States Full implementation comes only under George will, if necessary, act preemptively” if they are W. Bush with Operation Iraqi Freedom (Coyote perceived as a “threat to the United States or our C.E. 2013 p. 188, Baker P. 2013 p. 178). allies and friends” (National Security Strategy 2002 p.15-16). Therefore, even in the event that Iraq did not possess any WMDs, which was true, I. CAUSES just their potential development in the near future was enough to take action. Also, the former Vice Regime change President (VP) Dick Cheney and the former Iraq had been considered “unfinished business” Secretary of Defense (SoD) Donald Rumsfeld since 1990-1991 and regime change had been pressed the case that Saddam might transfer discussed for a long time. The 43rd President WMDs to Osama bin Laden (Coyote C.E. 2013 of the United States pictured his father - the p. 80. Baker P. 2013 p. 148-149, Napoleoni 41st President of the United States George H. L. p. 68-70). Notwithstanding the fact that the W. Bush - as weak for not daring to extend the National Security Council’s counterterrorism Gulf war beyond the UN mandate and go after advisor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Hussein (Baker P. 2013 p. 190). Driven by the and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) example of Thatcher’s Falklands war in 1982, found no evidence of such a connection, Cheney he strongly believed that “one of the keys to and Rumsfeld championed and influenced the being seen as a great leader is to be seen as executive into taking a position that considered a commander-in-chief” and that the secret to a the very risk of such an alliance tantamount to a successful presidency laid in beginning a small “casus belli” (Coyote C.E. 2013 p. 267). war with a pretext of sort and quickly transforming it into a success (Coyote C.E. 2013 p. 200-201). Stabilization of the Middle Therefore, as attested by former Secretary of the East Treasury Paul O’Neill and former Secretary of State The democratic peace theory holds that Condoleezza Rice, part of the administration was democratic states are extremely unlikely to already focusing on ousting Saddam Hussein in engage in armed conflicts with one another. It is early 2001 (Coyote C.E. 2013 p. 162, Baker P. on this theory that President Bush predicated his 2013 p. 91, Fareed Z. 2015). After the tragedy foreign policy (FP), after no WMDs were found of 9/11, regime change in Iraq was also deemed in Baghdad (Coyote C.E. 2013 p. 90 and 152). necessary to reaffirm US political and military He conceived democracy as the cure against strength as it had proven incapable of protecting terrorism and believed that “the only path to its citizens within its own territory (Fareed Z. 2015, lasting peace is the expansion of freedom and Hallenberg J. and Karlsson H. 2005 p. 22, Levy D. liberty” (The Washington Post March 29, 2006). Pensky M. and Torpey J. 2005 p. 167 and 182). Regime change and democracy promotion

VI Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

in Iraq were likely to have a spill-over effect II. VENUES OF INFLUENCE in the region, whose stabilization was key to undermining terrorism and increasing American The UN security (Fareed Z. 2015, Fawcett L. 2013 p. The United Nations (UN) played a major role both 329). Had he been successful in democratizing during and after the crisis: it was the main forum and stabilizing the Middle East, chances for where Iraqi disarmament was debated and al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations to recruit had a central role in post-conflict stabilization would certainly have been reduced. Thus, a (Cornish P. 2004 p. 101). “well-carried out military invasion, followed by Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the use of fairly simple reconstruction afterwards” would force is only allowed in the event of self-defense lead to a democratic and stable Iraq contributing or if collectively exercised by UN members to the stabilization of the entire region and previously authorized by the UN Security Council augmenting American security (Hallenberg (UNSC) (Cornish P. 2004 p. 92). Art. 51 states J. and Karlsson H. 2005 p. 24). Additionally, that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair in a democratized and stable Middle East the the inherent right of individual or collective self- probability of disruption in the oil flow was much defense if an armed attack occurs against a smaller than in an authoritarian and unstable member of the UN, until the UNSC has taken region (Hallenberg J. and Karlsson H. 2005 p. measures necessary to maintain international 25). To this extent, war was perceived as an peace and security”, and has been traditionally instrument of rapid social and political change construed as precluding the aggressed state that served US national interests (Cornish P. the right to counteract when the attack is no 2004 p. 98). longer in progress. Although broadened after September 11 and invoked for the war in Ideology Afghanistan, Art. 51 did not apply to Iraq. While The decision to invade Iraq was mainly driven the attack on Afghanistan gained international by ideology. The Bush administration was an backing because evidence proved al-Qaeda amalgam of Jeffersonians, neoconservative was behind the attacks and that Afghanistan Wilsonians and Jacksonians, in which key served as a safe haven for the terrorists involved, positions were held by neoconservatives: Dick no such evidence was ever found for Iraq. Cheney was VP, Donald Rumsfeld SoD, Paul For these reasons, US Secretary of State (SoS) Wolfowitz Deputy SoD (Tocci N. et al. 2008 p. Colin Powell and British Prime Minister (PM) Tony 95). As co-founders of the think-thank Project for Blair eventually succeeded in persuading Bush the New American Century (PNAC) they strongly to address the United Nations General Assembly believed in: (UNGA) and seek its authorization. The result was • American leadership as a positive example that the Council unanimously agreed on a lowest for the rest of the world, entailing that the US common denominator resolution – Resolution needed to export its own model abroad and 1441-, stating that Iraq was in “material breach” was responsible for protecting and boosting of its disarmament obligations under past an international order favorable to security, UNSCRs and offering it a “final opportunity to prosperity and US principles; comply”. It called on Saddam to readmit UN • military strength; inspectors and gave him 30 days to produce • the urgency of challenging hostile regimes; documentation of its biological, chemical and • the need to strengthen ties with democratic allies nuclear weapons or of their destruction (Baker (Coyote C.E. 2013 p. 166 -168 and 181-183). P. 2013 p. 227-228, Cornish P. 2004 p. 94-95).

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However, the resolution was ambiguous. The invasion, nor did it stymie it. A special UNGA Americans and the British deciphered it as a could have been summoned to overcome legitimation of war, underscoring the words deadlock or the International Court of Justice “final opportunity to comply” and the reference could have been asked for an advisory ruling. to previous resolutions, under which Iraq was Yet, nothing similar ever took place (Fawn R. already in material breach. The other permanent and Hinnebusch R. 2006 p. 263). What is more, members - France and Russia - plus Germany, despite the fact that intervention was explicitly who opposed intervention instead, regarded it declared illegal by the former Secretary-General as an alternative to war, objected to automaticity Kofi Annan as it had no legitimate basis under and maintained that in case of non-compliance neither international law nor the UN Charter, the further discussion within the UNSC was Anglo-American behavior was never punished mandatory (Cornish P. 2004 p. 94, Gause F. G. (The Guardian Sept. 16, 2004). 2010 p. 149, Hallenberg J. and Karlsson H. 2005 p. 37-38). Eventually, the latter triumphed as the The special relationship with US agreed to convene for a second resolution. the UK Accordingly, in February 2003 Powell addressed Since joining the European Economic the UN, evidencing how Iraq was still in material Community in 1973, Great Britain has always breach and had ties to al-Qaeda. The US and the been considered by Washington as its “longa UK then worked on a draft of a second resolution manus” in Europe. This special relationship holding that, as the declaration submitted by the represents a central component in British FP Iraqi government “contain(ed) false statements and the Iraq venture seems to confirm this trend and omissions” Iraq “ha(d) failed to comply with, (Fawn R. and Hinnebusch R. 2006 p. 38). and cooperate fully in the implementation of that Blair’s identification with American FP started resolution”. However, on the grounds that Iraq under Clinton, when he backed Operation Desert had been cooperating with UN inspectors since Fox, an operation of selective bombardment the first resolution was adopted and that the of Iraq (Coyote C.E. 2013 p.186-187, Cornish inspectors had found no WMDs yet, the bulk of P. 2004 p. 60). Later on, when Bush 43 took the members insisted on the need to reinforce office, the PM agreed on the need to enforce the inspections regime and allow inspectors democracy in the Middle East. At first, his more time and were inclined to vote no or abstain intent on siding with Bush was to temper his (Baker P. 2013 p. 252).“For the strongest state unilateralism (Fawn R. and Hinnebusch R. 2006 in the world not to be able to have its way in the p. 38). He expressed concerns about going to UNSC on an issue of great national interest could war without UN blessing to Powell, and together only be seen as a heavy defeat”, for this reason they persuaded the President of the need to the Anglo-Americans dropped the draft and, take the issue to the UNGA (Cornish P. 2004 after a last ultimatum to Hussein and his sons, p. 63). Notwithstanding the fact that the Joint opened hostilities on March 20 (Hallenberg J. Intelligence Committee’s draft provided little and Karlsson H. 2005 p. 38). evidence that Iraq possessed any WMDs, It is this author’s view that, despite the fact on September 24, 2002, Blair released the that the US could not get the UN green light first British dossier on Iraq maintaining that it and persuade all of its members to approve a was capable of launching chemical weapons second resolution, the US did exert some sort within 45 minutes of an order to do so, posing of influence over the international community. a “current and serious threat” for Britain (The It is unquestionable that the UN did not back Guardian Feb. 18, 2008). Soon after the dossier

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was published, the CIA released the 2002 the Middle East - a role he has recently resigned National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) upholding from - while at home Tony Blair became one of the British allegations (Baker P. 2013 p. 222- the most controversial figures in British politics 224). The British dossier together with the NIE (Cook J. 2013 p. 43, Cox M. 2014, Foreign helped Bush achieve a Senate vote of 77 to Policy May 27, 2015). Since 2009 Blair and 23, that gave him unprecedented war-making his entourage have been the center of the Iraq authority (Cornish P. 2004 p. 64). Additionally, Inquiry, also known by Chilcot Inquiry after its it was Blair who convinced him of the need for chairman Sir John Chilcot, whose final report a UN resolution, approved by all 15 members is still to be published. However, it is expected in November 2002. Later on, doubts raised by to assess Blair’s conduct that led to Britain’s the British intelligence were eventually erased “biggest foreign policy blunder since the 1956 by the publishing of a second dossier, known Suez crisis” (The Economist May 30, 2014, The as the “dodgy dossier”, as it emerged that part Guardian June 26, 2014, www.iraqinquiry.org. of it was copy-and-pasted from a thesis on the uk). It is therefore a fact that, through its spe- first Gulf War by an American Ph.D student cial relationship with the UK, the US was able to (The Guardian Feb. 8, 2003). Despite massive influence EU policy and divide its position on the public demonstrations, on March 18 Blair ob- invasion of Iraq. tained 412 votes in favor of war (only 149 voted against, of which 15 from his own party) in the NATO House of Commons and three days later went to Amid the crisis, some North American Treaty war alongside the US (Fawn R. and Hinnebusch Organization (NATO) members, led by Britain, R. 2006 p. 42). emerged as staunch supporters of the American In the light of these events, it is evident how approach. Even though only the Czech Republic, at first, Blair declared he would back regime Hungary and Poland (Bulgaria was holding a change in Baghdad only under certain rotating seat in the UNSC, though) were NATO conditions - that both the UN and public opinion members at the time, the whole of Central sided with intervention - but when it became Europe and the Baltic region behaved as a loyal obvious they would not materialize, he made and trustworthy ally. On January 30, 2003, an the choice of siding with the US (Fawn R. op-ed called “the Letter of the Eight” appeared and Hinnebusch R. 2006 p. 37 and 45). The in the Wall Street Journal. The letter, co-signed decision to preserve the special relationship by by Britain, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, supporting US efforts took precedence over any the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, concerns Blair may have had on intervention, expressed concerns about Iraq and conceded and on British membership to the EU. Blair went that resolution 1441 was its last opportunity to to war against his own majority and citizens, peacefully disarm (Fawn R. and Hinnebusch R. and when it became clear that he and Bush 2006 p. 84). After Powell made the hard pitch would never persuade the other two members for war in the UNSC, another letter known as of the Quad - France and Germany - he simply “the Vilnius letter,” signed by Albania, Bulgaria, abandoned his EU colleagues, even accusing Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, them of making intervention unavoidable (Fawn Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, stated that R. and Hinnebusch R. 2006 p. 37). the SoS had provided clear evidence of Iraq’s However, Washington rewarded his loyalty. On violation of the UNSCR and that they were the very day he stepped down as PM, President inclined to take part in a “coalition of the willing” Bush appointed him Quartet representative to to disarm Iraq (FoxNews.com Feb. 5, 2003).

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“Since the collapse of the Soviet empire no 332). For this, it is not regarded in a positive way state has had greater influence on the security by other large member states and is considered architecture in Central Europe and the Baltic by part of the literature as a competitor for the region than the US” (Michta A. A. 2006 p. 127). EU due to its frequent usage as an alternative Their traumatic past with the Soviet Union made framework for FP discussions (Gegout C. 2002 them particularly concerned about national p. 338). Still, considering that when it comes to security and highly reliant on NATO. Poland, FP matters, especially security and defense, whose president Kwasniewski was heard the Big Three’s points of view are the hardest to saying “if it’s President Bush’s vision it is mine”, reconcile, it has the merit of facilitating the EU in was the most active supporter, providing direct reaching a common position (Gegout C. 2002 p. military assistance to the operation (The NY 340). Yet, the reverse is also true: when France, Times Jan. 24, 2003). The CEE countries thus Germany and Britain cannot reach a deal, it is sided with America, and for that were regarded almost impossible for the EU to deliver a unified by the Pentagon as “friends”. SoD Rumsfeld stance. This is exactly what happened on Iraq. approvingly named them the “New Europe”, As a result of their inability to compromise the stressing how “the center of gravity (was) shifting fracture extended throughout the EU, frustrating to the East” and even suggesting to move troops any chances for the bloc to speak with a common from Germany to Romania” as a reward (Baker voice. P. 2013 p. 242). Consequently, the US managed to exert leverage on its NATO allies. NATO transformed into a battleground: 16 members led by Britain, Italy, Spain and the CEECs endorsed the idea of a military strike, while 3 - France, Germany and Belgium - were firm in their opposition (The Guardian Feb. 10, 2003, Press-Barnathan G. 2006 p. 303). Polarization was the product of US influence over the Atlanticist bloc. The Quad From the beginning to the end of the Iraqi crisis the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was hardly visible. Inaction was the result of division among the “Big Three”, who during the crisis in the Balkans had formed together with the US an informal directoire (Hill C. 2004 p. 152). The Quad, known as the Quint be- fore 9/11 as it also included Italy, is an informal grouping whose members actively discuss FP events and coordinate their policy positions. It has the ability to influence the EU decision- making process and to shape its outcome, affecting interests of other EU member states without their participation (Gegout C. 2002 p.

X Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

III. RESULTS the launch of EU Policy Mission in Bosnia in January 2003, Operation Concordia in FYROM EU the following March and Operation Artemis in In response to the attempt by the Franco-German Congo the following June) but also that Novem- axis to revive its leadership in the context of ber Chirac, Blair and Schroder agreed on the the 40th anniversary of the Elysee treaty, the creation of a permanent civilian-military cell in leaders of some European countries signed order to enhance cooperation in the planning of two letters without consulting other member civilian/military operations. However, since the states, including Greece, who held the rotating criteria set for joining was capacity to deploy presidency on the European Council at the time intervention forces, the outcome was much (The Economist Feb. 6, 2003). Even though closer to the British than to the Franco-German EU members eventually came to agree on a idea of European defense (Simon L. 2014 p. 212- common position, it is clear, as observed by SoD 213). The same goes for the European Security Rumsfeld, how such pro-American statements Strategy (ESS) as the final document conferred produced the effect of polarizing Europe. The more importance to NATO and relations with the “Old Europe” as he designated active opponents US (Menon A. 2004 p. 644). to the Anglo-American policy led by France and Germany, against the “New Europe” namely Enlargement Anglo-American supporters led by Britain and With regard to the European project, despite the CEECs. However, such a division was not the Chirac’s outburst criticizing EU candidate immediate result of Iraq but rather of antithetical countries for having “missed a good opportunity views concerning relationship with the US: the to shut up” on Iraq and stressing how their Atlanticist one of bandwagoning-appeasement accession to the Union had yet to be ratified, vs. the Gaullist one of balancing (Hallenberg J. the split does not seem to have dramatically and Karlsson H. 2005 p. 43, Crowe B. 2003 p. impaired enlargement as the Czech Republic, 534). The Iraq war served as a catalyst: it only Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, brought those divergences to the surface and Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004, Romania made the “gap between continental and Anglo- and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013 (CNN. American countries on the one side and Old com Feb. 18, 2003). Thus, not only was the Europe and the Central and Eastern European enlargement process not subject to a halt but it candidates on the other” grow deeper (Boon V. even empowered the Atlanticist block within the 2007 p. 293). EU by the addition of these Atlanticist-minded countries. CSDP This partition had a strong impact on security and defense as Iraq forced Europe to re-address the issue of development of independent military capabilities and of relationship with NATO, reinforcing the position of the Atlanticists on both matters (Menon A. 2004 p. 640-644). Part of the literature believes Iraq had a positive impact on Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and even contributed to its relaunch. Not only did it become fully operational (as proved by

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Transatlantic relations D. 2008 p. 135 -137). These are the reasons The decision to take with Iraq “was not war or why international support for the American war peace but war according to the criteria of the on terror quickly dissolved in the aftermath US or to the legality of the UN” (Levy D. Pensky of the Iraq venture and strong anti-American M. and Torpey J. 2005 p. 172). The clash on feelings began to pervade Europe. “World Iraq was a clash between two divergent ideas opinion…(saw) the United States increasingly of security. Absolute security, which implies as an outlier invoking international law when that when national security is at stake there is convenient, and ignoring it when not; using no alliance that holds, the endangered nation international institutions to its advantage and will endeavor to exercise control on everything disdaining them when they pose(d) obstacles to it perceives as a threat to its territorial integrity US designs” (Tucker R. and Hendrickson D.C. or political independence (rogue states in this 2004 p. 7). “Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and CIA case) and it will be more keen on unilateral action. renditions have damaged America’s standing in The other idea is relative security, which stems the world and have compromised our common from the Westphalian order and binds potential struggle against terrorism” (Keohane D. 2008 p. invaders in that “system of collective security” 137). On those grounds, the Bush years took a based on common institutions, procedures and grievous toll on the nation’s image. Not only did obligations, that is the UN (Levy D. Pensky M. they “hurt the US’ standing as a global symbol and Torpey J. 2005 p. 169-172). As shown, unlike of democracy and rights” (Cox M. Lynch T. J. Afghanistan where the international community and Bouchet N. 2013 p. 196) but even “eroded full-fledgedly supported military action, for Iraq transatlantic trust” as the administration showed military action was never authorized by a UN no respect for the international legal obligations resolution and was therefore illegal under the it had contributed to create and for international UN Charter: absolute security thus triumphed human rights law, in doing so detaching from over relative security (The Guardian Sept. 16, the core values that characterize the West (Cox 2004). M. 2012 p. 25, Zaborowski M. et al. 2006 p. 36). What clashed, however, was also a very different perception of the terrorist threat. The Europeans consider terrorism as a “long-term challenge”. They are more inclined to address its humanitarian consequences and they are more concerned about regional security. The Americans, on the other hand, favor an approach that is much more short-term as it aims at preventing a second 9/11, and they are more concerned about the situation abroad (Keohane

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Part II: THE SYRIAN CRISIS

Introduction

A decade after the events in Iraq, the issue of imposed, the opposition armed and, when the chemical weapons and their use by an autocratic crisis reached its peak, military intervention regime alarmed Western countries once again. threatened (Foreign Policy Apr. 26, 2011, The NY In this case, though, the scenario happened Times July 14 2013, The Washington Post Sept. to be slightly different as Iraq’s neighbor Syria 11, 2013). After the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq was acknowledged by the whole international and the Levant (ISIL), Assad’s atrocities and the community to possess WMDs and to have used bloody Syrian strife seemed to have been put on them against its population. the back burner (Foreign Policy May 26, 2015). The Arab uprisings that brought down the However, recent events have proven this to not autocratic regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, be the case. As the war dragged on, killing more did not spare Syria where anti-government that 250 thousand people and forcing millions to protests quickly precipitated into civil warfare. As flee the country, and as Russia began airstrikes violence escalated, the Obama administration against opposition forces to support the Syrian - currently on its second term - abandoned government, the White House increased its its policy of mere declarations condemning efforts to remove Assad from power and bring the government’s action and encouraging it the civil war to an end (CNN.com Oct. 30, 2015, to undertake democratic reforms. It became The NY Times Oct. 30, 2015). progressively more aggressive: sanctions were

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I. CAUSES Despite American efforts during the Geneva II talks to support the opposition in its call for a transitional government, Assad and his key Regime change allies - mainly Russia - managed to put an end to Regime change in Syria was not among the the negotiations by announcing that new multi- White House’s major FP objectives, at first. candidate elections would be held in the region, Actually, the Middle East as a whole was not a “parody of democracy” as Assad won another a top priority; Asia was and former SoS Hillary seven-year term (aljazeera.com April 28, 2014). Clinton made no secret of it (Cox M. 2012 p. 27). Later, when the jihadist group led by Abu Bakr Therefore, when the Arab spring exploded, the al-Baghdadi launched a reconstruction of the President and his staff gave an uncertain and old caliphate establishing itself on a territory that wary response because they had formulated stretches from Aleppo in Syria to the province no clear policy on the Middle East yet. The of Diyala in Iraq, Obama and his team have US was unsure “about the value of political seemingly put aside the issue of Assad’s ouster change for underlying American interests in and prioritized the halting of ISIL’s expansion the region”. They wanted “to avoid situations (BBC.com June 18, 2015, Napoleoni L. 2014 where the US would break all ties with leaders p.13 and 54). In reality however, the more recent from those countries” and believed that “the Vienna talks indicate that the administration is US should avoid putting itself at the centre of seeking agreement to initiate a political process potential political change in other countries” that will lead to a new constitution and new (Cox M. Lynch T. J. and Bouchet N. 2013 p. elections, this time to be closely monitored by the 208). As a consequence, their first reaction UN, which should mean that the Syrian dictator was to encourage the government of President is experiencing his last term in office (CNN.com Bashar al-Assad to put an end to violence and Oct. 30, 2015, The NY Times Oct. 30, 2015). pursue democratic reforms. Like its European allies, the US was also worried that regime Alleged possession of WMDs change could undermine the already delicate A year after Obama drew a red line on the use regional equilibrium and even open the ground of chemical weapons, the Syrian government to al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations launched chemical attacks against sleeping (The Guardian Apr. 22, 2011). The quest for civilians in the Damascus suburb of Goutha. regime change only came as a response to the Unlike Iraq, it was not only the US and the UK worsening of the civil war following the August claiming to possess evidence of such an abuse. 2013 attacks. France, and later UN inspectors, reported Contrary to his predecessor, even after Assad evidence of the use of the deadly nerve agent crossed his red line on the use of chemical sarin against civilians (CNN.com Sept 17, weapons, Obama did everything in his power 2013, The Telegraph June 6, 2013). Despite not to intervene militarily. Rather, he attempted the regime’s denial, the Organization for the to empower the moderate opposition by Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) recognizing the Syrian National Coalition as inspectors reported that “samples from the “the legitimate representative” of the Syrian surrendered sarin matched to samples taken in population, and later responded by providing the days after the strike” (The Guardian March the rebels with arms. Yet, this does not mean 6, 2014). that the administration had no real desire for Therefore, contrary to Iraq, evidence of regime change, only that it did not wish to get chemical weapons was soon found. Yet, military involved more than necessary. intervention was avoided.

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Stabilization of the Middle To deal with the situation, the 2009 Nobel Peace East Prize winner and 44th President of the United States relinquished hard power and based his Part of the literature believes that the ouster of doctrine on diplomacy, negotiation, soft power Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak and multilateralism in an attempt to restore in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya world’s confidence in the US as a positive leader. between 2011-2012 stemmed directly from the With this, he hoped to overcome the crisis with events of Iraq (Cox M. Lynch T. J. and Bouchet its European allies and seek a rapprochement N. 2013 p. 207, Napoleoni L. p. 35 and 68-70). with the Arab world (Cox M. 2014, Gerges F. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein revealed to A. 2013 p. 301-302, Kazemzadeh M. 2010 p. the Arab populations the inherent weaknesses 194-195, The NY Times July 8, 2014). These are of the regionally-dominant autocratic regimes, the reasons why, unlike Bush in Iraq, although which fostered their resistance to autocracy aspiring to have regime change in Syria, Obama and increased demands for political freedom. proved reluctant to act in the region. As the Moreover, the turmoil that followed the invasion crisis escalated, he began threatening military of Iraq increased instability in the region by intervention but only in an attempt to reinforce creating a power vacuum, with subsequent the credibility of his diplomatic efforts. Unlike alterations in the power balance affecting both Bush, he was not in search of a pretext for more regional and international security that eventually involvement in the Middle East and opted for a prepared the ground for terrorist groups like non-confrontational strategy (The NY Times July ISIL (Fareed Z. 2015, Fawcett L. 2013 p. 326, 8, 2014). Gause F. G. 2010 p.168). At the mo-ment four are the major powers confronting each other in the Middle East: The Gulf Cooperation Council II. VENUES OF INFLUENCE (GCC) monarchies, Israel, the HISH - a real “axis of evil” between Hamas, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah - and ISIL (Fawcett L. 2013 p. 332). The UN Like Iraq, the UN was the main forum where disarmament was discussed. After draft Ideology resolutions on Syria were vetoed by Russia When Barack Obama took office in January 2009 and China, finally on September 27, 2013, the his top priority was to end his predecessor’s UNSC managed to unanimously agree on a marked interventionist FP (Cox M. 2012 p. resolution. Resolution 2118 prohibited Syria 26). Bush’s legacy was catastrophic: “a war from “using, developing, producing, otherwise in Afghanistan, military engagement in Iraq, a acquiring, stockpiling or retaining chemical moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process, weapons, or transferring them to other States a collision course with Iran over its nuclear or non-State actors” and underscored that “no program, a broken relationship with Russia, party in Syria should use, develop, produce, a dysfunctional counterterrorism partnership acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical with Pakistan and blocked negotiations with a weapons” (UNSC res. 2118 p. 2). Additionally, belligerent and nuclear armed North Korea, a on September 14, 2013, “the Syrian Arab deep economic crisis”, a deep rift in transatlantic Republic deposited with the Secretary-General relations and a seriously damaged image for the its instrument of accession to the Convention on US, perceived as hegemonic and belligerent the Prohibition of the Development, Production, (Cox M. Lynch T. J. and Bouchet N. 2013 p.196). Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and

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on their Destruction and declared that it shall as Syria’s third-largest importer, while Russia comply with its stipulations and observe them had arm deals with Syria for around $4 billion faithfully and sincerely”. On these grounds, the (CNN.com Aug 30, 2013). Geopolitics plays an resolution also required Syria to allow personnel important role as well. The Kremlin is in fact par- from the OPCW or the UN into the country and ticularly concerned about the prospect of regime provide them with “immediate and unfettered change in Syria, fearing it could hamper his clout right to inspect any and all chemical weapons in the region (The Economist Feb. 5, 2012). As a sites” (UNSC res. 2118 p. 5 and 7). However, result, up to September 2013, due to their status unlike in the vetoed resolutions, Syria was not as permanent members of the UNSC, they were condemned for the events of August 21, 2013, blocking any proposal that would sanction the nor were sanctions threatened in the event of Syrian government’s crimes or ask for its res- non-compliance. As emphasized by the Russian ignation, thus provoking a UNSC gridlock. Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, unlike In this context the US impact was crucial. By the case of Iraq, the resolution was not passed threatening military intervention and turning under Chapter VII (The Economist Sept. 28, to Congress, President Obama gave the 2013). impression that he was serious about the As it happened for Iraq, the UN was divided prospect of invasion and was able to unblock but along different lines. It was not an internal the UNSC and save the day. As recently pointed European division - the US and the UK had no out by The Economist “still angry about the need to convince France and Germany that the military intervention in Libya…which was framed Syrian government possessed and made use of as protecting civilians but ended with the death chemical weapons, since their own intelligence of Muammar Qaddafi at the hands of rebel services came to the same conclusions (CNN. forces, Russia is unwilling to endorse similar com Sept. 4, 2013). The rest of the international action in Syria” (The Economist Feb. 5, 2012). community did not need much convincing as well By threatening military intervention, the US thus since UN inspectors found “clear and convincing managed to persuade Russia to assume a more evidence” that in the attacks perpetrated in the conciliatory tone, to the point that the Kremlin Ghouta district the Assad government had used even broached the idea of putting the Syrian nerve gas agent sarin (CNN.com Sept 17, 2013, chemical arsenal under international control and The Guardian March 6, 2014). This time the UN voted in favor of UNSCR 2118. experienced a split which consisted of the US and its European allies including Israel, Jordan, The special relationship with Turkey and the Gulf monarchies on one side, the UK and Russia and China, eventually backed by On Syria, Great Britain once again backed the Brazil and India, on the other. US. British PM David Cameron took the lead, From an ideological point of view, being together with François Hollande, in confirming autocratic and repressive regimes themselves, American laboratory test results concerning Moscow and Beijing could never have favored the use of sarin and advocating a military toppling an analogous regime like that of response. However, on August 29, 2013, he Bashar al-Assad. Also, as a realist approach was unable to persuade the British Parliament would suggest, both regimes have significant to favor intervention. On that very day the interests in the Middle East, especially in Syria. House of Commons rejected the government’s In 2010, the European Commission listed China

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motion on Syria by 13 votes - 285 votes to 272 House Sept. 1, 2013, foreignaffairs.com Sept. 6, (parliament.uk August 2013). On this basis, a 2013, The NY Times Sept. 1, 2013). The same few commentators have argued that the special can be argued for the United States. It is very relationship between the UK and the US might likely that Capitol Hill would have voted against be endangered (BBC.com Aug 30, 2013, an authorization of military force (AUMF) in Syria iemed.org November 7, 2013, The Guardian if it was offered the possibility. That is because, Aug 30, 2013). Yet Cameron himself emphasized like the UK has its Tony Blair factor the US has that “Britain isn’t going to be involved in this spe- its George W. Bush factor affecting its public in cific military action, but the special relationship a similar way. between Britain and America is as strong today Thus, the US did not get to influence the UK as it was a week ago” (The Guardian Sept. 5, position on military intervention for two reasons: 2013). On the other side of the Atlantic, SoS firstly, the use of force was not Obama’s John Kerry seemed to be of the same mind. In first option and as a consequence he had no a press conference in London, he reassured intention to pressure his ally in that sense; the the PM by saying “Our bond is bigger than one second is what professor Cox calls the Tony vote, it’s bigger than one moment in history, it is Blair factor and the need for the new occupant about values. We have no better partner in that of 10 Downing Street to draw a line with those FP effort than Great Britain and we are grateful for decisions that led to the Iraq disaster. In other that. Our special relationship with the UK is not words, America was unsuccessful in exerting just about Syria” (The Huffington Post UK Sept. leverage only because there was no real desire 9, 2013). However, after the UK general election to, as she was reticent about war herself. Perhaps made exiting the EU a very probable outcome, Cameron realized that, which explains why he feelings might well change on that side of the did not strive to persuade his own majority and Atlantic (Foreign Policy May 26, 2015). public (Chatham House Sept. 1, 2013). This author’s opinion on the matter is that the UK Parliament voting against military action NATO is only one among the many legacies of Iraq. Like the case of Iraq, NATO experienced a split Professor Cox agreed with this interpretation as because, while all major NATO allies agreed on he underscored that “the special relationship the need to punish the Syrian government because with the US is not fading away…it is just that the “any use of such weapons is unacceptable and Tony Blair factor in this country on foreign policy cannot go unanswered”, not all agreed that the is huge” (Cox M. 2014). He highlighted how the response entailed military action (CNN.com Aug. former PM is highly disliked in Britain for leading 29, 2013). the country into a “bad war” and that the current Among those leading the charge for a military solution one had to distance himself from the way things was France. Hollande announced his readiness for were handled back in 2003. Cameron admitted a military campaign against Syria “even in the face it himself by stating “for some in the debate in the of hostile public opinion” and his foreign minister House of Commons it wasn’t about evi-dence, Laurent Fabius attempted to keep the military threat it wasn’t about chemical weapons, it was about credible by proposing the adoption of a resolution how they felt let down over Iraq” (The Guardian under Chapter VII (The Economist Sept. 10, 2013, Sept. 5, 2013). In other words, public opinion The NY Times Sept. 1, 2013). did not back intervention because it did not Germany, traditionally non-interventionist since want to get enmeshed in another Iraq (Chatham

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World War II, although more cautious at first, The Quad came to agree that the use of chemical weapons Its members, until the UK vote, did not appear was “a serious breach of the international deeply divided over Syria as they were over Iraq, convention, which categorically bans the use as proved by the EU’s united call for Assad to of these weapons” and it had to “be punished” resign in August 2011. As emphasized by the and could not “remain without consequences” former French Minister of Foreign and European (BBC.com Aug. 27, 2013). Berlin stated that if Affairs Alain Juppé, “the EU was the first to impose confirmed, “Germany would be among those sanctions against Bashir al-Assad…The freezing who consider consequences to be appropriate”, of assets, visa bans, the oil embargo: we took implying that it might even take part in a targeted strong measures without delay” (ambafrance- military intervention (The Guardian Aug. 26, us.org Feb. 17, 2012). However, when the issue 2013). of military intervention was raised the European As for Central and Eastern Europe, contrary to members of the Quad - France, Britain and 2003, it showed no enthusiasm at the prospect. Germany - answered the call as individual nation Poland declared itself indisposed to “participate states not as EU member states. The rest of the in an intervention in Syria” and convinced it would EU simply followed the positions taken by one of not “put a stop to the crimes”. Poland was the the three - Denmark joined France, Italy and Spain first to float a possible diplomatic solution was for the UK, the Netherlands Germany etc… (iemed. Russia to secure Syria’s chemical arsenal (The org November 7, 2013). Telegraph Sept. 11, 2013, wsws.org Sept. 6, Reaching a common position on Syria could have 2013). A similar response came from the Czech been easier this time as evidence of WMDs was Republic, where the transitional government of found and confirmed, but national foreign policy Jiri Rusnok balked “We are not happy about the considerations were prioritized. The UK endorsed conflict, but we do not believe that a solitary action the US at first, but then public opinion and the legacy can solve anything. We remain skeptical”. And of Tony Blair forced her to retreat. As for France and Hungary, whose government no longer regarded Germany, they were particularly concerned about the Assad government as legitimate, but still enhancing cooperation with the US. In professor announced it would not participate in the event Cox’s words the French “have been wanting a of military intervention (wsws.org Sept. 6, 2013). rapprochement with the US ever since (2003)… Latvia was the only exception, as its government France has been on a long rapprochement with declared full backing to a military solution even the US and it found a culmination, a conclusion in the absence of a UNSCR (wsws.org Sept. 6, with what Hollande would have done if he could 2013). Considering that the above mentioned have done it. He would have intervened”. In declarations were all made in September 2013 Germany, when Merkel said she would have following the UK no vote, and that the UK is the favored a targeted military intervention her intent unwritten leader of the Atlanticist bloc in Europe, was to not “sound like Schroeder”, accused of it is reasonable to think that the CEECs, unsure having taken Germany alongside Russia and about what to do, chose to follow the UK position France over Iraq, harming relations with the US for (iemed.org November 7, 2013). Rumsfeld’s “Old” reasons of personal interest (Cox M. 2014). and “New” Europe thus switched seats. Yet, this As a consequence, the US was once again able to produced no effect as military intervention never divide the EU and influence its response, because occurred. both France and Germany were driven by their determination to foster better relations with it.

XVIII Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

III. RESULTS This shows how deeply the EU is concerned with the migration flows trespassing its borders, EU which is the main reason why it is providing On June 24, 2013, the EU agreed on a increased assistance. There is no doubt that comprehensive response to the events in Syria. the EU is the largest humanitarian donor to Syria Four objectives were set: supporting a political with a total funding to the region of upward of solution, preventing further destabilization of €4.2 billion, including contributions coming from the region, discussing repercussions of the its member states (ec.europa.eu July 9, 2014, conflict for the EU, and providing economic ec.europa.eu Sept. 14, 2015, europa.eu Sept. and humanitarian assistance (europa.eu June 25, 2013). However, despite its efforts, since 24, 2013). The author believes a closer analysis civil war erupted in 2011 around 11.7 million of these goals reveals what the EU strategy in people, of which about 150 thousands have Syria is, and more generally what the EU’s role applied for asylum in the EU, have fled Syria, in the Middle East is. too often with tragic consequences, triggering The resort to the verb “support” to express the the worst humanitarian crisis since World War first goal is simply crucial. Oxford Dictionaries II (ec.europa.eu Sept. 14, 2015, syrianrefugees. define supporting as “giving approval, comfort eu, The NY Times August 26, 2015). or encouragement to someone” or “giving The EU in a supporting role, thus, perfectly assistance to someone, especially financially”. depicts the role the EU is playing in Syria. It This is exactly what the EU is doing. First of all, the is supporting the US and it is supporting the EU is supporting (in this case, it is obviously the refugees. As a consequence, the EU is still first meaning that applies) a political solution. The “more of a payer than a player” in the Middle EU is in fact not actively taking policy decisions, East and is hiding its migration concerns behind rather its actions seem limited to approving or the mask of a civilian power (europarl.europa.eu encouraging what the Americans propose - July 13, 2010). perhaps with the exception of sanctions, as it was the EU who took the lead. The Americans call for Assad to step down, then the EU calls Transatlantic relations for Assad to step down. Again, the Americans In 2002 Robert Kagan suggested that recognize the National Coalition, then the EU “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are recognizes the National Coalition. This pattern from Venus: they agree on little and understand continues, and these are just a few examples one another less and less” (Kagan R. 2002 p. to show how the EU is reacting to what other 3). Syria has proved his argument to be com- international actors, mainly the US, are doing pletely wrong. Contrary to his prediction, not not playing an active role in the Middle East. only have transatlantic relations survived, but As for the other objectives, they are they have even strengthened as America and interconnected. The EU is discussing the Europe are becoming more alike. The charges consequences that conflict has within its against Obama’s FP are thus legitimate. His FP borders, mainly immigration, and is providing is really “European” as it is based on negotiation, support (in this case it is the second meaning diplomacy and engagement, rather than the that applies) to the region in order to avoid its military and the use of force (Cox M. 2014, The further destabilization, meaning more refugees. NY Times July 8, 2014). However, it is not too European.

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The term “European” is mainly used by the perceptions of the wisdom unilateralism, the GOP to accuse Obama of destroying American utility of force and willingness to act”, turning exceptionalism. This can be understood as Americans against military intervention (Fawcett “America’s peculiar form of Eurocentrism”, L. 2013 p. 337). They want less involvement as traditionally it tends to diverge from the abroad and on a more consensual basis (National “European-established way of doing things” Journal Feb. 1, 2014). This is why the President (National Journal Feb. 1, 2014). When it comes gives more credit to the international community to FP, exceptionalism means that America and where it stands and this is the underlying considers itself as a symbol of democracy basis for how he has conducted the situation in and freedom, and it believes it has a “special Syria thus far. He is “only executing the will of mission” to promote its model abroad and the American people by staying out of conflicts” needs no permission to do so. Therefore, by (The NY Times July 8, 2014). Therefore, it is the pursuing a more consensus-based FP and Americans that are becoming more European limiting interventions overseas, President from social welfare - ObamaCare is a clear Obama is accused of undermining American example - to FP (National Journal Feb. 1, 2014). exceptionalism. Yet Obama’s FP only reflects Still, one huge difference exists between the public opinion’s concerns (see graph American and European FP. America is a 1). “The Iraq experience…altered American military superpower who has recently embraced

XX Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

diplomacy and negotiation tactics but still main an isolated case. As a corollary, the quasi- possesses military capabilities and the ability to identification between American and British FP deploy them, as President Obama has recently objectives and thus US influence in Europe was made clear during his statement in the context expected to endure if not increase, at least until of the historic nuclear deal with Iran (Statement May 2015 when the Tories won another mandate by the President on Iran July 14, 2015). The relaunching the prospect of the “Brexit”. EU, on the other hand, is a civilian/normative As for the second point, it is undeniable that power who relies on soft power, diplomacy and something has changed. The fundamental negotiation, and who only possesses limited consequence of Iraq was a complete rejection military capabilities and extraordinarily agrees by the American public of those policies that on their mobilization (Manners I. 2002 p. 235). produced it. America has changed because America has credibility because it is capable Americans have shifted their attitudes against of backing diplomacy with military means. For invasions abroad (see graph 1). They have George.W. Bush hard power was the first option, reverted to noninterventionism, diplomacy and for Barack Obama it is the last. Either way, it is still multilateralism and elected a president who an option for the Americans to use and should made these promises and is largely abiding by the circumstances arise, although reluctantly, them. Obama would resort to armed forces, as he On the other side of the Atlantic, despite an did in Libya and as he did in Pakistan when bin apparent change in alliances due to internal Laden was killed. dynamics, the EU does not seem to have undertaken any substantial change. Its policy in critical situations is still one of bandwagoning Conclusions and of privileging humanitarian aspects over The aim of this paper was to establish how the military ones, which makes coordination on US exerts influence on EU FP and whether any security and defense matters difficult. As a fundamental change in this sense has occurred consequence, while the US has increased its in the decade between the Iraq war and the credibility by transforming itself into a champion Syrian crisis. of diplomacy, the EU is still perceived as a As for the first point, the paper illustrated how civilian entity largely dependent on what the Big essentially four areas are the venues through Three decide and rather passive to what other which the US exerts leverage - the UN, the actors propose. special relationship with the United Kingdom, The conclusion of this study is that transatlantic NATO and the Quad. Of the four, the most crucial relations, contrary to expectations, have one is unquestionably its special relationship strengthened as a reaction to the Iraq war. with the UK as by guiding the Atlanticist bloc, However, it is very likely that they will be put to Britain acts by and large as America’s proxy the test again soon if the EU does not take a step in the other three frameworks. The proposed into the US direction as well, which something interpretation maintains that the partnership like Syria showed is not really the case for now, has not been damaged by the vote on Syria, and in the event Britain decides to abandon the resulting from the Blair factor and likely to re- EU.

Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” XXI How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

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Gerges F.A., “Syria: Elections in the time of carnage”, aljazeera.com April 28, 2014

Groll E., “After eight years and few wins, Tony Blair steps down as Mideast peace envoy”, Foreign Policy May 27, 2015

Groll E., “Syrian doctor: Assad’s barrel bombs have us fearing the sun”, Foreign Policy May 26, 2015

Hewitt G., “Syria crisis response is test for Europe”, BBC.com August 27, 2013

Jones J. M., “Support for Iraq Military Action Low in Historical Context: Americans oppose Iraq military action by 54% to 39%”, gallup.com June 25, 2014

Kinninmont J., “Syria: UK Must Focus on Diplomacy”, Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs September 1, 2013

Labott E., “Syria peace talks to resume in two weeks after Friday meeting”, CNN.com October 30, 2015

Levs J. and Yan H., “War crime: U.N. finds sarin used in Syria chemical weapons attack”, CNN.com September 17, 2013

Levs J., “What’s the evidence of Syrian chemical weapons attack?”, CNN.com September 4, 2013

Londono E. and Miller G., “CIA begins weapons delivery to Syrian rebels”, The Washington Post September 11, 2013

MacAskill E. and Boger J., “Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says Annan”, The Guardian September 16, 2004

Mazzetti M., Schmitt E. and Banco E., “No Quick Impact in U.S. Arms Plan for Syria Rebels”, The New York Times July 14, 2013

Morillas P., “Assessing the EU’s Response to the Syrian Crisis”, iemed.org November 7, 2013

Norton-Taylor R., “Chilcot report into 2003 Iraq conflict delayed further due to have been published three years ago, the Chilcot report now threatens to haunt UK politics ahead of the 2015 election”, The Guardian June 26, 2014

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Pleitgen F., Levs J. and Carter C. J., “Obama: U.S. concludes Syria carried out chemical weapons attacks”, CNN.com August 29, 2013

XXIV Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

Sanchez F. in Washington and Farmer B. in Brussels, “US unmoved by French evidence of sarin use in Syria. America has appeared to show little urgency in response to growing calls for intervention after France said evidence showed Syria’s regime was using chemical weapons”, The Telegraph June 6, 2013

Sanger D. E., “To Some in Europe, the Major Problem Is Bush the Cowboy”, The New York Times January 24, 2003

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The Economist “Who speaks for Europe? France and Germany can no longer call the shots in Europe” February 6, 2003

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Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” XXV How does the US influence EU foreign policy? A comparison between the Iraq war and the Syrian crisis

Websites ambafrance-us.org “Europe/integration – Arab Spring/Syria – CSDP” February 17, 2012

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BBC.com “Syria crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action” August 30, 2013

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Documents The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002

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Documentaries Fareed Z., “Long Road to Hell: America in Iraq” CNN special report aired on October 26, 2015 from 9 p.m. E.T.

Interviews Cox M., founding co-director of LSE IDEAS and professor emeritus of international relations at LSE, LSE IDEAS London July 16, 2014

XXVI Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” L’Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “Niccolò Machiavelli” è un’associazione culturale senza scopo di lucro costituita a Roma nel 2010.

L’Istituto, think tank indipendente, nasce dall’iniziativa di un gruppo internazionale di personalità del mondo economico, accademico ed istituzionale civile e militare, con l’obiettivo di contribuire alla rinascita del pensiero strategico italiano.

La complessità e l’ampiezza delle sfide che attendono il Paese nel XXI secolo richiede conoscenza, consapevolezza e capacità prospettiche. L’Istituto Machiavelli, anche grazie al proprio network globale, promuove l’interscambio culturale tra il decisore italiano ed internazionale, pubblico e privato, e svolge attività di ricerca finalizzate ad elevare il livello di competitività globale del “Sistema Paese”.

L’Istituto Machiavelli, autonomamente o in collaborazione con istituzioni, organizzazioni ed aziende nazionali ed estere, realizza studi ed analisi strategiche policy-oriented, organizza briefing, seminari e workshop, cura corsi di alta formazione per i leader.

Per ulteriori informazioni:

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