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Chapter 12 Communications DoD 51 OO.52-M CHAPTER 12 COMMUNICATIONS 12-1 GENERAL 12-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS The On-Scene Commander (OSC) requires internal a. Fast, reliable and accurate communications are communications with the operations center and with essential for nuclear weapon accident response opera- forces in the field to control and keep abreast of response tions. Moreover, securing adequate internal commun- activities. External communications with higher echelons ications to support activities at the accident scene is a time-sensitive operation. Equally critical to effective of command are necessary to keep key personnel command and control is the timely establishment of informed. Many initial communications requirements external communications to higher echelons, particularly can be met by unsecure voice communications; however, in the Washington arena. Therefore, the communications both secure voice and record communications are officers of the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service required early in the response. Response Force (SRF) must take immediate action to ensure that appropriate communications equipment is Communication requirements: identified and requested early in response operations. a. Establish internal communications. b. Effective response to a nuclear weapon accident (1) Telephone communications between fixed site relies heavily on a communications officer knowledge locations, for example, the operations center and the about secure and non-secure tactical, strategic, and Joint Information Center (JIC). commercial communications systems. He or she must (2) Field phones for EOD operations (secure be able to apply conventional and imaginative methods phones are desirable). and ensure that required communications are available. (3) UHF/VHF nets. Several minimum nets, He or she should be equally adept at establishing command (secure desirable), weapons recovery opera- communications support in remote locations, or in areas tions (secure), radiological operations (secure desirable), near existing communications systems. security, public affairs will be required. c. In addition to military communications at the b. Establish external communications. accident site, the DoE, FE MA, State and/or civilian officials establish their own communications. Careful (1) Telephone communications with the Service attention must be afforded these installations to ensure operations center, the National Military Command mutual support and eliminate interference. Center, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Conferencing may suffice early in the response. 12-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (2) Multiple telephone lines to support response force elements. (3) Secure voice via satellite, telephone, .or HF. This chapter provides guidance for establishing (4) Access to the Defense Communications System communications systems and capabilities to support response operations. The requirements of both the IRF for record communications. and SRF are “discussed, including personnel at the accident scene (internal communications) and at long c. Coordinate frequency usage of all response distances (external corhmunications). Also included are organizations to prevent interference and radio treatments of various capabilities and hardware operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions may (telephone, radio, satellite, and visual signal) that are. Create explosive hazards or affect electronic and field available. laboratory instruments. 12-1 d. Obtain frequency clearances, as necessary. gapped” to AUTODIN through the HAMMER ACE operations center. Other capabilities include air-to- e. Prepare a Communication-Electronics Operating ground communications and a privacy feature, land Instruction for use by all response organizations. mobile radio network with a repeater/base station for local communications. The land mobile radios can interface with the secure satellite system. The limited 12-4 RESOURCES capability provided by HAMMER ACE is an initial capability only. For this reason, HAMMER ACE The communications capabilities and resources for personnel, in conjunction with the OSC, evaluate the nuclear weapon accident recovery operations vary situation and determine what, if any, additional widely. Resources are as familiar as the telephone or capabilities are required. HAMMER ACE equipment as sophisticated as satellite capable secure voice radio. is capable of battery operations, and enough batteries Communications assets must be capable of deployment are deployed to sustain 72-hour operation. A follow- to, and operation in, remote locations. The following on deployment of generators or additional batteries is presents a variety of communications resources for required for longer operations. response organizations. Because the same equipment supports numerous contingencies, only those assets ~. Requests for emergency HAMMER ACE required for a specific nuclear weapon accident response support should be made directly to HQ AFCC/COXC effort should be requested. Resources are available from (AFCC Command Center) or through the JNACC. the DoD, other Federal organizations, or commercial Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 20-A. Any sources. available communications media may be used to submit the request; however, verbal requests must be followed a. Service Assets. The Military Services maintain in writing within 24 hours. The requesting agency must communications assets organic to combat support units provide the following information with the request. as well as for contingency assets. Information about specific assets as well as procedures for requesting and a. Deployment location, including coordi- tasking Service assets can be obtained from the respective nates if avaiiabie. Service operations centers, or operational commanders. ~. Situation, including type of emergency. Telephone numbers are contained in Appendix l-G. c. Points of contact. ~. Remarks concerning any unusual condi- (1) U.S. Army. U.S. Army signal units have tions for wh~ch the team should prepare. communications assets to support battalion, brigade, and division operations including wire/ telephone ~. Requests for additional information should switchboards, multichannel radios, and record commun- “be directed to HQ AFCC/ DOXZ, Special Commun~’ ication systems. ications Division, Scott AFB, Illinois. Phone numbers (2) U.S. Air Force. Tactical communications assets are listed in Appendix 20-A. are available from both Combat Communication Groups and HAMMER ACE as described in paragraph (a) (3) U.S. Navy. Each U.S. Navy Fleet Commanders- below. “ in-Chief has control of ashore mobile contingency communication units. These units are maintained in a (a) HAMMER ACE. HAMMER ACE is a state of readiness to permit deployment within 24 hours rapidly deployable team of engineers and technicians by COMMNAVSTA Philippines and NAVCAMSLANT equipped with advanced technology communications Norfolk, VA, respectively. equipment. The team can deploy within three hours and establish communications within 30 minutes of arrival (a) Ashore Mobile Contingency Communica- on-site. HAMMER ACE equipment can be transported tions (AMCC). The AMCC van is . a small mobile on C-21, or equivalent-type aircraft, or commercial communications unit contained in one. transportable airliners. Capabilities include secure satellite system for equipment shelter with two separately configured 55 kw voice, facsimile, and limited data communications. The mobile diesel generators. The van contains sufficient secure satellite link can interface with AUTOSEVOCOM, equipment to maintain the following circuits STU-11, AUTOVON, and commercial telephone systems simul~aneously: through the HAMMER ACE operations center at Scott ~. Two secure full duplex teletype circuits (one AFB, Illinois. Record communications can be “air- via HF radio; or alternatively, two via HF radio). 12-2 ~. One narrow band secure voice (CV-3333) (a) Switchboards. via satellite with KG-36 security equipment. (b) HF radio. ~. Two UHF secure voice circuits with KY- (c) Microwave/ troposcatter radios. 28 voice security equipment. (d) UHF and VHF radios (secure and non- ~. HF High Command (HICOM) net. secure). ~. UHF satellite fleet broadcast receiver (AN/ (e) Secure record communications terminals. SSR-I receiver only). (f) Weather dissemination equipment. ~. One PARKHILL narrow band secure voice (g) UHF and SHF satellite terminals. circuit via HF or UHF satellite. (h) Secure TELEFAX (DACOM 412). ~. Two VINSON secure voice devices. (i) KY-65, KY-70 and KY-75 secure voice devices, and (b) When deployed, the AMCC uses local power (j) The AN/ URC Joint Airborne Communica- where available. Power source must be 440V, three phase, tions Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP). 60 Hz. Otherwise, mobile generators supplied with the AMCC units will be used. A complete AMCC unit can ~. The Joint Airborne Communication& Cen- be transported via one C-130 aircraft, one CH-53 ter/ Command Post (JACC/ CP), commonly referred t’o helicopter, or one 6x65-ton truck. The mobile generators as JACKPOT, consists of several pieces of equipment for the AMCC, if needed, requires an additional lift mounted in air transportable vans. The JACC/ CP has if transported by helicopter. When transported via truck, four major components—operations center, commun- an additional prime mover is required. ications control, generator, and an air conditioner/ (c) The AMCC units are, at all times, under the accessory trailer. operational control of the respective Fleet Commanders- ~. The JACC/CP can provide
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