The ANSO Report (16-30 November 2011)

CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2011

Issue 86 REPORT 16‐30 November 2011 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-4 November concluded with a slight shift within Afghan territory, the fluid and ill- 5-8 Northern Region away from the precipitous drop in overall defined nature of the border also likely at- Western Region 9-10 AOG initiated attacks noted during the tributed to the incident. past 3 months. This dynamic can be pri- Transition came to fore again this period as Eastern Region 11-15 marily attributed to the impact of the early the areas slated for the second tranche engagement by AOG elements beginning Southern Region 16-19 were announced (see p. 17 for complete in March, and the ensuing high activity lev- ANSO Info Page 20 listing) with the actual handovers to occur els which continued unabated through to throughout the coming month. As with the dramatic peak recorded in July (see the first phase, it represents a mix of pro- graph p. 8). While the impact of seasonal vincial, district and city based areas and in HIGHLIGHTS weather patterns on AOG access and most cases consist of relatively permissive movement is well established, this has been and lightly or uncontested areas. In addi-  Continued seasonal coupled with the expected exhaustion of tion, some areas have already witnessed downturn in AOG at- opposition forces following such an ex- tack rates steady increases in ANSF (for example tended and highly kinetic ‘fighting season’. ANA in Ghor) and irregular force presence  Cross border tensions in As is typical, the conflict also contracts to (for example ALP in Daykundi), in antici- the East well established operational areas, primarily pation of this announcement. As seen with in the South and East, which account for the first tranche, the impact on the opera-  Second tranche of transi- the highest ratio of incidents during the tion announced tional realities for NGOs in transitioned winter months. A final, but less well de- areas is minimal as in most cases the ANSF fined, element feeding into the downturn is  NGO staff affected by have de-facto control already. indirect fire attack the impact the shift of international forces in the East towards the border areas has Finally, there were two NGO incidents had on AOG cross-border infiltration and reported this period. The first incident, which occurred in Kapisa, was the more ANSO is supported by resupply routes. It is likely that the impact will only be temporary as AOG leadership significant as 1 national staff member was will simply exploit alternates in order to killed and 2 others were wounded as a re- circumvent these efforts. sult of an indirect fire attack. Due to the inherent inaccuracy of such AOG efforts, Also related to border dynamics, this peri- it is clear that the staff affected were purely ods IMF airstrike impacting Pakistani Mili- collateral damage, though the incident tary forces in Kunar attracted international serves to highlight the inherent risks of attention, though any long term impacts of proximity to key target areas, such as it remains unclear. This incident was in DACs as was the case here. The second some ways inevitable IMF assets reoriented incident involved the typical ‘slashed tire’ towards the border collided with PakMil criminal scheme though in a somewhat elements already insitu. The PakMil pres- atypical area, Mazar-e Sharif City in Balkh. ence was already particularly active, as at- While this tactic has been most frequently tested by the frequent cross border shelling executed in Kabul, it serves as an indicator incidents recorded throughout the past of the need for NGOs to implement pro- months. While this latest incident occurred cedures countrywide in order to counter it.

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C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents K ABUL Year to Date 8 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 The ANSF-IMF set-up for the 40 Traditional Loya Jirga (15 - 19 unrelated to the Jirga. In counter- 30 November) proved effective in point to two inconclusive cases of 20 deterring any significant AOG ‘harassing fire’ on the security 10 activity. The ANSF mobilized forces in the Uzbeen Valley of 0 impressive resources to scrutinize Surobi, the evening-time RCIED the access routes and ran a num- detonation on an IMF convoy on ber of search and arrest opera- the highway in Qarabagh on the KABUL AOG KABUL Crime tions which amounted to over 22nd was an achievement claimed 70% of the incident volumes this by IEA for the units based in the Musayi with 14%. AOG ratios in all other dis- cycle. In a striking contrast, the 3 vicinity of the Bagram IMF base. tricts remain below 10%. The experience from incidences of inaccurate IDF at- It appears likely that the same other areas which have already undergone the tacks on the city center and the network has been involved in the transition process confirms that the handover ANSF facilities in the outskirts recent emergence of magnetic of security responsibilities remains mainly a which followed the IED attempt IEDs in Bagram. political process, although one which creates th against the Jirga venue on the 14 Included into the second tranche opportunities for the local ANSF to secure a marked a surprisingly meagre of transition, Surobi nonetheless more significant allocation of resources, incl. AOG response to the event. remains a major staging area for IMF support in the form of training compo- Likewise, AOG intimidation ef- AOG operations in the province. nents. In the transitioned areas, IMF continue forts failed to discourage the par- For instance, the district has so far both conventional and SOF operations as well ticipants from attending the as- hosted 35% of all AOG attacks the training of the ANSF incl. ALP. The on- sembly. initiated in Kabul this year (42% going process of transition represents stages Besides the aforementioned IDF in 2010 and 21% in 2009). For leading to the inevitable conclusion in 2014 of incidents, the other half of AOG comparison, Kabul City closely withdrawal though ultimately transition bears activity took place outside the follows with 32% (of which ap- no immediate implications for NGO security security perimeter established for proximately one third are sin- in the field. that purpose by ANSF and were gle/multiple suicide attacks) and

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI D AYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Likewise Surobi, Daykundi is slat- 30 ed to undergo security transition Gizab side temporarily sealed off during the next tranche though the main road for freight traffic 20 for this cycle access was the pri- between Nili and Gizab, a major 10 step to pressurize the Daykundi mary concern. Heavy snowfalls in 0 Qunakh and Shatigh impacted constituency. While the situation traffic towards the capital from remains tense, with the communi- the north and west while ANP ty in Daykundi calling upon local DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime infighting in the Tamazan Valley powerbrokers to push the Gizabis also hindered access from the back from Tamazan, the onset of tember, and the legacy of the 2008 Shia tribal south. the winter will likely freeze the revolt which stemmed the influence of chances for any larger eruption of Uruzghani AOG in Tamazan provides enough In the night of the 21st, an ex- violence this year. Yet, the frus- motivation on the Daykundi side to re-claim change of fire erupted between trations on the Daykundi side af- the lost positions in the future unless a political Nili and Gizab police in the Low- ter the set-back suffered this Sep- solution is brokered amongst the parties. er Tamazan. Consequently, the THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 3 50

This Report Period 1 40 In the night of the 22nd, a rocket directed towards the district cen- of AOG field operatives remains 30 ter hit a camp of NGO de-miners an external factor beyond NGO 20 set up inside the compound of the control, reducing the proximity in 10 time, space and profile to targets Department of Agriculture in 0 Koh Band, a district that other- remains a feasible measure to re- wise hosts the lowest levels of duce the risk of NGO exposure violence in Kapisa. A single to AOG-initiated violence. KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime 107mm projectile directly impact- Overall, 16 incidents, incl. 6 ed a Kamaz truck killing an NGO AOG-triggered escalations, were first targeted an ALP checkpoint in Jalo Khel driver and causing injuries to oth- recorded this cycle. A discernible and caused two ALP casualties while the se- er two staff members. IEA proportion of AOG activity was cond, an ambush of an IMF/ANA convoy in claimed the authorship, implying triggered against ‘soft’ targets. Nawroz Khel, developed into a counter- that the DAC area in the vicinity Collusion with criminal interests ambush by IMF/ANA which left three AOG of the actual point of impact was in such type of targeting is a com- casualties. The AOG maintained an upper the intended target. Of note, a mon occurrence. Besides the hand in the third escalation, a day-light attack two-fold indirect fire targeted the afore-mentioned strike in Koh on an IMF-ANP patrol in Doran throughout same locality during the previous Band, an ineffective IDF attack which the attackers used a combination of cycle. When it comes to the IEA targeted the house of the head of RPGs, heavy machine-guns and small arms. constituency in Koh Band, the the provincial council in Namaz Three IMF and three ANP members sustained local units remain marginal and Khel, Tara Area of Kohistan II on injuries during the attack. have not undertaken any serious the 27th. The official, a member direct attacks so far. Neverthe- of Jamiat-e Islami, has a jihadi After one such record during the previous pe- less, their linkages with the potent background and is reckoned to riod in Isa Khel, the Tagab – Alasay road wit- AOG hubs in south-eastern Ka- enjoy a degree of influence nessed another incidence of an AOG check- pisa open a convenient access to throughout the province. Yet point in the early morning of the 25th in Laka weaponry required for IDF and another stand-off attempt, this Khel. This time, AOG intercepted and killed a IED attacks while their locality time an RCIED connected to a local resident employed with ANP in Kabul. also hosts a set of easily accessible mobile phone initiator, was neu- Whereas AOG surveillance of the access targets. However, the access to tralized by ANP on the Tagab – routes in Tagab is an obvious cornerstone of supplies remains a lesser con- Surobi road in Anar Joy, within AOG military operations, the recent check- straint on the AOG side than the close proximity to the residence points between Tagab and Alasay may indicate lack of local support and skilled of the District Chief of Police. a more thorough scrutiny of the road for personnel. For the latter, the The use of IEDs in targeted ANSF and GOA-associated targets. The pos- north-west of Kapisa has wit- strikes at private residences re- sible involvement of local criminal networks nessed several cases of NGOs mains quite common in Kapisa, was also put forward in several reports, a fac- getting harmed in random AOG although the majority of impro- tor to consider for the NGO staff using the attacks. The series of 15 NGO vised devices continue to be de- road. incidents recorded by ANSO in ployed on the road networks in an AOG strongholds along the Tagab – Surobi Kapisa since 2006 includes anoth- effort to challenge the movements road and on the access towards Badrab Valley er case of an INGO premise re- of the security forces. Indeed, witnessed a number of lethal ANSF-IMF oper- ceiving a direct rocket impact in other IED attempts were inter- ations including an air-strike in Omar Khel on the vicinity of an ANSF base dicted by ANP on the Abdul Khel the 21st. Several arrests and cache discoveries (May 2010, Mahmudi Raqi), as and Jalo Khel sections of the main have also been reported from the Afghaniya well as an INGO vehicle getting Nijrab – Tagab road and in Ba- Valley in Nijrab. While the communities will hit in transit by an amateurish dakshi in Nijrab. In the first loca- certainly face more inward-looking AOG scru- RCIED (January 2011, Mahmudi tion, the police force intervened tiny during the winter months, the road net- Raqi). The post-incident assess- during emplacement and detained work will continue to witness occasional com- ment revealed that the vehicle was two AOG operatives in situ. The bat operations of which the deployment of most likely mistakenly targeted by Tagab section of the main road ‘victim-operated’ IEDs by the armed opposi- a group of inexperienced AOG also witnessed three direct attacks tion constitutes the most significant threat to recruits. While the poor vetting on ‘hard’ security targets. The NGO movements. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents P ARWAN Year to Date 4 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 So far this year, Shinwari and 40 Ghorband wa Siyagerd jointly ing the access road to Namak Ab 30 hosted 42% of AOG-initiated before the regular morning com- 20 attacks in Parwan. It comes as no mute of their commander. To- wards the end of the previous 10 surprise that the two districts have 0 also been excluded from the ap- cycle, an additional two AOG proaching second round of the escalations were recorded in Ka- security transition which other- tasang (Ghorband) and Dahane PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime wise encompasses all remaining Kafshan (Shinwari), of which the districts of Parwan. In compari- latter, an accurate SAF ambush on in the spring quite likely. son, Chaharikar and Bagram have an ANA convoy, took place on the main Parwan-Bamyan road. Following a concerted and rather successful scored similarly in terms of AOG ANSF-IMF effort to disrupt AOG pre- volumes, each around 20% of the The ANSF build-up in Ghorband positioning of military materiel around the provincial breakdown for 2011. has certainly impacted the AOG Bagram IMF base – a cache of 50 mortars, The series of three suicide attacks capability to disrupt traffic on the ammunition often used for static IEDs, was in Chaharikar and another attempt main Parwan – Bamyan road in for instance discovered this period in Qalai in Sayed Khel demonstrate that the valley, a benchmark reached Ahmad Khan - local AOG networks have re- the area has not been overlooked by AOG in October prior to the cently shifted towards exploring the vulnerabil- in AOG planning. Yet unlike IMF-ANSF clear operations. Yet ities linked to fuel supplies for the base. This Ghorband, this part of the prov- a look into the upper side-valleys, is attested by the magnetic IED detonation on ince remains under effective con- such as Qemchak and Namak Ab, an IMF-contracted fuel tanker transiting in trol of pro-GOA forces. reveals that the AOG access Barik Ab on the 21st. Since the beginning of On the 21st in Shinwari, a pres- routes from Baghlan have re- October, four magnetic devices have targeted sure-plate IED detonated against mained open and without any fuel tankers in Bagram while other cases have two ALP members in Quli Nayak permanent ANSF-IMF presence. also been reported from Qarabagh and Deh while the militia men were scout- This makes the AOG reactivation Sabz.

NGO Incidents W ARDAK Year to Date 4 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 Regarding transition, Maydan 80 Shahr, Jalrez and the two Behsuds operations. In Saydabad alone, 60 IMF staged 5 targeted capture/kill have also been slated in the se- 40 cond tranche. While the Behsuds operations including a controver- 20 usually stay away from the main sial move in Wasi Khel where an conflict vectors, despite being IMF detachment interrupted a 0 only lightly policed by ANSF and graduation ceremony in a local madrasa. Yet, the three AOG- IMF, Jalrez in particular remains a WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime contested territory though one initiated incidents in the district which is only of secondary inter- remained quite lethal and demonstrated the on-going ability to dis- ANA and a targeted killing. The latter incident est compared to the main staging dated the 28th saw an AOG unit kill the deputy areas in the south. rupt IMF freight traffic along the highway. Further, the reporting head of Jaghatu shura in Khawaja Ab while The conflict patterns remained in from Logar revealed a coordina- transiting towards Ghazni. In another similar- line with the previous period and th tion effort on the side of the IEA ly targeted case on the 26 , a squad of AOG AOG and ANSF-IMF activity commander in Baraki Barak to gunmen on motorcycles searched the residence levels were on par. Direct SAF provide impetus for more action of a former Harakate Islami (Mohseni) com- attacks as well as IED strikes rein Saydabad in the weeks to come. mander in the Hussaini area of Day Mirdad. mained the favorite tactical option Accused of ‘spying for the government’, the on the AOG side. Following the spike of AOG ac- gunmen took the victim away. In a rather tivity in Jaghatu during the previ- The AOG volumes remained low atypical turn of the event, the local elders were ous cycle, AOG marked just two in Saydabad, a factor at least partly able to secure the safe release of the com- escalations, an IED detonation on attributable to steady IMF-ANSF mander later on the same day. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents L OGAR Year to Date 6 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 The core of 8 AOG and 2 crimi- 40 bouring DAC, remains a tragic nal escalations were concentrated 30 along the northern stretch of the outlier. In this particular case, the 20 Kabul-Gardez highway (incl. Puli strike caused mass casualties and Alam) as well as along the road caught the local AOG networks 10 network in Baraki Barak and by surprise. Most likely orches- 0 Charkh. Authoring twice as many trated by exogenous elements, the incidents than AOG, IMF and attack has never been claimed by ANSF focused on Puli Alam, fol- any group though the involve- LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime lowed by Baraki Barak and Mu- ment of the HQN network appears likely. provide a further motivation for the AOG to hammad Agha though IMF oper- exploit the Azra corridor. ations were also visible in Charkh The current status quo in Azra, and Kharwar. with AOG staying away from the In Baraki Barak, the appointment of a new IEA military commander came amid reports of In the early afternoon of the 20th, ANSF while the IMF rarely ven- ture into the district, is somewhat an intensified coordination of the local IEA a suicide attacker on a motorcycle structures with their counterparts in Saydabad. detonated his charge in the vicini- surprising. While IMF efforts to keep the border sealed in the Deploying IEDs to control the roads will likely ty of a halted IMF detachment continue as a signature activity for domestic close to the Governor’s Office in Eastern provinces seems to be a clear-cut component of the pre- Baraki Barak and Charkh IEA networks. An Puli Alam. The charge was trig- example of AOG flexibility also appeared this gered too early to inflict any large withdrawal IMF strategy, the access via Logar has been left open. cycle in Shah Mazar, where an IED was number of IMF casualties, yet promptly emplaced on the road in the anticipa- two civilians including a child On the AOG side, accessing Jaji and Azra from the Kurram Agen- tion of an ANP deployment to stem local skir- were caught in the blast. The at- mishes between the Kuchi settlements (mainly th cy has been made possible since a tack marked the 8 suicide strike of Khost & Paktya origin) and the local in Logar since 2006 of which 3 truce was reached between the rival sunni and shia tribal net- mixed population. This local dispute harkens occurred this year, all of these back to June 2010 when GOA allocated a occurring in district centers works on the Pakistani side earlier this autumn whereas the current number of land plots in the area to the Kuchis (Azra, Khushi, Puli Alam). Over- with the legitimacy of the move having been all, the activity has been dedicated IMF operations in Paktya and the legacy of the 2010 early-winter contested by the local community since. See- to the security target though the ing a part of the Kuchi community relocate for poorly targeted SVBIED strike IMF campaign in Khogyani and Shirzad - barred the then pre- the winter towards Paktya, the locals set sever- against the district hospital in Az- al Kuchi households on fire amongst increased th ferred AOG infiltration route and ra on the 25 of June this year, tensions. likely designed to hit the neigh- resulted in heavy IMF casualties -

NGO Incidents East, including direct access from Badakhshan P ANJSHIR Year to Date 2 and Baghlan, makes the exposure of the local This Report Period 0 population to the opium industry evident. Yet, There were two events reported there is no strong statistical evidence to sup- from Khenj this cycle although local vehicle during a routine port the claim that Panjshir would be of any neither of them impacted the search. According to the police import as a transit or consumption area. NGO community. On the 15th in account, the two male occupants Zani Area, soil erosion buried a of the vehicle hail from the area residential compound underneath and were on their way from a layer of mud and earth killing 9 Khenjan via Salang. Both of them out of 11 occupants. On the 24th, were taken into police custody. ANP manning a checkpoint in The proximity of the Panjshir val- Dalan Sang discovered a load of ley to the production and the several kilograms of opium in a smuggling hubs in the North- THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents B ALKH Year to Date 11 BALKH 50 This Report Period 1 A direct NGO incident, rather 40 unusual for the area, was reported and grab” attacks such as this are 30 this period in Mazar-e Sharif city. extremely rare and remain an out- 20 lier to the existing security para- On 21 November, in Kefayat 10 digm in the city; nonetheless, de- Market area of PD#4, unknown 0 perpetrator(s) stole a large amount spite the relative security of of cash from a vehicle belonging Mazar-e Sharif, criminal incidents to an INGO. The incident oc- are known to happen, as in major BALKH AOG BALKH Crime curred in the afternoon after the cities across the country. In the INGO driver, with another 2 staff case of a flat-tyre scenario, the security incident in the district. Initial—but members, withdrew cash from a driver should avoid being distract- still unconfirmed—reports have suggested that bank and were on their way back ed by the flat tyre and continue the culprits were linked to an AOG. There- to the office. Shortly after leaving driving to a safe location where fore, the incident needs more information and the vicinity of the bank they no- the tyre can be changed, or in- further assessment as AOG initiated incidents ticed that their tyre was flat, and stead calling a back-up vehicle has been extremely rare with this being only th the driver stopped the car and from the NGO office (especially the 6 this year. proceeded to repair the flat tyre if valuables are being transported) Lastly, an IED detonation was reported on the with the aid of his colleagues. before changing the wheel. 21st in the Toqai area of Shortepa. The cir- When they finished repairing the In other developments this re- cumstances of the incident seem to indicate vehicle they realized that the cash porting period, an irregular inci- that the Toqai community representative was had been stolen from inside the dent occurred in Khulm on the the intended target, as he had passed the area car. Given the circumstances of 18th, when an armed clash took just prior the detonation. Subsequently, he the incident it seems that the at- place around Shahedan Village received a phone call from an unknown indi- tack followed a “slash and grab” between the ANP and 4 armed vidual threatening him because he had cooper- scheme, which although unusual men on motorcycles, resulting in ated with an IO and distributed grains to the in the city represents a well estab- the arrests of 3 of the armed men community. Although armed groups are lished modus operandi of criminal and the escape of the fourth. known to operate in the area, IED deployment gangs in Kabul – where 5 cases Khulm has generally remained remains rare and this marks only the fourth involving NGOs have been rec- quiet, despite the slaying of an incident this year, with November experienc- orded since September 2010. important powerbroker earlier in ing 2 of them. As mentioned previously, “slash the year, and this marks the 18th

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 30th of November 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents F ARYAB Year to Date 12 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 Faryab continues to find itself the 40 ductions involving those who focal point for manifestations of 30 work with community or con- insecurity in the North—a title it 20 structions projects—with 4 has handily rested from Kunduz. 10 NGO-related abductions or at- This cycle saw another civilian 0 abduction—albeit not NGO- tempted abductions in the 3 related—which occurred on the weeks prior to the beginning of FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime 19th in the Qaysar area, and the this cycle. While the culprits and ambush and killing of the reasons remain unclear, it appears Responding to a volley of SAF around the Qaramqol District Chief of Police that these may be due to a mix of DAC, the COP took a vehicle and some per- on the night of the 20th. information gathering and ransom collection, with the killing of 2 sonnel to investigate and was ambushed by In Qaysar, on the 19th, 5 civilians NGO workers after their ransom AOGs with RPGs and light machine gun fire (3 labourers and 2 truck drivers had been paid last cycle (see previ- in a 2 hour fire fight that resulted in his death. along with their trucks) were ab- ous report) a notable and disturb- Attacks against ANP in Qaramqol are not un- ducted as they brought gravel to ing outlier. At this time it is be- common, with 5 security incidents occurring the district ANP headquarters. lieved that AOGs, potentially due over the 3 months prior to this, and many of Information suggests the abduc- to infringements on their space them targeting ANP. In that context, the cur- tion was authored by an AOG due to ongoing operations to the rent attack does not appear to denote any shift and was due to the fact that they east and west of the province, to the existing security paradigm. What could were working with/for the ANP. may be becoming more guarded potentially create a shift is rather the develop- The abductees were finally re- with their space, as reports have ment of a new CIP program in neighbouring leased unharmed on the 25th, re- surfaced that they have told ab- Dawlatabad. While multiple sources suggest portedly after payment of a ran- ductees that they do not trust such a program is in the works, it is unclear som; however, the AOGs threat- them and want some of them out what level it was at as of the writing of this ened them to stop working for the of their operating space. The kill- report, with some sources suggesting that lo- GOA. As noted in recent reports, ing of the COP in Qaramqol was cals had already self-selected and were awaiting civilian abductions have been on another noteworthy incident. approval. the rise in Faryab—especially ab-

NGO Incidents J AWZJAN Year to Date 4 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 In the last two weeks Jawzjan saw 40 only a handful of recorded securi- device placed on a bicycle was 30 ty incidents, although there were 2 located by ANSF near Hasan Ta- 20 events of note that occurred along bib village. 10 the province’s main roads. In Another noteworthy incident this 0 Shibirghan, ANSF located a small reporting period was a roadside IED emplaced under a bridge in robbery that occurred around JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime Seshanbe Tepa area along the 2100hrs in Garjak village (on the main Shibirghan–Sar-e Pul road Chahar Bolak/Fayzabad border) Much like the previous cycle, sporadic AOG on the 24th. Whereas the majority along the main Mazar-Shibirghan attacks on Pro-Government Militia check- of noticeable incidents recorded road. The road has been mostly points continued in Qush Tepa (Jawzjan’s por- along this road consisted of illegal quiet since the 2 IED detonations tion of the Tri-Provincial Area). In the last checkpoints, IED deployment has in early August (in Chahar Bolak fortnight, 2 separate attacks were recorded in been extremely rare, with this inci- District of Balkh), with this mark- Teraghli village area, where during an attack 1 dent marking only the third IED ing the first incident along the AOG member was killed, while another one related incident to occur along road in Fazyabad since an attack was injured along with 1 ALP. this road in 2011. Prior to this, an on 2 ANP checkpoints and 2 sep- Outside of the above incidents Jawzjan contin- IED struck an ANA Ranger in- arate IED discoveries, occurring ues to witness a considerable lull, one which side the city on 10 April and the in multiple incidents over late could potentially last into the usually quieter most recent incident occurred on April/early May. winter period. 19 October, when an explosive THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents B AGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 While reported activity, in particu- 40 lar that which can be attributed to them were questioned and re- 30 leased on the spot, while the third AOG, remained below last peri- 20 one was abducted. Although the od’s level, insecurity along main 10 latest incident occurred outside of roads in Baghlan came to the fore 0 in the last fortnight with several recommended NGO travel times, this occurrence is worth noting as noteworthy incidents. During this BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime reporting cycle this insecurity was the use of ANP/ANSF uniforms seems to be an increasingly com- visible in Dushi and in the usually convoy while travelling on the road in the area mon tactic during such incidents unstable Baghlani Jadid. of Street 9, Factory. The incident resulted in 1 countrywide. During the night of November IMF soldier and 1 child wounded, with the 25th on the main Pul-e Khumri - Baghlani Jadid, the usual ‘hot vehicle sustaining damage. The fact that the Kabul road, 4 armed individuals spot’ within the province, wit- incident occurred during the NGO travel times wearing ANP uniforms stopped nessed 2 noteworthy incidents is concerning, nonetheless the intended target and robbed private vehicles in that occurred along the main remains in line with general trends of attacks Kelagai area of Dushi. This Baghlan – Kunduz road. On the on ‘hard targets’. Further to this, Baghlani marks the third incident to occur last day of the previous period Jadid witnessed an additional 3 RCIED-related in Kelagai area this year. Prior to (the 15th), armed men – believed incidents, including 1 IED strike that caused this, the area saw an armed rob- to be members of an ACG – ab- injuries to 2 ALP members in Kukchenar area, bery on March, then the following ducted the owner of a gas station and a device that went off while being defused, month (on April the 18th), 3 local who was travelling through Jangal slightly wounding 2 IMF soldiers in Anar Khel nationals were stopped by an Bagh area. Then this period, on Village. armed group led by a well known November 29 at around 1430hrs, local ACG commander. 2 of an IED detonated against an IMF

NGO Incidents UNDUZ KUNDUZ K Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 Despite a certain level of ongoing 40 AOG IED activity, Kunduz has incident consisted of an RCIED 30 continued to see a lull in insecuri- that detonated against a Pro- 20 ty, experiencing a total of 14 inci- Government Militia (PGM) vehi- 10 th dents in the last fortnight. cle on the 20 at 1300 hours in 0 the Puli Zakhil area of Kunduz, Whereas there were no reports of injuring 1 PGM member. The direct engagement between AOG- second occurred on the 29th, KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime ANSF/IMF in the last two weeks, when another remote control de- IED emplacement remains a con- vice targeted an ANA vehicle and operations (with 1 occurring within the city), cern with 6 IED related incidents, injured 2 ANA soldiers. As high- criminal activity came to the fore. Of note, of which 4 resulted in detona- lighted by these examples, the armed men shot and killed a former ANP in tions. majority of explosive devices usu- PD#2, allegedly over a personal dispute. A The geographical distribution of ally reported from Kunduz are quite rare but drastic modus operandi was used these incidents followed well es- remote controlled and focused on by criminal elements in PD#4 on the 27th, tablished patterns, with Kunduz targeting of ANSF/IMF or PGM when armed men wearing ANA uniforms en- District and Chahar Dara noting 2 vehicles. tered a local residence and sprayed acid on incidents each followed by Kunduz District accounted for family members. The attack caused injuries to Khanabad and Aliabad. the majority of reported incidents 1 male and 4 female members of the family. Amongst these, 2 separate IED this period. In addition to the The said incident is also believed to have been strikes occurred along the Kunduz aforementioned IED-related inci- related to an interpersonal feud. – Chahar Dara road. The first dents, and 2 documented IMF THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents S AR- E PUL Year to Date 4 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 In the last fortnight the south of 40 Sar-e Pul has continued to see Sangcharak – Sozma Qala road. 30 sustained—although not in- The detonation injured the COP 20 tense—insecurity, mostly in the and 1 of his bodyguards. 10 form of illegal checkpoints along Sangcharak District has seen a 0 main roads. On 16 November at relatively low volume of manifest- 2000hrs, an illegal checkpoint was ed insecurity, and this represents SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime reported in the Sang Toda area, only the 28th incident that has between Sar-e Pul and Sozma been recorded in the district since that had been observed following recent oper- th Qala. The incident marks the 2006 (and the 6 thus far this ations. third checkpoint to occur in the year). It is worth noting, hat prior On a different note, some changes in the secu- aforementioned area this year, to this, only 1 incident in the dis- rity environment of the province may occur as after checkpoints were reported in trict has ever been attributed to sources have suggested that the Swedish PRT September and October (1 each). AOGs (in June 2010). in Sar-e Pul will cease to be manned by the Another illegal checkpoint took As mentioned in previous reports, Swedes and will be taken over by American place on the 22nd at 1900hrs, it is of some note that AOG and forces. While initial reports suggest this could when several armed elements ACG activities have picked up in occur as early as the coming reporting period, (purported AOGs) were seen in the southern areas of Sar-e Pul IMF schedules have been known to fluctuate Khanaqa Maliki area, along the while the northern districts have substantially. It is unclear whether the US Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road, gotten quieter, suggesting some troops would keep a similar—and relatively searching vehicles for level of displacement. Also of small—sized force in place, or attempt to add ANSF/GOA employees. note, in addition to a discovery of more individuals. The Americans are already The usually quiet district of 2 IEDs, 2 AOG initiated direct active in the province via the ALP program in Sangcharak saw a noticeable inci- attacks on ALP checkpoints were Sayyad, and allegedly, via Special Forces units dent on the 25th, when an IED reported this period from Sayyad. throughout. detonated against the vehicle of These incidents further confirm the District Chief of Police (COP) the return of manifested insecurity who was travelling along the in the area, after a temporary lull

Country Level AOG Initiated Incidents: 2006-2011 (the numbers provided on the graph indicate yearly peaks) 1800 Jul: 1714 Parlimentary Elections 1600 Sept: 1541

1400

Presidential Elections 1200 Aug: 1092

1000

800 Aug: 634 600 Jul: 405 400 Aug: 335

200

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR APR OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents G HOR Year to Date 15 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 While the low AOG volumes fol- 40 lowed the country-wide seasonal mand, a move used by Helmandi 30 downturn, the 3 AOG escalations IEA structures in Ghor to tighten 20 recorded this period nevertheless their control of the communities. 10 do illustrate the increasing level of In the third case, a roadside IED 0 control by exogenous AOG in the killed 3 locals in the border area southern part of the province. 2 between Shahrak and Taywara, GHOR AOG GHOR Crime incidents happened in the south another location where the AOG of Pasaband, a stronghold of Hel- influence pours in from outside. mand-based AOGs in the prov- ence and a degree of control in the southern The use of IED is indeed not a parts of the province throughout the winter. ince. In the first case, a local was typical tactical choice on the side executed in public on charges of of the indigenous commanders Finally, it should be noted that Chaghcharan having murdered his brother. In who generally lack capacity for has been slated in the second tranche of transi- the second case, AOG mutilated this strand of activity, partly also tion, though this will have limited impact on both hands of a local who was due to the fact that indiscriminate the situation considering the existing disparity accused of a robbery. Such a road-side bombs are not easily between force levels of ANSF vs. IMF in the straightforward administration of accepted by local communities. district. justice is typical for the customary practice of the sharia law in Hel- It appears plausible that exogenous AOG will maintain a pres-

NGO Incidents B ADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 Badghis remained the hotspot of 40 AOG activity in the Western Re- AOG incidents remained un- 30 gion with 28 security incidents in changed (5), the number of the 20 total and 14 initiated by AOG. At incidents initiated by ANSF/IMF 10 the provincial level, AOG activity slightly increased (from 7 to 9). 0 as well as the strategic focus of The ANSF/IMF activity in both districts was likely further moti- ANSF/IMF continued to be con- BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime centrated in Muqur and Murghab vated by the scope of the second with around 80% of the security phase of security transition which will include the adjacent Ab Ka- use of IEDs was reduced to just two effective incidents recorded in these two strikes. Of note, ANSF/IMF interdicted an districts this cycle. While the vol- mari District and Qala-I-Naw City. additional 8 attempts, a sharp increase to the 3 ume of incidents initiated by devices collected by pro-GOA forces in the ANSF/IMF increased further in Regarding AOG tactical prefer- PRP. Increased ANSF patrolling of the roads Muqur this reporting period (from ences, direct attacks with the use could have stemmed from a strategic objective 7 to 13 compared to that of the of SAF and RPGs remained dom- to secure Muqur and Murghab before the up- PRP), the number of AOG inci- inant having accounted for 65% coming security transition. dents increased from 4 to 6. As of the total AOG volumes, mainly for Murghab, while the volume of aiming at high profile targets. The THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents H ERAT Year to Date 8 HERAT 50 This Report Period 0 Herat hosted only 5 inconclusive 40 AOG events this reporting period ra, Gulran, Shindand, Pashtun 30 Zarghun, and Chishti Sharif. Par- (which dropped from 14 recorded 20 the PRP). Besides the seasonal ticularly, ANSF operations fo- 10 trends, pro-active ANSF efforts to cused on the Herat–Chaghcharan stem AOG activity had contribut- Highway. Of note, in Pashtun 0 ed to this considerable drop. 14 Zarghun and Chishti Sharif, out of the 27 total security inci- ANSF established several addi- HERAT AOG HERAT Crime dents involved ANSF operations tional check posts after clearing which resulted in the killing of 2 the areas. ANSF appears to have could have sped up the downturn in AOG AOG members, the arrests of 19 taken advantage of seasonal limi- activity (12 AOG members from Pashtun Zar- others, and multiple seizures of tations to AOG movements in ghun and 8 from Shindand joined the APRP). weaponry including IED compo- order to establish more sustaina- While these developments within their current nents. Of note, while the size as ble stability along this strategic scope are unlikely to change the security para- well as the absolute number of highway urgently needed for secu- digm of the province, the GOA structures operations is small compared to rity force logistics and supply (as have demonstrated a robust effort to stabilize those of the peak season in the well as humanitarian supply) be- the province before the second tranche of the summer, the volume of ANSF fore the deepening of winter clos- security transition, particularly targeting the operations proportionate to that es this highway. unstable districts. Nevertheless, the districts of of AOG incidents increased. Further, the surrender of a num- Shindand, Obe, and Chishti Sharif have not ber of AOG members along with been included in the plan to transition Herat These operations targeted AOG Province. concentration areas such as Guza- their commanders to the GoA

NGO Incidents F ARAH Year to Date 3 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 This reporting period, the onset 40 of winter caused a further down- and destroying 10 trucks. It ap- 30 turn in AOG activity in Farah pears likely that PSCs and the sup- 20 with only 9 AOG incidents rec- ply convoys appear as a more 10 attractive and vulnerable target to orded. This constitutes a nearly a 0 40% decrease compared to the AOG than the security forces, a PRP. Nevertheless, most inci- factor which reflects the planning dents continued to be concentrat- of AOG operations. FARAH AOG FARAH Crime ed in the Shiwan area in Bala During the winter, AOG capabil- Buluk and along the Herat– ity to mobilize resources usually incidents that happened this year. While other Kandahar Highway in the border deteriorates with the weather and factors, such as the technical capability or the area between Bakwa, Gulistan, its impact on road accessibility, commanders’ preference come into play, the and Bala Buluk. Of note, 3 out of resulting in AOG departures for use of RCIEDs often reflects AOG willingness 8 AOG incidents staged there the winter break. The limited ca- to maintain a degree of accuracy in targeting targeted PSC escorts or vehicles in pacity of AOG movements also while limiting the requirements in terms of transit. In a single incident, AOG usually affects the tactical choices. human resources present in the field. ambushed a convoy of IMF- The past 5 weeks alone the prov- contracted fuel tankers, killing 13 ince hosted 5 RCIED incidents, PSC guards, wounding 6 others, nearly a 46% of the total RCIED THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents AKTYA PAKTYA P Year to Date 7 150 This Report Period 0

After a relatively low provincial 100 conflict intensity in the first half policemen, while IMF also arrested 3 AOG fighters during an op- of November – exempting of 50 course the high-impact complex eration in the district. As described in the previous report, this suicide attack in Chamkanay – 0 there was a mild increase in the dynamic in these provinces cir- second half of the month to a cumstantially appears to be a re- level closer to that of October. sult of both the IMF’s border- PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime The northern border districts ac- tightening operations in Khost and the greater freedom of move- counted for a majority of these ANP arrests of 3 suspected AOG members in incidents, consistent with the wid- ment FATA-based AOGs, such as the Haqqani Network, current- an operation – which while just inside Gardez er developments in the AOG district on the border with Zurmat, more spe- landscape described below, with ly enjoy in Kurram Agency. As such, these factors are likely to cifically relates to the conflict in the latter Gardez and Zurmat accounting place. In three operations in Zurmat, includ- for the bulk of the remainder. have caused greater operational focus on these northern districts, ing 1 conducted solo by ANP, 12 were de- Firstly, the northern districts of as well as greater use of them as tained, while the only consequential AOG ac- Chamkanay, Dand wa Patan and infiltration thoroughfares into tivity was the execution of a teenage boy for Jaji, while not seeing any attack of areas to the west; reports of sig- his family’s alleged support for the govern- the scale of the DAC siege earlier nificantly heightened infiltration ment. in the month, continued to see an in Logar’s Azra district, which sits Elsewhere in the province, the most significant elevated number of opposition- on the northern border of Jaji, are events were a number of security force opera- initiated kinetic engagements with consistent with this view. tions, in Lija Mangal, Sayid Karam and Shwak. security forces. In Chamkanay, As mentioned, Gardez district was In the first district, 2 operations led to 11 de- rockets were fired at the IMF base tentions and weapons and ammunition sei- in the DAC area, while 2 IEDs another, secondary site of insecurity, although the general situation zures, while a mid-level HQN commander was were also discovered in the DAC detained in Shwak’s Tori Khel area. In Sayid and Sultan Khel areas. In Dand in the city itself currently remained calm, with only a road Karam, a joint operation detained 2 in Chino, wa Patan, 3 separate IDF attacks while the ANA separately detained another 2 took place, one targeting an IMF accident in which 3 were killed registering. Just outside the city, in Shijnak, in what appears to have been a rela- helicopter landing at the IMF base tively successful response to the deterioration in the DAC area, the second at however, in Khataba, an IED successfully struck an IMF vehicle, of government authority in that district in re- the base itself, and the third to- cent months. wards the DAC. Also in the dis- injuring 4 soldiers. While the trict, a hit-and-run SAF attack Gardez-Kabul road section inside Winter will continue to suppress AOG activity targeted an ANBP CP on the bor- the province remained calm, in the province until mid-spring 2012, but we der. Lastly, in Jaji, most seriously AOG cadres do remain active in are likely to continue to see activity in the an IMF patrol convoy was at- the hills to the north; in Tandan, northern border districts through the coming tacked with SAF in the DAC area, the body of a man killed by gun- cold weeks and months, given that for topo- while another such attack targeted fire was found by local residents. graphical reasons the winter does not usually an ANBP patrol convoy in Bayan The remaining incidents took cause the same absolute shutdown there as it Khel. Also in that area, an IED place in Ibrahim Khel – a short does in areas to the south. struck an ANP vehicle, injuring 2 attack on an ANA convoy and THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents K HOST Year to Date 4 KHOST This Report Period 0 150 Perhaps the most notable facts of the past fortnight across Khost sweeping up large numbers of 100 province are that, firstly, the num- AOG fighters in an attempt to ber of IMF operations significant- degrade the numbers and cohe- 50 ly increased over the first half of sion of the Haqqani Network’s the month, and secondly, opposi- provincial cadres. As an auxiliary 0 tion-initiated kinetic engagements to IMF action, ANSF also con- with security forces likewise sub- ducted a number of noteworthy KHOST AOG KHOST Crime stantially increased. As such, the search or clearing operations. In overall level of conflict in the Gurbuz, ANP discovered and ANSF injured, and 2 IMF injured. province was slightly up on Sep- disrupted a 7-strong IED daisy- tember and October, and it is like- chain, and arrested two AOG The next most numerous, but much less de- ly that the remainder of the year fighters with mobile phone-based structive, form of opposition attack was IDF, and early next will continue to see IED detonators the following day. which however did cause the death of an IMF roughly similar conflict levels, In Musa Khel, newly arrived ANP soldier in Nadir Shah Kot, when the IMF facil- before escalating again in the early arrested 4 armed AOG fighters ity in the DAC area was rocketed on the 16th. spring. during a search operation, while in In two others also, single ANSF members Sabari too, they detained 3, in were injured. Apart from these outliers, which From the IMF side, their opera- what amounts to aggressively ef- do however signify the greater expertise in this tional foci during the period were fective ANP activity outside the tactic that the province’s AOG cadres enjoy the traditionally problematic Saba- provincial capital. relative to elsewhere, all others were relatively ri and Tere Zayi, as well as Nadir inconsequential, most of them missing their Shah Kot to the west. In the for- From the AOG side, as men- targets, which were a combination of IMF fa- mer two districts, as well as one in tioned, there was a similarly high- cilities and DACs. The final tactic was that of Khost district close to the Tere er intensity in their activities, pri- direct attacks, which did not prove to be as Zayi border, a total of 34 AOG marily in terms of IEDs, IDF and casualty-heavy to any side as they can be. With fighters were arrested across 11 direct attacks. Of these, IEDs just 10 recorded, the majority occurred along operations. Likewise, in Nadir were both the most numerous and the border where AOG cadres can maintain Shah Kot across 4 clearing opera- damaging, with a total of 19 IEDs strong and protected lines of retreat. In these tions, a total of 11 were arrested, striking ANSF and IMF vehicles clashes, only 1 ANP was injured. with a further 5 in a single opera- across the province, a further 2 tion in Spera. While not matching prematurely detonating and 34 Beyond these dominating dynamics, the most the high fatality rate seen in neigh- more discovered and defused by noteworthy events in Khost were a small num- bouring Paktika, this does amount security forces. In the successful ber of targeted killings of civilians accused of to a return to a pattern seen earlier blasts, which focused on Gurbuz, working with IMF, even tangentially – as in the in the year in Khost, that of Khost, Nadir Shah Kot and Saba- execution of the driver of an IMF interpreter. ri, a total of 2 ANP were killed, 14

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents N ANGARHAR Year to Date 14 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 Nangarhar witnessed no security 80 Sources indicate that the AOG incidents affecting the NGO com- 60 munity during the second half of responsible for this was the largest 40 November along with a further Khyber-based group, Lashkar-e drop in the number of opposi- Islam, which has in past months 20 tion-initiated conflict incidents—a taken more permanent positions 0 roughly 33% decrease for Novem- in the mountainous areas of such southern border districts; it is ber over the previous month. NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime Moreover, no major changes in strongly suspected that the group the overall security environment has also benefitted from good war, two noteworthy events occurred. First, a were recorded during the period, relations and material assistance nightletter was posted outside the home of an though there were a number of by local AOGs when on this side employee of an IO, in Bibi Mehro, warning significant kinetic events across of the border. him off his job using language consistent with the province. North of Shinwar, Bati Kot con- the standard form of nightletters in Nangarhar. tinued to be home to the prov- Firstly, the districts of Bati Kot, Second, AOG fighters attacked a private vehi- ince’s worst security troubles. Chaparhar and Nazyan stood out cle being driven by an NDS officer and occu- The most serious incidents were as being home to elevated vol- pied by a number of his local sources, killing those of two armed attacks on umes of AOG operations. These the officer and a local student and injuring 3 local vehicles transporting GOA areas have all experienced a nota- other civilians. ble increase in AOG presence employees, both in the Farm-e 3 The provincial capital Jalalabad was quiet, with since the semi-conclusion of the area. In the first, Torkham cus- the most significant occurrence an armed clash Shinwar land dispute, with AOG toms office employees were vio- near Zone 5’s Kabul Bus Station between Ku- cadres that had been involved in lently stopped with SAF, with one chi settlers and ANSF, who had been ordered exploiting that dispute for their being killed and the other 3 ab- by the GOA to move the settlers to allow for own benefits moving out of the ducted and brought to the AOG the building of a new zone police centre. 3 area and into these neighbouring stronghold of Chardeh – 2 of passers-by were injured in the armed exchange, districts. While the first half of them being released at a later date. which led to the detention of a number of the the month saw the emergence of In the second incident, a similar Kuchis. To the southwest of Jalalabad, an this trend but no consequent IMF SAF attack targeted a private vehi- IMF night raid on a home in Surkh Rod late in reaction, by now IMF have recog- cle carrying 2 Canal Department the period led to the detention of 2 individuals nised this trend, and the opera- officials; in the attack, the 2 offi- – one allegedly for working with an al Qaeda tions detailed below in these areas cials and their 2 ANCOP armed facilitator, an allegation impossible to confirm can be understood to be their re- guards were killed. Also in Farm- – and also led to the killing of 2 others in the sponse to these ground develop- e 3, and again in Farm-e 2, AOG raid, which caused a demonstration the follow- ments in AOG presence and op- fighters staged a quick hit-and-run ing day that blocked the main Surkh Rod road. erations. attack on ANP CPs, while in Farm-e 4, a joint IMF-ANSF pa- In Khogyani, Sherzad and Pachir-wa Agam, Most significantly, on the fringe trol was briefly ambushed. With IEDs on main roads continued to be the pri- of the mountains in Nazyan, in AOG fighters now moving mary threat. 3 IEDs struck IMF convoys on the Dwa Khlah area, an IMF con- around openly in the daytime in roads leading to the Sherzad DAC, though not voy was ambushed by a large the district, IMF and ANSF also causing any reported casualties. In Gandomak, AOG party on November 16th, engaged in a limited response to an RCIED struck a vehicle in an ANP anti- and pinned down to such an ex- this quickly worsening situation; a narcotics convoy, with another anti-narcotics tent that air support was called in. joint search operation in Chardeh convoy being attacked by AOG fighters with After an initial bombing run, in and the wider environs led to the SAF in the same area later in the day. IMF which 27 AOG fighters were detention of 3 suspected AOG conducted a search operation in Memla during killed, the fighting expanded east fighters, while an ANP/NDS op- the period also, arresting 4, while in the same to the Nakhtar Naw area, stretch- eration in the district detained 1. area on the 20th an IMF air strike on a pair of ing into the following day, where AOG fighters planting an IED led to the 8 more AOG fighters were killed. In Chaparhar, to the west of Shin- deaths of both. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents N URISTAN Year to Date 1 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 After a sleepy October in Nuri- 40 stan, activity began to pick up in lage just down from the Kamdesh 30 the first half of November with DAC, and nearby areas. Another 20 some rocket fire from the border 7 were arrested and 6 thought to 10 have been substantially injured in Kamdesh’s Gawardesh valley, 0 and reports of numerous AOG but who escaped capture. Most units and trainers entering the significantly, it appears that the IEA’s Kamdesh DSG (District province to conduct operations, NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime presumably before access to the Shadow Governor), its shadow remote province was blocked by police chief and another im- settled the matter for the remainder of the winter, which would also give portant commander were amongst year. It is safe to bet that the IEA’s operation- them a certain degree of protec- the fatalities, marking a significant al objectives in Bargi Matal remain substantial- tion from security force retalia- blow for the IEA in this district. ly the same to those of last year, and the situation. Since those events, no significant developments have occurred, tion is likely to play itself out through the win- However, the ANSF seems to probably at least partly because ter and spring in a similar manner: meaning have had a very similar idea, the early casualties made the re- violence will remain confined to the DAC area, launching a major clearing opera- maining AOG cadres in the area but to the south of the DAC significant AOG tion in Kamdesh at the very be- more wary of kinetic engage- cadres will hold sway over local communities – ginning of this period – which was ments. The operation is set to although it remains to be seen what lessons in fact most immediately precipi- continue two further weeks. each side has learned since last year’s events. tated by local GOA worries about The final district that has recently seen a spike this rising AOG presence in the In Bargi Matal to the north of in AOG presence and activities is the western district, including what appears to Kamdesh, a single kinetic event district of Nurgaram, erstwhile home of the have been a significant upgrading took place, in the form of a SAF Nuristan PRT. The reports of AOG trainers of the importance of Kamdesh and RPG attack on the ANBP mentioned above were, in fact, mostly in rela- for the IEA within the past facility in the district centre. In tion to Nurgaram, in what seems to be an at- month. Comprising a large joint the attack, which lasted 40 tempt by AOG leadership to scale up the tech- force, with ANA commandos, minutes, one ANBP policeman nical and operational expertise of local AOG ANP and ANBP all represented, was wounded. Moreover, reports cadres in this relatively permissive district, the operation saw the force enter- have been received of growing which is surrounded by much more insecure ing Kamdesh from Nari, one-by- AOG numbers in the district, in districts such as Alingar and Waygal and thus a one clearing villages relatively what is likely to be a repeat of last relatively natural target for increasing AOG close to the major district road, winter. Beginning at almost pre- authority. During the period, the district saw 2 starting at the mouth of the cisely this date in 2010, a stream IDF incidents that targeted the PRT facility, Gawardesh valley. Likely because of reporting of AOG unit move- which remains occasionally used by IMF as a it enjoyed the element of surprise, ments into Bargi Matal com- destination for patrols convoys, and which also the early days the operation, menced, with the proximity of the retains a small ANA presence. This pattern is which remains ongoing at the AOG cadres and the intensity of likely to continue through the winter, but again time of writing, yielded the great- their kinetic engagements with the remain mostly confined to the immediate area est successes. In the first 4 days, small ANSF garrison in the dis- of the limited ANSF presence. 22 AOG commanders and fight- trict centre gradually increasing ers were killed in Mirdesh, a vil- until the major IMF-ANA clearing operation in spring decisively THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents K UNAR Year to Date 8 KUNAR 150 This Report Period 0 The intensity of the conflict in 100 Kunar remained stable through recent weeks. Ghaziabad saw the operation, specifically in Taray November, having varied little 50 since August. Nor did the pattern area, which led to the arrest of 1 and an ammunition and weapons of the conflict significantly 0 change, with a conflict picture seizure. The air strikes, in Mara- heavily dominated by hit-and-run wara’s Karwaro and Narang’s Badel valley, were more conse- attacks on security forces (spread KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime very evenly across the province in quential, each incident killing 3 AOG fighters. this period) but also registering a stationed at two PakMil CPs on that border It was another, more unusual, significant number of targeted with Mohmand Agency. The consequences IMF incident that is likely to be killings of off-duty ANSF person- are likely to be mostly political, but potential nel, local GOA employees includ- the most consequential of them, impacts on Kunar’s specific security environ- however. In Khas Kunar, IMF ing school teachers, and those ment in the form of punitive Pakistani retalia- and ANSF patrolling near the accused of spying for or working tion may include some form of intensification border in the Shunkray area are with IMF. One thing that did of the cross-border shelling in the coming change, however, was a slightly thought to have been fired on months, as well as increased indifference or from the border area, as a result more active IMF. Clearing opera- even active support for those AOGs operating of which air support was called in tions or air strikes took place in into Kunar from Pakistan. Ghaziabad, Narang and Mara- which led to the deaths of 25 Pak- wara, a noteworthy change from a Mil soldiers and the injury of 11 total absence of such activity in others, the full contingent of men

NGO Incidents L AGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 With just 6 recorded kinetic 40 The remaining 2 IED incidents events conducted by the armed 30 occurred in Mihtarlam; in the first, opposition – 5 IED strikes and 2 20 IDF incidents – in this past fort- a Traffic Police ranger vehicle was night, November as a whole has struck in the Pacha Khel area, 10 marked a big drop in the level of injuring two traffic policemen, 0 conflict in Laghman, decreasing and in the latter, 3 Kuchis were 50% on October levels. With 3 of injured in the Mihtarlam desert those IED strikes occurring on area by a detonation while out LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime collecting firewood. Also in Mih- the main road in Alingar, though, led to a small weapons and ammunition cache the AOG cells conducting these tarlam, two rockets were fired rather aimlessly at the city, striking seizure. That being said, 2 AOG fighters and attacks remain present and active, their commander were announced to have therefore sustaining this risk for nothing of any reported signifi- cance, while the remaining IDF joined the peace process and surrendered their road movements in the district. arms in the northern district late in the peri- Yet the only other events in Alin- event was a similar case of rocket fire on the Dowlat Shah DAC, od—though this is likely to have no impact on gar related to a long standing land the existing paradigm. dispute concerning a mountain in again wide of the mark. This may the Kaho area, leading to two sep- have been a rather muted re- arate armed confrontations be- sponse to a similarly muted, multi- tween two sub-tribes that killed 5 day IMF operation in the district, and wounded 11. which was only reported to have THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents ANDAHAR KANDAHAR K Year to Date 3 200 This Report Period 0 Kandahar experienced a total of 150 89 security incidents, of which 32 the beginning of 2011 in Kanda- 100 har city alone. The primary tar- were authored by AOGs. In the 50 last fortnight the territorial distri- gets in this type of incident re- bution of these incidents shows mains ANP personnel, GOA offi- 0 that Zhari, Panjwayi, Maywand cials and locals associated with ANSF/IMF. While the number and Kandahar City experienced KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime sustained AOG activity. of such incidents have fluctuated over the past months (with peaks After a temporary decrease in the recorded between January-March number of targeted killings that and June-August), they remain a with an IMF soldier killed in an IED strike in had been observed across the consistent and common tactic District 8. province, and in particular in Kan- within the city and will likely con- ANSF/IMF operations continued apace this dahar City, following Eid period, tinue to remain so into the mid- reporting cycle primarily in Zhari, Panjwayi, this reporting cycle saw a renewal term. Maywand and Kandahar city (the most ‘active’ of this type of tactic. On the 16th areas in the last fortnight). Air assets were in District 3 of Kandahar City 2 The level of IED deployment, with 37 incidents (including 14 used on several occasions in these operations AOG riding a motorcycle opened in Panjwayi, Zhari and Maywand districts, fire on an off-duty ANP official, detonations) remains in line when compared with a total of 35 IEDs which resulted in the death of a number of killing the ANP and wounding a AOG operatives (including a mid-level AOG civilian. Additional killings were (both detonations and discoveries) recorded throughout the previous commander killed in Panjwayi, and reported reported in districts 4, 2 and 7 death of 10 AOG members in Maywand). targeting respectively a civilian cycle. This period AOG contin- (reportedly working as an IMF ued to target security forces in This period, the highly contested Zhari district local contractor), a former Jihadi Zhari, Maywand, Kandahar city, also saw a noteworthy event. Although the commander and an ANP official. Panjwayi and Shah Wali Kot. exact circumstances of the incident, as well as Another 2 civilians were victims A noteworthy incident occurred the number of casualties, have not been clearly rd of mobile ‘hit teams’ in districts 2 in the latter district, when an IED determined, it has been reported that on 23 and 9, however in the latter cases caused injuries to 4 IMF soldiers November, IMF conducted an air strike criminal motivation behind the on the 18th. In Maywand, in addi- against an AOG cell planting IEDs in the area killing is likely. tion to 4 ANP wounded during a of Siya Choy. The operation reportedly resulted in 2 AOG members and up to 7 children It is worth noting that more than single incident that took place in Band-e-Temoor area, 1 ANP was killed, while 3 AOG and 2 children were 95 AOG initiated targeted killings wounded. Rather surprisingly, no demonstra- (including both attempted and killed on the 23rd. Another fatality was reported in Kandahar City, tions have been reported as a result of this op- effective attacks) occurred since eration. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents H ELMAND Year to Date 2 HELMAND This Report Period 0 350 Helmand remains a highly kinetic 300 area, recording this reporting peri- passing IMF convoy. It appears 250 200 od a large variety of incidents, that this time the explosive device detonated prematurely before 150 including a series of suicide at- 100 tacks, in addition to numerous reaching its target, killing only the 50 AOG direct attacks and a signifi- attacker and not causing any IMF 0 cant level of IED emplacement. casualties. Indeed, for the second consecu- It is worth noting that amongst 12 HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime tive reporting period suicide at- incidents involving suicide vectors tacks remained an important part recorded in Helmand in 2011, Sangin districts. Although ANSF/IMF contin- of the security landscape in the Lashkar Gah District itself saw 7 ue to be successful in discoveries and disposals province. attacks (incl. the most recent), of IEDs across the province (with this period with SVBIEDs being used on 5 On 21 November in Nahri Sarraj, more than 50% of devices disposed), the casu- separate occasions. a BBIED operative approached alties related with such incidents were once an ANP convoy (which included The risk of the potential for fur- again significant. In the last fortnight, 4 IMF the District Chief of Police) in the ther similar incidents has been soldiers were killed, whereas 4 ANCOP, 2 vicinity of the ANP HQ. The underlined with a discovery of a ANP and 1 civilian were wounded. individual was identified as a sui- large VBIED located in Toor ANSF/IMF continued to carry out numerous cide attacker and shot by the Tank area of Lashkar Gah on the operations throughout the province. In the ANP; nevertheless his vest deto- 15th. In addition, an IMF air last two weeks these were focused on Nahri nated, wounding 2 ANP officials. strike conducted in Nahri Sarraj Sarraj, Nad Ali and Kajaki districts. In addi- Although the district remains killed a suspected BBIED attacker tion to various weapons and explosive cache highly volatile and continues to along with 2 of his associates on seizures, security forces arrested 20 AOG host a significant AOG presence, the 17th. members, while a further 28 were reported to suicide attacks have been quite Not surprisingly in the past two have been killed. The interruption of the drug rare in Nahri Sarraj, with this inci- weeks IED deployment account- business remains another objective of the secu- dent marking just the second this ed for the vast majority of record- rity forces in the province, with this period year. Four days later (on the 25th), ed incidents within the province. seeing the detention of a number of persons a Toyota Corolla rigged as an These were focused in particular accused of cultivating poppy fields in Nad Ali. SVBIED detonated in Lashkar on Nahri Sarraj, Lashkar Gah and Gah (Sarkar area), targeting a

Transition Second Tranche Areas: Provinces Complete: Balkh, Takhar, Daykundi, Samangan, Nimroz & Kabul (Surobi was remaining)

Provinces Partial: Herat (minus Obe, Shindand & Chishti Sharif); Parwan (minus Shinwari & Ghorband); Sar -e Pul (minus Sayyad)

Districts: Yaftali Sufla, Shahri Buzurg, Baharak, Tishkan, Kishim, Argo & Arghanj Khwa (Badakhshan Province); Ab Kamari (Badghis Province); Nawa, Nad Ali & Marja (Helmand Province); Qarghayi (Laghman Province); Bihsud, Khas Kunar, Kama & Surkh Rod (Nangarhar); Jalrez, Bihsud I & II (Wardak)

Cities: Jalalabad (Nangarhar); Chaghcharan (Ghor); Shibirghan (Jawzjan); Fayzabad (Badakhshan); Ghazni (Ghazni); Qala-I Naw (Badghis); Maydan Shahr (Wardak) THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents G HAZNI Year to Date 2 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250

In the last two weeks Ghazni ex- 200 perienced impressive incident vol- population remains present. This umes once again, mainly affecting was highlighted by 2 incidents that 150 areas located along the strategical- occurred in Ab Band and 100 Qarabagh, during the first of ly important Highway 1. This 50 reporting cycle AOG activity was which a woman was killed while 0 focused in particular on the dis- in the second, another 3 civilians tricts of Gelan, Muqur, Qarabagh, were wounded in cross-fire. At- GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime and Andar. With at least 43 sepa- tacks on IMF logistical convoys rate cases direct attacks remained also remained a feature of the provincial security environment, PSC guards, 3 ANP, 3 IMF and 2 ANA sol- the AOG tactic of choice, target- diers wounded. ing on multiple occasions ANSF with one noteworthy incident oc- and IMF, DACs as well as IMF curring in the DAC area of Muqur Ghazni city, which has been officially an- logistical convoys. This period on the 25th: AOG attacked an nounced as part of the second tranche of tran- IMF personnel and convoys bore IMF contracted logistical convoy sition, witnessed several notable incidents in- the brunt of AOG attacks. Alt- and killed 2 PSC guards, burning volving security forces. The most significant th hough the majority of these at- 4 fuel tankers and damaging an took place on the 19 , when as a result of a tacks consisted of brief engage- additional 2. misidentification, an IMF detail clashed with ments and did not involve casual- In the last two weeks, at least 15 ANP in the vicinity of Baaba Yar area while ties, in addition to 5 ANP injured IED detonations affected the dis- conducting a night operation. As a result, 2 4 IMF soldiers were also reported tricts of Rashidan, Dih Yak, ANP were killed and another 3 were wounded. to have been wounded in the last Muqur and Qarabagh. As is fre- IMF night raids - frequently involving Special fortnight. Despite the fact that quently the case, IED deployment Forces units - remain a prominent tool of the AOG-initiated direct attacks con- caused numerous casualties IMF COIN strategy, despite being highly continued to be focused on ‘hard tar- amongst security forces, with this troversial (not only from the population’s gets’ such as ANSF/IMF, the risk period seeing a total of 6 ANP point of view, but also ANSF’s, as they are of collateral involvement for local and 3 ANA soldiers killed, and 3 often carried out without coordination with local Afghan security forces).

NGO Incidents Z ABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 This reporting period Zabul expe- 80 rienced 56 security incidents, fortnight in addition to security 60 forces, IED initiated incidents marking a sharp increase when 40 were particularly deadly against compared with the previous cycle. 20 With 11 AOG direct attacks re- PSC personnel. In 2 separate inci- 0 ported, IED deployment remains dents that occurred in Qalat the main threat across the prov- (Omakai area) and in Mizan districts a total of 2 PSC guards were ince. In the last fortnight 20 IED ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime related incidents were recorded, killed and another 5 were wounded. It is worth noting that while with Qalat and Tarna Wa Jaldak indirect fire attacks. Similar to the previous accounting for the majority of indirect fire usually plays a minor role in the province as compared period, Qalat district witnessed cases of target- them. The most significant inci- th with widespread deployment of ed killing. In the Senak area on the 27 , pur- dent related to the IED deploy- ported AOG members shot and killed the ment occurred on the last day of IEDs and less frequent but present AOG direct attacks, this peri- brother of a former District Governor of the previous cycle (November 15) Shahjoy and an employee of a road construc- in the Nawrak area of Qalat, when od 4 mortar rounds were fired against the Arghandab DAC. tion company. Further to this, temporary ab- an IED detonated on a civilian duction was reported on the 18th, in Shinkay, vehicle, killing 1 occupant and One projectile impacted in a gar- den, wounding 4 civilians, under- where a local teenager was abducted by an wounding 4 other. Also in Qalat AOG over the accusation of cooperating with another IED incident involving an lining the risk of collateral involvement for the local popula- the ANP. The victim was released the follow- ANA vehicle resulted in injuries ing day through the negotiations of elders. of 6 ANA soldiers. In the last tion from frequently inaccurate THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents P AKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 200 This Report Period 0 Conflict intensity in Paktika re- 150 mained broadly unchanged from 40% and were concentrated in 100 Barmal, Dila, Gayan, Urgun and the first half of November, and if 50 anything increased slightly, mean- Ziruk, almost all against ANSF ing that the September-November and IMF, although a couple tar- 0 period has seen a stable, Autum- geted DACs and a RCC worksite. nal level of conflict significantly These were the most deadly of the PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime down on the summer season. Yet opposition’s activities during the as with the previous period, what period, although this was mostly a lower level of conflict means in for the opposition themselves: 25 successfully disrupted. Lastly, the remaining practice in Paktika is still one that AOG fighters were killed as a re- 40% of opposition activities were accounted dwarfs the other eastern border sult of these attacks, including 10 for by IDF incidents, which continue to be region provinces in terms of over- in one attack on an IMF base in highly ineffective; not a single one of the 20 all levels of violence. While last Ziruk, while only 2 IMF, 2 ANP incidents – the majority of which took place in period’s extremely high level of and 1 ANA were injured in the Barmal with the remaining in Gayan and fatalities was not matched, this same engagements. neighbouring districts – struck their target. In period wasn’t too far off. IMF IEDs were, by contrast, more contrast to a number of other provinces, Pak- operations continued to account deadly for the security forces. tika’s AOG cadres appear to just be very badly for the most fatal incidents, with 4 While only constituting 20% of trained in this form of attack, unusual given separate air strikes – 2 in Barmal the opposition’s kinetic incidents, the HQN’s usually relatively high standard of and 1 each in Gayan and Nika – that is, 10 detonations, the blasts fighter. leading to a total of 38 AOG led to the deaths of 4 ANA sol- deaths. Other IMF operations in diers and 2 ANP policemen, as Finally, the only incidents of the small number Barmal, Sharana and Zarghun well as 2 AOG fighters due to that sit outside of these main dynamics worth Shahr were less kinetic, namely an premature detonation; 2 IMF, 2 noting were concentrated in Sharana. ANP air strike that destroyed a VHF ANA and 2 ANP were also re- found the dead body of a shopkeeper kid- repeater, a weapons seizure and ported injured. Barmal and Dila napped previously, while ANP also managed two arrests, respectively. saw the worst of these. Of note, to stop 4 individuals in the act of robbing a money changer. Also in Sharana, a lone oppo- Amongst the opposition-initiated there were also 12 IEDs discov- sition fighter was reported to have joined the kinetic engagements, there were ered and control detonated, with government, in what amounts to a good indi- also a number of significant casu- the bulk again occurring in Dila – cation of how successful such attempts at rein- alty tolls. Breaking these engage- demonstrating that while they tegration are likely to be in the province. ments down, hit-and-run remain a deadly threat for security SAF/RPG attacks constituted forces, more than 50% are being

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