The ANSO Report (16-30 November 2011)
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CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2011 Issue 86 REPORT 16‐30 November 2011 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-4 November concluded with a slight shift within Afghan territory, the fluid and ill- 5-8 Northern Region away from the precipitous drop in overall defined nature of the border also likely at- Western Region 9-10 AOG initiated attacks noted during the tributed to the incident. past 3 months. This dynamic can be pri- Transition came to fore again this period as Eastern Region 11-15 marily attributed to the impact of the early the areas slated for the second tranche engagement by AOG elements beginning Southern Region 16-19 were announced (see p. 17 for complete in March, and the ensuing high activity lev- ANSO Info Page 20 listing) with the actual handovers to occur els which continued unabated through to throughout the coming month. As with the dramatic peak recorded in July (see the first phase, it represents a mix of pro- graph p. 8). While the impact of seasonal vincial, district and city based areas and in HIGHLIGHTS weather patterns on AOG access and most cases consist of relatively permissive movement is well established, this has been and lightly or uncontested areas. In addi- Continued seasonal coupled with the expected exhaustion of tion, some areas have already witnessed downturn in AOG at- opposition forces following such an ex- tack rates steady increases in ANSF (for example tended and highly kinetic ‘fighting season’. ANA in Ghor) and irregular force presence Cross border tensions in As is typical, the conflict also contracts to (for example ALP in Daykundi), in antici- the East well established operational areas, primarily pation of this announcement. As seen with in the South and East, which account for the first tranche, the impact on the opera- Second tranche of transi- the highest ratio of incidents during the tion announced tional realities for NGOs in transitioned winter months. A final, but less well de- areas is minimal as in most cases the ANSF fined, element feeding into the downturn is NGO staff affected by have de-facto control already. indirect fire attack the impact the shift of international forces in the East towards the border areas has Finally, there were two NGO incidents had on AOG cross-border infiltration and reported this period. The first incident, which occurred in Kapisa, was the more ANSO is supported by resupply routes. It is likely that the impact will only be temporary as AOG leadership significant as 1 national staff member was will simply exploit alternates in order to killed and 2 others were wounded as a re- circumvent these efforts. sult of an indirect fire attack. Due to the inherent inaccuracy of such AOG efforts, Also related to border dynamics, this peri- it is clear that the staff affected were purely ods IMF airstrike impacting Pakistani Mili- collateral damage, though the incident tary forces in Kunar attracted international serves to highlight the inherent risks of attention, though any long term impacts of proximity to key target areas, such as it remains unclear. This incident was in DACs as was the case here. The second some ways inevitable IMF assets reoriented incident involved the typical ‘slashed tire’ towards the border collided with PakMil criminal scheme though in a somewhat elements already insitu. The PakMil pres- atypical area, Mazar-e Sharif City in Balkh. ence was already particularly active, as at- While this tactic has been most frequently tested by the frequent cross border shelling executed in Kabul, it serves as an indicator incidents recorded throughout the past of the need for NGOs to implement pro- months. While this latest incident occurred cedures countrywide in order to counter it. ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents K ABUL Year to Date 8 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 The ANSF-IMF set-up for the 40 Traditional Loya Jirga (15 - 19 unrelated to the Jirga. In counter- 30 November) proved effective in point to two inconclusive cases of 20 deterring any significant AOG ‘harassing fire’ on the security 10 activity. The ANSF mobilized forces in the Uzbeen Valley of 0 impressive resources to scrutinize Surobi, the evening-time RCIED the access routes and ran a num- detonation on an IMF convoy on ber of search and arrest opera- the highway in Qarabagh on the KABUL AOG KABUL Crime tions which amounted to over 22nd was an achievement claimed 70% of the incident volumes this by IEA for the units based in the Musayi with 14%. AOG ratios in all other dis- cycle. In a striking contrast, the 3 vicinity of the Bagram IMF base. tricts remain below 10%. The experience from incidences of inaccurate IDF at- It appears likely that the same other areas which have already undergone the tacks on the city center and the network has been involved in the transition process confirms that the handover ANSF facilities in the outskirts recent emergence of magnetic of security responsibilities remains mainly a which followed the IED attempt IEDs in Bagram. political process, although one which creates th against the Jirga venue on the 14 Included into the second tranche opportunities for the local ANSF to secure a marked a surprisingly meagre of transition, Surobi nonetheless more significant allocation of resources, incl. AOG response to the event. remains a major staging area for IMF support in the form of training compo- Likewise, AOG intimidation ef- AOG operations in the province. nents. In the transitioned areas, IMF continue forts failed to discourage the par- For instance, the district has so far both conventional and SOF operations as well ticipants from attending the as- hosted 35% of all AOG attacks the training of the ANSF incl. ALP. The on- sembly. initiated in Kabul this year (42% going process of transition represents stages Besides the aforementioned IDF in 2010 and 21% in 2009). For leading to the inevitable conclusion in 2014 of incidents, the other half of AOG comparison, Kabul City closely withdrawal though ultimately transition bears activity took place outside the follows with 32% (of which ap- no immediate implications for NGO security security perimeter established for proximately one third are sin- in the field. that purpose by ANSF and were gle/multiple suicide attacks) and NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI D AYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Likewise Surobi, Daykundi is slat- 30 ed to undergo security transition Gizab side temporarily sealed off during the next tranche though the main road for freight traffic 20 for this cycle access was the pri- between Nili and Gizab, a major 10 step to pressurize the Daykundi mary concern. Heavy snowfalls in 0 Qunakh and Shatigh impacted constituency. While the situation traffic towards the capital from remains tense, with the communi- the north and west while ANP ty in Daykundi calling upon local DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime infighting in the Tamazan Valley powerbrokers to push the Gizabis also hindered access from the back from Tamazan, the onset of tember, and the legacy of the 2008 Shia tribal south. the winter will likely freeze the revolt which stemmed the influence of chances for any larger eruption of Uruzghani AOG in Tamazan provides enough In the night of the 21st, an ex- violence this year. Yet, the frus- motivation on the Daykundi side to re-claim change of fire erupted between trations on the Daykundi side af- the lost positions in the future unless a political Nili and Gizab police in the Low- ter the set-back suffered this Sep- solution is brokered amongst the parties. er Tamazan. Consequently, the THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 1 40 In the night of the 22nd, a rocket directed towards the district cen- of AOG field operatives remains 30 ter hit a camp of NGO de-miners an external factor beyond NGO 20 set up inside the compound of the control, reducing the proximity in 10 time, space and profile to targets Department of Agriculture in 0 Koh Band, a district that other- remains a feasible measure to re- wise hosts the lowest levels of duce the risk of NGO exposure violence in Kapisa. A single to AOG-initiated violence. KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime 107mm projectile directly impact- Overall, 16 incidents, incl. 6 ed a Kamaz truck killing an NGO AOG-triggered escalations, were first targeted an ALP checkpoint in Jalo Khel driver and causing injuries to oth- recorded this cycle. A discernible and caused two ALP casualties while the se- er two staff members. IEA proportion of AOG activity was cond, an ambush of an IMF/ANA convoy in claimed the authorship, implying triggered against ‘soft’ targets. Nawroz Khel, developed into a counter- that the DAC area in the vicinity Collusion with criminal interests ambush by IMF/ANA which left three AOG of the actual point of impact was in such type of targeting is a com- casualties. The AOG maintained an upper the intended target. Of note, a mon occurrence. Besides the hand in the third escalation, a day-light attack two-fold indirect fire targeted the afore-mentioned strike in Koh on an IMF-ANP patrol in Doran throughout same locality during the previous Band, an ineffective IDF attack which the attackers used a combination of cycle. When it comes to the IEA targeted the house of the head of RPGs, heavy machine-guns and small arms.