The Commandants Introduction By Michael H. Clemmesen he Baltic Defence College is doing wear uniforms, but they will not develop Some of the best BALTDEFCOL its very best to ensure that successful into high quality military professionals, who graduates from the first three Joint Com- graduates are as well prepared as possible can contribute to a focused force develop- mand and Staff Courses have received very to assist with the development of the con- ment process. The reason for the failure may suitable postings, where they could put cepts and structures of their future armed either be a poor personnel management and into practice at battalion level what they forces. career planning system which fails to select learned in the course. However, the num- However, the College is limited to pro- the officers for the appropriate appoint- ber of such graduates is very limited and viding a theoretical foundation in a pro- ment post Staff College or the forces are even the best battalion commander can- fession that is as practical in its character too underdeveloped and have too few ap- not train himself, his staff and the head- as that of a doctor of medicine. For the pointments to support professional devel- quarters and the logistics elements of his officer to develop into a true professional, opment through demanding, realistic, and unit. Only a combined arms framework the structure and activities of the armed progressive command and staff tours of duty. a brigade can train the units and their forces that the graduate return to must The difference between the best West- cadre in a realistic way. be capable of offering him or her the ern general staff officer tradition and the The first step is to establish the bri- opportunity to gain realistic and practi- Soviet model is the deep understanding gades in order to provide the necessary cal experience in their profession. in Western armies that the staff officer training-architecture. We are still waiting If the best staff course graduates do not must serve regularly with and command for the necessary small and focused nuclei get that experience soon after the course, troops in order to retain and develop his of brigade staffs to be created in Estonia the effect of the year in the College will be professional understanding and skills. Any and Latvia. However, this is not enough, much diminished. These officers may still other solution is a harmful fallacy. in itself, to improve the situation. The 5 brigade commander and staff should be Field training exercises are costly and brigade commander in the first couple of given full authority, responsibility and ac- therefore they should be as demanding years. However, the developing staffs should countability for the practical combined and realistic as possible not Soviet type, have a small handful of highly qualified, arms training of the cadres and leadership well-rehearsed Potemkin Village demon- dynamic young officers (some with a Joint support elements of the existing and de- strations. They should only take place, Command and Staff Course training back- veloping units of the future brigade com- after the skills and understanding of com- ground and the rest with Junior Staff bat, combat support, and combat service manders and staffs have been developed Course/Captains Course training), and they support. It is thus essential that the key by other training activities. should have the clear initially overwhelm- part of the brigades come to life in reality, The higher level land force or opera- ing responsibility to develop the units that they do not remain as paper projects tional - headquarters are not in a posi- into a combined arms formation and be only. tion to conduct realistic training for units, provided with the necessary resources. The training activities that should have their commanders and their staffs. Instead The Baltic Defence College, NATO, the started long ago include study periods for they should run a similar full spectrum supporting states and the graduates are wait- unit and subunit commanders and spe- of training activities for the formation ing for development in this field to take cialist staff personnel covering both tacti- and above headquarters. place as soon as possible this year. We are cal and support subjects, tactical exercises An army, with its professional cadre, is waiting for implementation of one of the without troops, reconnaissance followed not created by building infrastructure, long sequence of force structure initiatives. by war gaming in the tactical trainers, sig- buying equipment and recruiting person- The main difference between the best nals and command post exercises, logis- nel who can be assembled for parade and NATO army units and what the Baltic tics exercises, and field exercises for each shows. Instead an army comes to life states have now is not in equipment. It is of the combat units reinforced by the through a varied spectrum of intense, de- in the difference in the intensity and qual- combat support and combat service sup- manding, realistic and sustainable training ity of training. port units. Most of these training activi- activities that develop both those trained ties are low-cost and have low visibility, and the trainers into professionals. but they are essential for the development The initial brigade staffs need not to of staff course graduates into professional be large. There may not even be an of- commanders and general staff officers. ficer ready for the permanent posting as Michael H. Clemmesen 6 Baltic Warmth: Strategic Change and Professional Military Education By Dr Peter Foot* ilitary Colleges in Eastern Europe record, the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, basis for establishing national command are facing profound challenges and Estonia, represents a concentrated version structures within their emerging political competing responsibilities and the re- of the problems encountered by all provid- systems. However, for the people, politicians cent events in Iraq have only deepened the ers of military education from the Baltic to and militaries in the three Baltic states, the problems. In a period of changing global the Balkans. task of post-Soviet transition included the security priorities, Alliance enlargement and * * * creation of national defence forces from nation building, such colleges are the places The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia scratch. Apart from uniform design, unit where national priorities and threat percep- and Lithuania belong to that disparate group names, a few battles - and some inspiring tions are passed to the next generation of of post-communist states which regained not stories of anti-Soviet resistance following military officers and security policy mak- only political independence from Moscow both World Wars - the states had virtually ers; where shifting regional concerns are but national existence as well.1 Former nothing on which to build appropriate, rehearsed; and where the obligations of Al- Warsaw Pact states at least had peacetime structured, properly funded and democrati- liance membership are exercised. They are national military structures and personnel - cally accountable armed forces after 1990. also the settings where, going beyond ac- even if wartime command and control en- That formidable challenge has led to a quired structures, security sector reform is tirely by-passed national capitals and came revisiting of ideas that had currency after consolidated or weakened. Because of its under the direct command of the General 1918, that other 20th century moment of unique multinational character and track Staff of the USSR.2 They therefore had some strategic change for the Baltic states. These * Dr Peter Foot is Deputy Dean of Academic Studies (External Relations) in the Department of Defence Studies at Kings College London 9 ideas flowed from the basic question con- states have not made some of the errors of regained national existence and inde- fronting all small states: How to reconcile that characterised their development after pendence, there remained the unifying limited size and resources with national 1918, leading in all three cases to reaction- problem of Russias proximity and inten- security requirements? Any small state next ary, authoritarian regimes with dubious tions just the wrong kind of interest to such a much larger one will have some democratic credentials, with little mutual to concern the Balts. Whatever sophisti- security concerns flowing from that geo- understanding and no external support. cated analytical conclusions are made fur- graphical fact. Indeed, the question was As was said rather cruelly during the inter- ther West about Russian capabilities and relevant to European states far bigger than war years: the views of the Balts were of intentions, popular sentiment about Rus- the Baltic Three. As such, it was not a no interest to anyone.5 Since 1990, one sia in all three countries remains largely question adequately answered by Lenin or might say that the whole thrust of the three negative.6 This may be an exaggerated fear Wilson, by the Treaty of Versailles or by Baltic states development has been to at- but it is one that political leadership is the interwar sequence of Treaties that fol- tract the right kind of interest and to de- unwilling to confront. Substantial Rus- lowed, either individually or in aggregate. flect any interest that might be hostile. sian minorities reluctant to integrate do In the Baltic region after 1918, largely left For both purposes, the method has little to help. The Tartu Peace Treaty of out of the Versailles settlement, ideas de- been to pursue national objectives in con- 1920 still causes irredentist problems be- veloped about cooperation and integra- cert across the three states. The creation tween Russia and the three Baltic states tion as the means of surviving in a Eu- of the Baltic Defence College as a tri-na- about the precise definition of borders; rope dominated by large states.3 Not tion solution to national staff training the current borders are those drawn by much is remembered about the Baltic needs flowed from exactly this perception.