URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA: A CASE OF LUFWANYAMA DISTRICT IN COPPERBELT PROVINCE TENURE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (TGCC) PROGRAM
RA TECH
THE LEGALITY OF CUSTOMARY LAND DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE EXISTING FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM SOMMERVILLE/TET MATT
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by Tetra Tech, through the Tenure and Global Climate Change Project, Contract No: AID-OAA-TO-13- 00016.
Cover Photo: Community members in Iphani village present out the results of a participatory rural appraisal exercise
Report Authors: Ephraim K. Munshifwa, Roy A. Chileshe, and Niraj Jain
Suggested Citation: Munshifwa, E. K., Chileshe, R. A., & Jain, N. (2017). Urban influences, customary land tenure systems, and rural livelihoods in Zambia: A case of Lufwanyama District in Copperbelt Province. Washington, DC: USAID Tenure and Global Climate Change Program.
Prepared by: Tetra Tech 159 Bank Street, Suite 300 Burlington, VT 05401
Principal Contacts: Matt Sommerville, Chief of Party [email protected]
Cristina Alvarez, Project Manager [email protected]
Megan Huth, Deputy Project Manager [email protected]
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS ON ZAMBIA: A CASE OF LUFWANYAMA DISTRICT IN COPPERBELT PROVINCE TENURE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (TGCC) PROGRAM
MAY 2017
DISCLAIMER
This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of its authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... i ABSTRACT ...... ii 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 2.0 BACKGROUND ...... 2 3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3 4.0 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ...... 6 5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 7 5.1 SELECTION OF STUDY AREAS AND SAMPLING METHOD ...... 7
5.2 DATA COLLECTION ...... 7
5.3 DATA ANALYSIS...... 7
5.4 LUFWANYMA DISTRICT PROFILE ...... 7 6.0 RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION ...... 10 6.1 SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE CHIEFDOMS ...... 10
6.2 MECHANISMS THAT FACILITATE INTERACTION BETWEEN CHIEFDOMS AND URBAN CENTRES ...... 12
6.3 INFLUENCES ON LAND TENURE SYSTEMS ...... 13
6.4 MAJOR LIVELIHOODS ACTIVITIES ...... 20
6.5 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (RULES AND REGULATIONS) ...... 22 7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 24 REFERENCES ...... 26
ASSESSING CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE INSTITUTIONS FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION IN SANDWE CHIEFDOM i ABSTRACT
Urban centers have various influences on rural areas which either enhance or detract from development. This study investigates the effect of urban influences, particularly a cash economy, on customary land tenure systems and rural livelihoods in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. It further explores the idea of whether these influences and effects can be differentiated in relation to distance from the centers of influence, to better understand the peri-urban dynamics occurring across Zambia’s customary land. The study asserts that although each traditional community has its own rules that regulate ownership, use, and transfer of land, these rules continuously change due to a number of influences or pressures. Using data from villages in three Lamba chiefdoms, namely Shibuchinga, Fungulwe, and Shimukunami, whose areas share boundaries with urban areas and are relatively close to Kitwe, one of the fastest growing cities on the Copperbelt Province of Zambia, the study examines urban influence on five key factors of customary land tenure systems, namely initial acquisition of land, emergence of land markets and price levels, land rights and documentation, tenure and fear of dispossession, and governance and institutions (rules). Data was collected using household questionnaires, focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews.
ii URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 1.0 INTRODUCTION
Customary land tenure systems face constant pressures, packaged as reform policies and programs, due to the perceived shortcomings of customary tenure (see studies such as Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Coldham, 2000; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007; Wily, 2007; Milimo, Kalyalya, Machina, & Hamweene, 2011; Johnson, 2011; Dodd, 2012; Rurangwa, 2013; Qudrat-I Elahi, 2013). These pressures to change often come from the state itself, usually instigated by political change or donor agency influence – the ultimate goal is often to change customary land tenure systems to Western-styled private property rights regimes (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997). The argument is precipitated by the perception that customary land tenure systems hinder long-term economic development in rural areas. Key expected outcomes from these reforms or changes are a fully functional private land market, increased tenure security through individual title, and increased investments in rural areas (particularly into agricultural development). Aside from these direct efforts to change customary land tenure systems, this study asserts that customary land tenure systems undergo their own subtle changes due to a myriad of influences. It is these subtle changes which have more effect on livelihoods in rural areas. Evidence has shown that change in national laws without engagement of traditional communities often has limited impact on customary tenure systems. Thus change of customary land tenure systems is an important research theme due to its effect on rural livelihoods. Another facet of this study is the examination of governance structures within customary land tenure systems. While land administration has often focused on the development of land markets as governance structures and marginalized the role that customary land governance plays in rural and peri-urban livelihoods, understanding land governance requires examining institutions beyond the formal structures. For instance, defining land governance as “rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made about access to land and its use, the manner in which the decisions are implemented and enforced, the way that competing interests in land are managed” (Palmer, Fricksa, & Wehrmann, 2009, 9) means that both formal and informal systems should be analyzed together, even if they lack formal recognition. This paper is organized as follows: after this introductory section, Section 2 presents the background to the study while Section 3 delves into the literature on the subject. Section 4 presents the theoretical underpinning of the study including the conceptual framework. Section 5 outlines the research methodology including presenting the profile of Lufwanyama District. Section 6 presents results, analysis, and discussion, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 1 2.0 BACKGROUND
The phenomena of urbanization is often discussed in terms of rural to urban migration and its effects on urban land, infrastrastrure, and services. A phenomena less discussed is the influence of urban activities on rural land and socioeconomic activities. With specific reference to customary land, this relates to the influence of statutory laws on customary laws, commoditization of customary land, and general impact on rural livelihoods. This study therefore examines the extent to which customary land tenure systems and rural livelihoods have been influenced by their proximity to urban centers in Zambia. Empirical data was explored from village communities located in Lufwanyama District of Copperbelt Province. The study explores the essential common elements of customary land tenure in Zambia which are potentially realizable by land holders. In particular it explores initial acquisition of land, emergence of land markets and price levels, land rights and documentation, tenure and fear of dispossession, and governance and institutions (rules). It examines the operation of these general features of customary land tenure in respect of a matrilineal people, the Lamba, whose chiefdoms share boundaries with urban areas and are relatively close to the city of Kitwe. Specific research questions included: a. What effects does a cash economy in urban centers have on customary land tenure systems and rural livelihoods? b. Besides a cash economy, what other influences exert pressure to change customary land tenure systems and how can these influences be differentiated? c. What mechanisms, institutional and organizational, are responsible for the transmission of these influences? d. What are the major effects on land, livelihoods, social organization, institutions, and commerce? e. How can national laws and policies be formulated to incorporate the dynamism of customary land tenure systems in order to minimize the negative effects and enhance the positive ones?
2 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Customary land tenure systems are changing or evolving across Africa. Thus studies to understand how these systems change have been packaged under many themes such as “reforming” (Villarreal, 2006; Johnson, 2011; Amone & Lakwo, 2014; Wily, 2016), “commercialization” (Dutse, 2006; Milimo et al, 2011; Pomevor, 2014), “formalization” (de Soto, 2000; Cousins, et al. 2005; Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2007), or “individualization” (Qudrat-I Elahi, 2013; Tygesen, 2014). However the overall anticipated outcome from this process of change is improvement in socioeconomic status of traditional communities. Thus these changes in land tenure systems have implications on livelihoods and will bring winners and losers in the process (Cotula, 2007). Literature is varied on the theme of customary land tenure systems and rural livelihoods, with some cautioning against changing customary land systems, while others support change. For instance Villarreal (2006) investigated the relationship between adult death, particularly caused by HIV/AIDS, and resultant changes in land rights for the survivors, especially widows and children. Villareal (2006) argued that changes in customary systems were impacting negatively on widows and children when the traditional structure, which guaranteed women’s usufruct and other forms of access to land, broke down due to changes in customary systems. The study thus concluded that this breakdown of traditional rules and institutions has resulted in gender inequalities to ownership and control of land resources. Because of this pressure to change, some see customary land tenure systems as being under threat. For instance Wily (2012, 2016) arguesdthat although six billion hectares and two billion rural poor reside on customary land around the world, this system of land holding is not adequately supported in national laws. Wily (2016: 1) further argued that most governments consider customary land rights as “permissive occupancy on state lands” and could be suspended any time. With pressure for commoditization of land and large-scale acquisitions by foreign investors, Wily (2016) concurred with Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata (2015) that the risk on customary land rights is immediate to most rural communities in Africa and Asia. Thus Wily (2016) focused on investigating wider socio-political and legal environment, which impede legal recognition of customary rights. Most studies though look at customary land tenure systems as a hindrance to development. The conventional argument is that Africa will only develop if the traditional tenure, consisting of about 90% of Africa’s land resources (Okoth-Ogendo, 1993; Deininger, 2003; Manji, 2006), is integrated into the leasehold tenure system which is founded on the principles of individualization. Thus the analytical framework for this argument against the indigenous forms of land tenure is embedded within the neo- classical economic theory of private property rights. It is generally argued that customary tenure systems are inconsistent with modern economic markets and the free market economy that can help eradicate poverty (Deininger, 2003; Barrows & Roth, 1990). For instance Shivji (2006) argued that customary tenure systems are disliked by many proponents of private tenure because it is perceived to be a primitive accumulation. This observation is also echoed by Mulolwa (2006) who showed that customary tenure has become a target for transformation because it is perceived to be insecure, it discriminates against women, it lacks individual ownership of land, causes environmental degradation, and it embodies weak institutions and management structures. This is a similar argument found in Johnson (2011) who argued that reforming these systems would unleash the vast economic growth potential in tourism, agriculture, and industry in Sierra Leone; implying that in the current state these systems hinder such development. Equally Amone and Lakwo (2014) attributed underdevelopment in northern Uganda to customary land ownership. Specifically, Amone and Lakwo (2014) found a positive relationship between customary land ownership and
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 3 underdevelopment. The main reasons cited are underutilization of resources, low agricultural practices leading to food insecurity and famine, existence of land conflict, and inability to access loans for development. The study thus recommended freehold tenure as a better alternative to customary tenure in northern Uganda. Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel also showed that the call for the privatizing of customary land rights is an old one. Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997) explored the transformation of customary tenure systems and the impact on women’s rights to land in Africa. In this study, diversity, institutions, and structures (e.g., inheritance, marriage) were identified as having influence on rights to land, and the trend toward uniformity and increasing matrilineal control. Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997) asserted that privatization disadvantages groups such as poor rural women and ethnic minorities while advantaging community leaders and male-headed households who are able to successfully claim their ownership rights to land. In terms of the effects of change, Dutse (2006), in a study based on investigating land commercialization on agricultural production in Nigeria, found that education had a significant influence on sale of land while urban influence had a significant contribution on purchase of land. Furthermore Dutse (2006) concluded that urban influence and household size were significantly related to agricultural production. Pomevor (2014) also investigated the dynamics of the customary land tenure practices in Nigeria; particularly on the operation of a private land market. The study concluded that rapid urbanization was a principal driver for privatization of land rights. Mwesigye (2014) similarly investigated the evolution of land institutions and its effects on security of tenure, land transactions, and agricultural productivity in Uganda. The assertion in this study was that institutions that strengthened private land rights and tenure security were crucial in the promotion of agricultural growth. It further contended that although customary land tenure systems are also evolving towards private ownership, the questions on how these evolve remain unanswered. Thus Mwesigye (2014) focused on examining the impact of rural-to-rural migration, ethnic diversity, and population pressure on the evolution of land institutions and on land conflicts in rural Uganda. The study further found that there is a higher likelihood of the emergence of private land ownership in immigrant and ethnically diverse communities than in ethnically homogenous non-immigrant communities; pointing to the influence of newcomers on the evolution of land tenure in their settled localities. Overall this literature review noted diversity in the study of customary land tenure systems; although very few are pointed at understanding urban influences as instigators of change in these systems. Having said that, it can be noted that change in customary areas can be induced either gradually, through an evolutionary process, or suddenly through a change in national laws and policies. This study is based on the earlier, with the understanding that urban influences are transmitted through various mechanisms such as commoditization of land and selling of agricultural produce. In that regard, this study found that literature can be broadly categorized in two main strands: the first being the literature that ends at investigating customary land tenure systems and drivers of change while the second set extends its investigations to the effects of such change on security of tenure, poverty reduction, productivity, livelihoods, access to credit, investment, and land markets (Migot-Adhola, Hazell, Blarel, & Place, 1991; Okoth-Ogendo, 1993; Leonard & Longbottom, 2000; Place & Otsuka, 2001, 2002; Mulolwa, 2006; Payne, Duran-Lasserve, & Rakodi, 2007, 2008; Place, 2009). This study is of the latter type. The general conclusion from this literature review is that the “jury is out” on customary land tenure systems. Although for a long time customary land tenure systems were seen as disorganized and a hindrance to social and economic development in most countries (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007) and that the solution was simply to reform or formalize (that is change laws and policies and issue titles on customary land), such views have been toned down. Part of the reason is due to counter-arguments from the land rights and livelihood proponents (such as Ben Cousins, Martin Taylor, Martin Adams, Robin Palmer, Roy Chileshe and others) and failed title registration programs across Africa. There is
4 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA now a general realization that customary land tenure systems perform more social and economic functions beyond what a formalistic private title registration system could provide. Thus instead of imposing change through statutory reform, attention has shifted to understanding how these systems evolve on their own and how then state laws can complement this process. Hence rather than a disruptive imposition of national laws, a more inclusive process of change is preferred, justifying the need to understand the dynamics of customary land tenure systems. Ultimately, the responsibility to formulate laws and policies in a country like Zambia lies with the state; however, for these laws and policies to be more effective there is a need to understand the local dynamics in customary land tenure systems. This study is an attempt in this direction.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 5 4.0 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
In a bid to understand the process of change of customary land tenure systems, the use of the term “customary” has also come under scrutiny. The reasons being that in many instances of change, “customs” or “traditions” of indigenous communities have become indistinguishable from those imported. This has ignited a debate in the literature with some scholars arguing that what is often referred to as “customary” could rightly be called local land tenure systems; recognizing the changed state of customary systems (Eichelsheim, 1990; Cotula, 2007). The argument is that African customary systems have been changing since the appearance of European settlers such that in many cases what is seen as “customary” is actually an outcome of a combination of local and imported ideologies. Cotula (2007) thus defines “local land tenure systems” as a combination of “statutory” and “customary” systems. Cotula (2007) also asserts that these local land tenure systems are dynamic and changing due to a number of influences such as “demographic growth, urbanization, the cash economy, livelihood diversification, greater integration in the global economy, and cultural change” (Cotula, 2007: 1). Thus customary land tenure systems undergo a continuous change process in adaptation and reinterpretation. Such changes tend to confirm the “evolutionary theory of land rights,” although the theory principally argues that greater individualization and commercialization of land rights is a result of demographic growth and commercialization of land rights. Thus the fact that customary land tenure systems are dynamic is no longer debatable in scholarly literature. This research project is conceived from the initial perspective that cities and towns have major influence in commercializing activities in surrounding rural and customary areas (see figure below). This influence can be differentiated through examination of the cash economy and its transmission mechanisms. In that regard, urbanization’s effects on rural tenure institutions and processes (land acquisition, security of land holding, transfer of land, transmission and succession, and land abandonment), livelihoods, social organization, institutions (rules and regulations), and commerce can then be investigated. This research examines the extent to which customary land tenure systems and rural livelihoods have been influenced by the cash economy and other influences from urban centers of Zambia. FIGURE 1: URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND LIVELIHOODS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
6 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research employed both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the major instruments being household questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. Empirical data was collected from village communities located in Lufwanyama District of Copperbelt Province in Zambia. The study involved a three-stage approach: (a) identification of variables (deemed influential factors on customary land tenure and rural livelihoods); (b) evaluation of data from each of the three chiefdoms against these variables; and, (c) comparison of results.
5.1 SELECTION OF STUDY AREAS AND SAMPLING METHOD Villages situated in three chiefdoms – Shimukunami, Fungulwe, and Shibuchinga – were purposefully selected as case studies for this research. The three chiefdoms are situated at different distances from the centers of influence; Chieftainess Shimukunami is the closest at 63 kilometers from Kitwe, Chief Shibuchinga at 102 kilometers, and Chief Fungulwe the furthest at 128 kilometers. The rationale for selecting villages at different distances is to enable the capture of any changes in effects with increasing distance from the centers of influence.
5.2 DATA COLLECTION Villages were selected using purposeful sampling in order to incorporate the distance component in the selection. Households were selected using random sampling techniques, focusing mainly on households situated nearer palaces in the three chiefdoms, while individuals for in-depth interviews targeted village headmen/women and other senior villagers. A total of 150 questionnaires, 50 per chiefdom, were administered for this study. As shown by the Lufwanyama District Situation Analysis Report of 2015, the population of the district is settled mainly along the Kalulushi-Kalengwa road (M18) which cuts across the district. The result is that the district has a linear pattern of population distribution with the main centers of agglomeration being the chiefdoms of Nkana, Shimukunami, Fungulwe, and Shibuchinga. These are also potential growth centers for the district. This leaves the rest of the population scattered across the vast remaining area of the district. Thus the most practical approach was to administer questionnaires starting from the palaces and moving outward. In addition, one focus group with eight senior individuals (males and females) was conducted per chiefdom and in-depth interviews with three headmen/women, one per chiefdom were also conducted. A total of 177 individuals were interviewed from the three chiefdoms.
5.3 DATA ANALYSIS Analysis of questionnaires used the Statistical Package for Social Science, using cross-tabulations, chi- square test, correlation test, graphs, chart, and other such analysis tools wherever applicable. Thematic analysis was used for qualitative data from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews.
5.4 LUFWANYMA DISTRICT PROFILE
Lufwanyama is a rural, mainly customary, district situated on the Copperbelt Province of Zambia, on the western boundary with North-Western Province (see map below). According to the Census of Housing and Population, Lufwanyama’s population stood at 78,503 in 2010 (Central Statistics Office, 2012). With
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 7 land coverage of 9,849 square kilometers, Lufwanyama has a population density of eight persons per square kilometer, making it one of the least populated districts in Copperbelt Province. The district has six chiefdoms, namely: Nkana, Shibuchinga, Mukutuma, Fungulwe, Shimukunami, and Lumpuma. Despite its closeness to three urban districts (Luanshya, Kitwe, and Chingola), Lufwanyama is largely undeveloped economically, relying mainly on mining of emeralds and copper, timber production, and agriculture. FIGURE 2: LUFMANYAMA DISTRICT LOCATION AND LAND USE MAP WITH NEIGHBORING URBAN CENTERS
Source: Lufwanyama Town Council (2015) District Situation Analysis [Unpublished]
8 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA FIGURE 3: LOCATION MAP SHOWING THREE CHIEFDOMS IN RELATION TO THE CITY OF KITWE
Source: Adapted from Google Maps
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 9 6.0 RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION
As stated earlier, data for this study was collected from three chiefdoms, Shimukunami, Shibuchinga, and Fungulwe. This data is presented and analyzed within five parts: socioeconomic characteristics of the three chiefdoms; mechanisms that facilitate interaction between chiefdoms and urban centers; influences on customary land tenure systems; sources of livelihoods; and, governance structures and institutions.
6.1 SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE CHIEFDOMS As an entry point, it is important to understand the socioeconomic characteristics of the three chiefdoms. Specifically this involved the analysis on gender, age, education level, occupation, income and expenditure, and occupancy type (i.e. owner/tenants). Gender - The study administered 150 questionnaires with respondents representing 74% male and 25% female heads of households in Shimukunami, 90% male and 10% female heads of households in Shibuchinga, and 93.6% male and 6.4% female heads of households in Fungulwe. Overall this represented 85.7% male heads of households and 14.3% female heads of households. It is clear that respondents were skewed towards male heads of households, as often is the case in customary areas. However there was no significant difference between the three chiefdoms in this aspect. Age - In terms of the age, the overall majority (82%) of respondents fell between 31 and 60 years. The analysis between the age groups showed that there were no significant differences between the chiefdoms. For instance, Shimukunami had 26% between the ages of 31-40 years, Shibuchinga had 20% in this same group, while Fungulwe had 33.3%. Similarly, between the age groups of 41-50 years, Shimukunami recorded 36%, 30% for Shibuchinga, and 33.3% for Fungulwe. For the age group between 51-60 years, Shimukunami had 30%, Shibuchinga 32%, and Fungulwe 14.6%. Overall, only 10.1% were above 61 years while 0.7% were below 20 years. These figures revealed that most respondents are within the economically productive age groups as the majority are below 65 years, the official retirement age in Zambia. Education level - At least 52% of respondents were found to have attained a primary level education in the three chiefdoms. For instances this was represented by 44% of respondents in Shimukunami, 54% in Shibuchinga, and 58% in Fungulwe. Only 32%, 34%, and 22% were found to have attained secondary education in Shimukunami, Shibuchinga, and Fungulwe, respectively. Overall there were very few college (6.2%) and university (3.4%) graduates in the three chiefdoms. Nonetheless the study noted that there were no significant differences between the three chiefdoms in terms of highest education attained. Occupation - The study then examined the occupations of these respondents. It was found that the majority (63%) are only in farming while another 15% are in farming and other activities such as formal employment, business, hairdressing, vending, etc. Very few (5%) though are in gainful employment such as public service (e.g. teachers, magistrate, etc.) or pastoral work (e.g. priests) while the rest are in some form of self-employment as builders, carpenters, fishermen, etc. Thus the way land is administered becomes a critical factor in the survival and livelihoods of these respondents.
10 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA TABLE 1: TOTAL INCOME CHIEFDOM TOTAL INCOME TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE 0 – 500 48.0% 76.0% 56.0% 60.0% 501 – 600 10.0% 6.0% 4.0% 6.7% 601 – 700 4.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 701 – 800 6.0% 0.0% 8.0% 4.7% 801 – 900 8.0% 2.0% 6.0% 5.3% 901 – 1000 16.0% 8.0% 8.0% 10.7% 1001 and above 8.0% 8.0% 16.0% 10.7% TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Income and expenditure - An analysis of incomes of respondents revealed that the majority earned less than K5001; as shown in Table 1 above. Statistics also revealed that there were at least 10% who earned over K1000 (approx. US$100) per month; this was so for at least 8% of respondents in Shimukunami and Shibuchinga, and 16% in Fungulwe. Compared to expenditure, the study found a similar pattern with 65% spending less than K500 per month and 6.7% spending over K1000 per month across the chiefdoms (see Table 2). The implication of these results are that most residents in the three chiefdoms could be said to be living in extreme poverty according to the updated 2015 World Bank international poverty threshold of US$1.902 per day. In such an environment, sustenance or livelihoods based on their own grown agricultural produce become critical; again underscoring the point that land tenure systems are a key component for the survival of communities on customary land.
TABLE 2: TOTAL EXPENDITURE CHIEFDOM TOTAL INCOME TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE 0 – 500 48.0% 82.0% 65.3% 65.1% 501 – 600 16.0% 6.0% 6.1% 9.4% 601 – 700 6.0% 4.0% 6.1% 5.4% 701 – 800 8.0% 2.0% 10.2% 6.7% 801 – 900 6.0% 4.0% 4.1% 4.7% 901 – 1000 6.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 1001 and above 10.0% 2.0% 8.2% 6.7% TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Occupancy type - In terms of the split between “owners”3 and tenants, the study found that 91% are owners while only 9% are tenants; further revealing that access to land and its protection is important for most residents in these areas. The study revealed that only 8% were renting in Shimukunami (the closet to the major centers), 2% in Fungulwe, and 2% in Shibuchinga.
1 Approximately US$50.00 per month; at K10.00 = US$1.00. 2 Previous line was US$1.25 a day from 2005. 3 “Ownership” here is understood in a non-technical sense as simply a person with a primary grant from the allocating authority; in this instance, the traditional authority. The exact form of this “ownership” is discussed later.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 11 6.2 MECHANISMS THAT FACILITATE INTERACTION BETWEEN CHIEFDOMS AND URBAN CENTRES The examination of the linkages between the three case study chiefdoms, Kalulushi town, and the city of Kitwe was cardinal to exploring the possible channels or mechanisms through which urban areas exert influence on customary systems. Thus the study scrutinized the distance to the nearest town of Kalulushi and consequently the city of Kitwe, the time it takes for villagers to reach these centers, means of transport and communication, frequency of visits, and purpose of these visits. Distances - As earlier pointed out, the three chiefdoms are situated at different distances from the centers of influence. Shimukunami is the closest at 63 kilometers from Kitwe, Shibuchinga at 102 kilometers, and Fungulwe the furthest at 128 kilometers. Travelling time - It was clear from the three chiefdoms that Kalulushi was the closest town while Kitwe was the closet major commercial center and market. This was also clearly seen from the time taken by respondents to reach these centers which ranged from 45 minutes from Shimukunami to nine hours from Fungulwe; with the average times being 50 minutes from Shimukunami, 2 hours 30 minutes from Shibuchinga, and 4 hours from Fungulwe (see Figure 4). FIGURE 4: TRAVELING TIME INTO TOWNS
Means of transport - The difference in the time taken to reach these centers was determined mainly by the means of transport used, which ranged from bicycles to own vehicles. The study revealed that most respondents (at least 89%) do not own vehicles and thus rely on public transport as their usual means of transport into towns and cities. This was the case for 92% of Shimukunami respondents, 96% for Shibuchinga, and 80% for Fungulwe. Fungulwe also reported 12% who use their own vehicles and 8% bicycle, which was slightly higher than the other two chiefdoms. A further observation in Fungulwe was that the main access road was in a poor state which gets worse in the rainy seasons (November to April)4. Consequently public transporters are hesitant to reach the chiefdom and prefer the bituminous tarred road from Kalulushi to Shimukunami and the gravel road to Shibuchinga. This forces residents of Fungulwe to rely more on their own transport, including bicycles; hence the wide difference in time taken to reach urban centers.
4 This was experienced by these researchers during data collection from December 2016 to January 2017.
12 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA Thus besides the distance, the state of the access road is also a major determinant on travelling time, frequency, and means of transport. For instance, the bituminous tarred road ends in Shimukunami with another 39 kilometers to Shibuchinga still a gravel road5. The road to Fungulwe though is simply a graded road and in major parts in very poor condition, which contributes to accessibility difficulties. Most discussants during focus group meetings bemoaned the exorbitant fares charged by private operators - popularly known as “pirate” taxis, who are the only means in the absence of a public transportation system. These high fares impact negatively on their incomes, and consequently their livelihoods, as a substantial amount of their sales proceeds is paid towards transport fares6 when they take their produce for selling in towns. Means of communication - The usual means of communication between the chiefdoms and towns and cities is mobile phones; as revealed by 93% of respondents, broken down as 96% in Shimukunami, 100% in Shibuchinga, and 83% in Fungulwe. Shimukunami also recorded 4% who rely on public phones and 2% for Fungulwe. In addition Fungulwe had another 6% who use letters and messages through others. Frequency - The study found that at least half the respondents visited town and cities monthly – this was 50% in Shimukunami, 54% in Shibuchinga, and 52% in Fungulwe. Another substantial number revealed that they visited towns and cities whenever need arose – this was true for 42% of respondents in Shimukunami, 38% in Shibuchinga, and 34% in Fungulwe. As discussed below, the need for visiting towns and cities is often to sell agricultural produce and usually at the end of the month. Thus the majority of respondents visit towns and cities monthly. Overall only 10% reported that they visited towns and cities weekly. A head man at Shibuchinga observed that: Because it is very far, people here rarely go to town. I only go there once after a month to visit my children to request for help with fertilizer and money for other things. But there are some business people who own vehicles or can hire a vehicle to go and order stock for their shops who do so more than once a month. The few times people go to town they go to buy clothing, food, building materials, farm inputs, motor vehicle spare parts, bicycles, and other items which cannot be bought here in the village (Interview, 5 January 2017). A further analysis revealed that there was a relationship between shopping/selling activities and monthly visits into towns, implying that respondents may be taking advantage of the month end when most formally employed urbanites get their wages. Thus respondents would want to maximize their returns on each visit to town. During focus group discussions, discussants complained about the cost of transport into towns, hence planning visits into town carefully was essential. This was further supported by results that showed a relationship between frequency into towns and time taken, with the lowest time being from Shimukunami into town while the highest being from Fungulwe.
6.3 INFLUENCES ON LAND TENURE SYSTEMS A key objective of this study was to investigate the influence of urban centers on the three chiefdoms in relation to land tenure systems. Five key parameters were therefore important in this section, that is: initial acquisition of land, land rights and documentation, emergence of a land markets and land prices, and tenure and fear of dispossession.
5 However works for upgrading to bituminous standard had already commenced at the time of collecting data for this study. 6 Charges per person (one way) are K60 from Fungulwe, K50 from Shibuchinga and K30 from Shimukunami, to Kalulushi respectively; an additional K8 is paid from Kalulushi to Kitwe. Another charge is paid for the luggage, determined by the size and type of the luggage.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 13 Initial acquisition of land -The study found that there was no significant difference in the initial acquisition of land amongst the three chiefdoms. The primary way to acquire land in all the chiefdoms is through the chief/tainess, who is assisted by headmen/women. Among respondents, 60% were allocated land by the chief/tainess and 10% by headmen/women in Shimukunami; 74% by the chief and 4% by headmen/women in Shibuchinga; and, 56% by the chief and 24% by headmen/women in Fungulwe. Results in Table 3 also showed that 6% bought land in Shimukunami, 18% in Shibuchinga, and 14% in Fungulwe; this shows evidence of an emerging land market. However, as later discussed, the study found that many respondents were conflicted when asked on market activities of selling and buying land.
TABLE 3: TOTAL INITIAL ACQUISITION OF LAND CHIEFDOM METHOD TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE Allocated by headman/woman 10.0% 4.0% 24.0% 12.7% Allocated by chief/tainess 60.0% 74.0% 56.0% 63.3% Bought 6.0% 18.0% 14.0% 12.7% Inherited 16.0% 0.0% 2.0% 6.0% Rented 8.0% 2.0% 2.0% 4.0% Others 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.3% TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Land rights and documentation - The study then interrogated the respondents on what rights they thought they had on the land. It was clear from the scrutiny of the documentation discussed below that there are no clear rights stipulated in either the farm or village permits (Figure 5 shows the variety of documents available). Thus this study sought to capture the perceptions of the users on what rights they thought they had on land. It was interesting to note that respondents felt they had various rights on land (see Table 4). Overall, all respondents felt they had the right to use, 25% felt had the right to sell, 41% had the right to let, 78% had the right to develop/improve, 7% had the right to bequeath, and 1% did not know what rights they had. The implication of these results is that where terms and conditions are not expressly outlined, users on land hold certain perceptions on what their land rights are. Thus how land users perceive their rights becomes amenable by urban influences.
TABLE 4: LAND RIGHTS CHIEFDOM METHOD TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE Right to use 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Right to sale 18% 36.0% 22.0% 25.0% Right to let 18.0% 74.0% 32.0% 41.0% Right to develop 78.0% 64.0% 92.0% 78.0% Right to give away 0.0% 16.0% 6.0% 7.0% Do not know 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% TOTAL (COUNT) 50 50 50 150
Despite these perceived rights on land, the study found that very few had documents to prove ownership on their occupancy; especially certificates of titles which are considered the absolute proof of ownership by the Lands and Deeds Registry Act of the Laws of Zambia. Overall 38% claimed to have some document granting them rights on the land while the majority (62%) had no form of
14 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA documentation. A further scrutiny revealed this to comprise 62% in Shimukunami, 56% in Shibuchinga, and 68% in Fungulwe having no form of document. Furthermore an examination of documents held showed that overall these comprised mainly farm and/or village permits or local occupation certificates (33%). Very few respondents (at least 1%) were reported to have title deeds while the majority as stated above had no document. FIGURE 5: DOCUMENTATION TYPE
A 65 years old headman and chief’s adviser (Chilolo) for 22 years in Shibuchinga Chiefdom explained that:
What I know is that the Chief only grants farm permits and is not happy with the idea of title deeds. I’m not sure if there are people who have acquired title deeds with the help of the Chief. By the way if the applicant does not develop the land or shows disrespect to the Chief or makes a habit of insulting people in the community the Chief may re-possess the land and offer it to someone with capacity to develop the land and who is respectful (Interview, 5 January 2017).
An interesting observation from the results was that Shibuchinga had more farm permits (at 36%) than the other chiefdoms (Shimukunami at 8% and Fungulwe at 10%). As explained later, this is due to Shibuchinga's proximity to Luswishi farm block which is exerting its own pressure on the customary tenure system.
Focus group discussants argued that a title deed reduces the chief’s powers in that once an individual obtains title they become pompous towards traditional leaders; because of that title deeds were not favored – examples were given in Shimukunami and Shibuchinga. The implication of these results is twofold: firstly, despite the closeness to urban centers and the pressure for private titles, the impact of this influence will be dependent on the receptiveness of traditional authorities in the area; Shimukunami is a good example in this regard. Secondly, traditional authorities are not against documentation of land rights for their subjects but object to any documentation system that also takes away their powers;
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 15 hence preference for farm and village permits which ensure that traditional authorities retain power and control on allocated land.
The study also found that at least 62% in Shimukunami, 66% in Shibuchinga, and 10% in Fungulwe have more than one piece of land. When interrogated further it was found that the second piece of land was usually farmland as revealed by 86% in Shimukunami, 41% in Shibuchinga, and 17% in Fungulwe. Emergence of land markets and land prices - An evident impact of the influence of the urban areas and monetization of the customary land tenure system is on the emergence of a property market and the level of prices. Statistics showed that all three chiefdoms have regular visitations from weekend farmers, local town elites, and foreign investors who frequent their areas. For instance on market activities of buying or selling land in the last five years, 98% of respondents in Shibuchinga said it was low compared to 58% in Fungulwe and 42% in Shimukunami (see Table 5). However 19% in Shimukunami and Fungulwe thought it was moderate.
TABLE 5: HOW MANY PEOPLE HAVE YOU HEARD OF BUYING AND SELLING IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS? NUMBER BUYING AND CHIEFDOM TOTAL SELLING SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE None 4.2% 2.0% 12.5% 6.2% Low 41.7% 98.0% 58.3% 66.4% Moderate 18.8% 0.0% 18.8% 12.3% High 35.4% 0.0% 10.4% 15.1% TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
These results were interrogated further to understand what types of people are mostly seen looking for land in chiefdoms. These were found to be mainly local investors who constituted 90% of those looking for land; broken down as 84% in Shimukunami, 94% in Shibuchinga, and 94% in Fungulwe. Another major group was foreign investors as revealed by 62% of respondent in Shimukunami, 8% in Shibuchinga, and 56% in Fungulwe. Long term village elder and headmen in Shimukunami and Shibuchinga elaborated as follows: Established village residents can clear their own land if they are familiar with other people’s boundaries but they risk contestation of boundaries later. For “outsiders” (local or foreign investors) the assistance of a headman or Chilolo is inevitable and assures the land seeker of less problems later (Interview with village elder at Shimukunami, 4 January 2017) Outsiders need to go through all the land acquisition procedures with the headman and Chief. This is because we need to know them, and they also need to know our ways, the authority of the Chief and headman. We are friendly and respectful and we expect our visitors to do the same. Very few local people want “farm permits” but if they do, they will be expected to make it formal with the Chief and District council (Interview with village elder at Shibuchinga, 5 January 2017).
Shimukunami though had a high percentage (35%) who thought that market activities of buying and selling land were high in the chiefdom. This result revealed that there is high pressure for land in Shiumukunami because of its proximity to towns and cities and easy accessibility but as discussed earlier, and through focus group discussions, it was found that there were very few titles issued in this chiefdom. Thus the context of these results is that while market forces on land are high in Shimukunami, many times these do not translate into sale of land but simply allocation for use of customary land
16 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA mainly for agricultural production. These results also exemplify the pervasiveness of market forces and that given a supportive local environment a land market would rapidly emerge. A key argument of the neo-classical economic theory on property is that rights on land should be private, with title deeds as the main document and evidence of privatized land rights. Thus to further contextualize these results, the study then asked to know how many of the non-residents have proceeded to obtain title deeds. Responses varied from 1 to 70 (see Figure 6), with the majority being in Shibuchinga and the least in Shimukunami. FIGURE 6: HOW MANY PEOPLE YOU HEARD HAVE OBTAINED TITLE
In terms of the rationale for this study, this sounded contradictory as Shimukunami is the closest to the urban centers and should therefore feel the highest impact. However during focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, two factors explained this “distortion.” Firstly, Shimukunami was found to be the most opposed to the selling and titling of land of the three chiefdoms. Secondly, the establishment of the Luswishi farm block in Shibuchinga (adjoining the customary area) where land is sold on leasehold interests and titled exerts a further influence in addition to the urban influences. As evidence of an established market, the study found that respondents are fairly knowledgeable about the going prices of land in chiefdoms. For instance results (see Figure 7) revealed that prices of land ranged from a minimum of K150 per hectare for customary land with a maximum of K5000 per hectare for land with title. However there were significant differences in prices between the three chiefdoms, with Shimukunami recording a mean of K1,802 per hectare, K740 per hectare for Shibuchinga, and K269 per hectare for Fungulwe – with the ANOVA test showing F = 41.442 and p = 0.000 at 95% confidence level. This revealed that the further out from towns and cities the cheaper the land.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 17
FIGURE 7: PRICE LEVEL PER HECTARE
A further analysis of the sizes of land acquired showed that the further away from towns and cities, the larger the land parcels, probably because it is cheaper to acquire and there is less pressure on acquisition from non-residents. For instance comparison of means using the ANOVA test showed that Shimukunami had a mean of 3.7 hectares, 11.5 hectares for Shibuchinga, and 46.6 hectares for Fungulwe – this difference was statistically significant with F = 11.565, p = 0.000 at 95% confidence level. However results in Table 6 below show that the average size for Fungulwe was too large compared to the other two chiefdoms; a further scrutiny though revealed that this was influenced by a few land parcels of 100 and 250 hectares allocated in the area. Nonetheless, the influence of proximity to towns and cities was clearly evident in the prices for land and the sizes of land acquired. TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LAND HOLDING SIZES STD CHIEFDOM MEAN N MEDIAN MIN MAX SKEWNESS DEVIATION Shimukunami 3.71 49 14.6 .5 .0120 100 6.3 Shibuchinga 11.51 45 23.8 .6 .0100 100 2.7 Fungulwe 46.6 38 74.4 17.5 2.0000 250 2.7 Total 18.7 132 46.5 2.0 .0100 250 4.0
Tenure and fear of dispossession - Because of undocumented rights, tenure on customary land is not clearly defined. Thus the study queried respondents on how long they thought were entitled to use the land. Responses varied with periods ranging from two years to life (see Figure 8 below). The majority of respondents believed that once given, they are entitled to stay on the land for the rest of their life. Because of the unwritten nature of customary land grants, the interpretation of how long one stays on the land is left to the interpretation of the user. It was however clear during focus group discussions and in-depth interviews that land will normally be reallocated to someone else only if left idle for two or three years.
18 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA FIGURE 8: TENURE
Seeing that the majority of respondents had perceived land rights which were not adequately supported by documentation, the study then sought to investigate security of tenure of those rights. At least 64% of respondents were not fearful of losing their land in Shimukunami, just like 34% in Shibuchinga and 65% in Fungulwe (see Table 7 below). The insecurity of at least 66% of respondents in Shibuchinga however needed further explanation. As noted earlier, unlike the other two chiefdoms, Shibuchinga Chiefdom has a newly established farm block of Luswishi. The immediate perception is that the allocation of land to outsiders in Luswishi farm block heightens the level of insecure in Shibuchinga, which is reflected in their responses.
TABLE 7: DO YOU FEAR BEING DISPOSSESSED? CHIEFDOM RESPONSE TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE No 64.0% 34.0% 64.6% 54.1% Yes 36.0% 66.0% 35.4% 45.9% TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
This is additionally explained in the cases of displacements. For instance when asked if outsiders displaced locals during their land acquisition process, 96% in Shibuchinga, 80% in Fungulwe, and 65% in Shimukunami agreed. Thus in the minds of the respondents, they too can lose their land to investors who use money to acquire land, like in the Luswishi farm block. Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews revealed that respondents were aware of the allocation to Gourock and other large investors in Shibuchinga and EC Mining and Cheelo Farms in Fungulwe; however, no major investors were reported in Shimukunami.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 19 FIGURE 9: BIGGEST THREAT TO POSESSION
When asked who posed the greatest threat, 68% of respondents in Shimukunami felt it was the Chieftainess, 30% in Shibuchinga felt it was the Chief, while 54.2% in Fungulwe felt the same. However the reason cited was simply that as the custodian of customary land, the chief/tainess has the power to repossess the land. Thus the major private threat were mainly investors, local (16%) and foreign (16%). For instance as it is clear from Figure 9 above, this can be differentiated with respondents in Shibuchinga fearing investors more (46% local and 12% foreigner) than in the other two chiefdoms.
6.4 MAJOR LIVELIHOODS ACTIVITIES Proximity to towns and cities has a major impact on livelihoods through their contribution to income generation of the inhabitants in customary areas. Furthermore the study hypothesized that their frequent interaction with major urban centers also exerts influence on customary livelihoods. The study thus examined income generation activities, major crops grown in chiefdoms, and the closest major market for their commodities. Income generation - The main sources of income was found to be selling of agricultural produce (84%), commercial trading (groceries, vending, etc) (23%), and income through salaries for the formally employed (14%) (see Table 8 below). However these activities can be differentiated between the three chiefdoms. For instance 76% of respondents in Shimukunami indicated that selling agricultural produce was an important livelihood activity in the chiefdom, as did 90% of respondents in Shibuchinga and 96% in Fungulwe. Commercial trading was felt to be important by 22% of respondents in Shimukunami, 36% in Shibuchinga ,and 11% in Fungulwe. Only a few respondents are formally employed and drawing a salary as indicated by 14% in Shimukunami, 14% in Shibuchinga, and 15% in Fungulwe.
20 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA TABLE 8: INCOME GENERATION INCOME GENERATION CHIEFDOM TOTAL SOURCE SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE Selling of agricultural produce 75.5% 90.0% 95.7% 84% Commercial trading 22.4% 36.0% 10.9% 22.7% Salary 14.3% 14.0% 15.2% 14% TOTAL (COUNT) 49 50 46 145
At Fungulwe the focus group discussion outlined the livelihood strategies of villagers as follows: The main livelihood of people here is agriculture. Food is grown for home consumption and for sale. People grow maize, sorghum, soya beans, and various other vegetables. In particular hybrid maize and soya beans are grown as cash crops. The Tonga people keep cattle, but the Lamba people mostly keep goats and free range village chickens. Chickens are mostly reared for home consumption, but goats are usually transported to Kalulushi or Kitwe for sale. A few well-off people run grocery shops where they sell small items such as soap, sugar, salt, match-sticks, candles, and talk time. Some women brew local beer for sale. There are a few bricklayers and roofers who charge for their services in construction of houses. We also have teachers who teach at Fungulwe School (Focus group discussion, 13 January 2017). These results further show the importance of land in the livelihood strategies of respondents in the three chiefdoms. Although this study was limited on data on agricultural production in each chiefdom, the expectation is that the more accessible to land, the more agricultural products and the better the living standards in the area. It was also clear from these statistics that the closer to urban centers the more diversified the income generating activities. For instance there was more commercial trading in Shibuchinga and Shimukunami than Fungulwe. However the involvement of residents in commercial trading is different. For example the closeness of Shimukunami to the urban centers also attracts outsiders, particularly from Kitwe and Kalulushi, who find trading businesses in these areas profitable. This creates competition and reduces the number of local residents involved in the activity. For Shibuchinga, the distance is a discouragement to most outsiders leaving the opportunity to locals but this is mainly for small vending-type commercial activities. Fungulwe is farthest from town centers making it difficult for both types of traders, local and outsiders. Statistics on those drawing salaries also needs further explanation. The study found that the more developed the public facilities in the chiefdom, the more opportunities for formal employment for residents. For instance, Shimukunami was found to be the headquarters for the district with public facilities such as municipal council offices (civic center), district commissioner's office, hospital, secondary school, police station, and other facilities, such as a National Savings and Credit Bank branch. In a strict linear relationship, Shimukunami should have more formally employed residents than the other two chiefdoms. However in this non-linear relationship, other factors distort this relationship, which ironically is again explained by Shimukunami's close proximity to urban centers. As revealed during focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, many of the employees in these public facilities are recruited from outside the chiefdoms, including those who drive daily into Lufwanyama from the nearby town of Kalulushi because of a good road and shorter distance. This has contributed to dampening the number of formally employed local residents of Shimukunami. The main activities followed into towns were mainly selling of agricultural farm produce. The study then sought to understand the main crops grown for the market. As shown in Table 9, the study found that the main crops grown were maize (100%), groundnuts (42%), sweet potatoes (41%), eggplants (11%),
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 21 and others (such as cassava, soya beans, Irish potatoes and beans) (11%). The closet markets were found to be Kitwe and Kalulushi, with others being Lufyanyama itself, Mpongwe, and Luanshya.
TABLE 9: MAJOR CROPS CHIEFDOM CROP TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE Maize 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100% Sweet Potatoes 26.0% 80.0% 18.0% 41.3% Groundnuts 36.0% 60.0% 30.0% 42.0% Eggplants 22.0% 4.0% 6.0% 10.7% Others 8.0% 16.0% 8.0% 10.7% TOTAL (COUNT) 50 50 50 150
6.5 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (RULES AND REGULATIONS)
The overall organizational structure in customary areas comprises the chief/tainess (assisted by chief's advisers or ba chilolo), section chairmen/women, village headmen/women, and then family heads. These play different roles in the allocation of land and governance of land in customary areas. The chief/tainess by traditional custom is a hereditary position while village headmen/women are elected from amongst family members. As revealed during focus group discussions, these would normally be persons considered wise and able to look after the family interests properly. Villages are then grouped into sections with a chairperson elected once a year during the visit of the chief/tainess to that section. For instance, Shimukunami has 57 villages divided in four sections, each with a chief person. Ba chilolo or chief’s advisers are appointed at the chief’s pleasure to assist in the governance of the chiefdom. Institutions, defined within the new institutional economics as rules of the game (North, 1990), are key in enabling or constraining actions within customary areas. Thus how these institutions emerge and evolve over time was important for this study. The study found that often respondents do not know how these institutions emerge as they are preserved mentally and transmitted verbally with custodians being the chief/tainess. The study revealed that at least 79% of respondents knew that the chief/tainess is the custodian of rules and regulations within the chiefdom while the other 19% thought it were headmen/women; the other 2% were unsure. The study then asked what the major rules were in the chiefdoms. Table 10 shows some of these rules from the respondent's standpoint. It is clear from these rules that the major one is that land is not for sale and that this should strictly be followed.
TABLE 10: IMPORTANT RULES IN CUSTOMARY AREAS CHIEFDOM CROP TOTAL SHIMUKUNAMI SHIBUCHINGA FUNGULWE Consult on acquisition of land 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% Develop land within 2/3 years 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% Follow the Ten commandments 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% Keep Chief informed 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% Maintain boundaries 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.7% Maintain peace 0.0% 0.0% 8.0% 2.7% Maintain sanitary environment 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7%
22 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA No charcoal burning 0.0% 14.0% 2.0% 5.3% No early marriages 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% No encroachment 0.0% 2.0% 6.0% 2.7% No leaving land idle for 2-3 years 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.7% No illegal allocation of land 0.0% 26.0% 0.0% 8.7% No illegal building 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 1.3% No indiscriminate tree cutting 0.0% 0.0% 26.0% 8.7% No inheritance 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% No selling of land 90.0% 10.0% 16.0% 38.7% No squatting on land 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.7% Notify chief on demarcation 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.7% Observe boundaries 0.0% 10.0% 2.0% 4.0% Only Chief allocates land 0.0% 24.0% 24.0% 16.0% Pay yearly royalties 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The point here is that despite its lack of documentation, the unwritten customary rules and regulations assist in ensuring a certain level of order and stability in these areas. For instance this study found that land disputes were few. Statistics revealed that only 34%of respondents have themselves been involved in disputes on land with the major source being boundaries at 21%, ownership at 5%, and encroachments at 3%.
URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA 23 7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Five strands of evidence, attributable to proximity to urban centers, reveal the emergence and operation of land markets in all the three chiefdom: (a) that almost 13% of respondents acquired land through buying; (b) that 25% of land users felt they had the right to sell and 45% felt had the right to let; (c) that at least 94% thought that they had heard of buying and selling activities in the last five years; (d) that 32% perceived non-villagers (local and foreign) as a threat to their tenure because they had a lot of money for buying land; and, (e) that there are established levels of land prices, ranging from K150 to K5,000 per hectare, depending on whether it is purely customary or has some permits or title. This study asserts that the rate of commoditization of land in customary areas is also affected by other factors besides proximity to centers of influence – two of these being the attitude of the chiefdoms towards the commoditization pressures and government actions in the area. It was clear that selling of customary land is still strongly opposed. The rule not to sell land affects both the actions of residents on customary land and their perceptions on their land rights. However this opposition was strongest in Shimukunami which was revealed in the fact that despite its close proximity to the centers of influence, no title deeds were seen and very few sales of land were reported compared to the other two chiefdoms. The implication is not that there is no influence from Kalulushi and Kitwe, but that this influence finds strong resistance in the chiefdom. Furthermore the establishment of Luswishi farm block in Shibuchinga in which land is allocated on 99 year tradable leaseholds revealed a partial acceptance of change towards commoditization of the land in this chiefdom. The result is an effect, both positive and negative, on neighboring customary land tenure systems, in terms of selling and buying activities, land prices, documentation, and heightened threat of dispossession. Thus while the establishment of a farm block in Shibuchinga seemed to bring in contradictions in these findings, this study asserts that it actually highlights the multiple factors which combine to bring changes in customary land tenure systems. For instance this study highlights the impacts due to proximity to urban centers, direct government actions (e.g. establishment of farm blocks), and visitation of local and foreign investors. Desegregating the magnitude and direction of each influence is a complicated process which demands more nuanced research tools. A number of policy recommendations ensue from this study. Firstly, it is clear that close proximity to urban areas exerts pressure on customary areas in a number of ways, however the effects on customary tenure is counteracted by the stance taken by traditional leaders, specifically because of the effects of titling on their powers and control on land. Therefore a rights documentation system which does not necessarily result in taking away the powers of traditional authorities on land would be acceptable. There are clear examples, for instance in Botswana, where this has been done. The recently announced countrywide titling program by the Ministry of Lands will not solve problems in customary lands. Secondly, since the biggest cause of disputes in customary areas is on boundaries, low cost mechanisms for marking boundaries would help to minimize this problem. Thirdly, it was seen that government action, for instance the establishment of a farm block adjoining customary areas, exerts its own pressure especially when accompanied by displacement of local residents. Thus to avoid resistance by local communities, government action into customary areas
24 URBAN INFLUENCES, CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE SYSTEMS, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZAMBIA should be accompanied by mechanisms which protect the rights of local residents on the land. Finally, it is clear that customary areas have their own rules which are passed on verbally to newcomers into the areas. In many cases these rules are not very different from those included as terms and conditions in certificate of titles and perform the same functions of enabling or constraining its holders; thus an engagement of local communities in a bottom-up approach can assist in the codification of these rules which then lessens their fluidity.
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