Pillars of Peace
cademy for Peace and Development cademy for Peace and Development Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka
Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and APD Hargeisa, Somaliland Central Africa (ECA) T: (+252 2) 520304 P.O. Box 14520 - 00800 Nairobi, Kenya E: [email protected] PILLARS OF PEACE T: +254 20 2655228 W: www.apd-somaliland.org + 254 710607373 Somali Programme + 254 733605290 APD Burco, Somaliland Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: E: [email protected] T: (+252 2) 712 980/81/82 W: www.interpeace.org E: [email protected] W: www.apd-somaliland.org
in partnership with the United Nations Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
This publication was made possible through generous contributions and support from:
Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: ISBN: 978-9966-1665-2-4 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
9 x
9 789966 166524 Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
cademy for Peace and Development Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka Hargeisa, Somaliland Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 2 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
cademy for Peace and Development Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka Hargeisa, Somaliland
Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa (ECA) P.O. Box 14520 - 00800 Nairobi, Kenya T: +254 20 2655228 + 254 710607373 + 254 733605290 E: [email protected] W: www.interpeace.org
APD Hargeisa, Somaliland T: (+252 2) 520304 E: [email protected] W: www.apd-somaliland.org
APD Burco, Somaliland T: (+252 2) 712 980/81/82 E: [email protected] W: www.apd-somaliland.org
Acknowledgements This Report was prepared by the Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa.
Author: Mohamed Farah Hersi Research Advisor: Abdirahman Osman Raghe Other support: Former members of National Election Commission (NEC), Somaliland Political Parties, Somaliland Civil Society, and Abdirahman Ahmed Hussein Editor: Peter W. Mackenzie Design and layout: Gecko Media Printers: SAGAL Jet Front cover photo: Woman being assisted to vote in the 2012 Local Council Elections, © Academy for Peace and Development (APD) Back cover photo: A voter is marked with the indelible ink after voting ISBN: 978-9966-1665-2-4 Copyright: © Academy for Peace and Development (APD) Published: May 2015
This report was produced by the Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace and represents exclusively their own views. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the contributing donors and should not be relied upon as a statement of the contributing donors or their services. The contributing donors do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor do they accept responsibility for any use made thereof. 3
Contents
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations...... 5 List of Tables and Diagrams...... 6 Executive Summary...... 7 Somaliland’s Democratic Transition ...... 7 The 2012 local council elections...... 8 Electoral Institutions ...... 9 APD’s Engagement: Building Sustainable Peace ...... 9 Election Results: Complications and Achievements...... 10 Lessons Learned...... 11 The future of Somaliland’s elections...... 12
1. Introduction...... 15 1.1 Origins of democracy in Somaliland...... 16 2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition...... 19 2.1 Somaliland’s electoral history...... 19 2.1.1 Results and implications of the first local council elections ....20 2.1.2 The first presidential and parliamentary elections...... 22 2.1.3 The second presidential election...... 23 2.2 The 2012 local council elections...... 25 3. Electoral Challenges...... 29 3.1 Suspension of the voter register...... 29 3.2 Formation of new political associations...... 31 3.3 The open-list system...... 33 3.3.1 Logistical and legal hurdles...... 34 3.4 Electoral institutions ...... 36 3.4.1 Parliament ...... 36 3.4.2 National Electoral Commission...... 36 3.4.3 Political parties...... 36 3.4.4 Supreme Court...... 37 3.5 Security ...... 38 Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 4 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
4. APD’s engagement building sustainable peace ...... 39 4.1 Reforming the electoral legal framework...... 40 4.2 Clarifying the selection criteria of the three parties...... 41 4.3 Preparing non-legislative instruments ...... 44 4.4 Supporting other election-related activities...... 45 4.4.1 The voter education programme...... 46 5. Election results: complications and achievements...... 51 5.1 Election Day...... 51 5.2 The outcome of the local council elections...... 52 5.2.1 Women’s Participation...... 54 5.3 Shortcuts in council leadership nominations...... 57 5.4 The Seylac test...... 58 5.5 The Xaqsoor challenge...... 59 5.6 Deficits in the transition to democracy...... 61 6. Lesson Learned...... 63 6.1 The importance of dialogue in the electoral process...... 63 6.2 Institutionalization of electoral processes...... 64 6.3 The importance of a voter register...... 65 6.4 Revisiting the formation of new political associations...... 65 6.5 The role of the judiciary in electoral disputes...... 67 6.6 Effects of the open-list voting system...... 68 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections...... 71 7.1 Strengthening political leadership...... 71 7.1.1 The upcoming combined presidential and parliamentary elections: a test case for political leadership...... 72 7.2 Preparation of a credible voter register...... 74 7.2.1 Civil and voter registration: combined, separate, or integrated?...... 75 7.2.2 Choosing CVR: the consensus approach...... 77 7.3 Electoral law reform...... 81 7.4 Institutional reform...... 82 7.4.1 Seat allocation, constituency demarcation, and electoral formulas...... 85 7.5 Donors: moving from event-based to procedural electoral support .85 7.6 Enhancing the role of civil society and traditional leaders...... 86 7.7 Promoting political representation for women ...... 88 8. Conclusion...... 89 9. Bibliography...... 91 5
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
APD Academy for Peace and Development
ASAD Alliance for Salvation and Democracy
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
ERIS Electoral Reform International Services
IRI International Republican Institute
MOI Ministry of Interior
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NEC National Electoral Commission
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
PoP Pillars of Peace
PR Proportional Representation
RAC Registration and Approval Committee
ToT Trainer of Trainers
UCID Ururka Caddaalada iyo Daryeelka (Justice and Welfare Party)
UDUB Ururka Dimuqraadiga Ummadda Bahawday (United Peoples’ Democratic Party)
UN United Nations Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 6 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
List of Tables and Diagrams
Table 1: Regional distribution of votes for Somaliland’s political associations, 2002...... 20 Table 2: National distribution of votes for Somaliland’s political associations, 2002...... 21 Table 3: Calculation of winning parties using the RAC ranking method...... 43 Table 4: APD/IRI party agent training programme, 2012...... 46 Table 5: Votes for each political party/association by district and rank, 2012...... 51 Table 6: Seats won by each political party/association by district, 2012...... 51 Table 7: Gender distribution of local council candidates by district, 2012...... 54 Table 8: Gender distribution of local council candidates by party/association, 2012...... 55
Diagram 1: Challenges of combined elections...... 72 Diagram 2: Civil and voter registration process implementation chart ...... 78 Diagram 3: Civil and voter registration process challenges...... 79 Executive Summary 7
Executive Summary
Somaliland’s Democratic Transition Somaliland’s unilaterally withdrawal from the union with Somalia in 1991 was followed by a decade-long peace- and state-building process led by traditional clan elders. Somaliland resolved internal disputes, merged militias into police and military forces, and built governance institutions and practices based on a system that blended tradition and modernity. These were formally codified with the ratification by popular referendum of a new constitution in 2001. However, Somaliland remains internationally unrecognised.
From 2002-2005, Somaliland held its observers. However, worrying political, first electoral cycle, including its first local legal, technical, and cultural hurdles council elections (2002), presidential appeared during Somaliland’s first election (2003), and parliamentary electoral cycle that were to cause election (2005). In advance of the 2002 headaches in the years to come. First, elections, Somaliland allowed for the the political process was vulnerable to formation of political associations. The manipulation by traditional structures, as three associations whose candidates well as individuals and interest groups. won the most votes (UDUB, Kulmiye, Second, the political parties did not and UCID) became Somaliland’s official clearly articulate doctrines or visions and political parties, and enjoyed exclusive revolved around strong individual leaders legitimacy for ten years. This system was who did not tolerate dissent. They also designed to pre-empt the proliferation of reflected a highly politicized clannist a large number of clan-based entities, ideology and mentality. which threatened to politically fragment Somaliland. Somaliland’s second electoral cycle, which remains incomplete, was beset All three elections in Somaliland’s first by repeated delays due to technical cycle were deemed peaceful and hurdles, legal loopholes, and political credible by domestic and international machinations. The second presidential Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 8 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
election, due in April 2008, was not Serious problems have also emerged held until June 2010, but resulted in Somaliland’s political party system. in a peaceful transfer of power from Laws stipulating that the 2002 elections incumbent President Dahir Rayale Kahin would determine Somaliland’s three to opposition leader Ahmed Mohamed official parties were unclear on whether Mahamoud (Silanyo). The second these would be permanent, or if new local council elections, scheduled for associations could form in the future. This December 2007, were delayed even ambiguity led to political conflict in 2007, further, to November 2012. The second when the new Qaran political association parliamentary election, due in 2010, has formed without government permission. still not been held. President Rayale ordered Qaran’s leaders imprisoned and declared the association The 2012 local council unconstitutional. However, the Qaran elections leaders insisted that Somaliland’s freedom of association allowed the The 2012 local council vote brought formation of new associations. new challenges. First, it used an open list voting system, in which parties and This dispute was settled through an associations had little control over the elder-led mediation process, but the nomination process. Second, while issues it raised remained unresolved until only three parties had contested the 2011, when the Academy for Peace and preceding three elections, the 2012 field Development (APD) organized a public included two existing parties and five stakeholder forum on contentious issues. new associations. Third, there was no After public consultations, Parliament voter register, as Parliament discarded passed an amendment to the Political in 2011 the register used in the 2010 Associations and Parties Law and presidential election. created a Registration and Approval Committee (RAC) to regulate the number Voter registration became a serious issue of political associations competing in in 2008, when Somaliland launched its 2012. Additionally, an important new legal first registration exercise. Somaliland decision forbade further Qaran-intrusions used the new register in the 2010 after these elections determined the three election, but Parliament nullified it in 2011 new legitimate parties. due to concerns about fraudulent and duplicate registrations. This negatively The 2012 elections’ adoption of an impacted the 2012 elections, in which open-list voting system was a response substantive multiple voting occurred. to public complaints that the closed-list Executive Summary 9
system had caused disconnect between Somaliland’s political parties operate local leaders and their constituents. without sufficient financial resources The open-list system sought to give and lack professional and technical local constituencies more say in the experience. They have also become nomination process, and to improve highly personalized, without internal the competence, transparency, and democratic practices, clear ideological accountability of local governance. or programmatic orientations, or effective However, it later became clear that dispute management mechanisms. the open-list system also helped open Clans also have a great deal of ownership considerable space for clannism and over the parties. corruption to enter the political process. The judicial system has failed to take The 2012 elections were also beset the lead in resolving political disputes and by technical challenges, including an interpreting ambiguous legal provisions. excessively large and complicated ballot, There are widespread doubts about the the lack of a census or civil register to courts’ impartiality. Complaints about help determine the placement of polling election results are not often sent to the stations, the lack of an urban zoning courts due to the fear that the judicial system, the lack of demarcation lines system is vulnerable to manipulation. between districts, and the lack of an effective mechanism for resolving The security forces are deployed on electoral disputes. Election Day to uphold law and order have been subject to questions about Electoral Institutions their neutrality, and they are seen by opposition parties as guaranteeing pro- Somaliland’s central electoral institutions government outcomes. The police have are all facing challenges. Parliament’s limited capacity to secure polling stations, imperfect legal drafting process has prevent election-related offences, and produced ambiguous, contradictory, respond to violations of electoral laws. and incoherent laws. Electoral laws have not been comprehensive, necessitating APD’s Engagement: Building amendment and revision. Sustainable Peace
The NEC has never been fully APD has played a critical role in the institutionalized nor equipped with democratization process since 1999. financial independence and standing APD has used its ‘political space technical capacity. management’ approach to promote Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 10 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
dialogue, bring change, and support the Somaliland’s legitimate political parties electoral process. APD has undertaken a for the next ten years. Very few women detailed review of the principal electoral ran for office and fewer were elected, due instruments and established networks largely to clan politics. of experts and social contacts. The role of APD in resolving various problems The election revealed troubling was instrumental throughout the 2012 shortcomings in electoral electoral process. institutionalization:
Ahead of the 2012 elections, APD • Multiple voting occurred throughout addressed important challenges Somaliland, challenging the surrounding the open-list system, the elections’ credibility. formation of new political associations, • The open-list system required very the clarification of laws, and the drafting large ballots, causing ballot boxes of codes of conduct for political parties to fill quickly and officials to store and the media. APD led an inclusive ballots in non-secure receptacles, reform process that helped Parliament threatening ballot integrity. address deficiencies in the electoral • Vote-rigging was reported legal framework, including amendments in several locations, though to laws on political parties and local not confirmed with concrete council elections. APD also reviewed and evidence or subjected to legal assessed the voter education programme consequences, due to a weak used in the 2010 presidential election and regulatory framework. conducted other election-related activities, • Vote counting was difficult, time- including training agents of the political consuming, and likely error-prone, parties and associations to scrutinize and due primarily to the technically monitor election-day activities. complex open list voting system.
Election Results: After the winning parties were determined, Complications and clans refocused their attention on council leaderships, stressing clan cohesion Achievements rather than on party loyalty, positions, Election Day took place relatively or principles. The aftermath of the 2012 peacefully. The opposition Kulmiye elections also exposed the fragility of the party won in most districts, with the balance of power in mixed-clan areas, new Waddani association coming in including Seylac, where two major clans second and the existing UCID party engaged in a particularly intense (and still in third. These three would qualify as unresolved) post-election quarrel over Executive Summary 11
the top positions in the local government. without significant donor support has The Xaqsoor association, which did created loopholes for political actors to not gain enough votes to become a delay elections. party, insisted that the government had manipulated the electoral process. Somaliland must pursue a credible Xaqsoor supporters engaged in clashes voter registry. Without a voter list, with police, leading to a number of multiple voting was a widespread civilian deaths. The Supreme Court problem in 2012. The lack of voter declined to adjudicate the case, and an registration hampers elections’ credibility agreement was reached through informal and impairs voters’ trust in the process. mechanisms. The periodic formation of new Despite these disputes, peace and political associations is necessary stability were maintained, and most but potentially destabilizing. In 2012, conflicts were contained. However, this process brought out inter-clan the electoral process needs to be hostilities and weakened community- institutionalized to prevent conflict. based trust. Opening the playing field to new associations is necessary to Lessons Learned legitimise the democratization process, but without a strong regulatory framework The “culture of dialogue” is it can exacerbate parties’ individualization indispensable to resolving electoral and clan domination. disputes. Somaliland’s traditional system of dispute resolution has exerted Somaliland must find a constructive a powerfully positive influence on role for the judiciary in electoral Somaliland’s democratization process. disputes. Somaliland’s courts do not APD has facilitated this inclusive dialogue resolve election disputes effectively. process as an independent, neutral, They are seen as lacking impartiality impartial body trusted by political and independence from the executive. stakeholders. As a result, disputes are mostly resolved through tradition-based consensual Greater institutionalization of approaches. Enhancing the courts’ electoral processes is needed. Current independence and role in resolving electoral processes are unsustainable, disputes is critical to the institutionalization unstable, under institutionalised, of democratic systems. under funded, and unstructured. The government’s lack of financial and The open list voting system has technical capacity to support elections notable drawbacks. Its candidate- Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 12 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
centred nature led to clan-based staff, the formalization of institutional nomination processes, in which political structures, and the development of parties and associations had no influence, regulatory frameworks. accentuating clan-based social divisions. Reforming political parties. The future of Somaliland’s Somaliland’s political parties lack elections institutionalized structures, decision- making is highly centralized, and internal Strengthening political leadership. party regulation is incomplete, causing Without institutionalized processes, frequent unresolved internal disputes, elections depend upon the political will weakening intra-party cohesion. of key leaders. Electoral processes must be transparent and free. Political power Establishing seat allocation, must not be exploited to unbalance the constituency demarcation, and playing field. electoral formulas. Somaliland still uses the seat allocation formula from the Preparing a credible voter register. 1960 parliamentary election, an ad hoc, Somaliland’s completion of an accurate, short-term solution, and constituency transparent, effective, trusted, and demarcation remains unresolved. The accepted voter registration is instrumental major political actors must find a solution to representative, credible, and peaceful to this problem before the parliamentary elections. Successful voter registration election. will help maintain peace, stability, and social harmony. Moving donors from event-based to procedural support. Much international Reforming electoral laws. Somaliland’s donor support has been event-driven, legal framework is weak, incomplete, and focused almost entirely on elections and incoherent. Parliament should conduct a giving insufficient attention to building legal reform process to review and revise electoral institutions and creating an electoral laws and draft new laws to enabling environment for peaceful regulate the NEC, local council elections, elections. Long-term, strategic, process- presidential elections, and parliamentary oriented support by international donors elections, and to address criminal and is essential for free, credible, and peaceful civil liabilities for electoral fraud. elections in the future.
Reforming key institutions. Institutional Enhancing the role of civil society and reform of the NEC is greatly needed, traditional leaders. Traditional leaders focusing on the recruitment of permanent must act responsibly in supporting and 1. Introduction 13
assisting electoral institutions, resolve society has helped to strengthen fragile political disputes, and avoid stoking post- institutions, facilitate consensus-based election violence. They need to better political dialogue to resolve disputes, and understand the importance of letting organized many successful awareness- candidates devise political programmes raising campaigns. It should continue to instead of relying on clan allegiances play an active role in the next elections. for their election. Somaliland’s civil Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 14 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward 1. Introduction 15
1. Introduction
It is an extraordinary achievement to hold peaceful and credible elections in a post-conflict context where institutions are fragile. Somaliland, which withdrew from its union with Somalia in 1991 after a long civil war, successfully held five elections in the decade from 2002 to 2012. International and local election observers considered these elections, which took place without any major outbreaks of violence, to be credible and representative.
Rather than pausing to celebrate this Development’s (APD) sustained efforts remarkable achievement, Somaliland to analyse these challenges and help policy makers must now reflect upon devise mechanisms to overcome them. the areas in which the democratization Finally, the report identifies a number of process has fallen short, and the lessons that Somaliland must learn from serious challenges Somaliland faces as these elections, not just for the sake of it prepares for new electoral contests. the democratization process but also for Somaliland’s long-term political health. The December 2012 local council elections were a troubling point in This report is part of APD’s ‘Pillars of Somaliland’s electoral history for a Peace’ (PoP) programme. Launched number of reasons. Formidable political, in 2009, this programme is an APD- legal, technical, and cultural hurdles implemented, Interpeace-funded emerged during these elections, many initiative that aims to consolidate of which Somaliland has not yet fully the achievements of the preceding addressed. ‘Dialogue for Peace.’ PoP’s vision is to help Somaliland consolidate more than a This report examines the process decade’s experiences of peace-making through which the 2012 elections and institution-building in order to create were held. It highlights challenges that new space for sustainable socio-political faced major stakeholders, and reflects harmony and progress. It is premised on upon the Academy for Peace and the view that Somaliland has successfully Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 16 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
emerged from the state of emergency communities to make peace, including that prevailed in the 1990s and the early those that had fought on the side of the years of the twenty-first century, and old regime. that Somaliland must now strengthen the foundations of peace, security, and The process was led primarily by clan stability through consensus-oriented, elders, who secured peace among their integrated approaches to governance. clans and helped demobilize the militias (such as the Somali National Movement, 1.1 Origins of democracy in or SNM) that had fought the civil war, Somaliland persuading most to join the new state’s police or military forces. Somaliland’s In 1991, the people of Somaliland founders envisioned a new state built declared the birth (or, more precisely, upon a unique hybrid system that would the re-birth) of a sovereign state that blend tradition and modernity. was no longer part of Somalia.1 A former British protectorate that had united with At the first Grand National Reconciliation the former Italian colony of Somalia in Conference held in Borama in 1993, 1960 to constitute the Somali Republic, delegates adopted the National Somaliland’s re-establishment emerged Charter, which laid the foundations for from an entirely indigenous, bottom-up, Somaliland’s stability and statehood. and community-driven peace-making Somaliland convened two other grand initiative. conferences in the mid-1990s to resolve outstanding post-war disputes and to Somaliland’s declaration of independence consolidate the achievements of the first marked its definitive conclusion of a conference. grinding civil war that had hit its people hard for many years. Somaliland’s In the early years of the new century, combined peace- and state-building Somaliland introduced democratic efforts endeavoured to heal the wounds measures to augment and deepen the inflicted on Somalilanders during this clan-based power-sharing arrangements war and the decades-long reign of Siad that the three conferences had established. Barre’s military regime that preceded It began putting in place a range of new it.2 For this healing process to succeed, institutions and practices, including: it was essential for all of Somaliland’s
1 Cabdirahman Jimcaale (2002), Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions (Hargeysa: APD). 2 Jhazbhay, M Iqbal D (2007), Somaliland: Post-War Nation-Building and International Relations 1991–2006, unpublished thesis (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand). 2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition 17
• A central government with three 1. To finalize Somaliland’s separation branches (executive, legislative, from Somalia and emergence as a and judicial) that would check and legitimate sovereign state through balance one another direct expression of the people’s • A devolution of powers from the will centre to regional and district levels 2. To install a legal foundation • Multiple political parties and regulatory framework • Regular presidential, parliamentary, for Somaliland’s governance and local council elections leading structures to peaceful transfers of political 3. To open the political arena to power multiple parties, as the primary institutional embodiments of • Protection of citizens’ human democratic politics. and civil rights, with special consideration for the most The constitution’s approval by a huge vulnerable segments of society majority (97 percent) suggested that all • An independent press. three objectives had been realized.
The democratization initiative launched This ratification paved the way for the by clan elders, independent intellectuals, 2002 local council elections, Somaliland’s and emerging political leaders infused first multiparty polls since independence. Somaliland society with a new spirit In preparation for these elections, the of optimism and hope, a new sense first political associations formed. Six of purpose, and a renewed belief that associations contested the elections, diplomatic recognition of Somaliland as but because the constitution stipulates a sovereign state was inevitable. that only three political parties can exist in Somaliland at any one time, the election Somaliland’s democratization began with also served as a winnowing mechanism. the drafting of a constitution in 2001 The three associations that won the and its ratification by referendum. This largest numbers of local council seats was intended to achieve the following became Somaliland’s official political objectives: parties, and enjoyed exclusive legitimacy for the next ten years. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 18 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward 2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition 19
2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition
2.1 Somaliland’s electoral history The first of Somaliland’s post-independence elections was a test case for the fledgling democracy. Prior to the elections, ‘local government’ consisted only of a mayor and a secretary, both of whom the Minister of the Interior appointed on the basis of the president’s recommendations. The 2002 local council elections aimed to establish robust, popularly-elected local governments that were directly responsible to local constituencies and obliged to respond more urgently to their service delivery needs. A credible election had to be held in order for Somalilanders to prove, as much to themselves as to their neighbours and to the international community, that they were capable of creating governance structures that transcended the clan-based power- sharing arrangement of the 1990s.3
Election preparations included the three political parties was that such formation of Somaliland’s first political an arrangement would pre-empt the associations. Altogether, six such proliferation of a large number of clan- associations – UDUB, Kulmiye, based entities crowding the political Sahan, UCID, Hormood, and ASAD arena. It was clear to a broad spectrum – participated in the elections. This of stakeholders that such a development competition determined the top three could lead to Somaliland’s fragmentation. winners, which became Somaliland’s first legitimate political parties since The clan structure has deep roots in Somali independence. society and has endured for centuries in part because it has a stabilizing, peace- The rationale behind the restriction enhancing aspect. In fact, it is likely of constitutional legitimacy to just that without the active involvement of
3 Academy for Peace and Development (2006), Local Solutions: Creating an Enabling Environment for Decentralisation in Somaliland (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace). Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 20 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
traditional clan leaders, the grand peace- • UDUB, led at the time by former making conferences of 1993 in Borama President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal would have been impossible. This aspect • Kulmiye, headed by Ahmed of the clan structure was to become an Mohamed Mahamoud (Silanyo) essential component of Somaliland’s • UCID, led by Faisal Ali Warabe.4 hybrid political vision, which integrated tradition and modernity. Somaliland These parties were destined to contest sought to avoid the fortification and three of the four elections held in institutionalization of a ‘clan ideology’ subsequent years, and two (Kulmiye and within the political party system, which UCID) also participated in the most recent 5 would risk subverting the creation and elections in 2012. The constitution gradual strengthening of sustainable and the original electoral laws did not state institutions. specify the term for which the three wining political associations would be 2.1.1 Results and implications recognized as political parties. However, of the first local council a later amendment clarified that the term of recognition would be 10 years. elections
The following two tables summarize the In Somaliland’s first local council elections, results of the 2002 elections. held on 15 December 2002, the three top vote-getting political associations were:
Table 1: Regional distribution of votes for Somaliland’s political associations, 2002
Political Maroodi- % Awdal % Saaxil % Togdheer % Sool % Sanaag % association jeex UDUB 70,989 38 58,939 58 13,502 50 18,330 28 1,055 17 16,574 31 Kulmiye 29,923 16 13,679 14 5,309 19 17,476 26 3,070 49 13,701 26 UCID 30,676 16 7,422 7 2,900 11 4,821 7 224 4 3,401 6 Sahan 14,748 8 4,499 4 2,054 8 15,234 23 51 1 11,356 21 Hormood 29,104 16 7,229 8 1,188 4 1,454 2 154 2 1,409 3 ASAD 10,943 6 8,727 9 2,281 8 9,283 14 1,707 27 6,655 13 Total 186,383 100,495 27,234 66,598 6,261 53,096
4 Simkin, Paul and Paul Crook for the European Union (2002), ‘Report on the Somaliland Local Elections held on 15 December 2002’, Delegation of the European Commission in the Republic of Kenya, available at
Table 2: Distribution of votes for Somaliland’s political associations, 2002.
Political association Votes cast % UDUB 179,389 40.8 Kulmiye 83,158 18.9 UCID 49,444 11.2 Sahan 47,942 10.9 Hormood 40,538 9.2 ASAD 39,596 9.0 Total 440,067 100.0
In the wake of the elections, a number of Somalilanders created and embraced important ideas established themselves these and similar expectations. These within Somaliland’s socio-political culture. elections’ establishment of formal, Some of these indicated progress, while democratically ratified local governance others were clearly symptomatic of structures was an achievement of problems to come. enormous significance.
On the positive side, the practice of On the other hand, worrying political, democracy gained currency within the legal, technical, and cultural hurdles public consciousness. Expectations appeared that were to cause headaches arose that: in the years to come. First, it became • Mature individuals would have the clear that the political process was right to vote vulnerable to manipulation by traditional • Eligible voters would have the structures, as well as specific interest freedom to cast their votes for groups and individuals. political candidates of their choice • There would be a contract between Furthermore, the three officially government and the governed recognized political parties were guided based on consent rather than less by clearly articulated political coercion platforms or visions than by a range of • Dialogue and debate at various localized issues. They were also built levels and between various around strong individual leaders who agencies and segments of rarely brooked dissent. society would be employed to help establish an inclusive, fully Most seriously, the established political representative government. parties were often conduits for the Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 22 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
clannist ideology that they were meant elders, intellectuals, and political leaders to combat in the first place. It was present. In 1997, Egal once again won virtually impossible for individual voters, the endorsement of the delegates at whom democracy had presumptively another grand conference in Hargeysa. empowered, to break free from the strictures of a highly politicized clan In 2002, Egal died unexpectedly in office mentality. and in 2003, Somaliland held its first direct presidential election. UDUB, the ruling Over the course of four more elections, party at the time, won by a narrow margin these problems combined to render of just eighty votes against Kulmiye, the volatile the delicate blend of tradition main opposition party; UCID lagged far and modernity in Somaliland’s electoral behind both. UDUB leader Dahir Rayale processes. Kahin, the former vice president who entered the top post after Egal’s death, 2.1.2 The first presidential and was confirmed as Somaliland’s first parliamentary elections directly-elected president.6
In the years immediately following 2002’s At the same time, Somaliland’s legislative initial local council elections, Somaliland branch was also taking shape. The accomplished two more ‘firsts’: its first Guurti (House of Elders or Upper presidential election in 2003 and its first House), gradually formed over the parliamentary vote in 2005. course of the three grand conferences. Mainly consisting of clan leaders turned Prior to the 2003 election, the presidency peacemakers turned political figures, its had twice been filled through consensual members were first selected from among appointment. After Somaliland declared the attendees of the 1993 Borama independence in 1991, a gathering conference. In 1997, another conference composed mostly of SNM leaders re-affirmed the Guurti as an important named Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Toor) the peace- and state-building body and first interim president. Two years later, increased its membership, again through at the first Grand National Reconciliation selection. The chamber has since settled Conference in Borama, Toor was into place, acquiring in the process the replaced by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who features of a quasi-hereditary institution.7 won the support of the majority of clan
6 As per Article 89 of the Somaliland constitution 7 The largely self-endowed, apparently open-ended mandate of the House of Elders is a cause of anxiety among a growing number of Somalilanders, who increasingly see it as an anomaly – and a powerful one at that – that does not easily fit into a truly democratic system of government. For more on the Guurti, particularly the issue of mandate extension, see Academy for Peace and Development (2012), A Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace). 2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition 23
Meanwhile, a lower house also formed. 2.1.3 The second presidential At first, specific clans chose delegates to election constitute the membership of the House of Representatives. These delegates In the mid-2000s, a second electoral took on functions that complemented cycle began, presenting a new challenge those of the Guurti. to Somaliland: that of peacefully and democratically transferring power to The House of Representatives was new leaders. However, it became clear parallel but clearly not equal to the that Somaliland’s electoral system was House of Elders. Although in principle unprepared for the new cycle: neither it enjoyed the traditional parliamentary the second local council vote, which was role of drafting legislation, its incumbent supposed to take place in December members did not have the self- 2007, nor the second presidential vote, perpetuating capacity that those in scheduled for April 2008, was held on the Guurti claimed. At one point or time. Technical hurdles, legal loopholes, another, their tenure was bound to end. and political machinations pushed the The first direct parliamentary election polls back again and again.8 of 2005 would replace clan-selected representatives with popularly elected Three critical issues were responsible parliamentarians. These individuals, for these postponements. The first was having undergone the rigorous test of a the delayed formation of a new National highly charged, multiparty contest, would Electoral Commission (NEC) after the enjoy stronger democratic credentials mandate of the first expired on 21 and a more formalized institutional January 2007. An institution established foundation. to oversee the electoral process, NEC has responsibility for technical election This ended the first cycle of elections management (setting dates, preparing in Somaliland. It is important to stress ballot papers, assigning voting stations, that all three electoral events – the local, counting and collating ballots after presidential, and parliamentary elections the election, etc.), and ensuring that – took place peacefully, a fact to which voting takes place in a fair and credible Somalilanders point with pride. manner. When the first NEC’s mandate
8 For a detailed discussion of these challenges, see APD (2012), op. cit. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 24 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
expired, key stakeholders were unable Three days before the original tenure of to reach a consensus-based agreement the incumbent local councillors was to over the exact composition of the next expire, the Guurti extended the councils’ commission. Proposed members were mandate to 1 July 2008, the date that the vetoed by one political party or another. new NEC and the three political parties This stalemate lasted more than seven had chosen as the polling day. However, months and was resolved only three Somaliland also missed that deadline. In months before the local government terms of importance, the issue of local election was scheduled to take place. elections gradually shifted to the back By then, it was clear that a delay was burner, as disputes over the delay of the inevitable.9 presidential election captured political attention. The second issue was the need for a reliable voter register. Given Somaliland’s For a politically and economically fragile porous borders and the nomadic lifestyle young state that had barely recovered of most of its citizens, the question of from the effects of an enormously who has the right to vote is vital, and destructive civil war, instituting a finding an answer satisfactory to all democratic form of governance was stakeholders is not easy.10 never going to be easy. Some of the challenges facing democratization in The third critical issue was more directly Somaliland were primarily legal – for political, primarily relating to matters of turf example, the ill-defined relationship and prerogative. The president (working between the different branches of closely with the Guurti) was not in any government and the relatively untested great hurry to see a presidential election nature of the newly adopted constitution, take place, whereas the opposition which is now recognized as being shot parties insisted that it should take place through with ambiguities, loose ends as soon as possible. and lacunae. These shortcomings in turn created political problems. All three issues led to contentious discussions as the election days In the years following the 2005 for both the local councils and the parliamentary election, both the Guurti presidency were repeatedly delayed. and the incumbent president, Dahir
9 APD (2012), op. cit. 10 See Section 2.1 about the original registration of potential voters in the lead-up to the second presidential election and the nullification of the resulting register after that vote 2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition 25
Rayale Kahin, extended each other’s to the main opposition candidate, Ahmed terms in office.11 The opportunistic and Mohamed Mahamoud (Silanyo), the collusive manner of these extensions leader of Kulmiye and the former SNM frustrated opposition leaders and many chairman, in an election that both local independent actors, and the second and international observers considered presidential election did not take place credible.13 The election was followed by in April 2008 as originally planned. The a peaceful transfer of power. period from 2007 to 2009 was marked by uncertainty and apprehension 2.2 The 2012 local council about where Somaliland was headed. elections Significantly, the presumptively independent judiciary did not intervene At the conclusion of the second in the extension row, even though it was presidential election, attention shifted an important legal matter. back to the much-delayed local council elections. The tenure of the local Ultimately, the will of the citizenry to councillors, which had already been consolidate its political gains and to extended once by the Guurti to July continue the democratization process, 2008, was extended yet again, this coupled with intense international time until September 2011. During this pressure (and conditional funding), led to period the local councillors had no legal a series of last-minute deals, culminating mandate to manage local affairs, and in the holding of a presidential election. conducted official business within a legal The six-point agreement brokered by limbo.14 the international community facilitated discussion and agreement over this Other serious problems were associated much-delayed and contentious second with Somaliland’s first group of presidential election.12 democratically-elected government officials. As early as 2003 and 2004, it On 26 June 2010, the people of had already become clear that the local Somaliland went to the polls to elect governments were not performing as well a president for the second time since as had been hoped. Waste and inertia in independence. Dahir Rayale Kahin lost service delivery, rather than effectiveness
11 The president extended the Guurti’s mandate by two years; shortly afterwards, the Guurti returned the favour. President Rayale claimed that a delay was necessary for security reasons, following armed clashes between Somaliland and Puntland in the border areas, and that an election campaign would be an expensive distraction. 12 APD (2012), op. cit. 13 APD (2012), op. cit. 14 APD (2012), op. cit. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 26 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
and efficiency, had become their recognized as the only legitimate political hallmarks. Various explanations were parties in Somaliland for the next ten offered for these failings, ranging from years.16 corruption and bureaucratic bungling to a lack of prior experience and proper The 2012 local government vote educational qualifications. Consequently, brought new challenges. First, it utilized concerns were voiced with increasing an open list electoral system, meaning frequency and urgency in the intervening that even though candidates ran under years. the umbrellas and emblems of their political organizations, the parties and After almost exactly ten years, associations had little control over the Somalilanders went to the polls again on selection process. Rather, the local 28 November 2012 to elect their local communities (largely-clan-based) to which candidates belonged authorized councils, in what was at the time billed and supervised the selection of as a whole new cycle of elections. At candidates and were chiefly responsible long last, citizens had the opportunity to for running campaigns. This meant that, rectify the mistakes of 2002. Equipped theoretically, anyone could run, rather with hindsight, they voted into office a than only a closed list of candidates new crop of local government officials. handpicked by the leadership of a Somalilanders hoped that the newcomers specific party or association. would be an improvement upon their predecessors. The open-list option had been used in the 2005 parliamentary election, but the The elections were generally peaceful, like field of local council candidates in 2012 the four that had preceded them. Seven was exceptionally large. Each of the political parties and associations fielded seven political associations and parties 2,368 candidates to contest 379 local nominated candidates for each of the council seats in nineteen of Somaliland’s nineteen electoral districts, where the twenty-three electoral districts.15 Like size of local councils ranged from thirteen the 2002 vote, this electoral event was seats to twenty-one. Hargeysa, the aimed at determining the top three vote- capital, has twenty-five seats, meaning winners amongst the contesting political that almost 200 candidates would parties and associations, which would be contest the election.17
15 The election was held in full capacity in seventeen districts but only in parts of two other districts. Polling did not take place in three districts in the east for security reasons. 16 As will become clearer in Section 4.2, these were determined by way of a complex ranking system that was agreed ahead of Election Day by all the parties and associations. 17 As discussed in Section 2.3, the process of candidate selection was clan-based: the parties played a limited role, and awaited the decision of the clan leaders. 2. Somaliland’s Democratic Transition 27
Second, unlike the preceding three been used during the 2010 presidential electoral events, which had been election, was rendered useless after the contested by only three political parties, law that had brought it into being was the 2012 election field was comprised of struck down by Parliament in 2011. seven political associations: two of the three existing parties and the five new It was clear long before Election Day associations that had survived a rigorous that technical and political complications selection process. might cast doubt on these elections’ credibility. These challenges will be The third challenge was the absence of examined in detail in the following a voter register. The old list, which had chapters. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 28 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward 3. Electoral Challenges 29
3. Electoral Challenges
The political, legal and technical difficulties encountered in the 2012 local council elections tested Somaliland’s capacity to hold free and fair elections. Some of these difficulties took months to work through, while others remain unresolved and continue to cast a long shadow over Somaliland’s electoral process, with implications for Somaliland’s political health. This chapter provides a detailed overview of these challenges, with a particular focus on election management and the role of Somaliland’s political and judicial institutions.
3.1 Suspension of the voter As the registration process got underway, register another serious problem appeared: the pervasive presence of clannist ideology The registration of Somaliland’s voting- in Somaliland politics and the realization age citizens first became a serious issue that certain clans had a greater chance of in the run-up to the second presidential benefiting from the registration exercise election, when key stakeholders than others by virtue of their geographic decided that a list of eligible voters distribution and their manipulation of should be compiled. In 2008, the NEC political elites. The Voter Registration Law recommended a registration process passed in early 2007 stipulated that every and international donors made funding person should vote in the place where he available. It was clear that this would be a or she was originally registered.18 This complex undertaking within Somaliland’s requirement imposed a severe limitation complicated, rough-and-tumble political upon the nomadic communities, as context. The absence of a ready-to-hand their migration patterns often prevented census or civil register was a significant them from being in the same place drawback, threatening to hamper the on Election Day as on the day of their effectiveness and transparency of voter original registration. Inhabitants of the registration, or even lead to abuse. western regions, predominantly agro-
18 APD (2012), op. cit. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 30 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
pastoralists, tended to be in favour of The voter register had voter registration, while those in the a high percentage of largely nomadic east were disinclined to fraudulent and duplicate support it.19 These regional differences, entries which the manifested as diverging perspectives of biometric filters had the clans living in the respective areas, been unable to identify had a profoundly negative impact on and remove. …the the legitimacy of the voter registration original problem arose project. It became a major bone of because the biometric contention and a tinderbox for future data collected during electoral disputes. the registration was not good enough to allow the Debate about the registration process biometric filters to detect raged throughout 2008 and 2009, but the duplicates, leaving a the preparation of the final voter list large number [of these nevertheless continued apace. In 2009, duplicates] on the register. serious problems were identified with the biometric data collected for voter In spite of these deficiencies, the political cards, and fresh controversy ensued. parties and the NEC agreed that this A completely new set of electoral voter register should be used for the commissioners, installed in October 2010 presidential election.21 However, 2009, hired Electoral Reform International in November 2011, the House of Services (ERIS) to undertake a full review. Representatives voted overwhelmingly The findings of the ERIS report confirmed to nullify the 2008 Voter Registration Law that:20 and throw out the voter list. 22 This action
19 Academy for Peace and Development (2012), A Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace). 20 Mathieson, David and Robin Wager (2010), ‘Somaliland National Election Commission: Report on the Preparation of the Voter Register, January to June, 2010’ (London: ERIS), p. 1. 21 APD (2012), op. cit. 22 Somaliland Times (2012), ‘Somaliland Parliament Wants Election Without Registration’, 12 November, available at < http:// www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2011/511/3.shtml>, accessed 23 December 2013. 3. Electoral Challenges 31
negatively impacted the 2012 elections, political parties to three. The president in which multiple voting is believed argued that “Everyone has the right to have occurred on a massive scale. to participate in the political affairs of Without a voter register, the credibility Somaliland in accordance with the laws and legitimacy of future Somaliland in place. Anyone who violates the laws elections remains in question. will be held accountable and punished accordingly.”23 3.2 Formation of new political associations The founders of Qaran disagreed. The chairman of the organization argued that Somaliland’s constitution states that he and his colleagues were acting within laws will determine the manner through the law of the land and their constitutional which the three legitimate political parties rights. He asserted that Article 23(3) of are formed. The 2000 Law for Political the constitution provides that “All citizens Associations and Parties (Law No. 14) have the right to form, in accordance with was the first law formulated to establish the law, political, cultural, educational, registration procedures for political social, and occupational or employees’ associations and requirements for the associations.” In addition, Article 22(1) three officially sanctioned political parties. stipulates that “Every citizen shall have the right to participate in political affairs Neither the constitution nor Law No. 14 in accordance with the laws and the clarified whether the three parties would constitution.” be permanent, or whether new political associations could be formed in the future. These conflicting interpretations of the This ambiguity led to political conflict. In constitution and the law generated a 2007, a new political association known great deal of confusion at the time. as Qaran was formed without permission The dispute was settled by elder-led from the government. The incumbent mediation efforts, but the broader issue president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, objected of new political associations threatened vigorously and Qaran’s founders, to remain unresolved. Mohamed Abdi Gaboose and Mohamed Hashi Elmi, were imprisoned. President An initiative in 2011 by the Academy for Rayale declared that the formation of Peace and Development (APD) broke Qaran violated the constitution, noting the deadlock. By organizing a public that Article 9(2) restricts the number of forum to examine the challenges of the
23 Somaliland.org (2007), ‘President Rayaale statement on the issue of formation of the new political association’, 20 December. Translation by author. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 32 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
upcoming local council elections, the account Somaliland’s current political, Academy facilitated open discussion security, and socio-economic state.25 between key stakeholders in the democratization process, including the On 7 June 2011, the committee political parties, the government, civil submitted its findings to the president. society, intellectuals, religious leaders, the Of 1,769 individuals interviewed during NEC, women’s advocacy organizations, the course of the survey, 57 percent youth groups, and minority clans. Several stated that the formation of new political factors, including the formation of new organizations should be allowed, while 26 political associations and the registration 42 percent disagreed. The president of voters, were identified as issues that formally accepted the committee’s could hinder democratization.24 The findings and supported the formation forum was broadcast via television of new political associations through a and covered in newspaper reports. proposed amendment to the Political As a result, the new administration of Associations and Parties Law (Law No. President Ahmed Mohamed Mahamoud 14/2000) that he submitted to Parliament (Silanyo) was obliged to look carefully into for approval. the matter of new political associations Although this solved the issue of allowing and their legality. new political associations to form, other In September 2011, the president formed electoral problems soon arose. In the a National Consultative Committee and months leading up to the election, tasked it with conducting a survey to Somaliland registered fifteen political explore public opinion towards the associations. An act of Parliament created formation of new political associations the Registration and Approval Committee ahead of the local council elections, at that (RAC) to reduce these associations to a time scheduled for April 2012. In addition, manageable number through a rigorous he asked the committee to examine the winnowing process involving stringent feasibility and possible consequences eligibility criteria. Only six associations of new political associations, taking into (Waddani, Dalsan, Umadda, Xaqsoor,
24 Academy for Peace and Development (2011), ‘Forum Activity Report’. 25 The committee members, with the support of the president, approached the Academy for support in carrying out these activities. Specifically, they requested from APD financial and technical facilitation for workshops to be held in all six regions, and APD obliged. The support was part of an enduring Interpeace/APD commitment to the enhancement of state and independent institutions through a prioritized, action-oriented initiative, whose focus in this case was the formation of new political associations ahead of the local council elections. 26 Somaliland National Consultative Committee for Political Organizations (2011), Press Release, 7 June. 3. Electoral Challenges 33
Nasiye, and Rays) passed this test. 3.3 The open-list system Nasiye later bowed out due to financial difficulties, leaving five associations. The 2002 local council elections employed Among the three existing parties, only a closed-list proportional representation Kulmiye and UCID contested these electoral system. In the years following these elections, communities across elections. UDUB, which was the ruling Somaliland voiced concern about party from 2003 to 2010, disintegrated their elected local governments’ poor as a result of internal leadership disputes. performance, particularly in light of the The technical challenges facing the repeated extension of their tenures. In relevant stakeholders were enormous. 2012, APD undertook a joint consultation with the Democratization Pillar Steering Foremost amongst these were the newly Committee (DSC) across Somaliland’s six adopted open-list electoral system and regions, engaging with local communities the complicated ranking arrangement to gain a better understanding of their used to determine the three winning local governance experiences and to parties after the election.27 An important collate suggestions for improvement.28 new legal decision was that there would be no further Qaran-like intrusions Participants in the consultative meetings, into the political landscape. The three including representatives of local associations that came out on top in the governments and local communities, local council elections would be the only identified a wide array of local governance legitimate political parties for the next ten problems, including poor service delivery, years, after which the arena would be incompetent elected officials, a weak opened once again. relationship between the public and the elected councils, and an absence of transparency and accountability.
27 As required by Article 9(3) of the Somaliland Constitution, the Law for the Political Associations and Parties (Law No. 14/2000/2011) sets out the process by which the three political parties are to be registered and approved. Article 6 of Law No. 14 is supposed to provide the criteria against which the three winners are determined, but it is ambiguous and contradictory, without explicit details on the relevant conditions or qualifications. Moreover, a number of interpretations of the intent of the article emerged. In 2012, the ambiguity of the law generated intense debates about the selection process of the three parties. The key stakeholders, primarily the political parties, but also the NEC, the RAC, and the government, were not on the same page about how to choose the final winners, creating a major challenge to the electoral process. 28 The democratization pillar is one of the Academy’s ‘pillars of peace,’ representing a major strand of research. The steering committee was composed of ten members, who were recruited according to the criteria validated by key stakeholders at the National Program Group Meeting in October 2010: availability, commitment, knowledge of the issue/context (professional or academic experience), and inclusiveness (representatives of regions/clans, youth, women and minorities, etc). The steering committee was an ‘action-oriented entity’ mandated to not only validate and refine recommendations from the research pillars, but also to drive the processes of change pursued within the ‘participatory action research’/ implementation phase of the PoP program. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 34 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Various explanations were offered for more responsible, and more responsive these deficiencies. The most common councillors. It would improve local complaint referred to the weak governance in terms of competence, relationship between councillors and transparency, accountability, and their constituents, which stemmed in relations with constituents.29 large part from a lack of familiarity and mutual understanding. Many people After this period of consultation and said that they just did not know their public discussion, in December 2011 representatives well enough. The main Parliament amended Article 22 of the reason offered for this disconnect was the Presidential and Local Council Elections closed-list electoral system. Many people Law (Law No. 20/2001), changing the felt that political association leaders had closed-list system to an open-list one.30 selected candidates without consulting local constituencies. As terms of office 3.3.1 Logistical and legal were repeatedly extended, elected hurdles officials became increasingly alienated from the electorate. Following this change to the law, all the In response to these findings, technical elements of the electoral system parliamentarians and government also had to be adapted. Later it would officials launched an initiative in 2011to become clear that the most far-reaching replace the closed-list electoral system impact of the new open-list system was with an open-list system, arguing that this political in nature: in conjunction with the would give local constituencies a greater nullification of the voter register, it helped say in the candidate selection process. open a huge space for clannism and Even though the selected candidates corruption to enter the political process. would officially fly the banners of their But in the months before the 2012 parties or associations, focus group elections, the major source of anxiety for participants felt that an open system the political parties and associations, as would streamline, fine-tune, and make well as NEC and RAC, was the potential more effective the criteria for candidate for technical bottlenecks. Amongst other selection. The assumption was that considerations, there was a good deal of this pre-election vetting and screening worry that the cumbersome, oversized would result in the election of stronger, ballot papers required to accommodate
29 Focus Group Discussion, Burao, 13 May 2012. 30 The third amendment’s addendum included two provisions: first, to introduce open lists under a new Article 22; and second, to amend the minimum age for local district council candidates to 25 years under Article 33(4). Presidential decree No. 0182/122011 was signed on 13 December 2011. The amended law is available at
the large number of candidates might people from different segments of society slow down of the logistics of voting. participated in the event, which was Consequently, a relatively large number held at APD’s Hargeysa premises. The of voters might not be able to vote. vote suggested that the worries about technical problems were justified. One There were six major areas of logistical key finding was that the ballot paper was concern: hard to read as there were too many • Ballot paper structure and size candidates on it. This consumed time • Number and size of ballot boxes and as a result, queues were too long to • Polling station capacities control. APD informed the NEC of the • Storage, distribution, and retrieval results of the ‘vote’ and it too organized of sensitive materials a mock election experiment on 16 May • Voting time 2012, in collaboration with civil society • Ballot paper counting, timing, and representatives and APD. transparency. The existence of legal and jurisdictional Many in government circles were grey areas magnified the potential hazards reluctant to confront the potential of the open-list system. Confusion and problems of the open-list system. Having controversy existed about voting venues just authorized the open-list option, the and seat allocations, for several reasons: parliament was not in a great hurry to • There was neither a census nor tinker with the law again, especially given a civil register for the Somaliland that Election Day was fast approaching. population Also, in the middle months of 2012, • Urban centres lacked a zoning legislators were in recess. For its part, system to identify constituencies the incumbent administration and ruling in a clear-cut manner party seemed satisfied with the status • Precise demarcation lines between quo, of which they were well placed to districts did not exist. take full advantage. Most observers expected that the three Consequently, it fell to APD to undertake winning political associations would a catalytic initiative. The DSC conducted take the lion’s share of local council the first-ever mock election to examine seats and other parties would win few in a practical manner the possible or no seats. But disputes were possible, implications of the open-list system and there was no effective adjudicative and to reveal the practical challenges. arrangement in place. These problems In April 2012, more than two hundred were identified in the course of five public Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 36 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
meetings that APD’s Democratization five times by Parliament.31 The electoral Pillar team and Steering Committee regulatory framework, which is the held in the latter half of 2012, as election foundation of free, credible, and peaceful preparations were underway. elections, is very weak and requires close examination. 3.4 Electoral institutions 3.4.2 National Electoral Since the beginning of its democratization Commission process, Somaliland has struggled with recurrent political disputes, electoral Electoral management models are conflicts, and internal political party indispensable to electoral stability, and crises, resulting in instability that could can be a means to prevent conflict. have been resolved by strong, impartial, Somaliland has an independent and competent institutions. This section commission model, which is more considers the strengths and weaknesses transparent, accountable, efficient, of Somaliland’s central electoral trusted, and impartial than government institutions. and mixed models.32 Nevertheless, the NEC has faced persistent political 3.4.1 Parliament pressure from the government. The NEC has never been fully institutionalized nor Somaliland’s two houses of Parliament equipped with financial independence have the constitutional power to draft and standing technical capacity, including and approve laws. Since Parliament’s a competent permanent secretariat. The establishment, the legislative process NEC’s institutional sustainability is the has exhibited gaps and deficiencies. basis for credible future elections and Both Parliament and the government can electoral institutionalization. Without it, draft bills, but this process is imperfect, Somaliland’s electoral success hangs in leading to ambiguous, contradictory, and the balance. incoherent laws. The legislature is crucial in providing the legal electoral framework. 3.4.3 Political parties But electoral laws have for the most part not been comprehensive, necessitating Following the adoption of the constitution amendment and revision. For instance, in 2001, Somaliland began to gradually Law No. 12, which regulates presidential move away from a clan-based power and local elections, has been amended sharing system to a hybrid reality
31 In addition to providing an electoral framework for the presidential and local council elections, this law provides for an independent electoral body (the National Electoral Commission) to administer the electoral process. 32 Article 14 of the Presidential and Local Election Law, 2001. 3. Electoral Challenges 37
embedded in multiparty politics. The dissolution (such as in the case of three political parties that arose from the UDUB). Third, political parties do not 2002 local council elections participated have adequate funding for their activities in four elections, and accepted the results such as lobbying and campaigning. in a peaceful manner despite extremely Fundraising is therefore conducted difficult and politicized circumstances. through clan channels, compounding These parties operated without the problem of clan ownership. sufficient financial resources and lacked professional and technical experience. 3.4.4 Supreme Court They also became highly personalized, without internal democratic practices. A well-functioning democracy requires The lack of comprehensive party an independent and impartial judiciary to regulations and rules was the source of peacefully resolve constitutional disputes internal party crises. It is clear that in the that may arise.33 Specifically, a supreme context of Somaliland, politics is highly court or constitutional court takes the influenced by clan even in a multiparty lead in resolving such disputes, and environment. has the legal mandate to interpret legal provisions that may be ambiguous. In Three important challenges persist. Somaliland, these functions have not First, the formation and functioning of been fully utilized due to stakeholders’ the parties is highly influenced by a clan lack of trust in the Supreme Court, which mentality. The founding members of each is rooted in doubts about the Court’s party draw their supporters, candidates, impartiality and its lack of structural or and funds from the clan system. In this practical independence. sense, the clan leaders own the parties. There is an absence of programmatic In the 2012 local council elections, orientation and a focus on clan politics. complaints about the results by the Second, the institutional structure of political parties and associations were the political parties is very weak. They not sent to the courts due to the fear lack comprehensive internal regulatory that the judicial system was vulnerable to frameworks, which are important to government manipulation. The Supreme internal party democracy and dispute Court’s lack of institutional independence management. For this reason, internal remains a potential risk to future electoral party disputes often go unresolved, stability. leading to party fragmentation and
33 Mohamed Farah (2010), ‘An Analysis of the Somaliland Constitutional Court’ (Hargeysa, SORADI). Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 38 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
3.5 Security stations. In remote areas with insufficient numbers of police, law enforcement In Somaliland, the security forces are agencies have limited capacity to prevent an integral part of the electoral process. election-related offences and hold to They are deployed on Election Day to account voters that violate electoral uphold law and order, and to ensure laws. In 2012, fraudulent activities such a stable environment for voting and as multiple voting went unpunished. counting. In stable parts of Somaliland, The police’s lack of capacity to arrest the security forces remain impartial. But in offenders had a negative impact on the other regions, the opposition parties have credibility of the elections. questioned their neutrality. Particularly in the conflict-affected areas of Sool, Another factor in election security is the Sanaag, and Togdheer, the security eastern border. The territorial dispute forces have been reported as influential between the Republic of Somaliland and in guaranteeing pro-government election the semi-autonomous Somali region of outcomes. In 2012, some political Puntland negatively impacted polling associations accused the government in several electoral districts in eastern of using the military to facilitate a majority Sanaag (such as Badhan and Dhahar), for the ruling party in several districts, and in Sool. In addition, the emergence including Xudan and Lascanood. of a militia-run authority known as Khaatumo in the Sool region prevented More generally, the police have limited voting for local councillors in most of capacity to ensure the security of polling Buhoodle, Xudun, and Taleex. 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace 39
4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace
The political, legal and technical difficulties encountered in the 2012 local council elections tested Somaliland’s capacity to hold free and fair elections. Some of these difficulties took months to work through, while others remain unresolved and continue to cast a long shadow over Somaliland’s electoral process, with implications for Somaliland’s political health. This chapter provides a detailed overview of these challenges, with a particular focus on election management and the role of Somaliland’s political and judicial institutions.
Since its establishment in 1999, APD space management’ approach to has played a critical role in Somaliland’s promote dialogue, bring change, and democratization process. Over the years, support the electoral process. Building APD has played a crucial role in facilitating on its neutrality and impartiality, APD the electoral process. Its long-term has developed relations with the NEC, involvement with these issues and its political parties, government, Parliament, relationships with electoral stakeholders and other stakeholders. It has put in make it well placed to engage key place written working agreements with actors and help them strengthen the the NEC and Parliament. democratization process. APD’s political space management Advancing the electoral process is approach has been successful in a focus of APD’s ‘Pillars of Peace’ bringing society together and creating programme.34 APD has used its ‘political sustainable peace in a politically charged
34 The specific objectives of the Pillars of Peace are: a) concrete contribution to peace and state building; b) transfer of peace- building capacity (institutions); c) transfer of peace-building capacity (civic leadership); and d) transfer of peace-building capacity (women, youth, and the diaspora). The expected outcomes include: a) public engagement in policy debates on focus issues related to the acceleration and implementation of recovery, and to state-formation processes that strengthen efforts to consolidate peace; b) enhancement of community participation in public policy debates; c) action-oriented outcomes of initiatives established during the process and supported by public dialogue and input. For more information, see Academy for Peace and Development (2010), Democracy in Somaliland: Challenges and Opportunities (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace). Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 40 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
atmosphere. Before APD engages in a 4.1 Reforming the electoral process through which a problem is legal framework solved, it examines and researches the issue. It seeks to understand the causes A series of electoral laws were enacted of the problem and develops solutions after the 2001 referendum on the that are then proposed to the important Somaliland constitution. These laws actors. Without this understanding included: of the key issues, genuine dialogue • The Regulation of Political cannot take place. APD benefits from Associations and Parties Law an experienced cadre of researchers (2000) that has undertaken a detailed review • The Presidential and Local Council of the principal electoral instruments. In Elections Law (2001) addition, APD has established networks • The Parliamentary Election Law of experts and social contacts spanning (2005) the full spectrum of Somaliland society. • The Voter Registration Law (2007).
Ahead of the 2012 local council elections, These laws were aimed at enabling APD sought to apply its research expertise Somaliland to transition from a clan-based and dialogue approach to address governance system to that of a modern important challenges surrounding the representative democracy. But these adoption of the open-list system, the laws were unstructured, ambiguous, and formation of new political associations, limited in scope, negatively impacting and the lack of clarity in Article 6 of Law Somaliland’s democratization efforts. No. 14 about the selection criteria for the Election-related disputes among key three political parties. In addition, APD stakeholders– including political parties, helped the NEC to draft and process the government, and the NEC– broke codes of conduct. out as a result of these gaps and contradictions. APD’s initiatives, which will be described in greater detail below, made it possible The lack of clarity in Law No. 14/2000 (the for key stakeholders in the electoral Regulation of Political Associations and process to resolve pressing issues before Parties Law) precipitated a major political the election. and constitutional crisis in 2007 when 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace 41
the founders of the Qaran association framework remains far from perfect. came into direct confrontation with the There is still a need to revise these laws government. This crisis, which had the and formulate a comprehensive legal potential to do devastating damage framework for Somaliland’s electoral to the political system, was defused process. For instance, the presidential through traditional Somali conflict- and local election law has been amended resolution mechanisms, including the more than five times, and it needs to be legendary “under-the-tree” negotiations harmonized with other electoral laws. conducted by elders. The APD-led reform process aimed at rectifying the 4.2 Clarifying the selection dangers engendered by these types of criteria of the three weaknesses in the electoral law. parties
APD formed a steering committee on APD is first and foremost a research electoral law, which helped Parliament institute, and in 2011 it conducted an in- to address some of the deficiencies, house exercise to examine the potential gaps, contradictions, and ambiguities risks of the electoral process. A principal of the electoral legal framework. It was focus of this research was Article 6 of the imperative for Somaliland to enact Regulation of Political Associations and comprehensive, properly structured Parties Law (Law No. 14/2000). electoral laws that would not be susceptible to misinterpretation. In Law No. 14 did not adequately specify keeping with APD’s participatory action the criteria for selecting the top three research methodology, the electoral law parties or associations in the aftermath reform process was participatory and of the election. Article 6 reads: inclusive. Public inputs were incorporated into the proposed draft bills without 1. The three parties/associations adulteration before they were submitted which gain 20 percent of all the to Parliament for approval. votes cast in every region shall be recognized as national political Parliament passed amendments to parties and shall be issued the Regulation of Political Associations certificates of recognition as and Parties Law (Law No. 14) and national parties. the Presidential and Local Council 2. If only one party/association Elections Law (Law No. 20) in 2011 succeeds in gaining 20 percent and the president signed them. Despite of the votes cast in every region, these amendments, the electoral legal the [Registration and Approval] Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 42 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Committee shall recognize as and associations interpreted it differently. national political parties that party/ Some of the political parties and association and the other two associations, such as UCID, Kulmiye, parties/associations which come Dalsan, and Xaqsoor, argued that, in next in the total percentages of addition to the single party with 20 votes cast for them in every region. percent of the vote, the two other parties 3. If the percentage of votes cast with the largest number of overall votes in every region for two or more should be officially recognized. On the associations/parties becomes other hand, Waddani, Umadda, and equal, the total number of national Rays argued that the regional balance of votes for each association shall be votes should be observed. These groups counted. supported the idea that each region 4. If no political association/party had equal weight and, as a result, had gains 20 percent, the Committee to be calculated separately, rather than shall recognize as national political subsumed into the total. parties the three parties which gain the highest percentage of the As a neutral research institution with votes cast in the elections in the more than a decade of experience regions of the country. in organizing political dialogue, APD facilitated several consultative meetings The first clause was unproblematic, and with key stakeholders to deliberate on all the political parties and associations this matter and resolve the ambiguity. The interpreted it identically. It demanded that RAC had the legal mandate to clarify the each party have representatives in every article through a code of conduct, but it region, winning at least 20 percent of the was reluctant to review the issue prior to votes. This was designed to promote the election. Through sustained dialogue the social cohesion of Somaliland’s across several meetings, members of political system, in which clannism is the RAC finally came to the conclusion much stronger than political parties’ that the article needed to be clarified to programmes and platforms. This clause provide clear criteria for the selection was consistent with Article 9(3) of the of the three parties in the event of only Somaliland constitution, which prohibits one clear winner. With APD’s technical political parties based on regionalism and assistance, the RAC issued guidance on clannism. Article 6 in the form of a code of conduct.
The second clause posed a serious Regarding clause 1, the RAC confirmed dilemma, however, since the parties that the intent of the law was cross- 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace 43
regional representation, and that parties region-by-region comparison of the needed to have 20 percent of the votes positions occupied by the associations. cast in every region. For instance, Depending on the percentage of the association A, which secured 20 percent vote received, each association would of the votes cast in all six regions and a be given a number of points equal to its total vote of 50,000, would be issued a rank (e.g. the top vote-getter would be certificate as an official political party. By assigned one point, the second-ranking contrast, association B, with a total vote association would receive two points, and of 100,000 and 40 percent of the votes so on). The total points earned by each cast in only three regions, would not association would be added up to derive be registered as a political party on the an aggregate value. The association with grounds that it was not well represented the lowest aggregate value would be in all regions. ranked first. For instance, if association A had the highest percentage of the vote On the matter of clause 2, the RAC in Maroodi-jeex, then that association sided with the interpretation of Waddani, would be designated the leader in the Umadda, and Rays as outlined above. In ranking table, as illustrated by Table 3. In its view, aggregate percentages did not the event that no one party or association capture the intent of the law. The RAC received over 20 percent of the vote in concluded that the votes of each region every region (clause 4), the RAC agreed should be converted into percentages to adopt this ranking system, thus separately, and the result calculated promoting regional balance. using a ranking system drawn from a
Table 3: Calculation of winning parties using the RAC ranking method.
Regions Parties/Associations A B C D E F G Awdal 3 6 5 4 2 7 1 Maoodi-jeex 1 7 5 4 3 6 2 Saaxil 3 1 2 5 4 7 6 Togdheer 2 5 6 1 7 3 4 Sool 4 1 5 6 2 7 3 Sanaag 4 1 5 6 2 7 3 Total 16 21 25 24 23 37 22 Winners 1st 2rd - - - - 3rd Source: Electoral code of conduct for the political parties and RAC on party selection criteria, 9 October 2012. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 44 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
APD and the Centre for Humanitarian accepted the resulting code of conduct Dialogue held consultative meetings on 9 October 2012.35 with political party and association leaders to highlight potential problems 4.3 Preparing non- that could arise before and after the legislative instruments election. In October 2012, APD facilitated a consultative meeting between RAC and Non-legislative instruments, or codes of the political parties and associations on conduct, have been used for some time the proposed interpretation of Article 6. to complement the electoral regulatory RAC explained its proposal to use the framework in Somaliland. Because of ranking system, and its addition of the gaps, ambiguities, and contradictions following language to clause 2: ‘The in the electoral laws, codes of conduct method of calculation will be based on are critical in establishing a working ranking instead of added percentages.” environment for elections. In collaboration with the NEC and other concerned The new sentence had terminological institutions such as the RAC, APD has problems and the political parties and drafted and facilitated the approval of associations had difficulty grasping several codes of conduct since 2002. its meaning. RAC explained that a For the 2012 local council elections, APD, mathematical interpretation of the in collaboration with the NEC, reviewed clause called for a ranking system by previously used codes of conduct for the which parties would be graded 1 for the political parties. The NEC revised most highest percentage of votes through 7 of the text of these agreements and for the lowest percentage, and those produced new versions. In its research with the three lowest scores would role, APD provided critical comments to be the official parties. The parties and the new versions. Crucially, APD brought associations argued over the proposed together stakeholders to review and interpretation, with some groups, such as sign these non-legislative instruments, UCID, insisting that the ranking system a key example being the RAC code of would undermine parties that received conduct discussed above. Although large percentages in the big cities. some minor changes were made, it Notwithstanding this objection, the RAC was a testimony to APD’s experience was convinced that ranking was the best with political dialogue that the political option for determining the three official parties and associations agreed to the parties without changing the intent of the code. After the parties signed the code in law. The political parties and associations October, the NEC formed a supervisory
35 A copy of the code of conduct (in Somali) is available at
IRI held a ‘training of trainers’ (ToT) Such codes of conduct are extremely workshop on 11 November 2012 for a helpful to the electoral process. They twelve-person APD team. These APD provide a comprehensive regulatory staff members were then assigned the framework for the electoral environment, responsibility of training 170 further defuse electoral conflict, and prevent trainers in central locations in the six potential risks to the electoral process. regions. These trainers were in turn sent APD’s facilitation was crucial to the to more remote locations to pass on their entire process, building on its decade- skills to the party agents themselves. long experience of political space APD was also responsible for the overall management. project execution, including the dispatch Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 46 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
of transport and logistical coordination, education team had not appeared as well as supervision of the training to demonstrate good regional reach, enacted by the ToT’s. A total of 9,373 as the APD monitoring team visited party agents were trained in all twenty- areas that NEC had not. The numbers one electoral districts, with a 77 percent of posters were also too few in many male, 23 percent female breakdown (as places considering the size of the local outlined in Table 4). population. Awdal was the exception. The implementing organization, Somaliland 4.4.1 The voter education National Youth Organization (SONYO), programme distributed pamphlets, posters, and stickers to several towns and districts. The second supervisory role that APD Their mobile unit provided regional played in the 2012 local council elections awareness about the voter education was the review of the voter education programme. Overall, however, APD found programme. For the 2010 presidential that the implementing organizations election, APD worked with the NEC on faced a tight timeline, insufficient funds, the implementation and monitoring of and a lack of proper implementation voter education, and thereby amassed programme design. considerable experience in this field. In 2012, the Academy conducted a In the 2012 elections, APD worked with monitoring and evaluation exercise to NEC, political parties, the government, examine the achievements and failures the RAC, Parliament, and civil society to of the local organizations implementing ensure credible and peaceful elections. the voter education programme in Awdal, It provided political space management Saaxil, and Maroodi-jeex. and resolved various problems through a consensus-oriented approach. The role The team visited all three regions and of APD was instrumental throughout the interviewed more than 120 people in each electoral process and APD will continue region about whether the voter education to support Somaliland’s democratization. programme had been implemented as As the next elections approach, APD is planned. APD assessed that programme preparing to bring stakeholders in the implementation had not been completely electoral process together to prevent effective or efficient. The NEC voter electoral disputes. 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace 47
Table 4: APD/IRI party agent training programme, 2012.
Party Name Agents Trained Percentage of Agents Trained (%) Male Female Total Male Female Total Kulmiye 1003 259 1262 79 21 100 Waddani 1109 242 1351 82 18 100 UCID 1102 367 1469 75 25 100 Dalsan 975 310 1285 76 24 100 Umadda 1171 381 1552 75 25 100 Xaqsoor 1159 425 1584 73 27 100 Rays 703 168 871 81 19 100 TOTAL 7222 2152 9374 77 23 100 Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 48 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
President of the Republic of Somaliland Ahmed Silanyo casting his vote during Election Day.
Female police officer assisting a voter. NEC officer giving a ballot paper to a voter. 4. APD’s engagement: building sustainable peace 49
NEC officer assisting an illiterate voter to identify her candidate Political party agents observing voting procedures on Election of choice. Day.
National Election Commission (NEC) Polling Staff registering NEC officers counting the votes. voters.
Male voters queuing to vote on Election Day. Supporters of the Waddani political association gather at Freedom Park in Hargeisa during the 2012 election campaign. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 50 5. Election results: complications and achievements Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward 5. Election results: complications and achievements 51
5. Election results: complications and achievements
On 28 November 2012, the people of Somaliland went to the polls to elect the second generation of local councillors and to determine which three political organizations would be officially approved as political parties. This was the fifth electoral event to take place in Somaliland since its declaration of independence in 1991. Two of the three existing parties, Kulmiye and UCID, contested the election (the third, UDUB, had ceased to exist as an effective political force earlier in the year), as did five newly registered political associations. Voting took place throughout seventeen of Somaliland’s twenty-three electoral districts, but only in parts of two other districts (Xudun and Buhoodle). Voting was not carried out in four eastern districts (Taleex, Las-Qoray, Badhan, and Dhahar) for security reasons. The election took place relatively peacefully, although clan politics loomed large, a problematic development from the point of view of democratic governance.
5.1 Election Day Most notably, multiple voting was a visible phenomenon throughout Somaliland, On Election Day, the NEC distributed challenging the credibility of the elections’ ballot boxes and sent staff to the field to outcomes. This phenomenon was largely manage the election. The government a result of the absence of a credible voter dispatched security forces to ensure register. Lacking this register, Somaliland that voting proceeded peacefully. relied primarily on finger-inking to prevent That it did was a great achievement multiple voting. However, international for Somalilanders, exhibiting that a observers noted that voters were able vibrant democratic culture had taken to remove the ink with relative ease.36 root. On the other hand, Election Day Furthermore, underage voting was also revealed troubling shortcomings in observed throughout Somaliland, despite electoral institutionalization. legal prohibitions on this practice.
36 Steve Kibble and Michael Wallis, Swerves in the Road: Report by International Election Observers on the 2012 Local Elections in Somaliland (London: Progressio, 2013), pg. 24-25. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 52 5. Election results: complications and achievements Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
The complexity of the open-list voting Vote counting was a difficult and time- system required very large ballots, consuming task for election management which caused problems in some areas personnel, due primarily to the technically as ballot boxes filled quickly and election complex open list voting system. Some officials had to resort to storing ballots results were miscalculated during the in non-secure receptacles such as management of this process, most likely envelopes and plastic bags, threatening causing some candidates to lose and ballot integrity. In some polling stations, others to win. electoral officials were observed breaking the seal on ballot boxes to compress 5.2 The outcome of the local 37 ballot papers and make space for more. council elections
Electoral fraud, including vote-rigging, A close examination of the results of the was reported in several locations, though local council elections shows that Kulmiye these reports were not confirmed with was the biggest winner in all districts concrete evidence. Some candidates across Somaliland with the exception and political associations alleged that the of three (Balli-Gubadle, Oodweyne, and government and the ruling Kulmiye party Garadag) that were dominated by three committed electoral fraud. However, new political associations: Xaqsoor, there were no legal consequences for Umadda, and Rays. Waddani came these allegations, largely due to the failure second in most districts. The third largest of Somaliland’s electoral laws to provide vote-winner was the existing UCID party. a comprehensive regulatory framework A full breakdown of votes can be found in for electoral crimes and their prosecution. Table 5, whilst Table 6 shows the council seats won by each party in each district.
37 Steve Kibble and Michael Wallis, Swerves in the Road: Report by International Election Observers on the 2012 Local Elections in Somaliland (London: Progressio, 2013), pg. 21. 5. Election results: complications and achievements 53
Table 5: Votes for each political party/association by district and rank, 2012
Region Umadda UCID Kulmiye Dalsan Votes % Votes Rank Votes % Votes Rank Votes % Votes Rank Votes % Votes Rank Awdal 12,477 10.90% 4 14,101 12.32% 3 39,803 34.77% 1 8,795 7.68% 7 Marood-Jeex 28,544 9.07% 5 55,185 17.54% 3 84,834 26.96% 1 24,578 7.81% 7 Saaxil 2,362 4.13% 6 14,562 25.44% 2 21,859 38.18% 1 1,426 2.49% 4 Togdheer 29,144 18.16% 3 9,541 5.95% 5 47,228 29.43% 1 3,185 1.98% 4 Sool 5,241 10.61% 5 3,876 7.85% 6 16,740 33.90% 1 2,092 4.24% 3 Sanaag 16,921 14.76% 4 7,840 6.84% 5 34,331 29.95% 1 4,604 4.02% 3
Total 94,689 11.68% 27 105,105 12.96% 24 244,795 30.19% 44,680 5.51% 28
Region Rays Waddani Xaqsoor Votes % Votes Rank Votes % Votes Rank Votes % Votes Rank Total Valid Votes Awdal 6,465 5.65% 5 24,239 21.18% 2 8,579 7.50% 6 114,459 Marood-Jeex 19,053 6.06% 6 56,109 17.83% 2 46,360 14.73% 4 314,663 Saaxil 4,026 7.03% 7 10,306 18.00% 3 2,710 4.73% 5 57,251 Togdheer 27,097 16.89% 7 38,624 24.07% 2 5,641 3.52% 6 160,460 Sool 7,039 14.25% 7 8,907 18.04% 2 5,488 11.11% 4 49,383 19,916 17.37% 7 25,604 22.33% 2 5,426 4.73% 6 Sanaag 114,642 Total 83,596 10.31% 39 163,789 20.20% 13 74,204 9.15% 31 810,858
Table 6: Seats won by each political party/association by district, 2012.
POLITICAL ASSOCIATION DISTRICT Umadda UCID Kulmiye Dalsan Rays Waddani Xaqsoor Total Baki 2 0 5 2 - 3 1 13 Boorame 3 3 7 1 2 4 1 21 Lughaya 0 2 6 0 - 2 3 13 Saylac 1 3 6 1 - 4 2 17 AWDAL 6 8 24 4 2 13 7 64 Balli-Gudadle 0 1 2 1 0 2 7 13 Gabiley 1 4 7 2 2 4 1 21 Hargeysa 3 4 7 2 1 4 4 25 Salaxley 0 5 3 0 1 2 2 13 MAROODI-JEEX 4 14 19 5 4 12 14 72 Berbera 1 5 9 0 2 3 1 21 Sheekh 0 3 4 1 0 4 1 13 SAAXIL 1 8 13 1 2 7 2 34 Burco 3 1 7 0 4 5 1 21 Buuhodle* 3 2 7 - 3 2 0 17 Oodweyne 7 1 1 1 0 6 1 17 TOGDHEER 13 4 15 1 7 13 2 55 Caynabo 1 0 6 0 4 2 0 13 LasCaanood 2 3 6 1 0 4 5 21 Xuddun 5 0 0 2 - 6 0 13 SOOL 8 3 12 3 4 12 5 47 Ceel-Afweyn 1 1 8 1 3 3 0 17 Ceerigabo 4 2 5 1 2 6 1 21 Gar’adag 0 0 3 0 8 2 0 13 Badhan ------Dhahar ------SANAAG 5 3 16 2 13 11 1 51 Total 37 40 99 16 32 68 31 323
* Buhoodle had ten closed seats and Xuddun had eight closed seats. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 54 5. Election results: complications and achievements Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Almost immediately after Election Day, clan competition for top leadership but before the NEC officially announced positions remained intense. the results, speculation began about the composition of the elected councils 5.2.1 Women’s Participation in terms of party/association and clan identification. It became clear early on Of the 2,368 candidates that contested that Kulmiye, UCID, and Waddani were the local elections in 2012, only 172 (7.6 the largest vote-winners, and would percent) were women. Out of these, hence qualify as Somaliland’s legitimate only ten were elected. This might be political parties for the next ten years. considered an achievement compared to the 2002 elections, in which only one In the absence of strong party principles woman was elected. However, cultural or doctrines, clan identity emerged as the norms, constraints, and challenges mean primary political ideology. From the outset that women’s participation in local politics of election season in mid-2012, clan- continues to be very weak. based motivations had surged through the preparations for the elections. Now Clan politics is perceived as one of that the three winners were known, the the main challenges. Because of the clans started to refocus their attention clan-based political structure, in 2012 on the contest for council leadership. political parties selected candidates The clans, led by traditional elders- who might bring more votes so that their turned-politicians and parliamentarians, party could be registered as one of the used the parties as props to manoeuvre national parties. Because of this reason, themselves into position in order to most political parties took the strategy capitalize on the number of seats they for securing votes instead of promoting had won. Theoretically the parties and representation. It was clear to the political associations had fielded the candidates parties that women would not be able to and cobbled together political platforms get more votes because of their inherited pertinent to issues of concern in local political disadvantages within the clan- governance. In practical terms, however, based political system, which does not the clan replaced the political party/ provide enough space to women and association as the primary object of minority groups. allegiance and exerted a great deal of pressure on the electoral process. As In addition, women face an identity crisis such it became a repository of actual in this clan-driven political system, as they power and authority. Hence, as the shape cannot represent either their clan of origin of the new local governments emerged, or the clan of their children and husband. 5. Election results: complications and achievements 55
This identity crisis has had a very negative is candidate-centred (voters chose impact on women and their chances of candidates, not parties) and so the being elected as public officials. In the parties’ success depended on the absence of ideologically-driven political strength of their individual candidates. parties and well-educated communities, In a society where women candidates are clan allegiance becomes the main basis less likely to garner votes as individuals, of support. Somaliland’s transition to a the parties avoided enlisting them as multiparty system in which candidates candidates. By contrast, closed list and parties are elected because of their voting systems tend to be friendlier to political platforms and ideological beliefs women candidates, because parties are is far from complete. more willing to place women on their lists when voters approve the list as a whole The open-list proportional representation rather than voting for individuals within system also imposed challenges the list. on women candidates. The system Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 56 5. Election results: complications and achievements Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Table 7: Gender distribution of local council candidates by district, 2012.38
District Male Female Total Seylac 99 3 102 Lughaya 78 0 78 Baki 75 0 78 Borama 135 12 147 Gabiley 141 6 147 Hargeysa 166 9 175 Salaxlay 87 4 91 Baligubadle 90 1 91 Berbera 139 8 147 Sheekh 82 9 91 Burao 138 9 147 Oodwayne 104 15 119 Laascanood 130 17 147 Caynabo 84 7 91 Xudun 29 1 91 Garadag 88 3 91 Ceel-afwayn 109 10 19 Ceerigaabo 132 15 147 Badhan 83 19 102 Dhahar 59 19 78 Buhoodle 40 2 42 TOTAL 2088 172 2260
38 The data analysis was compiled by Elizabeth McCann and Saeed Ahmed Mohamoud of Interpeace. 5. Election results: complications and achievements 57
Table 8: Gender distribution of local council candidates by party/association, 2012.
Party/Association male Percentage Female Percentage Total (%) (%) Umadda 305 91.0 30 9.0 335 UCID 307 91.6 28 8.4 335 Kulmiye 317 94.6 18 5.4 335 Dalsan 304 92.7 24 7.3 328 Raye 240 93.4 17 6.6 257 Waddani 313 93.4 22 6.6 335 Xaqsoor 302 90.1 33 9.9 335
5.3 Shortcuts in council new councillors. Elected councillors leadership nominations belonging to the same clan (but sometimes representing different parties) Article 62 of Law No. 23 on Regions and claimed that the quorum was filled and Districts (Self-Administration) stipulates held meetings to nominate the council that the mayors and deputy mayors of leadership. In these cases, the Ministry Somaliland’s towns are to be elected of the Interior stepped in immediately, by the local councillors at an inaugural declaring the decisions null and void. council meeting within fifteen days of the announcement of the local council Despite capturing about one-third election results. The Minister of the Interior of the council seats (see Table 6), is required to announce the date of the Kulmiye did poorly in its attempt to gain first meeting of the elected councils. If leadership positions in the emerging the minister fails to do so, every council local governments: it won only five of shall meet of its own accord within the the seventeen mayoral positions. The first ten days after these fifteen days have other two parties, Waddani and UCID, elapsed (i.e. no more than twenty-five had an even slimmer chance of winning days after the announcement of results). leadership positions unchallenged. They organized clandestine sessions After the announcement of the 2012 with Kulmiye councillors to decide election results, some district councils which party would get which position sought to elect mayors and deputy in specific localities across Somaliland. mayors without consulting all of the That these arrangements took place Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 58 5. Election results: complications and achievements Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
without the approval of Kulmiye attests First, neighbouring Djibouti’s to the power of the clan mindset. Stress independence in 1977 created was almost invariably placed on clan opportunities for Issa in the new state, cohesion (top positions being occupied where their clansmen dominate the by individuals from the same clan) rather political system. The Issa elite left Awdal than on party loyalty, political positions, in large numbers, leaving a leadership or clearly articulated principles. The vacuum in Seylac, which was filled by shortcuts taken in the election of the Gadabursi. council leaderships shows how clannism permeates Somaliland’s political culture. Second, Issa people who had participated in the Somali civil war also fled to Djibouti. 5.4 The Seylac test The Issa had fought against Siad Barre’s regime with the Isaaq-dominated Somali The 2012 elections and their aftermath National Movement (SNM) in the 1980s. exposed multiple fractures within The Gadabursi, on the other hand, had Somaliland society, most notably the been generally supportive of the regime, fragile balance of power among clans and their militias fought alongside its sharing the same constituencies. Areas in forces. However, in the last stages of which power-sharing disputes occurred the war there was a rapprochement included Erigavo, Ceel-Afwayn, Berbera, between Siad Barre and the Issa, and and Seylac (Zeila). In Seylac, the district’s the Issa turned against the SNM. After two major clans, Issa and Gadabursi, the SNM drove Siad Barre’s forces out engaged in a particularly intense post- of Somaliland in 1991, Issa militiamen election quarrel over the top positions left for Djibouti. Meanwhile, the Isaaq in the local government. Despite government-initiated reconciliation made peace with the Gadabursi, and efforts, passions still run high. were accommodated within the resulting clan-based power-sharing arrangement. Seylac is a coastal town in the north- western Awdal region in which the two Though many Issa and Gadabursi lived main clans have lived side by side for together in relative peace, the Issa felt centuries, their peaceful co-existence excluded from the new Somaliland punctuated by occasional fighting. For state and engaged in anti-government much of the town’s history, these clans resistance for a time in the 1990s. This enjoyed demographic and political was quickly subdued, but emotions parity. However, two events seem to continued to simmer. The Issa were have shifted the balance in favour of the brought back into the political fold during Gadabursi. the tenure of President Dahir Rayale 5. Election results: complications and achievements 59
Kahin, a Gadabursi, who ensured that in to vote from other parts of Awdal and both clans were loyal to his UDUB party, areas across the border with Ethiopia. In and that the Issa occupied prominent protest, the Issa councillors resigned en positions in Seylac’s local government. masse. Gadabursi councillors convened the inaugural sessions by themselves, By the time the 2012 elections were and were able to fill the quorum. They held, however, Rayale and his party promptly picked the mayors and deputy had passed from the political scene, mayors of Seylac and Lughaya from and the fragile clan alliance that existed amongst Gadabursi councillors. This under UDUB’s leadership had dissolved. step further enraged the Issa, and militias Most Gadabursi now belonged either to began to mobilize. Kulmiye or the new Waddani political association. The Issa, on the other Despite mediation efforts launched by the hand, were loyal to Xaqsoor, another government to settle the Seylac dispute, new association that had little support it remains unresolved, showing that outside several districts in and around competition for power among the clans Hargeysa and Seylac, in addition to will continue to pose a difficult challenge peripheral areas in the east. for Somaliland’s democratization process. Before the elections, Somaliland’s government closed the border with 5.5 The Xaqsoor challenge Djibouti under the pretext that ethnic Somalis from Djibouti (mostly Issa) As noted above, the local council were being shuttled in to vote illegally. elections had two objectives: to elect Kulmiye and Waddani candidates in the new councillors in nineteen districts region (mostly Gadabursi) benefitted and to select the three constitutionally from the border closure. These two recognized parties. Two of the existing parties fared well in the vote totals, parties, Kulmiye and UCID, were whilst Xaqsoor (which Issa members established in 2002 and maintained supported) performed poorly. Majorities their positions in 2012. Waddani, a of local councillors elected in the new political association, became the districts of Seylac (ten out of seventeen) third official party. The other political and Lughaya (ten out of thirteen) were associations—Ummada, Xaqsoor, Gadabursi. Dalsan, and Rays—were thus not permitted to become parties. Initially, The Issa cried foul, claiming that large they challenged the management and numbers of Gadabursi had been brought the results of the election, but three of Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 60 5. Election results: complications and achievements Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
them ultimately conceded and merged leadership argued that the government with the winning parties. Ummada joined had influenced the application process. Waddani, and Rays and Dalsan joined the ruling Kulmiye party. The government tried to resolve this post-election dispute through informal Xaqsoor, however, did not unify with any mechanisms. Both sides nominated of the legally recognized parties, claiming members of a negotiating committee that the election was not free and fair. in order to find a lasting solution for Formed by a well-known politician, this prolonged row. The negotiation Hassan Ciise Jama, the political paved the way for a meeting between association argued that the election the president and the leadership of was maladministered and alleged that Xaqsoor, primarily its chairman. A private the government had manipulated the preliminary agreement was reached, and electoral process.39 In early December the president nominated the first and 2012, the supporters of Xaqsoor took to second deputy chairmen of Xaqsoor the streets in Hargeysa and other cities for ministerial posts. The chairman of including Lascanood to demonstrate Xaqsoor challenged this, declaring that against the election results. The the president had breached the terms of Somaliland police forces tried to control the agreement. He vowed to continue his the situation, but violent clashes occurred protest against the validity of the election and a number of civilians died. results.
As a result, legal complaints were Despite these highly complicated filed in a UK-based court against the disputes, peace and stability have been incumbent president Ahmed Silanyo maintained in Somaliland, and the most for alleged human rights violations.40 severe post-election conflicts were In addition, the leaders of Xaqsoor contained. This is a clear indication that submitted a civil action to the Supreme over the past two decades a culture Court of Somaliland, which ruled that of peace has taken root among the it could not adjudicate the case. The Somaliland people. It is, however, very Court claimed that Xaqsoor had failed important that the electoral process is to comply with the complaint procedure institutionalized in order to prevent future enshrined in the electoral laws. Xaqsoor’s election-related conflict.
39 Xaqsoor announcement, Hargeysa, January 2013. 40 At the time of writing, there have been no substantive developments in the case. 5. Election results: complications and achievements 61
5.6 Deficits in the transition general societal cohesion, the contest to democracy for the council leaderships turned out to be one of the most serious sources The 2012 local council elections were of tension in these elections, driving meant to showcase Somalilanders’ wedges between clans in the same political maturity. Instead, they proved constituency. The contest was driven that clannism, which is a serious threat by short-term expediency and clan- to democracy, is alive and well. Clan- endorsed personal profit rather than based party politics tend to produce by a long-term vision of healing and highly personalized council leaderships progress. Serious consideration of these and a fragmented form of municipal issues is now required to address the management, which are fundamentally adverse effects of creeping traditionalism in tension with democratic practice. and cynical politics on Somaliland’s Rather than improving inter-clan trust and democratic governance. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 62 6. Lesson Learned Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward 6. Lesson Learned 63
6. Lesson Learned
As Somaliland continues its transition from a clan-based system to multiparty democracy, challenges have emerged that complicate the electoral process and sometimes cast doubt over the entire electoral system. Election delays, ambiguous laws, incompetent institutions, and a lack of structured electoral conflict resolution mechanisms have all negatively impacted Somaliland’s democratization process. These challenges have been addressed through ad-hoc, culturally rooted, consensual agreements between the concerned stakeholders. However, those solutions were short-term in nature, making it likely that such challenges will return in advance of the upcoming elections. In the absence of a strong electoral framework, dialogue is the only effective response to a disorderly democratization process marked by election-related disputes.
Credible elections can only be realised 6.1 The importance of when structured mechanisms are dialogue in the electoral introduced to prevent electoral fraud. In 2011, the voter roll that Somaliland process compiled from 2008 to 2010 was Somaliland’s electoral process has been discarded by the legislature, impairing disfigured by recurrent and lingering the credibility of the subsequent election. political disputes, which hold the potential In addition, the formation of new political for anxiety and even violence. Most of associations and the adoption of an these political incongruities have involved open-list system posed challenges issues that require compromise among to the 2012 elections. These electoral the main political actors. Fortunately, developments offer important lessons for many of the most dangerous disputes Somaliland’s democratization process. have been resolved through the all- Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 64 6. Lesson Learned Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
encompassing, consensus-oriented, process must be institutionalized to consultative processes that have long ensure stability and sustainability. This will been customary in Somaliland. The enable key actors to manage electoral incorporation of inclusive consensual disputes, and will lay a strong foundation dialogue into electoral processes since for sustainable political order. 2001 has steered the approach and thinking of important stakeholders and 6.2 Institutionalization of 41 has promoted a ‘culture of dialogue.’ electoral processes
This culture of political dialogue indicates Despite Somaliland’s remarkable that Somaliland’s traditional system democratic achievements in successfully of dispute resolution has exerted holding five elections in a decade, a powerfully positive influence on electoral sustainability and stability remain Somaliland’s democratization process. key challenges to the electoral process. In this context, the different parts of Somaliland’s electoral processes as Somaliland’s hybrid political structure they currently exist are unsustainable, complement each other and create an unstable, uninstitutionlised, underfunded, enabling environment for elections. and unstructured.
Without strong, competent electoral First, the government of Somaliland lacks institutions that can manage political, the financial capacity to support elections. constitutional, and legal disputes, Therefore, donors have been deeply Somaliland will continue to employ this involved in the funding of the electoral consultative process to manage electoral process. Second, the government lacks disputes. It is from this background that the technical capacity to hold elections, over the years, APD has managed, and critical election management navigated, and facilitated this inclusive skills are missing in Somaliland. Third, dialogue process as an independent, Somaliland’s electoral institutions are neutral, impartial body trusted by the weak and lack the capacity to sustain political stakeholders. The role of the and stabilize the electoral process. Academy is crucial in creating cultural Finally, this lack of financial capacity, dialogue and confidence building technical knowledge, and strong electoral measures between political stakeholders. institutions has created loopholes and However, dialogue and consultation are provided justification for self-interested merely short-term solutions. The electoral political actors to delay elections.
41 Academy for Peace and Development (2012), A Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace). 6. Lesson Learned 65
Therefore, the electoral process has 6.4 Revisiting the formation been held hostage to the political will of new political of Somaliland’s leaders to allow it to continue. Electoral sustainability requires associations that leaders build a long-term vision of The formation of new political electoral stabilization, including politically associations in mid-2011 was a major oriented electoral reforms. litmus test for Somaliland’s still-fragile democratization process. The RAC 6.3 The importance of a registered fifteen political associations voter register as potential participants in the elections. After a rigorous screening and winnowing The suspension of the Voter Registration process, only five made it to Election Law by Parliament made it imperative Day. Of the three previously established to hold the 2012 local council elections parties, two (Kulmiye and UCID) took part without a voter register. But without in the elections, while UDUB ceased to a voter list, multiple voting was a be a viable political force due to internal widespread problem, reportedly taking leadership squabbles. place in every polling station.42 One of the main reasons justifying the The lack of voter registration negatively formation of new political associations impacts the credibility of elections and was the lack of internal party democracy creates a lack of trust in the electoral in the three existing parties, which were process among voters. One of the key dominated by influential personalities and lessons learned through the 2012 local lacked overarching political doctrines or elections was that voter registration is long-term visions. Somalilanders hoped absolutely essential for elections to be that opening up the system might create credible, fair, and peaceful. This lesson opportunities for the emergence of has positively influenced political actors to reform-minded parties and party leaders. learn and understand the importance of Another reason was the pervasiveness a voter registration process to elections. of clannism. Somaliland’s politics have As a result, stakeholders have initiated a always been permeated by this ideology, voter registration process in advance of and it has been particularly difficult to the next elections. devise a multiparty system that absorbs
42 Academy for Peace and Development (2012), ‘Election Observation Team Report, Hargeysa’. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 66 6. Lesson Learned Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
the more egalitarian elements of the On the whole, the formation of new political clan system while transforming and organizations is regarded as a welcome transcending its more retrograde and development and an achievement for anti-democratic elements. democracy. However, in practical terms their emergence was destabilizing to In the early years of this century, the the political process. Their formation drafters of the Somaliland constitution was not guided by a long-term political tried to build a stable liberal democracy vision, but rather resulted from the lack with a cohesive political structure from of internal democracy within the three what had until then been a clan-based older parties and the personalization of power-sharing arrangement. The framers these parties’ leadership. In Somaliland, of Somaliland’s political system believed where institutions were weak and fragile, that a three-party structure would the political conflict that accompanied forestall the proliferation of small, clan- the formation and legitimization of new based organizations masquerading as parties brought out inter-clan hostility and genuine political parties. Instead, the first competition, and weakened community- three recognized parties became highly based trust. The situation in 2012, personalized entities without institutional whereby one or two clans supported credibility. In response, the law was each party, led to conflict between the reinterpreted to permit the formation of authorities and the associations when new political associations every ten years. particular organizations failed to be Although former president Dahir Rayale recognized as parties, as was the case Kahin was adamantly opposed to any with Xaqsoor. change in the official parties, the current administration under President Silanyo Opening up the playing field to new has allowed this development. It put in associations allows new political actors place procedures to test and screen the to compete in politics. It can create new political associations to make sure open, inclusive politics and legitimise that only those with genuine political the entire democratization process by appeal throughout Somaliland could earn preventing monopolization of the political the right to take part in the local council system. On the other hand, permitting elections. The election itself allowed new associations can also exacerbate the three most popular organizations the individualization of political parties, (Kulmiye, UCID, and Waddani) to emerge rather than encouraging sustainable, and be legitimized. Under the current well-structured parties. Strong parties are law, these three parties will be licensed crucial for the continuity of Somaliland’s to contest elections until 2022. democratization process, making a 6. Lesson Learned 67
regulatory framework for internal party transparent, democratic, accountable, democracy an urgent necessity. and strong political parties, Somaliland’s multiparty political system remains in In today’s world, more people than ever question. before are governed by the leaders of their choice, and more countries 6.5 The role of the judiciary than ever before choose their leaders in electoral disputes through multiparty elections.43 In post- conflict societies, political parties can be The Somaliland constitution, unlike a vehicle for the transformation of political many others, does not describe the behaviour and the building of democracy. functions of the Constitutional Court. For In Somaliland, multiparty politics have example, Article 101, which establishes become an indispensable vehicle for the the Constitutional Court as part of the transformation and transition of political Supreme Court, does not explain its power. In 2002, three associations distinct functions. These had to be were officially registered as political defined later by the 2003 Law on the parties and these parties contested Organization of the Judiciary, which five elections in extremely difficult and describes the hierarchy, powers, and politicized circumstances. These parties functions of all Somaliland’s courts (article operated without sufficient financial 15).44 The role of the Constitutional Court resources and lacked professional and includes: technical experience. They also became • Hearing and making decisions highly personalized, without internal on laws that are challenged as democratic practices. The leaders of contrary to the constitution each party maintained their power by • Constitutional interpretation designing regulatory frameworks that • Temporarily suspending laws that favoured their own political ambitions. are not in compliance with the The lack of comprehensive party rules constitution. and regulations has caused internal party crises. These challenges look set to be The Constitutional Court plays a very repeated with the new Waddani political important role in the electoral process, party selected in the 2012 local council as clarified by the electoral laws. The election, whose internal shortcomings Court is the highest organ of the state mirror those of the older parties. Without that announces the final election results.
43 Salih, M A Mohamed, and Per Nordlund (2007), Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). 44 Law No: 21 of 2003 Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 68 6. Lesson Learned Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
In addition, it resolves and issues rulings no separate budget and is subject on electoral disputes. This important to the administration of the Ministry function of the court has not been utilized of Justice. effectively. • Retirement and benefits: According to one judge of the Opposition parties and others in Constitutional Court, a lack of Somaliland have argued that the provision for retirement and Supreme Court, and by extension benefits is one source of the lack of the Constitutional Court, do not have independence. It is evident that the sufficient independence to determine lack of such benefits plays a major cases impartially. They argue that the role in the administration of justice court simply serves the executive, who and the Court’s independence. It enjoys the powers to nominate and makes judges vulnerable to control remove judges. Since the court was by the executive. formed it has only ruled on three cases, an indication that electoral stakeholders The absence of an impartial and do not have sufficient trust in the court independent court effectively means that to submit petitions to it. all electoral disputes are resolved through a tradition-based consensual approach. Various factors impede the independence, Enhancement of the court’s role is critical neutrality, and impartiality of the Court: to the transformation of Somaliland’s • Constitutional challenges: The political system. constitution gives effective powers of nomination and removal of 6.6 Effects of the open-list justices to the president. The voting system president nominates judges and the House of Representatives Since the beginning of Somaliland’s approves them. However, in democratic transition, policy makers reality Parliament’s opinion is have made notable adjustments to the always underestimated or ignored. electoral system to better adapt it to The constitution arguably could political realities, often with unintended have afforded justices more consequences. The December independence by giving the power 2002 local council elections, the first of removal to a Judicial Commission elections in Somaliland in more than and the House of Representatives, three decades, adopted a closed-list rather than delivering this power proportional representation electoral into the hands of the president. system. In early 2012, parliament • Financial challenges: The court has adopted Law No. 20/2001 governing 6. Lesson Learned 69
elections, replacing the closed-list system It also pits clans against one another for with an open-list one. This new system the leadership of each district. In this way, introduced technical complications to the the open-list system has accentuated management of the 2012 local council clan-based social divisions. elections, particularly regarding the size of the ballot paper, the corresponding The open-list system also marginalises increase in the size and number of ballot the representation of women and minority boxes, the duration of voting, and the groups. The system is candidate- complexity of the count. centred and requires all candidates to campaign and get votes as individuals. The open-list system in Somaliland faces Due to cultural, political, and economic socio-political challenges. The system constraints, women do not receive many is candidate-centred: the candidates votes in this type of electoral system. themselves campaign, mobilize They also require the backing of their supporters, and conduct fundraising. respective clans, which is difficult in a The system through which candidates male-dominated political system. Closed are nominated is largely clan-based; the list systems, especially those that require clans select and submit candidates to political party leaderships to place female the political parties and associations to candidates in high positions on their lists, include on their lists. This process affords provide a greater chance for female political parties and associations no candidates to be elected. influence over the selection of candidates. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 70 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 71
7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections
It is remarkable that Somaliland, after recovering from a protracted civil war, was able to hold five elections in a decade, each of which was assessed as credible and representative by local and international observers.
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight and constituency demarcation are that the administration of these elections also necessary to create an enabling has not been free of problems and environment for free and fair electoral challenges. As noted in previous sections, processes. Somaliland has struggled to consolidate and institutionalize its electoral This chapter provides a detailed processes. The previous five elections discussion of the choices available to were held on an ad-hoc basis, and there Somaliland’s stakeholders for undertaking has been little focused development of comprehensive upgrades to improve either electoral institutions or a structured the sustainability and effectiveness of electoral framework. The NEC’s lack of Somaliland’s electoral systems and permanent staff and organization is a processes. serious institutional challenge. 7.1 Strengthening political Elections should take place within a comprehensive regulatory framework leadership so that legitimacy can be assured. Elections are complex processes that Somaliland’s current electoral laws bring together different stakeholders were not designed in a way that can with different political interests. The successfully manage elections. There implementation of effective electoral are gaps, contradictions, and ambiguities processes in Somaliland depends upon within the electoral legal framework. These the political will of the key stakeholders: legal gaps pose a very serious problem to • The president has constitutional the entire electoral process, and thus this chapter includes recommendations to powers to nominate electoral address them. Electoral instruments and commissioners, ratify acts of mechanisms such as the voter register, parliament, and request rulings civil register, electoral district delimitation, from the Constitutional Court. In Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 72 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
addition, the president has the electoral process to benefit their own mandate to request from the interests. The speaker of Parliament’s upper house an extension of his formation of a political association ahead own term as well as those of the of the local elections was instructive in vice president, Parliament, and the this regard. There were also allegations local councils. that the president’s Kulmiye party • Parliament has the legal mandate wielded an unfair advantage through its to draft and approve electoral laws use of public property and civil servants in a manner that is consistent with for campaign purposes. constitutional principles. • The political parties play a critical As Somaliland’s electoral process role in resolving election related remains under-institutionalized, mutual problems and building legitimacy understanding, consensus, and in the entire electoral process. leadership will all be essential to ensure Without their participation, credible the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. elections cannot be held. Political leadership requires that political actors, specifically the government, Due to Somaliland’s lack of an should not manipulate the electoral institutionalized electoral process, process. The extensive power of the election-related disputes can cast executive can be used as a stumbling doubt over the entire electoral process. block to electoral process. Political In Somaliland’s history, disputes often leadership also requires that the electoral delayed the holding of elections, and process must be transparent and free these disputes were not resolved until from government intervention. The stakeholders reached consensus through the traditional Somali dispute resolution political power of the executive must mechanisms of dialogue and mediation. not be exploited to unbalance the playing Such consensus has always relied on field to benefit anyone. political will and mutual understanding amongst concerned stakeholders. 7.1.1 The upcoming combined presidential and In the 2012 local council elections, the parliamentary elections: Office of the President, Parliament, and a test case for political the political parties worked together leadership to hold a credible, representative, and peaceful election. However, observers As Somaliland prepares for its next set have asserted that key stakeholders – of elections, effective political leadership particularly Parliament – manipulated the will be extremely important, particularly in 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 73
terms of deciding how many elections to Second, the two electoral systems are hold. Since 2002, Somaliland’s elections different, with the parliamentary elections have always been held separately. using a proportional representation However, both the presidential and system and the presidential election parliamentary terms will soon expire. The using a majoritarian system. most recent parliamentary election was supposed to take place in 2010, but has Third, the NEC has limited institutional twice been postponed. The president capacity to hold two elections at the and the House of the Representatives same time. have proposed combining the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, In addition, political parties believe that and this merits further discussion. combined elections require considerable Combining these elections is meant to technical preparation, skills training, and save time and money, since election testing. They fear that the lack of a voter years are time-consuming and expensive, registry will be used as a pretense for taking energy away from Somaliland’s the government to further postpone development goals. For combined presidential and parliamentary elections. elections to happen, the stakeholders They have also voiced concerns about must accept the president’s proposal and the use of state resources in support of Parliament must enact a law. incumbent registration interests.
Combined elections face challenges. Finally, a combined election faces First, a well-designed regulatory technical, financial, and political framework is essential, but the laws that challenges, which need to be addressed govern presidential and parliamentary before the elections. Diagram 1 outlines elections are incomplete. There is a the main questions over the combined need to formulate a comprehensive elections’ technical and financial legal framework that can regulate both feasibility. elections. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 74 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Diagram 1: Challenges of combined elections.
Legal framework Electoral System Institutional Weakness/ Financial Constraints Limitation
Electoral Framework National COMBINED Electoral ELECTIONS Commission
Weak Voter Education
Political Leadership
Party Systems
Technical Complications
APD plans to engage with key political reasons. It is more than a stakeholders to create a dialogue on the technical process, and it is influenced by issue of combining elections. Using its the holistic political context. It is widely traditional consensus building approach, agreed among elections experts that APD will bring the stakeholders together accurate, transparent, effective, trusted, to find a solution to this matter. and accepted voter registration is instrumental to representative, credible, 7.2 Preparation of a and peaceful elections.46 credible voter register Voter registration fulfils six functions: Voter registration is critically important for • It provides information to assist political participation in the democratic with election planning and logistics context.45 It ensures that the right to • It protects the electoral rights of vote is universal, equal, and direct. the public Voter registration is a highly complex • It determines eligibility criteria for process for financial, technical, and participation in voting
45 Pintor, Rafael Lopez and Maria Gratschew, et al (2002), Voter Registration Turnout Since 1945: A Global Report (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). 46 The registration process should have the following guiding principles and qualities: integrity; inclusiveness; comprehensiveness; accuracy; accessibility; an informed public; transparency; security; information privacy; cost effectiveness; accountability; credibility; stakeholder participation; international assistance; and sustainability (institutional, financial, technical and technological, and political). 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 75
• It facilitates the designation of kept accurate. The latter requires financial electoral districts and technical sustainability, which is • It prevents election-related fraud difficult for countries like Somaliland to • It augments the transparency of deliver. the electoral process.47 7.2.1 Civil and voter registration: Voter registration can be conducted with combined, separate, or either active or passive participation, and integrated? on a continuous or periodic basis. If the system is passive, it requires no input Stakeholders have long recognized that from the voters to produce an electoral Somaliland needs to conduct both civil roll. Data is retrieved from the civil register and voter registration (CVR). Pursuant and all eligible citizens are automatically to that consensus, Somaliland needed listed on the roll, and informed of their to make a choice as to whether CVR inclusion by letter to their residential should take place as a single process or address. In this model, it is necessary as two separate initiatives. Both Rwanda to have an accurate civil register and and South Africa have combined CVR.50 accessible residential addresses, Other countries, such as Senegal, making it well suited to highly urbanized have conducted CVR as two separate 48 countries. processes.
In Somaliland, most voters live in rural In 2011, the MOI and the NEC signed a areas where accessible and permanent memorandum of understanding (MOU) addresses are not available, so an active to identify the tasks and responsibilities system is needed in which voters must of the two institutions with regard to physically visit a registration centre and the implementation of CVR. The MOU apply to be registered as a voter.49 This also stipulated areas of collaboration system was applied by the NEC in the between the MOI and the NEC. However, 2008 voter registration exercise. A further the signatories did not fully comply with choice must be made between periodic the terms agreed upon in the MOU, registration, used for a single electoral and there was confusion over the tasks event, or continuous registration, in which and functions of each institution with the database is constantly updated and regard to the implementation of CVR.
47 Evrensel, Astrid, ed. (2010), Voter Registration in Africa: A Comparative Analysis (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa). 48 Evrensel (2010), op. cit. 49 Evrensel (2010), op. cit. 50 Evrensel (2010), op. cit. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 76 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
The MOI argued that it had the legal The donors requested that NEC and mandate to undertake comprehensive MOI conduct a technical assessment civil registration in accordance with the to determine the advantages and Law for the Regions and Districts (Self- disadvantages of several options for CVR Administration) (Law No. 23/2007). On processes. The intention was to study the other hand, the NEC asserted that and examine technically and financially it had the legal mandate to implement the implications of the selected two- voter registration under Somaliland’s track process. In collaboration with electoral laws. NEC and MOI, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) hired To settle this confusion, the MOI, the an expert from Creative Associates NEC, and the three political parties International (CA) to conduct this agreed that a combined CVR was the assessment from 9 to 15 August 2013. best route, but one was not conducted in time for the 2012 elections. A 2011 Based on its assessment, CA presented feasibility study by Creative Associates three options:52 concluded that the civil registration 1. Combined CVR. In this approach, process in Somaliland could take years Somaliland would first conduct 51 to complete. a civil registry process and then extract a voter registry from the After the 2012 elections, stakeholders data collected. voiced concerns about whether 2. Separate CVR. In this option, combined CVR would allow the two Somaliland would conduct civil and registration processes to be resourced to voter registration concurrently on meet their respective statutory obligations two separate tracks. Completion in time to provide a credible voter of the civil registration process registry for the upcoming presidential would not be a prerequisite for and parliamentary elections. On 11 July the commencement of voter 2013, the MOI and the NEC signed an registration. agreement providing an implementation 3. Integrated CVR. In this option, framework for a two-track process, in Somaliland would conduct civil which civil and voter registration would and voter registration processes be implemented in separate exercises. together and concurrently. The signatories shared this agreement Somaliland would need to establish with donors for further engagement.
51 Creative Associates International (November 2011), ‘Somaliland Civil Registration Plan (Washington DC: Creative). 52 Creative Associates International (2013), ‘Somaliland: Civil and Voter Registration Assessment’, funded by Danish International Development Agency (Washington DC: Creative). 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 77
the infrastructure to conduct option. The delay in creating a voter both registration processes at register in 2008–2009 was one of registration sites, following the the reasons for the postponement operational model of the 2008 and of the local council and presidential 2010 registration processes. elections. • The preferred option should 7.2.2 Choosing CVR: the eliminate fraudulent voters and consensus approach voting practices, thereby reducing the financial and technical burden The stakeholders used a consensus- of accommodating extra ballots.53 based consultative approach to build • The preferred option should agreement regarding CVR. APD, using its provide an opportunity to use political space management approach, biometric technology to produce convened and facilitated more than eight a credible voter register that would consultative meetings, between April eliminate past mistakes and lay the 2012 and November 2013, attended by foundation for future updating and the leadership of the various stakeholder use of the voter database. groups, including the three political parties, the NEC, the MOI, and the Office With these conditions in mind, the task of the President. force examined all three of the options outlined in the CA assessment. The stakeholders comprising the three political parties, NEC, and MOI formed at The task force considered the combined the APD a task force to deeply analyse CVR option to have many disadvantages: the CA assessment report, examine the • Drawing the voter list from the advantages and disadvantages of the civil register would make voter options it presented, and come up with a registration dependent upon the viable solution. The taskforce agreed that: success and speed of the civil • A trustworthy voter list would registration process. The taskforce encourage all stakeholders’ considered that failure to complete acceptance of election results. the civil register in time to extract a • Holding a fair and credible election voter list could cause the election on schedule was of paramount to be delayed or conducted importance, and should be a without an electoral roll. precondition for any acceptable • Somaliland lacked tested
53 Extra ballots are required if the number of voters of a polling station is not fixed – in other words, where there is no voter registration. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 78 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
physical infrastructure to conduct statutory obligations. There would comprehensive civil registration be no time lag in preparing the and a legal framework for its voter list: it would be possible to implementation. accommodate the the timetable • There was a potential for confusion set for the upcoming presidential over the mandates of the MOI and and parliamentary elections. the NEC for the management of • Separate CVR would enable a the two processes. bifurcation of technology so that • Public confidence was lacking the voter registry, as a periodic about the guarantees for data endeavor, could be conducted protection in an MOI-controlled with simple technology. registration process. MOI was • It bolstered human and procedural not seen as transparent or fully controls on multiple voting, voter impersonation, and underage capable of managing the process. registration. • MOI had not been receptive • The legal framework, NEC to the inclusion of the NEC mandate, and operational and the political parties in the infrastructure (including polling implementation of both civil and stations and offices) were already voter registration processes, in place. raising serious concerns about • There was public trust in the transparency. NEC’s mandate and capacity • Combined CVR might allow to manage a separate voter political processes to influence registration process. The NEC outcomes in ways that were had learned lessons from the 2008 contrary to democratic principles. voter registration process, gained valuable experience, and identified The task force discounted the integrated many of the major challenges. CVR option on similar grounds. It further • This option would depoliticize civil considered that integrating civil and voter registration by separating the two registration would create a complex set processes, while also improving of challenges in terms of coordination the efficiency, effectiveness, and and delegation of responsibilities. focus of both. The MOI had a On the other hand, the task force clear mandate to conduct the perceived numerous advantages to the civil registration process, and separate CVR option: separating the processes would • This approach would allow the mean that full local capacity and two processes to be resourced ownership could be harnessed for and timed to meet their respective each. 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 79
• Separating the processes would the stakeholders; manual, hybrid, and permit more time for the civil biometric. The stakeholders agreed that registration process, for which the biometric option would be the most yearly funding could be allocated technically credible one. in the budget. • By allowing for flexibility, this option Some disagreements remained about would provide opportunities for the sequencing of the civil and voter convergence between the two registration processes. Kulmiye, the processes. current ruling party, supported the idea of conducting civil registration first. For all these reasons, and following However, this sequence was challenged intense discussion, the task force by the two opposition parties and the NEC unanimously agreed that separate CVR on the argument that prioritizing voter was the most viable option. However, the registration over civil registration would task force identified several challenges, be more likely to deliver a credible and including the need for timely and timely voter registry. Furthermore, a voter separate funding for the two processes, list extracted from the civil registration as well as the inefficiencies that could implemented by MOI without the NEC’s arise from the duplication of crosscutting involvement would lack credibility and activities. Nevertheless, the taskforce transparency, thereby compromising concluded that the two-track process its ability to be used in future elections. would maximize the sustainability of The opposition parties and the NEC also Somaliland’s democratization process. expressed concern that giving primacy to the civil registration might bias the A wide range of stakeholders validated subsequent voter registration in favour the task force’s decision at a workshop of the ruling party, thereby compromising on 18 September 2013. Those present the integrity of the elections. However, agreed on the need to develop a conducting voter registration first would roadmap for completing voter registration in time for the upcoming presidential require that a holistic technical approach and parliamentary election, and also be put in place to create a system into conducting a timely civil registration. which civil registry details could later In addition, they agreed to meet with be exported, ensuring the register’s donors to further engage them on the sustainability. selected option. The donors again commissioned CA The president nominated a civil to study options for the technical registration inter-ministerial steering implementation of voter registration. committee and technical committee CA presented another three options to to design and guide the process of Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 80 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
the implementing civil registration. The stakeholders turned their attention to the objective was to support the MOI’s issue of timetables for both processes. execution of a credible civil registration Though a completed civil registry was process. Stakeholders, comprising the no longer to be a prerequisite for the three parties, NEC, and MOI signed voter registry, stakeholders recognized another MOU indicating that even if civil that there was room for positive synergy registration was not held on time, voter between the two processes. Specifically, registration would not be delayed, and the detailed data collected in the civil the MOI would collaborate with NEC to registry would be extremely useful to carry out a joint CVR process. the implementation of voter registration. Diagrams 2 and 3 outline the With a decision in place on separate implementation process of the CVR and civil and voter registration processes, its foreseeable challenges.
Diagram 2: Civil and voter registration process implementation chart.
Context analysis study
Procurement Feasibility study
Registration Technical study period
CVR ID production Pilot project
Distribution of Legal framework cards
Display and Training adjudication 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 81
Diagram 3: Civil and voter registration process challenges.
Legal framework
Lack of residential Conflicting mandates address such as Ministry of Interior and NEC
Limited capacities of implementing CVR Limited time institutions
Variation of donor Lack of political interests understanding
Identification system-family tree tracking system
Ideally, the fulfilment of these twin tasks • Enable a more informed approach will allow for a sustainable and credible to key matters of policy, including election management system in the near healthcare, education, and future, and move Somaliland toward the long-term development of the full institutionalization of electoral Somaliland. registration and voting norms over the long term. To be successful, the separate 7.3 Electoral law reform voter registration process must: • Ensure that the momentum of Remarkable achievements were made Somaliland’s democratic process in the 2012 local council elections, but is maintained through the timely these elections reiterated the need for implementation of elections structural improvements and deeper • Maintain peace, stability, and social democratization efforts. Inherent gaps harmony in Somaliland’s electoral institutions and • Allow for the creation of a some aspects of the democratization foundation of knowledge about process need to be addressed before the Somaliland’s population already-delayed parliamentary election Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 82 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
is held.54 In particular, the current legal • Parliament must draft specific new framework is weak, incomplete, and laws that separately regulate the incoherent. The lack of comprehensive electoral commission, local council electoral laws hinders sustainable elections, presidential elections, democracy in Somaliland, and a number and parliamentary elections. This of aspects need to be addressed. follows the international standard, which holds that combining The scale of needed electoral law reforms electoral laws creates confusion is considerable, and it is a difficult task. and ambiguity. It will require political will and leadership • Parliament must pass a law on the from the government, the NEC, and selection or election of the House Parliament. The key stakeholders in of Elders, a version of which has the electoral process must properly already been before Parliament for coordinate the formulation of these laws some years. in order to ensure that a comprehensive • Parliament must prepare and pass legal framework is in place prior to the the Demarcation and Delimitation next elections. Ideally, the reform process of District Boundaries Law. should aim to harmonize, simplify, and • Parliament must pass an Electoral stabilize Somaliland’s electoral laws, Offences Act to address the creating a regulatory framework that criminal and civil liabilities of is free from ambiguity, inconsistency, the electoral process. Although deficiency, and contradiction. The electoral fraud such as multiple process through which Somaliland voting and multiple registrations conducts electoral legal reform should be is already criminalized under participatory and inclusive in the sense the regulatory framework of the that all the key stakeholders are able to electoral process, electoral laws participate in and contribute to it. This do not specify how violators are goal should be a strong legal framework to be punished. that will have greater legitimacy and popularity. 7.4 Institutional reform
APD recommends the following reforms In the post-conflict context, developing a to the current legal framework: culture of democracy is always a ‘work in • Existing electoral laws need to be progress.’ Effective and efficient electoral reviewed, revised, and amended. institutions are vital to peaceful elections,
54 Academy for Peace and Development (2010), Democracy in Somaliland: Challenges and Opportunities (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace). 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 83
not least the electoral management body. NEC. Most of the key stakeholders, The NEC is facing institutional problems including the political parties and the that cast doubt over the entire electoral government, blamed the commission for process. These problems include the maladministration of the election, despite lack of a formal institutional structure, the extensive election-related experience accountability, permanent staff, and rules and impressive level of unity exhibited by and regulations. the NEC members.
The efficiency of an institution depends A new commission was put in place largely on the capacity and competence in December 2014. By that time, the of its staff. The NEC has a number of political environment had changed different personnel– the commissioners, significantly, with a new president and the secretariat, regional and district one new political party. According electoral offices, and the polling staff – to the electoral laws, the president but in most cases these are temporary nominated three commissioners, the two consultants.55 In December 2012, a post- opposition parties each nominated one election lessons-learned workshop held commissioner, and the Guurti nominated for the NEC staff revealed that one of two commissioners. The new opposition the most serious institutional challenges party, Waddani, had its first opportunity facing the commission is the lack of to nominate a commissioner. permanent organizational structure and staff. The initial stage of the transition between the two commissions has gone relatively An ad hoc election management body smoothly, and the new commissioners is a serious threat to peaceful and showed themselves to be highly legitimate elections. Institutional reform competent and dedicated professionals. of the NEC is greatly needed, focusing However, there is still much to be done on recruiting permanent staff, formalizing in building the capacity of the new the institutional structure, and developing commission as it prepares to carry out a a regulatory framework. voter registration and subsequently the upcoming presidential and parliamentary The local council elections of 2012 elections. The ongoing transition must damaged public confidence in the be administered in a careful manner,
55 The secretariat is based in the head office of the commission in Hargeysa, and is composed of twelve departments or functions: human resources, finance, training, legal and operations, warehouse, security, communications, information technology, procurement, public relations, transportation and internal audit. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 84 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
sufficient training should be provided chairpersons of the women and to the new members, and attention youth wings. This committee is mainly should be paid to the continuity of the responsible for implementing party commission as an institution. policies and preparing budgets. Representatives from the women and Political parties youth wings are responsible for ensuring that the party properly addresses the In Somaliland today, there are three needs of these groups. main parties, Kulmiye, which is currently The central committee consists of in office, UCID, and Waddani. Political both elected and appointed officials. In parties in Somaliland generally share Somaliland these are usually based on similar structures. In theory, the political regional balances. Its main responsibilities parties follow democratic procedures include approving party budgets and elect people for the various positions prepared by the executive committee, available within the party. Intra-party monitoring the overall performance of structures include the general congress, the executive committee, and ensuring executive committee, central committee, the agenda of the general congress is regional committees, diaspora executed. committees, and wings for both women and youth. However, in Somaliland’s current parties, these structures are not institutionalized, The central decision-making organ within and as result the parties confront serious each party is the general congress. It challenges. Decision-making is highly consists of the party’s members of the centralized and internal party regulation House of Representatives and House is incomplete, causing internal disputes of Elders, delegates from the regions, to become a common phenomenon. In districts, and the diaspora, and local the absence of strong and accountable councilors. The congress is mainly intra-party deliberation and decision- responsible for electing Party leaders making structures, parties are unable to and members of the central committee, effectively resolve these disputes, which drafting party platforms, and approving gradually weaken cohesion within the decisions made by both the central and party. Political party institutionalization executive committees. is one of the key challenges facing Somaliland’s democratization process, The executive committee is comprised and a critical weakness hampering of elected officials, including the Somaliland’s political systems. 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 85
7.4.1 Seat allocation, 1960 parliamentary election (based on constituency demarcation, the number of seats won per region) and electoral formulas would be used. However, this was an ad hoc, short-term solution, and the issue The choice of an electoral system of constituency demarcation remains is crucial to political stability and unresolved. the effectiveness and efficiency of Some stakeholders are satisfied with democratic institutions. Somaliland, as the application of the 1960 formula, an emerging democracy, has adopted but others want a new formula based a system of proportional representation on the number of votes in each region. (PR). PR has the advantage of producing Both are problematic, and therefore highly representative electoral outcomes Somaliland must find a sustainable due to its seat allocation formula. The institutionalized solution before the main underlying principle is that each upcoming parliamentary election. It is political party should be represented in the responsibility of major political actors the legislature and the local councils in including the president, political parties, proportion to its support amongst the and Parliament to find a lasting solution electorate.56 to this problem.
Seat allocation, constituency demarcation, and electoral formulas are 7.5 Donors: moving inter-related concepts. Seats cannot be from event-based to allocated if there are no mathematically procedural electoral determined constituencies and electoral support formulas cannot be applied in the absence of the other two. Therefore, it For the past two decades, international is very important that the determination donors have provided emerging of seats in each constituency should democracies in Africa with financial be guided by a well-designed seat and technical support. The impact of allocation system. However, such a this support has been wide-ranging, system is not fully in place in Somaliland. and has included the advancement of In the 2005 parliamentary election, the a culture of democracy. However, much key stakeholders agreed that the seat donor support has been event-driven, allocation formula from the February focused almost entirely on elections. In
56 Van Eck, L, S E Visagle and H C de Kock (2005), ‘Fairness of Seat Allocation Methods in Proportional Representation’, ORION, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 93–110. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 86 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
most cases, the longer-term tasks of electoral laws. The flawed 2012 elections building electoral institutions and creating were a reminder that the electoral system an enabling environment for peaceful still has serious institutional weaknesses. elections are not prominent among donor electoral assistance goals. Somaliland’s ad-hoc approach to elections, in which electoral institutions The lack of long-term electoral assistance are under-developed or missing, as has, in many cases, led to fragmented well as the NEC’s weak institutional electoral processes. This issue was capacity, are problematic. Amongst other one of the principal topics of the 2006 requirements, the NEC needs on-going Ottawa Conference on Effective Electoral engagement, Parliament would benefit Assistance, which aimed to formulate from technical and financial support global electoral assistance principles in formulating electoral laws, and the and parameters.57 Although efforts have political parties are in need of long-term been made by both recipient countries donor support to be effective. Long-term, and international practitioners to put strategic support by international donors these into practice, the outcomes of of the electoral process in Somaliland is this conference do not often appear to essential for free, credible, and peaceful be taken into account by international elections in the future. policy-makers. 7.6 Enhancing the role International donors helped Somaliland to hold three elections between of civil society and 2005 and 2012. Most of this financial traditional leaders assistance was focused on the elections Somaliland’s political system has always themselves. Some capacity-building been strongly influenced by clan politics. support was given to electoral institutions The clans as social structures took the such as the NEC, the political parties, and lead in the peace- and state-building Parliament, but in the periods between processes that took place during the elections, these areas were largely early stages of Somaliland’s formation. neglected. Without process-oriented electoral support, Somaliland has been Due to the constructive role traditional unable to develop electoral sustainability, systems played in Somaliland’s post–war as demonstrated by the suspended voter political reconstruction, Somaliland has registration process and the inadequate formalized the traditional leadership into
57 The Ottawa Conference was convened by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Canada on 2–4 May 2006. The section title is based on IDEA’s subsequent publication. 7. The Future of Somaliland’s Elections 87
a constitutional governance structure. an important force in the upcoming The Guurti was established as a neutral elections. Therefore, it is crucial for body with a mandate to manage traditional leaders to support and assist and mediate Somaliland’s political the institutions mandated to manage hybridity. The Guurti has played a vital elections. These leaders’ capacity to role in the democratization process by resolve political disputes will also have approving electoral laws, mediating far-reaching impacts on the upcoming political stakeholders in times of crisis, elections. and creating an enabling environment of peace during elections. Tradition, If they do not act responsibly in supporting therefore, has been indispensable to effective institutions, traditional leaders Somaliland’s post-war democratization. might have a negative impact on the upcoming elections. In past elections, Since the inception of the democratization most pre- and post-election violence process in 2001, the role of traditional has been driven by traditional leaders, leadership has changed dramatically. and this must be prevented in the future. The institutionalization of the Guurti and Traditional leaders have also wielded the adoption of multiparty democracy inordinate influence in the selection and have transformed the traditional leaders election of candidates. Clan elders need into a more politicized element. This to better understand the importance of politicization has entrenched the elections and of letting candidates devise role of tradition in modern politics, attractive political programmes instead and traditional leaders who were not of relying on clan allegiances for their previously involved in politics have election. become politically active. Somaliland’s hybrid political system has influenced the The role of Somaliland’s civil society way elections are managed, regulated, was also instrumental in Somaliland’s and administered. For instance, clan post-war democratization process. Civil balance has been a key imperative in society has helped to strengthen fragile the National Electoral Commission’s electoral institutions in various ways. selection by political stakeholders. Party For instance, civil society organizations politics has also become dominated by have supported the NEC in managing clan representation. elections. Civil society organizations have also provided technical support Traditional leadership has shaped to Parliament in drafting electoral laws, the political landscape of Somaliland. and have provided political parties with Traditional leaders will continue to be training and awareness raising. Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 88 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Political space management is essential 7.7 Promoting political in emerging democracies where representation for political stakeholders do not trust the courts and electoral disputes cannot be women effectively resolved through formal judicial As indicated in Section Five, women institutions. In Somaliland, political face cultural, economic, and political dialogue based on consensus and challenges in terms of their political compromise has long been facilitated by representation at local and national levels. neutral civil society organizations in order The civil society and the government of to resolve political and electoral disputes. Somaliland took concrete steps toward The role of civil society, therefore, has the promotion of political representation been instrumental to achieving peaceful for women by introducing a quota system. and credible elections. The office of the president drafted a law introducing a gender quota in parliament. Members of civil society organizations However, this move was not successful have also played a vital role in monitoring due to the refusal of the House of Elders, and observing electoral events. Their which concluded that it was a violation monitoring mechanisms have ensured of the constitution and could not be the transparency of elections. In addition, approved. The constitutional concerns of civil society organizations have organized the House of Elders should be addressed and taken part in many successful legally. The president should ask the awareness-raising campaigns. Constitutional Court of Somaliland for further advice and clarifications on the Civil society should play an active role quota issue, and a determination of in the upcoming elections, particularly whether it violates the constitution. Civil in dispute resolution. The upcoming society organizations should pressure voter registration exercise will require the president to take this approach. A awareness raising, which civil society is quota system is the most effective means well-placed to provide. Civil society has of ensuring political representation for to be well-coordinated before and after women, and it should be addressed the elections in order to ensure that they before the upcoming elections. are held peacefully and credibly. 8. Conclusion 89
8. Conclusion
At one level, democracy in Somaliland is an unfolding success story. Five elections in only a decade, all conducted relatively peacefully, present an important milestone. The fundamental principles of democracy have taken root in Somaliland’s political soil in a remarkably short period of time, and there is now a political stage upon which Somalilanders can act collectively, define themselves, and determine their destiny. Today, most adult Somalilanders are familiar with the basic pillars of democracy, including political parties, elections and election campaigns, the rights of youth, women, and minority groups, and the prerogatives of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Somalilanders are also conscious that the acceptance and preservation of democratization are crucial for Somaliland as a viable state and a cohesive, stable society.
Due in large part to this attitudinal shift, Somaliland’s democratic success story Somaliland has been able to weather a is nevertheless challenged by numerous dangerous and tension-ridden but critical problems, many of which were brought phase of recovery and rehabilitation into sharp relief by the flawed local council during which the residue of war could elections of 2012. Weak institutions, gaps have easily torn out the sutures of peace, in the regulatory framework, the absence security, and stability. Somalilanders in of a political vision beyond elections, and government institutions, political parties the complexities of Somaliland’s political and associations, and civil society have hybridity are the main issues that beset come of political age. Democracy is the nascent democracy. not only discussed and debated in teashops and qat rooms, but practiced Critically, the leading actor in election and structured into the rhythms of socio- administration, the NEC, needs to be political life across Somaliland. strengthened and institutionalized. It Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: 90 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
must be equipped with the necessary reliable voter registration, elections lack skills and funds to hold free, fair, and legitimacy. Other important mechanisms, peaceful elections. Without an effective, such as electoral district delimitation, neutral, and strong commission, elections constituency demarcation, and electoral may not be properly managed, dividing formulas, must also be developed in society and creating instability. order to support Somaliland’s electoral process. Both local stakeholders and international donors must have a vision that goes Finally, Somaliland must ensure that beyond merely holding elections. institutions that bridge the gap between Specifically, the Somaliland Parliament, the people and their government operate which has the mandate to formulate in a way that is constructive, well- electoral laws, needs to develop the organized, and representative. Political necessary skills to draft and approve parties must endeavour to strengthen electoral laws that are free from gaps, and open up their internal deliberative contradictions, and ambiguities. and decision-making institutions, and Somaliland’s electoral history shows move away from the outdated model of that most disputes have arisen from the highly centralized and personalized the misinterpretation of electoral laws. party. Clan leaders must continue to Additionally, effective, representative, and play their traditional roles of peace- well-regulated political parties have a far- building and conflict resolution, while reaching impact on the peacefulness of avoiding undue interference in party the electoral process, and must also be politics and political campaigning. Civil supported. society organizations must make strong contributions to ensuring that electoral An impartial judiciary, primarily the processes are conducted fairly and Supreme Court, should also be seen effectively, that the people are well- as integral to Somaliland’s electoral informed and capable of carrying out process. Electoral instruments, including their democratic responsibilities, and a register, are a further important element that marginalized groups like women, of the consolidation of Somaliland’s youth, and minorities are able to make democratization process. Without their voices heard. 9. Bibliography 91
9. Bibliography
Academy for Peace and Development (2006), Local Solutions: Creating an Enabling Environment for Decentralisation in Somaliland (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace).
Academy for Peace and Development (2010), Democracy in Somaliland: Challenges and Opportunities (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace).
Academy for Peace and Development (2011), ‘Forum Activity Report’.
Academy for Peace and Development (2012), A Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process (Hargeysa: APD and Interpeace).
Academy for Peace and Development (2012), ‘Election Observation Team Report, Hargeysa’.
Cabdirahman Jimcaale (2002), Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions (Hargeysa: APD).
Creative Associates International (November 2011), ‘Somaliland Civil Registration Plan’ (Washington DC: Creative).
Creative Associates International (2013), ‘Somaliland Civil and Voter Registration Assessment’, funded by Danish International Development Agency (Washington DC: Creative).
Evrensel, Astrid, ed. (2010), Voter Registration in Africa: A Comparative Analysis (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa).
Hatchard, John, Muna Ndulo and Peter Slinn (2009), Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Common Wealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons 92 from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
Jhazbhay, M Iqbal D (2007), Somaliland: Post-War Nation-Building and International Relations 1991–2006, unpublished thesis (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand).
Mohamed Farah (2010), ‘An Analysis of the Somaliland Constitutional Court’ (Hargeysa: SORADI).
Mathieson, David and Robin Wager (2010), ‘Somaliland National Election Commission: Report on the Preparation of the Voter Register, January to June, 2010’ (London: ERIS).
Pintor, Rafael Lopez and Maria Gratschew, et al (2002), Voter Registration Turnout Since 1945: A Global Report (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance).
Simkin, Paul and Paul Crook for the European Union (2002), ‘Report on the Somaliland Local Elections held on 15 December 2002’, Delegation of the European Commission in the Republic of Kenya.
Somaliland.org (2007), ‘President Rayaale statement on the issue of formation of the new political association’, 20 December. Translation by author.
Somaliland National Consultative Committee for Political Organizations (2011), Press Release, 7 June.
Somaliland Times (2012), ‘Somaliland Parliament Wants Election without Registration’, 12 November.
Van Eck, L, S E Visagle and H C de Kock (2005), ‘Fairness of Seat Allocation Methods in Proportional Representation’,ORION, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 93–110.
Wall, Alan, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W Dundas, Joram Rukambe, and Sara Staino (2006), Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Pillars of Peace
cademy for Peace and Development cademy for Peace and Development Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka Harge isa, Som aliland
Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and APD Hargeisa, Somaliland Central Africa (ECA) T: (+252 2) 520304 P.O. Box 14520 - 00800 Nairobi, Kenya E: [email protected] PILLARS OF PEACE T: +254 20 2655228 W: www.apd-somaliland.org + 254 710607373 Somali Programme + 254 733605290 APD Burco, Somaliland Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: E: [email protected] T: (+252 2) 712 980/81/82 W: www.interpeace.org E: [email protected] W: www.apd-somaliland.org
in partnership with the United Nations Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
This publication was made possible through generous contributions and support from:
Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: ISBN: 978-9966-1665-2-4 Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way Forward
9 x
9 789966 166524