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INVESTIGATION OF CAUSES AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES CONCERNING NUCLEAR RADIATION

Aditi Chandra

B.Tech, Mechanical and Automation Engineering (2012) Amity University

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

JUNE 2014 ,7SS HUSETTS INSTITUTE

LABRPAIES

Signature redacted Signature of A uthor: ...... Aditi Chandra Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering May 9, 2014 -Signature redacted Certified by: .! ...... Michael W. Golay Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering 1107 Thesis Supervisor Signature redacted Certified by: ...... R. Scott Kemp Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering Thesis Reader Signature redacted A ccepted by ...... Mujid S. Kazimi -ECO Professor of Nuclear Engineering Chair, Department Committee on Graduate Students INVESTIGATION OF CAUSES AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES CONCERNING NUCLEAR RADIATION

Aditi Chandra

Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering on May 9, 2014 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Nuclear Science and Engineering

ABSTRACT

An individual's perception of radiation, termed as "Radiation Attitudes" in this work, is vital for understanding the stakeholder relationship dynamics for acceptance of controversial nuclear technology projects. Attitudes towards nuclear technology have been found to be different from those towards other technologies perceived as hazardous, such as hydraulic fracturing, genetic engineering or biohazard facilities. Even within the subset of nuclear technology, different applications invoke different reactions. Medical uses of the technology are generally viewed as positive, whereas nuclear power plants and radioactive waste management facilities can sometimes cause fear and anxiety in the minds of some people. This work explains the causes and structure of Radiation Attitudes, and the dynamics of the various factors influencing them.

A historical analysis of the narratives concerning nuclear technology was used to identify the complex, social, political, cognitive and technological factors that played a significant role in the formation of Radiation Attitudes. A system dynamics approach was utilized to construct causal loop diagrams depicting the cause-effect relationships and interdependencies between the identified variables. Qualitative interviews were conducted to test the causal relationships hypothesized in the model for Radiation Attitudes. The purpose of the interviews was to understand individual beliefs that result in a particular Radiation Attitude, the bases for these beliefs, and the process of their formation. The interviews enabled verification of the variables and relationships in the model, and the identification of the most significant interdependencies and links. The hypothesized model for Radiation Attitudes correlated well with the infonration inferred from the interviews, making the first stage of validation a success.

Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering

Thesis Reader: R. Scott Kemp Title: Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Michael W. Golay, for his invaluable support and guidance throughout the course of this work. Working with him for the past two years has been an incredible learning experience, both professionally and academically. I would also like to acknowledge the United States Department of Energy for providing the funding for this work.

I would like to thank my thesis reader, Professor R. Scott Kemp, for taking an interest in this work, and whose feedback greatly improved the quality of this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution made by Adam David Williams.

I would like to thank my parents, for supporting me in all my endeavours.

I would like to express gratitude to the all the professors and staff of the NSE department who have taught me and guided me throughout the time I have been here.

I would also like to thank all my friends for helping me maintain a good work-life balance, and making my experience at MIT a truly unforgettable one.

3 Contents

1 Introduction 10

1.1 M otivation ...... 10

1.2 Objectives ...... 11

1.3 Conflicts of Risk Perception between Experts and Laymen ...... 12

1.3.1 Cognitive Psychology Approach ...... 13

2 System Dynamics Approach 16

2.1 Dynamics of Complex Systems ...... 17

2.2 System Dynamics Tools ...... 17

3 Models for Stakeholder Acceptance 19

3.1 Definition of Acceptance ...... 19

3.2 Definition of a Stakeholder ...... 19

3.3 Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance ...... 21

3.4 Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level ...... 23

3.5 Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level . 26

3.6 Necessity for Addition of "Radiation Attitudes" to Model ...... 29

4 Identification of Variables for Causal Loop Diagram 30

4.1 Timeline of Nuclear Technology ...... 30

4.1.1 Late 19th Century to Early 20th Century- An Era of Scientific Discovery . 30

4.1.2 Discovery of Fission and the Manhattan Project ...... 31

4.1.3 The 1950s- Atoms for Peace and the Atomic Age ...... 33

4.1.4 The 1960s- The Cuban Missile Crisis and its After-Effects ...... 35

4 4.1.5 The 1970's - Anti-Nuclear Movements Gain Momentum ...... 36

4.1.6 Late 20th Century and the Chernobyl Accident ...... 37

4.1.7 The Yucca Mountain Controversy ...... 38

4.1.8 The 21st Century -Nuclear Proliferation in Iran and North Korea ..... 39

4.1.9 The Fukushima Disaster and its Consequences ...... 40

4.2 List of Important Variables ...... 43

5 Construction of a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) for Radiation Attitudes 45

5.1 Methodology ...... 45

5.2 Model Description ...... 45

5.3 Description of Identified Variables ...... 46

5.4 Explanation of Important Interdependencies and Loops ...... 62

5.5 Testing the Model ...... 67

6 Validation of Model by Interview Data 73

6.1 Interview Method ...... 73

6.2 Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level ...... 74

6.3 Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level ...... 74

6.4 Interviews for Determining Radiation Attitudes ...... 75

6.5 Selection of Interviewees ...... 76

7 Interview Data and Analysis 77

7.1 Interview No. 1 ...... 77

7.1.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops ...... 78

7.1.2 Identification of Important Links ...... 78

7.2 Interview No. 2 ...... 80

5 7.2.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops 80

7.2.2 Identification of Important Links ...... 81

7.3 Interview No. 3 ...... 83

7.3.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops ...... 83

7.3.2 Identification of Important Links ...... 84

7.4 Interview No. 4 ...... 86

7.4.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops ...... 86

7.4.2 Identification of Important Links ...... 86

7.5 Interview No. 5 ...... 88

7.5.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops ...... 88

7.5.2 Identification of Important Links ...... 89

7.6 Interview No. 6 ...... 91

7.6.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops ...... 91

7.6.2 Identification of Important Links ...... 92

7.7 Quantification of Responses ...... 94

7.8 R esults ...... 97

8 Conclusions 99

8.1 Recommendations for Future Work...... 99

A Variable Definition & Quantification Table for Local & State/Federal CLDs 101

B Interview Questions 111

B. I Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at a Local Level ...... 111

B.2 Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level . . 112

B.3 Interview Questions for Determining Radiation Attitudes ...... 113

6 C Description of MITR-II and Proposed Changes 116

D Detailed Interview Responses 119

D .1 Interview ee No. 1 ...... 119

D. 1.1 Responses to Questions related to the MIT Reactor and Proposed Fuel Change 119

D. 1.2 Summary of Responses to Questions related to Radiation Attitudes .. .. 120

D .2 Interview N o. 2 ...... 124

D.2.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects .. 124

D.2.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes ...... 124

D .3 Interview N o. 3 ...... 127

D.3.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects .. 127

D.3.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes ...... 127

D .4 Interview N o. 4 ...... 130

D.4.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects .. 130

D.4.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes ...... 130

D .5 Interview N o. 5 ...... 134

D.5.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects .. 134

D.5.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes ...... 134

D .6 Interview N o. 6 ...... 136

D.6.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects .. 136

D.6.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes ...... 137

References 140

7 List of Figures

1 Location of Nuclear Technology in the Spectrum of Human Cognitive Understand-

in g [1] ...... 14

2 Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance [2] ...... 22

3 Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level [3] ...... 24

4 Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level [3] 27

5 Causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes ...... 47

6 Risk-Benefit Tradeoff ...... 63

7 Social Trust Loop ...... 63

8 Empowerment ...... 64

9 Confidence and Control ...... 65

10 Media Favourability Loop ...... 66

11 Nuclear Context ...... 66

12 Nuclear Dread ...... 67

13 Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.1 ...... 79

14 Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.2 ...... 82

15 Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.3 ...... 85

16 Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.4 ...... 87

17 Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.5 ...... 90

18 Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.6 ...... 93

8 List of Tables

1 CLD Variable Descriptions ...... 56

2 Quantification of CLD Variables using Interview Data ...... 94

3 Analysis of Interview Data ...... 97

9 1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation

The nuclear enterprise has faced serious challenges over the course of history. Attitudes towards the use of nuclear technology and radiation have been very different, depending on the application. The majority of the public is accepting of nuclear technology and radiation when used for medical procedures like diagnostic imaging or radiation oncology. Uses of Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) and inspection techniques like industrial radiography, and oil and gas exploration techniques like nuclear well logging have also remained largely unopposed. However, strong negative reactions among the lay public have been observed with regards to nuclear energy and fuel cycle facilities, including nuclear power plants, enrichment plants, reprocessing plants, and waste storage and disposal facilities.

Though other controversial projects like hydraulic fracturing and genetic engineering also face public opposition, the reactions to nuclear projects are more extreme. Nuclear power, which once held the promise of power " too cheap to meter" now invokes images of mass destruction in the minds of many people. The negative perception of nuclear technology has significantly affected national energy policies all over the world. Public acceptance of nuclear technology has deteriorated. This has resulted in a stagnation of the nuclear enterprise in some, mostly wealthy, countries. This negative perception of nuclear technology has, for a long time been associated with an alarming perception of the risks associated with the technology. However, when it comes to practice, there seem to be other factors besides risk perception that affect an individual's views of nuclear technology, and hence his acceptance.

Approaches to understanding reactions to technologies viewed as risky can be classified into two major subgroups - a technical or rational approach, and a normative or value approach. According to the technical approach, risk decisions are the outcomes of a personal cost-benefit analysis informed by scientific and technical data. This would imply that opposition to a technology that is widely viewed by experts to be safe results from either a different private evaluation of costs and benefits, or insufficient information. This is true in most cases, but this approach has proved to be insufficient to explain the reactions to some technologies like nuclear. Lay opinion is not always formed by a rationalist decision making process, but also incorporates qualitative dimensions like catastrophic

10 potential, controllability, technological unfamiliarity and risk to future generations while developing attitudes towards risky technologies[4, 5, 6].

Within the nuclear enterprise, there exists a belief that information affects attitudes. This strategy has been utilized by the nuclear enterprise to a large extent, but with little success.It has not only been ineffective, but has also failed to explain why people accept radiation under some circumstances, whereas in other cases, the mere mention of the words "nuclear" or "radiation" engenders dread in the minds of some people. New scientific evidence does little to mitigate such public fear.

The reaction provoked in an individual by radiation, which may range from active acceptance of nuclear technology to a high level of anxiety, is termed as "Radiation Attitudes" in this work. How and why these attitudes develop in the minds of some people is a question that the work reported here aims at answering.

1.2 Objectives

This work is focused on answering the questions of why radiation provokes strong negative reactions under certain circumstances, and why the inconsistency in reactions exists. The objective of this work is to understand the processes and structure of the influence of Radiation Attitudes upon stakeholder acceptance concerning nuclear projects. This work aims to form a hypothesis on the formation process and structure of Radiation Attitudes. This is achieved by examination of complex, social, economic, political, cognitive and technological components that combine to determine the attitudes of individuals towards radiation, and their effects on the degree of acceptance of nuclear projects.

This analysis results in identification of the factors that influence Radiation Attitudes. In order to establish relationships between these variables, system dynamics modeling has been used. Causal loop diagrams showing different linkages between variables enable determination of the influence of different modes of causality upon different outcomes.

This work seeks to refine and validate these models via interviews with relevant stakeholders associated with nuclear facilities. The ultimate goal is to help in developing strategies that provide a clear understanding of factors affecting acceptance of nuclear- related projects. Radiation Attitudes are a vital element of this model since they strongly influence public opinion, thereby affecting policy

11 decisions and ultimately project success. Unless this threat perception and its causes are clearly understood, nuclear energy will continue to be opposed. This could slow down the rate of development of new nuclear projects or even result in abandonment of some projects, bringing the nuclear enterprise to a complete standstill.

1.3 Conflicts of Risk Perception between Experts and Laymen

In addition to understanding the social, political, economic and technical factors that influence an individual's attitudes towards radiation, it is important to understand why these factors invoke different responses in the lay public vs. experts in the field. This section aims to aid understanding of why some of the public follows a different approach towards formation of attitudes, as opposed to the fact based approach followed by experts.

It must be noted that the lay public isn't always risk averse. There are instances where risks are knowingly accepted, contrary to the expert opinion. Some examples are smoking, eating junk food, not wearing seat-belts etc. In some cases, this is due to willful disregard for expert advice. At other times, the laymen may believe that the experts are wrong, or simply lying to them. But the disagreements between experts and laymen do not seem to be rooted in facts or logic. Moreover, it is not the norm for experts and the laymen to disagree. The lay public trusts medical experts when it comes to their health, legal experts for law advice and pilots to fly airplanes. But nuclear technology is one field where there is a huge gap in risk perception between experts and a vast majority of the public.

The widely used narrative among nuclear experts is that that the conflict between experts and laymen arises due to a lack of trust. Lack of trust in experts could stem from a general distrust of authority.

When expert statements are made in support of a particular technology, laymen could believe that the experts have their personal agenda with regards to the technology, and that they seek to serve their own interests rather than those of the laymen[1]. A history of expert incompetency could also lead to public distrust.

Another theory, the theory of rival rationality, hypothesizes that what the lay public means by dangerous is not the same as what an expert is likely to mean by dangerous, which results in conflicts[7].

12 Experts aim to be precise and logical, and might overlook some intangible factors which are important to the lay public. Experts judge risk based on scientific factors like probability of a loss of coolant accident, the expected number of deaths, dose rate etc. The public rationale, on the other hand, is that of a general sense of well being. They wish for a "pristine" environment, where even the smallest radiation dose or a single death is unacceptable. Lay intuition is driven by qualitative features, sometimes ignoring quantitative features entirely.

However, these theories are not sufficient to explain how the lay public makes judgments and why the intensely negative attitude towards all things nuclear, or "nuclear dread"exists. In order to understand why nuclear dread exists, we need a model that is not just predictive, but also explanatory.

We need to understand an individual's process of making judgments, which will explain why in some cases there is an expert-lay conflict, while in other cases there is not. A cognitive psychology approach is necessary to study this phenomenon further.

1.3.1 Cognitive Psychology Approach

The cognitive psychology approach is based of the idea that different cognitive patterns illicit different responses in experts and in laymen. Howard Margolis, in "Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues", proposed that the spectrum of the issues that human beings encounter in their lives can be represented by Figure 1. The Figure shows that human problems can be classified into 3 main types, ranging from the narrow contexts of puzzles and experiments, continuing through ordinary personal experience, and then reaching the broad contexts of large social issues. Problems at the laboratory scale, at the extreme left of the spectrum in Figure 1, are unfamiliar to the average individual and he has limited experience with them. His cognitive patterns do not recognize these problems, and hence limit his capability of making judgments concerning problems in this range. At the social scale, at the broad end of the spectrum, the problems are outside the scope of individual experience. The consequences of actions are often so diffuse, ambiguous or delayed that close correlation of choices to experiences cannot occur. It is on the normal human scale, that one can expect close correlation between actions and consequences.

These are the problems that an individual encounters in his everyday life, and there are recognizable cognitive patterns in accordance to which the individual reacts to the problems[l].

13 Social Normal

Lab Nuclear X Technology

Level of Human Understanding

Scale of Problems

Figure 1: Location of Nuclear Technology in the Spectrum of Human Cognitive Understanding [1]

14 Nuclear technology lies on the broad end of the scale. It is a social problem, often outside the realm of understanding of a layman. This could explain why the attitudes towards radiations and nuclear technology do not seem to be affected by logical reasoning. This indicates that one must go beyond the conventional risk-benefit approach in order to understand the formation of these attitudes.

15 2 System Dynamics Approach

System dynamics modeling is used to represent the dynamic behavior of stakeholder acceptance and Radiation Attitudes. It forms the basis of our modeling systems for understanding the complex interactions between the numerous factors that influence public attitudes towards radiation, and stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects. System dynamics, a technique based upon engineering control modeling that emphasizes the simultaneous interaction of multiple important causal factors in system feedbacks, was developed at MIT in the 1960s. Jay Forrester, the founder of system dynamics defined it as follows- "Industrial [System] dynamics is the study of the information-feedback characteristics of industrial activity to how organizational structure, amplification (in policies), and time delays (in decision and actions) interact to influence the success of the enterprise." [8]

System dynamics is currently being used by many public and private sector organizations to help managers understand and forecast the effects of their decisions and actions on the behavior of a system. System dynamics is based on the principle of dynamic, ever-evolving relationships between system components. It can be used to analyze organizational, market, or other behavior which arises from the dynamic interaction, over time, of many interrelated variables. It simulates system behavior using explicit models of the internal cause-and-effect interactions of the system components. These models are recursive and deterministic. They are primarily distinguished from other types of models by their rich treatment of non-linear relationships, including feedback loops[9].

System dynamics can serve as an effective tool for understanding and counteracting problems in a system. According to the system dynamics approach, the solution to a problem lies in systems thinking-the ability to see the world as a complex system, in which we understand that outcomes are not independent and that a high degree of interconnectivity exists between all of the components of a system. With a holistic worldview, system dynamics enables faster learning and effective identification of the high leverage points in systems. A systemic perspective also enables us to make decisions consistent with our long-term best interests and the long-term best interests of the system as a whole[10].

16 2.1 Dynamics of Complex Systems

Sterman argues that real world systems are dynamic, since they possess some complex characteristics. Systems, and their components are constantly changing, sometimes at different rates. At the same time, the individual components are tightly coupled to each other as well as the external environment. Feedback is one of the most important characteristics of a system. It is defined as the modification or control of a process or system by its results or effects. Feedback may result in positive or negative reinforcing loops. Systems are governed by feedback which results in their dynamic behavior.

Another important characteristic is the time delay in feedback systems. There is often a time delay between the moment a decision or action is taken, and the moment its effects on the system. Delays in feedback loops create instability and increase the tendency of systems to oscillate. As a result, decision makers often continue to intervene to correct apparent discrepancies between the desired and actual state of the system long after sufficient corrective actions have been taken to restore the system to equilibrium. Thus, time delays can create problems and result in misjudgment of results.

Non-linearity in a system arises due to the fact that cause and effect are not always directly pro- portional. There are multiple factors that interact to result in a particular outcome. Systems are also largely dependent on the history of events. Past actions and decisions can determine the future course of events. Some events are irreversible, which can affect the dynamics of a system.

The dynamics of systems arise spontaneously from their internal structure. Often, small, random perturbations are amplified and molded by the feedback structure, generating patterns in space and time and creating path dependence. However, despite dependence on history and internal structure, a system is constantly evolving over time. The characteristics of the system and its components change and adapt due to factors both internal and external to the system[10].

2.2 System Dynamics Tools

The various system dynamics tools that can be used to model a complex system are described below.

1. Stock-Flow Diagrams

17 A Stock and flow diagram helps in studying and analyzing a system in a quantitative way. A stock is defined as a component of the system that accumulates or depletes over time. A flow is defined as the rate of accumulation or depletion of the stock. Stock Flow diagrams are effective tools for quantitatively defining relationships between variables and effects of positive and negative feedback.

2. Causal Loop Diagrams

A causal loop diagram effectively maps the different components of a system and their interactions.

It is a tool for understanding the structure of a system. It consists of cause- effect relationships between different variables. The relationships are represented by feedback loops. The overall dynamics of the system depend on which feedback loops are dominant.

3. Equations

After a causal loop diagram has been constructed and the dominant feedback loops have been identified, equations can be developed to mathematically represent the interactions within a system.

These equations serve as a tool for the next step, which is simulation.

4. Simulations

Simulations are analyses for modeling system behavior. The stock-flow diagrams and causal loops diagrams can be used to describe the system, the behaviour of which can be simulated using the formulated equations. This enables sensitivity analysis, optimization, and calibration to data to be automated, greatly increasing efficiency.

System dynamics, due to its ability to model complex systems was selected for this work as the tool to be used to portray the logic of stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects and attitudes towards radiation. System dynamics effectively captures the nonlinearities, heterogeneity, temporal- ity, asymmetry and micro/macro scale effects of the complex system we are attempting to represent.

Causal loop diagrams are the primary system dynamics tool used to create the aforementioned models. Stock-Flow diagrams are used to depict the different states of stakeholder acceptance and movement from one state to another. System dynamics modeling will ultimately serve as a tool for testing mechanisms to increase acceptance of new nuclear projects for various stakeholders.

18 3 Models for Stakeholder Acceptance

3.1 Definition of Acceptance

Acceptance is defined as a "condition where a project is allowed to proceed, given specific (tol- erable) constraints". Acceptance does not necessarily imply support for the project, or that the stakeholder no longer has any concerns or objections regarding the project. It implies that given a particular stakeholder attitude, he believes that the project should be allowed to continue. The constraints may be related to costs, time delays, environmental concerns, restrictions on behaviour, etc[ 11].

3.2 Definition of a Stakeholder

A stakeholder for a particular project is defined is an individual, group or organization which can affect (or can be affected by) the project under consideration, either directly or indirectly. For nuclear related projects, we can classify stakeholders into four main categories based on their sphere of influence.

1. Local level stakeholders

Local level stakeholders are those who are in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility and are most likely directly affected by it. This could include the following groups. a) Local bystanders- These are people who live in close proximity to the facility. They are not directly involved in the operations or administration of the facility, but are affected by it. They may or may not be knowledgeable about the facility. b) Project builders and employees- These are individuals related to and employed by the commercial enterprise looking to construct and operate the proposed nuclear facility. They are generally better informed about the facility than the local bystanders. c) Local decision- makers- Individuals living in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility site and who hold official leadership positions within the local government or firms. (e.g., energy-related utility companies or construction-related businesses).

19 d) Local opposition- These are individuals or groups operating at the local level who express a strong sentiment against the nuclear facility. They may actively demonstrate against the facility, seeking project cancellation. e) Facility neighbours- These are individuals living close to the facility, but not in the immediate vicinity. They are usually decision makers, or bystanders from towns neighbouring the one where the facility is to be constructed. They may not be as highly affected as the local groups, but in some cases, it has been found that their influence is strong.

2. State level stakeholders

State level stakeholders are stakeholders who have the ability to influence the project, or are affected by it, at the state level. These include- a) State level bystanders- State level bystanders may not be directly affected by the project, but they might have an opinion about having a nuclear facility in their state. b) State level decision makers- These are usually politicians and other state level government officials who hold leadership positions and have influence over the project. c) State level opposition- These are groups opposed to the project, operating at the state level d) State level organizations These could be industrial or labour organizations operating at the state level. These also include non-governmental organizations.

3. National level stakeholders

National level stakeholders are individuals or groups who have the ability to influence the project, or are affected by it, at the national level. These include- a) National level bystanders- National level bystanders are not related to the proposed facility in any way. However, they are significantly influenced by national public opinion polls and may hold a particular view about the proposed facility as a part of the national nuclear policy in general. They may see themselves as potential local bystanders. b) National level decision makers- These include individuals who hold official leadership positions within the national government. They are the policy makers and regulatory bodies who manage nuclear issues at the national level.

20 c) National level opposition- These are groups oppose the nuclear facility from a national level. The are usually large environmental or anti-nuclear organizations who are opposed to nuclear energy.

Some examples are the union of concerned scientists, federation of American scientists, sierra club etc d) Nuclear enterprise- This group represents the collective of individuals related to or employed by various nuclear facilities nationwide, including, but not limited to, nuclear power plants, enrichment plants, waste disposal facilities etc. It also includes agencies like the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). e) Academics- This group includes scientists, researchers and other academics who study nuclear science and technology.

4. International level stakeholders a) International opposition- Anti- nuclear groups operating internationally fall into this category.

Some examples are Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, etc. b) International nuclear organizations international bodies like the International Atomic Energy

Agency fall under this category. They are not affected by a particular nuclear facility but have influence over nuclear acceptance from the point of view of safety and security. They are also responsible for emergency measures in the event of an accident of the facility[ 11].

3.3 Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance

We assume that stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects ranges across a spectrum from active rejection to active acceptance. The 5 states of stakeholder acceptance are represented as stocks, meaning they can increase or decrease depending on feedback. They are defined as follows-

1. Active Reject- A stakeholder in this group would actively oppose a new nuclear project.

2. Passive Reject- A stakeholder in this group would not actively oppose a new nuclear project, but would not be accepting of the project either

3. Undecided- A stakeholder in this group is one who has not yet formed an opinion about whether he supports or opposes the project

4. Passive Accept- A stakeholder in this group would not oppose a new nuclear project, but neither would he actively promote the project.

21 A ive pas$Ie 87 U-mi Passive Actv et Nepative c Negative Posi"iv t Poiie Accp Advocatn UdsadIRe Untenstanding Advocatig

Decreasing Negative Decrasu Negatve Decreasin Positive Decreasitg Posve Advocatitg Understanix Understanding Avocati

Figure 2: Stock-Flow Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance [2]

5. Active Accept- A stakeholder in this group would actively promote a new nuclear project.

The flows from one stock to another represent mobilization of a stakeholder from one state of

acceptance to another. There are 2 main modes of mobilization-

1. Understanding

As shown in Figure 2, an increase in positive understanding mobilizes a stakeholder from the un-

decided stock to the passive acceptance stock, while a decrease in positive understanding results

in mobilization from passive acceptance to undecided. An increase in negative understanding mo-

bilizes a stakeholder from the undecided stock to the passive rejection stock, while a decrease in

negative understanding mobilizes a stakeholder from the passive rejection stock to the undecided

stock. From the undecided stock, the stakeholder can then be mobilized to passive acceptance by

increase in positive understanding, as explained earlier.

2. Advocating

Mobilizing stakeholders to and from the "active" stocks cannot be achieved by changes in under-

standing alone. Advocating is necessary to bring about these movements. An increase in positive

advocating mobilizes stakeholders from passive acceptance to active acceptance, while a decrease

in positive advocating mobilizes stakeholders from active acceptance to passive acceptance. Simi-

larly, an increase in negative advocating mobilizes a stakeholder from the passive rejection stock to

the active rejection stock, while a decrease in negative advocating mobilizes a stakeholder from the

active rejection stock to the passive rejection stock.

The base chain system dynamics model shown in Figure 2 illustrates a need to understand the initial

causes of, mechanisms for maintaining, and strategies for recovering stakeholder acceptance[2].

With this aim in mind, factors contributing to stakeholder acceptance were identified, and causal

22 loop diagrams describing their relationships were constructed.

3.4 Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level

The causal loop diagram in Figure 3 shows variables affecting stakeholder acceptance of a new nuclear project at the local level. An arrow pointing from one variable to the other denotes an influence of the former on the latter. A positive sign next to an arrow denotes that an increase in the upstream variable causes an increase in the downstream one. A negative sign indicates that an increase in the upstream variable causes a decrease in the downstream one, and vice versa.

The variables are defined in Appendix A. Following are the important cause-effect loops that determine stakeholder acceptance[3].

1. Danger/Risk Loop

This loop describes the reinforcing nature of tangible danger on fungibility and perceived risk. Fun- gibility is defined by Margolis as the ability to make a reasonable judgment by seeking a balance between the advantages of boldness and the advantages of caution[ 1]. In other words, it is the extent to which stakeholders consider risk as an opportunity, or risk as a danger. An increased sense of danger decreases fungibility. A decrease in fungibility increases the perceived risk from project, which decreases stakeholder acceptance. A decreased value of stakeholder acceptance further increases the sense of danger.

2. Benefit Loop

The benefit loop describes the effect of social trust and competency of the project implementer on the perceived benefit from project, and hence stakeholder acceptance. An increase in perceived probability of competent project execution increases social trust in project implementer. This increases the perceived probability that the benefit is received, which in turn increases the perceived benefit from project. An increase in perceived benefit from the project increases stakeholder acceptance.

3. Fungibility Loop

The fungibility loop shows that fungibility is a cognitive mechanism that serves as a 'gatekeeper' for countering perceived risk. It reinforces any sense of opportunity that exists. An increase in

Favorability+

R8:Media ProbabilitySafety & Opinion SecurityConcerns are Credibilityof Loop Met Stakeholder_---- Negtive NuclearWeapons Acecptance + DegreeofProject Framing Association . + ImplementerAwareness of er PStakeholder Values ExtremeNuclear-RI: PerceivedProbability of Events Daer Danger/ CompetentExecution + + RiskLoopR7 Fairness + R12: R7ia R6: R4: Perceived Benefit Trust Knowledge + Framing Threatof Loop + + Loop Importanceof vs rmn opRadiation SocialTrust in Publicized vs.F Framing- ProjectImplementer~ Mistaketo Loop (Negative) Fungibility . PerceivedBenefit + + Stakeholder Perceived fromProject Knowledge + Frequency +

Confidence - R5:Freq. +

Local Fur-ibty PerceivedRisk IncL Probability Socioeconomic Lty fromProject Loop + Benefitis ProbabilityFirstReporting of Condition LoopCognitive Received PublicizedMistakeis from the Familiarity Inclusiof Project Implementer withNuclear Perceived + Qppo+ Frequency S&T Positive It Probability Environmental + eciepec + NuclearWaste R9: Effects of Project Issueis Waste Perceived Implementer Resolved Loop Pridein Stakeholder

ResourcesProvided hy NationaAnti-Nuclear NGOs to IppositioniDocrel

Figure 3: Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level [3] sense of opportunity increases fungibility. An increase in fungibility decreases perceived risk from project, which therefore increases sense of opportunity.

4. Framing Loop

Framing is defined as a 'force multiplier' between risk as danger and risk as opportunity [1]. The framing loop describes the reinforcing effect of negative framing on tangible danger. An increase in negative framing increases the sense of danger, which decreases fungibility. A decrease in fungibility increases negative framing.

5. Frequency Inclusion Loop

This loop describes the relationship between benefits and perceived frequency of events. As the perceived benefit from project increases, cognitive inclusion of frequency increases, which decreases the perceived frequency of events. This increases perceived benefit from project.

6. Knowledge vs. Framing Loop

This loop represents the insufficiency of 'education only' strategies that have been widely used with the objective of increasing stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects. Facts and objective knowledge can be easily co-opted or overwhelmed by framing of the project. An increased negative framing decreases knowledge confidence. As knowledge confidence decreases, credibility of negative framing increases, which again increases negative framing.

7. Social Trust Loop

The social trust loop illustrates the importance of alignment of project implementer with stakeholder values. It emphasizes the importance of transparency and effective handling of publicized mistakes by the project implementer. As the project implementer's awareness of stakeholder values increases, the stakeholder's social trust in project implementer increases. This reduces the importance of publicized mistake to stakeholder.

8. Media Opinion Loop

This loop shows the influence of the source of message, as well as the message itself, on tangible danger and stakeholder acceptance. It also shows how framing and perceived danger affect media opinion. An increase in media favourability decreases the credibility of negative framing, which

25 in turn decreases negative framing. A decrease in negative framing decreases the sense of danger, which increases media favourability.

9. Waste Loop

Resolving the nuclear waste problem is vital for increasing stakeholder acceptance. The waste loop describes how the unresolved nuclear waste problem serves as a strong argument against nuclear technology, thereby strengthening the influence of opposition groups. A decreasing probability that the nuclear waste problem is resolved results in an increase in negative framing. An increase in negative framing represents an increase in the degree of opposition awareness of stakeholder values.

This decreases the perceived probability of the nuclear waste problem being resolved.

3.5 Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level

The causal loop diagram in Figure 4 shows variables affecting stakeholder acceptance of a new nuclear project at the state and federal level.

The variables are defined in Appendix A. Following are the important cause-effect loops that determine stakeholder acceptance[3].

1. Consensus/Controversy Loop

The consensus/controversy loop explains the reinforcing influence of social controversy attached to a specific nuclear project on constituent support. A constituent could be a local voter etc. It also emphasizes the importance of stakeholder consensus for increasing support. An increase in stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project decreases the political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project. A decrease in political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project increases constituent support for the specific nuclear project, which increases stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project.

2. Political Support Loop

The political support loop shows the importance of acceptance of nuclear projects by the state government and state-specific representatives in the federal government, and its effect on political controversy. An increase in stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project decreases

26 Probability of OppositionLegal, Time for NRC to Criticism of NRC Social Actions Consider License n+n+eApplication +

Proect trnplernter

FnuinAdditional +s & License e ) NRC License Approval Additional Cost to Project Expectations Loop Perceived Project Implmentr o LicnseImplementer License Aproval eApplication Quality National Project Implementer Anti-Nuclear Ability to Meet NRC NGO Activities Expectations R(S)2:Project

- Imipiernmer

Perceived National Confdence & Socioeconomic Benefits Expectations + op Perceived National Costs from Project + Likelihood of Specific Cost of Viability of Nuclear Project Receiving Continuing the Nuclear the Permit or License Politician Support of Project NRC Confidence in Specific Nuclear Project by Pr Implenenter State Governcot

R(S)5:Cost & License Stakeholder Consensus in Degree of National -ikskle teApoeval o Cppsens i Poi(a): Opinion Poll Data AcQephnc"

peSupport forSpecific +Politial ShowingSupportfor ResourcesNuclear Project Sp LoP Increasing Probability of Nuclear Facilities Provided by Politician Re-Election National from Supporting Specific Anti-Nuclear Constituent Support for Nuclear Project NGOs to Local R(S)1: Specific Nuclear Project National Economic Opposition Consensu/Condition Co vers Political Benefit of Specific R(S)4:PolKical Supporting Nuclear Project

Political Controversy from Supporting Specific

Nuclear Project - - National Pro-Nuclear NGO Activities

Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level [3] the political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project. A decrease in political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project increases constituent support for the specific nuclear project, which increases probability of politician re-election from supporting the specific nuclear project. This increases politician support of specific nuclear project by state government, which further increases stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project.

3. Project Implementer Confidence and Expectations Loop

This loop describes the influence of the credibility of the project implementer and the confidence of regulatory bodies in the capability of the project implementer to execute the project. An increasing

NRC confidence in project implementer increases the project implementer ability to meet NRC expectations, which increases perceived project implementer license application quality. This in turn increases NRC confidence in project implementer.

4. Political Benefit Loop

The political benefit loop shows the influence of political controversy on the political benefit to representatives concerned with maintaining constituent votes. An increasing political benefit of supporting specific nuclear project increases politician support of specific nuclear project by state government, which increases stakeholder consensus in support for specific nuclear project. This decreases political controversy from supporting the specific nuclear project, thereby increasing political benefit of supporting specific nuclear project.

5. Benefits and License Approval Loop

The benefits and license approval loop captures the effect of time delays in the regulatory process on the nuclear project. A decrease in additional NRC license expectations increases the project implementer ability to meet NRC expectations, which increases perceived project implementer license application quality. This increases NRC confidence in project implementer, which in turn decreases the time for NRC to consider license application. A decrease in time for NRC to consider license application decreases additional NRC license expectations.

6. Cost and License Approval Loop

This loop describes the reinforcing influence of cost perceptions on the time required to gain a license, with political controversy as a force multiplier. An increasing political controversy from sup-

28 porting specific nuclear project increases the perceived national costs from the project. An increase in perceived national costs from the project decreases the likelihood of specific nuclear project receiving the permit or license, which further increases the political controversy from supporting specific nuclear project.

3.6 Necessity for Addition of "Radiation Attitudes" to Model

Though the above causal loop diagrams provide a logical idea of the factors affecting nuclear project acceptance, they do not explain why some individuals fear nuclear technology more than other hazardous technologies. It also does not explain why reactions to some nuclear technologies are stronger than others. For example, nuclear power or nuclear waste handling facilities invoke reactions that are stronger than reactions towards nuclear medicine or imaging technologies.

These shortcomings necessitate the addition of another factor, which provides an explanation for the inconsistencies described above. This factor, specific to nuclear technology has been termed

as "Radiation Attitudes", since the fear of nuclear technologies is primarily from an underlying

fear of radiation. The "Radiation Attitudes" variable causes nuclear technology to be treated differ-

ently, and must therefore be included in the overall nuclear project acceptance model to reflect this

phenomenon.

29 4 Identification of Variables for Causal Loop Diagram

In order to construct a model describing the formation of Radiation Attitudes, it is necessary to identify the factors which influence these attitudes. The identified factors serve as the variables for the causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes. A historical analysis of Radiation Attitudes at different stages over time not only results in identification of the variables, but also enables a hypothesis to be formed regarding their interdependencies.

4.1 Timeline of Nuclear Technology

Tracing the history of narratives on nuclear technology, from the discovery of radioactivity in the early 20th century to the present day is essential for understanding how attitudes towards radiation and nuclear technology have evolved over time. Nuclear technology is a term that encompasses technologies ranging from medical imaging, cancer treatment and detection equipment to nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons, fuel cycle facilities and spent fuel handling facilities. Attitudes towards use of these technologies differ, and the strongest negative reactions are evoked by nuclear weapons, power plants, fuel cycle facilities and waste disposal facilities. Hence, the historical approach described below is focused more on these technologies. Defining events like the bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima clearly played major roles in solidifying the stance of the nuclear opposition pressure groups and cementing public fear. However, they are not sufficient to describe the outright rejection of factual information when dealing with nuclear technologies or radiation effects. Identifying the key discontinuities in the nuclear narrative can help in identification of factors causing nuclear dread, and serve as a starting point for formulating ways to understand them.

4.1.1 Late 19th Century to Early 20th Century- An Era of Scientific Discovery

The discovery of ionizing radiation in 1895 by Wilhelm Roentgen marked the beginning of a period of new discoveries in the field of nuclear science. In 1896, Henri Becquerel found that pitchblende, an ore containing radium and uranium caused a photographic plate to darken. He went on to demonstrate that this was due to beta radiation (electrons) and alpha particles (helium nuclei) being

30 emitted. Villard found a third type of radiation from pitchblende- gamma rays. Pierre and Marie

Curie gave the name 'radioactivity' to this phenomenon, for which they were awarded the Nobel

Prize in Physics. In 1898, polonium and radium were first isolated from the pitchblende. Radium was later used in medical treatment. Samuel Prescott showed that radiation destroyed bacteria in food[12].

Further advances in the study of radioactivity were seen in the early 20th century. Ernest Rutherford, in 1902, demonstrated that radioactivity involved the spontaneous disintegration of atoms into other types of atoms, by emission of an alpha or beta particle. Rutherford also discovered the concept of radioactive half-life. In 1911, Frederick Soddy discovered that naturally radioactive elements had a number of different isotopes (radionuclides), with the same chemistry. George de Hevesy showed that such radionuclides were invaluable as tracers, because minute amounts could readily be detected with simple instruments.

In 1932, Cockcroft and Walton produced nuclear transformations by bombarding atoms with ac- celerated protons, and Irene Curie and Frederic Joliot found that some such transformations created artificial radionuclides. In 1935, Enrico Fermi found that a much greater variety of artificial radionuclides could be formed when neutrons were used instead of protons. Fermi received the Nobel Prize in Physics for his "demonstrations of the existence of new radioactive elements produced by neutron irradiation, and for his related discovery of nuclear reactions brought about by slow neutrons." 13]

4.1.2 Discovery of Fission and the Manhattan Project

In 1939, physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann of Germany, along with Lise Meitner of Austria and her nephew Otto Frisch, split uranium atoms in a process known as fission. This proved Ein- stein's special theory of relativity, put forward in 1905, establishing the equivalence between mass and energy.

Francis Perrin introduced the concept of the critical mass of uranium required to produce a self- sustaining release of energy. Perrin's group in Paris continued their studies and demonstrated that a chain reaction could be sustained in a uranium-water provided external neutrons were injected into the system. They also demonstrated the idea of introducing neutron-absorbing material to limit the multiplication of neutrons and thus control the nuclear reaction, which is the basis for the operation

31 of a nuclear power station. Philip Abelson and Edwin McMillan demonstrated that neutrons cap- tured by uranium-238 lead to the creation of elements 93 and 94, neptunium and plutonium. A new element with atomic number 94, was found and named plutonium. American physicists confirmed that plutonium was fissionable, thus usable for a bomb.

In the summer of 1939, at the request of Leo Szilard, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Roo- sevelt, warning him about the possibility of development of nuclear weapons by Nazi Germany, and suggesting that the US should initiate its own nuclear programme. This letter prompted President

Roosevelt to take action, which eventually laid the groundwork for the Manhattan Project [14].

In 1941, the MAUD Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb reported that, "It will be possible to make an effective uranium bomb which, containing some 25 lb of active material, would be equivalent as regards destructive effect to 1,800 tons of T.N.T. and would also release large quantities of radioactive substance, which would make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to human life for a long period [15]." The Manhattan Project was formed in the United States in 1942 to build the atomic bomb for use in World War II. The first self-sustaining, controlled nuclear chain reaction led by Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard and other scientists at the University of Chicago on 2nd

December 1942. It was called Chicago Pile-I or CP-1. The first nuclear weapons test conducted as a part of the Manhattan project was an implosion type bomb, code-named Trinity. It was conducted at New Mexico's Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range on 16 July 1945. A uranium gun-type atomic bomb, Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, followed by a plutonium implosion-type bomb, Fat Man on the city of Nagasaki on August 9. Japan surrendered less than two weeks later, ending World War II.

The devastation caused by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alerted the public about the effects of radiation, and played an important role in the formation of Radiation Attitudes of the generation [16, 17, 18]. The first demonstrations against nuclear testing were held in Times Square,

New York, in 1946.

The doomsday clock appeared on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, representing an ominous oscillating countdown to global catastrophe. In 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device, marking the beginning of a nuclear arms race. The monopoly of the United States over nuclear weapons no longerexisted, and the government and public believed that the US was

32 vulnerable to a nuclear attack. In 1951, during the first big Civil Defense push of the Cold War; the movie Duck and Cover, produced by the Federal Civil Defense Administration was shown in schools all over the country, and Duck and cover drills became a part of school life.

4.1.3 The 1950s- Atoms for Peace and the Atomic Age

Despite the nuclear weapons race, nuclear technology showed great promise in the 1950s. The

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had been established to explore the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The 1950s saw huge advancements in civilian uses of nuclear technology, and a positive attitude towards nuclear technology.

In 1951, an experimental breeder reactor (EBR-I) in Idaho produced the first usable electric power from the atom, lighting four light bulbs. President Eisenhower, in 1953, made his famous "Atoms for Peace" speech, signifying an important moment in political history which brought the atomic issue which had been kept quiet for "national security" into the public eye. The Atoms for Peace

Program opened up nuclear research to civilians and countries that had not previously possessed nuclear technology, and proposed an international agency to develop peaceful nuclear technologies.

In 1953, the first nuclear-powered submarine, the U.S.S. Nautilus, was launched. The first Boiling

Reactor Experiment reactor was built in Idaho. It demonstrated that steam bubbles in the reactor core did not cause an instability problem. It was, instead, a rapid, reliable, and effective mechanism for limiting power. This could protect a reactor against "runaway" events. The Atomic Energy

Act of 1954 was passed, which gave the civilian nuclear energy program further access to nuclear technology. The AEC announced the beginning of a cooperative program between government and enterprise to develop nuclear power plants. In 1955, Arco, Idaho, became the first U.S. town powered by nuclear energy, by an experimental reactor, BORAX III, at the Idaho National Energy

Laboratory. The United Nations sponsored the first international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, held in Geneva, Switzerland. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed in 1957 as a part of the Atoms for Peace Programme, with 18 member countries, to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

On December 18, 1957, the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, "the world's first full-scale atomic electric power plant devoted exclusively to peacetime uses" started generating electricity for com-

33 mercial use [19]. With these advancements, it was believed that nuclear technology was the future of the world. There was a general feeling that there would be an age of peace and plenty in which atomic energy would "provide the power needed to desalinate water for the thirsty, irrigate the deserts for the hungry, and fuel interstellar travel deep into outer space[20]." Lewis Strauss,

Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission presented his speech about electricity

"too cheap to meter" in 1954. Public sentiment in favour of nuclear technology grew, and the term

"Atomic Age" gained widespread popularity. Radiation held a particular fascination with the public, with radiation spas promising miraculous health cures springing up in several locations. Irradiated food was believed to have medical benefits. Radium nail polish became popular with women. Shoe stores had x-ray machines where one could see the structure of the foot inside a shoe. Ford displayed the Ford Nucleon concept car to the public. Walt Disney Productions released the film Our Friend the Atom describing the marvelous benefits of atomic power. This film was also shown to almost all baby boomers in their public school auditoriums or their science classes and was instrumental in creating within that generation a mostly favorable attitude toward nuclear power[2 1].

However, these positive Radiation Attitudes would not last long. The adverse effects of radiation were gradually coming to light, and eventually would overpower any benefit an individual perceived from radiation. Popular media began to depict the effects of radiation in science fiction movies like

Godzilla.

In 1954, the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukury5 Maru ("Lucky Dragon No. 5"), was contaminated by fallout from the Castle Bravo test, killing one crew member and resulting in an international incident, and creating widespread concern about weapons testing [22, 23, 24].

In 1955, the United Kingdom announced the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons. Nevil

Shute's post apocalyptic novel, On the Beach was published in 1957, showing the last remnants of humanity in Australia awaiting the end of the human race after a nuclear war. The New York Times called it "the most haunting evocation we have of a world dying of radiation after an atomic war

[25]." The Guardian commented that "fictions such as On the Beach played an important role in raising awareness about the threat of nuclear war."

From November 1958 to September 1961, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) observed an informal moratorium on nuclear tests[26].

34 The Atomium was constructed for the Brussels World's Fair in 1958. The Peace Symbol was de- signed for the British nuclear disarmament movement by Gerald Holtom.

4.1.4 The 1960s- The Cuban Missile Crisis and its After-Effects

The Cold War between the United States and Russia reached its peak in the 1960s, which greatly in creased the fear of nuclear war in the minds of the public. In 1961, an article by Gilbert Burck appeared in Fortune magazine, outlining the plans of Nelson Rockefeller, Edward Teller, Herman

Kahn, and Chet Holifield for the construction of an enormous network of concrete lined underground fallout shelters throughout the United States sufficient to shelter millions of people to serve as a refuge in case of nuclear war[27]. As the anti-nuclear weapons sentiment grew, Project Plow- share was initiated in the United States for the development of techniques to use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. This did little to mitigate public fear. On November 1, 1961, at the height of the Cold War, about 50,000 women brought together by Women Strike for Peace marched in

60 cities in the United States to demonstrate against nuclear weapons. It was the largest national women's peace protest of the 20th century.

In October 1962, the Soviet Union shipped nuclear missiles to Cuba, in an attempt to deter any future invasion of Cuba by the United States. Upon discovery of the missiles, the United States demanded that they be removed. The Kennedy administration held only a slim hope that the Kremlin would agree to their demands, and expected a military confrontation. These fears were underpinned by the October 24, 1962 letter of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to President John F. Kennedy, in which he stated that the US blockade of "navigation in international waters and air space" constituted "an act of aggression propelling human kind into the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war [28]". For two weeks, the world was thrust to the brink of nuclear war, until Moscow agreed to remove the missiles. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world came to mutually assured destruction, and was a key factor in inducing a fear of nuclear weapons in the public.

The fear of nuclear war was also portrayed in popular culture. The film "Dr. Strangelove, or: How

I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb" was released, which was a black comedy directed by Stanley Kubrick about an accidentally triggered nuclear war.

Another important factor that indirectly resulted in an anti-nuclear sentiment was the Vietnam War.

35 Large scale movements and demonstrations against the Vietnam War began in the United States in

1964. The protests against the war manifested as protests against government policies in general, of which the nuclear power programme was a major part. The plans for the Bodega Bay power plant were abandoned due to anti nuclear protests led by Sierra Club. Historian Thomas Wellock traced the birth of the anti-nuclear movement in the United States to the controversy over Bodega Bay[29].

In 1968, the the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted, which called for halting the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities.

4.1.5 The 1970's - Anti-Nuclear Movements Gain Momentum

By the 1970's the term "atomic age" was no longer being used in the positive sense. However, in the early 70's the US nuclear power enterprise grew substantially. In 1973, the Arab Oil Embargo occurred, in which several Arab nations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoed, or stopped selling, oil to the United States to protest their support of Israel in the Arab-

Israeli "Yom Kippur" War. Arab OPEC production was cut by 25%, which caused some temporary shortages and helped oil prices to triple. This contributed to an increased interest in alternatives to petroleum, including nuclear power. U.S. utilities ordered 41 nuclear power plants, a one-year record[30, 26].

In 1974, the first 1,000-megawatt nuclear plant, Commonwealth Edison's Zion Nuclear Power

Plant, Unit lwent into service. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 split the Atomic Energy

Commission into the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC). ERDA's responsibilities include overseeing the development and refinement of nuclear power, while the NRC takes up the problem of safe handling of nuclear materials[30, 26].

But the rapid growth in the US nuclear enterprise came to a halt with the accident at the Three Mile

Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979.

TMI was the most serious in the U.S. nuclear power plant industry's operating history. Equipment malfunctions, design-related problems, and human error led to a partial meltdown of the TMI-2 reactor core but only very minute releases of radioactivity. Although no deaths or injuries resulted, the accident brought about sweeping changes in emergency response planning, reactor operator

36 training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. It also led to a public realization of the dangers of a nuclear meltdown. The public sense of danger was especially intensified because "The China Syndrome", a movie about safety coverups in the nuclear enterprise, which resulted in a meltdown, had been released only 12 days before TMI.

The accident at Three Mile Island changed the landscape of the US nuclear power enterprise. Before

TMI, protests had largely been directed against nuclear weapons, and the biggest public concern was that of nuclear war. However, this accident highlighted the potential risks of nuclear power, and led to mass protests against nuclear as a source of energy. 65,000 people demonstrated against nuclear power in Washington DC [31], and almost 200,000 people attended a protest against nuclear power in New York City after TMI[32].

4.1.6 Late 20th Century and the Chernobyl Accident

In the 1980's nuclear energy generated more electricity than oil and natural gas in the United States.

Nuclear replaced hydropower as the second-largest source of electricity, after coal. However, anti- nuclear protests continued. In 1982, one million people demonstrated in New York City's Central

Park against nuclear weapons and for an end to the cold war arms race. It was the largest anti-nuclear protest and the largest political demonstration in American history[33].

On April 26, 1986, a catastrophic nuclear disaster occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in

Ukraine. The Number Four RBMK reactor went out of control during a test at low-power, leading to an explosion and fire that demolished the reactor building and released large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. Safety measures were ignored, the uranium fuel in the reactor overheated and melted through the protective barriers. Radioactive elements including plutonium, iodine, strontium and cesium were scattered over a wide area. In addition, the graphite blocks used as a moderating material in the RBMK caught fire at high temperature as air entered the reactor core, which contributed to emission of radioactive materials into the environment, that drifted over much of the

European continent [34]. Approximately 100,000 km 2 of land was significantly contaminated with fallout, with the worst hit regions being in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. In the aftermath of the accident, 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness (ARS)[35]. Twenty-eight of the firemen

37 and emergency clean-up workers died in the first three months after the explosion from Acute Radi- ation Sickness and one of cardiac arrest. There have been at least 1800 documented cases of thyroid cancer children who were between 0 and 14 years of age when the accident occurred., which is far higher than normal. Health studies of the registered cleanup workers called in have failed to show any direct correlation between their radiation exposure and an increase in other forms of cancer or disease. The psychological affects of Chernobyl were and remain widespread and profound, and have resulted for instance in suicides, drinking problems and apathy.The Chernobyl accident greatly influenced the formation of negative attitudes towards radiation, and is still quoted as an example of the dangers of nuclear technology [34].

Nuclear power programmes in several nations were affected by the Chernobyl disaster. The United

States was especially sensitive after the Three Mile Island accident. After the accident at TMI, the percentage of respondents opposed to the building of more nuclear power plants in the United States jumped and then leveled off. This new plateau brought the opponents of nuclear power to more than

40%. According to a Gallup poll, 73% of Americans polled after the Chernobyl accident said they would oppose construction of nuclear power plants within 5 miles (8 km) of where they live. This is more than 10% higher than a similar poll taken in 1979 [36]. In other nations, nuclear power continued to advance. In 1996, Tokyo Electric Power Co Inc (TEPCO), Japan's biggest power utility, started commercial operation of the world's first advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR).

4.1.7 The Yucca Mountain Controversy

In 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter had banned reprocessing due to proliferation concerns. In

1981, President Ronald Reagan lifted this ban, and called for the development of a high level radioactive waste storage facility. In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), establishing a timeline for a permanent underground facility for nuclear waste disposal. In 1984, the

Department of Energy selected ten locations in six states for consideration as potential repository sites, based on data collected for nearly ten years. President Reagan approved three sites, Hanford,

Washington; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Yucca Mountain for site characterization. In 1987, the

NWPA Amendments were passes, naming Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be characterized for development of a repository. In 2002 President Bush designated, and Congress approved, Yucca

38 Mountain as the repository location.

The U.S. Department of Energy was to begin accepting spent fuel at the Yucca Mountain repository by January 31, 1998. However, the repository is not yet functional due to on-going litigation and opposition. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (NV), has been a prominent public figure opposing the repository. The project is also widely opposed in Nevada and is very controversial national topic. The 1987 legislation halting study of Hanford and Texas as potential sites for the waste repository has been often been termed as the "Screw Nevada Bill," since the people of Nevada felt that the decision was unfair. However, the local county in which the proposed facility is located,

Nye County, supported the development of the repository.

In 2010, the DOE suspended the license application for Yucca Mountain and the Blue Ribbon Com- mission on America's Nuclear Future was established to provide recommendations for developing a safe, long-term solution to managing used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The FY2011 budget eliminated funding for Yucca Mountain, and future of the repository remains highly uncertain.

4.1.8 The 21st Century -Nuclear Proliferation in Iran and North Korea

The beginning of the 21st century saw a renewed threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, especially from Iran and North Korea. The threat had now shifted from that of a nuclear war between US and Russia, to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations with unstable internal politics. The possibility of nuclear terrorism also became apparent.

North Korea In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence of trans- fers of HEU technology and materials from Pakistan to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missiles technology. In 2003, it was found that the 8000 spent fuel rods in the storage pool had been reprocessed for manufacturing weapons grade plutonium[37]. Six party talks including North Ko- rea, US, Japan, China, Russia and ROK began in August 2003 but failed to prevent a nuclear North

Korea. Despite international pressure, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9,

2006[38]. The seismic data collected by South Korean, Japanese and US institutes estimated the yield to be less than 1 kT, but Russian estimates were between 5-15kT. On 25 May 2009, North

Korea conducted its second underground nuclear test. The yield was estimated to range from 2-8

39 kT[39]. In 2010, US nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker confirmed that North Korea was actively pursuing its nuclear programme, and had completed the construction of a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon with 2,000 P-2 centrifuges in six cascades. After the death of Kim Jong I in 2011, his son Kim Jong Un was declared North Korea's new leader. The situation in North Korea has not shown signs of being resolved, and on 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, with a yield estimated between 6-9 kT[40].

Iran The US, in 2002, accused Iran of seeking to develop a secret nuclear weapons programme and published satellite images of two nuclear sites under construction at Natanz and Arak. IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei stated that inspections showed "Iran failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities" and urged "co-operative actions" on the part of Iran. International pressure and strict sanctions seemed to have little effect on the Iranian programme. In 2006, the International

Atomic Energy Agency voted to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council over concerns that the country was trying to develop nuclear weapons.

In the quarterly report in November 2012, the IAEA said that Iran had to enrich uranium to up to 20% U-235, and was "not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities [41]." The Iranian nuclear programme, like North Korea, has continued despite mounting international pressure and sanctions. The active proliferation of nuclear weapons by Iran, and the failure of the IAEA and the international community to prevent it, has led to increased public concern regarding nuclear weapons.

4.1.9 The Fukushima Disaster and its Consequences

A 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 wrecked the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, triggering three nuclear reactor meltdowns that contaminated food and water and forced mass evacuations. Nearly 18,000 people were killed in the earthquake and the tsunami. The

Fukushima Daiichi units Ito 4 were written off and are to be decommissioned. The accident resulted in a massive decline in the operating capacity of nuclear power plants in Japan. By mid-May

40 2011, only 17 out of Japan's 50 remaining nuclear power reactors (apart from Monju and written- off Fukushima Daiichi 1-4) were in operation. This represented 15,493 MWe, or 35%, of the total remaining nuclear generating capacity of 44,396 MWe. Twenty units, with a combined capacity of 17,705 MWe (40% of total nuclear capacity) were not operating as they had been shut for peri- odic inspections, while another two units (1700 MWe) had been shut for unplanned inspections or equipment replacement [42]. Units 4&5 at Chubu Electric's Hamaoka plant were shut down at the government's request in May 2011 to increase their resistance to tsunamis [43]. The other nine units

- with a combined capacity of 8826 MWe (20% of total nuclear capacity) - were shut down during the 11 March earthquake and have not restarted. They are in cold shutdown and were progressively joined by others as maintenance outages came due [42]. In 2012, Japan shut its last working nuclear power reactor following the nuclear disaster, leaving it without nuclear power for the first time since

1970.

The Japanese Energy & Environment Council (ENECAN) set up by the Democratic Party of Japan

(DPJ) released the "Innovative Energy and Environment Strategy" in September 2012, recommend- ing a phase-out of nuclear power by 2040. In the short term, reactors currently operable but shut down would be allowed to restart once they gained permission from the incoming Nuclear Regula- tion Authority (NRA), but a 40-year operating limit would be imposed. This provoked a strong and wide reaction from the Japanese industry, with a consensus that 20-25% nuclear was necessary to avoid very severe economic effects, not to mention high domestic electricity prices. The Keidanren

(Japan Business Federation) and the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) both said that the Enecan phase-out policy was irresponsible [44]. Four days after indicating general approval of the Enecan plan, the DPJ cabinet backed away from it, relegating it as "a reference document" and the prime minister explained that flexibility was important in considering energy policy [45].

In December 2012, the LDP came into power and said it would take responsibility for allowing reactor restarts after the Nuclear Regulation Authority issued new safety standards and confirmed the safety of individual units [46]. In February 2014, the Basic Energy Plan was proposed, which listed nuclear as an important one of four base-load options, the others being hydro, geothermal and coal. The plan stated that nuclear power was an "important power source that supports the stability of the energy supply and demand structure [47]."

41 The ambivalence among the various stakeholders in Japan after the Fukushima accident led to a paralysis of the nuclear enterprise in the country. There was disagreement about the future energy policy, which led delays in the decision making process. This could explain the long time taken to restart the reactors, and the difficulty n allowing people to return to the previously evacuated areas which have now been declared safe.

Large scale anti nuclear demonstrations began all over the world after the Fukushima accident. 600 people gathered for a weekend protest outside the Vermont Yankee plant[48]. In 2012, activists protested at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station to mark the one-year anniversary of the nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima. The international reactions to the Fukushima disaster with regards to nuclear energy policy were extreme, but short lived. Some positions were taken politically, but later reconsidered.

In June 2011, Italy held a national referendum, in which 94 percent voted against the government's plan to build new nuclear power plants. The strong pro-nuclear government in France was defeated in national elections, in favour of a government that promised to radically reduce dependence on nuclear energy. However, a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the government in both Italy and

France could suggest that the vote was influenced by the dislike of the government rather than the nuclear energy policy.

Germany closed down its oldest nuclear power reactors and decided to phase the rest out by 2022.

In May 2011, the Swiss government decided to abandon plans to build new nuclear reactors. The country's five existing reactors will be allowed to continue operating, but will not be replaced at the end of their life span. The last will go offline in 2034 [49]. The Fukushima disaster also affected nuclear policy in Belgium, and may have influenced the decision to shut down all reactors by 2025. However, all these decisions are long term, and it often happens that policy decisions are not enforced due to several reasons like government changes, economic considerations, etc.

Nuclear power growth estimates decreased significantly in China. But United Kingdom, Russia and

India are still pursuing active nuclear programmes. According to the World Nuclear Organization

(WNO), as of April 2014, over 45 countries are actively considering embarking upon nuclear power programs, the front runners being Iran, UAE, Turkey, Vietnam, Belarus, Poland and possibly Jordan

[50].

42 The Fukushima Daiichi accident and the consequent reactions portrayed that nuclear technology issues almost always become entwined with domestic political issues. Decisions that affect nuclear policy, are seldom purely technological in nature. Political influences play a significant role in the decision making process.

In 2013, the documentary, Pandora's Promise was released, which featured several notable individuals, some of whom were once vehemently opposed to nuclear power but who now spoke in favor of it. There have been positive responses to nuclear technology recently, due to the ever- increasing concern about global climate change and the necessity for a zero-emission, sustainable energy source. However, the majority of the public continues to be wary of nuclear technology and radiation.

4.2 List of Important Variables

Based on the historical analysis, the important variables influencing Radiation Attitudes have been identified below. Using these variables, a causal loop diagram (CLD) was constructed. The CLD is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. The variables are described in detail in Section 5.3.

1. Nuclear Context

2. Proximity to Extreme Nuclear Event

3. Weapons Association

4. Probability of Threat being Viewed as "Man-Made"

5. Socially Catastrophic Potential

6. Fear of Long Term Effects

7. Fear of "Nuclear-Winter"

8. Exposure to Apocalyptic Film and Literature

9. Media Favourability

10. Media Credibility

43 11. Trust in Opposition Groups

The following variables were added based on discussions with experts in academia and the nuclear enterprise.

1. Trust in Nuclear Enterprise

2. Transparency in Industrial Practices

3. Perceived Probability of Competent Project Execution

4. Exposure to Expert Communication

5. Scientific Agreement

A review of existing literature on risk perception resulted in the selection of the following variables for the causal loop diagram [6, 4, 51, 52, 53].

1. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology

2. Level of Education

3. Socio-Economic Status

4. Sense of Control

5. Knowledge Confidence

6. Sense of Uncertainty

7. Perceived Detectability of Radiation

8. Perceived Personal Benefit

9. Perceived Personal Cost

44 5 Construction of a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) for Radiation Atti-

tudes

5.1 Methodology

The qualitative analyses in the previous chapter led to a clearer understanding of the significant factors contributing towards the development of Radiation Attitudes. Once the variables were identified, the next step was to establish a relationship between these factors and to study their interdependencies. System dynamics modeling was used for this purpose. Using VENSIM software, a causal loop diagram (CLD) was developed, which is shown in Figure 5. This diagram shows the different linkages between the variables. The initial CLD was constructed based on extensive literature review and discussions with experts. The CLD went through several iterations based on feedback by experts.

5.2 Model Description

The causal loop diagram links the identified variables based on their interdependencies. This can enable determination of the influence of different modes of causality on different outcomes. The identified variables are listed in Table I along with the scale on which their values can range. The meaning of the highest and lowest value on the scale is explained. Variables are categorized as dependent or independent. Independent variables are those which are not affected by change in value of any other variable in the diagram. In case of dependent variables, the level of dependency i.e. the extent to which a variable is affected by the surrounding factors is noted. Finally, the weight of each variable, i.e. the extent of its influence on other variables in the diagram is listed.

Interviews were conducted to test this model and validate the dependencies. The interviews were used to determine the relative strengths of the influencing factors. They also helped in identifying the most important links in the model, which can then be used as a basis for decision makers seeking to develop strategies for managing stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects.

The developed Radiation Attitudes model will ultimately feed into the larger model for stakeholder acceptance of new nuclear projects and help provide a better understanding of how Radiation Atti-

45 tudes influences project acceptance.

5.3 Description of Identified Variables

The variables shown in Figure 5 are described below. The relationships between the variables are also explained.

1. Radiation Attitudes

An extensive literature review and field studies have revealed that attitudes of individuals towards nuclear technology are not the same as attitudes towards other technologies, even if the technologies are hazardous. Nuclear technology can prompt a largely negative response, which is primarily due to the fear of radiation. Negative reactions to nuclear technology have created hindrances for future nuclear projects, and resistance against existing ones. They must be better understood if project has to be successfully executed and operated with stakeholder approval at all levels, local, state and federal.

An individual's perception of radiation, which ultimately determines an individual's level of acceptance of nuclear technology, is defined as Radiation Attitude. A positive Radiation Attitude indicates that the individual has a favourable perception of radiation and its applications. A negative Radia- tion Attitude signifies fear and anxiety concerning radiation and nuclear technology. In this research project, we are primarily concerned with understanding how negative Radiation Attitudes influence stakeholder acceptance of nuclear projects.

2. Perceived Personal Benefit

Perceived Personal Benefit is defined as a sense of advantage associated with nuclear technology. This could be an economic benefit in terms of employment at nuclear facilities. Other examples are decreased power shortages due to nuclear power plants, economic development in the vicinity of a nuclear facility, increase in property values etc. There could also be an environmental benefit in terms of nuclear energy being viewed as a possible mitigator for global climate change by reduction in fossil fuel consumption leading to lower carbon emissions.

If an individual perceived a potential benefit, it was found that the value of Radiation Attitudes became more positive, even though the risks still existed. A sense of benefit is therefore vital for

46 socio-economic -141, +lvlo status fmiliarity with evei of +s expost re to expert nuclear science and education com nunication technology socio-political awareness and involvement

+ sense of control knowledge proximi confidence extreme nucar event sense of perceived uncertainty personal benefit + nuclear context

pe rceived + detec tability of + perceived RADIATION ra diation personal risk ATTITUDES + - - probability of threat being viewed as scientific trusttrs in +nnuclearmei weapons enter rise association +edia

+ socially catastrophic + transparency in potential+ - trust in industrial practices + fear of long term - opposition groups effects of radiation

fear of "nuclear perceived probability of winter"

competent project + execution

exposure to apocalyptic film and literature

Figure 5: Causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes overcoming the fear of nuclear technology. However, a negative attitude towards radiation can decrease the value of an individual's perceived personal benefit.

3. Perceived Personal Risk

This variable represents the potential cost that an individual associates with nuclear technology. Re- search has shown that this perceived risk is primarily due to fear of radiation. Concerns regarding health effects of radiation and contamination of the environment are the major factors contributing to the perception of radiation risk. This risk perception increases with temporal proximity to an extreme nuclear event. For example, individuals who experienced Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, or who live close to the areas where these accidents occurred, sometimes perceive a higher risk associated with nuclear technology. Risks from activities that are not very well known or are uncertain are judged to be greater.

However, a perceived personal benefit greatly reduces the influence of this risk. A sense of control also decreases this risk perception. Another important factor that must be taken into consideration is trust in the nuclear enterprise. If the enterprise establishing or running a nuclear facility has a good track record, people are less likely to view the facility as risky.

4. Trust in Nuclear Enterprise

Trust in nuclear enterprise is defined as the extent to which individuals are willing to rely on the nuclear enterprise to make sound decisions, maintain safety and security, and safeguard public interests. Trust in the nuclear enterprise decreases the perceived personal risk. Discussions with several experts led to the conclusion that trust in enterprise was the most important factor for gaining stakeholder acceptance for a new nuclear facility. Trust can be increased by transparency in industrial practices and a history of competent project execution.

However, contradictory information by opposition groups undermines trust in the nuclear enterprise.

A negative attitude towards radiation itself causes distrust.

5. Trust in Opposition Groups

Trust in opposition groups is a variable that denotes the extent to which individuals are willing to rely on anti-nuclear groups, activists and environmental organizations to safeguard their interests.

As discussed previously, a lack of scientific agreement concerning information about nuclear tech-

48 nology and radiation, increases trust in opposition groups and decreases trust in nuclear enterprise.

Also, if the perceived probability of competent project execution decreases, the trust in opposition groups increases.

6. Transparency in Industrial Practices

Transparency in industrial practices is defined as the accountability, openness, and sense of responsibility of the enterprise. If the enterprise is transparent in its practices, it increases public trust in the enterprise.

7. Perceived Probability of Competent Project Execution

Perceived Probability of Competent Project Execution is the probability that an individual believes that the enterprise has the necessary ability, resources and skills to successfully execute and maintain a project from start to finish. Competent execution encompasses various factors like timely execution, cost considerations, safety requirements and environmental consciousness.

An increase in perceived probability of competent project execution decreases trust in opposition groups and increases trust in the nuclear enterprise.

8. Scientific Agreement

This variable is defined as consistency and compatibility between different sources of scientific information. Often, the lay public is faced with contradictory data and findings, which causes uncertainty. This may lead to the lay public placing their trust in opposition groups and other independent environmental organizations as opposed to the scientific community.

9. Sense of Control

This variable represents controllability, or the amount of influence an individual feels he can have on a process and its outcome. Better socio-economic conditions and a higher level of education generally increase the sense of control felt by an individual, thereby decreasing perceived personal risk. A greater awareness of socio-political issues and involvement in the community also increases the sense of control. On the other hand, a negative Radiation Attitude can result in a person experi- encing loss of controllability.

A high sense of control results in in a decrease in perceived personal risk. It also increases knowledge confidence.

49 10. Socio-Political Awareness and Involvement

Socio-political awareness and involvement is defined as the extent to which an individual is aware of the social and political issues around him, and the level of his contribution or participation in community affairs. An increasing socio-political awareness and involvement is necessary for increasing the sense of control.

11. Socio-Economic Status

Socio-economic status is an economic and sociological combined total measure of a person's work experience and of an individual's or family's economic and social position in relation to others, based on income, education, and occupation [54]. A higher socio-economic status increases an individual's sense of control. Individuals from a higher socio-economic background also have access to better educational facilities, generally resulting in a higher level of education.

12. Level of Education

An individual's level of education refers to the degree of formal education he has received throughout his life. Better socio-economic conditions usually indicate a higher level of education, which increases familiarity with nuclear science and technology. An increase in level of education increases an individual's sense of control.

13. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology

Familiarity with nuclear science and technology is defined as the extent of an individual's understanding of, or experience with nuclear science and technology. A higher level of education and greater exposure to expert communication increases familiarity with nuclear science and technology. As familiarity increases, knowledge confidence also increases, which is necessary for reducing the sense of uncertainty associated with radiation.

14. Exposure to Expert Communication

This variable can be described in terms of the number and frequency of expert talks, research papers, journals or meetings that an individual has experienced in his lifetime. An increase in exposure to expert communication increases familiarity with nuclear science and technology.

15. Knowledge Confidence

50 Research has shown that merely communicating or providing information, is not sufficient to convince an individual about the merits or demerits of a technology. An individual needs to feel a particular level of confidence in the technology, and the knowledge he possess concerning the technology. This is encompassed in the knowledge confidence variable.

An increase in the sense of control is one of the major factors which increases knowledge confidence. Knowledge confidence also increases with increasing familiarity with nuclear science and technology. It is this confidence which results in a decrease in the sense of uncertainty associated with nuclear technology and radiation, thereby reducing nuclear dread and improving Radiation

Attitudes.

16. Sense of Uncertainty

One cannot see, touch, taste or smell radiation. The lack of detectability of radiation by the human senses leads to a very high sense of uncertainty. A lack of agreement in the scientific community with regards to safe radiation levels also contributes to higher uncertainty.

An increase in sense of uncertainty directly increases the perceived personal risk. This sense of uncertainty results from inadequate confidence in knowledge about nuclear technology.

17. Perceived Detectability of Radiation

Detectability is defined as the ease with which the presence or existence of a phenomenon can be identified. Lack of detectability greatly increases the sense of uncertainty. Because an individual does not perceive radiation as easily detectable, it breeds a greater sense of fear and uncertainty.

18. Media Favourability

Media favourability is defined as the overall evaluation of an enterprise or technology presented in the media resulting from the stream of media stories about the enterprise or technology[55]. Media discourse over the years, from television and radio to newspapers and social media has largely shaped public opinion about nuclear technology. Portrayal of nuclear energy in a negative image in the media is one of the key factors resulting in negative Radiation Attitudes among the lay public.

Negative media coverage directly leads to a negative context of nuclear technology and may result in undue exaggeration of the catastrophic impact. Selectiveness in publishing news stories is a major problem which can lead to the question of why scientifically factual stories are discounted in favour

51 of sensationalized accounts of incidents, especially in the case of nuclear events. On the other hand, a positive image of a technology in the media can lead to a higher level of acceptance, and reduce fear and anxiety.

It has been found that Radiation Attitudes and media favourability form a reinforcing loop as represented in the causal loop diagram. A decrease in media favourability decreases the value of

Radiation Attitudes, making them more negative. Negative Radiation Attitudes create an appetite for negative stories in the media. Since the media today largely cater to popular demand, it results in a further decrease in media favourability towards nuclear technology.

19. Media Credibility

Media credibility is defined as the quality of being trustworthy and convincing. Media credibility is the factor that determines whether the media will play a role in shaping an individual's Radiation

Attitudes or not. Unless the individual trusts the source of information, the story, whether favourable or unfavourable will have little effect on his views.

20. Nuclear Context

Nuclear context is defined as the pre existing narrative about nuclear technology that influences an individual's risk perception and decision-making. Nuclear context is largely influenced by past experiences and historic occurrences. How an individual first learned about nuclear technology can have a significant effect on the context in which he views the technology. For example, if an individual's earliest memories about nuclear technology are those of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the arms race during the Cold War, he is likely to develop a negative context concerning nuclear technology. A negative nuclear context results in a negative attitude towards radiation.

Proximity to an extreme nuclear event may cause an individual to develop a negative nuclear context.

An increase in value of the weapons association variable can result in a negative nuclear context.

Media favourability can also influence nuclear context to a large extent. The greater the level of media favourability, the more positive is the nuclear context.

21. Proximity to Extreme Nuclear Event

This variable is defined as the physical or psychological distance between an individual and an ex-

52 treme event at a nuclear facility. A physical proximity implies that the person was at a location close to the event or may have been directly affected by it. An individual may experience a psychological proximity to an extreme nuclear event if a person close to him was affected by the event. A psychological proximity could also arise if an individual assesses himself to be in a situation similar to the event and sees a possibility of the same event occurring in his situation.

An extreme event could be either a design basis accident or a non design basis accident at a nuclear facility. Proximity to an extreme nuclear event increases an individual's perception of personal risk.

It might also cause an individual to develop a negative context with respect to nuclear technology.

22. Weapons Association

The weapons association variable is defined as the action of making a cognitive connection between nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. For the vast majority of the public, especially for older persons, the first encounter with nuclear technology is when they learn about the bombings of Hi- roshima and Nagasaki in World War II. While it is true that the civilian nuclear power programme, and nuclear medicine developed as an offshoot of the weapons programme, this association creates psychological patterns in the minds of an individual which leads to a negative nuclear context.

An increase in weapons association may also cause an individual to overestimate the socially catastrophic potential of nuclear technology, despite scientific evidence to the contrary. An association of nuclear energy with nuclear weapons also increases the probability that the radiation threat is viewed as "man-made."

23. Probability of Threat Being Viewed as "Man-Made"

This variable is defined as the probability of a threat being viewed as occurring due to human incompetence, negligence or failure. Accidents that are natural in origin do not induce the same kind of fear as those of human origin. This is also the reason why exposure to geological radon or cosmic rays is not perceived as risky as radiation from a nuclear power plant. Also, human actions increase the total quantity of radioactive material in the environment.

An increase in the probability of the radiation threat being viewed as "man-made" makes Radiation

Attitudes negative. Increasing association of nuclear technology with nuclear weapons results in a higher probability of the threat being viewed as "man-made".

53 24. Fear of Long Term Effects of Radiation

This variable is defined as the fear of the effects of nuclear technology on future generations. Radi- ation exposure from a nuclear facility may not have immediate health effects, but there are concerns that it may lead to an increased risk of cancer in the future, or cause birth defects. This is mainly due to the fact that radiation is perceived as persisting in the environment for extremely long periods of time. The most important factors leading to this fear are concerns about long term nuclear waste disposal and delayed health effects of radiation. A concern for progeny is the major factor which adds to this fear.

A decrease in media favourability increases the fear of long term effects of radiation by using negative imagery. An increased fear of long term effects of radiation leads to an increase in socially catastrophic potential.

25. Fear of "Nuclear Winter"

Fear of "nuclear winter" is defined as the fear of global devastation and extinction or near extinction of the human race as a result of a nuclear detonation or an extreme nuclear accident. This fear has been caused largely due to the portrayal of nuclear technology as the source of annihilation is dystopic film and literature. A decrease in media favourability also adds to the fear of "nuclear winter", which increases socially catastrophic potential.

26. Exposure To Apocalyptic Film And Literature

Exposure to apocalyptic film And literature is defined as the number and frequency of movies, books or other popular media depicting nuclear technology as the cause of global destruction, which an individual has encountered in his lifetime. An increase in exposure to apocalyptic film and literature increases the fear of "nuclear winter".

27. Socially Catastrophic Potential

Socially catastrophic potential can be described as the potential of an event to cause great and often sudden damage or suffering on a large scale. Nuclear accidents are usually perceived as socially catastrophic by the general public, which is one of the main reasons why negative Radiation Atti- tudes arise. Socially catastrophic potential and Radiation Attitudes form a reinforcing loop where

54 an increase in socially catastrophic potential makes Radiation Attitudes negative, which further increases the perceived socially catastrophic potential of radiation.

The tone and frequency of the stories reported by the media have a significant effect on socially catastrophic potential. A fear of long term effects of radiation and fear of a "nuclear winter" scenario are the primary drivers of this variable.

55 Table 1: CLD Variable Descriptions

No CLD Description of Variable Range Meaning of Meaning of D/I

Variable Lowest Value Highest Value

I Radiation An individual's outlook -i to -1 indicates a 1 indicates a D

Attitudes or perception of 1 highly negative highly negative

radiation, influenced by attitude towards attitude towards

the various factors radiation radiation

described below

2 Perceived Sense of economic, 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates that the D

Personal social or environmental 1 individual individual

Benefit advantage associated perceives no perceives a large

with nuclear technology personal benefit personal benefit

from nuclear from nuclear

technology technology

3 Perceived Sense of cost associated 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates that the D

Personal with nuclear technology. 1 individual individual

Risk Costs could be perceives no perceives a large

economic, personal risk from personal risk from

environmental or health nuclear nuclear

effects of radiation. technology technology

4 Trust in Extent to which an -1 to -I indicates 1 indicates 100% D

Nuclear individual is willing to 1 absolutely no trust trust in the nuclear

Enterprise rely on the nuclear in the nuclear enterprise

enterprise to make enterprise

decisions, maintain

safety, security, and

safeguard public

interests.

56 5 Trust in Extent to which an -1 to -1 indicates 1 indicates 100% D

Opposition individual is willing to 1 absolutely no trust trust in opposition

Groups rely on the opposition in opposition groups

groups to safeguard groups

their interests

6 Transparency Accountability, 0 to 0 indicates a 1 indicates 100%

in openness, and sense of 1 complete lack of transparency in

Industrial responsibility of the transparency in industrial

Practices enterprise. industrial practices

practices

7 Perceived Probability that an 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates that the

Probability individual believes that 1 perceived perceived

of the enterprise has the probability of probability of

Competent necessary ability, competent project competent project

Project resources and skills to execution is 0 execution is 100%

Execution successfully execute and

maintain a project

8 Scientific Consistency and 0 to 0 indicates 100% 1 indicates

Agreement compatibility between 1 agreement among complete

different sources of scientific sources disagreement

scientific information among scientific

sources

9 Sense of Amount of influence an 0 to 0 indicates a 1 indicates 100% D

Control individual feels he can 1 complete lack of sense of control

have on a process and control

its outcome

57 10 Socio- Extent of an individual's 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates a high I

Political awareness of the social 1 absolutely no level of

Awareness and political issues socio-political socio-political

and In- around him, and the awareness or awareness or

volvement level of his contribution involvement involvement

in community affairs

11 Socio- An individual's 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates a high I

Economic economic and social 1 extremely poor level of

Status position in relation to socio-economic socio-economic

others, based on conditions conditions

income, education, and

occupation

12 Level of Degree of formal 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates an D

Education education received by 1 individual is extremely high

an individual uneducated level of education

13 Familiarity Extent of an individual's 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates an D

with understanding of, or 1 absolutely no extremely high

Nuclear experience with nuclear familiarity with level of familiarity

Science science and technology nuclear science with nuclear

and Tech- and technology science and

nology technology

14 Exposure Number and frequency 0 to 0 indicates no 1 indicates a high D

to Expert of expert talks, research 1 exposure to expert level of exposure

Communi- papers, journals or communication to expert

cation meetings that an communication

individual has

experienced in his

lifetime

58 15 Knowledge Level of confidence in 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates a high D

Confidence knowledge possessed by 1 absolutely no level of

an individual knowledge confidence in

confidence one's knowledge

16 Sense of Sense of not knowing, 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates that the D

Uncer- not being able to rely 1 individual individual

tainty on, or not being experiences experiences a high

completely sure of absolutely no sense of

something uncertainty uncertainty

17 Perceived Ease with which the 0 to 0 indicates that 1 indicates that D

Detectabil- presence or existence of 1 radiation is radiation is

ity of a phenomenon can be perceived as perceived as

Radiation identified by an highly completely

individual undetectable detectable

18 Media Overall evaluation of an -1 to -1 indicates that 1 indicates that D

Favourabil- enterprise or technology 1 the media are media are 100%

ity presented in the media highly favourable

resulting from the unfavourable

stream of related media

stories

19 Media Quality of being -1 to -1 indicates that 1 indicates that I

Credibility trustworthy and 1 the media are media are 100%

convincing highly uncredible credible

59 20 Nuclear Pre existing narrative -1 to -1 indicates that 1 indicates that the D

Context about nuclear 1 the context in context in which

technology that which nuclear nuclear

influences an technology is technology is

individual's risk viewed is 100% viewed is 100%

perception and negative positive

decision-making

21 Proximity Physical or 0 to 0 indicates no 1 indicates an

to Extreme psychological distance I connection to an extremely close

Nuclear between an individual extreme nuclear proximity to an

Event and an extreme event at event extreme nuclear

a nuclear facility event

22 Weapons Action of making a 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates the

Associa- cognitive connection 1 absolutely no highest degree of

tion between nuclear association of association of

technology and nuclear nuclear nuclear

weapons technology with technology with

nuclear weapons nuclear weapons

23 Probability Probability of a threat 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates that the D

of Threat being viewed as 1 probability of the probability of the

being occurring due to human threat being threat being

Viewed as incompetence, viewed as viewed as

"Man- negligence or failure "man-made" is 0 "man-made" is

made" 100%

24 Fear of Fear of the effects of 0 to 0 indicates I indicates a high D

Long Term nuclear technology on 1 absolutely no fear degree of fear of

Effects of future generations of long term long term effects

Radiation effects of radiation of radiation

60 25 Fear of Fear of global 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates a high D

"Nuclear devastation and 1 absolutely no fear degree of fear of

Winter" extinction or near of the "nuclear the "nuclear

extinction of the human winter" scenario winter" scenario

race as a result of a

nuclear detonation or an

extreme nuclear

accident

26 Exposure Number and frequency 0 to 0 indicates 1 indicates a high I

to Apoca- of movies, books or 1 absolutely no degree of exposure

lyptic Film popular media depicting exposure to to apocalyptic film

and nuclear technology as apocalyptic film and literature

Literature the cause of global and literature

destruction encountered

by an individual

27 Socially Potential of an event to 0 to 0 indicates that the 1 indicates that the D

Catas- cause a significant 1 perceived socially perceived socially

trophic number of deaths and catastrophic catastrophic

Potential injuries in a small potential of the potential of the

amount of time technology is 0 technology is

100%

Note: In Table 1, "D" denotes a dependent variable and "I" denotes an independent variable.

61 5.4 Explanation of Important Interdependencies and Loops

The causal loop diagram shows "Radiation Attitude" in the centre, surrounded by the variables influencing it. The 6 key factors that directly influence Radiation Attitudes are-

1. Perceived Personal Risk

2. Perceived Personal Benefit

3. Media Favourability

4. Socially Catastrophic Potential

5. Nuclear Context

6. Probability of Threat Being Viewed as "Man-Made"

Seven important interacting variables within the main causal loop diagram have also been identified, which explain the phenomena that affect Radiation Attitudes. These variable clusters are described below.

1. Risk-Benefit Tradeoff

The risk-benefit tradeoff describes two of the critical factors that determine an individual's attitude towards radiation. The formation of a particular attitude towards radiation can be viewed as a judgment made by an individual by weighing in the costs and the benefits that he perceives from nuclear technology. When perceived benefits outweigh perceived risks, Radiation Attitudes lean towards the positive side. When perceived risks outweigh perceived benefits, Radiation Attitudes lean towards the negative side.

However, it must be noted that perceived personal benefit has an overshadowing influence on perceived personal risk, and hence all the factors that contribute towards it. If an individual perceives a sense of benefit from the technology, be it economic, social or environmental, the strength of the perceived personal risk variable, and its influence on Radiation Attitudes is reduced significantly.

2. Social Trust Loop

Social trust is a vital factor influencing Radiation Attitudes. The social trust loop describes the reinforcing influence of trust in nuclear enterprise on an individual's attitude towards radiation.

62 perceived personal benefit

perceived personal risk

RADIATION ATTITUDES

Figure 6: Risk-Benefit Tradeoff

perceived personal risk - RADIATION ATTITUDES

trust in nuclear + enterprise

Figure 7: Social Trust Loop

As trust in enterprise increases, perceived personal risk decreases. A reduced value of perceived personal risk results in an increasing positive value of Radiation Attitudes, which further increases trust in enterprise.

This loop emphasizes the importance of building up trust if stakeholder acceptance is to be achieved.

A negative value of trust in enterprise may result in a negative reinforcing loop which will drive

Radiation Attitudes to a highly negative value. Trust in enterprise can be increased b ensuring transparency in industrial practices, and competent project execution. It is also necessary to reduce the negative influence of opposition groups.

3. Empowerment

63 level of education familiarity with nuclear science and technology

sense of control

knowledge confidence

Figure 8: Empowerment

The widely followed approach by the scientific community for overcoming public opposition has been to provide information. Technical experts believe that if an individual is aware of the facts and has the relevant information, then acceptance comes automatically. However, in practice, this approach has not worked as desired. Despite providing extensive information, peoples' attitudes towards radiation seldom change. One of the reasons for this could be the absence of a sense of empowerment.

The model hypothesizes that providing information is not enough; an individual needs to feel confident in his knowledge about the technology. This confidence comes from a sense of control in society, which is the result of an awareness of social and political issues, and an involvement in society matters. Figure 8 describes this phenomenon.

An increase in level of education increases an individual's familiarity with nuclear science and technology. It also a factor, along with socio-economic status and socio-political awareness and involvement, that increases the sense of control. An increased familiarity with nuclear science and technology and an increased sense of control together contribute towards increasing knowledge confidence.

4. Confidence and Control

Figure 9 describes the influence of sense of control on perceived personal risk. An increased sense of control reduces the perceived personal risk. An increased sense of control also increases knowledge

64 knowledge confidence

sense of control

sense of uncertainty

perceived personal risk -

Figure 9: Confidence and Control confidence, which reduces the sense of uncertainty, which also reduces the perceived personal risk.

This shows that an increased sense of control is important, both directly and indirectly, for reducing perceived personal risk.

5. Media Favourability Loop

The media favourability loop described the reinforcing nature of media favourability on Radiation

Attitudes.

An increase in media favourability increases the value of the nuclear context variable, making is more positive. An increasing value of nuclear context increases the value of Radiation Attitudes, makes it more positive. This further increases media favourability. This loop emphasizes the role of the media in shaping public attitudes towards radiation. Negative media coverage could result in a negative nuclear context, making Radiation Attitudes negative and thereby reducing media favourability even more.

6. Nuclear Context

Figure 11 describes the influence of prevailing narratives about radiation and nuclear technology on

Radiation Attitudes.

Historical events play an important role in determining nuclear context, as discussed in Section 4.1.

If the earliest memories of nuclear technology are related to nuclear bombs and proliferation, the nuclear context is shaped accordingly. The context in which an individual views radiation greatly

65 RADIATION ATTITUDES

media favourability nuclear context

Figure 10: Media Favourability Loop

nuclear context

RADIATION4 ATTITUDES ~ probability of threat being viewed as "man-made"

weapons association

Figure 11: Nuclear Context effects his perception of radiation. As weapons association increases, the value of nuclear context decrease, which decreases the value of Radiation Attitudes. An increase in weapons association also increases the probability of the radiation threat being viewed as "man-made", further decreasing the value of Radiation Attitudes.

7. Nuclear Dread

Figurel2 describes the role of negative imagery related to radiation and nuclear technology in inducing the fear of mass destruction in the minds of the public.

A decrease in media favourability and an increase in exposure to apocalyptic film and literature increases the fear of "nuclear winter". This fear leads to an increase in socially catastrophic potential.

A decrease in media favourability also increases the fear of long term effects of radiation, thereby

66 fear of long term effects of radiation media favourability

socially catastrophic + potential +

fear of "nuclear winter"

Figure 12: Nuclear Dread increasing socially catastrophic potential. An increase in socially catastrophic potential results in a highly negative attitude towards radiation.

5.5 Testing the Model

The model was tested by considering the following scenarios-

1. Does the model explain the nuclear fear post Fukushima? Does it explain the Radiation

Attitudes and responses of the public after the accident? Does it explain the extensive negative media coverage?

The Fukushima Daiichi incident is a recent example where all attempts at explaining the extremely low levels of risk associated with nuclear power seem to fall of deaf ears. According to the dose estimation report released by the WHO, using conservative assumptions, the assessment shows that the total effective dose received by characteristic individuals in two locations of relatively high exposure in Fukushima prefecture during the first year after the accident is within a dose band of

10 to 50 mSv. In the rest of Fukushima prefecture the effective dose was estimated to be within a dose band of 1 to 10 mSv, and in the rest of Japan, with a few exceptions, at about 0.1-1 mSv.

By comparison, the average annual dose to a person from natural background radiation is about 2.4 mSv globally, rising to 13 mSv in some regions of the world [56]. Yet, the public as well as the media seems to focus on the nuclear disaster rather than the estimated 18,000 deaths caused by the

67 earthquake and tsunami.

The selectiveness of the media could be explained by the theory of "cultural resonances", which states that some media narratives have a natural advantage because their ideas and language res- onate with larger cultural themes. These resonances increase the appeal of the media discourse.

Thus, public opinion influences media discourse indirectly, through journalists' beliefs, sometimes inaccurate, about what the public is thinking. In their commentary, journalists frequently attempt to articulate and crystallize a set of responses that they hope or assume will be shared by their audience

[57]. This phenomenon is also reflected in the radiation attitudes-media favourability loop.

The "nuclear context" for nuclear technology in Japan is negative due to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. However, this negative context did not play a very big role in public acceptance of nuclear energy because the "perceived personal benefit" of nuclear power outweighed the influence of "nuclear context" and "proximity to extreme nuclear event".

However, after the accident at Fukushima, the factors like "socially catastrophic potential", "perceived personal risk", "probability of threat being viewed as man-made" increased drastically in value. The risk benefit tradeoff leaned highly towards an increased personal risk, thereby making

Radiation Attitudes negative. "Trust in nuclear enterprise" was diminished significantly. Moreover, the "lack of scientific agreement" regarding post-accident health, safety and environmental issues further affected the "trust in nuclear enterprise" and increased the "sense of uncertainty". "Trust in opposition groups" increased and extremists ended up being more highly credited. The decrease in

"trust in nuclear enterprise" led to the reinforcement of negative Radiation Attitudes as described by the social trust loop.

The loss of "sense of control" and increase in " sense of uncertainty" further increased the "perceived personal risk". All these factors led to the development of highly negative "Radiation Attitudes" in the public.

Thus, a negative "Radiation Attitudes" created an appetite for negative media coverage and better news was discounted. The negative "media favourability" further increased the feeling of dread and resulted in further decrease in value of "Radiation Attitudes", as described by the Media Favoura- bility Loop. This cycle resulted in an amplification of the true damage caused by the accident.

68 2. Does the model explain public acceptance of radiation from medical procedures?

The public acceptance of medical procedures that involve radiation can be explained by the causal loop diagram for Radiation Attitudes. The most significant loop to be considered is the Risk-Benefit

Tradeoff Loop. An individual perceives an extremely high "personal benefit" from medical procedures. In fact, he would not be undergoing a medical procedure unless it was absolutely necessary.

A desire to be healthy trumps any risk from radiation that the individual might perceive. Because of this, "Radiation Attitudes" tend to lean away from the negative side, the magnitude depending on the individual.

Another factor which leads to positive "Radiation Attitudes" when it comes to medical radiation is the social trust. On average, the public trusts doctors much more than nuclear project implementers.

As explained by the Social Trust Loop, this trust reduces "perceived personal risk", thereby increasing the value of "Radiation Attitudes", which further reinforces " trust in enterprise".

The "sense of control" that an individual experiences during a medical procedure is also high, since the individual chooses to undergo the procedure voluntarily. The increased " sense of control" also reduces "perceived personal risk".

Another variable that differentiates medical radiation is the "nuclear context". Medicinal application of radiation do not have a negative historical context associated with them. There is no history of accidents, and the public does not associate it with weapons. The value of " socially catastrophic potential" is also extremely low since there is no threat of a large scale disaster resulting from medical procedures involving radiation.

"Media favourability" also plays an important role in increasing public acceptance of medical radiation. The public is constantly bombarded with stories about every minor event at nuclear facilities.

Even the smallest faults are highlighted. The overall image of the nuclear enterprise in the media tends to be highly negative. However, medical radiation does not suffer this disadvantage. Ar- ticles warning the public about the dangers of irradiation from medical procedures are extremely infrequent.

Thus, due to all the factors and causal relationships described above, Radiation Attitudes concerning radiation from medical applications tend to be on the positive side.

69 3. Does the model explain widespread opposition to nuclear waste repositories?

Nuclear waste repositories provoke a different response among the public than nuclear power plants.

On one hand, the lay public is concerned with the long term disposal of spent fuel, and recognizes the logical necessity of developing a solution. On the other hand, they seem to be strongly opposition building a spent fuel repository in their surroundings. This could be a manifestation of the NIMBY

(Not In My Back Yard) phenomenon, but the Radiation Attitudes model further explains the reasons for this opposition.

The first step is to look at the Risk-Benefit Tradeoff Loop. The lay public does not perceive any benefit from having a spent fuel repository in their surroundings. The merits of implementing a solution for safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel is not something most individuals can relate to personally. There would be no tangible benefits like electricity from nuclear power plants. Due to these reasons, the "perceived personal benefit" variable would be low. However, the lay public would view the facility as a hazard in terms of increased levels of radiation in the surroundings. This would increase the "perceived personal risk". The mechanics of nuclear waste disposal are not fully understood by the lay public, even less than operations of a nuclear power plant. The low level of "familiarity" results in low " knowledge confidence". The radiation threat, through extremely low, is perceived as dangerous.

Another factor that must be considered is the idea that the spent fuel would remain in the repository for generations. This greatly increases the "fear of long term effects of radiation". The public fears that even though there might not be immediate consequences, the facility could pose a risk in the future. The fear of long term effects explains why facilities which may be located in remote areas face opposition. Even though a layman would not perceive a risk to himself in his lifetime, he could be concerned about the potential hazards posed by the facility to future generations. A sense of responsibility towards preserving the environment could also be an influencing factor.

All these factors lead to the formation of negative "Radiation Attitudes" concerning waste repositories.

70 4. Does the model explain the Radiation Attitudes of the stakeholders in Carlsbad, New Mex- ico, after the radiation leak at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in February 2014?

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic repository for permanent disposal nuclear waste from the nation's nuclear defense program. WIPP is the nation's only repository for the disposal of mostly o- emitting transuranic (TRU) waste, consisting of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris, soil and other items contaminated with small amounts of plutonium and other man-made radioactive elements. Deep geological disposal in salt beds was chosen for the long-lived TRU waste[58].It is interesting to consider the example of the Waste Iso- lation Pilot Plant (WIPP) which is around 42 km from Carlsbad, New Mexico. The stakeholders in this region have extremely favourable attitudes towards the plant. The stakeholders in this region re- alize the long term benefits of having DOE projects in the area, and have a high " perceived personal benefit". Their "trust in enterprise" is also extremely high. Since the WIPP has been operating in the region for several years, the stakeholders are more familiar with such a facility than stakeholders in regions that do not have nuclear facilities. This increases their "familiarity with nuclear science and technology", and hence increases " knowledge confidence". The overall "Radiation Attitudes" are positive, which explains why a new facility would receive a high level of stakeholder acceptance.

The positive attitude of the leaders and residents of Carlsbad was tested in March 2014, after a radiation leak due to which isotopes of americium and plutonium were found on above-ground air filters. Preliminary test results indicated 13 employees working above ground that day had inhaled or ingested radioactive material. But it was the first serious incident in WIPP's history, and

Carlsbad still appears to have confidence in the site. WIPP has been a stable economic base for lifelong residents. About 1,000 people in Carlsbad, which is a city of 26,000, are employed by

WIPP or related contractors, and the site's annual budget is about $215m per year. Eddy County

Commissioner Susan Crockett, who represents Carlsbad has been quoted as saying, "Those are our high-paying jobs, they support our baseball teams, they are part of our community". This clearly implies that the "perceived personal benefit" is high enough to outweigh any "perceived personal risk".

In fact, town officials are hoping their corner of New Mexico can be the home of even more nuclear wastes. Eddy County and the neighbouring Lea County have formed the Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance

71 (ELEA), proposing an aboveground interim storage site for spent fuel produced by power plants awaiting a permanent US repository. When asked recently whether the leak would affect ELEA's future, Mr. John Waters, the city development director said that it was a separate project that would have to "stand on its own merits anyway." "Moving forward, their safety record is going to be phe- nomenal," Ms Crockett said. "There's no reason for us to not feel safe having WIPP there[59]."

The "trust in nuclear enterprise" has maintained its levels inspite of the accident. The single event has not significantly changed the values of " sense of control", "knowledge confidence" or sense of uncertainty". High "perceived personal benefit", high " familiarity with nuclear science and technology" and high "trust in nuclear enterprise" remain the dominant factors shaping public attitudes towards radiation.

Thus even, though there is an increase in public concern regarding safety, which is fair given the circumstances, the overall attitude towards radiation continues to remain positive, and support for

ELEA does not seem to have diminished.

72 6 Validation of Model by Interview Data

The interviews conducted as a part of this work represent the first stage of the validation of the model for Radiation Attitudes. The hypothesized causal relationships in the model were tested by conducting interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to understand an individual's beliefs, the bases for these beliefs, and the process of their formation. The interviews enabled verification of the variables and relationships in the model. The most significant interdependencies and links in the causal loop diagram were also identified.

Interview protocols were also developed for the refinement and verification of the models for stakeholder acceptance at the local, state and federal level. However, testing of these models will be carried out in the next stages of validation, and is beyond the scope of this work.

6.1 Interview Method

Recognizing the sensitivity of individuals when it comes to issues related to nuclear technology and radiation, an unconventional approach was necessary for gathering relevant data. Surveys or questionnaires as a means of understanding formation of attitudes were ruled out, since data from such surveys rarely shed light on the root causes of a particular phenomenon. Such quantitative studies pay a price for their standardized precision. Because they ask the same questions in the same order of every respondent, they do not obtain the full picture. Instead, the information that they obtain from any one person is fragmented, made up of bits and pieces of attitudes, observations and appraisals[60].

In order to determine the origins of Radiation Attitudes among the public, we needed more from respondents than a choice among categories. The interview questions were dynamically refined based on their responses during the interview. A set of reference questions was used as a guideline, but the interviews were conducted in a conversational manner. This method for conducting interviews has been termed as "qualitative interviewing". The analysis of these interviews relies less on counting and correlating, and more on interpretation, summary and integration. This method enables one to gain in the coherence, depth and density of the material which each respondent provides[60].

73 All interviews were governed by the MIT protocols for use of human subjects, among which is assurance of confidentiality for all interviewees.

6.2 Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the Local Level

In order to understand the level of acceptance and the individual factors affecting stakeholder ac-

ceptance at a local level, the approach taken is described as follows.

The first step was to provide the interviewee with information about the particular nuclear facility.

To begin with, questions would be asked to get a general idea of how the individual views the

facility, and his level of acceptance. Then, questions would be asked regarding the variables directly

affecting acceptance, mainly the factors that affect perception of risk and benefit. Subsequently, the

questions would lead to the to the end variables.

The facility of intent would be discussed within the context of the set of facilities for hazardous

or controversial projects, (e.g., hydraulic fracturing, construction of new electrical transmission

facilities, biohazard laboratories, etc.)

The responses would be analyzed to estimate the degree of correlation between the hypothesized

links in the causal loop diagram and the interviewee responses. The dominant links and loops would

be noted. The relative weight of each variable in influencing stakeholder acceptance would also be

determined. This process would enable drawing a conclusion on the level of acceptance for the

facility, which would be correlated with the initial views that the interviewee expressed. The com-

parison between an interviewee's initial response regarding acceptance and the conclusion drawn

on the basis on his responses regarding influencing factors would be valuable for understanding the

mechanism by which individuals form opinions about a particular facility.

The reference questions for analyzing stakeholder acceptance at a local level are given in Appendix

B. 1. The questions are formulated based on the causal loop diagram in Figure 3.

6.3 Interviews for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level

In order to understand the level of acceptance and the individual factors affecting stakeholder ac-

ceptance at the state and federal level, the approach taken is described as follows.

74 The first step, similar to the local level acceptance interview, was to provide the interviewee with information about the nuclear facility being considered. To begin with, questions would be asked to get a general idea of how the individual views the facility, and his level of acceptance. Then, questions would be asked regarding the variables directly affecting acceptance. In the case of stakeholders at the state and federal level, these variables are different from those at the local level. But the approach would be the same, starting with the variables considered to be most important and then working through the causal loops. The analysis of responses would be carried out in the same manner as described for interviews at the local level.

The reference questions for analyzing stakeholder acceptance at the state and federal level are given in Appendix B.2. The questions are formulated based on the causal loop diagram in Figure 4.

6.4 Interviews for Determining Radiation Attitudes

In order to understand the formation of Radiation Attitudes, and the individual factors that may alter or affect these attitudes, the approach taken is described as follows.

The interview approach for determining Radiation Attitudes would be similar to the previous two cases. The first step would be to get a general overview of the interviewee's opinion of radiation and nuclear technology. Then questions would be asked regarding the influencing factors, with a view of extracting information, not only about the effects of a particular Radiation Attitude, but more importantly about the root causes of the attitude.

For individuals that display a high perception of risks and low perception of benefits, the aim would be to find out if the Radiation Attitudes are indeed negative, and if so, understand why. The interview would then seek to gain information about variables other than risk and benefit, which shape

Radiation Attitudes. A conclusion regarding the interviewee's Radiation Attitude would be drawn based on this analysis. A comparison between an interviewee's initial response regarding attitude towards radiation, and the conclusion drawn on the basis on his responses regarding influencing factors would be valuable for understanding the mechanism by which Radiation Attitudes are formed.

The reference questions for analyzing attitudes of individuals towards nuclear technology and radiation are given in Appendix B.3. The questions are formulated based on the causal loop diagram in

75 Figure 5.

6.5 Selection of Interviewees

Individuals belonging to the stakeholder groups discussed in Section 3.2 are ideal candidates for interviews aimed at determining stakeholder acceptance of a facility and Radiation Attitudes. How- ever, one of the major challenges encountered was getting the consent of these stakeholders to participate in the interview process. Requests made to local and state level government stakeholders were not answered. The anti-nuclear opposition groups, both at the local and state level refused to participate. These difficulties in arranging the interviews were unanticipated.

The interviews conducted for the purpose of this work were focused on understanding the dynamics underlying the formation or Radiation Attitudes. The interviewees selected for this purpose were residents of Massachusetts, USA. They were well educated individuals, from a good socio- economic background. Their level of knowledge related to nuclear science and technology was very low. The interview candidates were men and women, belonging to an age group of 50 to 80 years. These individuals were selected because they could be potential stakeholders if a new nuclear project was proposed in their region. The age group selected would enable validation of the hypothesized historical factors affecting the formation of Radiation Attitudes.

Details about the interviewees are not included in this work in accordance with the confidentiality guidelines put forth by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES).

76 7 Interview Data and Analysis

The objective of the interviews was to determine the relative strength of the causal linkages in the models for stakeholder acceptance and Radiation Attitudes. The interviewees' responses were compared to the causal loop diagrams for nuclear project acceptance and Radiation Attitudes. The degree of correlation of the interviewee responses with the model was evaluated, and important variables and links were identified.

7.1 Interview No. 1

The MIT Reactor was selected as the first case for conducting interviews to test the model. There was a proposal to convert the reactor from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium, which would result in a redesign of the fuel matrix and change in operating parameters. The aim of the interview was to determine the attitude of the interviewee towards this proposed change in terms of acceptance of the facility. After determining the views of the interviewee with regards to acceptance, the objective was to gain an understanding of the interviewee's attitude towards radiation and nuclear technology on a broader scale.

The interview was initiated by providing a brief description of the MIT reactor and the proposed fuel change. The description is outlined in Appendix C. The detailed responses

The first part of the interview was conducted using the questions in Appendix B.1 as a guideline.

The aim was to gain an understanding of the interviewee's views about the MIT Reactor and the interviewee's reaction to the proposed fuel change. A summary of the interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D. 1.1. The next part of the interview focused on gaining a general understanding of the interviewee's views towards radiation and nuclear technology. The reference questions used for conducting the interview are outlined in Appendix B.3. A summary of the interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.1.2. Since the interviewee was well educated and from a good socio-economic background but had little familiarity with nuclear science and technology, he represented the large subset of the population whose attitudes the model aims to understand.

77 7.1.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops

Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.

1. Nuclear Context

The most significant interdependencies that were identified based on the interviewee's responses were those related to nuclear context. Most of the interviewee's opinions of radiation and the threat of nuclear war were formed due to early exposure to situations and circumstances that resulted in an extremely negative nuclear context. Growing up during the cold war and living through the

Cuban missile crisis, fear of a nuclear war was a part of the interviewee's daily life. This made the weapons association extremely high. "duck and cover" drills in school and talk of protective bunkers further increased the fear of nuclear weapons, which translated to a negative context when it came to nuclear technology in general. Radiation provoked a feeling of dread in the interviewee, making his Radiation Attitude negative.

2. Confidence and Control

Another factor that was emphasized throughout the interview was the lack of knowledge when it came to nuclear technology. The interviewee was unfamiliar with many aspects of radiation and nuclear technology and did not have confidence in his knowledge. The sense of uncertainty was very high with regards to the effects of radiation. Several questions came up regarding the safety levels, safe doses, extent of contamination and other characteristics of radiation. The low value of knowledge confidence and high sense of uncertainty led to an extremely high value of perceived personal risk, which resulted in negative Radiation Attitudes.

7.1.2 Identification of Important Links

The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 13. Their description is provided below.

1. Low familiarity with nuclear science and technology leads to low knowledge confidence

2. Low knowledge confidence and low perceived detectability of radiation lead to high sense of

uncertainty

78 socio-economic status

+ level of eucalion familiarity with nuclear expos ire to expert science and technology com nunication munictionsocio-political awareness and involvement

senseof control

knowledge xtreme confidence nuclear event sense of perceived

uncertainty personal benefit + - _ nuclear context

percei ved RADIATION detectability of + perceive -- radiatjon ersonal risk - ATTITUDES probability of threat being viewedas scientific agreement trust in nuclear weapons enterprise association media favourakility

socially catastrophic

transparency in potentia + trust in opposition industrialpractices fear of long term - _ groups effects of radiation

fear of "nuclear perceived probability of winter"

competent project - execution

exposure to apocalyptic film and literature

Figure 13: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.1 3. High sense of uncertainty results in high perceived personal risk

4. An extremely high weapons association and proximity to extreme nuclear event leads to an

extremely negative value of nuclear context.

5. An extremely high weapons association leads to a high value of socially catastrophic potential

6. Low media favourability leads to a high value of fear of long term effects

7. High value of fear of long term effects leads to increased socially catastrophic potential

8. Low perceived personal benefit, high perceived personal risk, negative nuclear context, low

media favourability and high socially catastrophic potential lead to negative Radiation Atti-

tudes

7.2 Interview No. 2

The aim of the first part of the interview was to gain a general understanding of projects that the

interviewee considered hazardous. Questions were asked to understand the interviewee's perceived

costs and benefits related to these projects. The interview questions were focused on understanding the basis for the interviewee's attitudes, and the process by which these attitudes are formed. A comparison of attitudes towards controversial projects in general, and nuclear projects was useful for determining the role and significance of Radiation Attitudes.

The next part of the interview focused on gaining a general understanding of the interviewee's views towards radiation and nuclear technology. The reference questions used for conducting the interview are outlined in Appendix B.3. A summary of the interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.2.

7.2.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops

Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.

1. Social Trust Loop

Social trust was a very important factor influencing the formation of the interviewee's attitudes towards radiation. He displayed a general distrust of authority, which could be a result of lack of

80 transparency in industrial practices. He believed that industries and government agencies sacrificed public interest in favour of personal profit motives. The fact that most of the information that the public could gather was provided by these sources also increases his sense of mistrust. He felt the need for gaining accurate information, but did not trust media sources to provide it. These beliefs led to an extremely low value of trust in nuclear enterprise, which greatly increased his perception of risk, and were a significant factor contributing to negative Radiation Attitudes.

An interesting link highlighted by the interviewee was the positive influence of presence of opposition groups. His belief that opposition groups asked questions which resulted in better analysis of the project or technology and resulted in higher accountability of the project implementers.

7.2.2 Identification of Important Links

The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 14. Their description is provided below.

1. Lack of scientific agreement leads to a high sense of uncertainty

2. Trust in opposition groups increased perceived probability of competent project execution (contrary to model hypothesis)

3. Low probability of threat being viewed as "man-made" results in increase in positive value of

Radiation Attitudes

4. Low media favourability results in negative nuclear context

5. Negative nuclear context decreases the value of Radiation Attitudes

6. High proximity to extreme nuclear event results in increased perceived personal risk

7. Decreased transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

8. Decrease in trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk

9. Increasing perceived personal benefit decreases perceived personal risk

10. Increasing sense of control decreases perceived personal risk

11. Decreasing perceived personal risk increases value of Radiation Attitudes

81 socio-economic status +~' level of education familiarity with nuclear exposure t( expert science and technology socio-political communicationsoi-oica awareness and involvement

sense of control

knowledge proximity to extreme confidence nuclear event

sense of uncertainty personal benefit - nuclear contexW

percei ved - detectability of + perceive - RADIATION radiation ersonal risk ATTITUDES + - probability of threat 00 being viewed as dibility scientific agreement proximiIy to "man-made" media cre

extreme nuclear + xet trust in nuclear weapons association ente risemedia favouruaility ente ise

socially catastrophic +

transparencyin potenti +

trust in opposition industrialpractices fear of long term - groups effects of radiation

fear of "nuclear perceived probability of winter"

competent project + execution

exposure to apocalyptic film and literature

Figure 14: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.2 12. Increasing perceived personal benefit increases value of Radiation Attitudes

13. Positive Radiation Attitude increases trust in enterprise

7.3 Interview No. 3

The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the

interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.3.

7.3.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops

Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.

1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee formed his attitude towards radiation based on a tradeoff between the risks and benefits of nuclear technology. In his case, the extremely high perception of risk, caused by lack of trust in enterprise, low sense of control, high uncertainty regarding radiation, and an extremely low

sense of benefit resulted in highly negative Radiation Attitudes.The negative Radiation Attitudes further decreased the interviewee's sense of benefit, resulting in an extremely high risk-low benefit

scenario.

2. Social Trust Loop

The importance of the trust variable was highlighted in the interviewee's responses. The reinforcing nature of the social trust loop described in Figure 7 was clearly visible in the attitude of the interviewee. The interviewee was adamantly distrustful of the nuclear enterprise as well as government agencies, believing that they rarely protected public interests. The low trust in nuclear enterprise increased his risk perception and resulted in negative Radiation Attitudes, further decreasing trust in enterprise. The interviewee's connection with prominent opposition groups also played a role in his negative image of the nuclear enterprise.

3. Nuclear Context

Another important phenomenon influencing the interviewee's Radiation Attitudes was his context of nuclear technology. Historical background had greatly influenced his views, specially the exposure

83 to the threat of nuclear weapons at an early age. This caused the interviewee to be anxious about the dangers of radiation causing large scale destruction.

7.3.2 Identification of Important Links

The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 15. Their description is provided below.

1. Increasing trust in opposition groups decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

2. Decreasing transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

3. Decreasing trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk

4. Decreasing perceived personal benefit increases perceived personal risk

5. Increasing perceived personal risk and decreasing perceived personal benefit result in negative

Radiation Attitudes

6. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases perceived personal benefit

7. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

8. Lack of scientific agreement increases sense of uncertainty

9. Increase in sense of uncertainty and low sense of control increase perceived personal risk

10. Increasing Weapons association leads to negative nuclear context

11. Negative nuclear context results in negative Radiation Attitudes

12. Increasing Weapons association increases socially catastrophic potential

13. Fear of long term effects of radiation increases socially catastrophic potential

14. Fear of nuclear winter increases socially catastrophic potential

15. Increasing socially catastrophic potential leads to negative Radiation Attitudes

16. Negative Radiation Attitudes result in increase in socially catastrophic potential

84 socio-economic status levelofeducation / familiarity with +nuclear exposure to expert science and technology communication SOCu-Pu L ca awareness and involvement

sense of control

knowledge proximity t extreme confidence nuclear event sense of perceived uncertainty personal benefit nuclear context

percei ved detectability of + perceive -- RADIATION radiation ersonal risk - TTITUDES + - probability of threat 00 being viewed as scientific proximityo "man-made"+ media credibility agreement extreme nuclear evenlI> trust *nncea weapons ent nre ente se association mediafavourablity

sociallycatastrophic +

transparency in potentia +

trust in opposition industrialpractices + fear of long term - effects of radiation groups

fear of "nuclear perceived probability of winter"

competent project - execution

exposure to apocalyptic film and literature

Figure 15: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.3 7.4 Interview No. 4

The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the

interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.4.

7.4.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops

Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.

1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee said that in order to form an opinion, one must look at the tradeoffs between nuclear

energy and other forms of energy, to see which has greater negative consequences. His responses

indicated that he weighed the costs and benefits of the technology before forming an opinion. The

risk-benefit tradeoff was the most important factor influencing his final attitude. Variables like trust

in enterprise, and benefits of nuclear energy, in terms of efficiency and reduced emissions reduced

his perceived personal risk. The positive Radiation Attitude also reinforced his sense of benefit,

further reducing perceived personal risk. The negative historical context associated with nuclear

technology was overpowered by the low perceived personal risk and high perceived personal benefit.

2. Social Trust Loop

The main factor that resulted in a low perceived personal risk and hence a positive Radiation Attitude

was the interviewee's trust in the nuclear enterprise. The high level of trust was an outcome of his

perceived competency of the enterprise, transparency in industrial practices, and positive historical

view of the technology. The interviewee recognized the fact that the frequency of accidents in the

nuclear enterprise had been very low, and this led to his high level of trust.

7.4.2 Identification of Important Links

The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 16. Their description is provided below.

1. Increasing perceived personal benefit decreases perceived personal risk

2. Decreasing perceived personal risk increases value of Radiation Attitudes

86 socio-economic status .," levelof education familiarity withnuclear exposure t expert science and technology socio-political communication p awareness and involvement

sense of control

knowledge proximity to extreme confidence nuclear event sense of perceived

uncertainty personal benefit - nuclear context

percei'ved detectability of + perceive RADIAT radiation personal risk ATTITUEA + 4- - probability of threat 00 being viewed as scientific proxnnity to "man-made"+ media credibility

agreement extreme UCleiear evenlt trustin nuclear weapons enteterune rassociationjse mediafavourability

socially catastrophic +

transparency in potential +

industrial practices + fearof longterm - trust in opposition eifdfectsof radiation groups

fear of "nuclear perceived probability of winter"

competent project - execution

exposure to apocalyptic film and literature

Figure 16: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.4 3. Increasing perceived personal benefit increases value of Radiation Attitudes

4. Positive Radiation Attitudes increase trust in enterprise

5. Increased transparency in industrial practices increases trust in nuclear enterprise

6. Increase in trust in nuclear enterprise decreases perceived personal risk

7. Low media favourability results in negative nuclear context

8. Weapons association results in negative nuclear context

9. Negative nuclear context decreases the value of Radiation Attitudes

10. High weapons association results in increase in socially catastrophic potential

11. Low media favourability results in negative Radiation Attitudes

12. Lack of scientific agreement increases sense of uncertainty

7.5 Interview No. 5

The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.5.

7.5.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops

Based on the interviewee's responses, the important variables and loops are identified below.

1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee perceived a very low level of benefit and a high sense of risk, which led to extremely negative Radiation Attitudes.

2. Social Trust Loop

Lack of trust in the nuclear enterprise played an important role in shaping the interviewee's Radi- ation Attitudes. The low level of trust was a result of low perceived competency of the enterprise, and lack of transparency in industrial practices. The negative Radiation Attitudes further reinforced the low levels of trusts and increased the values of perceived personal risk.

88 3. Confidence and Control

The interviewee felt no control over the outcomes of technology. The lack of control and low familiarity with the technology decreased his knowledge confidence.He also experienced a high level of uncertainty with regards to the effects of radiation. These factors further increased the perceived personal risk.

7.5.2 Identification of Important Links

The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 17. Their description is provided below.

1. Lack of scientific agreement leads to a high sense of uncertainty

2. High sense of uncertainty results in high perceived personal risk

3. Decreasing sense of control results in high perceived personal risk

4. Decreasing sense of control decreases knowledge confidence

5. Low familiarity with nuclear science and technology decreases knowledge confidence

6. Decreasing transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

7. Decreasing trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk

8. Decreasing perceived personal benefit increases perceived personal risk

9. Increasing perceived personal risk and decreasing perceived personal benefit result in negative

Radiation Attitudes

10. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

11. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases sense of control

12. Fear of nuclear winter increases socially catastrophic potential

13. Increasing socially catastrophic potential leads to negative Radiation Attitudes

14. Negative Radiation Attitudes result in increase in socially catastrophic potential

15. Increasing Weapons association leads to negative nuclear context

16. Negative nuclear context results in negative Radiation Attitudes

89 socio-economic status +' levelof educaTion familiarity with nuclear exposure t expert science and technology communication socopolitical awarenessand involvement

+ sense of control

knowledge proximity t extreme confidence nuclear event sense of perceived uncertainty personal benefit x

+ +

perceived detectabilityof + perceive -_ RADIATION radiation ersonal risk TTITUDES + -probability of threat being viewed as scientific proximity to "man-made"+ media credibility agreement extreme nujCear v enh> trustin nuclear weapons ent 'e association media favourability socially catastrophic +

transparency in potenti +

fear longterm - trustinopposition industrialpractices of rs ops effects of radiation groups

fear of "nuclear perceivedprobability of winter" competent project execution

exposure to apocalypticfilm and literature

Figure 17: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.5 7.6 Interview No. 6

The interview was conducted based on the same approach as Interview No. 2. A summary of the interviewee's responses is given in Appendix D.6.

7.6.1 Identification of Important Interdependencies and Loops

1. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee's low perception of benefits, and the high perception of risks from a nuclear project, was one of the main reasons for the formation of negative Radiation Attitudes. The interviewee was very concerned about both physical and emotional costs of a nuclear disaster. The risk of a nuclear meltdown clearly outweighed any potential benefits.

2. Social Trust Loop

The interview responses showed that trust plays a vital role in the formation of Radiation Attitudes.

In the case of Interviewee no. 6, the low level of trust in the nuclear enterprise and the positive view of opposition groups resulted in extremely negative Radiation Attitudes. Lack of transparency in the nuclear industry was one of the reasons for the low level of trust.

3. Nuclear Context

The context in which the interviewee viewed nuclear technology was extremely negative due to his past experiences. The events he encountered in his childhood, significantly affected his views f nuclear technology and radiation. The interviewee's introduction to radiation was in the context of nuclear bombs being dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in a high weapons association. The talk of bomb shelters during the Cold War further strengthened this association.

This resulted in a highly negative nuclear context, which led to a negative attitude towards radiation.

4. Media Favourability Loop

The negative tone of the media reinforced the negative nuclear context. The fact that the media was selective in the stories that were published, focusing more on the negative aspects of nuclear technology, contributed to the interviewee's negative nuclear context. The negative nuclear context

91 led to a negative attitude towards radiation. The negative Radiation Attitudes resulted in further

decrease in media favourability.

7.6.2 Identification of Important Links

The most important links based on the interviewee's responses are highlighted in Figure 18. Their

description is provided below.

1. Low familiarity with nuclear science and technology results in low knowledge confidence

2. Low knowledge confidence leads to a high sense of uncertainty

3. High sense of uncertainty results in high perceived personal risk

4. Decreasing transparency in industrial practices decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

5. High level of trust in opposition groups results in decrease in trust in nuclear enterprise

6. Decreasing trust in nuclear enterprise increases perceived personal risk

7. Decreasing perceived personal benefit increases perceived personal risk

8. Increasing perceived personal risk and decreasing perceived personal benefit result in negative

Radiation Attitudes

9. Decreasing value of Radiation Attitudes decreases trust in nuclear enterprise

10. Fear of long term effects of radiation increases socially catastrophic potential

11. Increasing socially catastrophic potential leads to negative Radiation Attitudes

12. Negative Radiation Attitudes result in increase in socially catastrophic potential

13. High weapons association leads to increase in socially catastrophic potential

14. High weapons association leads to a higher probability of the threat being viewed as "man- made"

15. High weapons association leads to negative nuclear context

16. Low media favourability leads to negative nuclear context

17. Negative nuclear context results in negative Radiation Attitudes

18. Negative Radiation Attitudes lead to decrease in media favourability

92 socio-economic status + + level of education familiarity with nuclear exposure to expert science and technology communication commnicaionsoclo-political awareness and involvement + sense of control

knowledge proximityto xtreme confidence nuclear event sense of perceived uncertainty personal benefit - nuclear context ++ perceived detectabilityof + perceived RADIATION radiation ersonal risk ATTITUDES + - probability of threat being viewedas scientificagreement proximity n "man-made" media credibility extreme nuclear event> trustin nuclear weapons n nuca association inediafavourability ente 7i e

+ socially catastrophic +

transparencyin potentia +

trust in opposition industrialpractices + fear of long term - radiation groups effects of

fear of "nuclear perceivedprobability of winter" competentproject execution

exposure to apocalypticfilm and literature

Figure 18: Radiation Attitudes Model for Interview No.6 7.7 Quantification of Responses

The interview responses were used to quantify the variables in the causal loop diagram and the results are produced in Table 2.

Table 2: Quantification of CLD Variables using Interview Data

No. CLD Variable Range Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 Radiation -1 to 1 -0.7 0.5 -1 0.6 -0.9 -0.9

Attitudes

2 Perceived 0 to 1 0.2 0.8 0 0.7 0.5 0.1

Personal

Benefit

3 Perceived 0 to 1 0.9 0.5 1 0.5 0.9 0.8

Personal Risk

4 Trust in Nuclear -1 to 1 0.5 -0.5 0 0.9 -0.2 -0.7

Enterprise

5 Trust in -1 to 1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.1 0 0.9

Opposition

Groups

6 Transparency in 0 to 1 0.2 0.3 0 0.8 0.2 0

Industrial

Practices

7 Perceived 0 to 1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5

Probability of

Competent

Project

Execution

94 8 Scientific 0 to 1 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5

Agreement

9 Sense of 0 to 1 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.5

Control

10 Socio-Political 0 to 1 0.8 0.7 1 0.8 0.5 1

Awareness and

Involvement

11 Socio- 0 to I 1 1 1 1 1 1

Economic

Status

12 Levelof Oto l 1 1 1 1 1 1

Education

13 Familiarity with 0 to 1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0

Nuclear

Science and

Technology

14 Exposure to 0 to 1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0

Expert

Communication

15 Knowledge 0 to 1 0.2 0.4 1 0.5 0.2 0.3

Confidence

16 Sense of 0 to 1 1 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9

Uncertainty

17 Perceived 0 to 1 0 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5

Detectability of

Radiation

18 Media -1 to 1 -0.5 -0.5 -1 -0.5 -0.5 -1

Favourability

95 19 Media -1 to 1 -0.5 -0.7 1 0 -0.5 0.2

Credibility

20 Nuclear -1 to 1 -1 -1 -1 -0.1 -0.5 -I

Context

21 Proximity to 0 to 1 0.5 0.3 0.5 0 0 0

Extreme

Nuclear Event

22 Weapons 0 to 1 1 0 1 0.9 0.9 1

Association

23 Probability of 0 to 1 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.6 0.9

Threat being

Viewed as

"Man-made"

24 Fear of Long 0 to 1 1 0.1 1 0.9 0.2 1

Term Effects of

Radiation

25 Fear of 0 to 1 0.2 0.2 1 0.1 0.9 1

"Nuclear

Winter"

26 Exposure to 0 to 1 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 0

Apocalyptic

Film and

Literature

27 Socially 0 to 1 1 0.5 1 0.3 0.9 1

Catastrophic

Potential

96 7.8 Results

The most significant interdependencies across the set of interviews conducted are listed in Table 3.

The values assigned for each interviewee range from 0 to 1. A value of "1" represents the highest level of significance of a particular interdependency for the interviewee, while "0" represents the lowest. The proportion of interviewees who considered a particular interdependency to be important is also shown. Since the sample size is small, a triangular distribution was assumed. The confidence intervals were calculated about the mean values, using the following method.

Confidence Interval = p + z p is the mean of the sample a is the standard deviation a is the significance level, for a 95% confidence level, a= 0.05 z is the (1 - a) percentile of the standard normal distribution, for a 95% confidence level, z=1.96 c is the number of positive responses n is the sample size, or number of people interviewed

Significant Interdependency Risk Social Nuclear Confidence Media Benefit Trust Loop Context and Favoura- Tradeoff Control bility Loop Interviewee No.1 0.3 0.1 0.8 1 0.4 Interviewee No.2 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.2 0 Interviewee No.3 1 1 1 0.4 0.6 Interviewee No.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.5 0 Interviewee No.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 Interviewee No.6 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.8 Sample size "n" 6 6 6 6 6 Sample mean "p" 0.5500 0.7000 0.5500 0.4500 0.3833 Standard deviation "or" 0.3450 0.3286 0.3507 0.3146 0.3251 Significance level "a" 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Confidence interval 0.2760 0.2630 0.2806 0.2518 0.2601 Lower limit 0.2740 0.4370 0.2694 0.1982 0.1232 Upper limit 0.8260 0.9630 0.8306 0.7018 0.6434

Table 3: Analysis of Interview Data

97 Social Trust was the most important factor influencing Radiation Attitudes, followed by Risk-

Benefit Tradeoff. Nuclear Context also played an important role, but more interviewees across different age groups need to be conducted to determine its significance. Confidence and Control, and Media Favourability were the other important interdependencies that were identified.

The cause-effect relationships in the model correspond well with interviewee responses. However, one phenomenon that the model did not capture was the positive influence of opposition groups. For

Interviewee no. 2, as indicted in his responses in Appendix D.2.2, the presence of opposition groups increased perceived probability of competent project execution, contrary to what was hypothesized.

More interviews need to be conducted to determine whether this effect is a significant factor for the general population, or whether it was an exception.

A new variable, "socio-political awareness and involvement" was added, which did not exist in the initial version of the model. This variable was found to influence the "sense of control." Socio- political awareness and involvement was identified when "level of education" and "socio-economic- background" proved insufficient to account for the sense of control experienced by an interviewee.

98 8 Conclusions

The first stage of validation of the model for Radiation Attitudes was successful. The interviews provided a means for testing the causal relationships hypothesized in the model. Some links were found to be stronger than others, as illustrated in the causal loop diagrams. The model for Radia- tion Attitudes correlated well with the information inferred from the interviews. The hypothesized variables and relationships in the causal loop diagram were also consistent with the interview data.

Apart from the addition of the variable "socio-political awareness and involvement", no modifica- tions were made in the model.

This work is the first step towards objectively defining the causes and structure of the emotional responses to radiation and nuclear technology, which influence stakeholder acceptance of a nuclear project. This work provide a framework for individuals or organizations seeking to understand the dynamics of the formation of Radiation Attitudes. This understanding could be translated to policies and strategies during planning and execution of nuclear projects which adequately account for stakeholder values in the decision making process.

8.1 Recommendations for Future Work

Complete validation of the model describing Radiation Attitudes is an iterative process which re- quires more interviews to be conducted. Future interviews should be conducted across a variety of age groups and socio-economic backgrounds. Interviews conducted with individuals from a younger age group will enable examination of the relative importance of historical factors in shaping Radiation Attitudes. A larger sample size will enable more accurate results to be obtained.

Analysis of interview data from several sources can ultimately help in quantifying the factors described in the model. The data from interviews conducted as a part of this work, and from future interviews will enable assignment of weights or betas to the different links in the model, thus quantitatively representing the level of influence of one variable on another. Regression algorithms can be used to analyze the data and identify the variables which have a statistically significant impact.

The developed Radiation Attitudes model will ultimately influence the broader models for stakeholder acceptance of new nuclear projects, (Figures 3 and 4), and help provide a better understand-

99 ing of the effect of Radiation Attitudes on nuclear project acceptance.

Interviews across other stakeholder groups have also been planned, and the protocols have been laid out in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The reference questions have been provided in Appendix B. 1 and

Appendix B.2. These interviews will enable validation of the models for stakeholder acceptance at the state, local and federal level.

The challenges faced in this work, primarily the reluctance of certain stakeholders to participate in interviews have provided valuable lessons for future work. Care must be taken while approaching potential interview candidates, and the work must be explained in an unbiased manner. The inter- viewer should also acknowledge the possibility of confirmation bias in the data, since the interviews conducted are qualitative. The interview questions and method can be further refined in an attempt to overcome the confirmation bias.

100 A Variable Definition & Quantification Table for Local & State/Federal

CLDs

The following table was produced by Adam David Williams [3], as a part of the research project titled "Scholarship for Nuclear Communications and Methods for Evaluation of Nuclear Project

Acceptability". The project is aimed at developing a deeper understanding of stakeholder relationship dynamics for acceptance of controversial technology projects - like nuclear facilities, electrical transmission facilities, hydraulic fracturing operations, etc.

101 Stock/Flow Variable CLD Variable Stock Meaning of Lowest Value Meaning of Highest Value Description Range

LOCALCLD VARIABLES

Stakeholder Extent to which stakeholder 0 to I Y '0' indicates active rejection of (e.g., '1' indicates active acceptance of Acceptance group supports a specific actively protesting against) a (e.g., actively lobbying for) a nuclear project specific nuclear project specific nuclear project

Local Socioeconomic Comparison of local social and 0 to 1 '0' indicates local economic '1' indicates sustained local Condition (i) economic factors to national stagnation (e.g., high poverty, high economic growth (e.g., low poverty, averages unemployment - above national low unemployment - below national averages) averages)

Perceived Pride in Degree of intrinsic value of the 0 to 1 '0' indicates no intrinsic value from '1' indicates absolute intrinsic value Nuclear Facility (i) nuclear project felt by nuclear project from nuclear project stakeholder group

Perceived Positive Extent to which nuclear energy -1 to I '-I' indicates belief that nuclear '1' indicates belief that nuclear Environmental Event has a net positive impact on the energy only has net negative impact energy only has net positive impact (i) environment on the environment on the environment

Media Favorability (c) Extent to which media reports -I to I '-I' indicates prejudicially negative 'I' indicates extremely positive are positive, neutral or negative (e.g., demonizing) tone (e.g., canonizing) tone

Source of Extent to which stakeholder 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no '1' indicates absolute alignment Media/Information (i) trusts or feels their values align alignment between stakeholder between stakeholder values and with source of information values and source of information source of information

Credibility of Negative Extent to which negative 0 to 1 '0' indicates negative framing of 'l' indicates negative framing of Framing framing of nuclear project is nuclear project is considered 100% nuclear project is considered 0% considered credible or trustworthy trustworthy trustworthy

Framing (Negative) (c) Extent to which the dominant -1 to 0 '-1' indicates that the dominant '0' indicates that the dominant perspective of stakeholders perspective of stakeholders is 100% perspective of stakeholders is 100% toward a nuclear project is positive toward a nuclear project negative toward a nuclear project negative

Perceived Risk from Probability of fatality to -1 to 0 '-1' indicates 100%perceived '0' indicates 0%perceived Project individual from the nuclear likelihood of fatality to the likelihood of fatality to the project individual individual

Perceived Benefit from Comparison of new/old local -i to I '-I' indicates complete loss of net '1' indicates perfect gain of net Project net benefit from nuclear project benefit (e.g., decreased property benefit (e.g., increased property values & tax revenue, increased values & tax revenue, decreased unemployment) from nuclear unemployment) from nuclear project project

Danger (c) Cumulative measure of -1 to 0 Y '-1' indicates accumulation of '0' indicates accumulation of objective risks associated with objective risks equals the maximum objective risks equals the minimum a nuclear project objective value of each input objectivevalue of each input variable variable

Opportunity Cumulative measure of -i to 0 Y '0' indicates accumulation of 'I' indicates accumulation of objective benefits associated objective benefits equals the objective benefits equals the with a nuclear project maximum objective value of each minimum objective value of each input variable input variable

Fungibility Extent to which stakeholders -1 to 1 '-1' indicates risk only considers '1' indicates risk only considers sum consider risk as danger or as sum of associated dangers of associated benefits opportunity

Cognitive Inclusion of Extent to which low frequency 0 to 1 '0' indicates complete rejection of '1' indicates complete inclusion of Perceived Threat of adverse events at nuclear frequency of threatening events frequency of threatening events facilities are included in Frequency stakeholder group risk from nuclear project from nuclear project determination ['S' Curve @ threshold benefit value];

Perceived Frequency Relative expected time between 0 to 1 '0' indicates no time between 'I' indicates infinite time between event occurrences expected events (e.g., continuously expected events (e.g., never occurring events) occurring events)

Probability the Benefit Extentto which a stakeholder 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no 'I' indicates complete realization of is Realized group realizes realization of publicized benefits publicized benefits publicized/expected benefits from the nuclear project ['S' Curve @threshold social trust value]

Probability Project Extent to which desired levels 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no level of '1' indicates level of desired Safety and Security of safety and security are desired safety/security reached safety/security perfectly reached Expectations are Met achieved by the nuclear project

Perceived Threat of Probability of fatality to -i to 1 '-1' indicates any exposure to '1' indicates any exposure to Radiation (i) individual from radiation radiation will cause death radiation will enhance health

Fairness (i) Extent to which dangers 0 to 1 '0' indicates that all dangers are 'I' indicates that all dangers are associated with nuclear project localized and experienced by a small equally experienced the entire are equally shared by subset of the public public public/stakeholders

Extreme Events at Extent to which adverse events 0 to 1 '0' indicates 0% inclusion of past '0' indicates 100%inclusion of past Nuclear Facilities (i) at nuclear facilities are included adverse events in attitude formation adverse events in attitude formation in attitude formation

Probability Nuclear Extent to which the nuclear -l to 0 '-1' indicates nuclear waste issue '0' indicates nuclear waste issue Waste Issue is waste storage and security issue completely unresolved completely resolved is resolved to satisfaction of Resolved stakeholders

Nuclear Weapons Degree to which the specific 0 to 1 '0' indicates 0% association of '' indicates 100%association of Association (i) nuclear project is associated nuclear project with weapons nuclear project with weapons with nuclear weapons

Perceived Probability Extent to which stakeholder 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no level of '1' indicates level of desired of Competent group desired levels of desired competent implementation competent implementation reached Execution competent project reached perfectly reached implementation are achieved by the nuclear project

Perceived Extent to which stakeholder 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no level of '1' indicates level of desired Transparency of group desired levels of project desired transparency reached transparency reached perfectly Project Implementer implerenter transparency are reached achieved

Probability First Extentto which the project 0 to 1 '0' indicates project implementer 'l' indicates project implementer is Reporting of implementer is first to report to not able to issue first reports able to issue first reports Publicized Mistake is stakeholders ['S' curve from the Project behavior?Where is the Implementer (i) threshold?]

Importance of Extent to which an additional 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no 'I' indicates absolute significance of Publicized Mistaketo publicized mistake is significance of an additional mistake an additional mistake Stakeholder considered significant to a stakeholder group [Exponential curve vs. 'Probability of Publicized Mistake']

Social Trust in Project Extent to which stakeholder 0 to I V '0' indicates absolutely no trust in 'I' indicates absolute trust in the Implementer groups are willing to rely on the project implementer to make project implementer to make the project implementer of a decisions decisions specific nuclear project make decisions in situations where the group lacks the resources to personally make a decision

Degree of Implementer Extent to which the project 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no 'I' indicates complete Awareness of implementer understands the understanding of stakeholder group understanding of stakeholder group Stakeholder Values salient values of stakeholder values values groups

Degree of Opposition Extent to which the nuclear -1 to 0 '0' indicates absolutely no acts to '1' indicates acts to perfectly align Awareness of project opposition understands align with stakeholder group values with stakeholder group values Stakeholder Values the salient values of stakeholder groups

Stakeholder Extent to which stakeholder 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no '1' indicates complete stakeholder Empowerment (i) groups can participate in stakeholder group participation group participation decisions and actions of the nuclear project

Knowledge Confidence Extent to which knowledge of -I to 1 '-1' indicates prejudicially negative '1' indicates extremely positive use nuclear S&T is positively, use (e.g., well informed opponents) (e.g., well informed proponents) of negatively or neutrally utilized of nuclear S&T nuclear S&T regarding a specific nuclear project

Familiarity with Extent to which a stakeholder 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no 'l' indicates perfect knowledge in Nuclear S&T (i) group has knowledge in and knowledge in or comfort with or comfort with nuclear S&T comfort with technical aspects nuclear S&T of nuclear science and technology

STATE/FEDERAL CLD VARIABLES Likelihood of Specific Expected probability of a 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutely no '1' indicates absolute likelihoodof a Nuclear Project nuclearproject receiving a likelihood of a license/permit being license/permit being received Receiving the Permit license or permit received or License (c)

Perceived National Comparison of new/old 0 to 1 '0' indicates complete lack of '1' indicates complete increasein Socioeconomic national economic benefit from benefits (e.g., increased GHGs, benefits (e.g., decreased GHGs, Benefits nuclear project decreased energy security, loss of increased energy security, gain of high-tech jobs) from nuclear project high-techjobs) from nuclear project

Perceived National Comparison of new/old -1 to 0 '-l' indicates complete increase of '0' indicates complete lack of costs Costs from Project national costs from nuclear costs (e.g., political/social capital, (e.g., political/social capital, project subsidies & upfront costs) from subsidies & upfront costs) from nuclear project nuclear project

Additional Cost to Extent to which state/national 0 to 1 '0' indicates no additional cost to 'I' indicates level of prohibitive Project Implementer of decision makers or processes the project implementer additional cost to the project License Approval increase the cost of the nuclear implementer (e.g., discontinue the project to the project project) implementer

Cost of Viability of Extent to which the cost of 0 to 1 '0' indicates complete fiscal '1' indicates absolutely no fiscal Continuing the Nuclear continuing the nuclear project viability of continuing to the project viability of continuing to the project Project is no longer fiscally viable for implementer implementer the project implementer

Project Implementer Extent to which the project 0 to 1 '0' indicates complete lack of the 'I' indicates perfect achievement by Ability to Meet NRC implementer meets the national project implementer meeting the project implementer of national Expectations regulator expectations national regulator expectations regulator expectations regarding the nuclear project

Perceived Project Extent to which the project 0 to 1 '0' indicates extremely poor quality '1' indicates perfect quality Implementer License implementer submits a quality license/permit submittal license/permit submittal Application Quality license/permit application

Additional NRC Level of additional 0 to 1 '0' indicates zero additional 'I' indicates prohibitive level of License Expectations license/permit expectations expectations form national regulator additional expectations from expected by the national national regulator regulator

Time for NRC to Amount of time taken during 0 to I '0' indicates no additional time '1' indicates prohibitive amount of Consider License the license/permit application taken during the applications time taken during the applications Application process (during which the process process (e.g., long enough time to project implementer is where cumulative costs leads to expected to maintain progress discontinuing the project) forward on the nuclear project) ['S' curve behavior? At a threshold level of 'Probability of Criticism of National Regulator']

Probability of Level of criticism lobbied 0 to 1 '0' indicates no criticism of the '1' indicates prohibitive levels of Criticism of NRC toward the national regulator national regulator regarding a criticism of the national regulator regarding a specific nuclear specific nuclear project regarding a specific nuclear project project

Opposition Legal, Extent to which oppositional 0 to 1 '0' indicates no oppositional actions 'l' indicates prohibitive levels of Social Actions stakeholder groups are acting to to delay or stop a specific nuclear oppositional actionsto delay or stop delay or stop progress on a project a specific nuclear project specific nuclear project

National Anti-Nuclear Extent to which national anti- 0 to 1 '0' indicates no national anti-nuclear 'I' indicates prohibitive levels of NGO Activities nuclear entities are acting actions against nuclear projects nationalanti-nuclear actions against against nuclear projects nuclear projects

Resources Provided by Extent to which national anti- 0 to I '0' indicates no national anti-nuclear 'I' indicates prohibitive levels of National Anti-Nuclear nuclear entities provide resources provided to local national anti-nuclear resources NGOs to Local resources to local opposition opposition of specific nuclear provided to local opposition of Opposition (c) groups for a specific nuclear projects specific nuclear projects project

Political Controversy Extent to which supporting a 0 to 1 '0' indicates no political controversy 'I' indicates prohibitive levels of from Supporting specific nuclear project results associated with supporting a specific political controversy associated with Specific Nuclear in political controversy nuclear project supporting a specific nuclear project Project (c)

Constituent Support for Extent to which a decision- 0 to 1 '0' indicates no constituent support '' indicates complete constituent Specific Nuclear makers constituents support a of a specific nuclear project supportof a specific nuclear project Project specific nuclear project

Stakeholder Consensus Extent to which different 0 to 1 '0' indicates no stakeholder 'I' indicates complete stakeholder in Support for Specific stakeholder groups hold a consensus for a specific nuclear consensus for a specific nuclear Nuclear Project consensus in support for a project among stakeholder groups project among stakeholder groups specific nuclear project

Probability of Extent to which supporting a -1 to I '-I' indicates increase in politician's 'I' indicates increase in politician's Politician Re-Election specificnuclear project re-election with complete rejection re-election with complete support of from Supporting increases thelikelihood of a of a specific nuclear project a specific nuclear project Specific Nuclear politician's re-election Project

Politician Support of Extent to which state -I to I '-I' indicates absolute rejection of a 'I' indicates absolute support of a Specific Nuclear government politicians support specific nuclear project by state specific nuclear project by state Project by State a specific nuclear project government government Government

Political benefit of Extent to which political -I to 1 '-' indicates political benefitcomes 'I' indicates political benefit comes Supporting Specific benefit relates to supporting a from absolute rejection of a specific from absolute support of a specific Nuclear Project specific nuclear project nuclear project nuclear project National Pro-Nuclear Extent to which national pro- 0 to 1 '0' indicates no national pro-nuclear '' indicates significant levels of NGO Activities (i) nuclear entities are acting in actions supporting nuclear projects national pro-nuclear actions support of nuclear projects supporting nuclear projects

National Economic National averages of social and 0 to 1 '0' indicates national economic 'l' indicates sustainednational Condition (i) economic factors stagnation (e.g., high poverty, high economic growth (e.g., low poverty, unemployment - above national low unemployment - below national averages) averages)

Degree of National Extent to which public opinion 0 to 1 '0' indicates absolutelyno national '1' indicates absolute national Opinion Poll Data polls show support for nuclear public support for nuclear facilities public supportfor nuclear facilities Showing Support for facilities Nuclear Facilities (i)

Project Implementer Extent to which a project 0 to 1 '0' indicates severe insufficiency of '1' indicates overabundance of Capacity implementer is capable of project implementer capacity project implementer capacity completing the required tasks for progressing the nuclear project ['S' curve behavior? At a threshold level of 'Additional National Regulator License Expectations']

NRC Confidence in the Extent to which the NRC has 0 t ol '0' indicates absolutely zero 'I' indicates absolute confidence of Project Implementer confidence in the Project confidence of the NRC in the the NRC in the Project Implementer Implementer to successfully Project Implementer to successfully to successfully operate a nuclear operate a nuclear project operate a nuclear project project

***Perception = reality/expectations... from a conceptual to operational perspective B Interview Questions

B.1 Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at a Local Level

1. What is your view of the XYZ facility?

2. Why do you feel this way?

3. What do you think are the benefits of XYZ facility?

4. What according to you are the negative aspects of the facility?

5. What would your opinion be about the desirability of a government-approved nuclear project in your city?

6. Do you see potential benefits from such a project?

7. What are your sources of information about nuclear technology?

8. Do you think the media are favourable? Why?

9. Do you think the media are acceptably credible? Why?

10. Do you trust the project implementer? Why?

11. Do you think the project implementer is acceptably transparent? Why?

12. Have there been any events of concern to yourself at the facility?

13. How did you learn about these mistakes?

14. How did these events change your views of the facility?

15. Do you think that the project implementer adequately takes into account the views of local stakeholder groups?

16. Are you proud of having XYZ facility in your surroundings? Why?

17. Do you think there are any environmental benefits associated with XYZ facility? Why?

18. Do you perceive an immediate danger from the facility? Why?

19. Do you associate the facility with issues of concern about nuclear technology like weapons proliferation? Why?

111 20. Do you feel well informed about nuclear matters? Why?

21. Is nuclear waste an issue of concern to you? Why?

22. Do you think your safety and security concerns are being met by the project implementer?

23. What is your view of opposition groups? Why?

B.2 Interview Questions for Stakeholder Acceptance at the State and Federal Level

1. What is your view of the XYZ facility?

2. Why do you feel this way?

3. What do you think are the national socio-economic benefits of XYZ facility?

4. What according to you are the national costs of the facility?

5. What do you think is the likelihood of the project receiving a permit/license? Why?

6. What are your views of national anti-nuclear NGO's and their activities? Why?

7. Do you see a link between national anti-nuclear NGO's and local opposition groups?

8. What are your views of national pro-nuclear NGO's and their activities? Why?

9. Do you perceive a political benefit from supporting the project? Why?

10. Would opinion poll data showing public support of nuclear facilities influence your views?

11. Does your constituency support the project?

12. Is there consensus among stakeholder groups in support/opposition for the project?

13. Do you think the NRC has confidence in the project implementer? Why?

14. Do you think the project implementer is capable of meeting NRC expectations? Why?

15. What do you think would be the quality of the project implementer's license application? Why?

16. What do you think will be the approximate time required by NRC to consider the license application? Why?

112 B.3 Interview Questions for Determining Radiation Attitudes

1. How would you characterize nuclear technology?

2. If you were advising someone else about nuclear technology, what would you suggest to them?

3. How would you characterize the benefits of nuclear technology?

4. What do you think are some of the solutions for global climate change? Do you believe that nuclear energy can help us to alleviate global warming? Should its use be encouraged? If yes, how; if not, what else should be done?

5. How confident are you that serious global warming will be prevented? Why?

6. Do you believe nuclear energy is safe enough? Why?

7. Do you think there are negative aspects of nuclear technology?

8. How would you characterize these negative aspects?

9. What uncertainties related to nuclear technology are of concern to you?

10. What are your major concerns about nuclear facilities? How are they different for those used to treat diseases, provide better industrial materials and provide energy?

11. Do you trust the nuclear enterprise? Why?

12. Do you think the nuclear enterprise is acceptably transparent in its practices? Why?

13. Do you trust government agencies to protect the public?

14. Do you trust anti nuclear activists and other environmental groups? Why?

15. Do you think the nuclear enterprise is competent in its execution of projects? Why?

16. Have you ever encountered lack of competence or dishonesty in the nuclear enterprise? A lack of politeness?

17. Do you think there is a lack of scientific agreement when it comes to information about nuclear technology?

18. Does this affect your views of nuclear technology?

19. Are you uncertain about the benefits or costs of nuclear technology? Why?

113 20. Does the lack of detectability of radiation affect your views? Why?

21. Were you or your acquaintances ever affected by a nuclear accident?

22. Has this affected your views? Why?

23. How did you learn about radiation?

24. What are your views about radiation?

25. Do you fear radiation more than other things in life? Why?

26. Are you familiar with nuclear science and technology?

27. Are you confident with your level of knowledge? Why?

28. Have you been exposed to expert communication regarding nuclear technology?

29. Has this affected your views about nuclear technology?

30. Do you think your education has affected your views about nuclear technology? Why?

31. Do you think your socio-economic background has affected your views about nuclear technology? Why?

32. Do you think nuclear technology has a socially catastrophic potential? Why?

33. Do you think there are adverse long term effects of nuclear technology?

34. Does this affect your views of nuclear technology? Why?

35. Did the Fukushima/ Three Mile Island/ Chernobyl accidents change your views about nuclear technology? Why?

36. Do you consider these disasters to be "man-made"? Why?

37. Do you associate nuclear technology with nuclear weapons? Why?

38. Did you read any books or watch any movies which related to nuclear technology?

39. Did this impact your opinion? Why?

40. Do you believe that a nuclear disaster could potentially lead to a "nuclear winter"?

41. Are there any historical factors which have shaped your opinion of nuclear technology? What are these factors?

114 42. Why did they affect your opinion?

43. Who do you believe is the most credible source of information about nuclear matters? About other matters concerning energy and society?

44. Do you think the media are adequately credible? Why?

45. Do you think the media are favourable? Why?

115 C Description of MITR-II and Proposed Changes

The MITR-JI, the major experimental facility of the NRL, is a heavy-water reflected, light-water cooled and moderated nuclear reactor that utilizes flat, plate-type, finned, aluminum-clad fuel elements. The average core power density is about 70 kW per liter. The maximum fast and thermal neutron flux available to experimenters are 1.2 x 1014and 6 x 10 13 neutrons/cm 2 s, respectively. Ex- perimental facilities available at the MIT research reactor include two medical irradiation rooms, beam ports, automatic transfer facilities (pneumatic tubes), and graphite-reflector irradiation facilities. In addition, several in-core experimental facilities (ICSAs) are available. It generally operates

24/7, except for planned outages for maintenance. The MITR-II encompasses a number of inherent

(i.e., passive) safety features, including negative reactivity temperature coefficients of both the fuel and moderator; a negative void coefficient of reactivity; the location of the core within two concen- tric tanks; the use of anti-siphon valves to isolate the core from the effect of breaks in the coolant piping; a core-tank design that promotes natural circulation in the event of a loss-of-flow accident; and the presence of a full containment. These features make it an exceptionally safe facility[61].

Description of the Proposed Fuel Change Concern about use of Highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear facilities arose due to proliferation risks. The RERTR Program was initiated by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1978. The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors

(RERTR) Program develops technology necessary to enable the conversion of civilian facilities using high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. During the Program's existence, over 40 research reactors have been converted from HEU (= or >20% U-235) to LEU

(< 20% U-235) fuels, and processes have been developed for producing radioisotopes with LEU targets[62].

However, some high performance research reactors like the MIT reactor have a compact core and use HEU because they need a higher power density and higher neutron flux. MITR-II currently has the same power density as an LWR, which enables simulations of LWR conditions. Power density would be significantly reduced if MITR-II was simply retrofitted with LEU. It would result in significant reduction in criticality. In order to enable conversion from HEU to LEU, there is a necessity of higher density LEU (approx. 5 times higher) to get the required U-235 density. The

116 current fuel matrix is not qualified for this. A new matrix is being tested by RERTR.

Significance of Conversion to LEU There is a proliferation risk associated with use of HEU in civilian facilities, not just in the US, but also abroad. The US wants to serve as an example for other countries to convert to LEU.

Challenges associated with Proposed Fuel Change Maintaining high performance after switch- ing to a lower enrichment will be a significant challenge. There have also been challenges in fuel fabrication. A small amount of fuel was fabricated and tested in ATR, but there are concerns whether it can be fabricated economically on a large scale. Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) would have to start an entirely new fabrication line to produce this new fuel. Since the DOE assumes the responsibility of providing university reactors with fuel free of charge, the LEU fuel, once qualified, would have to be paid for by the DOE. This could be a problem if it is prohibitively expensive.

Reactions to Proposed Fuel Change MIT fully supports the conversion to LEU. In the US, there is no resistance to the conversion.

Implications of Proposed Fuel Change Most other reactors in the US have converted directly to LEU. However, since MITR-II is a high performance reactor, it will have to compensate for loss of neutron flux. It is proposed that the power level will have to be increased to 7 MW. This would require redesigning the fuel matrix. The current number of 15-plates/fuel element will have to be increased to around 18-19 plates/fuel element. There will also be changes in the operating parameters. In addition to higher power, the mass flow rate will increase by around 10%. The operating temperatures will also be higher.

Using LEU calls for reduction of cladding thickness to compensate for lower fuel density. The initial proposal was to reduce the thickness from 20 mil to 10 mil. However, B&W increased this to 12 mil due to manufacturing constraints. There is also another engineering problem in terms of cladding thickness. Currently, the MITR has a unique design feature consisting of longitudinal fins on the surface of the cladding which increase the surface area by a factor of 2. The proposed

117 design calls for removal of these fins due to thinner cladding. The operating temperature and other parameters will have to be adjusted to account for this.

The new design is being studied thoroughly by MIT and RERTR. The amendments to the core design will be submitted to the NRC for their approval. The redesign is feasible from the engineering point of view and there are no adverse safety implications.

However, the new fuel has to be qualified by RERTR. The economics and feasibility of fabrication must also be taken into account.

Stakeholders The stakeholders in the proposed conversion of MITR-II from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium are identified below.

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Operates the MITR-II and is responsible for the design and engineering of the new fuel matrix in collaboration with RERTR

- Department of Energy (DOE) - Assumes the responsibility and cost of providing MITR-II with fuel.

- Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program - Develops technology necessary to enable the conversion of civilian facilities in the United States from HEU to LEU fuel.

New fuel matrix design will have to be qualified by RERTR

- Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)- Responsible for fuel fabrication.

- Cambridge residents - People living in the region around the MITR-II

118 D Detailed Interview Responses

D.1 Interviewee No. 1

D.1.1 Responses to Questions related to the MIT Reactor and Proposed Fuel Change

1. Knowledge about the MIT reactor

The interviewee was a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the MIT reactor is located. Despite being well educated, the interviewee only found out about the MIT reactor about a year ago. He also stated that he sometimes even forgot that the reactor exists. He felt that he did not know a lot about nuclear technology but was reassured by his neighbor, a policewoman, that the facility was secure.

2. Social Trust

The interviewee stated that he trusted MIT and felt more at ease since knowledgeable people were working on the MIT reactor and proposed fuel change, but wanted assurances that safety is ensured. He said he would feel much better knowing that it is MIT or an MIT- like institutions handling matters related to nuclear technology. He did not fully trust government agencies.

3. Concern about Radiation

The interviewee was concerned about radiation and evacuating a densely populated area like Cam- bridge in the event of an accident at the MIT reactor. He was worried about an event like Fukushima happening at the reactor since he believed that Massachusetts is also a seismically active area and earthquakes that could potentially cause a reactor meltdown are beyond human control. He was concerned about his family and the health effects of radiation. He had several questions about radiation like- What are the byproducts? Can it spread? How long is it around? Where does it go? How is it contained? He was afraid that radiation could cause genetic defects and was very concerned about the effects of radiation on future generations.

4. Perceived Sense of Benefit

The interviewee did not perceive any personal benefits to himself from the MIT reactor and stated that sometimes he even forgot that it was there. He acknowledged that there were benefits in terms

119 of scientific and medical research. He said that he would like more information about the benefits from the facility as he felt that he did not have complete knowledge about it. He also said that benefits do not always justify the costs associated with a technology.

5. Need for Information

The interviewee believed that information was the key factor for preventing fear and imagination from running wild when it came to a nuclear facility. He was not sure about accuracy of government sources but thought that MIT would be a good source of information.

6. Acceptability of New Reactor

He stressed the fact that since the MIT reactor already existed, he was accepting of the facility and did not oppose any fuel changes carried out by the university. However, the interviewee was not sure how he would feel about a new reactor. He said that his unfamiliarity with radiation made him edgy about a new facility. He would want information about any new project, to address his concerns about radiation. He said that there was a lot of fear of nuclear war around him growing up, and that his early experiences described below made him less acceptable of a new facility.

D.1.2 Summary of Responses to Questions related to Radiation Attitudes

1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology

When asked how he would characterize nuclear technology, the interviewee stated that nuclear technology was necessary and beneficial in terms of energy and medical applications. He stated that he did not think of nuclear reactors in the same terms as the technologies used in nuclear medicine. He stressed the importance of implementing the technology knowledgeably and safely.

He emphasized the need to pay attention to public concerns.

2. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association

The interviewee first learned about radiation from nuclear weapons tests. He was concerned about genetic effects of the radiation release from the Nevada test site and wondered where the radiation went. He remembered the "duck and cover" drills at his school and talk of protective bunkers during the cold war which a factor that induced fear of being bombed. He also stated that the events

120 at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were significant factors contributing to the fear. He said that these early experiences were important in terms of his knowledge of risks and benefits.

He grew up listening to the church talk about nuclear war. He lived through the Cuban missile crisis, and always had the sense of being seconds away from nuclear war. Because of this historical association, whenever he thinks of radiation, he thinks of nuclear war.

However, the interview said that he was more comfortable now that atmospheric testing had stopped.

He also felt more comfortable with newer nuclear technology.

3. Risk-Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee thought information about the benefits of nuclear technology would be helpful.

He also wanted to be assured about the safeguards and competence of the operators. He realized that there had been accidents in other industries, like oil spills etc., but believes that the scale of destruction and cost of human life is not as huge in those accidents.

4. Concern about Nuclear Wastes

The unresolved problem of disposal of nuclear wastes was a factor of concern for the interviewee.

He expressed a deep concern for the planet, and what was being dumped in the oceans. He did not believe that any of the nuclear wastes disappeared harmlessly, but rather led to contamination of the food chain and aquatic life. He again stressed that he wanted to know where exactly nuclear waste goes and what is done with it. He also wanted information how much waste was produced, and about safe levels of radiation. Some other questions he wanted answered were- Who is it affecting?

Are babies more affected? How are we affected? How is it stored? How protected is it? He mentioned again that information about all these matters would be reassuring.

5. Influence of Media and Imagery

With regards to media, the interviewee believed that media get people riled up about some problems which may be controversial. He relied on media for information but did not fully trust them. He stated that during the Fukushima accident in Japan, there was a lot of uncertainty about the credibility of the stories. But he trusted the images of the disaster that were displayed and found them quite "scary."

He felt that because the media constantly bombarded the public with stories about North Korea and

121 Iran, he felt that the threat of nuclear bombs being used was present all the time, which increased fear of the technology.

He also mentioned the recent radiation leak at WIPP, and said that images in the media like a father holding his little child, worried about the effect of radiation on his child, caused him great concern.

6. Influence of Books and Popular Media on Radiation Attitudes

The interviewee remembered reading about Marie Curie and her husband, and their work related to radiation. He said that the fact that Marie Curie had died due to radiation scared him. He acknowledged the fact that both our understanding of the phenomenon and safety measures are far better today than in Marie Curie's time. However, the incident provided him a perspective on radiation and its effect on human body.

7. Proximity to Nuclear Event

The interviewee felt very strongly about the effects of the Fukushima accident on the public. The interviewee's sister and nephew had friends in Tokyo, so he personally knew people close to the accident location. He said that he was extremely worried about the people in Japan.

8. Social Trust

The interviewee stressed the necessity of a particular level of technological expertise for running a nuclear facility. He trusted experts and professionals, but was unsure about trusting government agencies. He thought that there was a lack of transparency on the part of the concerned agencies in

Japan after the Fukushima accident.

9. View of Opposition Groups

With regards to opposition groups, the interviewee said that he listened to the views expressed by the groups. In case of extreme groups, he made an effort to check the facts before forming an opinion.

He wished to separate fact from fiction, since he realized that not everything the opposition groups said might be of real concern.

10. Perception of Nuclear Accidents as Primarily "Man-made"

The interviewee believed there was a human factor involved in some of the nuclear accidents. He acknowledged that Fukushima was caused due to an earthquake and tsunami, but is not sure whether

122 the authorities in Japan did a good job of managing it. He does not know if it was handled safely.

He also stated that now that we are aware of the design faults, we can improve them, but we cannot control everything.

11. Sense of Control and Empowerment

The interviewee believed that as a citizen, he had a voice in the government. He felt that if he had a concern, it would be addressed. He said that he had avenues for voicing his concerns, even if there was no guarantee of the concerns being addressed. He also emphasized that groups have more control than an individual. Hence, being a part of a group can increase an individual's sense of empowerment.

12. Knowledge and Information

The interviewee mentioned several times throughout the interview that knowledge is the key factor that would help address all his concerns. He had several unanswered questions and believed that if information was provided, he would be able to make a better judgment. He said that his fear of radiation is probably irrational, but there is always the possibility that "something could happen".

Having information was the most effective way of curbing this irrational fear.

123 D.2 Interview No. 2

D.2.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects

The interviewee stated that he had a favourable attitude towards technology in general, but was concerned about the misuse of technology. He was worried about technologies that pollute the environment, giving the examples of oil spills and chemical spills. An important point of concern was the fact that some project implementers do not provide accurate information to the public, or even withhold information. It was the combination of environmental pollution, lack of transparency by project implementers, and low level of awareness among the public, that caused him concern.

The interviewee recognized some benefits of technology, like increase in efficiency of industrial processes, reduction in manual labour, better communication and faster travel.

D.2.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes

1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology

With regards to nuclear technology, the interviewee stated that he did not know too much about it.

He had heard people say that it is safe if nothing went wrong, but the consequences of an accident were very severe. He characterized nuclear technology as clean, efficient and economical.

2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

He thought nuclear power as a response to climate change was a great idea. He stated that he was not very knowledgable about nuclear technology, but saw the benefits of reduced pollution and higher efficiency. He was not worried about nuclear waste, since he believed that every technology has some problems which need to be resolved.

3. Opinion of Medical Radiation

He did not have information about the differences between radiation from nuclear facilities and radiation from medical and other applications. But he believed that government standards were acceptable, and he trusted the US regulatory authorities with regards to acceptable levels of exposure.

4. Trust

124 The interviewee stated that project implementers usually had their personal profit motives. But the public had no option but to trust that the companies were doing the right thing, and take the information provided at face value. There were often different viewpoints related to a particular problem. He said that this made it difficult for an individual to understand the real risks related to a project. The interview did not trust government sources, and thought it was very difficult to get accurate information through government channels. He thought that there was never enough analysis that can be done, and one could never be 100% sure of a particular outcome.

5. Influence of Extreme Nuclear Events

The interviewee said that TMI had not made him anti nuclear, but if an accident occurred that was closer to him, him reactions might be different. He also stated that he had more confidence in projects regulated by the US and trusted US authorities more than those of less developed countries.

He found Fukushima really scary, because he felt that the radiation contamination would reach the west coast of America. He was concerned about the people it affected. But he categorized the disaster with natural disasters like hurricane Katrina, tsunamis, etc.

6. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association

The interviewee first learned about radiation as a child in school during the Cold War. He remembered the radiation signs in school, and the fallout shelters in the 1960's. The bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II also scared him. However, he had a different opinion of nuclear power plants vs nuclear warheads. He said he would rather have nuclear power plants than hydraulic fracturing. He wished to learn more about both technologies, but said that nuclear was much better in his opinion. He believed that his education and family background influenced his positive views of technology.

7. Sources of Information

Some of the interviewee's sources of information are television news channels and newspapers. He read some articles that provide in depth analysis of a situation. He also listed information he got from him friends as a source of information. He believed that news was biased, and the media could provide a dramatically different picture depending on the country or the audience. He read and listened to a lot of information, but as a non-scientist, he said he did not have all the answers. In

125 order to form an opinion, he looked at a number of different sources of information. He believed that the internet could provide information in an uncensored manner, and can reach a broad number of people. But it also had the drawback of uncertainty in quality of information due to lack of verification. He did not know about the MIT reactor, and being told that there was a reactor in

Cambridge made him nervous.

8. View of Opposition Groups

The interviewee believed that having opposition groups was extremely positive. He said that controversy encourages better evaluation of a situation, and can provide more confidence in good management. He believes that more questions asked result in higher accountability. Thus, existence of opposition makes him more willing to accept the facility in question.

126 D.3 Interview No. 3

D.3.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects

The interviewee considered any projects that damage the environment or human health as hazardous.

The irreversibility of the damage was a point he stressed upon. Some examples he gave were biohazard facilities, nuclear power, and river dams.

When asked about any benefits from such projects, he stated that politicians and project implementers argue about benefits to try and convince people. But their arguments were not well balanced and they tended to manipulate statistics. He said this made him skeptical of the projects from the point of view of safety of the community.

He believed that in order for a project to be successful, multiple types of stakeholders should be invited to voice their opinions, and their opinions must be taken into consideration. The decision making process must be fair and unbiased. Safety issues must be addressed competently.

D.3.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes

1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology

The interviewee characterized nuclear technology as a tool for weapons and destruction. He stated that uncontrolled radiation, even from nuclear power was extremely dangerous and could wreak havoc.

2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee said that the long term costs of nuclear technology, especially nuclear waste, were very high. The fact that we could not get rid of nuclear material was very dangerous. He was very skeptical about the cost benefit tradeoff. He said that nuclear technology was scientifically interesting, but its benefits were debatable. He mentioned that on considering the potential hazards of nuclear waste, he did not know if the technology was worth it. He was also concerned about nuclear material in the hands of unstable nations. He saw nuclear weapons proliferation as a major problem in an unstable world.

127 The interviewee did not think that nuclear power could be a potential solution for global climate change. He reiterated that some countries with unstable regimes should not be allowed access to nuclear material. Even in the case of stable countries, he said that time and money should be put into finding other renewable sources of energy.

He did not believe that nuclear energy was safe. He was not familiar with the level of hazard from other applications of nuclear technology like medicine.

3. Trust

The interviewee's trust in the nuclear enterprise was very low. He believed that the nuclear enterprise, like every other enterprise, wanted to make money, and sacrificed safety for profits. Even if it was a government run project, he said it wouldn't change his bottom line conviction. He said that government agencies did not always protect public interests. What is stated as law isn't always enforced. As an example, he said that EPA air and water safety standards were not always enforced.

He was concerned about problems like corruption in the enterprise. The interviewee said that he was more likely to trust information that received collective acknowledgement from multiple parties. He trusted organizations that he was aware of and had observed for a long time. He was wary of trusting government sources. He listened to opposition groups, but did not take all of their information for granted. His mother was active in the "women for nuclear disarmament " group, and he mentioned it as one of the groups he trusted, since it was a well established organization.

4. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association

The interviewee first learned about the threat of radiation as a 5 year old during the Cold War.

He recalled vivid childhood experiences like the duck and cover drills in school when he was in the 1st and 2nd grade. He thinks that our understanding of nuclear technology has increased now, but he found it terrifying how misinformed public figures were in the past. He said that his early childhood experiences greatly affected his views of nuclear technology. His mother was an activist for disarmament and a friend of leading anti-nuclear activists, which also influenced his views.

5. Extreme Nuclear Events

He said that he found nuclear accidents like TMI, Fukushima and Chernobyl terrifying. He believed that the public never really knows what happens. He was also worried about human error causing

128 severe accidents leading to contamination of the environment.

6. Socially Catastrophic Potential

He firmly believed that there was political instability in several nations, and dysfunctional govern- ments could not be relied on to deal with nuclear material, and could potentially lead to nuclear disasters. He did not read any science fiction related to nuclear technology, but watched some docu- mentaries that influenced his views. He was afraid of a nuclear disaster leading to a "nuclear winter" scenario.

7. Influence of Media

He said he would consider academic experts as sources of information, but not trust a single individual as he could be unreliable. He generally found the media credible, specifically newspapers and radio. The interviewee saw a study on the effects of radiation in Japan after the WWII bombings.

He found the images very graphic and something he cannot forget.

8. Uncertainty and Lack of Control

He found radiation more dangerous than other toxic wastes, because he believed that other wastes can be contained, whereas radiation is long term phenomenon and cannot be contained. He was more concerned about radiation than biohazards or hydraulic fracturing. He said that one of the reasons could be a longer history of being made afraid of radiation, mentioning the duck and cover drills during the cold war. He also said that the community could adequately handle a biohazard, but nuclear weapons are more difficult to control.

129 D.4 Interview No. 4

D.4.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects

The interviewee considered projects like hydraulic fracturing, nuclear power plants and wind tur- bines hazardous. He stated that two of the criteria that resulted in his classification of a project as hazardous were his proximity to the project and presence of conflicting data. The interviewee had more clearly formed thoughts about hydraulic fracturing than nuclear technology, and considered some of the hazards to be water contamination, disturbances of the earth's crust, and the long term effects of continued use of carbon based fuels in terms on climate change. The interviewee recognized some benefits of hydraulic fracturing, including reliability as a source of energy and reduction in dependence on foreign energy. He also said that it was cleaner than burning coal and diesel oil and could serve as a bridge to solar and wind energy. He also said there could be economic benefits if gas was produced locally.

However, his overall attitude towards the technology, after weighing the costs and benefits, was negative. He recognized that there was always some tradeoff between costs and benefits but for him to accept a project, the benefits had to clearly outweigh the costs. He also said that projects would need to be at worst neutral to environmental concerns of global warming. In order to combat global warming, he suggested nuclear energy, wind and solar power as possible solutions.

D.4.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes

1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology

The interviewee characterized nuclear technology as controversial, but having a continuing sense of promise. He said that the consequences of things going wrong or accidents occurring were very severe. He perceived it as a high risk technology, especially after the Fukushima accident, but considered it a learning experience, which influenced the design of future facilities. Not knowing the long term consequences was a point of concern, and he was uncertain about ways of controlling and storing nuclear material.

But his basic premise was that technology had come far enough in the nuclear field, and he was willing to live with humanity moving forward, as long as no undue risks were taken. He did not

130 have much anxiety about nuclear technology. -He was aware of the presence of the MIT reactor in

Cambridge, but said that it did not create much concern.

2. Risk-Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee said that nuclear energy was clean, resulted in no emissions, and was a good alter- native for fossil fuels. His major concerns were the unsolved problem of nuclear waste and radiation contamination due to accidents. He said that when everything was functioning correctly, fissionable material did not make him anxious. In terms of medical applications of nuclear technology, he believed that the regulatory environment and medical professions were sufficiently tuned to storage and disposal of medical waste safely.

3. Trust

In general the interviewee said he trusted the nuclear enterprise. However he had lost confidence in federal oversight groups around mining, due to a history of accidents. He was anxious about the rigour of their oversight, which applied to nuclear as well. But he was not specifically concerned about nuclear energy. He said that since TMI, there had been no major nuclear catastrophe in the

US. He said that nuclear energy had been well managed and regulated. He had not heard about any radiation release, and he wasn't very suspicious of nuclear regulatory bodies.

4. View of Opposition Groups

The interviewee believed that opposition groups were driven by fear. The had a tendency for over- arching generalization, and did not look at data very well. They made a lot of noise but did not provide alternatives. He said that they had the ability to stop good debate.

He looked at information provided by these groups skeptically. He listened for valid concerns and gauged whether he viewed them as legitimate and accurate. In terms of reaction to anti-fracking groups, he said he wished he had more information, but had no cause to disbelieve them. However he always tried to figure out whether information was accurate. He noted that empirical data on hydraulic fracturing was more prevalent than nuclear.

5. Sources of Information and Media Credibility

His main sources of information were newspapers like the Boston Globe and New Yorker, and

Television news. He did not use the internet as a source of information. He said that the media

131 served the public reasonably well, but were not perfectly credible.

When he came across conflicting information, he considered the sources where it was coming from to judge credibility. However, it resulted in less certainty about his original point of view. He said that if a source was clear about its point of view, he considered it more credible, since he could take that into account. He said that if a bias was revealed or made explicit, he could interpret it through that lens, which made him more comfortable with the information.

6. Knowledge of Radiation and Historical Context

The interviewee first learned about radiation through comic books. But he learned about the negative consequences of radiation when he was introduced to foot X-rays at shoe stores and use of lead jackets during medical X-ray procedures. However, the most graphic images he grew up with were post war images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was not sure when he became aware of nuclear energy as a power source. But he said that World War II showed him that nuclear was a very powerful source that could cause large scale destruction and lead to radiation poisoning.

7. Weapons Association

The interviewee felt an association between nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. He said that the association would always exists because of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He said that the link was not necessarily based on logic, but was present at an emotional level. He said that it was exacerbated by the concerns of nuclear waste and the threat of use of dirty bombs by non state actors.

8. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology

The interviewee believed that having more information about the safe use of nuclear energy would help in alleviating concerns. He felt that most negative reactions were due to the fact that people knew very little about it.

9. View of Non-Nuclear Hazardous Materials

The interview said that anxiety about long term consequences did not show up in dialogue of chemical waste. He recognized that there could be a false assumption that it got neutralized, and could be viewed as less harmful or less potent. He stated that the higher concern regarding nuclear waste was not based on logic. He had the perception that nuclear wastes had extremely long half lives,

132 and could last forever, whereas he did not hear people talking about the half life of chemical waste.

He also mentioned that biohazards did not evoke same level of concern as radiation related hazards.

133 D.5 Interview No. 5

D.5.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects

When asked about projects he considered hazardous, the interviewee said that nuclear projects were at the top of the list. He was also concerned about transporting hazardous materials, and the threat of terrorism, but stated that nuclear projects caused him most concern.

When asked about non-nuclear hazards, the interviewee said that the effects of other hazards were not as long lived. He felt that there was an element of human control over other hazards, and something could be done, but nuclear accidents were catastrophic and uncontrollable. He had a more negative attitude towards genetic effects of radiation than genetically modified organisms. He also said that nuclear waste was harder to contain than other pollutants. He was also concerned about global warming, but not as much as the effects of nuclear technology. With respect to biohazards, the interviewee said that they did not cause the same anxiety as radiation. He did not imagine a large scale destruction scenario causing a massive number of deaths due to a bio hazard. He felt that health effects due to biohazards could be cured, unlike radiation.

D.5.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes

1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology

The interview was of the opinion that nuclear technology was a two-pronged thing. He thought it was clean and efficient, but was worried about nuclear accidents. He did not support nuclear energy as a solution for global climate change, since He felt that the effects of climate change would not harm him in his lifetime, but a nuclear meltdown could happen at any point in time. His views towards a new nuclear facility in his surroundings would be very negative . He would be uncomfortable with a nuclear facility even if it was producing medical isotopes. He felt that due to the extreme dangers of radiation, such facilities should be in areas with low population densities.

2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The main costs that the interviewee listed related to nuclear technology were the danger of radiation leakage or contamination. He was also concerned about nuclear accidents, costs associated with

134 nuclear security, and the costs of long term storage of nuclear waste. Transportation of nuclear materials was also recognized as a serious problem. The interviewee was of the opinion that when working properly, nuclear energy was not as polluting as fossil fuels. He recognized that it was cleaner, but also more risky. This caused him to be very cautious about it. He said that nuclear had killed lesser people than other industrial processes, but the danger was greater and there was no recovery from a nuclear disaster.

3. Medical Applications of Radiation

The interviewee said that medical applications of radiation had a higher benefit than cost, and he thought they were a good thing if needed. He said that the same issues of waste disposal existed, but the benefit justified the cost.

4. Trust

The interviewee was highly concerned about the management of the nuclear enterprise, and felt distrustful of enterprise in general. He said there was a lack of transparency in the enterprise.He believed there was low competency in industrial practices, and the aftermath of the Fukushima accident was not managed adequately. He was not very concerned before Fukushima, but the accident and its response caused him great concern. He stated that this was because of the fact that information about the accident was continuously changing, which led him to believe that the responsible authorities were not telling the truth.

5. Sources of Information

The interviewee's main sources of information were the radio, television and newspapers like the

Boston Globe. He felt that these sources were credible, and helped raise questions about the technology. He believed in information that had been verified by various sources.

6. View of Opposition Groups

The interviewee understood the rationale behind opposition groups but felt that they did not have a solution to the problems they brought up. He did not find them credible. He found people in academia more credible than both people within the enterprise, and anti nuclear activists. The interviewee had a friend who was adamantly against nuclear technology. He found the friend to be an extremist, but couldn't dismiss everything he said.

135 7. Knowledge of Radiation and Nuclear Context

The interviewee was not very familiar with nuclear science and technology. He remembered being told that nuclear power would be too cheap to meter. The interviewee first learned about radiation in grade school, in the context of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He did not have duck and cover drills at his school, but could not think of nuclear power without thinking of bombs. He said that nuclear power was hardly ever presented alone, but always in terms of bombings. He said that radiation created the same anxiety, whether it was coming from a power plant or weapons. The interviewee recalled Homer Simpson when asked about books or movies related to radiation. He also read John Hersey's novel, "Hiroshima".

8. Socially Catastrophic Potential

The interviewee believed that nuclear power hadn't worked out as well as people hoped. The consequences of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were huge in his opinion. He had seen photographs of people affected by the accidents, which alerted him about the dangers of radiation.

9. Sense of Control and Knowledge Confidence

The interviewee felt no sense of control regarding nuclear matters. He mentioned that he had no ability to make judgements regarding safety. He thought that if a case was made that was under- standable enough, it would be helpful and influence his decisions. He also said that information about safety levels might alleviate some of his concerns. He also said that if radiation was treatable, he would probably be less concerned.

D.6 Interview No. 6

D.6.1 Summary of Responses related to Attitudes towards Hazardous Projects

The interviewee considered any projects that had human involvement as the most hazardous projects.

An example that he gave were modification of food, like irradiation, GMO, etc. He listed hydraulic fracturing, large infrastructure projects and deep see oil drilling as hazardous to people and the environment. He said that energy related projects were the most harmful for the environment. Every energy source had a downside, and some were more dangerous than others. The interviewee said

136 that he would be more accepting of a project or technology if it resulted in less damage to humans and the environment.

Climate change was a concern that he expressed, and said that he would favour projects with low carbon emissions. He considered solar energy a possible solution for global climate change, stating that it had no negative consequences. He said that reduction in use of oil and gas could reduce emissions, and hydropower could be used. He did not see any potential hazards from hydroelectricity

He said that nuclear power concerned him most. He was unsure of whether nuclear energy was a possible solution for global climate change, and was worried about meltdowns. The interviewee said that technology had some benefits, if it was correctly managed, but felt that he couldn't trust private companies to adhere to laws. He said that affordable energy made life more convenient. He said that projects that reduced dependence on oil and foreign energy had benefits, but also had costs associated with them.

The interviewee said that he would not want to live next door to a nuclear power plant or near land being fracked. He said that he would protest against any such projects in his surroundings. He said that if he didn't have a choice, he would want transparency and oversight, and would want to educate herself about what was going on so that he could prepare himself if things went wrong.

D.6.2 Summary of Responses related to Radiation Attitudes

1. Characterization of Nuclear Technology

The interviewee characterized nuclear energy as a clean source of energy, but was very concerned about the threat of a meltdown. He said that he could not think of nuclear technology without thinking of meltdowns. He said his initial reaction towards nuclear technology was that of fear, but acknowledged that it might not be based on facts.

2. Risk Benefit Tradeoff

The interviewee was very anxious about nuclear meltdowns. He was afraid of dispersal of radioactive material in the event of a meltdown. He was also concerned about nuclear wastes and the problem of their storage and disposal. The extremely long half lives of radioactive materials worried him, and he was anxious about the risks of cancer, especially to future generations. He said that

137 he was more afraid of prolonged suffering that death. The mental suffering that could be caused due to trauma from a nuclear accident also concerned him. Nuclear weapons proliferation was another problem that he was anxious about.

The interviewee said that he would accept a project if he believed that it was safe and was going to make the US less dependent on oil overall. Reduction in damage to the environment was also a potential benefit.

3. Views of Medical Radiation

The interviewee tried to use medical procedures involving radiation as little as possible. He only accepted them when his doctors told him that it was absolutely necessary. He trusted the doctor's opinion, and believed that he did not receive significant exposure to radiation from the procedures, since they were very infrequent.

4. Trust in Nuclear Enterprise

Trust was a very important element for project acceptance for the interviewee. The interviewee did not trust people or organizations, since he believed that most people were not moral or ethical. He did not trust organizations to do their job responsibly. But he felt that human error was a more important problem than unethical behavior. He also felt that industries withheld information about the dangers of the technology from the people. He felt that transparency and oversight were important for the nuclear enterprise to generate trust. He also believed that the nuclear enterprise had an obligation to educate people honestly about the mechanisms involved in the implementation of a technology, and the potential risks.

5. Trust in Government Agencies

The interviewee felt that government agencies should be involved in oversight, but his trustworthi- ness was the same for government and private firms. The interviewee believed that there was not sufficient transparency in industrial practices.

6. View of Opposition Groups

The interviewee respected opposition groups since they were willing to fight for what they believed.

He sometimes wished to join them, and believed that a protest against nuclear technology would be positive.

138 7. Familiarity with Nuclear Science and Technology

The interviewee's familiarity with nuclear science and technology was extremely low.

8. Sources of Information

The interviewee said that he did not encounter stories about nuclear technology in the media very often. His main source of information was newspapers. He treated information from opposition groups like information from any other source. He preferred to make up his own mind regarding a controversy, but felt that government agencies and academic experts were slightly more credible than opposition groups.

9. Media Favourability and Credibility

The interviewee felt that the media image of nuclear technology was mostly negative. He said that he only heard about nuclear disasters, or about the threat of weapons proliferation. He said that the media focused on problems and disasters rather than other aspects of nuclear power plants because that was what the public wanted to hear. He said that he was careful about what he read in the media, because he was not entirely sure if the media were credible.

10. Nuclear Context and Weapons Association

The interviewee said that the fear of nuclear technology was bred into his psyche from the time he was a child. He said that he was born around the time nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and he heard several stories of terror. He said that the early trauma significantly affected his views of radiation. He said that it "scared him to death", which is why he would not be able to forget it. He said that as a kid, he remembered hearing that Russia could launch a nuclear attack on the US. His family was encouraged to build bomb shelters. He strongly associated nuclear technology with nuclear weapons, and felt that there could not be nuclear bombs without nuclear power plants.

11. Probability of the Threat being Viewed as "Man-Made"

The interviewee considered human error an important factor affecting safety of nuclear technology.

He said that this belief was due to the nuclear accidents that occurred in the past.

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