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STU-III System Level Description and Network Applications

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STU-III System Level Description and Network Applications DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING CENTER STU-III SYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 00 j2 ""AND I -NETWORK APPLICATIONS " NOVEMBER 1986 * REVISED JUNE 1988 DTIC ELECTE f .JU U 2 71988 H o APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNUMITED IN '. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DD 254 Approved for Public Release: Distribution 2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Unlimited a. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBERIS) 6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION b1.OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (If opplicbil. Defense Communications Engineering Center Computer Sciences Corporation CSC (DCEC) 6c. ADDRESS (City. State and ZIP Codei 7b. ADDRESS (City. State and ZIP Code) 6565 Arlington Boulevard 1860 Wiehle Avenue Falls Church, VA 22046 Reston, VA 22090 84 NAME OF FUNDING/ISPONSORING So. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (it applicable DCEC R630 DCAI00-87-C-0013 8k ADDRESS (City. State and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS. PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT Reston, VA ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. NO. 87-18A 11. TITLE Il ciude S curit> ChaJssbcatiOni STU-III System Level Description and Network Applications 12. PERSONAL AUTHORIS; Wilmot, Roger 138& TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT fYr., Mo., Day) 15. PAGE COUNT Technical FROM 1988 TO 880630 35 16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 17 COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS lCorit'nur on reverse if neceuary' and identify by block numberi FIELDO GROUP SUB GR STU-III, RED Switch, TRI-TAC, Radio Wireline Interface, IVSN, DSN, Conferencing 19 ABSTRACT rContinue on reverse if ncessary and identify by block numberI 3 This paper serves as the system level description of the Secure Terminal Unit Type III (STU-III) and its interfaces in a variety of DoD switched voice network appl'cations. The STU-III terminal is being developed by the National Security Agenc:r7NA-6nd is intended to replace several thousand existing analog clear voice telephone instruments in the DoD. Its operation and interface to the switched networks is essentially the same as for existing or planned clear voice telephones. The STU-III family of terminals includes two types of Low Cost Terminals (LCT-l and LCT-2), a STU-II compatible terminal (STU-III/A) and a ruggedized mobile/portable terminal (STU-III/MPT). The LCT-l is intended to be the primary DoD secure voice terminal, whereas the STU-III/A and STU-III/ MPT will be used for special applications, e.g., for interoperability with the NATO STU-II terminals and tactical operations requirements. 20 DISTR, BUTION/AVAILABI LITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 7 SAME AS RPT. 9' DTIC USERS 0 UNCLASSIFIED 22s NaME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE NUMBER 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL (include Arra Code) Mr. Bobby Donald (703) 437-2150 R630 DCS SWITCHED NETWORKS SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STU-III SYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION AND NETWORK APPLICATION9 REVISED *- JUNE 1988 Prepared for: DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING CENTER 1860 WIEHLE AVENUE RESTON, VIRGINIA 22090 Under Contract No. DCA100-87-C-0013 Prepared by: Computer Sciences Corporation - 3160 Fairview Park Drive * Falls Church, Virginia 22042 '-." . r TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Section 1- Introduction......................................... 1 Section 2 - STU-III Physical Description and Basic Features. 2 2.1 Physical Description................................... 2 2.2 STU-III Features and options........................... 2 Section 3 - System Overview, Interfaces, and Call Procedures 7 3.1 System Overview......................................... 7 3.2 STU-III Network Interfaces............................. 7 73.2.1 Secure Nonsecure Call Features........................ 12 3.3 STU-III to STU-III Call Procedures.................... 16 3.4 Interface to RED Switches.............................. 16 3.4.1 Trunk Interface Mode ........................ 16 03.4.2 RED Switch Interface Call Descriptions for Trunk Interface Mode..............................17 3.4.3 User Access Line Interface Mode....................... 19 3.5 Interface to DSN STU-III Conference Units............. 19 3.5.1 Interface Description.................................. 20 3.5.2 Conference Call Description........................... 20 3.6 Tactical Radio/Wireline Interfaces (RWI's) to ANDVT/VINSON......................................... 20 3.6.1 Generalized RWI Description........................... 22 3.6.2 RWI Call Description................................... 24 Q.~3.7 STU-III Interface to TRI-TAC (AN/TTC-39).............. 24 3.7.1 STU-III Deployment with TRI-TAC AN/TTC-39............. 24 3.7.2 Manual RED Switch Interface........................... 25 3.8 NATO Interface......................................... 28 .,~.Section 4 - Transmission........................................ 31 Section 5 - Status of STU-III Logistics Support Planning . 32 5.1 Low Cost Terminal (LCT)................................ 32 5.2 STU-III/A and STU-III/MPT.............................. 32 Bibliography..................................................... 33 * Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations............................. 34 D iC TAM~ U1miounce d IN:SPECTEDA Dj stribiltion/ Availatilit,, Code I Avnil and/or' Dist Special w Ii I 0ii If II IIC111 1 1 ,1 1 11 g-w- L=&Nm LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1 STU-III Network Applications ............................ 8 2 STU-III Two-Wire Network Interface .................... 10 3 STU-III Four-Wire Network Interface ................... 11 4 RED Switch Interface to Switched Networks ............. 18 5 Current General Purpose STU-III Conference Approach 21 6 Tactical RWI Interoperability .......................... 23 7 STU-III/TTC-39 Interoperability (1)................... 26 8 STU-III/TTC-39 Interoperability (2)................... 27 9 NATO Interoperability .............................. 29 LIST OF TABLES 1 Vendor Data Port Modes (LCT-1) .......................... 4 2 STU-III/LCT-1, STU-III/A and STU-III/MPT Interconnection Matrix ............................... 9 3 STU-III LCT-I Application Configurations .............. 13 4 LCT-l Interface Configurations ......................... 14 C ~iii 4 SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION This paper serves as the system level description of the Secure Terminal Unit Type III (STU-III) and its interfaces in a variety of DoD switched voice network applications. The STU-III f terminal is being developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and is intended to replace several thousand existing analog clear ri voice telephone instruments in the DoD. Its operation and interface to the switched networks is essentially the same as for existing or planned clear voice telephones. Installation of a STU-III in the United States can be very simple; normally, installation for a two-wire application consists only of inserting I'. a telephone connector (e.g., RJ11C) and an AC power plug into the appropriate receptacles. The STU-III family of terminals includes two types ot Low Cost Terminals (LCT-1 and LCT-2), a STU-II compatible terminal (STU-III/A), and a ruggedized mobile/portable terminal (STU-III/MPT). The STU-III/LCT-I, STU-III/A, and STU-III/MPT are intended for all levels of government classified traffic. The STU-III/LCT-2 is intended for sensitive unclassified traffic. The LCT-1 and the LCT-2 units will be available in at least three vendor variations; i.e., AT&T, Motorola, and RCA. The STU-III/A is in the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase, deliveries are expected by October, 1989 from Motorola. The MPT .p.is currently in the development phase with Motorola. A production - contract is anticipated in early 1989. All STU-III terminals are interoperable at 2.4 kb/s using an enhanced Linear Predictive Coder voice algorithm. The LCT-l is intended to be the primary DoD secure voice terminal, whereas the STU-III/A and STU-III/MPT will be used for special applications (e.g., for interoperability *_ with the NATO STU-II terminals and tactical operations . requirements. 1,1 04 SECTION 2 - STU-III PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND BASIC FEATURES 2.1 PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION The STU-III consists of a deskset, handset, and, depending upon the vendor and/or location, a separate AC power adapter. The *approximate range of physical parameters is: 225-900 cubic inches, 8-15 lbs., and 14-30 watts. This range of parameters varies respectively in size, weight, and power depending upon the vendor and the type of terminal provided (i.e., STU-III/LCT, SSTU-III/A, or STU-III/MPT). 2.2 STU-III FEATURES AND OPTIONS The STU-III terminals will incorporate the following features and options: i. STU-III/LCT-1 a. Common Features (1) Clear and secure voice operating modes (2) Digital voice processing based on Linear Predictive Coding, Enhanced (LPC-10e) at 2.4 kb/s for the secure mode (3) Full-duplex operation over two-wire access lines, with internal echo cancellation (4) Half-duplex operation (VOX) over two-wire access * lines J r (5) Secure data capability at 2.4 kb/s, synchronous. (6) EMI/TEMPEST protection * (7) Crypto keying using the FIREFLY II algorithm (8) Precedence tone dialing for two- and four-wire applications 2 0, * r* .V. *.. W.. (9) Preempt tone recognition (10) Secure dialing mode, which allows address information to be passed securely to a distant interface, e.g., conference bridge or RED switch. b. Common Options (1) Foreign
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