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TB 380-41 Final! klg DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION STATEMENT The technical or operational information in this manual is required solely for official use; therefore, distribution is authorized to U.S. Government agencies only. This determination was made on 1 January 1993. For further information, see page i of this document. WARNING: Military or civilian personnel who misuse or disclose to unauthorized persons information marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) may be subject to administrative sanctions brought under UCMJ Article 92, or in accor- dance with AR 690-700, Chapter 751, Table 1-1. Elec- tronic copies made of any publication herein must (1) bear the Four Official Use Only marking, and (2) include this WARNING in its entirety. Protective marking is in accordance with paragraph 3-200, Exemption 3a, AR 25-55. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters, Department of the Army Date of this Publication is 1 August 2003. Current as of 1 July 2003. This bulletin supersedes TB 380-41, October 1994 and rescinds the use of DA Forms 2008 and 2009. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TB 380-41 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION STATEMENT OUTSIDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RELEASE: Requests from outside the U.S. Government for release of this publication under the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Center, ATTN: AMSAC-MI/I, 5002 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-0001. Request from outside the U.S. Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act must be made to the Director, Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), Communications Security Logistics Activity (CSLA) at ATTN: SELCL-ID-P3, U.S. Army CECOM CSLA, 2133 Cushing Street, STE 3600, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7041. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i TB 380-41 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, D.C., 03 July 2003 TECHNICAL BULLETIN SECURITY: PROCEDURES FOR SAFEGUARDING, ACCOUNTING AND SUPPLY CONTROL OF COMSEC MATERIAL TB 380-41, July 2003, is chang ed from October 1994 as follows: (Remove the old TB in its entirety and replace with the July 2003 edition.) 1. Added a chapter to address specific AKMS issues (Chapter 6). 2. Added a chapter specific to Incidents and their reporting (Chapter 7). 3. Included newer information about shredders. 4. Changed reporting time frames to cause all accounts to be the same (National Guard and Reserves still have an extension on time). 5. Added information on deployment issues. 6. Reduced the amount of samples and included more charts. 7. Eliminated the COMSEC account numbering system, as the account number no longer identifies the type of account. 8. Incorporated changes to the MARKS. 9. Incorporated ALC 6/7 key issues. 10. Eliminated specific issues concerning CLSFs, as they will no longer be handled differently from other accounts. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii TB 380-41 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter/Paragraph Page CHAPTER 1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................1-1 1.1 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................... 1-1 1.1.1 (U) Objective .........................................................................................................1-1 1.1.2 (U) Scope..............................................................................................................1-1 1.1.3 (U) References, Abbreviations and Terms ...............................................................1-1 1.2 APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................................1-1 1.3 AVAILABILITY OF FORMS ................................................................................................1-1 1.4 RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS ..........................................................................................1-2 1.5 ARMY COMSEC WHOLESALE LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ............................1-2 1.6 COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................1-2 1.7 INTRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EKMS) .......................1-3 1.8 SERVICE AUTHORITY ......................................................................................................1-3 CHAPTER 2 COMSEC FACILITY, CMCS, ACCOUNTS, AND CUSTODIAN REQUIREMENTS .....2-1 2.1 COMSEC MATERIAL CONTROL SYSTEM (CMCS)........................................................... 2-1 2.1.1 (U) Army CMCS Structure ......................................................................................2-3 2.1.2 (U) CMCS Addresses.............................................................................................2-5 2.1.3 (U) COMSEC Directory Service (formerly COMSEC Activity Address Directory..........2-6 2.2 COMSEC FACILITY ......................................................................................................... 2-6 2.2.1 (U) Approving Office For the COMSEC Facility ........................................................2-6 2.2.2 (U) COMSEC Facility Approvals .............................................................................2-6 2.2.3 (U) Request for Approval........................................................................................2-7 2.2.4 (U) Action by Approving Authority ...........................................................................2-7 2.3 ESTABLISHING A COMSEC ACCOUNT ............................................................................2-8 2.4 COMSEC ACCOUNT NUMBERING SYSTEM.................................................................... 2-8 2.4.1 (U) COMSEC Account Number/EKMS ID Structure..................................................2-8 2.4.2 (U) Hand Receipt Numbers (Local Element) ............................................................2-8 2.5 COMSEC ACCOUNT REGISTRATION PACKET (CARP)................................................... 2-8 2.5.1 (U) COMSEC Account Registration Packet (CARP) Distribution................................2-9 2.5.2 (U) Reporting COMSEC Account Data Changes ......................................................2-9 2.5.3 (U) Completion of the CARP ...................................................................................2-9 2.5.4 (U) Fund Code DODAAC .......................................................................................2-9 2.6 SUPERVISION OF COMSEC FACILITIES ........................................................................2-11 2.7 COMSEC CUSTODIAN AND ALTERNATE REQUIREMENTS .......................................... 2-11 2.7.1 (U) Custodian and Alternate Appointments ............................................................2-11 2.7.2 (U) Custodian/Alternate and Witness Duties ..........................................................2-12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iii TB 380-41 Chapter/Paragraph Page 2.8 COMSEC CUSTODIAN ABSENCE ...................................................................................2-14 2.9 RELIEF FROM ACCOUNTABILITY ..................................................................................2-15 2.10 MOVEMENT OF COMSEC ACCOUNTS .......................................................................... 2-15 2.10.1 (U) Traditional Account Custodian Actions .............................................................2-15 2.10.2 (U) AKMS Account Custodian Actions ...................................................................2-16 2.10.3 (U) COR Processing Actions ................................................................................2-16 2.11 CLOSING OF COMSEC ACCOUNTS .............................................................................. 2-16 2.11.1 (U) Commander’s Actions ....................................................................................2-16 2.11.2 (U) COR Procedures Upon Closure of COMSEC Accounts ....................................2-17 2.11.3 (U) Closing of Accounts Due to Inactivity ...............................................................2-17 2.12 CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT OF A COMSEC ACCOUNT…………………………….…….2.17 2.12.1 (U) Traditional COMSEC Account Contingency Deployment…………………………..2.17 2.12.2 (U) AKMS COMSEC Account Contingency Deployment………………………………..2.18 2.12.3 (U) Additional Requirements for Deploying COMSEC Accounts……………………….2.18 2.12.4 (U) CSLA Responsibilities to the Deployed Account…………………………………….2.19 2.13 UNIT DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT COMSEC ACCOUNTS .................................................. 2-19 2.13.1 (U) Mission Support .............................................................................................2-19 2.13.2 (U) Suspension of a COMSEC Account .................................................................2-19 2.13.3 (U) Unit Return to Home Station ...........................................................................2-20 2.13.4 (U) CSLA Responsibilities for a Suspended Account ..............................................2-21 CHAPTER 3 SUPPLY AND CONTROLLING AUTHORITY PROCEDURES ..................................3-1 3.1 IDENTIFYING COMSEC MATERIAL ..................................................................................3-1 3.2 REQUISITION FUNDING AND RETURNS ......................................................................... 3-1 3.2.1 (U) Requisitions .....................................................................................................3-1 3.2.2 (U) Customer Returns ............................................................................................3-2
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