GENERATION Is nuclear power history? The dream evaporates...

by CM Meyer, technical journalist

This is the 15th in a series of articles being published in Energize tracing the history of nuclear power throughout the world.

“It was truly a case of life imitating art. has since been explained, much of the anti- those arguing that pressurised water reactors

Last month, amid a burst of publicity, nuclear feeling in the USA can be ascribed to (the competing V VER design) were more Columbia Pictures released, in the United something not easily explained; an incredible dangerous, and strengthened the Soviet States its film "The China Syndrome. coincidence that a fictional movie about a commitment to continuing and modernizing The fictional tale deals with the near melt- nuclear accident was released just before a the RBMK [3; 239]. real nuclear accident happened. down of a nuclear reactor. Then last week it The Three Mile Island incident was basically almost happened in real life.”[10; 20] Three Mile Island; what happened? caused by a faulty valve. At about 04h00 on In actual fact, the Three Mile Island accident 28 March 1979, the main feedwater pumps of “In the two decades since Three Mile island, of 28 March 1979 was a real meltdown, the non-nuclear section of the plant stopped the plant has become a rallying symbol resulting in more than half of the reactor’s running, because of either a mechanical or for the anti-nuclear movement. But the core being permanently damaged. But electrical failure. This prevented the steam nuclear power industry, which has not built many people living near the damaged generators from removing heat. First the a single new plant in the United States since turbine, then the reactor automatically reactor in Pennsylvania were preoccupied 1979, says the incident shows that its safety shut down. Immediately, pressure in the with something much worse, an enormous systems worked, even in the most extreme primary system, that is, the nuclear part of cloud of radioactive fallout the size of circumstances” [13; 1]. the plant, started to increase, and a relief Pennsylvania that would soon be permanently valve opened to allow pressure to reach a uninhabitable [14; 3] [15; 1]. On 30 March When compared with Chernobyl, where lower level. So far, there wasn’t a problem, 1979, nearly 200 000 people fled their nearly 20-million curies of radioactive and all equipment functioned as originally homes, some for several weeks [12; 1]. materials and several million curies of inert designed until the relief valve failed to close, radioactive gases were released [3; 45], What happened and why? On 19 March, and signals available to the operator failed the actual radioactivity release by the Three 1979, the film “The China Syndrome” was to show that the valve was still open. The rest Mile Island (TMI) accident was miniscule. released for the movie-going public by is basically history. More and more coolant Approximately 43 000 curies of radioactive Columbia Pictures. The film dealt with a water continued to drain from the reactor, krypton was vented from the reactor more fictional near melt-down in a nuclear reactor. slowly exposing the core and leading to a than a year later in preparation for cleanup The title came from the idea that, “if an meltdown in which about one half of the crews to enter the reactor building [11; 4] American nuclear plant melts down, it will core melted. [12; 1]. This came after a significant release melt through the Earth until it reaches China” of radiation from the plant’s auxiliary building, Because of badly planned instrumentation, [14; 1]. Although intended as a joke, some performed to relieve pressure on the primary a crucial error was missed as no instrument viewers might well have believed this really system and avoid curtailing the flow of showed the level of coolant in the core, and would happen. But then came the actual coolant to the core on 30 March 1979. In the inadequately trained operators failed Three Mile Island accident. Nine days and simpler language, steam from the leaking to realise that the plant was experiencing more after the release of the movie, tens pilot-operated relief valve over-pressurised a a loss-of-cooling accident. The operators of millions of Americans could turn off the tank in the auxiliary building, and a bursting misunderstood what was happening, and evening news, walk down the street to the disc released it automatically into the turned off the emergency core cooling movie theatre and see a film version of what building. system. But, even though the plant suffered they had been watching on television all a severe core meltdown - the most week. [15; 1] And, not surprisingly, many got This release of radiation resulted in an average dangerous kind of nuclear power accident, confused between the conflicting accounts dose to about 2-million people in the area of the containment vessel held and virtually no of what they were seeing in the news with about 1 millirem, less than that for a full set of radioactivity was released. Unlike Chernobyl, the fictional explanations of the film. Small chest x-rays (about 6 millirem). The maximum there was no actual explosion, by steam wonder then that, when the Governor Dick dose to someone at the site boundary would or otherwise. A major concern in a core- Thornborough advised an estimated 3 500 have been less than what one would have meltdown scenario is that the core will melt pregnant women and children living within received from natural background radiation through the pressure vessel and start to attack five miles of the plant to evacuate the area, in the area during a year, about 100 to the concrete container. This did not begin to many more people responded with alacrity. 125 millirem per year [11; 2 – 3]. Ironically, happen. Two results of the accident were that Not surprisingly, the enthusiasm the American there was a link to Chernobyl. Soviet nuclear Generation II reactors (the type then in use) public had for nuclear power dropped energy planners studied the incident, but and practices were modified to make them considerably after the Three Mile Island sincerely believed that the RBMK design was much safer, while Generation III reactors accident. While what actually happened actually safer. The TMI incident actually served (e.g. the EPR and AP 1000, contenders for

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Eskom’s nuclear programme) must be able and with it went Harwell’s livelihood. The USA Hinton’s words, written in 1958 during the to accommodate core meltdown. took much the same decision when it shut heyday of nuclear power now have an ironic down the integral fast reactor program in ring to them: “British supplies of coal are While a large hydrogen bubble was found 1994, at a time when the price of oil was little running short. All of our oil is imported. From in the core, the absence of oxygen in the more than $10 per barrel. Like the American the outset we realized that we would need pressure vessel meant that it could not decision, the British decision has proved nuclear power and need it soon.” [6; 35]. explode. Plant operators later managed to to be equally short-sighted. After 1992, greatly reduce the bubble’s size [11; 1-2]. Chernobyl: the hidden conflict the British North Sea oilfield had practically But, unlike the hydrogen bubble, public fear been exhausted. Once again, a means of “If it had not been for the atomic bomb, exploded. While steps were taken to correct using nuclear reactors as a source of electric sustainably using energy was obliterated by the instrumentation and improve training of energy would probably still be in the research the short-term lure of fossil fuels. The ironic operators, all further nuclear plants in the US stage. The technology is far too expensive difference is that this time it was not solar were put on hold. Exhaustive public hearings, for civilian use alone” [3; 226] power or wind power that was affected, but delays, and consequent huge increases in the best and most promising means of using If you mention the word “Chernobyl”, many will costs were now associated with all plans nuclear power economically. automatically associate it with the ill-starred for nuclear power plants, and after the Chernobyl disaster, any positive sentiments for nuclear power seemed to have disappeared forever.

In the United Kingdom, Chernobyl came after an even bigger blow to nuclear power; the discovery of oil in the nearby North Sea.

Harwell versus North Sea Oil

“In that same year (1969) oil and gas deposits were discovered off the Norwegian coast and in 1975 in UK waters. By 1981, the UK had become a net exporter of oil and with energy costs falling to an all time low, the nuclear power dream evaporated.” [2; 116]

When Calder Hall, the first British nuclear power station opened on 17 October 1956, [6;29], nuclear power was seen as the solution to the United Kingdom’s energy problems. In 1956, the UK government White Paper planned for twelve nuclear power stations, totalling 2000 MW, to produce electricity at a price cheaper than burning oil [2; 107]. After the Suez crisis of late 1956 this target was revised to 6 000 MW (halved two years later) and the golden age of nuclear power had seemingly arrived [2; 108]. In the 1980s the British government began to cut back on funding for nuclear research. For the first time ever, some researchers at Harwell, the world-renowned atomic energy research establishment that had virtually developed British nuclear power technology from scratch, faced the grim prospect of redundancy. By the early 1990s, Harwell, was facing oblivion. And during 1994 the 250 MW Fast Reactor at Dounreay ceased to operate, and with it virtually all British research. [2; 259 – 261].

What went wrong? Essentially, this can be reduced to one word, oil. The discovery of oil and gas reserves in the North Sea, in 1975, to be more precise. In 1988, Margaret Thatcher’s government decided that it no longer needed the commercial demonstration fast reactor power station, and cut the fast reactor programme by one third,

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RBMK reactor. But, suprisingly, the decision at least during the commissioning period from A fateful decision to install a RBMK reactor in the Chernobyl 20 December 1983 to March 1984 [3;13]. "With its four RBMK-1000 reactors, it (Chernobyl) power station was anything but automatic. To meet a production target the decision was the largest nuclear plant in the USSR. Two Bad planning gave the RBMK-1000 reactor was quietly made to perform the tests later additional reactors were under construction the edge over the competing design, the and the power plant, intended to be the and they would have made it the largest V VER1000, a pressurised water reactor with largest in Russia and eventually in the world, (nuclear power) plant in the world.” [3; 239] a containment dome (see “A “dam” bad was signed off as officially completed. As choice: the RBMK design becomes the In 1972, an important meeting took place Zhores Medvedev stated, if the manager in the office of the Minister of Energy for basis” in Part 13. “The awesome power of Bryukhanov had not signed off the new the Ukraine, Aleksei Makukhin. Also present water”). But nothing has been said of the plant on 31 December 1983, thousands of were Grigory Medvedev a nuclear power surprisingly strong opposition to building a workers, engineers and his own superiors in station inspector who later published the RBMK reactor at Chernobyl, and how and the ministries and committees would have book “Chernobyl Notebook”, and Bryukhanov why the actual decision was arrived at. What lost bonuses, awards and other extras which, (then the new director of Chernobyl, and to follows gives some idea of how Russia, too, in an era of small, non-increasing salaries, whom much of the blame for the accident became disenchanted with over-optimistic were then an increasingly important part of was assigned) [3; 238]. But ironically enough, attitudes to nuclear power. Especially the average industrial income [ 3; 14]. both Bryukhanov and Medvedev were then when those attitudes were based on flawed both in favour of the VVER system and both assumptions. Strangely enough, there are some parallels maintained that it was safer. Even Makukhin, between Aleksandrov and Rickover. Both were What follows is based on the very interesting who played an important part in the decision, forced into retirement in their 80s: Rickover summary given by Zhores Medvedev in his was concerned at the amount of radioactivity when 82, and Aleksandrov when 83. Both that the plant would emit. This was 4 000 Ci a book “The legacy of Chernobyl”. had a huge influence on nuclear power plant day, largely because of radioactivity in water The long shadow of Academician Anatoly construction, Rickover advocating the PWR, used to cool the reactor, because of a very Aleksandrov and Aleksandrov the RBMK. Aleksandrov had controversial simplification to reduce the cost the hugely influential position of Chairman of electricity the plant would produce. “The main scientist behind the original design of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, while of the RBMK reactors in the early 1950s and The flawed decision to use the RBMK plant Rickover had a powerful position both in the the main proponent of locating nuclear at Chernobyl was largely based on the US Navy and, politically in the US House of power plants near large cities, Academician opinion of Academician Aleksandrov, who Representatives, Congress. And, technically Anatoly Aleksandrov, was by then [in June claimed that the RBMK-1000 was the safest at least, both were born Russian, as Rickover 1986] 83 years old and he retired from his and most economical reactor [3; 236 – had been born within the borders of the old position of President of the USSR Academy 238]. Aleksandrov backed the RBMK design. Tsarist Russian empire. of Sciences.” [3; 72]. An important factor was that the RBMK

There is saying that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. One could paraphrase this by saying the road to Chernobyl was paved by a tragically sincere belief in RBMK reactor. Not only was it considered safer than the pressurised water reactor VVER then being considered as an alternative for Soviet nuclear power plants, but various design features made it more cost-effective. The one person largely responsible for promoting the RBMK reactor and who recommended it for Chernobyl, sincerely believed it was not only the safest but also the best option then available. Academician Anatoly sincerely and tragically believed what they were doing was right [3; 235]. And once the programme gained momentum, direct criticism of it and Aleksandrov became taboo [3; 256].

There are even strong indications, well explained by Medvedev in his book, that the Chernobyl accident really started when the power plant was physically launched on 20 December 1983 [3; 12]. The problem was that some key tests of the reactor, including the infamous safety test that caused the accident, should have been performed before the reactor was formally opened, or A helicopter moves in to help experts check the damage to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. Photo: Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

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design was cheaper, and within the limited A new realism [4] “Too cheap to meter?”. 26 July 2006.(http:// manufacturing capability of Soviet industry. www.cns-snc.ca/media/toocheap.html) [5] “I believe, then, that when the deposits of For one thing, the absence of a massive steel Clayton JC, “The Shippingport Pressurized coal are exhausted we shall heat and warm pressure vessel for the reactor core and (not water Reactor and Light Water Breeder ourselves with water. Water will be the coal Reactor”, American Chemical Society, Oct having) a containment structure contributed of the future” Jules Verne, "The Mysterious 1993. , pp1-7 (www.osti.gov/energycitations/ greatly to the cost-effectiveness. While Island", 1874 [22; 70] servlets/purl/10191380_pwwUeT/native/). these design features are now known to be [6] Hinton, Sir Christopher. 1958. “Atomic power highly dangerous, they were then presented Today, attitudes towards nuclear power are in Britain”. Scientific American. Vol 198 No 3, as the main advantages of the [RBMK] changing and there is even talk of a nuclear 29-35. model [3; 236]. Another very controversial renaissance. But this is very different to the [7] Hogerton JF, 1968. “The arrival of nuclear simplification was to eliminate closed cooling shattered nuclear dreams of the United States, power”. Scientific American. Vol 218 No 2, tower circuits for the RBMK systems, as this the United Kingdom and the former USSR. It 21-31. would have raised costs and made the is not based on unrealistic expectations [8] “Nuclear reaction: Why do Americans fear design less competitive with the V VER-1000 and assumptions, but on cold, hard facts nuclear power? Interviews: Dr Charles Till”. models [3; 236 – 237]. Bryukhanov soon and unpleasant realities. Perhaps it is time (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ came to regret the choice. Thirteen years to look at nuclear power in a different way. shows/reaction/interviews/till.html) . later, when he met the Grigory Medvedev Perhaps we should stop trying to ascertain [9] Golden GH, Planchon JI, Sackett JI and Singer, [the nuclear inspector] in 1985, he had a long why one form of energy generation is better RM “Evolution of thermal-hydraulics testing list of complaints, including there being many than another. Instead, perhaps the time has in EBR-II”. Nuclear Engineering and Design. leaks, fittings not holding, and huge amount come to realise that all forms of energy have 101(1987), 3 - 12. of radioactive water from the reactor that had their lace in a well-balanced energy mix and [10] “US reactor accident melts nuclear credibility”. to be processed, producing a great deal of that for a country to rely too much on any New Scientist. 5 April 1979, reprinted in 50th Anniversary Special, Vol 192 No 2578, 20. radioactive dirt [3; 238]. one form of energy is dangerous, because, 10a. Dump it in the mantle”. New Scientist. sooner or later, something unplanned will Chernobyl - the aftermath Vol 186 No 2501, p 81. come along that threatens the security of “The weather forecasters promised heavy [11] United States Nuclear Regulatory that energy. rain, and to prevent the activity being Commission. Fact Sheet. “Three Mile Island washed into the soil, people were being A country that relies too much on hydropower Accident” (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf) sent instead of robots, because there were will have problems when rainfall is less than [Accessed November, 2007]. no robots. Later, when he heard about this, usual. Coal-fired power stations seemed Academician Aleksandrov was upset." At fine: until global warming came along, and [12] “Three Mile Island: a chronology”. Washington Post, 28 March, 1989. (see next internet Chernobyl they don’t care about people. it was discovered that the quality of the coal reference) This will all be blamed on me” [he said]. But used affects the power generated. Natural [13] Stencel M, “A nuclear nightmare in it’s true they didn’t care about people when gas is nice and efficient, until the supplier Pennsylvania”. Washington Post, 27 March, they promoted an RBMK reactor liable to state starts to fiddle with supplies and pushes 1999. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- explode for the Ukraine” [3; 168 – 9]. prices upwards. Solar and wind power is srv/national/longterm/tmi/tmi.htm) useful, until the sun stops shining or the wind As the extent of the Chernobyl disaster [14] Wikipedia.“The China Syndrome”. (http:// stops blowing, and another source of power unfolded, military planners on both sides of en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_China_Syndrome) is needed for those relying on it. And, while the Cold War slowly realised the chaos caused [15] “The China syndrome (idea)”. (http:// nuclear power stations do not lose 5% of their by destruction of a large nuclear power plant www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_ power each time it rains, they do undoubtedly id=1673985 and that no nation with a large nuclear power have disadvantages. programme could really afford a massive [16] Dodge DM, 2002.”Illustrated history of wind power development. Part 2 – 20th century conventional or nuclear war. Chernobyl soon Who knows what the future may bring? developments. (http://www.telosnet.com/ became a potent and practical argument Anything is possible. Maybe, just maybe the wind/20th.html) for ending the Cold War. Once the RBMK hydrogen age Jules Verne envisaged in 1874 [17] “Experimental Breeder Reactor programme was finally cancelled in 1988, it will end our energy problems sooner than - I”. Idaho National Laboratory became known that RBMK reactors had been many dare predict. But, until then, with a (www.inl.gov/factsheets/ebr-1.pdf) introduced into serial, mass production under well-planned energy mix that has a sound, [18] “Experimental Breeder Reactor II”. Wikipedia. pressure, despite strong opposition from balanced amount of all the different types of (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_ many experts in the relevant divisions of the energy appropriate to a particular country, Breeder_Reactor_II) Ministry of Power and despite opposition from hopefully energy consumers will not face a [19] “Integral Fast Reactor”. Wikipedia. (http:// within the Kurchatov Institute [3; 258]. Dr. Ivan dark future. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integral_Fast_Reactor) Zhezherun, a senior scientist at the Kurchatov [20] “An introduction to Argonne National References Institute, had been writing to various officials Laboratory’s Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) since 1965, pointing out the inherent defect [1] Butti K, and Perlin J, 1980. A golden thread. Program”. (http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/ of the RBMK [the positive steam coefficient] New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Limited. designs/ifr/anlw.html) and warning of the possibility of explosion. [2] Hance N, 2006. Harwell: the enigma [21] Hannum WD, Marsh GE and Stanford GS Over more than twenty years, he had revealed. Oxford: Enhance Publishing. “Smarter use of nuclear waste”. Scientific accumulated more than 1000 pages of [3] Medvedev ZA, 1990. The legacy of American. Vol 293 No 6, 64-71. correspondence but had been deliberately Chernobyl. New York: WW Norton and [22] Romm JJ, 2004. The hype about hydrogen. ignored [3; 258] Company. Washington: Island Press. v

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