Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil

Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War I Thecontinuing spread of ethnic violence seems set to replace the spread of communism as the central security concern in western capitals. Ethnic wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, and elsewhere frequently dominate the attention of policymakers and publics worldwide, and when top American officials say that ”instability” is the major worldwide threat to American national security, ethnic wars are largely what they have in mind. The impression created by such rhetoric is that ethnic war can happen anywhere, an impression reinforced by the wide range of places where such wars have recently occurred, from Chiapas to Croatia, Iraqi Kur- distan to Sri Lanka. There have been numerous attempts to explain the causes of these ethnic wars. One approach focuses on the role of mass passions or ”ancient hatred” in driving ethnic violence.’ A second theory suggests that inter-ethnic security dilemmas may be the key cause of ethnic war.’ A third approach blames ethnic wars on manipulation by belligerent leaders. However, by focusing on only one cause of conflict-whether hostile masses, belligerent leaders, or the security dilemma-many of these arguments create the false impression that where that one factor is present, ethnic war threatens. They therefore exaggerate the threat of ethnic war. Stuart 1. Kuufman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky The author would like to thank Leokadia Drobizheva, Airat Aklaev, Nicholas Dima, Stephen Bowers, and Vasile Nedelciuc for their help in organizing this research. This research was sup- ported by funds from the University of Kentucky, and by grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, with funds provided by the US. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Valuable suggestions and advice were provided by Jeff Chinn, Charles Davis, Pal Kolsto, Karen Mingst, and Stephen Saideman. None of these people or organizations is responsible for the views expressed. 1. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993). Some more sophisticated approaches including this argument are Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pludisrn (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976);and Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Abele MacIver, ”The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 127-142. 2. Among the first to publish this insight was Barry R. Posen in “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 2747. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 19961, pp. lob138 0 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 108 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.2.108 by guest on 28 September 2021 Spiraling to Ethnic War I 209 This article argues that all three factors-hostile masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas-are necessary if ethnic war is to result. These factors cause ethnic war by reinforcing each other in a spiral of increasing conflict: belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders; and both together threaten other groups, creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership belligerence. Furthermore, these three factors only emerge if the necessary preconditions are present. The preconditions for mass hostility are a set of ethnically defined grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes over emotional symbols. Hostility serious enough to motivate ethnic war also requires a fear (usually exaggerated) of ethnic extinction, based on threatening demographic trends and a history of domination by one group over the other. A security dilemma requires that the fears of extinction be mutual-that actions taken by one side to avert extinction be seen by the other side as threatening extinction for themselves. A security dilemma also requires a de facto situation of anarchy and-if it is to lead to war-the military means to enable both sides to fight. Belligerent elites contribute to ethnic conflict through a process of "outbidding," in which they compete with each other to promote increasingly extreme nationalist positions. For outbidding to be possible, elites require political space-i.e., the freedom to engage in outbidding. Successful outbidding also requires either the presence of mass hostility, or the preconditions for mass hostility, so the masses will have reason to respond to extremist appeals. Because each of the three main proximate causes of ethnic war is to some degree a cause of the others, there is no single path to war which all ethnic conflicts follow; rather, two different patterns are possible. One is the mass-led pattern, which begins with mass hostility. In these cases, hostile masses choose belligerent leaders and engage in actions which provoke a security dilemma; the escalating spiral of hostility and insecurity eventually results in war. The other pattern is elite-led; it begins with belligerent leaders who come to power when mass hostility is low. The leaders use the power of government and their influence over the media to encourage the growth of mass hostility and provoke a security dilemma, eventually leading to war. In either case, whether the pattern of escalation is mass-led or elite-led, the necessary preconditions for all three causes-mass hostility, belligerent elites, and a security dilemma-must, theoretically, be present if war is to result. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.2.108 by guest on 28 September 2021 International Security 212 1 110 Foreign patrons may also play an important role in the origins of ethnic wars. Their main effect comes, I argue, through providing the means for extremists to cause war. Specifically, patrons can provide belligerent elites with resources which help them capture the government or create a rival government, and then begin the process of elite-led violence. Patrons can also provide the military means which enable extremist groups-whether mass-led or elite- led-to fight. An additional distinction-between conflicts initiated by the dominant group and those begun by a subordinate group-helps in clarifying both the crucial factor promoting war in each case, and the most promising alternative for third parties interested in preventing it. Mass-led conflicts initiated by subordinate groups are mass insurgencies, driven primarily by intense fears of extinction: efforts at reassurance are the best alternative for third parties trying to prevent such wars. Mass-led conflicts initiated by dominant groups are cases of popular chauvinism, driven primarily by mass hostility; deterrence is the best third-party strategy in such cases. Elite-led conflicts initiated by dominant elites, cases of government jingoism, are driven by elite outbidding, so the best option for third parties is to offer inducements to the leaders to change their policy. Finally, elite-led conflicts initiated by subordinate groups are cases of elite conspiracy, and while also driven by elite outbidding, they are usually dependent on aid from foreign patrons, so they are uniquely vulnerable to strategies aimed at isolating them from outside sources of support. Moldova’s 1991-92 ethnic civil war illustrates the value of this approach for explaining the outbreak of ethnic war, providing examples of mass insurgency, popular chauvinism, and elite conspiracy. On the Moldovan side, the conflict began as a mass insurgency, but it became a case of popular chauvinism after Moldovan nationalists came to power in Moldova. On the side of the Russian- speaking secessionists in the Dniestr region, in contrast, the violence was a case of elite conspiracy, with support from Moscow playing a crucial role. The war in Moldova happened as it did because Moscow deterred mass-led violence on the Moldovan side, but later determined that its strategic interests were best served by supporting instead of preventing the Dniestrian elites’ secessionism. Moscow therefore helped the Dniestrian elites to start the war, and then win it. My argument begins, in the next section of this article, with a more detailed discussion of the causes of ethnic war, showing how the same three factors can cause either mass-led or elite-led violence. The following section examines the Moldovan case, outlining the preconditions that made war possible, and showing how the violence was mass-led on the ethnic Moldovan side, but elite-led Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.21.2.108 by guest on 28 September 2021 Spiraling to Ethnic War 1 111 on the Dniestrian side, with Moscow playing a crucial role in supporting the Dniestrian side. The concluding section shows how third parties can sometimes help avert ethnic wars, and why they sometimes cannot. Spiraling to Ethnic War Ethnic wars, which combine processes from both international relations and comparative politics, can be better understood if ideas from both theoretical traditions are combined. Four theoretical approaches are particularly relevant: the mobilization school of thought about internal violence, the competing ”fear of extinction” theory of ethnic violence, the diversionary theory of war, and the ”spiral model” of international ~onflict.~Combined, these approaches yield the argument that ethnic wars are driven by three mutually reinforcing factors: mass ethnic hostility, outbidding by belligerent elites, and a security dilemma between groups. The basic logic is as follows: People do not engage in ethnic violence unless they are hostile, that is, unless they actively want to harm each other, and they cannot engage in large-scale organized violence-i.e., war-unless extremist elites mobilize the group for the fight.

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