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Lbl:E~Ijul!JC11!JI] JUN-AUG 1985 TOP SECRET llJ~UVCDllJ£Dl1 ~C5CBC!JWVU~ aJl]C5UJCB~ crcmi1U l!ll511JU1l!ll5 l!l~ 0015~CDl5 f OO~W~Ck(i)GJ(D lBl:E~IJUl!JC11!JI] JUN-AUG 1985 ~> : ~ . 86- 36 NSA 1 S INITIATIVE ON SECURE VOICE (U)........... ••••••••••• 1 TELEPHONE SECURITY, 1918 (U) ••••••••.· .••.•••••.•.••••.•••• \ \ •..•"-:- .. ~ •.••.•••.. 4 BULLETIN BOARD (U) •••.•••••..•.•••••.••••••••••••.••..•••• ~\., -...• . ••••• ">. ......... 4 SHOPWORK (IV) (U) ............................. ·1 ).\ . · .... >.. ... · · · .5 AN APPLICATION OF PINSETTER (U)............ • • . ·I •••• 7 VALEDICTORY OF A TRAFFIC ANALYST (U) .•..••...••• Joseph Starr .. -. .....•..•.•• • 9 BACK UP YOUR DATA FILES (U) ..................... Norman P. Smith.\ .......... 10 ESCHEW OBFUSCATORY SCRIVENERY, PLEASE (U)....... ••••••••• 11 NSA-CROSTIC NO. 62 (U) ••••••••••••••.•••..•..••. D.H.W •.•.•••••.••••.•.•...• 12 'fHIS 80€l:JMl3Pi'i' €0:l"i'fAH'JS 60BFJWORB MATERIAE. OCID: 4019704 , P.L. 86- 36 Published by Pl . Techniques and Standards ·11 EDITORIAL VOL. XII , Nos. 6-8 ..... June-August 198S..<3f'/ /.}:l_i#nalysts in NSA have an opportunity to share their views and --,-------- --------- -----,..'-'"·/ ;/!fcJxperiences with others by writing for one of the several PUBLISHER . ._I____ .....;_.. / ..;j.;i! 'f. J:i eriodicals published in the Agency ·... ·.. :/j?/f BOARD OF EDITORS '" ·· 'i One of them is CRYPTOLOG. It is specifically intended for . , informal exchanges among analysts on subjects of interest to Editor .. .. .. .. ... .. l.._ ______,,k9f5 :3~f10~) · them. The editorial blue pencil is lightly applied, and only in the interest of clarity cz_ it's up to you to sustain the readers' (%j ~5ifr7> interest and toputyour idea~ across persuasively. Collection p.;..;..;..;..;..;..;.i....... I ___"' . Computer-Security . r t96~i$i4J) Comp~ter Systems ... Li. lr-------1(~~3t.'f 1Q3) For assistance, advice, or JUSt plain aid and comfort, you may Cryptanalysis ... •.._....,.---....i(¥ 3-47f!O) call on any of the editors; it need not be the one on your Cryptolinguistics __..__1 ___ .IJ.9~ ~~ 4704) subject. Index .. I 9;$3,s33oJ Information Science r (963~ 1/\ 45) As for anonymity, we follow the standard etiquette of most Intelligence· Research ..........................,1 ____--#\)63- $ 095) publications: ·. We will honor the author's request to remain ~anguage · ...1 ______ --1 (~93 f S151) anonymous, (we will even provide a nom de guerre for those Linguistics .... .. .I (% i iJa96l who might want one) but the identity of the author must be Mathematics . 1.__ ______.(96 ~- 5655) made known to the Editor. Anonymous contributions (that Puzzles .. David H. Will1ams (96'B-1103) is, lacking identification of the author) may as well be Science and Technology I ~9p3 - 4423J written in invisible ink ... we throw them out unread. Special Research . Vera R. Filby (968-8014) Traffic Analysis .. Robert J. Hanyok (~63-3888) Another point of etiquette that authors must observe is about multiple submissions. If you send your article to more Illustrator p.;..;...;..;.· ....1 ___ --tl(963-3057) than one publication, you must so state. Distribution .. .I _(963 -3369) Now for a few tips to ensure early consideration: * The subject should be related in some way to our business. Unclassified term papers seldom fill the bill. To submit articles or letters by mail, send to: Editor, CRYPTOLOG , Pl The article should be shorter rather than longer. A readers' survey showed that long articles are not read. If you used a word processor, please include the mag card, floppy or diskette along with your .. The text and illustrations should be of reproducible hard copy, with a notation as to w hat equip­ quality. ment, operating system. and software you used. * Every paragraph and illustration should be appropriately ·via PLATFORM mail, send to: classified. cryptolg at bar 1c OS (bar-one-c- zero- five) Hard copies of articles prepared on word processors (note: no 'o' in 'log ' ) should be accompanied by the mag card or floppy. (We send it to the Data Conversion Center where it is transformed to Always include your full name, organization, and an 860 floppy, and then we convert that to an 8010 floppy.) Se.cure phone number. Be sure to state what equipment and what software you used, and the operating system in the case of a pc. * If you submit a contribution via electronic mail, notify us by spme other medium that you are doing so. {There 's slippage every now and then.) For Subscriptions or Change of Address send name and organization to: * If you're going off on a field assignment or extended I f>14 training or if you are retiring, designate someone who can P .L. 86- 36 act as your literary executor. * Label every submission with your full name, organization, Contents of CRYPTOLOG should not be reprodu.ced or and secure phone. further disseminated outside the National Security Agency without the permission of the Publisher. · Inquiries regarding reproduction and dissemination should be -v~. directed to the Editor. / FOR: OFFICIAL t:!SE eHLY 4019704 NSA'S INITIATIVE ON SECURE VOICE (U) P.L. 86-36 (U) The Soviet Union and other hostile governments can intercept and exploit, with ease and impunity, many U.S. telecommunications in the continental United States and around the world. Classified and sensitive communications over unsecured telephone systems alone represent such a lucrative and easy source of intelligence that NSA has undertaken a bold new approach to counter this threat. (U) Each of NSA's past efforts to develop and distribute COMSEC equipments to the field has taken many years to complete. To reduce this time signifi­ cantly NSA decided to tap the knowledge and resources of major commercial manufacturers of telecommunications equipment in a program called The Future Secure Voice System (FSVS) whereby NSA provides the cryptologic expertise and contractors provide technical, manufacturing, and marketing know-how. The goal is to design and produce a secure telephone the size of a conventional office deskset which will plug into a modular jack, cost less than 145, which directs that all U.S. Government systems $2,000, and be simple to operate. carrying classified information be secured, including telephone. EO 1.4.(c) EXTENT OF THE THREAT (U) NSDD-145 requires that NSA, as the new National P. L. 86_-3.-6. _~_ . Manager for Telecommunications Systems Security, \ ~ ~~secured tel~ph~:me c_onversat1ons ~an be provide a secure communications capability for as \ easily exploited by hostile mtell1gence-gathermg many as 500,000 users beginning in 1987. The FSVS · activities to reveal governmental, military, and program has been conceived to help implement this industrial secrets and technology. That is because directive. communications over commercial telephone systems, especially long distance, are likely to be transmitted PRESENT SECURE TELEPHONE SERVICE via microwave or satellite which are particularly easy to intercept; all it takes is equipment costing about ~The only DoD-wide, secure telephone system $25,000, small enough to fill the back of a station available today is AUTOSEVOCOM, which serves wagon. I about 2,500 locations around the world. This system, 1....------------------------'·I however, secures only a small fraction of the total telephone conversations of the DoD, and much of the ~Moreover, mission-essential, classified information equipment is outdated and provides poor voice quality. is sometimes discussed over unsecure telephones · Under the recently implemented AUTOSEVOCOM Life simply because secure communications are Cycle Extension Program (ALCEP), older HY-2/KG-13 unavailable. Unclassified but sensitive technological equipment is being replaced by newer VINSON devices, data also pass over the telephone system daily. As a which will update the system and improve voice recent National COMSEC Committee Biennial Report quality. The total AUTOSEVOCOM community will, points out, "the industrial base which produces the however, remain small. nation's most advanced military hardware and develops it~ most sensitive technol?gy _is almost ~~mplete~y. ft('NsA's Secure Telephone Units (STU- II and STU- w1thout a secure commun1cat10c:s _capab1llty. Crttrcal !IM) are also being procured by military departments secrets are lost before the sens1t1ve systems and and the civil sector. Over the next five years the technologies they represent can be fielded by military total number of STU-II and STU-UM units should reach or other government users." approximately 14,000 units, which is only a small portion of the half-million or so of the secure (U) The unsecured telephone has been determined to telephones needed. Because of their relatively high be the most lucrative source of classified and sensitive cost ($12-25,000) and their dependence on the Bellfield information available to unauthorized recipients. To Key Distribution Centers (KDCs) each of which can counter this vulnerability, President Reagan recently service only a limited number of subscribers, these signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) units cannot be distributed to the field in large Jun-Aug 1985 * CRYPTOLOG * page l HANQI.E vu COMUl'l' Clr/1Ul#Efl" ONL! sr:ertE 1· OCID: 4019704 quantities. KDCs act as centralized points for strategy is neeessary to achieve NSA's goal of initial electronically distributing key, a function necessary in delivery in early 1987. communications security. COMSEC DOCTRINE STU-III FAMILY OF TERMINALS (U) Physical handling requirements for such a large (U) With a half million or more potential customers to quantity
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