The Commandant’s Introduction

By Michael H. Clemmesen

he Baltic Defence College is doing wear uniforms, but they will not develop Some of the best BALTDEFCOL its very best to ensure that successful into high quality military professionals, who graduates from the first three Joint Com- graduates are as well prepared as possible can contribute to a focused force develop- mand and Staff Courses have received very to assist with the development of the con- ment process. The reason for the failure may suitable postings, where they could put cepts and structures of their future armed either be a poor personnel management and into practice at battalion level what they forces. career planning system which fails to select learned in the course. However, the num- However, the College is limited to pro- the officers for the appropriate appoint- ber of such graduates is very limited and viding a theoretical foundation in a pro- ment post Staff College or the forces are even the best battalion commander can- fession that is as practical in its character too underdeveloped and have too few ap- not train himself, his staff and the head- as that of a doctor of medicine. For the pointments to support professional devel- quarters and the logistics elements of his officer to develop into a true professional, opment through demanding, realistic, and unit. Only a combined arms framework – the structure and activities of the armed progressive command and staff tours of duty. a brigade – can train the units and their forces that the graduate return to must The difference between the best West- cadre in a realistic way. be capable of offering him or her the ern general staff officer tradition and the The first step is to establish the bri- opportunity to gain realistic and practi- Soviet model is the deep understanding gades in order to provide the necessary cal experience in their profession. in Western armies that the staff officer training-architecture. We are still waiting If the best staff course graduates do not must serve regularly with and command for the necessary small and focused nuclei get that experience soon after the course, troops in order to retain and develop his of brigade staffs to be created in Estonia the effect of the year in the College will be professional understanding and skills. Any and Latvia. However, this is not enough, much diminished. These officers may still other solution is a harmful fallacy. in itself, to improve the situation. The

5 brigade commander and staff should be Field training exercises are costly and brigade commander in the first couple of given full authority, responsibility and ac- therefore they should be as demanding years. However, the developing staffs should countability for the practical combined and realistic as possible – not Soviet type, have a small handful of highly qualified, arms training of the cadres and leadership well-rehearsed “Potemkin Village” demon- dynamic young officers (some with a Joint support elements of the existing and de- strations. They should only take place, Command and Staff Course training back- veloping units of the future brigade – com- after the skills and understanding of com- ground and the rest with Junior Staff bat, combat support, and combat service manders and staffs have been developed Course/Captains Course training), and they support. It is thus essential that the key by other training activities. should have the clear – initially overwhelm- part of the brigades come to life in reality, The higher level – land force or opera- ing – responsibility to develop the units that they do not remain as paper projects tional - headquarters are not in a posi- into a combined arms formation and be only. tion to conduct realistic training for units, provided with the necessary resources. The training activities that should have their commanders and their staffs. Instead The Baltic Defence College, NATO, the started long ago include study periods for they should run a similar full spectrum supporting states and the graduates are wait- unit and subunit commanders and spe- of training activities for the formation ing for development in this field to take cialist staff personnel covering both tacti- and above headquarters. place as soon as possible this year. We are cal and support subjects, tactical exercises An army, with its professional cadre, is waiting for implementation of one of the without troops, reconnaissance followed not created by building infrastructure, long sequence of force structure initiatives. by war gaming in the tactical trainers, sig- buying equipment and recruiting person- The main difference between the best nals and command post exercises, logis- nel who can be assembled for parade and NATO army units and what the Baltic tics exercises, and field exercises for each shows. Instead an army comes to life states have now is not in equipment. It is of the combat units reinforced by the through a varied spectrum of intense, de- in the difference in the intensity and qual- combat support and combat service sup- manding, realistic and sustainable training ity of training. port units. Most of these training activi- activities that develop both those trained ties are low-cost and have low visibility, and the trainers into professionals. but they are essential for the development The initial brigade staffs need not to of staff course graduates into professional be large. There may not even be an of- commanders and general staff officers. ficer ready for the permanent posting as Michael H. Clemmesen

6 Baltic Warmth: Strategic Change and Professional Military Education

By Dr Peter Foot*

ilitary Colleges in Eastern Europe record, the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, basis for establishing national command are facing profound challenges and Estonia, represents a concentrated version structures within their emerging political competing responsibilities – and the re- of the problems encountered by all provid- systems. However, for the people, politicians cent events in Iraq have only deepened the ers of military education from the Baltic to and militaries in the three Baltic states, the problems. In a period of changing global the Balkans. task of post-Soviet transition included the security priorities, Alliance enlargement and * * * creation of national defence forces from nation building, such colleges are the places The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia scratch. Apart from uniform design, unit where national priorities and threat percep- and Lithuania belong to that disparate group names, a few battles - and some inspiring tions are passed to the next generation of of post-communist states which regained not stories of anti-Soviet resistance following military officers and security policy mak- only political independence from Moscow both World Wars - the states had virtually ers; where shifting regional concerns are but national existence as well.1 Former nothing on which to build appropriate, rehearsed; and where the obligations of Al- Warsaw Pact states at least had peacetime structured, properly funded and democrati- liance membership are exercised. They are national military structures and personnel - cally accountable armed forces after 1990. also the settings where, going beyond ac- even if wartime command and control en- That formidable challenge has led to a quired structures, security sector reform is tirely by-passed national capitals and came revisiting of ideas that had currency after consolidated or weakened. Because of its under the direct command of the General 1918, that other 20th century moment of unique multinational character and track Staff of the USSR.2 They therefore had some strategic change for the Baltic states. These

* Dr Peter Foot is Deputy Dean of Academic Studies (External Relations) in the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College London

9 ideas flowed from the basic question con- states have not made some of the errors of regained national existence and inde- fronting all small states: How to reconcile that characterised their development after pendence, there remained the unifying limited size and resources with national 1918, leading in all three cases to reaction- problem of Russia’s proximity and inten- security requirements? Any small state next ary, authoritarian regimes with dubious tions – just the ‘wrong’ kind of interest to such a much larger one will have some democratic credentials, with little mutual to concern the Balts. Whatever sophisti- security concerns flowing from that geo- understanding and no external support. cated analytical conclusions are made fur- graphical fact. Indeed, the question was As was said rather cruelly during the inter- ther West about Russian capabilities and relevant to European states far bigger than war years: ‘the views of the Balts were of intentions, popular sentiment about Rus- the Baltic Three. As such, it was not a no interest to anyone’.5 Since 1990, one sia in all three countries remains largely question adequately answered by Lenin or might say that the whole thrust of the three negative.6 This may be an exaggerated fear Wilson, by the Treaty of Versailles or by Baltic states’ development has been to at- but it is one that political leadership is the interwar sequence of Treaties that fol- tract the right kind of interest and to de- unwilling to confront. Substantial Rus- lowed, either individually or in aggregate. flect any interest that might be hostile. sian minorities reluctant to integrate do In the Baltic region after 1918, largely left For both purposes, the method has little to help. The Tartu Peace Treaty of out of the Versailles settlement, ideas de- been to pursue national objectives in con- 1920 still causes irredentist problems be- veloped about cooperation and integra- cert across the three states. The creation tween Russia and the three Baltic states tion as the means of surviving in a Eu- of the Baltic Defence College as a tri-na- about the precise definition of borders; rope dominated by large states.3 Not tion solution to national staff training the current borders are those drawn by much is remembered about the Baltic needs flowed from exactly this perception. Stalin for administrative purposes and League: it came to very little in practice However, the moment of restored na- cede areas to Russia which, back in 1920, but included the notion that foreign tional sovereignty is not an easy time to were included in the sovereign territory policy harmonisation and military alliance discuss and implement transnational ideas of the three then-newlyindependent coun- building would provide for more state about harmonisation and integration. In tries. The existence of the Kaliningrad security than their absence.4 Those con- the area of security, the three Baltic states pocket on the Baltic coast and the con- cepts are today very relevant to Baltic have been ready to cooperate to a consid- nected issue of Russian access rights also political calculations and strategic assess- erable extent - and this has two main exacerbate things. The deeply reactionary, ments; they are part of the reason the three causes. First, in the immediate aftermath unreconstructed regime that dominates

10 Belarus reinforces a general sense of Table 1: Baltic Security Cooperation geostrategic unease. Secondly, all three Tri-nation Activity BALTSEA8 countries involved states accepted that applications to join Baltic Management Group Policy co-ordination among the 3 Baltic states NATO would be politically strengthened Baltic battalion; air surveillance network, The three Baltic states sponsored by Belgium, by developing unity in military matters. naval squadron, military exercises Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Initially, Russian hostility to Baltic mem- Baltic Defence College, including Civil the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, bership was palpable; after George W Servants' course Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States Bush’s election and later the transform- Peace support within IFOR & SFOR in Denmark and the three Baltic states ing events of 11 September 2001, the Bosnia workings of the NATO-Russia Council and the closeness of Moscow and Wash- tivities to give it substance, backed by has been to pursue a policy of interna- ington on counter-terrorism, reduced external sponsors. tional co-operation with the Baltic states, Russian opposition to virtually zero. The results seem to confirm the readi- leading to their inclusion in post-Cold Applying together, it was hoped, would ness for security co-operation among the War security arrangements, followed by a leave NATO with virtually no choice but three. However, it is also true that exter- more equal partnership leading to NATO to accept all three, regardless of varying de- nal sponsorship of such activities has been (and EU) membership.9 Far from being grees of readiness for membership.7 In fact, sustained and considerable. It has been of ‘no interest to anyone’, the Balts are Alliance politics overtook this calculation: the countries listed in the Table as mem- now seen as among the most attractive for small members, NATO has always been bers of the BALTSEA group who have, role models for post-communist transi- more interested in the number of flags in from a Baltic perspective, demonstrated tion in the security context of contem- the line, showing unity of purpose and re- the ‘right’ kind of interest. The extent to porary Europe. solve, than in their actual capabilities. which constructive, transnational co-op- But just how real is all of this? Or is it The degree of Baltic military unity eration in the security field would have a further example of what Dutkiewicz and achieved to date is more than a tempo- happened in the absence of such spon- Plekhanov have called ‘the politics of mim- rary response to fears about Russia and sorship is a matter for speculation. Much icry’?10 Essentially, the argument is that the political imperatives of NATO’s join- clearer are the results to date. From the external pressures on states in Eastern Eu- ing procedures. It has a whole raft of ac- outset, the sponsors’ animating objective rope, coupled with complex and differing

11 internal conditions, have forced them to regional security thinking and doctrinal eign affairs. The problem is how to adopt a strategy of pretence and superfi- development, multinational exercises, operationalise this general aspiration. cial imitation of western civil-military democratic control of armed forces, civil- Conceptually, there is the question of norms, multinational cooperation and military decision-making, and officer determining whether, in reality, the re- military capabilities. At its toughest, the cadre professionalisation. It also is pro- quirements of the region, of the alliance- general case is: ‘East European transfor- gressively undergoing ‘baltification’, as of-choice, and of the nation state are eas- mation mimicry has manifested itself in it is called - the gradual transfer of fund- ily reconcilable. The available local at- half-way reforms, in [the] introduction ing, staffing and training to the three tempts to do so are various and reflect of formal structures instead of building states themselves, thereby reducing the different traditions, political cultures and capacity and content, sometimes in out- direct support of sponsoring states over judgements about risk. Finland, like Swe- right falsification of reality’.11 The trans- time. It also is in close connection with den, equates national security with a loose, parency in defence planning and bud- the respective defence ministries; it regional partnership supported by Total geting across the three Baltic states may wargames scenarios, with the Chiefs of Defence structures; but Sweden, with its be defence enough against the serious- Defence participating; and represents the enthusiasm for network-centric defence ness of the accusation (a charge more supply of the best military officers and concepts and capabilities, is now mark- applicable to some countries in the defence department civil servants. edly different. Poland, as a major Baltic Danube Basin). But that is no reason to player, has never shown interest in Scan- avoid testing the progress achieved to Choosing the Priorities dinavian ideas of Total Defence12, and has date in two areas: contributions to re- instead become a relatively energetic new gional, alliance and national security; and Contributing to regional, alliance and NATO member whose compass rarely performance in domestic security sector national security would seem at first sight shows the need to look to the north. For reform programmes. to be the obvious purpose of military good or ill, Belarus goes it alone entirely. It is here that the Baltic Defence Col- forces of small states placed in today’s stra- For themselves, the three small Baltic states lege provides a useful lens through which tegic context. It is certainly central to the reacted to the choice in a similar, undif- to sharpen focus on the issues. Perhaps work at the Baltic Defence College, backed ferentiated way: use the generosity of spon- the most successful example of intra-Bal- internationally by the sponsors and by soring states to provide the strategic and tic co-operation, it serves as a focus for the Baltic ministries of defence and for- military know-how lost since the signing

12 of the Nazi-Soviet Pact condemned them gional, alliance and national security sum, two things were achieved: first, the to a half-century of political oblivion; needs? At the outset in 1999, but still quite professionalisation of the officer corps develop national structures and plans as late in post Cold War terms, the basis for and national interest were closely inter- befits new nation states proud of their operational teaching was territorial de- twined; secondly, national needs were regained sovereignty; pursue NATO and fence, especially the defence of capital cit- harmonised across the three states in a European Union membership at the ear- ies at risk of a Russian- or communist-led regional context which included Sweden liest opportunity; and get involved in strategic coup, allied to Swedish and Finn- and Finland (both, incidentally, major peace support operations that can enhance ish ideas about Total Defence.13 This had sponsors of the College). It might not have credibility and show the capacity to con- the great benefit of linking the new states’ been perfect in every way but it did unify tribute to other multinational actions in military training and leadership firmly the Baltic ‘horseshoe’, stretching round due course. This last point was the pur- with both national interest and public from the Kategat, through Lapland to the pose behind the formation of the Baltic prejudices about Russia. In military terms, Lithuanian-Kaliningrad border. For the Battalion, established under British aus- it meant that officers could be trained to three Baltic states, joining NATO finally pices in the first instance. It illustrates both command national battalion-level forma- to ‘solve’ the problem of Russia seemed the willingness of the states to think tions (about 600 personnel), following an the logical last step in that process. broadly and shows the limitations in be- operational doctrine that suited the three Politically a natural choice, it disturbed ing able to operationalise this: the man- states. Officers could use the concepts and the apparent mutuality of interest between ning of the Baltic Battalion now drains skills of mission command to achieve their national and regional security. Once alli- officer talent to the detriment of staffing objectives. Interestingly, the requirements ance membership is key, training needs national needs in ministries of defence of the Baltic Battalion figured very little move away from ensuring territorial and and in preparing for NATO membership. in training programmes, reflecting the way political integrity towards preparing for Too much apple pie can be indigestible* . it was not linked to national purposes, collective defence. Now, command and So how has the Baltic Defence College other than demonstrating a degree of leadership training becomes capability- responded to the tensions between re- unity between the participating states. In based, with acquired skills being applicable

* At the time of editing this article, the three Baltic ministries of defence have made the decision to disband the BALTBAT and replace it with other forms of tri-lateral co-operation between the armies of the Baltic states (editor’s note).

13 to a variety of settings. The familiar mili- old stand-by of national defence, robust them by national armed forces and min- tary concepts of defence, attack and delay redundancy, is rejected in favour of leaner istries of defence. In this case, the three continue to be exercised but without the and more efficient Allied fighting forces. states are finding it understandably hard specifics of national geography as the set- The two new major commands, Opera- to agree on common responses to these ting. Operational doctrine loses its na- tions and Transformation, will concentrate challenges. The mechanisms for accession tional character and raises the issue of respectively on confronting post-9/11 to NATO are bilateral ones between the which doctrine to follow – a problem small challenges (with deployable Task Forces Alliance’s headquarters in Brussels and states have in an alliance such as NATO. being the means by which they are met national capitals. The Membership Action Major states like Britain and France plan beyond NATO’s borders) and on upgrad- Plan process begins a rhythm which, af- divisional-sized operations; Denmark and ing of Alliance doctrine, acquisition plan- ter membership has been achieved, turns the Netherlands plan at full brigade level. ning and technology to the levels already into the annual review cycle that has in- In both instances, there is a critical mass reached by the United States.14 This is a ternally characterised NATO for de- sufficient to require national operational very different set of circumstances than cades.15 Above all, it concentrates on in- doctrines to fit into the NATO scenario. were envisaged when Baltic NATO mem- dividual nation’s requirements and con- Moreover, NATO doctrine itself is pitched bership was sought and is complicated tributions. This is a process with plenty at the high operational end of military further by the fact that existing NATO of potential to create disunity or shades planning (divisions and corps) and so members long ceased to see Russia as mili- of understanding. Latvia, for example, has offers an alliance framework for national tary threat to the Baltics or anywhere else, a different desk officer to the one sup- contributions of major or medium size. even in the long-term. porting Lithuania and Estonia – an ex- For nations mostly able to deploy and The Baltic Defence College, as a think- ample of what is often referred to as the sustain abroad only at the battalion level, tank and policy-resource, is fully aware of ‘revolving door’ of different officials giv- no such framework is available. To make these problems. As the main provider of ing not always consistent advice. Under things more difficult for the three Baltic professional military education for na- current Alliance thinking, the Lithuanians states, NATO’s revised command struc- tion-states caught in these difficulties, the and the Estonians have been recom- ture, prefigured at Prague, disconnects choices to be made are less clear. Tradi- mended to abandon territorial defence as regionally-based military leadership from tionally, one thinks of staff colleges carry- the best way to maximise their Alliance traditional nation-state defence needs. That ing out the functions determined for contributions - but they have reacted dif-

14 ferently to the advice. Lithuania has ac- Defence College will not be free to deter- and Mons or manning NATO desks at their cepted the recommendation in entirety, mine its own curriculum entirely inde- own defence ministries. All of this suggests planning to dispense with territorial units pendent of the three main participating a continuing momentum towards the ‘new and organization as the basis for national countries. Equally, it will have a role that model NATO’ and its training needs. defence, creating a new Special Forces very much helps determine how the best Graduates of the College are likely to Command,16 establishing a new deployable officers are prepared for regional, alliance agree but make the case not so much ‘be- brigade, and developing a degree of and national service. For a start, courses cause of NATO’ but that any security Homeland Security on the American must continue to attract NATO or NATO- order - with a strong or weak NATO or model. Estonia, on the other hand, insists candidate staff and students: American, without it altogether – is likely to be weak- on maintaining strong elements for terri- Canadian, British, Danish, Dutch, Czech, ened by the re-nationalisation of defence torial defence: partly due to the heritage German, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and that small states remain in the same of Finnish training among its officer and Norwegian personnel are not only position now as they did in 1918, with corps;17 partly for the larger, nation-build- regulars on the senior staff course but are insufficient resources to defend them- ing purposes of maintaining a visible link regarded as significant for the interna- selves. Much of what might be seem in- between the conscript Army and all geo- tional standing of the college and of the stinctively sensible from a national Cen- graphical regions within the state; and three Baltic states themselves.18 The three tral Staff perspective is not self-evidently partly to prepare Host Nation Support states are preparing their own courses at appropriate or beyond challenge. Terri- facilities for subsequently arriving NATO the junior military academies to common torial defence, for example, really requires forces. Latvia, for its part, remains wedded standards set by the College. Attendees on a fast mobilisation system, based on con- to the territorial concept, the defence of the Civil Servants’ Course designed for scripts and made robust by a substantial the capital city, and to using a strategic the three Ministries of Defence will need investment in reserve forces. Territorial- coup as the nation’s fundamental basis for NATO-centric exercises to maximise their ity in defence also concedes a degree of national military planning and structure. professional effectiveness and career oppor- passivity that is unwise in an era of asym- Clearly, heterogeneity rather than uni- tunities. In addition, the courses serving metric warfare and suggests a bias towards formity characterise current Baltic states’ Baltic personnel at full colonel level are ground forces that sits uncomfortably with security and military thinking at the na- training officers who are going to be the Alliance’s commitment to joint and tional level. In such a setting, the Baltic posted direct to NATO jobs in Brussels combined formations. The assumptions

15 underlying Total Defence include high ris Janowitz’s concept of constabulary 2000 shows that about half of the Baltic levels of expertise in governance, eco- forces: students now occupy significant posi- nomic and industrial self-reliance, indi- “The military establishment becomes a tions in Central Staffs; about a third in vidual and civic responsibility and inter- constabulary force when it is continuously operational jobs, frequently in command national non-alignment: none of these prepared to act, committed to the mini- or as Chiefs of Staff; the balance goes to conditions obtain, or are insufficiently mum use of force, and seeks viable inter- training and education.20 Given that the developed, in the Baltic states. Fears about national relations, rather than victory, Central Staffs also receive virtually all of a strategic coup, reflecting worries about because it has incorporated a protective the civil servant graduates in addition, potential ‘fifth columns’ in the immedi- military posture.”19 this represents a considerable inflow into ate aftermath of independence, and per- Writing in 1960, Janowitz could not the policy and administration areas. In haps reinforced from time to time by have known how every element of that sen- general, it looks as though the three states Russian pressures on one or more of the tence speaks evokes aspects of global secu- are using their own graduates in a simi- Baltic states, can surely now be dismissed rity high on most agendas since 1990. lar way. Apart from the observation that as the basis for national military planning. More specifically today, the relevance of increasing the proportion of postings Handling the Russian minority question this categorisation – vision, almost - of to training jobs would expose the is just that: an example of an ethnic mi- military force in the professional context younger members of the Baltic officer nority problem much less acute than those of Crisis Response Operations is obvious. corps to the freshness of the graduates, experienced elsewhere in Europe. Finally, These arguments are not subversive in this looks like a constructive use of skills, small states do not need to emulate across- any sense. They are professional challenges leadership, analytical ability and talent – the-board military competence but find to senior ranks brought up in and con- at least, when looked at from a parochial, areas of expertise that are both related to ditioned by the Cold War and not dar- Baltic state perspective. It is certainly national need and which can serve as part ing to dream of national restoration. impressive when measured against what of larger, multinational formations. As the “Young Turks” are rarely welcomed by other new invitees to NATO have Alliance has now accepted the principal those senior to them. However, in the achieved in providing the trained per- of role specialisation this is a particularly Baltic setting, things are progressing well sonnel necessary to make a working real- attractive option. The best students might for the participating states. An analysis ity of reformed structures for the secu- even remind their senior officers of Mor- of Baltic Defence College graduates since rity sector. Here, at least, the charge

16 against Baltic states of ‘mimicry’ is clearly to request discussions on its concerns, fully understandable. But NATO is now unwarranted. how does a small state get to be heard if it a harder place in which to be a good, However, when seen from a broader feels threatened? new ally perspective, these positive developments take • Will the currently strong public opin- For the Baltic states, the necessity on the character of ‘not enough’. The NATO ion supportive of national defence forces would seem to be to increase their mu- alliance for which membership was applied be sustained for forces being used beyond tual cooperation. The logic of 1918 re- in 1999 is no longer the alliance that exists NATO’s new boundaries? mains a constant. If the Baltic states do today. 9/11 and the ‘Transformation Sum- • Can small nation conscript-based not provide Baltic security answers, ei- mit’ in Prague 2002 come in between. And armies really generate ‘niche capabilities’ ther no-one else will or the answers will NATO’s February 2003 crisis offered the for instant deployability and alliance-en- be contradictory. Continuing security Baltic states the first fresh opportunities to hancing service overseas? integration is the most obvious and most reflect on expectations since the enlargement manageable way to demonstrate to scepti- and other decisions taken in Prague. A se- There are, of course, answers to each cal national populations defensive solidar- ries of questions makes the point. of these challenges, answers which can rec- ity vis-à-vis eastern neighbours. A ‘de- • What value will new members place oncile at least two out of the three arenas: Baltification’ of policy - with, say, on an Article 5 ‘guarantee’ – for all appli- regional, alliance and national. But they Lithuania linking to Poland and Estonia cants the sine qua non of their application are likely to be more convincing to ma- seeking Nordic answers from Finland – is – in the light of repeated official sugges- jor powers and to international staffs than certain to produce disappointing results. tions to avoid an over-reliance upon it? they are to the hard pressed ministries Smallness has its price: without coopera- • Given the shift in the Alliance’s com- and armed forces of small states confront- tion under continuing international spon- mand structure away from territoriality and ing the full realities of NATO member- sorship for the time being, Baltic voices towards expeditionary operations and ship. The Prague ‘Transformation Sum- are unlikely to be listened to in Brussels. transformation, is the promise by larger mit’ ushered in a great deal more than And harmonisation in equipment acqui- allies ‘to be there’, in time and with enough, another wave of invitations to join sition and personnel training and educa- a responsible basis for national planning? NATO. In an era of fears about weapons tion maximises the potential contribution • In the wake of the February 2003 of mass destruction and effect, and about towards NATO. Fortunately, the Baltic debate about Article 4 and Turkey’s right terrorism and asymmetric warfare, this is states have two instruments able to en-

17 sure a continuation of constructive co- prevailing conditions of strategic change with Russia’s international position. See ‘Results operation. The first is for the Baltic Man- are not easy or self-evident. However, if of trust amongst non-Estonians towards state in- stitutions’ - http://www.saarpoll.ee/raud3.htm; agement Group operating at the high they revise their priorities too soon, then and ‘Result of trust amongst Estonians towards policy level to prevent any drift towards it is likely that it is not just the Baltic state institutions’ - http://www.saarpoll.ee/ Baltic unilateralism. The second is for the states that will feel the cold. raud2.htm. Baltic Defence College itself to increase 7 In the event, the NATO Prague Summit, Octo- ber 2002, accepted 7 new members and set a com- its intellectual leadership and strategic 1 Some post-communist states have an even mon timetable for accession, May 2004, regard- analysis role for the three states while it tougher job, having never had a recognised na- less of the well-known disappointments experi- continues to train and educate future ci- tion-state existence until the break-up of the Soviet enced with the previous accessions by the Visegrad vilian and military leaders in the security Union. Three. 2 See Michael Sadykiewicz, The Warsaw Pact Com- 8 See the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) sector. Its output represents the real na- mand Structure in Peace and War, Santa Monica: web site at www.baltsea.web for fuller details of tional, alliance and regional ‘transforma- Rand, 1988. all defence-related activities. tion’ in the Baltic: skilled and educated 3 In her comprehensive work, scarcely any refer- 9 Julian Elgaard Brett, No New Dividing Lines: people make processes; processes make ences are made to Baltic issues: see Margaret Danish Defence Support to the Baltic States, MacMillan, Peacemakers, London: John Murray, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International structures work. It is a regional resource 2001. Affairs, 2002, p. 5. still under-used by government depart- 4 Some politicians went further than others, 10 Piotr Dutkiewicz and Sergei Plekhanov, ‘The ments and armed forces. But ensuring tri- advocating economic unification as part of the Politics of “Mimicry”: The Case of Eastern Eu- nation harmonisation will not be suffi- security ‘survival’ package. Certainly both the rope’ in Albert Legault and Joel Sokolsky (eds.), security and economic aspects are in evidence to- The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era, cient. Small states like these still require day for Baltic states, with NATO and EU enlarge- Kingston, Ont: Royal Military College of Canada, some mentoring for the time being; the ment proceeding in parallel. A good discussion pp. 113-142. College is an excellent example of how it is Marko Lehti, ‘Baltic Cooperation After the First 11 Ibid., p.115. can be done without prejudicing national World War: Independence through Integration’ 12 Finland and Sweden do not share the quite in Tâlvas Jundzis (ed.), The Baltic States at Histori- same concepts of Total Defence. Compare the primacy. The external sponsors of Baltic cal Crossroads, Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia, entries in The Swedish Agency for Civil Emer- developments have a need to protect their 391-404. gency Planning, International CEP Hanbook 1999- considerable political and economic in- 5 Ibid., p. 436. 2000: Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC 6 vestment in the region by staying closely This holds true for the Russian ethnic minori- Countries, Stockholm 1999. ties in each of the states; cultural and other links 13 The model for this is Estonia 1924: Bolshevik engaged - and the choices for them in have not translated into large-scale identification elements in Tallinn were activated, with a view to

18 taking control of key infrastructure points, then applying for fraternal Soviet help. In the event, the coup failed: the Bolshevik cell was very weak and prompt action by the military and police contained the incident. 14 Completion of the new command and con- trol arrangements will be agreed at the June 2003 Ministerial Meetings. See Defense News, 20 Janu- ary 2003, p.6. 15 For details, see NATO Handbook 2002, Brus- sels: NATO Office of Information, 2002, pp. 63- 67. 16 Lithuania had a Special Force unit in Af- ghanistan. 17 Finland’s long tradition of Total Defence, conscription and national mobilisation has been part of the training received by many Estonian officers since 1994. Although such security fea- tures are hard to envisage for such a small coun- try as Estonia, the legacy of this training has cre- ated an on-going division of opinion within the Estonian officer corps. 18 The non-Baltic students have a vital, informal mentoring role for their Baltic colleagues on course. 19 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A So- cial and Political Portrait, New York: The Free Press, 1960, p. 418. 20 Data provided by the Baltic Defence College. The figures are: Central Staff 53%; Operations 30%; Training 15%, with 2% uncategorised.

19 The Effective State

By Lars Johannsen*

structure but also secures access to the vast – the acquis communitaire. If the national The goals secured European marked. Politically it naturally public administrations fail the whole implies some transfer of sovereignty from project of the inner marked and the eco- Each of the three Baltic countries, Es- the respective domestic political systems nomic union become meaningless, as it tonia, Latvia and Lithuania have held sev- to European institutions but it also gives will result in different rather than uni- eral free and fair elections in which power the three countries a stake in European form standards across the continent. In has changed hands. With the resumption politics and promises of resolution to this respect EU integration exacerbates the of economic growth in the mid 1990s, cross-border political, economic and so- process of modernising the public admin- the transition to democracy and the mar- cial problems. istrations in the Baltic states. As argued ket developments can only be deemed a Notwithstanding that Estonia and previously1 the consolidation of democ- success. Furthermore, sustained indepen- Latvia still have to ratify membership of racy and the process of modernization dence has been secured through member- the EU by national referenda; the chal- and development require a usable state: a ship of NATO, and the three countries lenge of EU membership is less about the state that is both responsive to society are now racing to modernize as a part of low level of economic development com- and effective in the realization of policies the process of securing membership of pared to the ‘old’ EU-members than it is on the ground.2 Responsiveness and ef- the European Union. The importance of related to the nature and requirements of fectiveness in conjunction with the pro- membership for the three countries can European integration. More than any- cess of democratization and marketization hardly be underestimated. With respect thing else the EU is a regulatory body implies that the post-communist state to economy, membership not only prom- that depends on the national public ad- needs not only to transform itself vis-à- ises transfer of funds to modernize infra- ministrations to implement EU legislation vis its relationship society but should be * Dr. Lars Johannsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark.

23 strengthened with respect to implementa- countries face the daunting challenge of 2 to 3 times larger than the average size tion capacity. building implementation capacity in the of the central government in Central and This article is the second in a series of face of European integration. The article Eastern Europe. two that attempts to compare the respon- aims, specifically, at gauging the extent to This oversize, which to some extent can siveness and the capacity to implement which top-decision makers4 (1) believe in be explained by the smallness of the coun- political decisions in the three Baltic the development of modern bureaucracy, tries not being able to exploit the econo- countries.3 The first article focused on (2) reports the existence of a centre for mies of scale, is also expensive as the wage the responsiveness of the state, in particu- the coordination of policies and (3) ex- bill in all three countries takes up a large lar the expressed intent and factual in- perience problems in the process of imple- share of the GDP. However, despite the volvement of societal interests in the mentation. expenses the average ‘take home’ for the policy process and the perceived extent civil servants has, in real terms, only im- of misuse of position. It was found that Small countries – large central proved in Latvia with real wages at a small the state elites in all countries express the administrations? loss in Estonian and a staggering decline desire to involve societal interest but of 82 percent in Lithuania. Lithuanian and Latvian administrations The civilian central government in Es- While these developments may help us have more factual experience with such tonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively to explain the high degree of turnover of involvement. Moreover, even if misuse on average employed 19, 47 and 47 thou- staff as civil servants move to other and and corruption is a problem in all three sand civil servants in the five-year period more prosperous positions in other sec- countries, it appears less of a problem in from 1996 to 2000(table 1). The figures tors of the society, large central adminis- Estonia than in the two other countries, cover a relatively large contraction in Es- trations do not necessarily imply that they which riddled with corruption to a larger tonia (34 percent) and a relatively large are more effective let alone more efficient. extent also face the risk of being captured expansion in Lithuania (27 percent) com- As will be made evident in the following by particular interests at the expense of pared to the previous five-year period. the civil services of the three countries the common good. In relative terms the central governments are facing enormous challenges in the re- All of the three countries are thus ‘still of the two countries are, however, of the design of public administration and con- on the road’ in developing a modern re- same size but smaller compared to the front a cocktail of implementation prob- sponsive European state and all of the three Latvian central government and between lems partly related to the process of mod-

24 Table 1. Wages and size of the central government Lithuania* Lithuania* Latvia* Latvia* Estonia* Estonia* CEE average† 1991- 1996- 1991- 1996- 1991- 1996- 1996- 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 2000 Civilian Central Government** (7,000) 37474749291 (% pop.) 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.3 0.5 Public Employee Wages T6otal Central gov't wage bill (% of GDP) 33. 130. 64. 96. 53. 87. 6. Total Central gov't wage bill (% of gov't exp.) 15.9 15.2 19.6 11.7 7.8 12.8 14.4 A44vg. gov't wage (,000 LCU) 1128144 Real avg. gov't wage - 1997 price (,000 LCU) 73 13 1 2 46 44

*Data are for the latest year available; **excluding education, health and police, if available; LCU = Local Currency Unit;† Averages only generated if data are available for at least 35% of the countries in that region or sub-region. Source: World Bank ernization and partly stemming from the mative principles regarding expected uniformity (much in demand in societ- systemic legacy of communism. behaviour and performance standards for ies with rule of law), flexibility and adapt- each function. Even though communist ability to address problems as they ap- Political oversight and bureaucracy on paper resembled the pear. Second, one cannot underestimate administrative neutrality Weberian merit system5 a modern admin- the importance of the politicization of istration represents at least on two points communist bureaucracy and the control In the redesign of public administra- a radical break with the past. First, com- with dire individual consequences if the tion the three countries need to develop munism implied detail instruction rather line of the party was broken.6 This a modern cadre of civil servants, i.e. a than professional standards regulating politicization itself inhibited profession- professional civil service appointed and behaviour; professional standards that are alism and merit based promotion leaving promoted on merit and guided by nor- necessary to strike the balance between civil servants to guess the wishes of their

25 ‘masters’ rather than analysing and pre- explanation arguing that it might be the see the value in creating stable structures. senting real options. In real terms it re- case that ministers once they have filled va- However, the pattern does not necessarily sulted in policy failures. Furthermore, the cancies with their loyal supporters suddenly only reflect a politicized administration. control culture developed into a ‘pass the buck’ culture where few if anyone would Table 2. Civil servants should not be members of governing coalition party take responsibility.7 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Questioning the still existence of A0gree 100. 60. 2. politicization in the public administra- Disagree 36.0 36.0 42.9 tion we find that the ministers in our S0trongly disagree 108. 402. 49. surveys, in general, do not believe in the Of no significance 36.0 16.0 6.1 value of having party comrades appointed T0otal (N) 50594 (table 2), but in all three countries a rather Total (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 large turnover is reported when a new minister is appointed (table 4) and many Question: Do you agree that it is desirable that civil servants are members of a governing of the ministers, in particular Lithuanian, coalition party? will reserve the right to appoint ‘their’ civil Table 3. But many are replaced servants (table 5). While the responses to the first question is in concordance with Estonia Latvia Lithuania the civil service laws the responses to the M0ost 65. 6. two other question reflect that the reality About half 8.0 8.7 is far from the prescription of the laws. L0ess than half 568. 649. 65. These findings are supported by King’s None 12.0 4.3 32.7 survey where the separation of career posi- D0o not know 196. 190. 1. tion from political influence is unanimously Total (N) 50 46 52 supported but at the same time it is also T0otal (Percent) 1000. 1000. 100. unanimously recognized not to be the case Question: In general, how many of the ordinary administrative staff are/were replaced in the Baltic states.8 King offers a cynical when a new minister from another party appears/ed in the ministry?

26 Table 4. Naming my own civil servants Irrespective of the explanation (and probably it is a function of both) as a Estonia Latvia Lithuania reflection of the soviet administrative S1trongly agree 61. 62. 39. and political culture it is also counter- Agree 51.0 40.8 45.1 productive conditions hampering the D7isagree 386. 388. 11. development of a professional civil ser- Strongly disagree 2.0 14.3 2.0 vice and in conjunction with a high D1o not know 40. 2. degree of turnover it impedes the Total (N) 49 49 51 gradual accumulation of knowledge and T0otal (Percent) 1000. 1000. 100. experience necessary to build adminis- Question: In your opinion, is it better when ministers themselves can appoint their civil trative capacity. Moreover, patronage servants? or politicization leave, just as in previ- ous times, the civil servants to second Comparing the responses from the only more evident but the expected pay- guess the wishes of their masters result- three countries it is evident that the off of capturing the civil service is also larger. ing in flawed advice that at its worst Lithuanian ministers to a higher degree However, on the other hand it is still about leads to policy failure. prefer a stake in the appointment and half of the Estonian and Latvian ministers promotion of civil servants than their who desire a stake in the personnel proce- Cross-cutting coordination colleagues in the two other countries. On dures and on the face of it replacements do the one hand this fits nicely with theory also seem to be more common in the two Oversight and policy coordination are of politicization. Given that the countries than in Lithuania. This suggests important to any government, and in par- Lithuanian political parties historically are personalization rather than politicization of ticular to transition countries operating larger and better organized than respec- the administration in the sense that minis- under budgetary constraints and at the tively Latvian and Estonian political par- ters will want to build a cadre that are per- same time steering in a market economy, ties, that there is a tradition for majority sonally loyal to them. Thus patronage-based is a complex issue involving numerous governments and that politics is more relations where favours and loyalties are ex- policy instruments and agencies. In this polarized in Lithuania,9 the issue is not changed come to dominate. respect the patronage-cum-politicization

27 of the civil service can in the long run Table 5. The most influential ministry. Percent answering “Finance Ministry” create agencies and departments that op- erate like little chiefdoms impeding Estonia Latvia Lithuania oversight and policy coordination M0inistry of Finance (percent) 510. 464. 48. within the executive. However, in the Total (N) 44 34 37 first instance there is little to suggest T0otal (percent) 1000. 1000. 100. this is the case in the Baltic states where Question: Which ministry do you consider to be the core ministry in terms of influence on the Ministries of Finances (MOF) ap- decision-making in other ministries?” pear to be the primary coordinating institutions recognized by (table 5) the Table 6. Frequent influencer. Percent answering “Finance Ministry” frequency by which the MOF’s exert Estonia Latvia Lithuania influence (table 6). M8inistry of Finance (percent) 827. 838. 84. The unparalleled importance of the Total (N) 49 51 51 MOF’s should not only be seen in the T0otal (percent) 1000. 1000. 100. light of domestic budgetary constraints. Question: In the cases where other ministries tried to influence proposals in your own The dominance must also be seen against ministry, who did it most frequently?” the background that budgetary oversight and development of policy coordination tutions like the IMF, EBRD and the among the economic and financial min- World Bank has also propelled this de- Implementation capacity istries and institutions are important pre- velopment. requisites for membership of the Euro- With the structural parallel in the three Despite the development of a coordi- pean Union. As such these developments countries it seems safe to conclude that nating centre, it seems little surprising are evaluated, on a yearly basis, in the the development of a ministry with core that many, and in Latvia and Lithuania reports from the Commission. However, cross-cutting capabilities is a function of most, of the ministers believe that the it is not only a question of EU member- both domestic necessity (all three coun- communist civil servants did implement ship. The need for fresh credit and sup- tries face budgetary constraints) and pres- political decisions more efficiently than port from international financial insti- sure from the outside. present bureaucrats (table 7). As prob-

28 lems of patronage and the politicization it is perhaps more the general confronta- the complexity and lack of knowledge of the civil service also existed during tion with a total reorientation of the state about the policy instruments needed to communism this is hardly the explana- - to steer rather than row and the devel- see the country through and beyond the tion. Part of the explanation can prob- opment of central governments where transition from communism. ably be found in the high turnover, but none previously existed,10 in addition to Given this perceived decline in imple- mentation capacity it is perhaps surpris- Table7. Efficiency in communist systems compared to now (pct.) ing that we again find the ministers ex- pressing values concurrent with the de- Estonia Latvia Lithuania velopment of a modern bureaucracy. Thus A0gree 496. 514. 73. when asked about whether they themselves Disagree 50.0 31.4 21.2 take responsibility for policy failures or D0o not know 47. 183. 5. problems more than 9 in 10 answer in Total 100 100 100 the affirmative (table 8).11 If not surpris- N051525 ing then it is at least a brave position Note: Agree collapsed from strongly agree and agree; Disagree collapsed from strongly considering the number of experienced disagree and disagree. implementation problems (table 9). Question: In your opinion, did the civil servants implement political decisions more effi- ciently under the communist system than they do now? We questioned the ministers whether Note: Total not weighted by country sample size. they had experienced one or more out of eight commonly known obstacles to pub- Table 8. The buck stops here: personal responsibility for difficulties lic policy implementation12 and not un- Estonia Lithuania expectedly the lack of resources came out Y0es (percent) 924. 96. on top named by, respectively, 76.0 and No (percent) 6.0 3.8 96.2 percent of the Estonian and T0otal (N) 525 Lithuanian ministers. Considering the Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 shortage of financial resources in the last Question: Did you take personal responsibility in cases where the implementation or a decade this response probably reflects re- policy program faced difficulties?” ality more than the ‘automated’ reaction

29 Table 9. Frequency of encountered implementation problems tween policy making and policy imple- mentation King offers an explanation by Problems encountered Estonia Lithuania arguing that there is little communication L0ack of resources 726. 96. between policy makers and those affected Lack of understanding and agreement 66.0 52.8 by the policy, before a policy is imple- P0oor policy design 462. 22. mented.14 This problem is recognized and Lack of coordination and information 58.0 62.3 reported upon in the first article as a L0ack of monitoring and evaluation 490. 50. majority of our respondents thought that Insufficiently specified tasks 26.0 35.8 implementation could be improved by I0nterference from outside 246. 43. co-opting societal interests in the policy Insufficient staff motivation 46.0 47.2 process. Question: Which of the following problems have you encountered during policy imple- The braveness of the ministers in tak- mentation? - Percent answering “Yes” ing personal responsibility for policy fail- of a politician when questioned about among other agencies and departments is ures is further highlighted by table 10, policy failure. On top of the list we also not sufficiently developed. With respect where the combined number of problems find the lack of understanding and agree- to the lack of understanding and agree- each minister have encountered is reported ment on objectives by involved agencies ment on objectives it is less of a surprise upon. With an average of respectively 3.8 and partners with, respectively, 66.0 and in Estonia than in Lithuania. As previ- and 4.1 experienced problems in Estonia 52.8 percent in Estonia and Lithuania. ously discussed13 ties with civil society and Lithuania the mean difference is not Furthermore and perhaps more surpris- are less developed in Estonia than in statistically significant. From this it should ingly given the strong status of the MOF’s, Lithuania. However, distinguishing be- thus not be concluded that there is less we also find that the lack of coordination Table 10. Number and mean of problems experienced and information is on top of list, being second in Lithuanian and third in Esto- Number of problems 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean nia. This suggests that the MOF’s coordi- E033stonia 121654433. 8 nation is restricted to budgetary regula- Lithuania 0 4 7 9 12 9 7 2 3 4.1 tion and that the capacity to coordinate T070otal 212814111664. 0

30 implementation capacity in Lithuania than tives. In this respect the correlation analy- sectors are in demand but long-term ca- in Estonia. Furthermore, the problems sis point to the influence from outside, reer prospect are certainly also a key mo- appear to be general across all types of which in the gravest of cases equals mis- tivator. However, as this is at odds with ministries and the functions they have. use or capture, but more generally con- the patronage and politicization of the Even if expected differences appear be- firms the necessity to involve partners at civil service discussed above it only serves tween ministries these are not statistically an earlier stage in the policy process. to underline the necessity not only to significant.15 However, a number of min- Furthermore, even if more resources, introduce but to also strengthen the isters are frankly in deep trouble as no especially in the form of wages, can in- professionalization of the public admin- less than 37 of 103 ministers have experi- crease staff motivation and help to at- istration. enced a combination of 5 or more prob- tract the best and the brightest candidates lems. 6 ministers report all 8 implementa- for positions it is not only wages that are Developing effective states: tion problems. Even if we discount the of concern. Staff motivation, in the a reform agenda resource problem we find that 96 minis- minds of the ministers, is thus correlated ters at least confront an extra problem in with classical soviet bureaucratic traits of It is promising that the state elites in- addition to the lack of resources. control, monitoring and a higher degree terviewed in the DEMSTAR surveys ex- In the responses, however, also lie clues of specification of tasks. To some extent press values consistent with the develop- as to how the implementation capacity the responses here are at odds with the ment of democracy and a modern state. can be strengthened. ‘Give us more development of a professional civil ser- However, as demonstrated by the surveys money’, will be the typical answer from vice, and the ministers do underestimate there is still a need to develop and the ministers, and a correlation analysis the motives of recruitment and ‘staying strengthen the states in the three coun- show that allocating more resources to on board’ in civil service. Zealots, who tries. Furthermore, it is also demonstrated the public sector would assist in reduc- wanted the opportunity to do good for that treating the three countries as being ing problems stemming from coordina- the country, were attracted in the early similar is a gross underestimation of real- tion, monitoring and not least an un- days of transition. Nowadays favourable ity on the ground. This was, however, motivated (and underpaid) staff.16 How- job-training and educational schemes, like more the cease with the responsiveness of ever, abundance of resources is not the in Estonia, matter more. Schemes that, at the state (argued in the first article in the solution to foster agreement on objec- a later stage, may become entry to other BDR no. 8) than with the implementa-

31 tion capacity examined in this article. The ministrations is created. Properly the most ordination among various units partici- relative unresponsiveness of the Estonian difficult part of creating a higher degree pating in the planning and execution of state versus the captured cum more cor- of professionalization may, however, be policies suggests that divisions of respon- rupted nature of the Latvian and the empowerment of the civil servant as sibilities should be cleared and supported Lithuanian states only serve to highlight it runs against the prevailing administra- by the development of policy centres ac- that the latter two, penetrated as they are, tive culture. 17 Increasing opportunities cumulating know-how. With the collabo- need to combine the reform agenda dis- for whistleblowers, suggestive rewards, ration of academic specialists such cen- cussed below with stringent measures to tightening the legislative framework and tres can also improve evaluation processes increase state autonomy. supporting professional organizations is allowing those responsible for the policy Resources will naturally assist in an obvious solution for the short run to react to problems before they turn into strengthening of the capacity to imple- but a reform of the personnel manage- failures. ment policies but the central governments ment departments strengthening their are, in terms of employment, already rela- functions and responsibilities, i.e. devel- tively large, and the development of an oping catalogues of competence for posi- 1 Johannsen, Lars (2002), ’The Responsive State’, Baltic Defence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 9-20 effective state is not merely a question of tions, a roster for high grade personnel, 2 The wording ‘effective’ is chosen deliberately resources and increasing personnel. The training and competence centres, in con- as ‘strong’ give a connotation that can be misin- interviewed decision makers do, in fact, junction with open competition may in terpreted, especially in a post communist com- pinpoint two areas that can only be re- the long run assist in ingraining Weberian munity, where the memory, of a state penetrating and controlling almost all aspect of life, is still solved with targeted administrative re- principles in the administrations. alive. forms. Second, besides increasing the civil ser- 3 Johannsen, Lars (2002), ’The Responsive State’, First, in terms of personnel policy the vants motivation and interest in compe- Baltic Defence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 9-20 patronage-cum-politicization pattern tence building such a reform may also be 4 The elite surveys are part of the DEMSTAR program (www.demstar.dk) and have so far been needs to be rooted out. Against the back- a first step towards increasing adminis- carried out among top-level governmental ex- drop and residues of soviet administra- trative oversight and policy coordination. ecutives in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, tive culture and in combination with pa- Even if budgetary oversight is seemingly The Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Poland, the tronage and politicization, a barrier for in place with the MOF’s in the form of Czech Republic, Mongolia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Slovenia, Moldova and a survey is the professionalization of the national ad- the coordinating centres, the lack of co- at present underway in Bulgaria. More informa-

32 tion about the Baltic surveys can be found at the 13 Johannsen, Lars (2002), ’The Responsive State’, website. Baltic Defence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 9-20 5 For a discussion concerning ongoing reforms 14 King, Roswitha M. (“Vita”), ‘CONVERSA- with respect to the Weberian principles in the EU TIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS: Interview Re- applicant states see: Nunberg, Barbara: “Ready sults from Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic for Europe: Public Administration Reform and and Poland’, at http://www.nispa.sk/news/pa- European Union Accession in Central and East- pers/main/King.rtf ern Europe”, World Bank Technical Paper no. 15 However, when test upon the larger set of 466; The World Bank Washington D.C., 2000. surveys differences appear robust with members 6 Verheijen, Tony (1999), Civil Service Systems in of presidential administrations (separate survey Central and Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar, in presidential systems) reporting fewer problems Cheltenham, UK compared to ministries with sectoral regulatory 7 Nørgaard, Ole and Lars Johannsen with Mette function or ministries with general coordination Skak and Rene H. Sørensen (1999), The Baltic states regulatory functions both reporting the highest after Independence, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar number of problems. 8 King, Roswitha M. (“Vita”), ‘CONVERSA- 16 Preliminary analyses show that resources are TIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS: Interview Re- in fact uncorrelated with all other problems when sults from Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic applied to a larger set of countries. and Poland’, at http://www.nispa.sk/news/pa- 17 Rosen, Ellen Doree (1993), Improving Public pers/main/King.rtf Sector Productivity: Concepts and Practice, Lon- 9 Nørgaard, Ole and Lars Johannsen with Mette don: SAGE Skak and Rene H. Sørensen (1999), The Baltic states after Independence, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 10 Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore (1996), Reforming the Civil Service, Finance & Development Vol. 33, No. 3, September 1996: pages 10-13 11 Unfortunately the following question was not asked in Latvia. The Latvian survey was a pilot programme testing survey methodology. For more information on the Latvian survey see www.demstar.dk. 12 Hogwood, Brian W. & Lewis A. Gunn (1984), Policy analysis for the real world, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

33 Is the Russo-phone Minority a Structural Security Threat to the Estonian State?

By Maibritt Lind*

I. Introduction the consolidation of Estonia as a strong nia is faced with a serious structural se- democratic state. In other words my in- curity threat that can obstruct the con- One could argue that with the clo- tention is to reach a clearer understand- solidation of Estonia as a strong demo- sure of the OSCE mission in Tallinn at ing of the scope of the problematic fact cratic state. the end of 2001 was the end of the ini- that about 20% of the population does In order to analyse this it is necessary tial problems between the Russo-phone not have Estonian citizenship, and to get first to elaborate on Barry Buzan’s state minority and the Estonians. The ques- an idea of the consequences and the di- model comprising the idea of the state, the tion is whether the problems are solved mensions of this problem. I will investi- physical base of the state and the institutional or was it more a question of sending the gate the problem by analysing whether expression of the state. It is the analysis of signal to the surrounding world that legal, socio-economic and identity cleav- the coherence between the three compo- Estonia is master in its own house. Thus, ages in the Estonian society correspond nents that enables a conclusion of the purpose of this article is to analyse with the ethnic cleavage between the Es- whether the Russo-phone minority con- whether, and if so, to which extent the tonians and the Russo-phone minority. stitute a structural security threat to the Russo-phone minority1 in Estonia can If the cleavages correspond and overlap consolidation of the Estonian state and be seen as a structural security threat to the ethnic, linguistic cleavage then Esto- democracy.

* Maibritt Lind is MPhil of political science and is a former research assistant at the Baltic Defence College Institute for Defence Studies. The article is based on a research project by Ms. Lind, which was published in its entirety in February 2003.

34 II. Buzan’s state model of the state, the institutional expression of the for the idea of the state are the nation and the concept of state and the physical base of the state. and organising ideologies (Buzan, 1991). security The nation can be characterised as a large The idea of the state group of people sharing the same cultural A structural security threat exists due and possibly the same ethnic or racial to more or less arbitrary circumstances, This is the most central part of the state heritage. If the purpose of the state is to not as a result of an intention. Whether a but also the most abstract and difficult to protect and express a cultural group, then threat becomes a national security threat investigate. A state is based on an idea, life and culture must come high on the depends on the type of threat, how the which lies at the heart of the political iden- list of national security priorities. Fur- state perceives it and on its intensity. The tity of the state, that is, the purpose of thermore, national identity is a central Russo-phone minority accounting for one the state. The idea of the state defines the component of the security problem third of the Estonian population can be character of the state and power in the whether or not it is the foundation of characterised as a structural security threat international system. The idea binds the the state. Organising ideologies are a higher if the Russo-phone minority is not inte- territorial, political and societal elements idea of the state, and are often closely grated into the society; if there is system- together in a whole like an organic en- connected to the institutional structures atic political, legal and economic imbal- tity. The idea establishes legitimacy in the of the state. An example of an organising ance between the Estonians and the Russo- minds of its people. The two main sources ideology is racial preservation or com- phone minority; if the Russo-phone mi- Figure 1: The components of the state (Buzan, 1991) nority does not see the same purpose with the Estonian state as the Estonians do. The idea of the state In order to analyse structural security threats to the consolidation of the Esto- nian state, I need to clarify what a state actually is. Here the state will be defined, according to Buzan’s definition, in terms of a political, territorial and societal unit The physical base The institutional expression of the state that consists of three components: the idea of the state

35 munism. The organising ideologies will state is the most concrete component of stitutional expression of the state has, in be an integrative part of the entire struc- the state, and border disputes still play a the course of time, been growing, in or- ture of the state and closely connected to role in international relations even though der to meet the demand for services from the institutional structures as a guideline the number is limited. Another situation the modern welfare state. There is a close or a higher principle. This is, for instance, where the state’s territory can give rise to connection between the institutional ex- the case in the United States, where plu- insecurities is when a state defines its na- pression of the state and the organising ralist democracy and market economy are tional interests and security in terms of ideology of the state. It is the institutions inseparable parts of the foundation of the territory and population which are not that put the organising ideologies into state (Buzan, 1991). under the control of the state. This can action, since the institutions have to be This abstract term is indeed difficult happen if a state considers the safety of organised in a specific way in order to to measure and understand at the same its diaspora living in e.g. the express the ideology. The state institutions time, which is why I in concordance with neighbouring state, as a part of national can to a varying degree compensate for Constitution of the Republic of Estonia security. weakness in the idea of the state. A good operationalise the idea of the state as the Estonia still has border disputes with example of this is a totalitarian state where preservation of the Estonian nation and culture Russia but an agreement has been reached the coherence of the state would be main- over time and the organising principle of after Estonia denounced all demands of tained by extreme use of force. In a state Estonia is liberal democracy founded on lib- the territory of the First Republic, al- where the coherence to a large extent is erty, justice and law. though Russia has not yet ratified this determined by negative and forceful agreement. means, the citizens cannot be characterised The physical base of the state as loyal citizens, but instead the leaders The institutional expression demand obedience to a varying degree. The physical base of the state comprises of the state its population and territory, including The coherence between the three all of the natural resources and man-made The institutional expression of the state components wealth contained inside the border, which comprises the entire machinery of the for instance is technology and education government, including its executive, leg- The coherence between the three com- (Buzan, 1991). The physical base of the islative and judicial institutions. The in- ponents determines how strong the state

36 is (Buzan, 1991). The question is what does Say, that the idea of the state is the pres- is strong or weak depends on the coher- the coherence between the three compo- ervation of the nation then there will be ence between the three components and nents of the state consist of? Is it popular a strong coherence between the idea of not the organising ideology. If the physi- acceptance of the system, legitimacy or the state and the physical base in a ho- cal base accepts that the idea of the state something else? mogeneous state with no large diaspora is, say, economic growth and prosperity It is necessary to consider if there is a outside the borders of the state. The but no political liberties, then it is cer- common factor(s), which can characterise third connection between the physical tainly possible that the state can and will all the connections among the three com- base and the institutional expression of be strong if the institutions are organised ponents. If we first look into the con- the state is strong if the institutions are according to that purpose. Having said nection between the idea of the state and structured according to the size of the that, it is obvious, though, that the po- the institutional expression of the state, territory and the population. It is not tential of finding this in real life is rela- then we know from Buzan that they are possible to gain acceptance for the state tively small, but the possibility cannot be highly intertwined. Say, the higher idea institutions if they are not able to deliver eliminated. On the other hand, in states of the state is pursuing democracy, and the expected services to the whole popula- where the organising ideology is liberal in order to pursue democracy one needs tion because the institutions have limited democracy the coherence can be institutions to secure, among other capacity. The population will not accept characterised as not only acceptance and things, civil liberties and political rights. the institutional expression of the state if legitimacy but also as democratic legiti- In the end, this implies that the institu- they have to pay a vast amount in taxes macy. In this respect a state with a con- tions through the organising ideology without gaining proper roads, medical ser- solidated democracy is a strong state. gain legitimacy because the institutions vices etc. in return. To sum up, the coher- In analysing whether the Russo-phone and the idea of the state are in coher- ence between the three components of the minority in Estonia is a structural secu- ence with each other. The second con- state consists of acceptance and legitimacy. rity threat to the consolidation of democ- nection between the idea of the state and Does this then imply that a state can racy, this theoretical tool – the coherence the physical base can also be narrowed only be strong if it has a consolidated between the three components of the state down to acceptance and legitimacy, be- liberal democracy? No, it is theoretically – is of utmost relevance. If the Russo- cause the population or the territory of possible to find strong states which are phone minority is alienated and disloyal the state accepts the purpose of the state. not liberal democracies. Whether a state to the Estonian state, then they will not

37 accept the idea of the state and the insti- become member of a political party, are Germanic languages. Requiring knowl- tutional expression of the state. If a mi- fundamental to a democratic system, and edge of the Constitution of the Repub- nority group is alienated, then democratic these political rights are achieved lic of Estonia and the Citizenship Act legitimacy cannot be obtained. through citizenship. A systematic exclu- also puts severe demands on the appli- sion of some groups from gaining citi- cant to be able to understand difficult III. Estonian legal frame zenship has consequences, e.g. a division legal documents. In short, the require- and integration policy of the population that can hamper con- ments in the naturalisation process are solidation of a strong democratic state. in no way simple demands. The creation of the legal fundament in By restoring the Citizenship Law of Despite some liberalisation of the a newly re-established state is an impor- 1938, the body of citizens was deter- Citizenship Act, the nature of the act is tant tool to shape the structures of the mined as the citizens of the First Repub- exclusive towards the inhabitants who new state. It is not within the scope of lic before the Soviet occupation in 1940 were not citizens in the First republic the article to investigate every aspect of and their descendants, while about half or their descendants. Thus limiting the the Estonian legislation. Instead I have a million people, who had immigrated possibility for primarily Russo-phones, chosen to shortly state some of the fun- to Estonia during the Soviet occupation who have moved to Estonia during the damental problems in the Estonian legis- were declared non-citizens (Semjonov, Soviet occupation, to acquire political lation concerning the legal rights for the 1998). Estonian citizenship can be ac- rights in the country they reside. The population of Estonia – the citizens and quired in two ways, by birth or through number of inhabitants who have ac- non-citizens. a naturalisation process. The quired Estonian citizenship through naturalisation requirements are stated in naturalisation speaks its own clear lan- Law on Citizenship Article 6 of the 1995 Citizenship Act. guage of how difficult it is to acquire it. The language requirements, which the By 13 January 2001 only 113,764 indi- Citizenship is fundamental to the es- applicant must fulfil before acquiring viduals had acquired Estonian citizenship tablishment of a democratic state and so- Estonian citizenship, are quite harsh, es- through naturalisation, or about 29.6% ciety. The political rights, such as the pecially when taken into account that of the group who did not automatically right to stand for election, to vote in Estonian is a Finno-Ugric language with acquire Estonian citizenship in 1992 with parliamentary elections, and the right to few similarities to either Russian or the the Citizenship Act (CMB, 2001).

38 an indication of the consequences of this, systematic discrimination of the Russo- Aliens Act a survey has asked both Estonians and phone minority. The language policy has Russo-phones if they think the govern- developed in two stages in Estonia. Dur- The purpose of the Aliens Act is to ment treats the Russians living in this ing the first stage, which began during guarantee aliens residing in Estonia an country fairly. It is striking that among the end of the Soviet Union, the aim internationally recognised status and to the Estonians 72% answer ‘yes’ while only was for Estonian to obtain an equal sta- determine the duties of the aliens. An alien 17% answer ‘no’. The Russo-phones per- tus to Russian – bilingualism was the aim. is defined in Article 3 as a person with- ceive the treatment of them very differ- After regaining independence, the focus out Estonian citizenship, and it regulates ent because only 29% think they are changed in the sense that Estonian was entry, stay, residence and employment in treated fairly while 61% think the treat- given a supreme status and all other lan- Estonia and the bases for legal liability of ment is unfair (Rose, 1997). guages were considered as foreign lan- aliens (Article 1). Identification papers and guages. The second stage of Estonian lan- passports are documents which a stateless The Language Law guage policy resulted in the adoption of person does not possess, and an urgent the Language Law of 1995. This implies need for these papers arose after declar- The language has been, and is, one of that Russian is a foreign language, de- ing half a million people stateless in 1992. the most important factors for the iden- spite the fact that about 32% of the Es- But not until 1994 did the Estonian gov- tification as an Estonian, and the Esto- tonian inhabitants have Russian as their ernment decide on a permanent solution, nian language policy has played a major mother tongue, and more than 75% of the Alien’s Passport, which could be used role in the liberation process from the the whole population is said to have good both domestically and internationally Soviet Union. During the Soviet occu- or sufficient knowledge of Russian (RT, 64, 1993 & RT, 46, 1994). The pro- pation poor skills in Russian meant ex- (Semjonov, 1998). Some limited language cess of applying for and acquiring the clusion from public employment rights to national minorities are Alien’s passport took until 1997 to be al- (Jonsson, 1999). A language policy was recognised, through Article 51 of the most completed and implied that the needed in order to give Estonian an of- Constitution and in Article 10 of the Russo-phone minority from 1992 till 1997 ficial status, but in a state with about Language Law, but the status of the Es- was in a stage of uncertainty about their 32% having Russian as their mother tonian language is different from the sta- legal status in Estonia (Laitin, 1998). As tongue, a strict language policy can cause tus of the national minority languages.

39 Estonian is a basic right, while the mi- Normally protection of minorities fo- within the Russo-phone minority is a nority language (e.g. Russian) may be used cuses on the protection of the minority potential source of conflict. (and it may not be used). language. In the Estonian case the mi- As of today no cultural body has been Language has been and is a particu- nority language is Russian. But the Lan- established, and no minority group has larly sensitive issue, and has, in the Es- guage Law prevents the use of other lan- even tried to establish one (Government tonian state and nation building pro- guages than Estonian and, furthermore, Integration Report 2001). This probably cess, been an effective political resource even in a cultural autonomous body, they has to do with the fact that only Esto- in uniting the Estonians behind the sys- have to communicate in Estonian if nian citizens can enjoy these rights. Non- tem. The consequence of the adoption asked by one person. The legislation in citizens are allowed to take part in the of the strict Language Law is that the general, and especially the Law on Cul- activities of the cultural institution, but Estonian political society has alienated tural Autonomy, creates a divided Russo- they may not vote, be elected or ap- itself from a significant part of the physi- phone minority. The elite Russo-phones, pointed to the leadership of the institu- cal base of the state – the Russo-phone who have the abilities and dedication to tion (Article 6). Paradoxically, this im- minority. pass the strict naturalisation require- plies that non-citizens have fewer rights ments, have protected minority rights, in a cultural autonomy institution than Law on Cultural Minority Rights which provide the space under which permanent residents, who can participate and Cultural Autonomy it is easier to adapt to the new Estonian in the local elections. The second reason conditions. The rest with poor Estonian is the very vague and unclear terminol- The purpose of having cultural mi- language proficiency are in the Estonian ogy used in the law and the lack of defi- nority rights is to preserve the minority Constitution guaranteed the same nition of the role of autonomous cul- cultures as a vital part of the society and rights, freedoms and duties as Estonian tural institutions. Thirdly, it is easier to ensure to, in theory, the right to pre- citizens, but they cannot enjoy politi- establish an NGO, which has the same serve one’s ethnicity, language and reli- cal and cultural minority rights, because right to request financial help from offi- gion. Protection of minorities exists in they have not acquired Estonian citi- cial and public foundations and Estonia but it is only Estonian citizens, zenship. The risk of alienation of the organisations, as an autonomous cultural who can obtain the protection, which poorly adapted group of Russo-phones institution has (Semjonov, 1998). The the Law on Cultural Autonomy provides. is therefore high, and the division role of an NGO is clear, and the proce-

40 dures for establishing one are less com- portance in the protection of minority plex and expensive, than the procedures Integration or assimilation of the rights in Estonia (OSI, 2001). set out by the Cultural Autonomy Law2 . Russo-phone minority? An analysis of the State Integration Programme3 enables me to conclude that IV. The integration policy An analysis of the Presidential although the programme is in no way in Estonia Roundtable, which is an advisory body blind to the minority problems in the and a permanent conference of represen- Estonian society the focus on only lin- Characteristic for the Estonian legal tatives of ethnic minorities, stateless per- guistic integration is not enough to solve framework is its systematic division be- sons and political parties, reveals that it the structural cleavages between Estonians tween Estonian citizens and non-Estonian played a successful role as mediator in 1993 and the Russo-phone minority. Further- citizens. This legislation and the political between the Estonian state and the succes- more, the Programme reinforced the discourse of protection of the Estonian sive forces in North East Estonia. But it institutionalisation of the Estonian nation nation can create a problem for the Esto- has lost its importance and impact on the as the basis of the state, and it gives no nian state and society. However, a change political decisions because of its strictly concessions to the legal and political ex- in the radical discourse can, combined advisory character. clusion of the Russo-phone minority. The with a genuine goal of integration as op- The Ombudsman function has been programme only seeks integration posed to assimilation of the Russo-phone established, and this could have been a through delivering the possibilities for minority, help to solve the structural se- vital institution helping to protect mi- the Russo-phone minority to live up to curity threat inherent in the legislative nority rights in Estonia, but unfortunately the naturalisation requirements for Esto- organisation of the Estonian state. It is this has not yet been the case. Limited nian citizenship. Inherent in the State therefore important to analyse the Esto- information about the jurisdiction as well Integration Programme is a future risk nian integration policy, in order to reach as the lack of consistency in protecting of instability, which is a characteristic of an understanding of whether the Estonian the minority rights makes the institution a deeply divided society that cannot guar- state institutions do try to change the of little value to the Russo-phone minor- antee equal opportunities for all its in- exclusive character of the legislation into ity at this point. Yet, with improvements habitants. The current integration a search for integration, or whether the in these defaults, the ombudsman institu- programme is suitable for integration of state policy seeks linguistic assimilation. tion could in the future be of vital im- immigrants or guest workers but not for

41 a national minority constituting 31% of increased the time span considerably. On market, unemployment rate, income, and the Estonian population. The fact that such the basis of the analysis of the legislation living conditions. a large part of the Estonian population and the integration policy the Estonian does not have Estonian citizenship and democracy can be termed as exclusive na- Education level that some of these even are stateless is a tion building and ethnic state building. major obstacle for the democratic pro- Reforming the Estonian educational cess in Estonia. Here it should in fairness Socio-economic conditions and system has in recent years been discussed be mentioned that Estonia does not pre- political participation intensively and has resulted in concrete tend to be ethno-culturally neutral, but is reform initiatives during the first part of actively engaged in the project of build- Here the purpose is to analyse whether 2001. Unfortunately, these reforms do not ing up the Estonian nation as the core of there are systematic and significant dif- come up with a solid solution to the ques- the state ferences between the Russo-phone minor- tion of language of instruction. The On the basis of the analysis of the Es- ity and the Estonians regarding socio-eco- amendment of the Law on Basic and Up- tonian legal frame and Integration Policy nomic conditions. If there is a systematic per Secondary Schools in April 2001 im- I am now able to conclude that the Esto- difference between the two groups that plies that from 2007 the Russo-phone nian nation building strategy is primor- corresponds to the cleavage found inher- minority is no longer guaranteed educa- dial where blood ties are important and ent in the legal framework, then there is a tion in their mother tongue, Russian. The that the state building project is exclu- solid foundation for saying that Estonia quality of education in the Russo-phone sive. Membership of the nation can hap- is a divided society, which can influence schools is not as good as in the Estonian pen not only through linguistic assimila- the extent of the structural security threat. schools due to the lack of qualified teach- tion but also cultural assimilation in the There are generally no differences between ers and poor translations of Estonian sense that the new members must have a the Russo-phone minority and the Esto- terms and textbooks (OSI, 2001). There clear understanding of the Estonian tra- nians on background variables such as life are no initiatives from the Estonian state ditions and customs. It will take genera- expectancy, birth rate and infant mortal- to re-train Russo-phone teachers to teach tions before the Russo-phone minority ity. Thus the intention is to analyse in Estonian, and thus the lack of quali- is considered equal to the ethnic Estonians whether there are differences in the edu- fied teachers in Estonian instruction does and the nationality legislation has only cational level, the position in the labour not seem to be eliminated by 2007.

42 Table 1: The educational structure of groups with different citizenship (%) It is prohibited to discriminate or give preference in employment on the grounds Basic Secondary Higher Nationality/Citizenship Total education education education of e.g. sex, nationality, colour, race, na- E6stonian citizen Estonians 37461010 tive language, religion, and political or other opinion (RT 1992, 15/16, 241, Ar- Estonian citizens Russo-phones 34 45 21 100 ticle 10). The Labour Inspectorate has S5tateless Russo-phones 3858010 found no discrimination but the Russo- Russian citizens 29 57 14 100 phone minority claim that the language Source: Pavelson, 2001:4 requirements restrict their access to pub- The statistics show that there is no sig- older generation, who opted for the easy lic and private employment (OSI, 2001). nificant difference in the educational level solution of acquiring Russian citizenship, Linguistic requirements in the public as between the Estonians and Russo-phone which were given to all former Soviet citi- well as in the private sector are preva- minority except that more Russo-phones zens. This can therefore explain why a sig- lent, which limits the geographical area have a higher vocational training. An ex- nificantly low percentage of the Russian where the Russo-phones with poor Esto- planation can be the naturalisation re- citizens have higher education as well as a nian language skills can apply for work. quirements because only persons with a high proportion has only basic education. The difference between the Estonians large social and educational capability and and the Russo-phone minority increases who are in an economically viable situa- The labour market according to the educational level for the tion have the possibility to live up to the and employment occupation structure (see table 2). Firstly, requirements. The group of Russo-phones the Estonian “blue collar workers” have with Estonian citizenship has the skills to There is a market difference between a lower educational level compared to pass the language and civic exam as well as the occupational structure of the Estonians the non-Estonians. Furthermore, there the dedication for it. It is therefore very and the Russo-phones. The service and are a larger number of non-Estonians likely that this group will have a large agricultural sectors are dominated by the (40%) with a higher level of education interest in getting a higher education. But Estonians, while those employed in the who work as office workers compared one must also keep in mind that a large industry are three to one in favour of to the Estonians (17%). Among the spe- number of the Russian citizens are of an non-Estonians. cialists and the directors the Estonians

43 Table 2: The educational structure of occupation groups of employed Estonians and non-Estonians (%)

Occupational group ESTONIANS NON-ESTONIANS Secondary Secondary Basic Higher Basic Higher Education Education A4uxiliary worker, unskilled labour 425474548 Skilled labour 39 60 1 16 77 7 S0ervice Personnel 247602377 Office worker 8 75 17 - 60 40 M63id-level specialist 811211771 Specialist (without subordinates) 3 35 62 - 39 61 S99pecialist (with subordinates) 325-35 56 Director of institution or unit 7 45 48 - 44 56 T0otal 27532612622

Source: Table 4 in Government Report on State Integration Programme in 20004 .

get employment as managers and experts Again, proficiency in Estonian language with a lower educational level more of- can account for some of this difference, Unemployment and social exclusion ten than non-Estonians. Despite the in- because lack of language skills prevents significant differences in the educational the part of the Russo-phone minority Estonia has experienced tremendous level, the non-Estonians are more often with limited social capability from seek- progress but one of the downsides is the than Estonians employed in a position ing employment in other regions than emerging poverty and unemployment and in which they are over-qualified. This can North-Eastern Estonia. Thus, it seems that the risk of social exclusion and alienation. help explain why you find more those the claim of the Russo-phone minority Of interest here is whether the risk of unsatisfied with their job among the that the Language Law discriminates in poverty, alienation and social exclusion Russo-phone minority (39%) than employment is right. is higher for the Russo-phone minority among the Estonians (20%) (Rose, 2000). than for the Estonians.

44 Table 3: Poverty Indicators phone unemployment is significantly and systematically higher than unemployment ESTONIANS RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS among the Estonians (Statistical Office of To do without the past 12 months? 1995 2000 1995 2000 Estonia). According to the Estonian Hu- Food man Development Report, integration of -Often 8 7 26 24 -Sometimes 15 16 28 21 the Russo-phone minority into the labour -Rarely 14 18 14 15 market is stranded on the language bar- -Never 62 59 31 40 rier and on the low rate of economic de- Heating, electricity velopment in Ida-Virumaa, where about -Often 2 2 6 8 98% of the population have Russian as -Sometimes 4 6 12 13 -Rarely 7 12 10 14 their mother tongue. -Never 86 80 72 66 The analysis does not provide an in- Clothes you really need sight into whether the Russo-phone mi- -Often 17 16 34 32 nority is socially excluded from the Esto- -Sometimes 21 20 26 22 nian society but it is striking that the -Rarely 16 22 15 21 -Never 45 42 25 24 Russo-phone minority is, according to the UN Committee Against Torture on Esto- Source: Rose (1995 & 2000), New Baltic Barometer II and IV. nia, over-represented in the prison popu- As can be seen from table 3 there have the Estonians. Furthermore, members of lation (Press Release Geneva, 22 Novem- not been any dramatic improvements or the Russo-phone minority are generally ber 2002). Higher education is indicative worsening from 1995 to 2000. The pov- more afraid of losing their job as 60% of of active participation in the society, erty indicators show that a larger num- the Russo-phone minority believe their which is a normal tendency to find. Yet, ber of Russo-phones have to do without job is in danger, while the same is true as we already know, the educational struc- food, clothes, electricity and heating com- for just 35% of the ethnic Estonians ture of the Russo-phone minority and the pared to the Estonians. The difference is (Norbalt, 2000). Estonians is quite similar. Thus, the Russo- systematic, and it makes the Russo-phone There are significant differences in the phones should participate just as much as minority more at risk of poverty than unemployment rate, where the Russo- the Estonians do, but this has not been

45 the case. First, the unemployment rate is Table 4: The proportion of Estonians and non-Estonians in the three strata. systematically higher for the Russo-phone % of population Estonians Non-Estonians minority. It is true that the higher unem- F%irst strata 2%3 8%0 20 ployment rate is a structural phenomenon, Second strata 33% 64% 36% but whatever the reason, it is still a fact T%hird strata 4%4 4%8 52 that the Russo-phone minority to a higher degree is excluded from the labour force Source EHDR, 1998, 65. than the Estonians. Secondly, the politi- cal exclusion cannot be debated. It is pri- which comprises 23% of the population, the main part feels excluded from the Es- marily the persons without both the fi- consists of the successfully adapted elite tonian society. nancial and the social capabilities for and higher middle stratum, which are It is striking that only 20% of the first learning Estonian that are excluded from characterised by having a higher educa- strata is Russo-phones and in the second political participation in Estonia. Thirdly, tion level, being well informed, very ac- strata the Russo-phone minority is slightly the Russo-phone minority has a higher tive and young. The first stratum receives over-represented according to the popu- percentage that “often” has to do with- almost half of the population’s total in- lation share (31%). In the third strata the out food and clothes even though they come. 33% of the population constitute Russo-phones are clearly over-represented constitute a smaller portion of the entire the second stratum and is characterised with 52% as opposed to their share in population. by having adapted with some effort and the population. The new structure of the about 30% of the total income in Estonia Estonian society has by 1998 stabilised, Income goes to this group. The educational level which implies that the Russo-phone mi- is relatively low and they occupy the jobs nority is vastly under-represented in the The Estonian Human Development left over from the first stratum. The third higher social strata and over-represented Report has analysed adaptation as an in- and lower stratum that comprises 44% has among those who feel excluded and have dicator for integration in the market severe difficulties adapting, and every adapted poorly to the new conditions. economy (1998:65-67). fourth person is chronically unemployed. The 25-34 year old generation has adapted The report divides the Estonian popu- They have only a minimal and indirect well, and this applies for both Estonians lation into three strata. The first one, effect on the developments in Estonia, and and Russo-phones that have a higher share

46 of Estonian citizenship than other age tween the Russo-phone minority and the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU groups (EHDR, 1998). Estonians does exist, but the picture is and UNDP that have an effect on the policy Furthermore, the research conducted not clear. Not all Russo-phones are poor formulation. This implies that there is a in 1999 has shown that the economic and not all Estonians rich, but every time lack of continued dialogue between the position and financial security of the non- I have tried to compare the Russo-phones, state and the civil society, thus the devel- Estonians has deteriorated over the last share to their share of the population, opment of a cohesive social capability of decade, compared with the Estonian po- they are under-represented among the the civil society will be reduced. The So- sition. “Thus, in 1999, non-Estonians higher income groups, while over-repre- viet educational system is not known for spent approximately 31% of their total sented among the unemployed and the fostering critical sense because the com- income on food as against 25% among lower social strata. The only category in- munist ideology told the truth even in Estonians” (OSI, 2001). This corresponds vestigated, where the Estonians and the the area of political science. This legacy is with my analysis of poverty, where it in Russo-phone minority are roughly equal still hampering the development of the the majority of cases is the Russo-phone is education. Thus, it is no wonder that Estonian society, and there is a clear lack minority that has to do without food, “the Russo-phone minority is more likely of people with ideas for civil society clothes and heating. than the Estonians to define themselves projects. The EU Commission has That is, the income differences in Es- as poor” (Norbalt, 2000). criticised the limited involvement of out- tonia are large, with 23% of the popula- side organisations in the policy planning tion earning half of the total income, and Participation in civil society and legislative drafting and has, through only 20% of the first, highly adapted, stra- the Phare and ACCESS programmes, given tum are Russo-phones. On several charac- The civil society in Estonia can be financial support to the development of teristics, such as education, capital resi- characterised as free and consisting of both the civil society and individual initiatives dency, citizenship, and ethnicity, income relativelly autonomous groups and indi- (SEC, 2001). Foreign donations and fund- differences can be found (Norbalt, 2000). viduals, but the civil society does not con- ing are crucial for the development of The Russo-phone minority is under-rep- stitute a counterbalance to the state be- NGOs and their continuation. Thus, one resented in the high-income group. cause the civil society has limited effect of the biggest problems with democracy The analysis of the socio-economic on the political society, and it is mainly in Estonia lies in the civil society – in its conditions has shown that inequality be- international organisations such as the weakness and low level of participation

47 in shaping the development of the state within the European Union, which have put on them and improve their economic (EHDR, 2000), but also the fact that the an election turn-out around 75-80%. Rea- situation at the local rather than the na- Russo-phones and the Estonians partici- sons cited for the low turn-out are the prob- tional level. The reasons for wanting Es- pate in separate civil societies, and that lems with distinguishing the political plat- tonian citizenship were predominantly dialogue between these two communities forms of the parties from each other, and economic and pragmatic; thus the Russo- has been difficult to establish constitute a the belief that voters are unable to influ- phones need to feel as a part of Estonia problem for the development of Estonia ence the political system (FHCR, 2001). and must rebuild their political and na- as a strong democratic state. The Norbalt Survey from 1999 clearly tional identity, which collapsed together shows that the Russo-phone minority to with the Soviet Union. This, furthermore, Participation a larger extent than the Estonians has not corresponds with my previous argument in the political society participated in any kind of political ac- that it is the Russo-phone elite who takes tivity or event during the past 5 years. active part and is very interested in poli- Only Estonian citizens can enjoy full Thus, it can be fair to say that the Russo- tics, because the elite has been able to access to political participation (Riigikogu phone minority is less interested in poli- adapt to both the changing political and Election Act), while non-citizens, who have tics, they participate in the political soci- economic conditions in Estonia. In short, resided in Estonia for the past five years ety less than Estonians and do not want I think the Russo-phones are less inter- can vote in local government elections, citizenship to acquire political rights. The ested in politics because there is an over- but not run for office (Local Government obvious question now is why the Russo- representation of Russo-phones who be- Council Election Act). This implies that phones are less active when it comes to long to the lowest stratum, who feel ex- 62% of the Russo-phone minority (some participation in the political society? The cluded and have adapted poorly to the 20% of the total population) cannot par- survey results I have had access to do not market economy. ticipate in the political society at the na- provide an answer directly, but after hav- Thus, the legislative cleavage and the tional level. ing studied the socio-economic differences nationality policy have created a divid- The turn-out in the elections both for between the Russo-phone minority and ing line among the Russo-phones between national parliament and local government the Estonians a qualified guess is that the the well adapted, successful elite and the has generally been low, between 52% and Russo-phone minority is very occupied rest, who are over-represented among the 69%, compared to developed democracies in living up to the legislative demands poorly adapted and to a large degree feel

48 excluded from society. This gives grim the civil and the political society has straightforward because several elements signals for the future, because this will shown systematic differences between the have to be taken into account. The first deepen and strengthen the linguistic di- Estonians and the Russo-phone minority. element is the integration policy, which I vision in the Estonian society. Participa- On the basis of this analysis it is fair to have argued is exclusive, because it estab- tion and competition in national elections conclude that the Estonians and Russo- lished the Estonian language and nation is restricted to ethnic Estonians and Russo- phones form two fairly separate commu- as the enforced common core of the soci- phones who have lived up to the legal nities with limited communication be- ety. There is no intention in the future requirements for obtaining Estonian citi- tween themselves (Vetik, 2000a:). The two to acknowledge the Russian language as zenship. The Estonian democracy can in groups go to different schools (though an element in the public sphere of the other words be characterised, according an increasing number of Russo-phone Estonian state and the recognition of to Smith, as an “Ethnic Democracy”. parents are beginning to put their chil- Russian will, from 2007, diminish even dren in Estonian schools), they have dif- further. The second element is the dis- Integration or assimilation ferent language and thus different media, crimination in the labour market on the and there is a lack of interest for the other basis of language, which freezes the Russo- From the analysis of the Estonian legal group in the media. They work and live phones in a state of unemployment be- frame and the integration policy I am able in different places and have different le- cause they are not able to find employ- to conclude that both the Estonian na- gal status. Thus, the relationship between ment outside the Russo-phone populated tion and state building project is exclu- the Russo-phone minority and the Esto- areas. The third element is the fairly sys- sive in character. On the basis of the analy- nians can be characterised as separation tematic difference between the Russo- sis of the socio-economic differences and (Vetik, 2000a:), which was also the case phone minority and the Estonians on the participation in the civil and politi- during the Soviet Union just reversed socio-economic conditions, which to cal society I am able to evaluate whether with Estonians under-represented in the some extent can be explained by the poor the exclusive nationality policy has im- higher social strata etc. socio-economic conditions in North-East- plied integration or assimilation of the The question is then whether it is pos- ern Estonia. Russo-phone minority. sible to determine if the Russo-phone On the basis of these three elements I The analysis of the socio-economic minority is being integrated or assimi- can conclude that the Russo-phone mi- conditions and the participation in both lated. Unfortunately, the answer is not nority is not being integrated into the

49 Estonian society neither in political, so- forced (implying that the stateless and der construction and re-construction in- cial or economic terms. The Russian lan- Russian citizens have to leave Estonia). fluenced by factors. I will investigate guage does not have the same status as whether the factors point in the same di- Estonian, and the new integration policy V. Political and national rection and compare it to the perception puts an emphasis on the preservation of identity of the Russo-phone minority of their situ- Estonian language. The Russo-phones have ation and possibilities in Estonia. This to prove their loyalty (proficiency in Es- Crucial for determining whether the will make it possible for me to conclude tonian) in order to participate in the Russo-phone minority constitutes a struc- if the identity of the Russo-phone mi- political society. Thus “integration for tural security threat to the consolidation nority is in concordance with the idea of participation” is dominant in Estonia. of Estonia as a strong democratic state the state. This would therefore lead to the conclu- are not only socio-economic differences sion that the Russo-phone minority as a and differences in political participation, The Estonian nation consequence of the nationality policy is but also political and national identity. being integrated only by accepting that Differences in political identity between Analysing the ethnic foundation of the the Estonian nation and language is the Estonians and Russo-phones can give an Estonian nation, the five characteristics foundation of Estonia. However, my actual indication of whether the Russo- that Smith lists must be investigated. First, analysis also indicates that the Russo- phone minority is alienated from the Es- the Estonians share a common proper phones who have adapted well to the new tonian society and has another idea of name. Second, the Estonians have a rich political and economic conditions in Es- the state than the Estonians. collection of folk songs and fairytales dat- tonia are able to be a part of the higher The primordial approach will first be ing back to the end of the 19th century in social strata. Acquiring Estonian citizen- used to analyse whether there are any dif- which the common myths and memories ship and having proficiency in Estonian ferences between the strength of the eth- are an integrated part (Lieven, 1993:110ff). are preconditions for participation in the nic foundation of the Russo-phone mi- The third characteristic of an ethnic com- Estonian state and society. This leaves us nority and the Estonians by analysing if munity are historical memories, and in with the conclusion that the Estonian they possess the characteristics of an the case of Estonia the experience and nationality policy and integration policy ethnie5 . According to the instrumental memories of the First Republic are often encourages assimilation, but it is not en- approach, national identity is always un- used in political rhetoric (Berg, 2002 &

50 Jonsson, 1999). The Estonian language is tional identity by the time the First Re- an important denominator for the Esto- public was established. Factors influencing the identity nian culture, which is the fourth charac- formation teristic Smith lists, and I would even The Russo-phone nation characterise it as the basis of the Estonian Several factors have influence on nation. The fifth characteristic of an It is immediately clear that the Russo- whether it is more likely that the Russo- ethnie demands that the Estonians have a phone minority lacks the ethnic base and phone minority culturally will choose an special relationship with the Estonian ter- a national identity. To some extent they identity associated with the natural home- ritory, which the Estonians have inhab- have a common name but some term them land, Russia, develop their own distinc- ited since the 12th century as a coherent “Russian diaspora”, others “non-Estonians” tive Russian identity or identify with the group, and this is used in political rheto- or “Russo-phone minority”. The majority Estonian culture. Furthermore these fac- ric as evidence of a primordial right to has immigrated during the Soviet Union tors have influence on the political iden- the Estonian territory (Berg, 2002:111). The era and do not have any association to the tity choice, which determines whom the final content of an ethnie is a sense of so- Estonian territory. The historical memo- Russo-phone minority will choose to be cial solidarity, which is not easy to analyse, ries and myths they have in common are loyal towards. but a survey show that 85% of the Esto- from the Soviet Union, which has seized The first factor is whether and to what nians have a great deal in common with to exist. Instead, the Russo-phone minor- extent the national minority constitutes the state nationality and 12% have some- ity can be said to have a conglomerate iden- a regional community, and the second thing in common (Rose & Maley, 1994:54f). tity put together by their common Rus- perspective is if the national minority has Furthermore, the low rate of social rela- sian language and diasporic social identity, a natural homeland. Russia can be con- tions with other ethnic groups indicates which is characterised by the loss of iden- sidered as a natural homeland, and the that a sense of social solidarity exists. tity as Soviet citizens (Laitin, 1998:363). Russo-phone minority constitutes about On this background it is possible to Diasporic memories of a Russian-speak- 31% of the Estonian inhabitants and have conclude that the Estonians have a strong ing Soviet world are distinct from the a tight-knit community in North-Eastern ethnic base since they share all the charac- rest of the Estonian population, who only Estonia on the border with Russia. Espe- teristics Smith has listed. Moreover, the have more or less bad memories from the cially, in the early 1990s did a secessionist Estonian ethnie had developed into a na- Soviet Union. potential exist, because the Soviet City

51 Council deputies threatened with seces- cus in the state building process is secur- ing Estonia. Here the instrumental ap- sion (Semjonov, 1998). Compared to the ing the Estonian language and nation. The proach comes into action, because the Estonians, the Russo-phone minority to a nation and state building processes are naturalisation requirements and the inte- larger extent has relatives, friends or busi- deeply intermixed and the aim of the state gration policy try to win the political ness partners in Russia (82%), and in gen- building process is consolidation of the loyalty of the Russo-phone minority, and eral the Russo-phones have more contacts nation in the institutional expression of the symbol of political loyalty to the Es- outside Estonia than the Estonians do the state. Thus, the Estonian policy towards tonian state is basically speaking Estonian. (Rose, 2000). Furthermore, the Russo- the Russo-phone minority can be Thus, the Estonian policy aims to recon- phone minority is known for a low de- characterised as nationalising. The Estonian struct the identity of the Russo-phone gree of rootedness, as many moved from nation has primacy in the public sphere of minority. republic to republic in the Soviet Union, Estonia, and thus the Russo-phone minor- but the rate of Russo-phones born in Es- ity has to accept the rules the Estonian state Russian policy towards tonia is increasing. The rate of inter-eth- has established, or leave. The tone is no the Russian diaspora nic marriages between Estonians and Russo- longer as harsh as it was in the beginning in the near abroad phones is low. These factors favour reten- of the state formation, but the underlying tion of a traditional Russian identity, be- message is still the same. It is my clear im- The policy of the external homeland cause they are not much exposed to Esto- pression that the Estonian state authorities, towards the Russian diaspora is a factor nians and links with Russia have contin- who strive towards membership of the EU that has influence on the identity choice ued. On the other hand, the Estonian im- and NATO, have learned to conceal the of the Russo-phone minority. Total lack migration quota limits the number of Rus- exclusive character of the policy6 . of interest from the Russian Federation sians arriving, thus no re-enforcement of The Estonian understanding of na- will make the Russo-phone minority less a traditional Russian culture can take place. tional identity is primordial because de- inclined to choose loyalty towards Rus- scent determines whether you are part of sia, while the possibility of military in- The policy of the nationalising state the Estonian nation or not. Yet, at the tervention in the course of protecting same time the Estonian politicians and their rights will reinforce the possibility The analysis of the legal frame and the the public have realised that the Russo- for a choice of loyalty towards the exter- integration policy tells that the main fo- phone minority has no intention of leav- nal homeland.

52 Russia’s policy towards the Russian bility of a military intervention cannot diaspora is difficult to get a grip of be- be ruled out (Vining, 2002). The Russo-phone minority’s cause the Russian statements are sporadic, The Russian President Vladimir Putin perception of their possibilities and often they have the character of po- has furthermore, in connection to the in Estonia litical rhetoric and not real policy state- Macedonian crisis, used the claim for mak- ments. However two documents, the New ing Albanian an official language to de- Perceived political, economic, or cul- Russian Military Doctrine adopted in Oc- mand that Russian should obtain an offi- tural deprivation is of vital importance tober 1999 and the Russian National Se- cial status in the Baltic states (RFE/RL for the development of national identity. curity Concept adopted in January 2000, Baltic States Report, 2001:16/10). On the The Estonians perceived themselves to be can give an insight into the Russian atti- other hand, the friendly winds between politically, economically, linguistically, tudes and interests in the Russo-phone Russia and the USA indicate that the po- and culturally deprived in the Soviet minority in Estonia. Both the National tential of a military intervention to pro- Union, even though Estonia was one of Security Concept and the Military Doc- tect Russian citizens is rather unlikely. the net contributors to the Soviet bud- trine state that among Russia’s national Russia might continue to interfere, but get. This perceived deprivation had a large security interests are “protection of the the political demands from Russia nor- impact on the Estonian national revival lawful rights and interests of Russian citi- mally only appear in the media and not in the late 1980s (Bollerup & Christensen, zens abroad with the use of political, eco- as official demands, which could be in- 1997). It is therefore, interesting to inves- nomic and other measures”. Furthermore, terpreted that Russia can no longer use tigate how the Russo-phone minority one of the basic external threats to Russia’s the Russian citizens as a political platform perceives the economic positions and security is “discrimination against and sup- for their interests in the Baltic states possibilities in Estonia, because this can pression of rights, freedoms and lawful (Aareng, 05-04-02). Thus, the analysis of indicate whether the Russo-phone minor- interests of Russian Federation citizens in the Russian policy towards the Russo- ity is developing an identity as a deprived foreign states” (Military Doctrine, 1999). phone minority shows that Russia does national minority. These two Russian documents clearly in- take an interest in the rights of the Russo- A clear majority of the Russo-phone dicate that Russia does take a firm inter- phone minority, but actual actions be- minority (68%) finds the economic in- est in the protection of its citizens out- hind the policy are not likely to occur in equality very large or fairly large, while side its border and if necessary, the possi- the near future. the Estonian majority (79%) finds it fairly

53 small or non-existent. It is therefore fair the Estonians during the Soviet Union. two groups find different things impor- to conclude that the Russo-phones per- However, it should be noted that com- tant in the integration. The most impor- ceive themselves deprived of economic pared to the possibilities in Russia the tant issues for the Estonians are that the possibilities in Estonia. When asked about Russo-phones agree or somewhat agree Russo-phone minority acquires profi- the possibilities of the Estonians and the that “the conditions are worse in Russia ciency of the Estonian language and is Russo-phones, who are equal in citizen- for people like me” (67%) and that “Esto- loyal to the Estonian state. Second, that ship, age, education, language fluency and nia offers better changes for improving the growth of mutual acceptance and readi- experience, the same picture appears. The the living standards in the future than ness to co-operate and the number of non- Russo-phone minority generally thinks Russia does” (67%) (Rose, 2000). Estonians applying for Estonian citizen- that it is easier for Estonians, while about ship increases. This could indicate that half of the Estonians agree that the Esto- The perception of the the Estonians are beginning to believe that nians will often or sometimes have better integration policy the development of a common state iden- possibilities than the Russo-phone minor- tity is possible, because they emphasise ity. The Monitoring survey of integration that the Russo-phone minority must be This could be a factor that will pro- has found differences in how the Esto- loyal towards the Estonian state and that vide the foundation for the rising of a nians and the Russo-phone minority evalu- the achievement of tolerance is a mutual national minority identity, as it was for ate the integration process in Estonia. The project for Estonians and Russo-phones. Table 5: Perceiving economic inequalities between the Estonian and non-Estonian The Russo-phones in general find the in- people (%) tegration process more important than the Estonians, and they see the growth of Estonians Russo-phones mutual tolerance as the way for them to V52ery large 2 feel as part of Estonia. This presupposes, Fairly large 17 46 according to the Russo-phones, that the F9airly small 452 Estonians must be ready to co-operate and Very small 13 4 interact as well as create a clear integra- N7o inequality 13tion strategy, where the nationality legis- Source: New Baltic Barometer IV. Question asked spring 2000. lation will be amended in concordance

54 with European norms7. The way to en- possible to see the tendencies in the for- This leaves two possible political iden- hance the loyalty of the Russo-phone mi- mation of the Russo-phone minority’s tity choices for the Russo-phone minor- nority towards the Estonian state is a pro- cultural identity. The tendency can be ity, first the aspirations for their own cess that enables individual and collective that they identify culturally with the ex- nation-state and, second, being loyal to- self-realisation through citizenship and ternal homeland Russia, or that they wards the Estonian state. Considering the participation in the political society, equal obtain a new Russian identity that dif- close-knit Russo-phone community in possibilities in the labour market and the fers from the cultural traditions of the North-Eastern Estonia and the autonomy development of a culture in their own Russian Federation, or that they are be- referendum, the aspirations for secession language. ginning to assimilate into the Estonian and the creation of a new nation-state is culture. clearly a possible option, but since the The likely direction Political loyalty is a fundamental ele- middle of the 1990s it has only been a of the Russo-phone minority’s ment in the consolidation of democracy rhetorical possibility. The Russo-phones identity choice and of the state. Some of the political are well aware that secession will not ren- identity choices can be eliminated easily. der an economically viable situation, but The analysis of the different factors The Russo-phone minority has accepted this does not exclude the possibility that influencing the identity formation, the that the Soviet Union has collapsed, and the Russo-phone minority has aspirations nationalising policy, the Russian policy as 62% of the Russo-phones do not wish for cultural autonomy with Russian as an towards the diaspora and the perception to re-establish communist rule, they have official language within the frame of the of the possibilities in Estonia enables me no intention of reconstituting the Soviet Estonian state. to discuss the direction of the Russo- Union (Rose, 2000). The likelihood that The Russo-phone minority would like phone minority’s identity formation. the Russo-phone minority will be loyal to choose the second option, being loyal Thus, it is possible to evaluate whether towards the Russian Federation is equally towards the Estonian state, but the Esto- the Russo-phones are loyal towards the unlikely, because they have seen only po- nian nationalising policy prevents it. The Soviet Union, are loyal towards the new litical rhetoric and no actions to secure majority of the Russo-phones want to Russian Federation, have aspirations for their rights. They furthermore see them- become Estonian citizens, but at the same creating a new nation-state or are loyal selves as different from Russians and as time they find the naturalisation require- towards the Estonian state. But it is also strangers in Russia. ments far too harsh. The Russo-phones

55 accept that they should learn Estonian and yet others a Belorussian identity. nia, but they have not accepted that Esto- (Monitoring) but at the same time they However, members of the Russo-phone nian will be their mother tongue. In the seek the possibility to develop their own minority think of themselves as different Monitoring Survey the Russo-phones ex- culture based on the Russian language, and from the traditional Russians and have pressed their intention to search for their they do not believe this to be possible to a large degree adapted the Estonian own cultural identity based on the Rus- within the present legal frame of the Es- working morale. sian language. Thus, developing a new tonian state. Thus, the Estonian state and The option of adopting the culture of Russian self-understanding is more likely, the Russo-phone minority have very dif- the dominant nation, the Estonian, is especially when the feeling of being de- ferent understandings of how to obtain another possible identity choice for the prived of possibilities and unfairly treated loyalty, and as long as this difference pre- Russo-phone minority. Usually the change is taken into account. The likely scenario vails, the possibility for the Russo-phones of mother tongue will be the most im- is not assimilation, but that the Russo- to become an equal and integrated part portant ingredient in an assimilation pro- phone minority will develop a distinct in the Estonian society is not likely. The cess (Kolströ, 1996), and this is the op- cultural identity based on the Russian lan- political identity of the Russo-phone mi- tion the Estonian nationalising policy is guage and bilingualism. nority can be characterised as placed be- trying to encourage. More and more tween loyalty towards Estonia and aspira- Russo-phones learn Estonian in order to The political or national identity tion for autonomy within the frame of pass the citizenship requirements, and in formation the Estonian state. more parents are beginning to send their The cultural identity determines the children to an Estonian language school, The character of the identity of the collective self-understanding of the Russo- but does this imply that the Russo-phone Russo-phone minority is in many ways phone minority, and it is now possible minority in the future will be monolin- very different from the Estonian. The to see the tendencies. There is no indica- gual in Estonian, or will they be bilin- Russo-phones do not have a strong com- tion of the Russo-phones internalising the gual in Estonian and Russian? At the mon ethnic foundation, and they were official nationality from the Soviet Union. moment the answer is clear. The Russo- in a state of identity crisis when the So- Thus, the majority of the Russo-phone phone minority has accepted that they viet Union collapsed because they to a minority should choose a traditional have to learn Estonian if they want to large degree had a Soviet identity. Thus, Russian identity, but others a Ukrainian have the possibility to prosper in Esto- different factors have influenced the iden-

56 tity of the Russo-phone minority, and the bilities to develop their own Russian lan- rivation that can fuel the formation of a tendency is that the Russo-phone minor- guage-based identity, because the Estonian national minority identity. Thus, the con- ity will develop a culture distinct from nationalising policy does not provide the tinuation of the nationalising policy can the Estonian and from the traditional public space for this. The nationalising lead to the consolidation of a new Russo- Russian culture, thus, seeing themselves policy of Estonia has, as a mean to reach phone self-understanding, while a more as Russian-Estonians. Politically, the Russo- the goal of a pure Estonian nation-state, integrative policy that gives concessions phone minority wants to be loyal to the tried to influence and force the Russo- towards the naturalisation requirements Estonian state but the nationalising policy phone minority to live up to the and where the Estonian state shows trust prevents it. naturalisation demands and through that in the Russo-phone minority could lead The important question is whether the gain political loyalty, but as we know the to assimilation on a voluntary basis. The Russo-phone minority is alienated and has naturalisation process has been very slow Russo-phone minority would have to live another idea of the state than the one in and only about 113,000 people out of up to the trust given to them from the the Estonian Constitution. The analysis half a million have acquired Estonian citi- Estonian state. It is therefore possible to of the identity formation as well as the zenship. Thus, in this sense the conclude that the Russo-phone minor- socio-economic conditions can help to nationalising policy has failed, because ity to a large extent feels alienated from answer this question. As we know by now, about 39% of the Russo-phones are state- the Estonian state and society and that the Russo-phone minority is over-repre- less and another 19,4% took Russian citi- they do not share the Estonian idea of sented in the third strata, which is zenship instead. the state. characterised by social stigmatisation and The nationalising policy can be judged alienation from the Estonian society, and as mistaken, and the only wanted result VI. The Russo-phone furthermore, the analysis has shown that the policy has reached is the Russo-phone’s minority, a structural the Russo-phone minority generally feels acceptance of learning Estonian. The un- security threat? deprived of possibilities to prosper po- wanted results are the consolidation of litically and economical. Socially, the Es- the divided societies inherited from the It is now time to analyse the conse- tonians and Russo-phones live in separate Soviet Union and the stigmatisation of quences of the corresponding cleavages communities. The Russo-phone minority the majority of the Russo-phone minor- between the Estonians and the Russo- has expressed the lack of cultural possi- ity, which has resulted in perceived dep- phone minority for the coherence be-

57 tween the three components of the state. state. The purpose to “preserve the Esto- will not be threatened, because naturalised I will analyse if, despite the cleavages be- nian nation and culture over time” is Russo-phones have proven loyalty and tween the majority and the minority, also saturated to a very strong degree at do no longer pose a threat to the Esto- there can be a strong coherence between several layers of the Estonian institu- nian state. the three components in the Estonian tions, as the analysis of the Estonian le- Fundamental for the legal frame as an state. gal frame showed. The Citizenship Law institutional expression of the state is the and the naturalisation requirements have demand of proving loyalty towards the The coherence between the idea different consequences for the Russo- Estonian state in its present form. The of the state and the institutional phone minority and the Estonians. Thus, integration policy, which emphasises the expression of the state the Estonian nation is the core element difference between the Estonians and the in the law, and persons who are not mem- Russo-phone minority, is also strongly The institutional expression of the state bers of the Estonian nation must accept coherent with the Estonian idea of the gains legitimacy when the institutions are the Estonian language and the values of state. The integration policy focuses on constructed according to, first, the the Estonian nation in order to be in- the development of a strong common organising principle and, second, to the cluded. The Language Law protects and core, which is based on the Estonian ter- purpose of the state. First, considering defends the public sphere as an Estonian ritory and the Estonian language. Thus, the organising principle of liberal democ- language sphere at the expense of the the purpose of the integration policy is racy, the Estonian constitution secures Russian language. The Cultural Au- to enhance the Estonian nation and en- equal civil rights to all inhabitants of Es- tonia including the right to, for instance, tonomy of National Minorities Act is force it as the basis of relations between unemployment benefits and social secu- also in coherence with the Estonian idea the majority and the minority. The analy- rity. Furthermore, all Estonian citizens, of the state, because only naturalised sis of the legal frame and the integration as opposed to all inhabitants, are guaran- Russo-phones are entitled to protection policy enables me to conclude that there teed full political rights. of minority rights. By only granting is a very strong coherence between the Second, there is a strong coherence cultural autonomy for Estonian citizens idea of the state, which is found in the between the Estonian idea of the state the institutional expression of the state Estonian constitution, and the institu- and the institutional expression of the secures that the Estonian idea of the state tional expression of the state.

58 words, consolidated in the idea of the Furthermore, the analysis of how the The coherence between the idea state. Russo-phone minority perceives its pos- of the state and the physical It is the Russo-phone minority that cre- sibilities and the integration policy re- base of the state ates instability and lack of coherence be- veals that the Russo-phone minority does tween the Estonian idea of the state and not share the Estonian idea of the state. The coherence between the physical base the Russo-phone part of the physical base. The Russo-phones believe that the only of the state and the idea of the state is The first problem is the idea itself, which way to obtain their loyalty towards the strong when the idea does not have aspi- does not consider the Russo-phones as an Estonian state is by the Estonian authori- rations of territory outside the state bor- integral part of the state. The Language Law ties showing them trust. The symbol of ders and when the idea of the state is symbolises this weak coherence between the this trust is easier access to Estonian citi- widely held among the inhabitants of the institutional expression of the state and zenship and elimination of the national- physical base. First, considering the terri- one third of the population because they ity legislation that marks the Russo-phone tory, Russia has not yet ratified the bor- speak Russian, instead of the Estonian, as minority as second rank, and not fully der agreement signed in 1994, while Esto- their mother tongue. The Russo-phone worthy of trust. This is completely unac- nia has accepted the Soviet borderlines minority can accept the naturalisation re- ceptable for the Estonians, because they and does not have any aspirations of re- quirements, which over time will assimi- have been treated unfairly during the gaining its lost territory. Therefore, the late them, and become a part of the Esto- Soviet Union and exposed to idea of the state can be considered to be nian society, or they can leave Estonia. This Russification. This is one of the funda- in coherence with the territory. is the basic issue in the integration policy mental problems in Estonia and it is so Concerning the Estonians the coher- even though it is disguised in wordings as difficult to solve, because the fear of oblit- ence is strong because the Estonians ‘the enabling of maintenance of ethnic eration is so deeply felt in the Estonian agree with the idea of the state. A strong difference’ and ‘multicultural society’. The national identity. The Russo-phone mi- element in their national identity is the idea of the state has not changed, and the nority has accepted that they have to learn fear of assimilation and extinction, and Estonian nation and language is the fun- Estonian, and the Russo-phone elite is a the idea of the state is the protector of dament of the Estonian state. Thus the good example of that. The rest is not their identity from outside threats. The Russo-phone minority can only be of sec- against learning Estonian, they just do not Estonian national identity is, in other ond rank in the Estonian public sphere. have the social capability for it, and the

59 majority of the Russo-phone minority though still stressing the Estonian lan- Yet, the Russo-phone minority feels wants their children to learn Estonian. guage as the core element. unfairly treated by the Estonian institu- Yet, the Russo-phone minority does not The coherence between the idea of the tions. Again the naturalisation require- want to assimilate as the Estonians wish state and the physical base of the state can ments are harsh and, on top of them, them to do. They are a group with dis- be characterised as strong for the Esto- many find themselves waiting for a long tinct social character and the actual and nians, while it is non-existent for the time before acquiring Estonian citizen- perceived unfair treatment of them has Russo-phone minority, who feel alienated ship. The analysis of the nationality legis- strengthened their need for a common and excluded from the Estonian society. lation and integration policy demon- national identity based on the Russian strated that the Estonians are in a language. The coherence between the favourable position and their concerns Thus the nationality policy, which has physical base of the state and the are appreciated more than the concerns created unequal socio-economic condi- institutional expression of the state of the Russo-phones. I will, therefore, tions for the Estonians and the Russo- characterise the coherence between the phone minority and tried to assimilate A strong coherence between the physical physical base and the institutional expres- the Russo-phones into the Estonian na- base of the state and the institutional ex- sion of the state as weak but existent, be- tion, has actually reinforced the need for pression of the state depends on whether cause the entire population has secured developing a national minority identity the institutions can deliver the expected ser- civil rights including unemployment ben- among the Russo-phone minority. This vice to the whole population and secure efits and other social services. seems as a deadlock, and only when the the territorial base. In Estonia the institu- Estonians do no longer fear for their fu- tions correspond to the physical base of To what extent is the Russo-phone ture as Estonians can they begin to accept the state and there is a widespread accep- minority a structural security that Estonia is not only for Estonians. tance among the Estonians and the Russo- threat? The first steps are already taken because phones of the system, which has delivered the Estonians are changing their attitude economic growth and promise a prosper- The analysis of the coherence between towards the Russo-phones from “a prob- ous future (Rose, 2000:22ff). This strength- the three components has demonstrated lem to a potential”, and they believe that ens the coherence between the physical base some weak and strong points in the Esto- different ethnical groups can get along, and the institutional expression of the state. nian state. The core problem is the Esto-

60 nian idea of the state, which the Russo- Figure 2. The three components of the Estonian state phone minority does not share and can- not share, even though they really want to Russo-phone Idea Estonian Idea become a part of the Estonian political and civil society. The analysis demonstrated that Russo-phones come in 2nd the Estonians and the Russo-phones do not place. have the same status in the institutional The idea of the state expression of the state. The institutions are Russo- Estonian institutional organised to serve the needs of the Esto- Estonians nian citizens, and the rest of the Estonian phones expression of the state inhabitants come in second place, though still guaranteeing the basic civil liberties. The physical base The institutional expression Thus, the physical base is divided into of the state of the state the Estonians and the Russo-phone minor- ity, and there are two ideas of the state, the Estonian one, which is the idea the state tain under the present conditions. The assimilate the Russo-phone minority into works according to, and the Russo-phone interesting thing then is, what creates this the Estonian nation, but the East-Euro- idea of the state that stresses the need for instability in Estonia? Is it the presence pean and post-Soviet understanding of multiculturalism. The multicultural idea as of the Russo-phone minority in Estonia national identity is primordial and eth- a core element in the idea of the state in or is it the idea of the state and the nic; you are either born into a nation or Estonia would enable the Russo-phone mi- nationalising policy as the institutional you are not. Thus, the present Russo- nority to be loyal towards Estonia, because expression of the state? The Russo-phone phone minority will be considered sec- the Russian language would be an accepted minority can be considered as a structural ond rank even though they have lived up part. This can be seen in figure 2. security threat for Estonia when the idea to the naturalisation requirements, but the As the figure clearly shows, a strong of the state is the preservation of the Es- Russo-phones that are still in Estonia have coherence between the three components tonian nation and culture. The core of no intention of leaving Estonia and con- of Estonia is indeed very difficult to ob- the Estonian nationalising policy is to sider Estonia as their country. In this situ-

61 ation the only way to solve the inherent This is the positive scenario for the where the Russo-phone minority is pro- instability is to organise the state and the development of Estonia and can be con- vided with equal opportunities. Thus if idea of the state so that the Russo-phone stituted in two different state formations. an economic crisis hits Estonia it is not minority is no structural security threat The first one is within the frame of the likely that a state-nation can develop. to the Estonian state. The solution that federal multinational state, where the Russo- The more negative scenario is based will solve the fundamental problem is to phone minority is granted extensive cul- on the continuation of the present policy change the idea of the state and the na- tural autonomy and where the Russian and idea of the state, which will alienate tionality policy. But this is not a way Es- language has an official status as the sec- the Russo-phone minority even further tonians can accept because of the deep ond language of Estonia. This state model and strengthen the Russo-phone national fear of obliteration. will be met with fierce opposition among identity. The consequence will be com- The important thing is to help the the Estonians and is therefore not that plete separation between the Russo-phones Russo-phone minority to acquire Estonian likely an outcome of the state building and the Estonians, with the Estonians be- citizenship, let them really know that Es- project. The second state model that is ing in the dominant position and using tonia wants them to be a part of the Esto- possible is the state-nation, where the state their dominant position to gain control nian state and society. At the moment the tries to create a nation that coincides with of the distribution of the resources and Russo-phone minority sees the the physical base of the state, but this to ensure that the advantages remain naturalisation requirements as a means to demands that the strong emphasis on the within the nation. Buzan (1991) has la- prevent them from becoming Estonian Estonian nation must be lessened, so that belled this kind of state a primal multina- citizens. Furthermore, there is a strong the Russo-phone minority can have the tional state, and Estonia will therefore be need to improve the socio-economic con- room to give input to the Estonian cul- vulnerable towards political threats aimed ditions of the Russo-phone minority. This ture. The Estonian identity would be a at changing the fragile balance between will not eliminate the structural security mix of the Estonians and the Russo-phones the dominant nation, the Estonians, and threat but it will slowly make the Russo- on equal terms, where the ethnic nation the minority. Thus, instability and inse- phone minority feel as part of the Esto- comes in second place and only has a sta- curity will characterise the Estonian state. nian state and with time, the deeply felt tus in the private sphere. This model is The integration policy did not foresee fear of obliteration will evaporate as will only likely in a long-term perspective, any changes to the nationality legislation; the emphasis on Estonia for Estonians. when the Estonians feel more secure and thus the Estonian nation is in the near

62 future still the core of the Estonian state, Kolströ, Pål (1995), “Russians in the vey Study”, University of Strathclyde, with a few expressions stating the Former Soviet Republics”, Indiana Uni- Glasgow (SPP 251, 284, 338) multicultural society of Estonia. Depend- versity Press. Semijonov, Aleksei (2000), ”Estonia: ing on how well the Estonians can con- Kolströ, Pål (1999), ”Nasjonsbygging. Nation Building and integration. Politi- ceal the continuation of the nationalistic Russland og de nye statene i øst”, cal and Legal Aspects, COPRI Working focus, the state will be characterised by Universitetsforlaget Oslo. Papers No. 8 vulnerability towards political demands Kolströ, Pål (1996), ”The New Russian Smith, Anthony D (1992), “Ethnic from the Russo-phone minority. Thus, the Diaspora – An Identity of its Own?, Ethnical Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Russo-phone minority will continue to and Racial Studies, Vol.19, No. 3, p. 609-639. Comparative Perspective” in Alexander J. constitute a structural security threat, and Laitin, David D. (1998), “Identity in Motyl (ed) (1992), ”Thinking Theoretical the strength of the threat will depend on Formation. The Russian-Speaking Popu- About Soviet Nationalities”, Columbia how the Russo-phone minority is treated lations in the Near Abroad”, Cornell University Press, New York. and if they get the same possibilities as University Press, United States Vetik, Raivo (2000a), “Democratic the Estonians. Lieven, Anatol, (1993), ”The Baltic Multiculturalism: A New Model of Na- Bibliography Revolution. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania tional Integration”, Aland Islands Peace and the Path to Independence”, Yale Uni- Institute (http://www.ut.ee/abvkeskus/eesti/ Andersen, Erik André (1999), ”An Eth- versity Press, New Haven and London. democratic_multiculturalism.htlm – 09-05- nic Perspective on Economic Reform: the Rose, Richard (1997b), “Baltic Trends: 02). case of Estonia”, Aldershot Ashgate. Studies in Co-operation, Conflict, Rights Legal documents are found on http:// Buzan, Barry (1991), “People, States and Obligations”, University of .www.legaltext.ee, which is the homepage and Fear”, 2nd edition, Harvester Strathclyde, Glasgow (SPP 288) of official translations in Estonia. Wheatdheaf, Great Britain. Rose, Richard & William Maley (1994), Monitoring integration Report (2000): Jonsson, Anna (1999), “Nationalising “Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Sur- http://www.meis.ee/eng/monitoring (20- State-Building and Language, The Case of vey Study”, University of Strathclyde, 03-02) Estonia”, Uppsala Universitet, department of Glasgow (SPP 222) Norbalt II Baseline Report (2000), “Liv- East European Studies, Working Papers 50, Rose, Richard (1995, 1997a, 2000), ing Conditions Study in Estonia 1999”, ISSN 1103-3541. “New Baltic Barometer II, III, IV: A Sur- http://www.fafo.no/norbalt/ (30-09-01)

63 Report of the Government of Estonia, 4 The use of the term “non-Estonians” corre- Implementation of State Programme “In- sponds with my use of “Russo-phone minority”. 5 Ethnie is defined according to Smith as a unit tegration in Estonian society 2000-2007” of population sharing: A common proper name; in May 2001. http://www.riik.ee/saks.htm Myths and common ancestry; Historical memo- (20-03-02) (referred to as “Government ries; One or more distinctive elements of culture; Integration Report”). An association with a given territory; A sense of social solidarity (1992:50). Open Society Institute (2001), “Moni- 6 The State Integration Programme is in this toring the EU Accession Process: Minor- connection a prime example, with wordings as ity Protection”, httP://www.riga.lv/ the harmonisation of society. A thorough analysis of minelres/count/estonia.htm (01-04-02) the State Integration Programme can be found in Lind, 2002. State Programme “Integration in Esto- 7 For instance, that the status of national mi- nian Society 200-2007”, http:// nority is not limited to citizens only. www.riik.ee/saks/ikomisjon/ programme.htm (15-03-02) (referred to as State Integration Programme)

1 The Russo-phone minority is the group of non-Estonians with Russian as their common language and not necessarily ethnic Russians. 2 It should be noted that the Estonian State has in the State Integration Programme recognised the need to re-examine the Cultural Autonomy Law including defining the role of cultural self- government in the advancement of the culture and education of ethnic minorities. 3 State Integration Programme refers to “Inte- gration in Estonian Society 2000-2007” adopted by the Estonian Government June 1998. See http:/ /www.riik.ee

64 Belarus - A Unique Case in the European Context?

By Peter Kim Laustsen*

Introduction Remaking of World Order”2 , where he ex- Federation, Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia and pressed a more pessimistic view. It was Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Since the end of the Cold War and the claimed that the spreading of liberal de- Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and break-up of the Soviet Union, a guiding mocracy had reached its limits and that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) did paradigm in the discussions concerning outside its present boundaries (primarily support Huntington’s theory. political changes in Central and Eastern Western Europe) this form of government The development in the latest years has Europe has been a positive and optimis- would not be able to take root. shown progress in all but a few of the tic believe in progress towards the vic- The political development that took above mentioned states. Reading Freedom tory of a liberal democracy. This view was place in the years after the fall of the Ber- House’s surveys on the level of political clearly expressed by Francis Fukuyama in lin Wall and the birth and rebirth of the rights and civil liberties gives hope. his widely discussed book “The End of successor states of the Soviet Union, Widely across Europe these rights and lib- History and the Last Man”1 . The optimistic Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not erties have been and are still expanding view of the political changes was however however support Fukuyama’s claim. On and deepening. One state does clearly sepa- challenged by Samuel P. Huntington in the contrary, the political upheaval in, for rate itself from the trends in Eastern and his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the instance, Slovakia, Belarus, the Russian Central Europe: Belarus. According to * Mr. Peter Kim Laustsen is a Master student of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, and is a former Academic Assistant in the Baltic Defence College Institute for Defence Studies. The article is based on a paper from January 2003.

65 Freedom House, the political and civil describe Belarus as one of the wealthier Belarusian National Republic created af- rights and liberties have worsened since republics socially as well as economically. ter German Kaiser’s protection under the 1994/1995 and continue to do so. The Belarus went through a massive eco- First World War. purpose of this article is an attempt to nomic and industrial modernization af- The commonality between these two explain the causes to the specific political ter the end of the Second World War. units is the absence of an effect on the developments in Belarus and to charac- The developments in the political sphere Belarusian consciousness today. Both Po- terize the political regime. could only take place after the death of land and Lithuania largely possess mo- Josef Stalin, after which the political elite nopoly on the state continuity from the The starting point of obtained a certain degree of autonomy Lithuanian Grand Duchy. The end of the Belarus in relation to Moscow and because of that state was that it was split between the ma- a relatively high degree of internal self- jor powers of the time. The Belarusian part Two critical factors can be said to have rule. ended up under Russian control, and the existed in Belarus: modern internal struc- Another characteristic feature of the period was characterized by a cultural, re- tures and an existing state structure. Ac- Belarusian case is the presence of a crisis ligious, and political repression with Rus- cording to a survey conducted by of sovereignty. Compared to, for instance, sian attempts to erase all traces of a Deutsche Bank in 1990 and repeated by the three Baltic states history shows that Belarusian identity. This co-optation of the Kuzio & Nordberg3 , Belarus had a high there de facto has not existed a Belarusian Belarusian nation David Riach described score on the scales of the survey concern- state before. The first possible state that as de facto destruction of the Belarusian state ing industrialization, infrastructure, and can be said to have existed is the Grand and nation. The short time the National level of education in the population. Duchy of Lithuania due to the fact that a Republic existed, its establishment under Among the republics in the former So- large part of the present Belarusian terri- the German Kaiser’s protection and the viet Union, Belarus was clearly positioned tory was a part of the state formation, a lack of popular support has had an almost as number five, while Ukraine was posi- predominant part of the population was negative effect on the feeling of a state tioned as number one. This evaluation of of Slavic decent and the language used in among the population. The perception had Belarus is also supported by the United the state administration was Belarusian, been that the republic was an attempt to Nations Development Programme’s while the other possible state formation incorporate the Belarusian territory and (UNDP) yearly development reports that can be said to have been the short lived population under German rule.

66 The establishment of Belarus as a So- In contrast to Belarus, the three Baltic tria-Hungarian rule, where the govern- cialist Soviet Republic in 1919 exists states succeeded in maintaining their in- ment pursued a more liberal policy to- strongly in the minds of the Belarusian dependence from the end of the First wards ethnic groups within the state’s bor- population. The strongest memories for World War until the beginning of the ders. Despite the fact that the sovereignty Belarusians are of the time under Soviet 1940s. In this period the populations of was challenged, the populations in the rule with the fighting and resistance dur- the Baltic states built a strong conscious- Baltic states as well as in western part of ing the Second World War, the rebuild- ness about their independence, the state, Ukraine managed to preserve the memory ing, modernization and industrialization the nation, and their cultural heritage. The of a sovereign statehood, and because of after the war, and the rising standards of Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic that the states were more prepared for state living that followed these developments. states, the deportations and the armed and nation building project by the time Another important element was the fact struggle against the occupation until the of independence in 1991. that Belarus was accepted as a founding middle of the 1950s, all contributed to member of the United Nations. These strengthen the consciousness. The popu- Politico-institutional positive elements of the incorporation of lation of Belarus stood in an almost op- factors Belarus in the Soviet Union led the popu- posite situation at the Independence in lation to see itself as Soviet Belarusians 1991. In the three Baltic states the Another critical factor was the collapse rather than Belarusians. This problem has population’s memory of the statehood of the totalitarian rule imposed by the So- probably been further advanced by the and nationhood was a positive heritage viet Union. The collapse became clear in fact that Belarus as well as other republics that had positive effects during their battle the late 1980s and in the beginning of the in the Soviet Union experienced state for independence and nation building. 1990s. Two elements strongly contributed building before its nation building, the Another relevant comparison is in re- to undermining the totalitarian rule. It was opposite of the development that took lation to Ukraine which experienced a the meltdown of the nuclear reactor in place in most of the West, Central and longer period as an independent state. Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986 and the dis- East European states. The consequence has Despite the heavy Russian and Soviet sup- covery of the mass graves from the 1930s been that it has not been possible to build pression, a national consciousness did sur- and 1940s in the Kuropaty Forests north the national identity within the frame- vive. This was partly the effect of the fact of Minsk in 1988. These events had massive work of a state. that a part of the state came under Aus- consequences for the rule from Moscow.

67 The catastrophe revealed the inefficiency concerning the events were reported to The Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the lack of action from the totalitar- the public and where the findings in rela- ian state - at the regional level as well as at tion to the excavations were described. The meltdown of the nuclear reactor the state level. Both Ukraine and Belarus David Marples estimates that the discov- in Chernobyl occurred on the 26th of abstained from taking action indepen- ery of the mass graves had a decisive ef- April 1986, where the explosion caused dently of the centre in Moscow. The melt- fect on the possibilities for political an immense leak of airborne nuclear ma- down had a considerable psychological as changes in Belarus. terial. The consequences of this pollution well as physical effect on the population The reaction from the local govern- were a vast relocation of population and of Belarus, which was caused by the lack ment in Minsk was moderate. It was de- a large portion of the Belarusian land of information, help, and action from the cided to establish a commission which kept in quarantine (and therefore it can- local as well as the national government. had to go deeply into the matter. The not be used to produce agricultural This became obvious in relation to the result of the commission’s work was, for products). The accident had large eco- evacuations, which were only partial and large parts of the population, another nomic and human costs as well as conse- did not evacuate all the persons to safe piece of evidence of the regime’s charac- quences for the legitimacy of the Soviet and clean areas. This passive behaviour ter in Belarus. Despite the fact that over- Union. led the population to re-evaluate its atti- whelming evidence pointed in the direc- One reason for this event having such tude towards the state and caused a fall in tion of Stalin’s secret police as being the a deteriorating effect on the rule from confidence. perpetrators behind the massacres that Moscow was the reluctance of the authori- were conducted in the period between ties to reveal the existence of the catastro- The Kuropaty Graves 1930 and 1950, the most conservative phe and, later, also the extent of it. Not elements of the communist party denied until 40 hours after the accident did the The other event that contributed to that these claims were true. The old com- evacuation begin, and not until two days undermining the Soviet state was the dis- munist nomenklatura tried instead to after did Moscow recognize that an acci- covery of the mass graves in the Kuropaty blame the invasion forces from Nazi dent actually had happened. In fact, Mos- Forests north of the Belarusian capital Germany. The whole matter did however cow until that time deliberately tried to Minsk. The discoveries were published in further undermine the population’s trust stop any public mentioning of the event. two articles, where eye witnesses’ accounts in the regime and eroded the legitimacy

68 of the Soviet Union. The mistrust was Soviet Union. After the euphoria around the importance of the Belarusian national clear and it was further encouraged by the establishment, the Front tried to ob- identity to the nature of the transition. the regime’s aversion against recogniz- tain representation in the Belarusian par- This literature is almost concurrently stat- ing the horrors and crimes committed liament during the parliamentary election ing that the national identity and nation- under Stalin’s rule and its attempt to in 1990. The result was only a marginal alism have been very weak. This weakness conceal the clues. success, which was better than expected contributed to creating the base for a This degree of loyalty to Moscow has beforehand. The consequence was that the strong ruler taking over the power in been unique for Belarus compared to the old political regime continued to domi- Belarus. other republics in the Soviet Union, and nate the political sphere. Weak support The history of the Belarusian state can, it stands in strong contrast to the devel- behind the Front was further underlined as mentioned earlier, only be character- opment in the Baltic states. The loyal lead- during the following parliamentary and ized as being very limited. The same seems ership in Minsk and the massive presidential elections. The opposite devel- to be the case with the Belarusian nation russification of the Communist Party had opment could be observed in the Baltic building. This is a distinct feature for the the effect that a local communist elite was states and Ukraine. Regarding the elections long history, but it is much easier to iden- not developed, which could have headed in Ukraine, the popular movement suc- tify when looking more closely at the a democratic development as it happened ceeded in obtaining over one third of short history, that is the history after in Estonia. In the Baltic states the local the seats in the parliament, and also in Belarus was incorporated in the Soviet communist elites in fact led the liberaliza- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania the popu- Union. tion of the totalitarian systems in con- lar fronts succeeded in winning the elec- The Belarusian language has through- trast to the development in Belarus. tions. out history been under a strong pressure. The revelation of the mass graves in After having been used as the official state the Kuropaty Forest initiated popular The national identity language in the Grand Duchy of protests and the establishment of the Lithuania, the Belarusian co-optation in Belarus Popular Front. The destiny of the There is no doubt that the national the Russian Empire put a strong pressure Front was however radically different identity is decisive for understanding the on the Belarusian language in a very nega- from what happened to the similar orga- political change. This can also be seen tive direction. The reason was a very sup- nizations in the other republics in the from the massive amount of literature on pressing policy towards the national lan-

69 guages, which led to the name “Belarus” Belarusian language was driven out of with a common identity for all inhabit- and the prevailing religion - the Uniate the educational institutions, from the ants from Estonia to Kazakhstan, from Church - being forbidden. The pressure media, and the public space and its use Vladivostok to Kaliningrad. The conse- on the national language continued un- was confined to the countryside. Only quences of this policy were the installa- der the Soviet Union - though interrupted among a limited number of academics tion of Russian public servants in the cen- by a period of relaxation from the co- that wished to preserve the Belarusian tral administration in Minsk. At the same optation in 1919 until Josef Stalin’s take- national identity was the language still time a massive influx of Russian workers over and power consolidation in the late used. Because of that the new generations took place. The reason was an increasing 1920s, where the liberal policy towards of Belarusians were influenced by the need for workers to man the positions in the different nationalities inside the So- Russian language and culture, and the the Belarusian industry because of the viet Union ended very abruptly and dra- national language was looked upon as an republic’s industrialization and the re- matically. The population in Belarus did, obstacle to social mobility. Stalin’s goal building, which took place after the enor- in the 1920s, experience a national was to eradicate all possible alternatives mous destructions during the Second reawakening where the national values to and all opposition against the centre World War. and symbols were allowed to bloom and in Moscow and Stalin’s position as the Another consequence of Stalin’s take- grow. The Belarusian language was intro- uncontested leader of the Soviet Union. over was re-drawing of the inter-repub- duced at the educational institutions and This eradication of alternative elites had lican borders, now inside the Soviet the intellectual elite was allowed a voice. serious long term consequences for the Union. These border changes meant that The immediate impression was that the course of political changes in a non- Latvia lost the Abrene area and that Es- national communist elite could function democratic direction. tonia lost the Narva area in the north as the basis for the development and con- Perhaps the most important cause for and the Pskov/Petseri area in the south - solidation of the national identity and the absence of national consciousness can all areas that were added to the Russian also as a basis for the creation of a na- be said to be the integration in the So- Socialist Federative Republic. Opposite tional elite. With Stalin’s final and total viet Union. Belarus was, during that time, these losses Lithuania gained a signifi- takeover in Moscow a massive purge of exposed to a massive and all-embracing cant area, the north eastern part of Po- political allies as well as opponents, in- sovjetization and russification. The goal was land as it looked like before the Second tellectuals, and cultural elite followed. The to create the Soviet Man - homo sovieticus – World War. Included in this area was

70 Vilnius, which was looked upon by some national consciousness because the cities tional symbol. The symbol had been Belarusians as the cultural capital for were natural centres for culture, politics, adopted as the national symbol of the Belarus. It has been pointed out that with and education. But the truth is that the Republic of Lithuania at its declaration the loss of this significant cultural, intel- Belarusians have never constituted a ma- of independence in 1918 and stayed as lectual, and national centre, Belarus lost jority in their own capital. The opposite such until the Soviet Union occupied its possibility for a national reawakening. was the case in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, Lithuania in 1940. It was kept as the na- That is why Stalin’s revision of the bor- which was dominated by the Ukrainians. tional symbol when Lithuania declared re- ders had major effects on the nation Extensive urbanization, weak national establishment of its independence in 1991. building in Belarus. Minsk became the consciousness, large Russian population, The coat of arms had also been used by new capital of Belarus as a consequence continuing inflow of workers from other the Poles during their rebellion against of the loss of Vilnius and became the republics, and strong influence from Russia in 1863-1864. The symbols were centre for the Russian influence, but Moscow exposed the Belarusian popula- also inextricably linked with the events Minsk never became such a powerful cen- tion to a strong influence from Russian that happened during the German occu- tre for Belarus which Vilnius had been language, culture, and it further weakened pation during the Second World War. A for the state previously. Belarusian consciousness. puppet-regime was established under Nazi- Another relevant development in this Another aspect of nationalism is the German protection, and the symbols from context is the growth of the cities after the “rallying point” that the national symbols the national republic from the 1910s were end of the Second World War. This growth - like the coat of arms and the state flag - adopted by these collaborators. That is was significant in Belarus, and the main provide. There are two historical groups why this symbol was looked upon very reason behind it was partly migration from of national symbols for the Belarusians: a negatively. It was linked to the suffering the countryside to the cities and partly the flag and a coat of arms from either the and destruction that occurred during the inflow of individuals from other repub- short-lived republic from the end of the Second World War. Because of the use of lics, who mainly settled in the cities where 1910s, or the Belarusian Soviet-republic the symbol by other states, by the short- the industry and the employment were to from the beginning of the 1920s. A pos- lived state in 1918, and by the Nazi-Ger- be found. sible national rallying point was the coat man friendly collaborators it was all but Urbanization could seem like a possi- of arms called the Pahonya. It was deeply impossible to use it as a national rallying bility of strengthening the Belarusian problematic if it was to be used as a na- point.

71 There are major differences between of that they were in a much stronger Tendencies in Belarus the developments in Ukraine and in position to build a nation and an inde- Belarus on this subject. Ukraine experi- pendent state. The state enced cultural re-awakening in its period On the basis of the discussion above of independence after the Russian revo- it must be concluded that a number of As all former Soviet republics Belarus lution, re-awakening that left permanent factors have been contributing to the faced the challenge of independence after traces. Also the fact that the historically developments in Belarus in a negative the Soviet Union collapsed. Despite the cultural and political centre of Ukraine, direction. Modernization of Belarus af- fact that Belarus de jure did exist as an Kyiv, remained the capital for the Ukrai- ter massive destructions during the Sec- independent state, realities were quite dif- nian Soviet Socialist Republic and re- ond World War, formidable challenges ferent. The extent of autonomy under mained populated mainly by the Ukrai- to the sovereignty of the state and the Moscow’s rule was very limited and re- nians contributed to a preservation and nation, absence of national identity, sup- stricted to some areas, and it was further strengthening of the Ukrainian national pression of language and culture, doubt- decreased by the fact that the regime in consciousness. The development in ful national symbols, and unclear geog- Minsk was considered to be one of the Ukraine and in Kyiv was very different raphy. Other factors have been collapse most Moscow-loyal regimes of the Soviet from what happened in Minsk, because of the totalitarian rule as well as the republics as well as the fact that heavy the Ukrainian capital became centre of gradual pullback leaving an intact, strong dominance of the Communist Party un- the Ukrainian nationalism and not of state administration ready to be taken dermined functioning of the state. This the Russian influence. There were also over. abnormal state structure has not been radi- major differences in the linguistic area. The lack of recent experience with cally changed under the rule of Lukashenka. The population as well as the media con- democratic governance during the Soviet Almost unanimously the analyses of the tinued to use Ukrainian, contrary to the rule and the social and economic crisis in Belarusian regime show that the merger situation in Belarus. Central and Eastern Europe can also be of Lukashenka’s regime and the state is So, all in all, it looked like both identified as factors contributing to the almost total. Lukashenka has in several cases Ukraine and the three Baltic states had birth and consolidation of the present personally interfered in the daily manage- much stronger national identities and rule in Belarus. ment and functioning of the state’s ad- consciousnesses than Belarus, and because ministration and has, via his position as

72 a president, directly as well as indirectly, eration, and the centralization and in- was placed under arrest - a clear example via his presidential administration, admin- creased power of the presidency have been of the gratitude that subordinates must istered the state as his personal domain achieved at the expense of the regional show towards Lukashenka. and attempted to form the state after his self-governance. Another example of Lukashenka’s desire. This has been made clear through It is also characteristic that Lukashenka behaviour is almost total nationalization his involvement in the abolishment of the tries to appoint loyal persons for impor- of the industry in Belarus. All local administrations. tant positions in the Belarusian adminis- privatization and liberalization initiatives Another clear example of the concen- tration. These persons are old friends from have been cancelled, and the development tration of power and the attempt to gain his childhood, from the area where he has in fact moved in the opposite direc- full control over the state is the voter’s was born and from the area where his tion - in the direction of a total state con- rejection of a proposal for a direct elec- political career started. Another example trol of business and trade. That makes it tion of the regional leaders - a rejection of Lukashenka’s expansion of his power difficult for private corporations to op- that followed the president’s recommen- and influence is that the number of posi- erate. The President has clearly managed dation. As a consequence the right to ap- tions directly responsible to the president to place the economic sphere under strict point these regional leaders still rests with has increased. control. the president. Lukashenka’s fear has been All these factors contribute to In these areas it is clear that there ex- to experience a development similar to Lukashenka’s construction of a state ad- ists a merger of the state and the regime. what has happened in the Russian Fed- ministration where all individuals owe It is also possible to observe strong rela- eration where the opposition against the their position to him, but developments tions between the president and his sub- regime had its basis in the local adminis- in Belarus also show that no one is safe. It ordinates, namely dependence of the lat- trations. Lukashenka’s actions are very is clearly demonstrated by the events con- ter on the president, and his unpredict- much alike the actions of Putin to cerning the former president of the able behaviour. Also weak state institu- strengthen the central government vis-à- Belarusian National Bank, Ms. Tarawa tions can be identified in Belarus. It was vis the federal subjects (regions, regional Vinnikava, who used to be one of exemplified by the constitution that col- parliaments and governors). Putin’s ac- Lukashenka’s closest political allies. She was lapsed under the pressure created by tions can be said to be a preventive move appointed by Lukashenka, but subse- Lukashenka. He managed to arrange the against potential disintegration of the fed- quently lost his confidence and trust and existing power structures according to his

73 wishes. Because of that many of the po- man fighting for justice and for the well- alism were also means used by Lukashenka. litical structures collapsed under the pres- being of the population. He legitimizes However, Lukashenka did not at all use sure of political infighting. his decisions on the basis of the support the Belarusian nationalism as a part of he won during his election to the presi- his political project. He did, on the con- The personality dency as well as on the support that his trary, try to de-nationalize Belarus, and proposals received when they were sent there are many examples showing this. Lukashenka tries to go out to the pub- to referendum. The population was, in 1995, asked to lic and present himself as a plain and simple Lukashenka’s electoral victory during vote in a referendum concerning three person, and he has successfully achieved the 1994 presidential election was not based themes converging around the this by communicating to the population on a solid and thoroughly prepared po- president’s de-nationalization project. clear and distinct messages and visions. litical platform that appealed to certain The first theme was whether Russian On the other hand, there has been no social groups in the population. Instead should be an official state language on active attempt at building an image of Lukashenka appealed to the resistance in the same terms as Belarusian. The second Lukashenka as a statesman. He has tried the population against the elite which theme concerned the introduction of to keep his image as a head of a collective ruled Belarus during and immediately new state colours and a new state coat of farm, an administrator. To show his pres- after independence and to the nostalgic arms, while the third theme concerned ence, concern, and worries he uses radio feelings many Belarusians had towards the economic integration with the Russian and television broadcasts to transmit his times during the Soviet Union, where Federation. All three proposals were ap- speeches to the population. He argues that large parts of the population enjoyed a proved in the referendum with 83,1%, there is a need for a strong man to take much better living standard compared to 75,0% and 82,4% of the votes cast. The control, to steer the state through the the present state. Lukashenka succeeded adoption of all three proposals supported difficult times and to manage the prob- in distancing himself from the politicians the president’s political project and has lems facing the state. Lukashenka has thus who led Belarus before, during, and after actively contributed to de-nationalization succeeded in establishing an intimate re- the independence and also from the prob- of Belarus, closer ties with the Russian lation with the Belarusian population. The lems that were a consequence of the up- Federation, and nostalgic praising of the relationship is based on Lukashenka’s cre- heavals. The nostalgic feelings about the Soviet Union. Belarus has, as mentioned ation of a myth about himself as a plain Soviet Union and the Belarusian nation- earlier, all throughout history been char-

74 acterized by a very weak national iden- between the electorate and the president problems and thereby saving the state. tity. This identity has further been weak- as charismatic. There exists a widespread That was also what Lukashenka showed to ened during Lukashenka’s regime, and and general perception of Lukashenka as the population as a head of the parlia- the period under the Soviet Union has a competent and understanding ruler. The mentary investigations into corruption. instead actively been used as a reference. electorate does not consider Lukashenka But an interesting fact about Belarus is That is also one of the reasons why the as being the cause of the problems. On that Lukashenka is not directly account- regime has been trying to rewrite the the contrary, the perception is that the able to the electorate. The government, history behind the Kuropaty Graves, bureaucrats and the politicians that are the parliament and the bureaucracy are which is widely perceived as a legacy of responsible for the dissolution of the instead used as “lightning rod” against Josef Stalin’s regime of terror. The offi- Soviet Union are the main cause of the attacks on the regime. That has manifested cial policy of the regime is to blame the problems. There is also a widespread ac- itself through the stable support invasion forces from Nazi Germany. An- cept of the need for a total delegation of Lukashenka has received over time. other aspect of the strategy is to power to the president and a non-com- strengthen the Slavic community between promise seeking approach to the govern- The constitutional hypocrisy the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and ing of the state. It is however worth not- Belarus and tie the three states close to- ing that Lukashenka does not exclusively Belarus’ first democratic constitution gether. The most clear attempt that has use his charisma as a legitimizing element. of March 1994 did in fact create the pos- been made since 1994 is the signing of He has also tried to derive legitimacy for sibility for a positive political develop- several political, economic, and military the concentration of power from the ar- ment in Belarus. A presidency was cre- agreements between the Russian Federa- gument of necessity - that it is necessary ated, and an independent Constitutional tion and Belarus linking the two states for an effective implementation of politi- Court became the supreme judicial power. together. cal decisions. Thus the arguments are based These institutions created the basis for a A part of Lukashenka’s strategy is also on rationality and bureaucratic efficiency. democratic, presidential republic. The to use his charisma in order to create a The characteristics described above president and the parliament were to be charismatic rule to legitimize his control show the extent of the delegation of power elected directly by the population. The over the state. A survey conducted by to Lukashenka. He is considered to be Constitutional Court was created to en- Gille-Belova4 presents the relationship the best person capable of solving the sure “checks and balances” vis-à-vis the

75 president. Its members were to be elected a referendum with 77,6% in favour of home, and he tore his ballot apart in by the parliament, while its functions were the question regarding the president’s public in front of the television cameras to be independent of both the legislative right to dissolve the parliament in case of and tried in every way to discredit the and executive powers. continued and gross violations of the parliament and its members. The strategy The presidency was, according to the constitution. This strengthening of the of Lukashenka was clear: with the massive 1994 Constitution, ascribed significant presidency lended Lukashenka a tougher backing he had received during the presi- powers. In a comparative analysis of the grip on power by giving him further dential election and the continuing sup- presidential systems of Europe and Cen- control over the legislative branch, but port he enjoyed in the population, a tral Asia, Frye describes the presidential the purging of democratic elements was showdown with the parliament and the systems of Ukraine and Belarus as having not over. Constitutional Court was a step towards some of the most powerful presidencies total control, total consolidation and con- in the post-Soviet area after the Russian 1995 parliamentary elections centration of power. If Lukashenka suc- Federation and Georgia. Since that analy- ceeded in obstructing a new election and sis, the developments in Belarus have fur- The event with the greatest impact on at the same time, managed to marginalize ther increased the president’s power, so Lukashenka assuming full control in the old parliament, he would be unchal- the Belarusian office today is one of the Belarus was the parliamentary election in lenged. most powerful offices. This claim is fur- 1995. The course of the election as well as An important factor in this uncom- ther supported by an account by Lars the result was contributing to Lukashenka pleted parliamentary election was the Elec- Johannsen5 , who in a similar analysis obtaining the position as an unchallenged toral Law, which stated that only election reaches the same conclusion. ruler. The election was scheduled to take results from constituencies where the The first “shots” against the democratic place in 1996, but because of political turn-out was over 50% could be declared constitution came from Lukashenka in pressure from the Belarusian Popular valid. If the turn-out was below this 1995, when he suggested adding further Front, it was hastened. threshold, the result was to be declared powers to the presidency. According to From the start Lukashenka did every- invalid. the 1994 Constitution it was not within thing in his power to prevent that the The election resulted in a clash between the president’s power to dissolve the par- election was carried through. Lukashenka Lukashenka and the old parliament. liament. Lukashenka succeeded in winning encouraged the population to stay at Lukashenka was of the opinion that the

76 mandate of the incumbent parliament had tions, and Lukashenka used the situation tional Court and the Electoral Commis- expired with the calling of the election, to rule Belarus by decrees from July 1994 sion as well as a number of members of while the parliament was of the opinion to January 1996. This meant no checks the new upper chamber, the Council of that it had to carry on until a new parlia- and balances existing whatsoever. the Republic of the parliament, the Na- ment was elected - an opinion that was tional Assembly. supported by the Constitutional Court. The constitutional changes in 1996 The first electoral round was held in a) May, and the result was that only 18 Mem- Lukashenka was elected as president According to the 1994 constitution, bers of Parliament were elected out of 260 under the 1994 constitution, and he ac- the Belarusian presidency was already one seats to be filled. The second round later cepted the constitution in the beginning of the strongest executive offices in Eu- in May resulted in the election of further of his term. But from his election and rope. But with the adoption of the 1996 102 members - a total of 120, but still not until 1996 Lukashenka’s rule frequently constitution it was further strengthened. enough of the required 174 seats (2/3 of clashed with the provisions of the consti- The new constitution gave the president the total number of seats as quorum). tution. These clashes culminated when further authority over both the legisla- Because of that the Belarusians had to Lukashenka introduced a draft for a new tive and the judicial branches of govern- participate in a by-election. The first constitution to eliminate any political ment. It became a right for the president round of the by-election was held in opposition and to ease his centralization to appoint six of the twelve members of November, and 20 seats were filled, while of power. The draft was sent to referen- the Constitutional Court. Thereby the ex- the second round which was conducted dum and was passed by 70,5% of the par- ternal and independent control of the in December led to the election of fur- ticipating electorate. president disappeared. The Constitutional ther 59 Members of Parliament. With this The changes included in Lukashenka’s Court had overruled Lukashenka’s deci- fourth election the required number of draft constitution concerned a) the presi- sions several times and declared his de- Members of Parliament was achieved, and dency, b) the parliament and c) the courts. crees as unconstitutional and invalid. the new parliament formed a quorum. The main themes were that Lukashenka’s Lukashenka, however, started to ignore Thereby the new parliament could assume term was extended by two years, that the these rulings. The rulings caused several powers. Until that time the old parliament president was given the right to appoint conflicts between the Court and the par- had been unable to carry out its func- a number of members of the Constitu- liament on one side and the president on

77 the other. These conflicts were stopped expire before a new parliament could so that in reality these are under the when Lukashenka brought the Court be elected. This would have created a president’s control. The consequence of under his control. situation where the president would be these realities is that parliamentarism in The power that was vested with the able to get full control of the state. The Belarus is an empty shell. This trend is parliament was also diminished when sig- move did not succeed, and because of enforced by the fact that the president nificant legislative powers were given to that the conflict between the two par- also has the power to appoint half of the president. Article 85 in the new con- ties started. the members of the Electoral Commis- stitution gave the president the right to The constitutional changes divided sion. The Commission has great influ- issue decrees corresponding to and on the the legislative power between two cham- ence on approval of parties and candi- same level as laws passed by the parliament. bers in the parliament. It lies within the dates in the elections and on the certi- This new power and the control of the power of the president to appoint one fication of the results. With that influ- Constitutional Court altogether produced eight of the members of the upper cham- ence the president and his administra- massive distortion of the democratic in- ber. That corresponds to eight members. tion gained the possibility to prevent stitutions. The president further got the The president is also empowered to dis- potentially dangerous candidates from power to appoint persons to several pow- solve the parliament and has been given running. The president’s increased pow- erful offices, a right that was a move in legislative powers. Lukashenka also used ers were visible in relation to the sec- the same direction. The appointments his power to influence the establishment ond parliamentary election in Belarus, could be used by the president to pay and composition of the lower chamber, which produced an ever more pro- loyal individuals for their support. the House of Representatives. He picked presidential parliament. In reality this 110 loyal members of the outgoing par- means that the parliament works as a b) liament to fill the seats in the new lower rubber stamp on the president’s pro- A part of the democratic facade in chamber and succeeded in creating a loyal posals. Evaluations from the Organiza- Belarus was to carry out multi-party elec- parliament. The reality was that Belarus tion for Security and Co-operation in tions. The first elections were conducted de facto was without an elected parliament Europe (OSCE) of the parliamentary under Lukashenka. As mentioned ear- in the period from 1996 to 2000. elections have been severely critical, and lier, Lukashenka hoped that the man- The legislative procedures have also the elections have been characterized as date of the parliament in session would been subject to presidential intervention neither free, nor fair.

78 c) in 1995. The last referendum themes con- It is clear that the referenda have been With the constitutional changes cerned i) changing the Day of Indepen- used to legitimize Lukashenka’s initiatives Lukashenka succeeded in taking control dence from the day that independence was and to demonstrate the support his ac- over parts of the judiciary, namely the declared after the break up of the Soviet tions enjoy among the population. Sev- judgement of the legality of the decision Union to the day where the Red Army eral themes have been put to referendum, taken by the government. Likewise, the liberated Minsk during the Second World and the result has been clear every time - presidential administration has great in- War, ii) liberalization of land market, iii) support behind the president and his rec- fluence on the appointment of judges at abolishment of the death penalty, iv) di- ommendations. This backing has given the local as well as national levels. The presi- rect election of regional leaders and v) president a credible and clear mandate dent is also entitled to dismissing judges financing state institutions via the cen- from the population. Lukashenka has also serving in the Constitutional Court as tral government budget or via a fund used these referenda to create an image of well as in the Supreme Court. This means controlled by the president outside par- himself as a person in close contact with that the judicial power de facto remains liamentary supervision. The first and last the electorate and as a person who listens under Lukashenka’s control. proposals were adopted with a large ma- to the voice of the people. The president’s Another consequence is that it has be- jority of votes (88,2%), while the rest of direct contact with the society is used by come impossible to remove the president. the proposals were rejected, as the presi- Lukashenka to distance himself from the Although there is a de jure possibility, the dent recommended prior to the referen- old power elite. demands for removing the president are dum. All the proposals mentioned above This can be explained by the weakness impossible to fulfil. During less than one have contributed to the continued con- of institutions in Belarus. The constitu- month the parliament must complete the solidation of Lukashenka’s power and tion, the electoral law, the parliament and consideration regarding a removal and position. They also strengthened denation- the court system were all weak when cre- adopt a decision to remove the president alization of Belarus and the praising of ated or were weakened over time, which with a two-third majority of all members the years under the Soviet rule, both a paved the way for a non-democratic re- of parliament, and in both chambers. part of Lukashenka’s political project. The gime. Contributing to the collapse was There were also areas unrelated to the proposals concerning regional leaders and also the political message Lukashenka pre- division of power that were affected by financing also contributed to sented to the population and the socio- the referendum, which Lukashenka held Lukashenka’s concentration of power. economic crisis in the state, which all in

79 all led to the popular support of the total joy a widespread support in the parlia- Lukashenka. Thereby Lukashenka pushed delegation of power to Lukashenka. ment. Lukashenka created his platform by away his old allies and succeeded in creat- using his position as chairman of the ing a loyal circle of persons around him. The social base parliamentary committee investigating Lukashenka also uses rhetorical means corruption in the government and in the to maintain his support in the popula- Lukashenka does not have a long record parliament. Using that position he suc- tion. He pointed out several times that inside the communist nomenklatura. He ceeded in creating an image of himself as he was the only Member of Parliament was born in a small village in the Vitebsk a fair and honest person. The position voting against the dissolution of the So- Oblast in the north eastern part of also gave Lukashenka a huge advantage viet Union and tries to blame the old elite Belarus, and he created his political base because the committee could be used to for the problems of today. in the Mogilev Oblast in the eastern part discredit his political opponents by ac- It cannot be ruled out that Lukashenka of the country. Lukashenka’s past career cusing them of being involved in cor- in fact enjoys a widespread popular sup- is not the “traditional” way up through ruption. Such accusations contributed to port despite the fact that most statistics the ranks in the Communist Party. In- turning the population against these can- from Belarus is probably fake. Examin- stead he entered the political stage at a didates. ing the numbers from the 1994 presiden- rather late point in his life, when he was During Lukashenka’s candidacy the tial election one will find a massive sup- elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1990. inner circle around him were democrati- port to Lukashenka and, despite a nega- Until that time he headed a collective farm. cally minded persons, who wished to gain tive and critical evaluation of the 2001 Lukashenka has been able to use the political power in the aftermath of the presidential election from the OSCE, it same approach as other rulers through- political upheaval in the Soviet Union. seems to remain unchanged. In the first out history by creating a picture of his They wished to use Lukashenka’s charisma presidential election Lukashenka received childhood as the poor and humble. His to reach that end. But the alliance did 44,8% of the votes cast in the first round, career and promotion inside the party not last, and after Lukashenka took office while he received 80,1% of the votes cast happened without the help of others and he installed loyal persons in key positions. in the second round, securing a landslide solely by own means. In the presidential These persons were either friends from victory. OSCE’s comments on the elec- election in 1994 he was not the Commu- his native area or friends from his child- tion were that they only observed minor nist Party’s candidate and he did not en- hood - all loyal and faithful towards errors and difficulties. The second presi-

80 dential election showed stable support for lic from e.g. Russia. The system collapsed clear fall in their economic position and Lukashenka. The opposition did succeed with the Soviet Union, and Belarus had prosperity. Inflation peaked in 1994, and in nominating a single candidate, but to make radical reordering of its priori- the unemployment rate was increasing Lukashenka still won the election by se- ties due to its heavy dependence on im- until 1996, according to numbers from curing 75,7% of the votes cast in the first ports of raw materials and energy. the World Bank7 . Despite the fact that round. His main opponent only managed All economies in transition experienced the statistical numbers look much better to secure 15,7% of the votes cast. fluctuations and downward trends. The today, there are some who claim that the Lukashenka’s popularity has also been Belarusian politicians chose gradualism as numbers are hiding the truth about the described in a statistical analysis by the means to handle the pressure from real economic situation in Belarus. It is Korosteleva6 , where the findings showed the market. However, the reforms carried important for the regime to present a a relatively stable support to him. out were half-hearted and ineffective. A picture of healthy and growing economy negative consequence of these reforms was to keep the support of the population. The distorted capitalism the old nomenklatura attempt to seize as- Such numbers increase the likelihood of sets in order to obtain personal gains the survival of the regime despite other During the existence of the Soviet during the transition. This behaviour political challenges. An illusion of eco- Union, Belarus was one of the wealthiest only worsened the economic situation in nomic stability is created by presenting republics apart from the three Baltic states. Belarus. healthy numbers to the population. De- Massive industrialization was the main As a result, the population faced ris- spite the fact that the Belarusian economy reason of that as described earlier. But ing inflation, devaluation of the savings is experiencing vast problems, a total col- the collapse of the Soviet Union and the and a rising unemployment rate. The pe- lapse has probably been avoided due to independence of Belarus meant a formi- riods between 1991 and 1994 and 1994 to cheap oil and loans provided by Russia. dable economic challenge. In the Soviet 2002 are very interesting to observe with Haggard & Kaufman8 have argued that Union, the system of planned economy regard to total Gross National Product economic crisis and challenges not only was centred on an inter-republican “divi- and Gross National Product per Capita facilitate political change in a democratic sion of labour”. Belarus’ industry deliv- adjusted to Purchasing Power Parity. It is direction but also the breakdown of de- ered the finished products while raw ma- possible to identify that the population mocracy. It has also been argued that the terials and energy poured into the repub- in 1990-1991 to 1994-1995 experienced a economic heritage from the former non-

81 democratic regime to a large extent deter- ing the presidency to enrich himself, under Putin have showed how these oli- mined the possible actions that successor which points in the direction of separa- garchs can pose a threat to the centre of states had to take. Both claims seem to tion between his personal finances and power - the presidency and the state ad- carry some weight in the case of Belarus. the states finances even though public ministration. The frightening example for The politicians governing the state dur- funds probably are used to pay off sup- Lukashenka is Putin’s showdown with two ing the transition had to face the prob- porters and allies. oligarchs, Berezovsky and Gusinskij, both lems of transition, and the consequences It is also characteristic for the forced into exile abroad. of hard political choices pushed the Belarusian economy that Lukashenka tries population into Lukashenka’s arms. to gain full control of all economic ac- Concluding Remarks In a normal democracy and parliamen- tivities. It has been exemplified through tarism, the parliament passes the state the fact that all economic transactions in The main focus of this article has been budget, but since Lukashenka’s take-over, Belarus are subject to the president’s ap- on the political changes that took place large parts of the public finances have been proval. This massive control can be seen after Belarus gained her independence. The moved beyond legislative scrutiny and re- as an attempt to secure revenues to the main emphasis has been on the period vision. In 1996 Lukashenka managed to unofficial budget as well as an attempt to after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. win the referendum concerning the es- shield the regime against the establishment It has been necessary to include historical tablishment of a separate budget without of alternative centres of power. elements to illustrate significant influence parliamentary control. Thus Belarus has A threat that Lukashenka is trying to these elements have had on the develop- two budgets, the official one, adopted by avoid could be one similar to what has ments in Belarus. the parliament, and the unofficial one, been happening in the Russian Federa- In the first part of the article some controlled solely by the president. It has tion, where economically strong oligarchs critical elements were presented in the been claimed that the latter has been and were positioning themselves under the Belarusian case that advanced a radically is being financed through the sales of Yeltsin administration. They were allied different political development compared military equipment and that one of its with the president and had considerable with states in a similar situation follow- purposes is to pay subjects for their loy- economic as well as political resources, ing the fall of the Berlin Wall. alty and support. There is however no which they were able to expand during Very weak national consciousness can evidence showing that Lukashenka is us- Yeltsin’s presidency. The developments be identified as the most important fac-

82 tor contributing to the particular un- primarily used the constitution as a versal and pre-determined development in democratic development in Belarus. The weapon in his clashes with the parliament the former communist states towards de- consequence of this weakness is an unsuc- and the Constitutional Court. Persistent mocracy - a perception further justified cessful nation and state building, which constitutional changes introduced by by the developments in e.g. Slovakia, is a very critical factor. Such a situation Lukashenka stand as a further evidence to Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia. But stands in stark contrast with the situation such a claim. the recent developments in the Russian Fed- in other states in Central and Eastern Lukashenka’s entry into the political eration and Ukraine can contribute to chal- Europe. The absence of national feelings scene and his behaviour has underlined lenging this perception. It is worth con- meant the absence of a rallying point for the fact that an institutional focus alone sidering if a relapse in the democratizing the democratic movement, which weak- is an inadequate analytical approach. The states is a real danger that must be addressed ened the possibility for a democratic de- president’s personality and his charismatic politically and, if this is the case, which velopment in Belarus significantly. appeal to the population have also been factors are behind this development. Another factor which contributed to decisive factors in securing a widespread the developments was the functioning of support to Lukashenka in the population. the institutions. The parliament’s adop- Another important factor is the political 1 Fukuyama, Francis (1992), “The End of His- tory and the Last Man”, London: Hamish tion of the constitution and the creation economy. The transition from plan to Hamilton. of a strong presidency created the insti- market economy caused major economic 2 Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), “The Clash of tutional framework for Lukashenka’s take- problems and, in conjunction with Civilizations and the Remaking of World Or- over. It supports the claim about the con- Lukashenka’s economic and fiscal policy, der”, Norman: Oklahoma University Press. 3 stitution being a decisive factor when the produced a nostalgic feeling towards the Kuzio, Taras & Marc Nordberg (1999), “Na- tion and State Building, Historical Legacies and result of political struggle has to be evalu- situation under the Soviet rule. These feel- National Identities in Belarus and Ukraine: A ated. It is however important to under- ings have further bolstered Lukashenka’s Comparative Analysis”, Canadian Review of Stud- line that the constitution alone does not powers and advanced a non-democratic ies in Nationalism, Volume 26, No. 1-2, pp. 69-90. constitute the complete constitutional development. 4 Gille-Belova, Olga (2002), “The Nature of Rela- tions between Political Leaders and their Sup- framework. The electoral law is another Undoubtedly Belarus is a unique case porters - The Case of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine”, important element. But in the Belarusian in the European context. It questions the Paper for the International Conference “Russia, case it can be observed that Lukashenka widespread perception of an almost uni- Ukraine and Belarus: Political Leadership, Inter-

83 national Society and Public Order”, July 1st 2002, CERI, Paris, France. 5 Johannsen, Lars (2000), “The Constitutions and Democracy: The Choice and Consequences of the Constitution in Post-Communist Coun- tries”, PhD Dissertation, Aarhus: Forlaget Politica. 6 Korosteleva, Elena A. (2002), “What Lies Be- hind the Public Support of Leading Politicians in Belarus? Elaborations from Opinion Polls and Focus Groups”, Paper for the International Con- ference “Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: Political Leadership, International Society and Public Order”, July 1st 2002, CERI, Paris, France. 7 World Development Indicators 2002. CD- ROM Query Database, World Bank Group / International Bank for Reconstruction and De- velopment. The conclusions based on these num- bers should be read with some reservations. 8 Haggard, Stephen & Robert R. Kaufman (1997), “The Political Economy of Democratic Transi- tions”, Comparative Politics, Volume 29, No. 3, April, pp. 263-283.

84 Between Chirac, Bush and Putin: The Baltic States, From Factors to Actors in the New Europe

By Susanne Nies*

Chirac’s rude statement, in February 2003: There is a widespread perception of a di- Introduction: 2003: “Eastern Europeans missed an opportu- vide between big and small states in Eu- Half a Year of European Turmoil nity to shut up”. This statement is a re- rope, 21 against 6, especially in the wake sponse to the Eastern European pro- of the European convention and gover- 2003. Half a year of turmoil: the war American stance, understood in France nance reform in the EU. in Iraq and its diplomatic aftermath seem (as elsewhere)1 to be a lack of commit- There is, in fact, no such thing as an to divide Europe as never before. Ger- ment to Europe. Meanwhile, Berlin and old or a new Europe. Europe is an ap- many, the most loyal and pro-American Paris celebrate the 40th anniversary of the proach, an impressive diversity, an op- country in Europe since WW II, cedes its famous Elysée-Treaty.2 For the first time, portunity, a commitment. There is no position to Poland. France, more or less German-French cooperation raises anxi- choice to be made between the US and absent in Eastern Europe since Napoleon eties in all capitals of the so-called small Europe. European states, stretching from and perceived by many Eastern Europe- European states from Vilnius to Lisbon. the Atlantic to the Urals – though an ev- ans through the lens of stared and striped The German-French motor is the very erlasting question mark rests on Turkey glasses, confirms all prejudices with reason for British-Spanish cooperation. and Russia (or at least parts of these coun- * Susanne Nies is research fellow at Center for International Studies and Research in Paris, and Free University in Berlin.

87 tries) – are undoubtedly as much Euro- The contribution is based on a series prising as the quarrels surrounding post- pean as California or New Mexico are of interviews taken with the political elites cold war settings were articulated in vari- American. Europe is more than the Com- of the three Baltic states in 2002 and 2003. ous contentious discussions throughout mission in Brussels, the Council, France, The constructivist approach, threat per- the nineties i.e. on the retreat of the Red or Germany. The anxiety of accession can- ception, and the study in discourse stand Army and the abandonment of its bases, didates is comprehensible, just as the dis- at the centre of this paper’s approach. the status of the Slavic population, in par- appointment of some founding members, It is organized as follows. Part I intro- ticular in Estonia and Latvia, and, in re- idealists about the European idea. Never- duces conceptual definitions of the terms cent times, NATO enlargement and the theless, not that much has been added to “region”, “security”, and “de- CFE-Treaty as well as the issue of visas for the existing debate over Europe, aside securitization” and is also devoted to a inhabitants of Kaliningrad. A new con- from the Eastern European actors. Not discussion of the maintenance of security sensus between Russia and the West, which only is Europe expanding, but so are its measures in the aftermath of the Cold emerged in the aftermath of the terrorist discourses: the eternal Franco-German- War. Part II presents threat perceptions attacks of September 2001, opened the British debate about “how much of since 2001. Finally, part III assesses the door for change. In winter 2002, the three America” and “how much of integration” major changes in orientations and per- Baltic states received the western placet to should accompany the admission of new ceptions in and of the three Baltic states, join NATO and the EU in 2004.3 As this member states into the Union. This is in from NATO enlargement to the Chirac author’s interview-series proves, the vast fact a proof of a normalization of rela- speech, and provides an outlook on fu- majority of Baltic leaders no longer con- tions, and, for that matter, of European ture developments. sider Russia to be a threat to their na- integration. tions.4 Thus, the international relations Up to the middle of 2001, the admis- of Baltic states are shaped today by a di- This contribution focuses on the par- sion of Baltic states into NATO was a vided loyalty between Europe and the US ticular development of the Baltic states in highly controversial issue. Unexpected (NATO). The question therefore arises their international and European environ- political change has since occurred. The what threat perceptions do guide these ment, their transition from factors to ac- Baltic Sea region, a highly securitized area international relations and how the Bal- tors, and their perspectives in the enlarged since World War II, shifted towards tic states now assess their own perspec- EU and NATO. desecuritization. This is all the more sur- tives and Euro-Atlantic affiliations.

88 I. Concepts adopted a new political orientation, lead- Both approaches agree nevertheless that ing to quarrels and negotiations over the use of extraordinary measures is justi- The Baltic Space post-Cold War arrangements with Mos- fied in case of an existential threat. cow. New regional and international af- This paper adopts the widener ap- European dividing lines are multiple filiations have arisen. The Warsaw Pact proach to security, which has become and relative.5 This was demonstrated once disappeared, and NATO and the EU will nearly “traditionalist” in recent times. It again at the end of the Cold War: the soon be enlarged. insists on the desecuritization approach. boundaries of the area connoted by the Since the three new Baltic states have term “East” shifted due to the political been the most concerned with change and Securitization/ Desecuritization and economic integration of former parts security challenges, this paper will be lim- of the Soviet bloc into the “West”. Since ited to the consideration of these as well Waever locates all public issues on a 1991 new transitory terms have emerged as the issue of Kaliningrad. spectrum ranging from non-politicized in Europe, such as Central Europe or the (meaning the state does not deal with it Baltic Sea Region. The latter is composed Security and it is not in any other way made an of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Po- issue of public debate and decision) to land, Germany and the Scandinavian In the conceptualisation of security, politicized (meaning the issue is part of countries and constitutes a highly clus- traditional approaches assign primacy to public policy, requiring government de- tered space, both in political and eco- state actors and their military capabilities. cision and resource allocation, or, more nomic terms. For both traditionalists and wideners, rarely, some other form of communal Changes in the region, formerly di- security is about survival and existential governance), to securitized (meaning the vided by the iron curtain, have been threat. The difference between the two issue is presented as an existential threat, threefold: new borders were drawn, approaches lies in the perception of threat requiring emergency measures and justi- former states emerged with the reestab- and thus the very nature of existential fying actions outside the normal bounds lishment of Estonia, Latvia, and threats. For traditionalists, they are mostly of political procedure). The placement of Lithuania, and Kaliningrad became an military. For wideners they can be mili- issues is open, according to Waever. Any enclave. As a result, former Soviet repub- tary, political, societal, environmental, and issue can be placed on any part of the lics from East to North and West have other. spectrum, depending on circumstances.

89 The placement varies from state to state II. Quarrels over Nationalist revival, the end of the Ger- and across time.6 man-Russian medieval entente in the re- Securitization means that the common post-Cold War gion, and the collapse of the Tsarist Em- rules of political games are abandoned for settings: maintained pire led to the emergence of three inde- the sake of homeland defence. Extraordi- pendent Baltic states in 1918. nary measures are thus justified. securitization in the The Western allies were hesitant in rec- Desecuritization is to be understood as aftermath of the ognizing the new states due to the un- clear fate of Russia during its civil war: the shift back to the normal political game Soviet collapse and bargaining. How to assess securitization only after the defeat of the Whites the split-offs of the defunct Empire where shifts? Perceptions are essential. The study (1991-2001) recognized and admitted to the League of discourse, through interview series and of Nations. This linkage between Russia media-analysis reveal changes. The decision The Baltic Sea Region: and its periphery was repeated in 1991: over desecuritization or securitization is bridge or battlefield? Western states recognized the new situa- based on threat perception, which varies tion in the Baltics only after the August For centuries the strategic position of tremendously from state to state, and re- 1991 putsch, during the course of which gime to regime. If culture or religion is the Baltic Sea Region has contributed to Gorbachev was replaced by Yeltsin, who securitized in some states, in others it is its role as an economic and political in- happened to support Baltic independence. not. terface between the East and West, North The fate of the Baltic interface has thus and South, as well as its role as a battle- always been determined by the state of field between neighbouring civilizations Big Power relations, in particular East- and states. The Westphalian order was Westrelations. unaccomplished in the Baltic provinces The region has been securitized since of the Tsarist Empire. Up to the end of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939 and under- World War I a curious medieval order, went three successive Soviet-German gov- represented by a domineering German ernments during World War II. nobility, coexisted with Russian central The most obvious expression of post- rule. war securitization was the extreme Soviet

90 militarization of the front, especially tling of the Russian radar station in III. The shift towards Latvia, and the transformation of Skrunda in 1999 brought the Red and Kaliningrad into a closed military zone. Russian Army retreat to a close. In the desecuritization early 1990s the Baltic states considered the Polemics in the 1990s Red Army retreat from other parts of 1. Factors Europe through Kaliningrad and Latvia Introduction Surprisingly, the Baltic issue remained (1991-4) particularly frightening. securitized until 2001, even after the end - The conflict over NATO enlargement. The following four factors have had a of East-West confrontation. This conflict emerged with Baltic inde- major impact on the geopolitics of the The most important confrontations and pendence in 1991, but became virulent Baltic Sea region: the change in domestic polemics concerned: after the adoption of the Membership elite, the American-Russian relationship, - The conflict over independence, in Action Plan (MAP) in 1998. The Russian NATO enlargement, and EU enlargement. particular between Moscow and Vilnius, government tried to influence the progress If the NATO debate has been strongly which lasted until the Moscow putsch in of integration by strengthening its ties affected by the September 11th attacks, the August 1991. The Soviet Union tried to with the Baltic states, for instance by means philosophy and course of the EU enlarge- put pressure on its republics by reducing of the CFE treaty, the border treaty, or ment, on the contrary, remains un- the supply of energy during 1988 to 1991. also by staging open protests to Western changed. While NATO agreed to invite - The quarrel over citizenship and the integration. Romania and Bulgaria, and Russia ceased status of the Slavic population in Estonia - The dispute over the Schengen re- rejecting this idea, the EU has a lot more and Latvia, which first arose in 1991. This gime and its implication for the Russian narrow-minded approach, putting the two conflict, even if it still re-emerges from exclave of Kaliningrad (since 2001). This Balkan states, Romania and Bulgaria, in a time to time, is more or less settled, as item concerned first of all the third class waiting room, till 2007. Tur- manifested by the departure of the OSCE neighbouring countries, Poland and key, interested in the EU membership mission from Latvia and Estonia in late Lithuania. since 1963, has an option to negotiate, if, 2001. All these conflicts have been settled: the by the end of 2004, Ankara fulfils the - Polemics over the retreat of the Red first two during the 1990s, and the two Acquis Communautaire. Until the war in Army and its installations.7 The disman- others recently, in 2001 and 2002. Iraq, Russian-Western confrontation

91 shifted from strategic to the EU issues, - Russia has been recognized as a mar- with Kaliningrad as the most important The domestic factor: ket-economy, first by the US, second by battlefield. In the last month, a new coali- elite turnover the EU, with World Trade Organization tion emerged, with Russia, Germany and (WTO) admission now scheduled for France taking an aggressive stance toward The idea that it takes time and a new 2006.10 the Anglo-Saxon Alliance in the war in generation for mentalities to change is - After exclusion from the G7 after the Iraq and frightening the small European applicable to developments in the Baltic August 1998 crisis, Russia was reintegrated countries in the Convention debate of states. In less than four years the percep- into the now G8. new governance in Europe. tion of Russia has already changed con- - The immediate end of negative and After long intra-institutional debates siderably. What was considered to be a critical Western media reports on Russian on future candidates, both the EU and military threat in the early nineties is now brutalities in Chechnya. NATO have committed themselves to a seen as a rational actor. Two reasons for - The NATO-Russia rapprochement “Big Bang” scenario: this 180-degree turn should be mentioned: and Russia’s integration as a special ally, In November 2002, the Transatlantic - The generational change in the elite, with the formula “Council of 20” in Alliance invited seven candidates to join: from old to young people; Rome, May 2002. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ro- - Recent developments in East-West re- mania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.8 lations. These advantages have been obtained The EU Commission has announced in exchange for that it will invite eight, mostly Central The international environment (1): - Immediate Russian alignment in the and Eastern European candidates to join the regional impact of the new “War against Terror”;11 in 2004: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, American-Russian partnership - American access to Russian intelligence Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and data, especially that concerning Afghani- the Czech Republic, as well as the two The Russian commitment to the West- stan; Mediterranean countries, Cyprus and ern Alliance and the common strategy - The opening up of Russian aerospace Malta.9 against terrorism has resulted in impor- for American airlifts; tant and immediate pay-offs for Mos- - Tolerance of the American presence cow: in Central Asia.12

92 This new international deal introduced and that the Russian government welcomes In public declarations, especially since harsh shifts in the relations between Rus- this step now? the Council of 20 Declaration, Russia has sia and the former Soviet republics: if In fact, the Bush speech at Warsaw not recently opposed NATO enlargement. Putin reneged on opposing NATO en- University in June 2001 was already a sign Accordingly, two myths exist on Russia’s largement, his stance towards Georgia that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would attitude towards the Baltic region: became aggressive in 2002. In recent be included, whatever the Russian posi- a. Russia is not worried about the Bal- times, i.e. since the Iraq divide in inter- tion. Aside from the rhetoric, Russia had tic states’ integration in NATO and the national public opinion, Moscow became and has no means to prevent NATO en- EU much more reserved towards the US, with- largement. Moscow has tried to make in- b. Russia is worried about the Baltic out, for the moment at least, any worsen- fluence by suggesting a linkage between states’ integration in NATO and the EU. ing in its relationship with the former NATO admission and the CFE Treaty. Yet Both patterns are wrong. Russia is con- Soviet periphery. NATO and EU integra- this linkage was refuted once again by cerned, but due to limited means, and to tion became an acquis international since American Secretary of Defence, Donald a shift of priorities, this concern does not 2001. Rumsfeld, in Warsaw.14 Russia has yet to determine Russian politics towards the sign the bilateral border treaties with the region any more. The international environment (2): former Soviet republics15 . These territo- Desecuritization and NATO enlarge- NATO enlargement rial regulations are normally required for ment do not, for sure, coincide automati- any NATO admission, but, as put by cally. If desecuritization goes hand in hand The Warsaw Summit on September 25/ Christoph Bertram, Director of the SWP with the enlargement, the following rea- 26th 2002 amounted to informal consent on Berlin, NATO does not accept this kind sons are to be mentioned as well: the upcoming “Big-Bang” enlargement.13 of linkage and expression of power poli- - The Russian demilitarisation of the The central issue at the November Summit, tics. Thus, a precedent will be created with region, especially Kaliningrad, and the some two months later, was no longer en- the admission of states without ratified borders, but not the Leningrad District.. largement, but the reform of the border treaties.16 -Finland and Sweden are most likely organisation both in structure and doctrine. Russia has not been able to exercise to join the Alliance in the near future, Does this mean that the controversies even a symbolic influence on the issue of since the Baltic enlargement isolates them over Baltic admission belong to the past, NATO enlargement. from Western standards and intelligence.

93 man Königsberg is at the centre of a com- most outstanding examples are rumours The international environment (3): plex cluster of problems, both domestic about an impending German-Russian deal EU enlargement and the (Russian) and international: to exchange Kaliningrad in return for the troublesome Kaliningrad case - the reorganisation of the post-Soviet annulment of Russia’s foreign debt or space; Russian-style federalism applied to about intelligence data on the presence Russia and the US share certain dis- the specific situation of an enclave; the of Soviet nuclear weapons in the region.19 trust for the hybrid structure of the EU, economic survival of the enclave in a bet- A liberal visa regime has been main- expressed over and over again through ter-off regional context;18 the establish- tained between Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, the famous question “Mr. CSFP - what is ment of a special economic zone; and Kaliningrad since 1991. Latvia did your telephone number?”, or in Mr. rumours, fears and misperceptions, such not participate. This regime will now come Rogozin’s question about his homologue as Kaliningrad separatism, the return of to an end, with the progressive integra- EU negotiator with regards to the German rule, the loss of a war trophy, tion of Poland and Lithuania into the Kaliningrad matter. Both countries are etc. Schengen regime. more familiar with traditional bilateral or - bilateral agreements between the en- If the military issue has nearly been multilateral diplomacy (under one or the clave and its immediate neighbours resolved thanks to the reduction of Rus- other lead) than with dealing with supra- Lithuania, Poland, and Belarus; the Rus- sian military forces in the region,20 the national organisations. 17 sian military presence as a European and movement of people to and from The Kaliningrad issue was put on the international problem; the specific impli- Kaliningrad has become a highly conten- European and international agenda sud- cations of the future EU membership of tious issue. denly and at a surprisingly late point in bordering countries for the 15.000 square Approximately 120.000 people cross the time. The problem existed throughout the kilometres territory and its one million Kaliningrad borders every day, a total of 1990s, but the perception of a problem Russian-speaking inhabitants, who origi- nine million times each year. They run did not. nate from all parts of the former Soviet small cross-border businesses, which is a Since the end of the closed military union. typical expression of the difference in the zone in 1991 and the attainment of en- The polemics over Kaliningrad has re- standard of living in the region. These clave status due to Lithuanian and peatedly been subject to serve as a litmus- crossings have been facilitated by the cur- Belarusian independence, the former Ger- test of current East-West-relations. The rent liberal visa regime between Lithuania,

94 Poland, Belarus, and Kaliningrad, which exceptions and special regimes may be al- A multitude of proposals have been is intended to stabilize the weak border lowed, as the French and Greek examples presented, such as a special regime based regions.21 Curiously, the travels to and prove.23 on a cheap visa, a tunnel from Kaliningrad from the Russian mainland have been less Unfortunately and for specific reasons to Belarus, or a corridor through Poland important, due, last but not least, to the on both sides, Kaliningrad became the and Lithuania, the last of which conjur- costs of travelling: to date it is less expen- centre of an EU-Russian confrontation: ing up bad memories in Warsaw, as the sive for a Kaliningrader to travel to Ber- - Since both sides had disorganized Gdansk corridor connecting the city to lin (a distance of 600km), to Warsaw (400 views on the issue, different and contra- the German Reich had served to prepare km), or to Vilnius than it is to travel to dictory opinions started to circulate at the German invasion in 1939. St. Petersburg or Moscow.22 various levels; A problem that should have been an- - Russia benefited from the issue and Visas are highly symbolic in nature and ticipated became controversial only in the put all of the blame for its former disin- they function to express either mutual summer of 2002. Lithuania and Poland, terest and domestic failure in the enclave trust or distrust. In an era of new tech- who will enter the EU some time in 2004, on the EU; nologies, visas, which are still delivered are obliged to adopt the so-called Schengen - playing upon populist opinion, the in the 19th century manner, prove to be Acquis, which was integrated into the Russian media hyped up the issue; claims inefficient and costly.25 The current visa Acquis Communautaire in 1999, chapter were raised there would be no visa for regime does not fulfil the aim of control- Justice and Home Affairs. An opting out Russians to travel from one part of Rus- ling the flow of persons while at the same is no longer possible, as practiced by sia to another, as Dmitry Rogozin, spe- time opening borders for trade. Denmark and the UK in the past. cial envoy of the President and Chair of According to the realists and political The integration into the regime will the Foreign Affairs Commission of the negotiators involved in the debate, sev- begin early next year, delayed perhaps Duma put it;24 eral short, medium, and long-term solu- until the summer, with full integration - the beginning of the quarrel coin- tions have to be distinguished. after successful implementation some six cided with EU hesitation in recognizing For example, Vytautas Zalys, Lithuanian years later. Russia as a market economy. Kaliningrad consul in Kaliningrad, proposed a mul- Thus, the liberal post-Cold War bor- negotiations failed twice during EU-Rus- tiple visa regime, under which visas would der regime will disappear, although some sia summits in May and June 2002. be offered at low prices. Furthermore, he

95 suggested that consular points should be three Baltic states went through during - Perceived threats in the three states reinforced, in particular at border cross- the last year. The thesis is based on a se- are located less in the military domain, ings. The idea was simple. Once the de- ries of interviews conducted by the au- than in the soft-security sector: ecology, bate dies down, this short-term scenario thor of this paper in Moscow, Berlin, and especially due to the contamination of will likely be introduced. Kaliningrad during the summer of 2002. the Baltic Sea, the Russian military, and The idea of a non-stop train link has nuclear waste; political instability in also been debated. Threat perception and motivation Belarus and Kaliningrad; terrorism in Negotiating all of the possible exemp- for NATO membership the sense that the Baltic states could serve tions from the severe Schengen regime as a basis for preparing attacks. One of for a short-term compromise presupposes If Russia is not considered to be an the most important issues facing all Bal- that Russia reforms its system of controls, immediate danger any longer, why then tic Sea states jointly will be border con- produces passports, and starts to cooper- joining a defence alliance as NATO? The trol – a project for the future, since ate with the Schengen Information Sys- answers of the author’s interview partners today’s situation is more than dysfunc- tem in the medium term. were the following: tional, even between the Baltic states For the time being and for the sake of - joining NATO and the EU is consid- themselves. cost reduction, Moscow has abolished a ered to be an attestation of normality, of large number of border controls, thus leav- a stable market economy, and of democ- IV. From factors to ing its Western neighbours with the task racy. Membership enhances foreign direct actors: The Baltic of guarding borders. The Finnish experi- investment and international trust. ence with the long Russian border has been - The three Baltic states have strong states in the New very costly and negative in that respect. Trans-Atlantic affinities. These will be re- Europe inforced by NATO membership. 2. Perceptions: - For the younger generation, and Changed patterns: the a study in discourse today’s elite, the Western way of life is desecuritization shift “fun”. As a Lithuanian journalist explained This chapter summarizes the main to the author, participation in the Alli- One decade after the collapse of the changes in politics and perception the ance is part of this fun. Soviet Empire, the Baltic Sea Region does

96 not constitute a major East-West-North harmonization, adhesion to European, economic bridge: the energy supply chan- security concern anymore. and international structures. Securitisation nelled through Klaipeda and Ventspils are A securitization shift has taken place, will be difficult in that context. NATO outstanding examples for an already ex- from the East to the South, and, with and EU accession has a different meaning isting situation. Finally, in a medium term some interruptions, along the new bor- today than it did in Cold War times or the post-Cold War setting in the south of derline from the Baltic to the Black Sea. even with the first NATO enlargement the former Soviet Union will be a greater Rationality, scarcity of means, as well round in 1997. Adhesion is to be consid- foreign policy priority both for Russia as strategic considerations prompted the ered as a certificate of good governance, and for the US. former opponents to adopt a coopera- stability, and reliability. tive stance in the Baltic Cold War contact Option 3: The region will oscillate be- Remaining security issues zone. For the moment, this approach tween option 1 and 2, as it did in the corresponds to a win-win constellation for history of the 20th century. Despite this, security concerns remain both sides. The present situation at the To date only the second option seems in the Baltic Sea region. Security concerns southern border of Russia is more likely to be realistic, for the following reasons. must be perceived as potential threats, to deteriorate than is the new pattern of First, members of the Russian elite with a such as the unclear fate of the Lukashenka cooperation in the Baltic region. traditional and anti-Western approach in regime in Belarus and ecological prob- this respect have no decisive influence and lems. According to an interview partner Three theoretical options exist for the are not likely to get it very soon: their at the Estonian Embassy in Berlin, one of future of the Baltic Sea region: basis is mostly the military, which itself is the most frightening scenarios for Tallinn Option 1: There will be a new shift in in a deep crisis, due to failed reforms and is the explosion of Sosnovy Bor Nuclear the region towards securitization. the heavy Soviet heritage. Second, coop- Power Plant near St. Petersburg, which Option 2: The region will become a eration with the Western capitals and in could lead to the flow of millions of refu- kind of Baltic Benelux, and the former the Baltic Sea Region will have more pay- gees to Estonia. The most important se- conflicts an anachronism. The region will offs for Russia than confrontation. Third, curity issue for the time being, and in serve as a bridge and transit line between just as the Baltic Germans have been an the context of the war on terrorism, is East and West. The politically and eco- interface between continental Europe and certainly the anachronistic border con- nomically clustered space will integrate via Russia, the Baltic states could serve as an trol in the countries of the region, and

97 the total lack of cooperation in this re- as Georgia. Belarus is considered to be a or bilateralism will be the decisive inter- spect. Kaliningrad is only one expression nightmare in terms of unforeseeable re- national relations pattern in the future. of this more general problem. Thus, a gime changes, refugees etc. Being normal The EU has to come to terms with the solution has to be found not only in terms actors and the international recognition largest and most expensive enlargement of access to the enclave, but also the trans- of this fact constitutes one of the most in history at a moment of economic cri- parency of the circulation of goods and important aims of all the CEE countries sis in its motor-economies Germany and people in the region as a whole. The Bal- at the moment. (to a lesser degree) France due, not least, tic region’s bridge function between East, to the introduction of the Euro. Unequal North, and West, and the prestige of this The European battlefield commitment to political integration and role will depend on a successful and com- fed-up member states are perceived as an mon establishment of control mechanisms. The Baltic states will join NATO and obstacle to the requirements of European the EU at the very moment of a renewed governance. The big-against-small quarrels, From factors to actors: new identity crisis. The reassessment of Euro- as well as the implicit argument on vari- opportunities for new actors pean and international institutions has not able geometry, has accompanied the de- come to an end yet, some 15 years after cade. The defreezing of the Cold War in the the fall of the Berlin wall. NATO has to The American position hostile to the Baltics ten years after the Soviet implo- worry about its first or second class sta- political integration of Europe will be sion means a resurging opportunity of tus in the resolution of international con- strengthened in the short run with the normal political bargaining. After a de- flicts, reach a more definitive stance on inclusion of the CEE candidates. It risks cade of introverted behaviour, typical of its pre-emptive strikes doctrine, and re- exacerbating interior dividing lines of the transition countries between Germany and assess the concepts of a defence alliance, Union for the next two years. A more Russia, the Baltic states transformed into member state military spending, the need pro-European commitment together with active subjects in regional relations. Espe- for a rapid reaction force, adequate means a trans-Atlantic orientation, very much like cially Lithuania and Poland aspire to an to confront asymmetric risks, and deci- West Germany’ s position of the 1970s, active role in political and economic East- sion making. It cannot be ruled out that should be expected in the medium term. East rapprochement, thus the transmission NATO’s role will be reduced to something Meanwhile, and to reinforce this commit- of their own experience to countries such of a second OSCE and that unilateralism ment, a surplus of sensitivity is required

98 on both sides of the former iron curtain. comes more and more problematic. Most ing this border politicized and avoiding Western European states must recognize likely, the integration of Estonia, Latvia, its securitization. Since a lot of actors are the Eastern transition from Phare-assisted and Lithuania into NATO will lead to implicated and a regional structure for countries to policy makers, from objects the integration of Sweden sooner or later. handling conflicts is missing, a constant to subjects, from factors to actors. And In the East, Europe in 2004 will have to long-term tension in the border region CEE states should admit that European find mechanisms how to build up an East- could have devastating effects on the pros- integration needs not to proceed from East interface, without, however, increas- perity and political stability of this part scratch, and does not begin with their ing insecurity and instability. CEE coun- of Europe. The Baltic states have a very entrance, but has been the result of a dif- tries, and in particular the Baltic states, important place to take in bridging the ficult battle over all the decades since will become important actors in this re- gap. World War II. The EU is not a Citroen design. 2CV, as a Polish diplomat put it, but has Bibliography proven able to deal with extremely diffi- The new European lines cult historical challenges: the place of Eu- Davies, Norman: Europe A History. Ox- rope in the era of superpowers, the col- The upcoming enlargement will deci- ford University Press 1998. lapse of Breton Woods, and the unifica- sively draw a new border from the Baltic European Comm. Report Kaliningrad tion of post wall Europe. to the Black Sea. This border risks to be 2000. EU enlargement will imply the securitized at least partly, since economic, Föhrenbach, Gerd: Die Westbindung der easternisation and even a certain military, and political differences are very Baltischen Staaten. Nomos Baden-Baden russification of the organization: 1.4 mil- important on both sides of the dividing 2000. lion of so-called Euro-Russians from line. Moreover, the political evolution of Kirby, David: The Baltic World 1772-1993: Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania will become countries like Belarus, Ukraine, and Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age of inhabitants of the EU. The border between Moldova is difficult to anticipate. For the Change. Longman Publishing Group 1995. the EU and Russia will be extended to time being they belong neither to the Nies, Susanne: Les pays baltes dans leur some 1.300 kilometres. Baltic NATO mem- West nor to the East in any clear manner. environnement : enjeux et perspectives stratégiques, bership concerns the larger region: the The concerned countries of the bor- Etude DAS/ CERI, Paris 2002, http:// Swedish non-participation in NATO be- der line have a common interest in keep- www.defense.gouv.fr/das.

99 Norgaard, Ole: The Baltic States after 3 NATO summit Prague, 21-22 November 2002, 14 Robert Kaiser, Washington Post, 26.9.2002. Independence. Studies of Communism in Tran- EU council in Copenhagen, December 2002 15 At the time of editing this issue of the BDR, 4 cf. Nies (2002) the Russian Parliament has finally ratified a bor- sition. Cheltenham 1996. 5 Cf.: Dacie, Norman 1998:18. der treaty with Lithuania, signed by two coun- Vardys, Vytas: The Rebel Nation. 6 Buzan, Waever 1998: 23 tries in 1997. Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Repub- 7 The retreat of the Red Army from Eastern 16Interview with Christoph Bertram, former lics. Westview Press 1996. Europe started in 1991, short after the dissolu- Director of IISS, Berlin June 24, 2002 tion of the Warsaw-Pact. The retreat from Lithuania 17 This preference for bilateralism is even re- NATO-enlargement Daily Brief. was accomplished in September 1993, from Esto- flected in the Russian style federalism, which is NEBD. [email protected] (daily nia and Latvia 1994, while, on the basis of a bilateral (and asymmetric): Moscow negotiates mailing list, compiled by the Latvian bilateral agreement, the radar station in Skrunda, issues case by case with its subjects. Embassy in Washington, on NATO-en- Latvia, has been maintained by Moscow till 1999. 18 The region is economically highly dispersed: Now, Russians are unhappy to learn that Skrunda poor Polish border regions, Belarus etc. Curious largement and security issues) will be used for NATO intelligence gathering phenomena occurred, such as Lithuanian pen- -http://www.securities.co.uk (media-ser- purposes. sioners living in neighbouring Belarus to make vice on emerging economies) 8 NATO announcement at the Warsaw-summit, better use of their pensions in a country with end of September 2002: Kaiser, Robert G., NATO lower price level. ready to admit Seven Eastern Bloc Countries. Wash- 19 Daily Telegraph, January 2001. ington Post, 26 Septembre 02. 20 The decrease of military presence in the 1 Le Figaro February 19th, 2003, Les pays 9 European Commission, 9th of October 2002. region has been tremendous: from 100.000 candidats au centre de la bataille, p. 2 The Eastern Reuters 04.02.02, http://groups.yahoo./com/ troops in 1991 to 14.000 today, with cuts an- European governments, from Prague to Vilnius, group/nedb. NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, nounced for a new decrease to 9.000 this year. had signed a Washington (Bruce Jackson) –pre- 04.10.02: European Union to Recommend 10 Can- Cf. Facon, Adomeit, Mironov report. pared letter, the Vilnius 10 declaration, in sup- didate Countries for Admission. Kaliningrad is one of the most concerned re- port of the Anglo-Saxon position on Iraq. 10 Important divergences remain on this issue, gions with military cuts, and even the military 2 The Elysée Treaty has been signed in January most notably the Russian energy market, both in itself doesn’t see any sense to maintain strong 1963 between France and Germany and stipu- prices and in terms of state or private property. presence in the specific situation of a far away lates a preferential relationship between the two 11 Putin’s speech on September 11th 2001. enclave. In the same time, FSB activities in the countries within Europe. If General de Gaulle 12 Cf. Roger Kanet, Terorism and the US- region have been reinforced, and a special en- aimed at European and French reinforcement, Russian Relationsship, http://www.apsanet.org, voy of the governor of the strong North-West the German Bundestag counteracted any anti- presentation of August 24, 2002. District has been nominated. Representatives American ambition while including the famous 13 Kaiser, Robert G., NATO Ready to Admit from the Baltic ministries and governments Preamble in the Treaty. The latter stresses the im- Seven Eastern Bloc Members. Washington Post, don’t consider Kaliningrad any more as a mili- portance of the transatlantic link. 26 September 2002 tary threat. See the interview series of the au-

100 thor, published in December 2002 in a study for the French Ministry of Defence (DAS). 21 For the moment Poles, Lithuanians and Kaliningraders buy vouchers for travelling. Due to the Russian-Byelorussian treaty both countries renounced on visa. Only Latvia refused to par- ticipate in any liberal regime with Kaliningrad: the transit to and from the homeland has thus to be diverted through Belarus. 22 The Soros Foundation initiated a “Russians to Russia” programme in summer 2002, to en- hance contacts between the enclave and mainland. This is exactly what was done by West Germany to run isolated West Berlin. For more details on transport issues, mentality etc. see the report of the EU Commission 2001, Fairlie, Nies http:// www.oei.fu-berlin.de (Kaliningrad report, Febru- ary 2002). 23 France has a special bilateral regime with Morocco and Greece with foreign workers from Ukraine and Moldova. Both regimes limit access to the concerned Schengen country and prohibit border crossings to the others. 24 cf. Vinogradov, Michail, The Duma protects Kaliningrad, Izvestija 20.6.02, p.2. 25 Interview with a representative of the German MFA, Ulrich Bethkenhagen, summer 2002: accord- ing to him the procedure with Russia is long and costly, the refusal rate low, the criminals still cross the borders and are not refused.

101 Life After Enlargement

By Ambassador Linas Linkevicius*

lthough the topic of this paper is ment” started long ago. It actually started Russia will be closely entangled into the very broad, its message will be rather when our first troops landed in Bosnia activities of both NATO and the EU. On straightforward. To set the ground and and Herzegovina alongside NATO forces the other hand, less diversity outside means to some extent provoke further back in 1996. We have always behaved like more diversity inside. It is completely discussions, it will be attempted to go true allies committed to the values and different experience to observe a big fam- through the main issues that the spirit of the Alliance. In this sense, the ily gathering from the street and actually Northeastern Europe faces today and will Prague invitation was only recognition be in the club of 25 members with dif- be facing in the years to come. of our sustained efforts. ferent characters, temper and beliefs. We Let me start with a few words on the After enlargement, there will be more will have to learn to adjust and reconcile general outlook of the region after NATO stability and mutual confidence, as there our interests with others. The kind of and EU enlargement takes place. Although will be less diversity in the region. Al- partnership we have developed in this predictions are usually risky and difficult ready six nations around the Baltic Sea region throughout the years will be in- to make, our region is as predictable as a [the Baltic states, Poland, Germany and dispensable in this process. The same region can be in this turbulent era. After Denmark] will be members of both NATO applies for the old-timers of these clubs all, one does not need to make predic- and the EU. In the next 10 years there – a new member of a family always brings tions because for us “Life after Enlarge- will be no non-aligned countries left while changes. * Ambassador Linas Linkevicius is a Minister of National Defence of Lithuania. The paper was presented at the roundtable discussion ‘Northeast European Security After the 2004 Dual Enlargement: the End of History?’, held jointly by the Ministry of National Defence, the U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies, George C. Marshall Centre for Security Studies and Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Vilnius (Lithuania) on 6-7 June 2003.

102 The Baltic states will bring a rather day Russia would not be a member of where, or what new unforeseen and unique experience and contribution to NATO 20. unpredicted threat may emerge. In this the dialogue between NATO, the EU and Let me now turn to another related sense, Northeast Europe is no less and no Russia. We have managed to turn our issue – threats in our region and their more secure than any other region. We dramatic past under the Soviet Union into implications to the military transforma- should be honest about the future: we a window of opportunity to build a pros- tion. For a long time the Northeast Eu- should expect more international terror- perous and peaceful future. Lithuania has rope has been a line of tensions separat- ism, more proliferation of the weapons an impressive record of dealing with Rus- ing the West and the East. Today it serves of mass destruction (WMD), more re- sia on a number of issues including troops as a link of trust and stability between the gional tensions. withdrawal, military transit, cross border two. The good news is that there are no Therefore we must be ready for any cooperation etc. Such experience will be major military threats in the region. scenario in the region, around the region extremely valuable for NATO and the EU Moreover, this region did not see a single and beyond the region. Due to their his- once we become members. Even more violent spark involving any kind of use tory, the Baltic states should feel vulner- importantly, now we will be taking part or threat to use force from any country able to traditional military threats but in the process of policy formation to- for the past decade. Recently resolved tran- instead we are among those who argue wards our eastern neighbours and we will sit issue to Kaliningrad is the latest ex- that NATO must transform itself from be able to shape this policy from within ample of how we can peacefully settle even an immobile defence alliance in the heart NATO and the EU. The Baltic states have the most difficult disputes. Good of Europe into a flexible and rapidly re- a vital stake in the effort of Euro-Atlantic neighbourly relations will remain the key active force capable of intervention wher- community to bring Russia as close to to security after enlargement. The fact that ever needed to prevent a conflict rather NATO and the EU, as Russia wants to the eastern borders of the Baltic states will than to stop one that already started. To come. To my mind, the true success of become eastern borders of NATO and the match our words with deeds our coun- this NATO enlargement round is not as EU will only add a new quality of cred- tries are boldly and rapidly transforming much the membership of the Baltic states, ibility and reassurance to the the armed forces, dropping outdated ter- but the Alliance’s rapprochement with neighbouring countries. ritorial defence posture and acquiring Russia. If it were not for our stubborn- There is bad news too: in a rapidly modern military capabilities so as to be- ness to become members of NATO, to- changing world, no one can be sure when, come trustworthy new allies within a new

103 alliance ready to meet tomorrows security in ensuring homeland security and civil Nordic-Baltic Eight etc. Regardless of the challenges. This implies a major shift in defence? How to strike the right balance past merits, their future utility will have our planning assumptions from a reactive between the civilian authorities and po- to be reviewed. Some of them will fade Cold-war type defensive posture to a pro- lice and the armed forces when it comes away and some will grow in importance. active planning that would enable timely to, say, countering a terrorist act? After enlargement, there will be both con- action instead of reflection. One might Third question: NATO does not see tinuity and change in our relations with argue that the greatest risk to our security any military threats in the region. But the Nordic countries. It is not to say, that is the environment changing more rap- then we have a regime right next to the we do not value all the assistance Nordic idly than our ability to adapt. Today’s centre of Europe, which was ready to host countries provided to us throughout the threats do not allow for long warning time Saddam Hussein. Is it something we do years in our efforts to build modern mili- and prolonged force build-up periods: the not want to see and hear about or is it so tary establishments. To the contrary: armed forces must be capable of reacting self-evident that we cannot see it anymore? NATO and EU membership will give a in a matter of days and even hours. In the first case it is dangerous ignorance, new quality to this partnership. Nordic- There are some questions we still have in the second - it is self-deception, which Baltic Eight will be a club of like-minded to answer and better sooner than later. At points me to a question whether we truly states cooperating as equal partners on times, the Alliance may have to take pre- believe that Europe now is whole and free? equal basis, coordinating their policies ventive actions. Where do we derive le- We have to find the right answers to all inside NATO and the EU, coordinating gitimacy for such actions and what is their these questions before we start investing participation in the international opera- relationship with the international law? our resources in one direction or another. tions and drafting common strategies and How to define when a threat is big enough Let me now turn to another impor- activities towards other regions. As some to justify a preventive strike? tant issue at hand - the future of regional of the BALTDREAM projects are already Second question: When we talk about cooperation. There is a wide variety of completed, we need to move forward and the new challenges we emphasize their non- security and defence-related frameworks, look for new opportunities of coopera- military nature. As a Minister of Defence, initiatives and mechanisms operating in tion, common projects and niches for spe- I ask myself, what is the role of the armed the Northeast Europe: the Council of cialization. One such opportunity could forces in dealing with such challenges? Baltic Sea States, Northern Dimension be transformation and expansion of What should be the role of the military Initiative, Northern European Initiative, BALTDREAM into NORDBALTDREAM

104 projects. The spheres of closer cooperation boost mil-to-mil dialogue and confidence to keep the US interested and engaged in could encompass science and technology, between NATO and Russia and improve Northeast European affairs. The US ad- special operation forces, logistics, eventu- force interoperability for peace support ministration and some American NGOs ally even procurement. To go more prac- missions. do indicate willingness to pursue active tical, Nordic-Baltic Eight should consider Finally, ‘Vilnius 10’ will cease to exist strategy of cooperation with the Nordic establishing some regular arrangements at but the Vilnius process as a cooperative – Baltic countries. Consolidated zone of the working level. effort to pursue NATO membership will peace, stability and economic growth in Lithuania has always pursued a multi- continue in the same spirit. We must now the Northeast Europe is clearly in the U.S. dimensional approach towards regional help to implement NATO’s promise to interest at a time when more serious threats cooperation, and we will keep opportu- keep the door open for those willing and rise in the Middle East, Korean Peninsula nity windows open after enlargement. The ready to join. Vilnius process should now and South Asia. Strengthening regional merging of two trilateral forums – Dan- encompass not only the most obvious security should remain high on the fu- ish–German–Polish and Lithuanian– candidates - Macedonia, Albania and ture agenda and include issues like counter- Latvian–Estonian and the eventual launch Croatia. We must also assist and encour- terrorism, control of WMD and border of the Multinational Baltic Corps seems age Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan in security. A regular 8+1 format at the min- to be a particularly promising initiative. their NATO aspirations. isters’ level would greatly enhance this We also have not exhausted all the poten- Whatever the future of regional coop- cooperation. This format could also de- tial of the third triangle yet - Poland, eration is, we must keep the United States velop and implement a common strategy Lithuania and Ukraine. involved in the matters of Northeast Eu- towards Ukraine, Caucasus and Central We should also consider launching a rope. It is no secret that in the absence of Asia as the U.S. itself expresses growing concrete practical regional initiative that the Soviet threat the strategic focus of the interest in these areas. Finally, an option could involve NATO, Russia and the will- U.S. has shifted elsewhere in the world of establishing an American or NATO ing countries in our region. With NATO- than Europe. The U.S. may also lose in- military base or a training facility in one Russia relationship advancing to new lev- terest in Northern Europe and the Baltic of the Baltic states could be considered. els of cooperation, we should think about states as a resolved issue in the context of It would perfectly make sense and serve some common training projects in whole and secure Europe. To prevent this the common goals that NATO, the Baltic Kaliningrad. Even a modest project would from happening we need an active agenda states and our eastern neighbours share

105 in terms of dealing with the new chal- supported the US-led coalition to oust redefining Euro-Atlantic community’s lenges. Sadam’s regime. This is how we think the geopolitical scope to embrace within it Turning to the second element of dual interests of European security can be Ukraine and South Caucasus countries. enlargement – that of the EU - one can- served best - by resolve and unity rather The question whether the Baltic states not speak about its impact on security than by accusations and distrust. We do will be security providers or mere con- situation in the region as something sepa- support the political will of the EU to sumers today is completely irrelevant. rate from that of NATO. It is simply im- assume greater share of burden in main- Lithuania maintains a record number - possible to envisage European defence taining international security. As future 13 military commitments and participates policy decoupled from the transatlantic members of both organisations we have a in 7 international missions: our troops security link. From the very launch of stake in success of this cooperation. The serve in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq; the ESDP project we have been monitor- outcome of the ESDP project must not military cargo plane is deployed in Italy ing its development. Now we will be full- in any way compromise the role of NATO in support of the KFOR/SFOR missions, fledged participants of the whole process as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic secu- we have liaison officers in Bosnia and and we will take an active stance on de- rity but strengthen it. Herzegovina and Macedonia and a mili- fence-related issues, as they will directly tary observer in the OSCE mission in affect our own security. The spirit of trans- Finally, let me address last but not the Georgia. After our two peacekeeping con- atlantic solidarity, which was so full- least issue - spreading security to other tingents are deployed in Iraq, by the end heartedly displayed after the terrorist at- regions. Before Prague, the Baltic states of this year we will have almost 300 troops tacks of 9/11, has faded, sadly. Europe must were part of the problem of divided Eu- deployed abroad. For a country with three now prove its commitment to the trans- rope. Now we must live up to the expec- and a half million of inhabitants and a atlantic Alliance to save American com- tations of our allies to become part of a 12,000-strong army, this is far more than mitment in Europe and vice versa. The solution. As Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. symbolic contribution to the international only way for Europe to be heard in Wash- Defence Secretary, has noted during the security. While we are stepping up our ington is to speak in one strong voice. Prague Summit, new countries bring a international involvement and participa- While some countries argued what sub- “spirit and enthusiasm” to NATO. We tion in crisis management and peace sup- stance and character this voice should already lead the Alliance’s efforts in ex- port operations abroad, some critics main- carry, the Vilnius group unanimously tending zone of security eastward and tain that we conduct international in-

106 volvement at the expense of defence re- unpredicted threats, and unexpected cri- form at home and that the 2% of GDP ses. Nobody could ever imagine the Twin are wasted on other things than home- Towers collapse, who could tell what can land security. Such thinking is a danger- happen tomorrow? Ad hoc coalitions may ous misperception of today’s reality. Our provide a temporary salvation in an im- security is not a national endeavour. Our mediate crisis but only such a battle-scarred security starts way beyond our borders: and storm-beaten organisation as NATO it starts in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, can be a long-term solution. If NATO is in Central Asia and the Middle East. If to remain successful and effective Alliance these regions are not stable and at peace, it will have to stand up to any kind of we will always feel the ripple effect of in- challenge and prevail rather than to es- security via illegal migration, organized cape through the back door. If NATO crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. In had a will to act, ad hoc coalitions could the same manner, security of our Nordic rest in peace. If NATO is to remain rel- and Western neighbours starts with secu- evant in the 21st century, it has to go glo- rity of the Baltic states. Given the geo- bal, or go out of business. As the Minis- graphic location of the Baltic states, it is ter of a future Allied country, I can as- our destiny to serve as a vital link of trust sure you that Lithuania will do everything and security between North America and it can to keep it in business and profit- Western Europe and eastern regions and able. nations of Eurasia. We already live in an era after enlarge- ment, which unfortunately coincides with the period of global turmoil. Although today our nations may feel more secure than ever before, in fact we face a whole new era of unforeseen challenges,

107 Northeast European Security After the 2004 Dual Enlargement: The End of History?

A joint Vilnius Roundtable in co-operation with the Institute for National Strategic Studies, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, and Konrad Adenauer Foundation*

e hosted a high level expert talks double breakthrough of the European We took a chance to look profoundly at on security policy issues in the Union and NATO enlargement goes ahead the EU at 25 and NATO at 26 formulas, Baltic Sea region that were held on 6-7 as planned, the political map of Europe the EU and NATO cooperation vs. com- June 2003 in Vilnius, Lithuania. The event will have changed dramatically. The ma- petition process while finding compatible was co-sponsored by the Institute for jority of countries in the Baltic Sea re- roles and tasks for the countries in the National Strategic Studies, George C. gion will then become members, giving Baltic Sea region. The starting point of Marshall Center for Security Studies, and both the EU and NATO a rather pan- our discussion was the possible applica- Konrad Adenauer Foundation. European character as well as underlining bility to other regions of the Baltic co- Our intellectual and practical talk’s new security challenges for the region and operation model and the experiences ambitions were fuelled by the tremendous for its neighbours. Top experts, academ- gained. This would help us in finding an changes in the New World system, which ics, politicians, and diplomats were do- answer to whether dual enlargement could be better described as an electronic ing their best to explain the impact of would be the end of history or a new book available to update every day. If the dual enlargement on the Baltic security. start in the Baltic Sea region.

* An executive summary by the International Relations Department of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania.

108 Our talks were launched by two key- the basis of implementing mutual confi- Prague Summit led to three subjects of note-speakers, H.E. Mr. Linas Linkevicius dence and fully obliterate the Yalta’s wall discussion: the quantitative and qualita- and Mr. Robert Nurick who set the scene in the Baltic Sea region. tive changes caused by expansion of for the ensuing debate. First, we were We agreed that there is no major mili- NATO, the creation of a NATO Response provided with a general overview of the tary threat, and the solution of the Force, and strengthening of NATO’s ca- influence on the Baltic security of double Kaliningrad problem proved that diplo- pabilities. enlargement in general and then the main matic means prevail. Nevertheless, the re- NATO decided upon the largest ex- issues this region face in particular. The alistic world is fraught not only with di- pansion of the alliance in history - seven Copenhagen and Prague Summits opened rect military threats but also with other countries were invited to join the Alli- up possibilities for new practical instru- problems such as illegal trafficking in ance, among them the Baltic states. The ments, which will contribute to strength- weapons of mass destruction, international participants agreed that the expansion ening and consolidating the region. Af- terrorism, regional tensions, economic reflects a vital contribution to strength- ter a decade of transition following the depression, and disrespect for interna- ening the stability and values in the Euro- end of the Cold War, the Baltic states will tional law, and this should keep us awake Atlantic community, which is based on take a chance to outline the multi-vector and prepared for any scenario in the re- democracy, freedom and the rule of law. policy within the Euro-Atlantic institu- gion. In this sense, the EU and NATO However, this added many questions to tions. First, special military and political should be used to overcome these prob- our agenda. NATO enlargement has a di- relations with the Nordic countries should lems. On the one hand, a pro-active U.S. rect impact on geo-strategic stability in be established in order for the Baltic states engagement in Baltic-Nordic affairs is the Baltic Sea region and leads to ques- to become more visible and reliable part- desirable at practical and military levels, tions about Russian security. We noticed ners. A long chain of regional organiza- and, on the other hand, much attention that Russia has a new relationship with tions and initiatives such as the North- should be given to a common NATO- NATO. This rapprochement was stipulated ern Dimension initiative, Nordic-Baltic Russian agenda. by a necessity to counter terrorist attacks Eight, and the Council of Baltic Sea States Keeping this framework in mind, we wherever it might appear. From differ- are already used. Secondly, predictable started with a discussion of NATO at 26 ent perspectives possible negative trends relations with the neighbours and Russia’s and a new U.S. footprint in the Baltic in the relations between NATO and Rus- inclusion in Euro-Atlantic affairs serve as Security Agenda. The outcome of the sia were evaluated. Russian military still

109 identifies NATO along with the U.S. as gic position as a result of the possibility umbrella of NATO. NATO should ensure the main threat to Russia’s security. This of establishing an offensive front against that Russia follows arms control treaties. was not said straightforward though. This Russia from the Baltic states in which con- The Lithuanian representative added that emanates, according to the Russian repre- ventional arms control does not apply. the Baltic states would seriously consider sentatives, from the Agreement on the Ad- Additional problems are also related to their acceding to the A-CFE Treaty which aptation of the Treaty on Conventional unpredictable states’ behaviour and offen- could make the region more predictable Armed Forces (A-CFE) in Europe of 1999 sive motivations of great powers, which and transparent. As a framework for co- and its implications for the relations be- does not consider arms control as an ap- operation, our Belarusian colleague pro- tween NATO and Russia. The A-CFE, a propriate mechanism for maintaining sta- posed to form a common airspace con- cornerstone in European security leading bility in the world. The U.S., indeed, was trol network covering Commonwealth of to greater conventional stability on the seen as one of the most serious potential Independent States and NATO. continent, has not entered into force for threats not just in Russia but also in Eu- political and geo-strategic reasons. A-CFE rope. On the other hand, the problem In this context, we came up with a con- aimed at establishing a stable and balanced was to large extent related to the old think- cept for a U.S. footprint on the Baltic level of conventional armed forces between ing and threat perceptions. Stronger pro- security agenda, which could be used with NATO and Russia in Europe, thus solv- ponents noted that dividing lines between both negative and positive connotations. ing NATO enlargement and security di- NATO and Russia created not by the Some representatives argued enthusiasti- lemmas has become a bone of contention Alliance’s policy but by weak democracy cally that we have to keep the U.S. in- between NATO and Russia. The first wave and civil society in Russia. We have ar- volved in affairs of the Baltic Sea region. of NATO enlargement was set in a frame gued that Russia should forget conven- At present time, the U.S. may loose her of arms control thus solving the security tional perception of threats although the interest as a result of success stories in the dilemma of Russia, whereas the second on-going conflicts might block it. Trans- Baltic states and an absence of direct mili- wave diverted the distribution of power formation of the old thinking would be tary threat. The Baltic states seeking to and required a new response for arms very helpful in this case. Co-operative strengthen military co-operation with the control. In Russia’s view, with the second activities between NATO and Russia could U.S. would like to establish a multi-na- wave including the Baltic states, NATO make sense, and it could be implemented tional military base or training centre has significantly improved its geo-strate- through joint military exercises under the where Americans along with other part-

110 ners can improve their military skills and with the A-CFE Treaty’s provisions. We address their national defence and con- mutual interaction. Together with shared therefore concluded that the U.S. role in tribute to collective operations? One of Euro-Atlantic cultural values this would the Baltic Sea region may be misunder- the solutions we came up with and which help to maintain the U.S. involvement. stood or misinterpreted and no magic was attractive to the small countries was Thereby the U.S. would be interested in formula can be found. niche capabilities. For example the Baltic this prosperous and growing region, states together with the Nordic countries which could help in countering terror- To our mind, NATO enlargement in- could be working together on creating ism or providing support for interna- cludes a broader context and we even dis- small Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tional peace operations. Our co-operation cussed the credibility of the Alliance. or de-mining units. Namely, joint com- can also develop and implement a com- NATO must adapt itself to changes in the panies or rapid reaction platoons as well mon strategy towards Ukraine, Caucasus, global security. We agreed that new threats as conceptual expertise of military man- and Central Asia as the U.S. expresses grow- largely posed by non-state actors are un- agement would be very helpful to meet ing interest in these areas. Such ideas nev- predictable and require global response. new requirements. However, the partici- ertheless inspired some scepticism ex- It was intended to set out priorities for pants did not agree on what NATO needs pressed by our participants. They men- developing the military capabilities of to improve. Although, deployable forces tioned that the U.S. was planning to with- NATO’s member states. These include should be a top priority of NATO as well draw all her troops and bases from Ger- protection against weapons of mass de- as niche capabilities should be more suit- many. Under these plans, the U.S. would struction, improvement of management able to the small countries, we had some move her troops in Europe eastwards to skills, and the ability to transfer and mo- striking points that NATO would need countries such as Poland, the Czech Re- bilize forces. This means that NATO only well-equipped soldiers and the Bal- public and the Baltic states. It is likely should include the forces required, suit- tic states would be ready to provide them that the overall size of the deployment able planning and appropriate procedures very soon. would be reduced, as the U.S. military that will allow the efficient and decisive changes priorities to a long-term engage- military presence at the right time. How Taking into account new threats and a ment against international terrorism. can the small countries contribute? How need to respond globally, we talked about Russian representatives reiterated that this should new members be encouraged to the U.S. proposed plan to create a NATO might be legally done only in accordance reform their armed forces in order to Response Force. The plan, according to

111 some of our colleagues, must be compat- The question raised whether it would be Belarus. Kaliningrad became a pilot ible with the development of European profitable for us if these organizations project between the EU and Russia, ex- crisis response forces within the scope of were going to work together? We agreed cluding Belarus from negotiation despite European security and defence policy. that the EU and NATO should act in a it having been the main partner of the This generated an interesting discussion. co-operative way rather than in a com- district. What we discussed was the general func- petitive one. However, some of us pointed The enlargement process naturally will tion of both organizations in the secu- out that the duplication would be un- include new regional co-operation initia- rity field and in particular the relation- avoidable. Since we focused on the Baltic tives and models. We vividly discussed the ship between the EU and U.S. NATO still Sea region, the EU and NATO are quite applicability of Baltic co-operation expe- struggles to find its role in the post-Cold different organizations in nature, and the riences and models to other regions, pri- War environment as well as the EU is de- Baltic states should exploit comparative marily to the South Caucasus and Ukraine. veloping a defence dimension of its own advantages of both of them. Trilateral co-operation among Lithuania, with the intention to have military forces. Latvia, and Estonia in the field of defence We admitted that the EU has been able to An important item we had on the has been an important factor in develop- develop its capabilities in the soft secu- agenda was related to the ripple effect of ing the Baltic states’ defence capabilities rity field. This indicates specific strengths dual enlargement. The EU and NATO are within the framework of their prepara- of the EU in the defence sphere, some- distinct organizations in political and le- tion for NATO membership and strength- thing that NATO lacks to a large extent. gal terms and pursue different objectives. ening the security in the Baltic Sea re- NATO’s rapid reaction force would clearly Their enlargement can be regarded as the gion. Our experience may be transferred introduce an element of disturbance in same process: it overcomes the dividing to the other regions. Many participants the duplication process between the EU lines and unites countries sharing same agreed that the Baltic co-operation expe- and NATO. Conversely, the EU decision values. Even though the enlargement pro- rience in itself was unique and valuable to extend the defence dimension may put cess was mainly evaluated positive it might which could be well implemented and stumbling blocks on the Trans-Atlantic way have negative consequences. The represen- acceptable in the countries seeking to join of co-operation. The dispute over Iraq and tative from Belarus explained to us that the EU or NATO. Some participants esti- the International Criminal Court add the EU and NATO enlargement was per- mated it with unconcealed reluctance. They some spokes in the transatlantic wheels. ceived as a deadlock creating a belt around argued that there were a lot of social prob-

112 lems to be solved in the regions that we eration in order to dispel current distrust would like to act upon. Will Georgia re- as well as European countries have to main a single country after Shevarnadze? optimize the potential in the EU and This is a highly important question. The NATO to become more reliable co-work- elites of these countries have no vision to ers. With the enlargement of NATO at 26 build a European Ukraine or Belarus. The and the EU at 25 we will get structural role of the EU in the South Caucasus changes in the Baltic Sea region, which would not be successful because it nor- might be the end of the history of mally works from the “outside” in order misperception. We still lack a strategy of to prevent the crisis. In this case, we need co-operation, which will solve many prob- a more American approach – to get into lems. We came to the conclusion that the and stop the crisis from inside. This Baltic Sea region will remain important showed us that diversity of opinions because it will co-operate from the inside, could further initiate and produce new provide co-operation between Euro-Atlan- ideas that can help to export security to tic institutions, and pursue common strat- the other regions. egies towards South Caucasus and other regions. In the end of our roundtable, we dis- cussed what has been said. Some of us pointed out that Russia remains in the same global boat and it could be a secu- rity donor as well as a tool solving the North-South dilemma. The problem in the relations between the EU and NATO is basically a misperception of threat. As the U.S. is seeking to get an equal partner in Europe she should emphasize co-op-

113 Lithuania’s Foreign and Security Policy Agenda Beyond 2004: Challenges and Opportunities

by Renatas Norkus*

n upcoming membership in the institutions. This ultimate and long institutional and human capacities to per- North Atlantic Alliance and awaited goal will be met with formal form the role of credible members, but European Union is about to bring an membership in these two organizations most importantly, in terms of adapting important qualitative change to foreign in spring 2004. our foreign and security policy postures and security policies of Lithuania and the This will be a truly historical achieve- to be able to grasp the opportunities and other Baltic states. This change is by no ment for the peoples of the three coun- deal with challenges that membership of means unexpected, neither is it unplanned. tries, and not the least for their young the EU and NATO is likely to present. It was enshrined into their policies from diplomacies. As much as there is plenty In this article I will attempt to present the very first years of re-established of reasons to celebrate a diplomatic vic- some sketchy thoughts and observations independence of the Baltic States in the tory, it is nonetheless important to real- on the subject from an insider that has early 1990s when all three countries clearly ize (the earlier the better) that member- been involved in Lithuania’s foreign and set their foreign and security policy ship in the Euro-Atlantic institutions is security policy formulation and imple- agenda towards integration into the going to require a substantially new qual- mentation efforts during the last ten years. Western political economic and defence ity from our countries, both in terms of Given my rather limited insight in the

* Renatas Norkus is a Minister-Counselor of the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington.

114 institutional matters of the European out with experience sharing projects to economy at home. The matter of the fact Union, for most part my thoughts will countries like Georgia in Caucasus. Yet, is that firstly, lacking that same leverage centre on Lithuania’s multilateral and bi- despite our rightfully stated principle that after joining NATO, Lithuania will have lateral security policy agenda in the con- “the goal of NATO membership is not committed to carry out these policies and text of upcoming NATO membership. an end in itself”, it was the so called mem- reforms with the same pace and dedica- The views expressed in this article are the bership requirements, initially declared by tion. This represents a serious responsi- author’s and do not represent an official the Alliance in NATO Enlargement Study bility which is well understood and ac- position of the Lithuanian government. of 1995, and later specified in the Mem- cepted by the government in the spirit bership Action Plan, that in many respects of overall progress and further develop- Realizing the change provided most of the incentives to ment of the institutional capacities of the Lithuania’s foreign policy direction. country. There has to be no doubt that For more than ten years, membership Obviously, it was a very prudent ap- Lithuania sees itself and wants to be seen in NATO and the EU, as two predomi- proach from the Alliance’s perspective that by allies as a credible and trustworthy nant and equally important major objec- has served NATO to earn a label of an partner in the Alliance. tives, have been naturally limiting institution with implicit conflict preven- The second challenge, however, has to Lithuania’s foreign and security policy to tion and reform generating instruments do with a nature of accustomed policy be exercised largely by a single goal-ori- in addition to its explicit function of posture that is bound to change with a ented agenda. This is not to suggest, that collective defence. Such an approach has formal membership in the Alliance. The other important foreign policy areas, such been useful to the membership seeking essence of that qualitative change is that as bilateral relations with Poland, Russia, countries as well. The Alliance’s exercised the former objective, task and goal, namely the United States, sub-regional Baltic and leverage helped Lithuania and other ap- membership of the Alliance (and obvi- Nordic cooperation, or multilateral fora plicant countries to adopt and implement ously the EU), shall have become one of within the OSCE, Council of Europe and rather demanding defence reforms, sup- the means to help ensure its national se- the UN have been neglected. Moreover, port them with adequate human and fi- curity and economic welfare interests as Lithuania has been active in promoting a nancial resources, develop responsible well as determine Lithuania’s place in in- so-called “good example policy” vis-à-vis bilateral agendas with its neighbours, and ternational politics. This change is not Belarus, and for that matter trying to reach proceed with building free market going to affect the direction of our for-

115 eign and security policy. But I tend to generally viewed by many observers as unity not only across the Atlantic, but argue that the ways and patterns of the lately experiencing a rather visible cri- also within Europe itself. conduct of our policy and its agenda will sis. It is not an exaggeration to say that Various theories and images have been more than likely be modified. differences between the U.S.-led coali- used to underline the perceived transat- Without the goal of membership (as tion and some European nations over lantic rivalry, such as most widely com- the primary mission will be achieved) and how to deal with Iraq’s non-compliance mented Robert Kagan’s statements that having obtained a new status and quality with the UN resolutions have had some Americans are from Mars and Europeans in the international community, Lithuania serious repercussions to the relations from Venus and that the United States is likely to face an increasing demand of a across the Atlantic, within Europe and live in a Hobbesian world and Europe in much broader focus on the world affairs. NATO. a Kantian one. Others have spoken of a This will require a much more deliberate In February the allies had a tough de- U.S. persistence on uni-polarity contrasted and sophisticated analysis and development bate in NATO about providing assistance with a European preference for multi- of a national position on the issues that to Turkey. In the end, support for polarity, of the “continental drift” of so- Alliance as a whole and its members indi- Turkey’s defence was provided. Most of cietal values that will force the two sides vidually are concerned with. On the other the members would have preferred to of the Atlantic further apart, of separa- hand, as a new member, Lithuania will un- make that decision at 19, instead of 18, tion and divorce, and so on. questionably have to deal with enormous but one country would not permit it. The Though admittedly many of these im- institutional novelties and peculiarities that disagreement was serious, and a delay to ages and analyses contain a grain of truth, are going to demand a huge amount of Turkey’s request damaged the credibility they just very little account for the am- human resources. It would be self-righteous of the Alliance. biguous, complex and multilayered to state that such a change is not going to Outside the Alliance, the US, UK, Ger- reality of the relationship between be a challenge. many, France, and Spain have come America and Europe as it is today and through another bruising battle in the will remain in the future. Now, that the Importance of Trans-Atlantic link UN Security Council concerning Iraq. military phase of the war in Iraq is over These differences and policy disagree- and the defensive measures taken in Tur- Lithuania is formally joining the ments, however, have sparked some un- key have ended, America and Europe can Trans-Atlantic partnership that has been necessary comments about perceived dis- look back at these disagreements and de-

116 bates against the backdrop of almost half common values and interests which unite and disintegrate, with thousands of a century of solid cooperation. Europe and the United States are infinitely people inside, and who watched the Pen- When it comes to core values and com- deeper than the differences that separate tagon in flames, knows what terrorism can mon goals, Europe and the United States them. Lithuania’s objective is not to bring to their home. This emotional real- have not parted ways. The Atlantic alliance choose between Europe and America but ity leads Americans to conclude that ter- is not at its end, and European and Ameri- to help protect Europe and project sta- rorism must be eradicated – especially ter- can security remains indivisible. While the bility beyond Europe by keeping America rorism that seeks to exploit nuclear weap- approaches and strategies needed to accom- engaged in the “old continent”. ons, and other means of mass destruction. plish common or individual national agen- Therefore, repairing and renewing Some in Europe see it differently. Some das have been the subject of much discus- Trans-Atlantic relations is not an impos- see terrorism as a regrettable but inevitable sion and varying degrees of disagreement, sible and rather a desirable task. To that part of society and want to keep it at arms I certainly do not believe that Americans end, the Euro-Atlantic community is length and as low key as possible. However, and Europeans are, in effect, from two dif- bound to focus its immediate attention this is a threat that Europe and America ferent and distinct planets. on forging joint strategies with respect share and can only combat together. Lithuania has always seen membership to post-war Iraq reconstruction, the Israel- The US Secretary of State Colin Powell in NATO and the EU as complementary Palestine conflict and more generally the said the following when testifying at the and never through an “either, or” for- Greater Middle East, antiterrorism and the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee mula. It is going to be our primary na- proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- on NATO, on April 29, 2003: tional interest, as a member of both orga- tion. These are the agenda items that “But we must not forget also that we are nizations, to work with other members Lithuania and other Baltic states will have democracies in NATO. None of us follows to make sure that the partnership between to devote much more attention to than blindly. We debate. We disagree. On those occa- the United States and Europe remains they used to do before. sions when we disagree, we roll up our sleeves, strong and relevant. Most allies agree that Perhaps one should be clear, however. put our heads together, and find the way to a strong Trans-Atlantic link is more nec- It seems that one of the challenges Eu- work things out. At the end of the day, that is essary than ever in a world as uncertain as rope and America face is ‘understanding’ our great strength. And that is why the trans- ours is today. The driving principle for the threat. Every American who watched Atlantic link will not break. The glue of NATO Lithuania and its allies indeed is that the the World Trade Towers burn, crumble is too strong and holds us too fast to let it break”.

117 ment process to include the Baltic states the Northern European Initiative has The US engagement in the Baltic and other new members last year. Deci- begun to wane in the last several years; region: why and how? sions on enlargement, its smooth ratifi- the US-Baltic Charter, which served not cation in the US Senate, and the antiter- only as an excellent framework to help Important part of Lithuania’s priori- rorist campaign have added impetus to Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to prepare ties in the context of transatlantic coop- the Lithuanian – US agenda. and join the Alliance, but also provided a eration will most obviously centre on But above all, one has to face the fact good practical mechanism to conduct the how to keep the US engaged in the Baltic that in today’s world, one power alone Baltic – US bilateral military and economic region, and specifically maintain its in- has a total and global reach and thus may cooperation on a daily basis, has been terest in continuous bilateral relations play a global and leading role in ensuring quietly declared as „mission accom- with Lithuania. peace and stability. The US have been will- plished“. Thus the challenge is to develop Lithuania has been traditionally re- ing to play that role. Moreover, after 9/ a new strategic agenda which can keep the garded as one of the most pro-Atlantic 11 terrorist attacks, the US undertook the US engaged in the Baltic region. countries in Central and Eastern Europe. responsibility to lead the fight against The new agenda might include two Indeed, there are many historical and cul- international terrorism. But for this mis- parallel tracks: 1) continue and enhance tural ties that bond the US and sion to be successful, the US need allies Lithuania’s contribution to the war on Lithuania, not the least almost one mil- and the cooperation of the international terrorism, and 2) stabilize the immediate lion Lithuanian-Americans who have been community. The challenge for America is neighbourhood. active in the US both culturally and po- to use its power so that it safeguards its With regard to the first task, Lithuania litically. Washington has never recog- interests and promotes its values for years will have to be proactive and try to find nized Lithuania‘s incorporation into the and decades to come. its role in the US broader foreign secu- Soviet Union. Lithuania has supported There is a growing concern that once rity policy agenda. It will be an impera- the US-led fight against global terrorism the Baltic states are members of NATO, tive to continue active involvement in the both diplomatically and in practical the US may essentially regard the Baltic antiterrorist coalition, including its mili- terms, including by joining the coalition issue as „fixed“ and disengage from the tary and civilian contribution to security for the war in Iraq. The United States region. Indeed, there are signs of this al- forces in Afghanistan, reconstruction and were the leader of the NATO enlarge- ready happening. The momentum behind stabilization efforts of Iraq, and eventu-

118 ally in other places where the US- or need to explore regional and bilateral factors will play as potential force multi- NATO-led operations might unfold in the frameworks within and outside the Alli- plier that in turn is likely to make the future. ance. Working together with partners will region strategically more attractive to the There might not be sufficient capacity increase Lithuania’s weight both in NATO United States. and resources for a small country to sus- and in Washington. tain its military involvement in every fu- In this context, Poland and the Nor- Projecting stability to the East ture mission. However, it would clearly dic-Baltic Eight format will be the most be in the interests of Lithuania, especially logical partners to Lithuania for at least This leads me to the second track of in terms of its efforts to pursue and main- several major reasons. First, the latter Lithuania’s new agenda, namely project- tain enduring partnership with the US, group is one of the most pro-Atlantic ing stability and assistance cooperation to have so called specific „niche“, be it countries in continental Europe. Sec- to the East. military or civilian, in those activities. ondly, all of them share largely the same A few words need to be said about By being a committed and credible ally or similar foreign and security policy Lithuania’s relations with Russia. Some sharing a burden of building stability and agenda. Thirdly, after the NATO and EU observers have been worried that NATO democracy in the Greater Middle East, enlargements in 2004, this regional group membership would make the task of im- Lithuania would most definitely also ad- will represent an area of greater institu- proving cooperation between Lithuania vance its bilateral agenda with the US. One tional geometric congruence in Europe’s and Russia harder. The dynamics of the may observe a common interest here, since north. Fourthly, the Nordic countries relations between the two countries over the United States need allies supporting are better organized than any other part the last five years, however, has been noth- their agenda and (however modestly) help- of Europe. Fifthly, Poland is increasingly ing but positive. Vilnius has stable politi- ing in their efforts to fight terrorism. becoming a center of Washington’s Eu- cal and good economic relations with Obviously, NATO is likely to further ropean link, at least from the US per- Moscow. There are no issues as far as mi- evolve so it can be a natural and most spective. Given the latter, if the US mili- norities are concerned. The recent accord useful instrument, especially for tary footprint shifts from Germany to on the travel arrangements for Russians Lithuania’s military involvement in vari- include Poland, it will likely have a sub- travelling to and from Kaliningrad ous operations. However, given its size stantial new impact on political and mili- reached between Russia, Lithuania, and and limited resources, Lithuania will also tary cooperation in the region. All these the EU, and the most recent ratification

119 by the Duma of the bilateral border agree- An important change could also be Belarus and internationalize it more ef- ment (both have taken place after the expected in the area of military coopera- fectively. Prague decisions), are telling examples that tion, possibly involving Kaliningrad. As On the other hand, most of the initia- Lithuanian – Russian relations have ad- Russia improves its relations with the US/ tives that Lithuania has begun in recent vanced in a positive and pragmatic man- NATO/Lithuania, some possible new mili- years vis-à-vis Belarus, such as youth semi- ner, despite of, or even maybe because tary initiatives in the context of the EAPC nars and lectures on economic and po- of, Lithuania’s Trans-Atlantic integration. and the NATO-Russia Council, as well as litical reform, expanding human contacts Now, that Lithuania’s long-term institu- within the German-Danish-Polish-Baltic with democratic opposition and support tional security status has been resolved, group, involving Russian forces could be to civil society in Belarus will have to Moscow is likely to show greater interest in developed in the future. continue with a purpose of also provid- strengthening its ties with Lithuania – just Lithuania’s role and participation in ing a framework for an increasing involve- as it happened with Poland after it joined projecting stability to the East is most ment of the US, EU and Russia in those the Alliance. At the same time, NATO mem- likely to take different forms and objec- initiatives. bership will solidify the self-confidence of tives depending on the countries that It is also in the interests of Lithuania the Lithuanian government and enable it Lithuania with its partners will be reach- to help Ukraine develop closer ties with to further explore bilateral ties. ing out to. NATO. Ukraine’s closer integration with Looking from a practical perspective, There is no question that democrati- the West would undoubtedly influence at least a good number of issues related zation of Belarus is likely to constitute a reforms and changes in Belarus. Given the to Russia will now be dealt with within very important part of Lithuania’s new existence of a framework where Ukraine the context of the NATO-Russia Council foreign policy of good neighbourhood. is involved in bilateral consultations with (or in case of some soft security questions It is likely to be in the primary interests NATO, Lithuania will be in a position to – within the EU). This will provide of Lithuania to encourage the US Ad- take active part in the NATO-Ukraine Lithuania with an opportunity to bring ministration and the EU to make reform commission, in addition developing some its expertise and experience of its relations in Belarus among their top priority specific areas where the experience and with Russia to the NATO table. Such a agenda items. Membership in both the expertise could be shared. development should be favoured both by EU and NATO will provide Lithuania Lithuania has begun to take lead in Russia and the old and new Allies. with better means to address the issue of developing a so-called Caucasus initiative.

120 Started as expanding Lithuania’s bilateral mass and make the case of ten nations loud Firstly, it depends on the interest of agenda with Georgia, the initiative has a and clear. the recipients and the dynamics of their good potential to develop into a 3 (Bal- The group will be a useful consulta- internal readiness to accept such coopera- tic) + 3 (Caucasus) cooperation. The goals tion instrument for the three Adriatic tion. The spread of experience, such as of the initiative could be to help Geor- countries of Macedonia, Albania and privatization, integration of national gia, Armenia and Azerbaijan develop Croatia as they proceed with up-coming minorities, democratic control of the stronger market economies and stable membership preparations. Georgia and military forces, the fight against corrup- democracies, and help them develop closer Ukraine have both shown interest in tion and organized crime, legal and insti- ties to NATO and the EU. closer cooperation within the group as tutional mechanisms for the protection The main challenge for success of the well. In this sense, the “grand mission” of of human and civil rights and freedoms, Caucasus as a test for Baltic cooperation the V-10 has not yet been accomplished. etc. will be most effective when it is lies in the lack of political will among the But the reality is that the long-term streamlined according to the interest of three Caucasus countries to cooperate sustainability of the V-10 is less than ob- the receiving individual states and when among themselves. On the other hand, vious. The countries have quite different it is coordinated with similar efforts of the type of Baltic cooperation might serve priorities. Without the common objec- the nations providing such assistance. as a good start to the healing of the tive of membership, they do not share Secondly, and not least importantly, it wounds of somewhat uneven and at times one another’s foreign policy concerns to will depend on the readiness of Lithuania rivalling relationships, especially between the same degree, and, as a group, it lacks itself to extend the right type of outreach Armenia and Azerbaijan. significant resources. (not merely what is available, but what is Last, but not least, we still have the All in all, it is obvious, that projecting exactly needed), and do it at the right Vilnius-10 Group that has been extraor- stability and security to its time. This precondition is not to be un- dinarily successful in bringing seven new neighbourhood – both immediate and derestimated for one important reason: members to the Alliance. The V-10 had its more distant – will increasingly become Lithuania is going to be rather engaged common objective and a common goal- Lithuania‘s foreign and security policy in completing its own reforms – that work oriented agenda. It worked as a well-or- priority. The timing of and/or need for will be continuously requiring substan- chestrated mechanism, which helped co- various previously discussed initiatives is tial human and financial resources. There- ordinate joint action, develop a critical likely to depend on two factors. fore, the foreign and defence establish-

121 ments will have to balance their outreach terrorism being the main threat today, the transformation of the Alliance into intentions against the resources available. there is no such thing as “out of area”. one that is able to deal with the strategic Until recently, the notion of NATO tak- challenges of the 21st century, including Joining a New Old NATO ing on a security role in Afghanistan those that arise outside the traditional would have been rejected by most as both NATO area . Lithuania is joining a long established unrealistic and undesirable. Yet the allies The decision to establish a NATO Re- Alliance which is being tested by interna- disproved doubts about relevance of sponse Force (NRF) promises to provide tional events and, most importantly, by NATO in the new security environment the Alliance the ability to quickly deploy the changing nature of threats. Like the by acting recently to expand NATO’s role a force capable of executing the full range end of the Cold War and the end of the in Afghanistan and by agreeing to pro- of missions NATO may be called upon World War II, September 11th was one of vide support for Poland in the stabiliza- to undertake. If implemented to the stan- the relatively rare earthquakes that is likely tion force in Iraq. Future similar roles dards proposed, the NRF will be lethal, to cause lasting tectonic shifts in interna- for the Alliance might possibly be con- technically superior to any envisioned tional politics. The Alliance is known to sidered in the Middle East. threat, and readily deployable on short have been rather adaptive to the changes NATO members will increasingly have notice. The goal for initial operational since 1990s. At the same time, however, to be prepared to focus their energies capability for training is October 2004, its raison d’etre has been evolving to the beyond Europe – a reality that will re- with full operational capability proposed point that Lithuania and other incom- quire that member nations possess mili- by October 2006. ing members today are joining a much tary forces with the capability to go and In Prague, Heads of State and Govern- different organization compared to the fight beyond Europe. These requirements ment also approved the Prague Capabili- one they applied for almost ten years ago. equally apply to the new members as to ties Commitment (PCC) as part of an ef- the old. In fact, there is a notion that fort to create minimal necessary capabili- Emphasis on „Out-of-Area“ NATO‘s incoming members should plan ties to deal with a high threat environ- The Alliance’s concept of out-of-area to join „the Alliance of 10 years from ment. Individual allies have made firm operations, somewhat cautiously applied now“, not today‘s NATO. commitments to improve capabilities in in the past, now clearly stands at the top NATO’s Prague summit in November the areas of chemical, biological, radio- of NATO’s agenda. Indeed, with global 2002 represented a major step forward in logical and nuclear technologies (CBNR);

122 intelligence, surveillance, and target acqui- Recently, 44 Lithuanian infantry ser- personnel) operating from Naples in sup- sition; air-to-ground surveillance; C3; vicemen started their mission under com- port of SFOR/KFOR. Lithuania also pro- combat effectiveness; strategic air and sea mand of the Danish Forces in the UK- vides one military observer for the OSCE lift; air-to-air re-fuelling; and deployable controlled sector to the North - East of mission in Georgia, and plans to contrib- combat support and combat service sup- Basra. The unit’s mission includes a num- ute one officer to the EU-led mission in port elements. ber of tasks ranging from keeping the FYROM. The PCC and NRF will allow Lithuania public order, patrolling and protection This is by no means an unimpressive to focus on “niche” specialization as a way to service at checkpoints. pool of active forces in operations given to extend national and multinational ca- Preparations for another Lithuanian Lithuania’s size and resources. All the pabilities and fill a certain gap. This trans- contingent of 45 troops to be deployed missions that the country is currently lates into a practical aim for Lithuania’s to Iraq to act in the sector under the Pol- involved in serve important Lithuanian defence establishment, namely to develop ish Armed Forces control are well under- interests and help the efforts of the US- more capable, deployable and sustainable way as well. A few months earlier, Lithuania led coalition to confront the threat of forces that can contribute to the full range also provided a special forces unit in sup- terrorism. But with only few exceptions of Alliance missions. When put in per- port of the United States forces in Op- most Lithuanian units lack national lo- spective, the plans are to: eration Enduring Freedom in Afghani- gistic support. Lithuanian soldiers in the • achieve an initial operational capabil- stan. Persian Gulf have their personal equip- ity, a fully capable battalion prepared to Lithuanian contributions to opera- ment and NBC protection kits, but they deploy in support of NATO operations, tions in and around the former Yugosla- had to fully rely on the APCs and ve- by the time of accession to the Alliance; via include one motorized infantry com- hicles from Denmark, which is also ren- • develop an interim operational capa- pany (95 personnel) on a rotational basis dering medical assistance and treatment. bility, the ability to rotate deployed bat- with Estonia and Latvia (previously in There is no question that for our par- talions to support longer term commit- SFOR but next Lithuanian rotation will ticipation in international missions to be ments, by the end of 2008; be in KFOR in August 2003), one infan- more effective, Lithuania needs to focus • and reach full operational capability, try platoon (30 personnel) as part of the on the development of a streamlined and the entire structure manned, equipped and Ukrainian-Polish Battalion in KFOR, and highly responsive logistics system that operational, by the end of 2014. one An-26 light transport aircraft (seven supports not only in-place but also de-

123 ployed forces. This might come at the tinue to be the valuable institution help- Lithuania’s becoming party to the Treaty expense of the quantity of Lithuania’s ing prepare Lithuania’s senior staff offic- on Conventional Forces in Europe engagements overseas, but on balance it ers for national and, now, NATO posi- (CFE). Indeed, the Baltic states cannot be might be the price worth paying. tions. expected to define their CFE levels until In practical terms, and based on its they know how NATO’s collective defence experience, Lithuania is committed, by Article 5 arrangement is going to work and how 2004, to be able to effectively deploy and Despite the changing emphasis in the much Treaty Limited Equipment they will sustain an infantry battalion and offer a priorities of the Alliance, its core mission need. special operation forces squadron, an en- remains collective defence. Therefore, it Secondly, any collective defence ar- gineer platoon and a team of medical per- is both NATO’s and Lithuania’s respon- rangements vis-à-vis Lithuania are going sonnel as special capabilities to the Alli- sibility to ensure that Article 5 is not just to relate to the changes that are being ance missions. Taking into account future a “hollow” paper commitment. implemented with regard to NATO’s com- NATO requirements through the NATO It is not the purpose of this paper to mand structure. At Prague, important Force Planning Process, Lithuania will have go into the debate on NATO’s options decisions have been taken that will allow to further consider its contribution to for defending Lithuania and the other to reduce operational commands from 23 the NRF. Baltic states, for it is too significant to be to 16. It will provide NATO command- International contingents such as dealt with in just a paragraph or two. A ers with headquarters that are more mo- Lithuanian – Polish battalion (LITPOLBAT) couple of observations, however, would bile, joint and interoperable. as well as BALTBAT, BALTRON and be appropriate. Internally, Lithuania is set to move away BALTNET will have to be utilized in the Firstly, understanding that although, from the concept of territorial defence. context of membership in the Alliance. due to the factors described earlier, the There is a plan to reassign the territorial As an example, BALTRON could natu- Alliance’s attention is likely to focus on units from their current territorial de- rally become a part of the NATO Mine ‘out of area’ activities, it is Lithuania’s fence tasks and missions in order to en- Counter Measures (MCM) Force North. interest to develop an allied consensus on sure that these elements, albeit reduced in Similarly, BALTNET will be integrated Baltic defence plans. It is important also size, are more capable and able to con- into the NATO Integrated Enhanced Air in terms of timing, as NATO’s decisions tribute to the overall strength of the Defence System. BALTDEFCOL will con- on defence plans will have to precede Lithuanian Armed Forces. Their role will

124 be to facilitate the reception and onward restructuring and modernization of the movement of Allied reinforcements to armed forces. Lithuania, protect the key points/objects There is a solid political and public and assist the civil authorities as and when support in Lithuania that the defence requested. It is likely that Lithuania will sector’s budget shall not be less than 2% be moving in the direction of a more of GDP. It is the opinion of this author, professional force. By the end of 2008 however, that Lithuanian people still lack the number of conscripts will be reduced the understanding that allocating resources to some 2000 to meet the requirements for defence is an investment into of the new force structure. Lithuania’s national security. The largely An important priority in terms of predominant view that a “2 percent” was practical preparation for collective de- a requirement by NATO for Lithuania fence, as Lithuania begins to operate to be admitted will have to change if we within the Alliance, will be to establish want to win a genuine public support for necessary Host Nation Support arrange- Lithuania’s pro-active foreign and secu- ments. This task will certainly require some rity policy. substantial investments and proactive co- operation in dealing with the NATO Se- curity and Infrastructure Programme (NSIP). To effectively continue its international military engagements as part of NATO or within the coalitions of the willing Lithuania will be required to maintain such level of defence expenditures that is sufficient, but, more importantly, rightly invested to support the defence reform,

125 The Driving Logic Behind the Defence Reform in Lithuania: Building the Future Military

By Kestutis Paulauskas*

ny reform is a painful, costly and establishment. At the same time defence not ready for the invasion of the challenging endeavour, particularly reform is an inevitable, necessary and barbarians, kingdoms of Europe were not in the defence sector. Defence reform continuous process. In an ever-changing ready to deal with the mass army of encompasses strategic review, force security environment a country can Napoleon, European democracies failed restructuring and task rescheduling. For maintain an efficient military capability to contain modern military power of the military personnel it means irregular and adequate level of combat readiness only Nazi Germany, the Baltic states were rotation, reassignments, closure or if it is responsive and flexible enough to helpless in the face of Soviet aggression redeployment of military bases, sometimes quickly adapt its military establishment and, likewise, even the United States were dismissal and the end of career. Military to new conditions. Otherwise a country not ready for September 11th despite heavy are for this reason usually inclined to may find itself less than ready in the wake investment in their defence. And still the resist changes guided by civilian of new severe security threats. This environment changes more often and leadership, and reform initiative rarely assumption can be substantiated by many faster than the states’ ability to adjust their occurs from within the military historical examples: the Roman empire was policies. Although there is always a certain

* Mr. Kestutis Paulauskas is a desk officer at the Defence Policy Division, Defence Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania.

126 likelihood of unexpected outbreak of some missions that the military must be enabled cratic control and depolitization of the new unforeseen contingency, lessons to assume in the 21st century. It attempts armed forces. At the same time, an all per- learned from the past mistakes reduce this to explain the logic behind the bold de- vasive fear of recuperation of Soviet ex- kind of risk. cisions Lithuania took following the pansionism still persisted in the pub- Invitation of seven Central and East- Prague summit on abandoning its decade- lic. However, this fear started to fade with ern European states to join NATO dur- old territorial defence posture and review- the failed coup in Russia and was further ing the Prague summit greatly affected the ing its total defence concept. diminished with the withdrawal of Rus- overall strategic landscape of Europe and sian troops by the end of August, 1993. the defence and security policy of the new Reform background In 1994 Lithuania officially applied to invitees. Lithuania, as well as other coun- join NATO and signed up to the Part- tries, got new impetus to restructure and Defence planning in Lithuania has nership for Peace programme. In 1996 modernize its armed forces. In parallel undergone four modes. The initial period Lithuania sent its troops to Bosnia and with the accession negotiations between saw the creation of the armed forces “from Herzegovina under the flag of NATO. In the Alliance and Lithuania, which were scratch”. The first conscripts of the the same year the Law on the Basics of concluded with the signature of Accession Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer National Security was adopted. The Law protocols in March 2003, the defence re- Force (NDVF) and the former officers of set national security objectives and the form in Lithuania acquired a rather rapid the Soviet army became the backbone, basic principles of military defence. The pace. By the end of 2003, Lithuania ex- which constituted the nascent Lithuanian concepts of total and unconditional self- pects to complete an extensive force struc- Armed Forces. Defence planning at this defence and civil resistance were explic- ture review and to identify defence plan- stage was rather eclectic. The NDVF struc- itly established as the main defence plan- ning assumptions and guidelines up to ture was highly politicized, some elements ning principles. These concepts signified 2014. among the officer corps were heavily a threat-based approach to the planning This article discusses the reasons, prin- engrained with Soviet military doctrine, of the force structure. In other words, ciples and objectives of the ongoing trans- and equipment and weapons came mostly the Lithuanian armed forces and civil formation of the Lithuanian Armed from donations. During this period the society had to be prepared for the worst- Forces. The article also tackles the chang- top priorities of defence policy agenda case scenario – a massive territorial aggres- ing nature of security threats and the were establishing the basics of the demo- sion against the sovereignty of the Re-

127 public of Lithuania. With NATO mem- Lithuania started to procure anti-tank and perts from the CUBIC Applications Inc. bership being a rather distant prospect anti-aircraft weapons instead of wasting launched an extensive force structure re- and security environment far from stable resources on a few costly battle tanks or view and assumed a scenario-based ap- and predictable, this territorial, uncon- fighters as did some other Central Euro- proach. This approach aims at identify- ditional self-defence posture perfectly made pean countries. Actually Lithuania has ing the most probable threat development sense. never fully implemented a threat-based scenarios and the capabilities Lithuania The first round of NATO enlargement defence planning approach due to objec- needs to counter these threats. Having and the adoption of the Membership tive constrains of resources. defined the objective force necessary, the Action Plan for other prospective candi- Finally, a sequence of very significant most glaring shortfalls are singled out and dates including Lithuania, triggered an- events - the tragedy of 9/11, rapproche- subsequent defence planning is directed other shift in planning assumptions. Al- ment between Russia and NATO, and the towards closing those gaps as much as though total self-defence and civil resis- NATO transformation summit in Prague, possible. tance remained at the core of defence plan- as well as the invitation to join the Alli- To sum up, NATO invitation, reassess- ning, a directed and consistent guidance ance - has led to another major break- ment of threats and a new approach to de- from NATO did encourage certain re- through in defence planning of Lithuania. fence planning has prompted abandoning forms of the defence establishment. With After adoption of the National Security the territorial defence posture that Lithuania anticipation of NATO membership and Strategy in May 2001 Lithuania com- has been nurturing throughout the years related collective defence guarantees, the menced a review of its National Military of independence, and restructuring of the rationale for a threat-based approach was Strategy. This strategy due to be adopted armed forces to carry out new missions. not so obvious anymore. Therefore in 2003, reassesses the strategic environ- Lithuania had to turn towards a capabili- ment of Lithuania and the threats to se- Total self-defence vs. ties-based defence planning approach in curity. Building on a threat assessment, collective defence looking for ways of the most efficient uti- the missions and tasks of the Lithuanian lization of limited resources. In practice Armed Forces are also outlined in the During his visit to Vilnius after the it meant focusing on specific most neces- strategy. In parallel with the review of the Prague summit, the US President G. W. sary capabilities rather than developing military strategy, Lithuanian MND with Bush declared that “in the face of aggres- all-around military. For example, the assistance of an American team of ex- sion, the brave people of Lithuania, Latvia

128 and Estonia will never again stand alone”. not be a full-fledged member actively tak- Cold War. The nature of threats is chang- It is difficult to overestimate the impor- ing part in most of the Alliance’s opera- ing, and so is the Alliance. The Prague tance of these words to the overall secu- tions and at the same time maintaining summit, which was destined to be an en- rity perspective of Lithuania. Collective numerous immobile territorial defence largement summit, turned out to be the defence guarantees constitute an essential forces. When a man has a big umbrella, Alliance’s transformation summit. The new difference between the Lithuanian defence he does not need a smaller one beneath members are not joining the same Alli- policy prior to Prague and after Prague. it. It is more efficient to reinforce the ance they aspired to join 10 years ago. Taking into account this new reality, strings of the big umbrella. Ultimately it The Alliance transformation formula pre- Lithuania has undertaken the review of is a matter of trust in the Alliance and in sented by Secretary General Lord total and unconditional self-defence con- the allies. If Lithuania entered a collective Robertson is leaner, more mobile, more cept, upon which the whole strategy of defence treaty but continued the build capable and responsive NATO forces of deterrence and credible defence was built. up of its forces as if it had to defend tomorrow. Although Article 5 remains It is not to say that the Lithuanian Armed alone, the membership quite simply would intact, with the creation of NATO Re- Forces from now on will not be credible not make sense. In that case one would sponse Force the Alliance has undertaken or that defence will not be unconditional. have to ask if deterrence by Lithuania as an “out of area” posture, which embod- Quite the contrary, the Lithuanian Armed a non-aligned country is more persuasive ies the common sense that NATO must Forces will be more capable than ever than the deterrence by Lithuania as a have a role in anti-terrorism to remain before. In the case of aggression the role NATO Ally? For 40 years NATO has been relevant in the contemporary world. The of the Armed Forces will be reinforce- a successful deterrent of the Soviet Union. NATO Response Force is expected to be ment of NATO’s collective defence op- Is it possible that NATO could not deter a technologically advanced, flexible, erations rather than defence of the any hypothetical aggressor who can by deployable, interoperable, and sustainable whole territory. Therefore, territorial no standards be seen as equal to the mili- force, including land, sea and air elements, units must be restructured, reserve forces tary power that the Soviet Union enjoyed? ready to move quickly wherever needed. significantly reduced, and the total mo- However, it is also symptomatic that After all, NATO enlargement is indeed bilization concept revised. NATO evoked both Article 4 (on request a certain mechanism for defence reform It is a piece of self-evident truth that from Turkey) and Article 5 (in reaction in Lithuania rather than its cause. The Lithuania with its limited resources can- to September 11th) after the end of the underlying causes of the defence reform

129 rest with the overall strategic landscape fore. According to NATO a possibility answer to this simple question is vital to around Lithuania and assessments of the of an incidence of a military conflict in the defence policy of Lithuania and the threats posed. our region is very low to non-existent. other Baltic states. The vision of a new Although there are some possible sources NATO most insistently pursued by the Peculiarities and ambiguities for regional tension, only some unimag- United States sees the Alliance willing and of threat assessment inable political earthquake in the region capable to take pre-emptive and preven- or fundamental tectonic shifts in the in- tive actions against any potential threat. There is a recurring misperception in ternational security system could lead to Many in Europe are rather cautious about the public and the media that reform of an escalation of a major crisis. Even in this approach and doubt the legitimacy the Lithuanian Armed Forces is pursued this case there would be a long warning of preventive military engagement. They as a NATO requirement. Moreover, some time and a lot of indications of irregular would prefer to stick with the old reac- critics argue that the two percent of GDP military activity in the region, which tive rather than proactive NATO. Restruc- assigned to the defence budget is wasted would allow a timely start of NATO’s turing and modernization of the to satisfy some mystical NATO standards operational planning and actual defence. Lithuanian Armed Forces fall perfectly in or pay for costly international operations However, the controversy that sur- line with the vision of the new trans- in remote regions that have little to do rounded the issue of Turkey’s defence formed NATO. If the vision of the old with Lithuanian security. As discussed in does provide some ground for concern. NATO prevailed, Lithuania and other Bal- the previous paragraph, collective defence Yet Turkey’s case clearly indicated the need tic states would need to have initial self- guarantees undoubtedly affect defence to improve NATO’s decision making pro- defence capabilities. Meanwhile, the cur- planning assumptions, however, in prac- cess, and certain moves in this direction rent force structure review of Lithuania tice defence planning first and foremost are very likely, especially given the expan- is not projecting self-defence against a rests on threat assessment. sion to 26 members. At the end of the major aggression in the absence of NATO As the widely used cliché reads: follow- day, Turkey’s defence was planned and reinforcement. ing the collapse of the Soviet Union, a started despite all the controversies. Up till now, the “old” approach was threat of a major conventional war with- Another major question is how quickly predominant within NATO and prevented ered away. The Baltic Sea area does seem NATO would be able to respond to a its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq to be as peaceful and stable as never be- major military threat in the region. The at an early stage (not to mention political

130 disagreements between the allies in the isolation and disregard of pending inter- thoritarian regimes, that use non-conven- latter case). Coalitions of the willing may national security issues elsewhere would tional forms of warfare and are hardly provide a temporary salvation in an im- only decrease the regional security of the deterred by traditional means. These sources mediate crisis but only such permanent Baltic Sea area as there is always a poten- do not threaten state’s territory but rather collective defence or even security arrange- tial conflict “spill-over” effect from the target vulnerable civilian facilities or civil- ments as NATO can be a long-term solu- troubled regions. Ultimately, it is a mat- ians themselves. By using modern means tion. Both the US and its European allies ter of Euro-Atlantic solidarity: countries of information, communication and trans- seem to understand this and the new that do not assist their allies in cases of portation terrorists can strike anytime with- NATO Response Force appears to embody need should not expect assistance when out warning and anywhere from Bali to this understanding. they get into trouble. Moscow. It is for this reason that preven- After all, major conventional conflict Most of the “new” challenges are not tion becomes almost the only way to deal in the Baltic Sea region is a very remote military in a traditional sense. What with non-state actors and regimes that and highly unlikely possibility, which in should the role of the Armed Forces be nurture international terrorism. a scenario-based planning approach can in dealing with them? The changing face of the enemy raises be excluded to divert resources to more a double challenge to the armed forces. likely scenarios. This assumption alerts to The new role and missions They need to reorient themselves from such challenges as terrorism, proliferation of the Armed Forces the traditional task of Homeland defence of weapons of mass destruction, natural to less noble missions like protection of or industrial disasters, illegal migration In the past century the main mission civilian sites or assistance to civilian au- etc. It would be dangerous to dismiss these of the military was deterrence and defence thorities and police. On the other hand, challenges assuming that the countries of the territory against potential enemies. terrorism, proliferation of the WMD, around the Baltic Sea are unlikely targets Although deterrence remains an impor- spots of ethnic or religious tension and of, for example, international terrorism, tant function of the armed forces, the face violence raise far more demanding tasks especially given their active participation of the enemy is changing: the main source to the military high intensity crisis re- in the US-led global campaign against ter- of the potential threat is no longer the sponse and peace operations. To fulfill rorism. Although this region is more armed forces of another state, but non- these missions, the armed forces must be stable than the Balkans or the Middle East, state actors, supported and hosted by au- ready:

131 1) Inside the country to work closely ness, disposal of unnecessary infrastruc- role and missions of the military and with civilian authorities and police in cases ture and outdated weaponry and technol- highly demanding operational require- of terrorist attack and other emergencies ogy but, above all, rational and efficient ments are the main catalysts of the mod- that may require military response; resource management. ernization of the Lithuanian Armed 2) Smoothly to carry out crisis re- New missions raise new operational Forces. The future military means mod- sponse operations within multinational requirements. The future military of NATO ern command, control and communica- forces; must be interoperable and credible forces tion systems, modern intelligence, surveil- 3) In peace operations, to deal with a capable of executing collective defence and lance and reconnaissance capabilities, foreign civilian society that sometimes crisis response operations. The forces must modern equipment and weaponry, and might be hostile. be able to deploy whenever and wherever joint rapid reaction forces. needed to prevent a crisis and sustain them- New missions of the Armed Forces selves in the area of operation with or with- The basic principles of the defence re- imply a new image of a soldier who must out host nation support. They must be form in Lithuania are the following: not only be well-trained in military terms, able to apply decisive force in combat, Ø Improving capabilities and quality but also well educated (e.g. be aware of based on timely intelligence and have ad- rather than building new territorial struc- international relations), know foreign lan- equate force protection capabilities, includ- tures and increasing quantity; guages, and be an expert of civil-military ing protection against NBC weapons. Last Ø Creating smaller but more capable relations – in other words versatile. Large but not least, interoperability is crucial in and rapidly deployable units; conscript armies were well suited for a order to operate smoothly in a combined Ø Improving the capabilities necessary long front line, while when faced with manner and to prevent the losses caused to carry out collective defence and other the current threats small multi-role highly by “friendly fire”. missions together with NATO forces; capable and mobile units are indispens- Ø Keeping the balance between the able. Modern armed forces do cost money. Main principles and guidelines defence plans and resources available to The main financial sources for modern- of defence reform in Lithuania implement them. ization within the budgetary constraints In line with these principles, the main are reductions of unneeded territorial The changing security landscape guidelines of the defence reform imple- forces and reserves with low level of readi- around Lithuania, new perceptions of the mentation encompass:

132 Ø Downsizing the overall structure of the Armed Forces1 in the following way: relief and facilitate individual and sub- 2003 2008 unit deployment. The proposed structure of the Homeland Security Command in- Professionals 81100 831 cludes two Security battalions, a Trans- Concsripts 4500 2000 portation Support battalion, an Engineer Active reserve 90000 650 battalion, a Signal company and a Medi- Cadets 430 250 cal company. 1 Structure approved by the Parliament of Lithuania in June 2003. See the Law on the Principal Ø Creation of a highly responsive logistics Structure of the Armed Forces for 2003-2008, available on-line: http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/ preps2?Condition1=212547&Condition2= system that could support all services in any operation in and outside the country. Ø Development of one reaction brigade with port and combat support companies, two Improving logistics is absolutely essential all supporting elements (by 2008). Until mechanized infantry battalions, two mo- for Lithuania to be a full-fledged ally ca- Prague Lithuania was planning to main- torized infantry battalions, and an Artil- pable of contributing to any NATO mis- tain three brigades: one reaction brigade lery battalion. sion. The Logistic Support Command will and two military districts with one bri- Ø Development of one deployable and sus- encompass Headquarters, a main support gade each. The plan was ridiculed by tainable infantry battalion (Rukla battalion) battalion (for all services), a forward sup- NATO as unrealistic and not based on for the full spectrum of Alliance’s mis- port battalion for the Reaction brigade, resources. NATO officials repeatedly in- sions together with niche capabilities – military police and cartographic services. sisted that the Alliance does not need ter- special operation forces, engineers and Ø Restructuring of the basic training system ritorial forces for collective defence op- medics (by the end of 2004). The Rukla to adjust to the requirements of the new erations. Therefore Lithuania made a battalion will be fully professional due to force structure. The Training and Doc- move to reorganize the two military dis- its potential deployment missions. trine Command will consist of the Head- tricts into one Homeland security com- Ø Relieving territorial units from territorial quarters, Training Regiment with two bat- mand (KASP) to save scarce resources for defence mission to provide host nation sup- talions, and training schools, centers and the reaction brigade and deployable bat- port for Allied forces, carry out protec- polygons. talions. The Reaction Brigade structure tion of strategic facilities and key sites and Ø Improving counter-terrorist capabilities. encompasses the Headquarters with sup- assist the civilian authorities in disaster This task is assigned to the newly estab-

133 lished Special Operations Command, equipped, well-trained, mobile, deployable attack on a NATO country did occur, which consists of the Jaeger battalion and and sustainable force, able to participate NATO would react as a collective defence a Special Operations unit. in the full spectrum of Alliance’s opera- alliance under the Article 5 commitment Ø Ensuring sea and air surveillance and tions. (regardless of the format used - NAC or control. Lithuania will maintain small but DPC - to make the political decision). efficient Navy and the Air Force. Navy Conclusion After all, the debate on total self-de- will be centred around high readiness fence vs. collective defence is only partly mine counter-measures and patrol crafts The effect of NATO membership on relevant to the future NATO and the fu- capable of participating in Article 5 and Lithuanian defence policy is indeed pro- ture Armed Forces of Lithuania. NATO crisis response operations. The Air Force found as it constitutes a fundamental quali- and Lithuania as a soon-to-be ally of will carry out search and rescue opera- tative change in the overall security situa- NATO must shake off the shadows of the tions, tactical airlift, and ground-based air tion of Lithuania. However one should past and get ready to meet the unpredict- defence of key sites. However, air polic- not be misled in that the decision taken able future, which calls for combined joint ing and air defence remain a problem that by Lithuania to abandon territorial de- multi-role rapid reaction forces highly Lithuania will have to address in the fu- fence posture is a reckless implementation capable to counter any contingency any- ture. of NATO orders. NATO did encourage where in the world where international Ø Procurement of cutting-edge weapons and Lithuania as well as other candidate coun- peace and security is at stake and NATO technologies that meet NATO requirements. tries and current members themselves to security interests are threatened. Procurement priorities include anti-tank, move away from territorial defence con- anti-aircraft weapons, tactical communica- cept and structures. This article reinforced tions, transport vehicles etc. 20-25 % of the case for a clear rationale behind this the defence budget is earmarked for arms decision: the first reason being major of- procurement and upgrading in the future. fensive military operations against NATO having become highly unlikely; the sec- The ultimate vision of the Lithuanian ond being NATO’s collective defence Armed Forces after the restructuring and posture as an efficient deterrent to any modernization is a small, modern, well- potential adversary; the third being – if

134 Security Options of the Baltic States After the Gulf War II

By Erik Männik*

‘ Adherents and critics of the two leading the system level’s variables play a key role Introduction paradigms of international relations, realism and in explaining the foreign policies of small liberalism, did not succeed in explaining ad- states, in other words, small state policies After I was offered to make a short equately, let alone predicting, the peaceful end of are first of all influenced and determined contribution to the Baltic Defence Re- Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union’ by their external environments (Hey 2003: view regarding the latest developments in (Katzenstein 1996: 499) 186-187). the European, transatlantic and global se- ‘ One can almost always identify post hoc, Thus, while in need of some sort of curity, I did what researchers usually do a norm to explain given behaviour’ understanding of the latest international when they are asked to present their opin- (Kowert & Legro 1996: 486) developments at the systemic level, we seem ion on future developments – I looked at to have only limited theoretical tools to the ranges of possible developments de- The latter approach is aimed at social do that. One way out of this situation is fined by various international relation constructivism that is the theory flour- to infer trends in international politics theories. The outcome, I must admit, was ishing in the post-Cold War period. on the basis of the latest developments a bit confusing. In brief it can be expressed These statements may look even more and hereafter evaluate the policy options by these quotations: depressing in the light of finding that of the Baltic states.

* Erik Männik came to the Centre for Research in International Security at Manchester Metropolitan University as a visiting researcher in early 2001. He was previously Head of the Defence Policy Planning Bureau in the Estonian Ministry of Defence. From the end of 2001 he has been undertaking doctoral research on Estonia and NATO.

135 be shown by the coalition’s inspectors that ing less certain – the continuing problems What have we seen? there actually were serious substantiated rea- with the export of Iraqi oil and legitimiz- sons to accuse Iraq for not cooperating with ing the intermediate Iraqi administration The political reason for asking ques- the UN and for hiding WMD. have potential to deepen the existing gap. tions about one’s viewpoint is based on The second important issue related to According to the statement of the US the dynamics and outcome of the bar- bargaining was its dynamics. The way it Secretary of State, the “coalition of the gaining process in the United Nations’ was conducted – quick changes in situa- willing” (45 states) was larger than the one, Security Council (UNSC) that led to the tion, new initiatives emerging on almost a which fought in the first Gulf War. How- adoption of Resolution No 1441, preced- daily basis, the US activities aimed at get- ever, it contained fewer major powers and ing the military campaign. ting information before the other mem- more small states. Is this such a straight- There are many related issues to that bers of the UNSC, and quick alternating forward Realpolitik as it looks at first bargaining. The first is about motives. What seizures of initiative – has potentially very glance? That is, a security-autonomy trade- were the actual motivations behind the serious ramifications for small states. In- off between supporting small states and opposition against military actions by the terestingly, even after the end of the active the only remaining superpower in the US-led coalition and what reasons exactly military campaign, the global political situ- world? This question will probably be led to the use of force? Was it about war ation is still potentially volatile – depend- exhaustively answered in due time when against terrorism, self-defence against weap- ing on whether the coalition’s experts ac- more evidence has been accumulated re- ons of mass destruction (WMD), oil and a tually find WMD in Iraq. garding the respective political decisions. potential general reshuffling of the oil mar- In general, we already witnessed the sec- Another crucial bargaining process ket, geopolitics and spheres of influence, en- ond major armed conflict without the took place in NATO. The Belgian posi- forcing international law, protecting human UNSC’s sanction/resolution. The great tion blocked initially the deployment of rights or following the will of growing power’s votes in the UNSC were cast differ- “Patriot” missiles to Turkey, and it may Muslim communities in different countries? ently this time (in comparison to the situa- be very important in showing that (at least The official (that is, declared) reason for the tion in Kosovo in 1999) – a majority of some) “older” small states have evolved to military campaign was insufficient Iraqi co- them opposed the action, France being the the point where they make an absolute operation with the UN weapons inspectors one who decisively tilted the balance. The adherence to international law the foun- who searched for WMD, and it remains to destiny of the UN as a whole is also becom- dation of their policies. Belgium may be

136 an example of such a small state having might be the latest meaning of the term hard decisions about committing their no particular security concerns any more “capability gap”. It is not only a huge gap troops to possible operations with prob- and thus engaging herself increasingly in between the US and her current NATO lematic legitimacy (that is, adopting an ag- the promotion of international law (e.g. allies, but it looks simply immeasurable gressive/assertive foreign policy in the by attempting to legally prosecute the Is- and totally beyond bridging in regards frameworks of “coalitions of the willing”). raeli Prime Minister and some heads of to the states that were invited to join the Israeli governmental agencies). NATO in Prague in November 2002. Presented list of different features of the The other important aspect of bargain- Another aspect related to military ac- latest developments is sketchy and it shows ing in NATO was Turkey’s rejection of pro- tion is about planning. Was the conflict that, as of now, there are by far more ques- viding her territory for the US forces for predetermined? The concentration of forces tions than answers. With regard to pos- launching an attack on Iraq from the North. was initiated long before the bargaining sible evolving trends in international poli- Does it show that NATO is at best becom- in the UNSC reached the decisive stages tics, I would like to outline the following: ing a pool of potential members for the and the coalition members’ political lead- 1) This was the second consecutive fail- future “coalitions of the willing”? What sort ers assured the public right up to the twelfth ure of the UN to reach consensus on the of political unity is there within NATO? hour that the conflict was not inevitable. large-scale use of military force against a This question becomes even more impor- Does it indicate that until the end of the sovereign state; in addition, the full range tant considering that the values of NATO bargaining in the UNSC there was a true of motives that influenced different coun- members have not (at least visibly) changed willingness to cancel an invasion? If so, what tries to support or oppose the use of force – they are still democratic countries with levels of readiness, deployability, and mo- remains unclear; ostensibly very similar sets of values. bility are required from the forces of fu- 2) There is a continuously growing gap The question about the observed de- ture members of the “coalitions of the between military capabilities of the US velopments could be even more relevant willing”? How were military planning and and the rest of the world; from the military perspective. The speed other military activities related to the bar- 3) There is a potential long-term loss of advance, the corresponding logistics’ gaining process in the UNSC? This ques- of unity in NATO whereas the values of miracles, the precision and lethality of tion has actually a great importance for different members of the Alliance remain used weapon systems leave the representa- invited small states, because under similar unchanged (although this loss might not tive of a small state simply wondering what circumstances they would have to make be so permanent);

137 4) Acceleration: the speed and inten- That is not at all clear in view of evolving ing mainly the interests of the US. The sity of bargaining processes and war fight- threats to security and existing different respective theoretical model has been out- ing seem to be ever-growing in the infor- views on how to deal with them. lined by James Morrow who proposed mation society; The ever-increasing speed of developments that great powers use alliances to pursue 5) Small states’ support provided con- leaves the political initiative in the hands of their interests and change or preserve the siderable legitimacy for the US-led action. the remaining superpower (the country able status quo in international politics. to apply more resources than any other to Weaker alliance members can offer to great “A brave new world”? achieve her politico-military goals). The powers concessions (military bases, coor- ongoing “war against terrorism” is likely to dination of foreign and domestic poli- amplify the global influence of the US. To establish the implications of the out- cies, etc) for increased security. Therefore, With the background of that strategic lined trends for small states, one must deter- in Morrow’s words: ‘ alliances can ad- trend, it is possible to discern smaller de- mine how they shape the international sys- vance diverse, but compatible, interests.’ velopments like the Gulf War II. In fact, tem, because the latter is the main variable (Morrow 1991: 905) would it not be justified to say that the influencing the policies of the small states. “coalition of the willing” had had any po- It is highly likely that some larger Euro- The trends outlined above point in the litical importance only for six to eight pean powers will oppose such a transforma- direction of an increasingly “realist” world weeks, and now, as it has done its job, it tion, and therefore NATO’s Article 5 com- where states prefer to follow their own may dissolve in peace leaving first of all mitment could be transformed into looser interests and where they are not afraid of the US to deal with the Iraqi problems? commitment in order to provide assistance confronting each other and the remain- Thus, I would suggest that future devel- on the basis of a member’s request. ing superpower at the political level. Such opments will be likely evolving as rapidly fearlessness is probably based on the com- or even faster, considering the develop- What is it there for the small states? mon belief in “democratic peace” and eco- ment of various capabilities. nomic interdependence. Will these beliefs, The growing international weight of Having drawn a fairly grim realist pic- shared values, and economic factors ex- the US is likely to transform NATO from ture of the transformation of interna- clude the possibility of a (accidental or an alliance based on shared values and tional system one can ask whether the “way intentional) military conflict or coercive aimed at collective defence/security into of life” of the small states will again be use of force between democratic states? one that rather serves the task of promot- described as follows:

138 ‘Small Powers threatened by neighbouring foreseeable future international politics will defined by simultaneous memberships in Great Powers, or intent on securing benefits for be dominated by realist considerations. the EU and NATO. The Baltic states are themselves in the course of Great Power con- How long is that “foreseeable future” likely to seek position in the limelight of flicts, were forced to play a perilous game: mov- is another question. Considering the dif- the US attention to deter potential “hard” ing quickly from the lighter to the heavier side ficulties facing the superpower conduct- threats from Russia, and they will also seek of the balance as soon as an apparent victor ing global urban-rural counterinsurgency support from the EU and European could be discerned’ campaign, one may conclude that such a NATO members against threats from the (Rothstein 1968: 11) campaign cannot be won even theoreti- lower part of a threat spectrum (such as cally, or, if it by any chance could be won, potential destabilisation of Russia, differ- It needs not necessarily to be so. The then it would probably take a very long ent kinds of disasters, etc.). The hardness analysis performed above was fairly super- time. Therefore, it seems to be justified of the game lies in the danger that such a ficial and based mainly on evaluating sys- to assume that for the time being the small balancing act could take the Baltic states temic variables. It did not consider the states would have to operate in generally right between conflicting larger powers. strong anti-war sentiments in Europe as rapidly fluctuating, unstable environment. Other circumstances/conditions further well as in non-European countries. Nor The small states in relatively stable secu- complicating the balancing act arise from did it consider the domestic political con- rity environments and with low threat per- the description of the system given above. straints (e.g. elections, etc.) on governments. ceptions (e.g. Belgium) are likely to have The first condition is acceleration. The dif- Instead, the current analysis took the more freedom of action and will be able ficulties that the small states naturally have in ongoing “war against terrorism” as the key to pursue fairly independent policies (e.g. crafting proactive policies due to their lim- variable and assumed that once the words conflicting with larger states on important ited resources and small administrations will “combat”, “warning”, “threat level”, “casu- political issues). The small states with in- be further aggravated by the more frequent alties”, “enemy”, “weapons of mass destruc- tensive perception of threats or recent ex- and rapid changes, developments, and events. tion”, etc. appear in the daily briefs of heads tremely negative historical experience (both The second problem lies in the global of governments (especially in the US) the descriptions fit the Baltic states well) will scale of the developments. The small states way that these states behave will switch be playing a risky game, although not as have only a limited capability to gather in- into the realist one. Thus, the underlying perilous as described above. The rules of formation necessary for decision-making, assumption of this paper is that for the that game will require balancing policies which, for example, in the case of the EU

139 has led to the reliance of the small EU mem- cut and concrete policy recommendations, bers on information received from the EU I would like to suggest the following as at References Commission. Being a participant in the least worth thinking through: global “war on terror” poses in this sense a 1) Since we live in the information Hey, J.A.K. (2003) “Refining Our Un- huge challenge – the Baltic states have to society, the ability to gather, systematise, derstanding of Small State Foreign Policy” be informed about geographically distant evaluate and analyse information is cru- in Hey, J.A.K. (ed) Small States in World Poli- and complicated situations and issues. cial for state security, thus respective gov- tics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour, Boul- The third problem lies in striking the ernmental or nongovernmental capabili- der, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers balance between security gains and au- ties (think-tanks) are worth developing; Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) “Conclusion: Na- tonomy losses. Bargaining power of the small 2) The real-time decision-making/bar- tional Security in a Changing World” in states that is generally connected to the stra- gaining in the information society could Katzenstein, P.J. (ed) The Culture of National tegic location, strategic resources or pro- lend itself for modelling on the basis of Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, viding political legitimacy is, in fact, fairly game-theoretical approaches; that is an New York, Columbia University Press limited. In the era of dramatic increase of area/capability having the potential to Kowert, P., Legro, J. (1996) “Norms, mobility and reach of the US forces these mitigate to a certain extent the small state Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical elements of the bargaining power may lose limitations in that area; Reprise” in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed) The Cul- or change their value quite unexpectedly. A 3) The reaction times are shortening – ture of National Security: Norms and Identity small state might be slow to perceive these the different capabilities of the small states in World Politics, New York, Columbia Uni- changes in time and react adequately. such as defence, crisis management, deci- versity Press sion-support, etc. must be available at short Morrow, J.D. (1991) “Alliances and Any ideas, Sherlock? notice or not at all; Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capabil- 4) The small states could, to a certain ity Aggregation Model of Alliances”, Ameri- Having done all this deductive think- extent, mitigate their limitations by in- can Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No 4, ing the only question left to answer is: what tensive cooperation with each other; this p904-933, University of Wisconsin Press could analysts involved in policy formula- is valid especially for the Baltic states hav- Rothstein, R.L. (1968) Alliances and tion or capability development in the Bal- ing similar political aspirations and posi- Small Powers, New York and London: tic states learn from this? Instead of clear- tion in international system. Columbia University Press

140 The Democratic Warrior: The Future for the Bosnian Military*

By Peter C. Alexa and Michael Metzsch**

Introduction many of the concerns that are prevalent The country is still suffering from the in the West when it comes to the future war which has lasted for three years and The aim of this article is to investi- of Bosnia after SFOR. Bosnian military caused death of about 250.000 people. Fur- gate the possibilities and requirements that only obeys orders from a legally thermore, the country is still divided, and for using military co-operation to elected government will decrease the risk the geographical division into two enti- strengthen stability in Bosnia- of war that is caused by disputes between ties including three large ethnic commu- Herzegovina.1 The focus is mainly on the ethnic groups. Therefore, this kind nities leads to many problems in Bosnian the possibility of establishing a PfP co- of military could - in the long term - society: the economy is poor, there is ex- operation with Bosnia since this forum operate as an integrating factor in Bosnia. tensive corruption in the public admin- has proven to be useful and effective, Hereby you avoid military which is istration, and hate still prevails between for instance, in the Baltic states. The ar- closely related with nationalistic opin- the ethnic groups. The country’s policy gument is that one common profession- ion in the three ethnic groups as has on stability is furthermore dependent on ally based2 military in Bosnia will remove been the case until now. the presence of the international commu-

* This report has previously been published in Institute for International Studies 2003. The research behind the article is financed by the defence and security political studies at the Institute for International Studies. The report was translated into English by the editors of the Baltic Defence Review. * * Peter C. Alexa is a member of the scientific staff at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Michael Metzsch is a former intern at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

143 nity and NATO’s peacekeeping forces, analysed to what extent there is a need Bosnian people.3 However, no one be- particularly SFOR. for changes in Bosnia’s officer corps, and lieves that NATO will leave the country In the article the empirical data is gath- in chapter 4, two suggestions on how to in the foreseeable future, and therefore ered from three different sources: 1) lit- implement the changes. the question arises as to whether it is pos- erature about Bosnian history, 2) facts sible that NATO’s involvement in Bosnia gathered from the internet, 3) interviews 1. NATO’s role in Bosnia can take another form. The obvious an- made in Bosnia. With regard to the latter swer would be Partnership for Peace (PfP) there is a considerable difference between Since 1995 NATO has had between which has developed an even stronger role official and unofficial stances amongst the 12.000 and 60.000 troops stationed in within the activities of NATO.4 international community in Bosnia. Thus Bosnia-Herzegovina (in the remainder of The purpose with the PfP is, among the information from the interviews can- the article Bosnia-Herzegovina will be re- other things, to increase the transparency not be accredited to one single respon- ferred to as Bosnia only). These forces had in national defence planning and budgets, dent and hence the interviews will also been the international community’s guar- to secure democratic control over the serve as background information. antee for avoiding a repetition of the civil armed forces and to develop the mem- The theoretical frame of the report is war that in the beginning of the 1990’s bers’ forces so that they can cooperate with Samuel Huntington’s theory on civil and led the country into chaos. NATO forces (for instance in peace sup- military relations. This frame is chosen After 11 September 2001, NATO’s fo- port operations). However, such coopera- because the theory illustrates quite sim- cus is no longer on the Balkans but on tion is not possible at the moment since ply some problems regarding civilian con- the international fight against terrorism. Bosnia – together with Serbia and trol of the military. This is one of the reasons why NATO has Montenegro5 - is the only country in The report comprises five chapters. In an interest to end – or at least to reduce – Europe that is not a member of either chapter 1, the latest developments in SFOR’s mission in Bosnia so the forces the PfP or NATO.6 Bosnia are taken into account. In chapter can be used elsewhere and with other So why is Bosnia not a member of the 2, the theoretical approach is set out with objectives. Winding up SFOR is also in PfP? The answer to this question is partly emphasis on the relationship between civil line with the general aim of the interna- to be found in the country’s constitu- and military authorities according to tional community to gradually hand over tion, which is a part of the Dayton agree- Huntington’s theory. In chapter 3, it is responsibility for Bosnia’s fate to the ment. The agreement’s distribution of

144 competences between the entities and the (SCMM). Earlier SCMM consisted among demonstrate courage to their respective government meant that the entities were others of the entities’ defence ministers ethnic groups at the same time as unpopu- entitled to – but not committed to - cre- and chiefs of defence, but these are now lar, but necessary, initiatives can be car- ating their own military structures. This in a sub-committee. Today it is the ried out. Moreover, there are reports say- means that since the end of the war Bosnia Bosnian presidency (one from each eth- ing that the ethnic groups unofficially has had two ministries of defence and nic group), the presidents of the two en- have asked the UNHR to force through three armed forces, which in relation to tities, Bosnia’s minister of finance, and requests while they officially dissociate the PfP is unacceptable for NATO. NATO the chairman of the Bosnian council of themselves from these requests. Con- only wants to cooperate with military ministers that are members of the com- versely, the extensive powers of the forces that are assigned to sovereign states mittee. With the increased decision-mak- UNHR mean that the leaders at other times and not with different local military fac- ing powers in the SCMM the move can express themselves more positively than tions. NATO’s Secretary General George be viewed as the first step towards a joint they are in reality in order to avoid the Robertson has often said that the primary ministry of defence. It is still uncertain, UNHR setting them aside or even remov- condition for a Bosnian membership of however, to what extent the three ethnic ing them7 . In other cases the leaders seek the PfP is the establishment of one gov- groups really want this development since confrontation with the UNHR, which in ernmental ministry of defence and one they have widely different interests that 1999 led to the UNHR removing the presi- common structure of command for the have to be safeguarded in relation to a dent of the Republika Srpska (RS), Nikola armed forces in the country (NATO, potential PfP-membership. Furthermore Poplasen (Chandler, 2000: 201) 2002a). The development towards this has it is difficult to get an overview of the From statements it can be noted that so far been slow but during the last year interests because the UN High Represen- representatives from the Federation have pressure from the international society has tative (UNHR) and SFOR possess the real not said anything pronounced about the increased. power in the country. Statements from SCMM as a forerunner for a unified min- Probably as an attempt to satisfy the the Bosnian leaders have to be taken with istry of defence. The Bosnian-Serbs in the international community, the Bosnian certain reservations. For instance the lead- beginning expressed considerable scepti- presidency decided on 4 September 2002 ers will often protest against the UNHR’s cism towards the idea. Zivko Radisic – to reorganise and strengthen the Stand- decisions although they actually agree. who at that time was the Bosnian-Serbian ing Committee for Military Matters They do so because in that way they can member of the presidency – stated on 21

145 August 2002 that if one defence ministry Serbs have not managed to ensure satis- was set up it would favour the Bosniacs The Orao case factory control over the military and its and the Bosnian-Croats who preferred a authorities. Therefore the case could be single state rather than two entities (Radio The situation changed after it was re- used to strengthen the government’s con- Free Europe, 2002a). The day after, the vealed – with huge media coverage – that trol over the military, and it could be a Bosnian-Serbian president Mirko Sarovic the Bosnian-Serbs have secretly sold parts forerunner for a governmental ministry followed up on this remark by stating that of weapons and provided services for of defence. Two facts, in particular, should Bosnia ought to become a member of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It is, be taken into account. PfP but that the RS rejected the idea of a among others, Yugoslav dealers who have Firstly, the case is very clear. The sale unified ministry of defence (Radio Free sold the materiel, and it includes a long of weapons from Bosnia to Iraq is a vio- Europe, 2002b). Therefore some of the list of military equipment such as small lation of the Dayton agreement which Bosnian leaders’ final goals are still that arms and aircrafts - also from the Orao contains a passage saying that each weapon the RS can secede from the Federation and factory in the RS. sale has to be approved by SFOR. More- instead be integrated with Serbia. Because The interest from the international over the sale is also against the UN-sanc- of this they still fight against initiatives press is probably due to the focus on a tioned embargo towards Iraq. In addition, that lead to the present autonomy of the possible war against Iraq* but for Bosnia the Bosnian-Serbs were also caught in the RS being decreased.8 For example, prior the case might have consequences for act and did not even try to conceal their to the election campaign in 1998 the people who have not been removed from guilt. Bosnian-Serbian party SRS cooperated with their position (for example, the depos- Secondly, the time will come where the its sister party in Serbia, a party that pub- ing of the Bosnian-Serbian defence min- international community with the UNHR lished the magazine “Greater Serbia”, which ister and the chief of defence) (Radio Free in the leading role will launch a plan to was distributed in all RS (OSCO, 1998). Europe, 2002d). Many observers in Bosnia strengthen Bosnia’s bid for the PfP. The The question is if this resistance will be are of the opinion that both the UNHR plan contains among other things an es- maintained - two arguments favour a pos- and SFOR will use the case as an example tablishment of the three “task forces” - sible change in the Bosnian-Serbian stance. to demonstrate that at least the Bosnian- each being led by different international

* At the time of writing this article the hostilities in Iraq had not broken out yet (editor’s note).

146 institutions. Thus the UNHR will be re- (Radio Free Europe, 2002e). In this way drawn. However, even then it is difficult sponsible for a task force concerning the the RS is pressured to carry out a thor- to see the need for an expensive territo- establishment of democratic control of the ough investigation, since SFOR has not rial defence. It is only Croatia and Yugo- armed forces. The OSCE will lead work laid down criteria beforehand for the mea- slavia that geographically and historically to ensure transparent budgets and increas- sures that the RS has to take. could appear as potential aggressors ing economic control in the country, and against Bosnia. Croatia is, however, a SFOR will guarantee that uniform and Economy member of the PfP, although Yugoslavia NATO/PfP compatible doctrines and regu- has only just applied for membership. Be- lations are established for the armed The other main argument for a pos- sides, both countries have expressed the forces. It could have been expected that sible change of stance is the economic wish for future membership of the EU, the RS especially would resist - question- burden in relation to the maintenance of previously hampered by the domestic re- ing whether the Dayton agreement makes the three military structures in Bosnia9 . sistance of the former nationalist leaders defence matters a case for the entities. But Because of the lack of transparency in the Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Slobodan since the Orao case has demonstrated that budgets and the accounts, it is difficult Milosevic in Yugoslavia10. Neither NATO the government of the RS has not been to decide how much of the country’s GDP nor the EU will accept aggression from able to or wished to execute effective con- is actually spent on the armed forces. The the two countries against Bosnia thereby trol over the actions of the army, it has OSCE estimates that the figure is about risking a new outbreak of conflicts in the become difficult for the RS to lay down 8-10%. In comparison, Denmark spends Balkans. arguments against the plan set forth by 1,4%, USA 3,1%, and the Czech Republic Of course, the three groups in Bosnia the UNHR. – a country that is restructuring from realise this, and the question is whether The chief of SFOR has furthermore Warsaw Pact standards to NATO standards they do not primarily look at their mili- declined a request from the RS that SFOR - 2,2% (IISS, 2001: 19, 50-51). The vast tary forces as protection against the other should lead the investigation with regard expenses for the armed forces seem to be entities. to the sales of the weapons. He said that out of proportion with needs, since the Since economic assistance to Bosnia the results from RS’s own investigation country in reality is under “protection” cannot be continued infinitely the three will be checked, and only if SFOR is not (or occupation) by SFOR. One can argue ethnic groups seem to have realized that satisfied with the results, will it intervene that SFOR at some stage will be with- there is a need to reduce the expense of

147 the military forces. So far some cuts have been more than decimated from about the military is dependent on which civil- already been made so that the armed 430.000 men at the end of the war, the ian group is most powerful. forces in Bosnia were reduced from an military’s role in society has still not been Objective control is derived from a estimated 430.000 in 1995 to about 34.000 definitively clarified. If SFOR is going to professionally based officer corps which in 2001.11 It is also possible to make re- be withdrawn from Bosnia and replaced only deals with military questions and ductions by giving up some of the double with a PfP-cooperation, it has to be guar- does not have its own economic and functions that exist today due to the two anteed that a reliable civilian control over political interests.13 The aim of objec- (three) military structures. the armed forces has been established. How tive control is to get the military to act Areas such as management of the bud- do you secure civilian control over the unconditionally as a tool of the state (Hun- get and administration of the infrastruc- armed forces? In order to answer this ques- tington, 1957: 83). Subsequently it will be ture could most likely be more cost effec- tion you have to define what civilian con- argued that a professionally based officer tive in a common structure. That is why trol over the military forces is. In The Sol- corps can play an important role in the economic realities could push forward the dier and the State, Samuel Huntington establishment of such a new state as Bosnia. idea of a unified ministry of defence in equates civilian control over the military Since the Second World War there has been Bosnia. An establishment that within the with minimizing military “power”, in other a close connection between the politics and foreseeable future could lead to Bosnian words the officer corps’ ability to possess the military in the former Yugoslavia. A membership of the PfP. authority and influence the society (Hun- connection that was clearly demonstrated tington, 1957: 80,86). Huntington describes in 1974, when the officer corps possessed 2. The role of the military two principal forms regarding civilian con- 10.8% of the seats in the central commit- trol of the armed forces: subjective and tee of the Communist Party (Allcock, 2000: Whereas most countries have single objective control. Subjective control is an 270,387). This inevitably influenced the military with a monopoly on the legiti- expression of different civilian groups ex- states that followed Yugoslavia’s dissolution. mate use of force12, two defence minis- erting direct influence on the decision- Since the start of the war there has been a tries in Bosnia, three armies, and SFOR’s making process in the military. However, mix of military and political – primarily presence demand considerable resources since different civilian groups have differ- nationalistic – interests, and it has been and cause an untenable security architec- ent interests – and thereby influence the difficult to distinguish between political ture. Even though the armed forces have military in different ways – control over and military issues in Bosnia. Thus, if you

148 apply Huntington’s terminology there has fessionally based officer corps. But, on areas to the government, but a successful been a form of subjective control over the the other hand, how can the establishment integration of the defence area will in- military with the nationalists having the support the creation of a new state in crease the chance of reducing the public control. But subjective control has, espe- Bosnia? The main argument is that joint expenses - also in other areas – in a coun- cially in a country like Bosnia, had serious professionally based military in Bosnia try that spends 64% of its GDP on the disadvantages. will remove many of the concerns that public sector (The World Bank, 2002a). Firstly, civilian control over the forces people in the West especially have for resulted in several atrocities during the Bosnia’s future after SFOR. Bosnian mili- Professionalization of the military war14, and, secondly, there have been sev- tary that only obeys orders from a legally eral examples of corruption, misguided elected government will decrease the risk So what is characteristic for a profes- control of the economy and absence of of conflicts developing into war. Thus, sionally based military? According to cooperation across ethnic borders.15 Since in the long term, the military will work Huntington it has two characteristics in subjective control – seen from a democratic as an integrator in Bosnia instead of be- particular. Firstly, it is politically sterile western stance – has not been effective in ing connected to the nationalist circles in and neutral to the extent that it only obeys Bosnia, it will be natural to consider the the three communities, as has been the orders from the government (Hunting- establishment of objective control over the case so far. ton, 1957: 84). Secondly, it has a high military. The problem is though, that Secondly, the military can work as a professional standard. This combination objective control – besides a professional forerunner for other areas that could be will ensure that the military can solve its officer corps – requires that a state exists transferred from the entities to the gov- primary task: to protect the nation against to which the officer corps can be loyal. ernmental level. The decentralized health external threats. When it comes to gain- This precondition is not present in Bosnia. and social security system and the educa- ing a high professional standard, this can The question is, if it ever will. tional system constitute – as the entities’ typically be achieved through developing military forces do – a heavy strain on the each officer’s skills with regard to carry- The Military as an Integrator Bosnian economy, and probably a con- ing out still more complex military op- siderable amount of money could be saved erations in line with their career ad- Huntington sees the state as the pre- in these areas. So far the Bosnian-Serbs vancement. In this aspect, an officer can condition for the establishment of a pro- particularly opposed a transfer of these be compared with a surgeon whose pro-

149 fessional competence gradually increases education should be targeted at develop- time it is the role that justifies the officer’s through his career. However it has become ing the Bosnian officer corps to be duty as an independent profession. Hun- more difficult to achieve a high professional - skilful warriors who are capable of tington, for instance, writes: “It must be standard today, since the officer beyond his planning and carrying out effective – seen remembered that the peculiar skill of the competence as a warrior also has to attend from the perspective of NATO – military officer is the management of violence, not to the role as a leader in peacetime. It can be operations in the whole spectrum from the act of violence itself” (Huntington, difficult to achieve professionalization when supporting civilian society, participating 1957: 13). To describe this role the focus it comes to political neutrality. in peace support operations to partici- will be placed on three factors in the cycle The military’s role as the society’s pro- pating in war and of warfare: doctrine, technology, and or- tector can lead the officer corps to see - democratic leaders who accept the le- ganization.16 itself as serving their own understanding gitimacy and authority that civilian soci- Doctrines can shortly be described as of national interests instead of serving the ety exercises over the military forces in a the thoughts behind military operations, government. Therefore it must be a re- democracy. and so far they have been aimed at tradi- quirement for professional military that 3. The two roles tional territorial defence. Naturally, this an attitude adaptation is made in order has partly stemmed from the Yugoslav to ensure real acceptance of a legitimate Future military cooperation can thus experiences from the Second World War government’s right to define the inter- focus on the two roles that the officer and partly from the civil war that shaped ests of the society. corps can play in Bosnia (the role of the the present Bosnia. From a PfP perspec- Thus, a high professional standard warrior and the democratic leader). The tive the Bosnian doctrines should be de- combined with political neutrality will two roles will be elaborated below. There- veloped in order to meet “softer” pur- only be achieved through a goal-oriented after it will be discussed which problems poses since she does not face any direct education and a change in attitude so that such a process may face. external threat. This could, for instance, one not only focuses on purely military be participation in international opera- conditions but also on the officer corps’ The Warrior tions and support to civilian society. In attitude to the surrounding environment. this way, the Bosnian military can be Seen from the perspective of the objec- The role of the warrior is the tradi- employed in peace support operations and tive control of Bosnia’s armed forces the tional function of an officer. At the same thereby contribute to creating security

150 elsewhere in the world – and maybe gain it is the sense of occasion and the ability lem concerning small arms but when it a better understanding of the conflicts in to use your own judgement that are two comes to more complicated weapons they Bosnia. But the doctrines in the Bosnian of the most important qualities. The prob- are only interoperable to a small extent armies are very centralized. The army in lem is also pervasive in the Federation with the weapon systems in NATO – and the RS is still marked by the doctrines since many of the officers in the Federa- that hampers PfP cooperation. that were applied in the former Yugoslav tion – especially the older ones – also re- On the other hand, the Federation has federal army (JNA). Those were similar to ceived their military training in the JNA. received a large number of American weap- the doctrines in many of the former mem- However, the problem is alleviated a little ons including tanks, antitank missiles and bers of the Warsaw Pact and caused con- by the US-controlled “train and equip” M-16 riffles. They received the weapons sequently the same weaknesses. The differ- programme which after the war intro- as a part of the “train and equip ent services operate mainly independently duced the Federation’s army to western – programme”(Jane’s, 2002). With regard to and because of this the possibilities of especially NATO – doctrines and forms materiel, the Federation is therefore bet- utilizing possible synergy-effects in the op- of operations (Boucher, 2002). Due to ter equipped to participate in future peace erations of common services are limited. the war many – particularly Bosniacs – support operations but at the same time Furthermore, a high degree of centraliza- became officers without having any for- the armament also reinforces the Bosnian- tion means that each leader has the possi- mal background in the military and there- Serbian perception of a threat from the bility to act autonomously to a certain fore they are not influenced to the same Federation’s army. extent. On a few occasions centralization extent by their time in the former Both entities have vast stockpiles of can be appropriate but often an effective Yugoslav army. It will probably be easier small arms. These are designated to mobi- decision-making process is hindered be- to influence those officers since they do lization units in case of a crisis, conflict, cause information has to pass many lay- not need to be “de-programmed” from or war. But it can be disputed how neces- ers in the command structure before a the JNA thinking. In the technological sary it is to retain these stockpiles. The decision can be taken. The decision can area there is a similar difference between reductions of the armed forces that have thus be seen as limiting the initiative and the RS and the Federation. The army in already been undertaken and the limited responsibility of the younger officers, and the RS is still equipped with weapons from external threat make territorial defence this is a problem in missions such as peace the JNA time, but they are outdated from unlikely. Therefore there is a possibility support operations. In a tense situation a NATO perspective. It is not a vast prob- that the real purpose of these stocks is “to

151 be ready” in case the conflicts between tion and the RS both employ a corps the acquisition of weapon systems that are the ethnic groups once again flare up, and structure with four corps each. It is no- compatible with NATO. In addition to it would probably suit the international table that the structures have “survived” this, an attitudinal change of the former/ community if the weapon stocks are de- the intensive reductions in the armed present image of an enemy should result stroyed before SFOR leaves the country forces in Bosnia: when one takes into ac- in a break up of the existing corps struc- definitively. Since the beginning of the count that the total military force is go- tures plus destruction of the depots of 1990s there has been a considerable illegal ing to be reduced to about 13.200 (the small arms. In the case the weapons in the market for weapons, and therefore one Federation) and 6.600 (RS), the structures depots are destroyed it will probably not can argue that there is a danger that the seem to be out of proportion with the be possible to equip all 230.000 men in weapons will be used to arm criminals and realities on the ground (Fitzgerald, 2001). the respective military structures’ reserves. rebels, which of course does not help to As was also the case for the depots of weap- Therefore the internal threat connected stabilize the country. In worst case sce- ons it is very likely that the structures with total mobilization will decrease con- nario the situation in Bosnia can develop primarily are kept as defence against the siderably. into the same situation as was the case in other ethnic groups. Thus, the two enti- Albania after the “Pyramid Scandal” in ties have theoretically an opportunity to The Democrat 1997 where people broke into stockpiles mobilize 250.000 men in total (IIIS, 2002: of weapons and stole hundreds of thou- 67). Besides establishing a governmental A democratic officer corps is a corps sands of small arms weapons (Hansen and ministry of defence it is likely that it will that accepts the authority and legitimacy Metzch, 2002: 10). It not only destabilized be necessary to break up the corps struc- that underlie civilian control over the Albania but also spread a huge amount tures in order to adjust the military struc- military as an institution. It is both the of weapons to other unstable regions in tures for the PfP membership. most difficult role to define unambigu- the Balkans such as Kosovo. To sum up, the Bosnian forces – espe- ously and the most difficult to measure, The organisation of the armed forces cially the Bosnian-Serbian force – face but at the same time it is also the most in Bosnia still reflects the situation im- many military challenges in relation to important military parameter for a future mediately after the war’s ending. Besides adjustment for PfP co-operation. The Bosnian PfP membership. The problem the aforementioned division of the armed adoption of and the adjustment to NATO/ with “democratization” of the officer forces between two entities, the Federa- PfP doctrines ought to be combined with corps is that it requires corresponding

152 democratization concurrently taking place the outrages were committed by more or groups gets the impression that it is only in the Bosnian society. less self-appointed militias whose person- their country-men who are being pros- Huntington’s perception of the mili- nel typically is no longer on active ser- ecuted. Therefore it had an immense sym- tary that is isolated from civilian society vice in the Bosnian armed forces. bolic significance when the first trial for (Huntington, 1957: 16) does not apply war crimes committed against Serbs was to Bosnia, where officers – as in Denmark But other outrages – such as the massa- concluded in November 199817. Similarly, – do not live in the barracks. The officers cres in Srebrenica – were allegedly com- it will be of vast significance if Croatia are thus a part of the civilian Bosnian mitted by regular army units which were decides to extradite General Janko society, too. It is difficult to imagine that under command at the time of the crime Bobetko18 . the officer can understand, accept and (Sell, 2002: 232). The International Crimi- implement democratic initiatives in his nal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in the Besides the deterrent effect that the military unit in the case where the rest of Hague ought to be a visible proof that International Tribunal has, it is also nec- the society does not develop in the same crimes of war are not accepted by inter- essary to provide the officer corps with direction. This applies especially after a national community. It has therefore con- basic education in the laws of war and war - a period where the military’s role siderable significance when high-ranking international law in order to ensure demo- changes from being perhaps most impor- officers from one of the three ethnic cratic development. The mentioned top- tant component of society to being in groups are convicted of war crimes – Gen- ics not only increase the officers’ knowl- line with other public institutions. Be- eral Radislav Krstic who was charged with edge but also change the behaviour that low, three factors will be looked upon with being one of the leaders responsible for officers show in the daily life. Thus, the regard to “democratization” of the officer the Srebrenica massacre (Guardian, 2001). teaching should not only be theoretical corps. However, the strongest signal will be sent but also be a part of the daily service as Firstly, the officer corps has to exer- if the two main suspects, the Bosnian-Serbs well as supplemented by exercises. It is cen- cise general respect for human rights. The Radovan Karadizc and Radko Mladic are tral to the extent that it is possible for war in Bosnia was marked by units being prosecuted in the Hague. This will indi- the respective ethnic groups to work to- involved in some of the most brutal out- cate that in the long term no Bosnian gether at different levels in the military. rages against prisoners of war as well as war criminals can escape prosecution. It Thus procedures and rules must be estab- against the civilian population. Some of is also important that none of the ethnic lished to ensure that promotions and ca-

153 reer management are entirely based on widely spread (The World Bank, 2000). time, the older officer’s almost unre- professional qualifications and not on Another survey from July 2002 showed stricted power over their subordinates ethnical affiliations. that one fourth of the respondents should be limited. In the former members Secondly, the Bosnian officer corps within the last year bribed both a doc- of the Warsaw Pact – plus the former Yu- has to be taught to manage. Even though tor and a policeman (Transparency In- goslavia – the leaders could treat subordi- the expense of the military will properly ternational). nates in the way they wanted, a problem decrease in the future, the armed forces The OSCE has tightened up the re- that still exists in Russia, for example. This will still be responsible for the employ- quirements regarding transparent ac- is an impediment for the development of ment of vast resources. To avoid repeti- counts due to the carelessness with responsibility and initiative of the younger tion of the situation in March 2002, trusted funds but it is estimated that officers and at the same time it means that where representatives from the OSCE’s management of the resources will still be counselling and reporting is controlled by mission in Bosnia had to put pressure problematic in the armed forces. Since what you think that the chief would like to on the RS’s government to limit defence officers in general are badly paid (NATO, hear instead of what you think yourself. expenses, it is necessary that the leading 2001) it is difficult to imagine that they Finally, the connection between the officials – both military as well as civil- will voluntarily give up the benefits military and the nationalist parties should ian – show responsibility toward the lim- which they traditionally have had unless be removed. Since the war, close ties have ited resources in Bosnia (OSCE 2002a). such a renunciation is followed by a simi- existed between the nationalists – on all This can be problematic. More than one lar rise in salaries. The problem is that three sides – and the respective armed source in Bosnia mentioned that a no- rises in salary either require more re- forces because nationalists as well as the ticeable “kleptocracy” exists where pow- sources – which is unrealistic in a pe- military have seen themselves as protec- erful persons misuse public funds for riod when the defence budget is going tors of their respective ethnic groups. their own benefit.19 Corruption is there- to be reduced or a heavy reduction in Whereas such an association was natural fore considered as one of the main prob- the number of officers, which of course under wartime conditions, it is, during lems in Bosnia. The World Bank made a the officers are not interested in either. peacetime, an impediment to effective survey which documented that more than Thus, since bigger increases in salaries control of the military. If the officer corps half of the respondents (from the ethnic are not realistic there is no big incite- is to be loyal towards the government it groups) had the view that corruption is ment to economic integrity. At the same should not at the same time have com-

154 mitments towards various parties or 4. Socialization and fence structures - but they did not feel groups. integration the same hatred as certain elements in the The question is how you break the three ethnic groups in Bosnia do. bonds that among other things are cre- A broad and intensive process of edu- - The Baltic states had (or perceived) ated by war with great sacrifices such as cation can thus strengthen the integration an external threat from Russia. In Bosnia the Bosnian are. There is no clear-cut an- and democratization of the Bosnian mili- the threat is instead internal. swer, but basically the self-perception of tary. In this process it is not enough to the officer corps needs to be changed so improve the existing officer corps’ knowl- The following paragraphs will focus on that the officers no longer see themselves edge concerning the issues discussed in two initiatives that seem particularly in- as protectors of their own ethnic group. chapter 3. In reality a change in the teresting for Bosnia: a joint defence col- In the current situation the guarantee is behaviour has to be forced – a change of lege and a joint peace support force. given by SFOR but the officer corps is the skills and the stances that exist at the more worried about the time after SFOR, moment. A Joint Defence College where the security guarantees are unclear. In connection with the Baltic states’ It is therefore of utmost importance that preparation to join NATO a lot of initia- Establishing a joint defence college in the international community develops a tives were taken in facilitating the pro- Bosnia, similar to the Baltic Defence Col- security system which protects all ethnic cess, a process that the Bosnian officer lege (BALTDEFCOL) established in Tartu groups against military outrages. Thus corps also faces. It is problematic though, in Estonia, would promote some oppor- criteria should be made with regard to to apply the experiences from the Baltic tunities to integrate the three ethnic SFOR’s withdrawal for when and how states because three important differences groups. Below, three possibilities will be NATO can intervene in Bosnia to pre- separate the two situations: underlined. vent possible acts of war in the country. - The Baltic states really wanted PfP Firstly, it will give the officers from The end is, of course, that the inclusion cooperation while Bosnia is more or less the three groups an opportunity to make in western structures will contribute to pressured into the PfP. contacts and friendships across ethnic af- creating an internal stability in the coun- - The Baltic states did not agree on filiations. Since classes and groups etc. try thus making NATO intervention everything – and the projects were used would be mixed across ethnic affiliation needless. as a means to establish the national de- the students will quite quickly be depen-

155 dent on each others’ assistance and help. warded financially as well as in respect of sitioning of the college it will not be pos- This can be encouraged by emphasizing their careers. In this way it becomes at- sible to continuously change the position project-oriented education where no one tractive to apply for the education, and since a duplication of the facilities would can gain success without everyone having the best young officers are attracted to be impractical and economically unsuit- contributed to some extent. apply for the course. able. However, the college could be placed Secondly, similar education of a year’s However, there are also problems with on ”neutral ground” near one of the in- duration can in reality change ways of think- such an establishment. If you strengthen ternational organizations’ establishments ing, particularly among the younger offic- the younger officers’ career it will unde- in the country such as the SFOR head- ers, if the officers are removed from their niably be at the expense of the elder of- quarters. respective units. The students should be ficers, who possess the most influential In connection with the establishment forced to be proactive and, among other positions. Most likely they will – con- of such a college, Bosnia can learn from things, be evaluated on their ability to take sciously as well as unconsciously – be in the experiences that the BALTDEFCOL the initiative. In this way they will be en- opposition to such a threat against their has had, for instance, with having experi- couraged to be critical and take part in dis- own positions and argue that the young enced officers and instructors from the cussions, which will improve their ability officers do not have an understanding of West to introduce the officers from the to formulate independent solutions to com- the war’s causes and consequences as they Baltic states to western military ways of plex problems. Furthermore, they will learn do themselves. thinking.20 In the same way, a joint de- that one single solution to a military strate- At the same time there will be a lot of fence college in Bosnia could be manned gic problem does not exist. In the coun- practical problems such as the geographi- by western instructors in the beginning, tries that were members of the Warsaw Pact cal position of the college and decisions and thereafter the responsibility could be mathematical calculations were emphasized, concerning the distribution of the key gradually handed over to local officers as and these calculations could determine fu- positions. Probably one will have to dis- they become educated. In this way ture battles. This way of thinking is one of tribute the most important posts between Bosnian officers would be urged to in- the first things that the BALTDEFCOL seeks groups so that the interests of all groups volve themselves in the project, in con- to change. (Kværnø, 2003). will be considered. Such a system already trast to a situation where only foreigners Thirdly, the officers who take a course exists in other places in the administra- run the college. The BALTDEFCOL is fur- at the joint defence college should be re- tion in Bosnia. When it comes to the po- thermore already educating Bosnian of-

156 ficers who could form the core staffing in ited to the posting of the UN observers towards cooperation across the entities such a college. The advantage among other to the UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) than older officers are, but individual ser- things is that the BALTDEFCOL has the plus the preparation for posting observ- vice as an UN observer does not require experience in educating officers who have ers to the MONUC (Congo). It is posi- cooperation between the different ethni- a “Warsaw Pact way of thinking”. tive that there is an equal representation cal groups. from each of the ethnic groups in the It has thus been more difficult for A Joint Peace Support Force country. This indicates that the three Bosnia to set up a real military unit that military groups actually are able to coop- can be deployed on peace support opera- To build up a joint Bosnian force that erate. tions. The build up of a logistics com- can be deployed on peace support opera- One can argue though that it is a weak pany with about 60 persons has been on tions will have three advantages. sign as it is only a few observes and all are its way for two years, and no unit has Firstly, it will help to integrate the dif- posted as individuals, and therefore there been deployed yet. According to several ferent Bosnian forces and thereby further has not been a need for cooperation be- representatives from international com- contribute to the socialization of these tween the ethnic groups. Normally, the munity, the problems have mainly been forces. Secondly, Bosnia will in this way observers from the same country are sepa- focused on ethnical balance as to num- contribute in a positive way to maintain- rated to ensure multinationality in the bers and on conditions concerning com- ing international peace and security. Par- area, and therefore the officers only co- mand. The latter is made especially visible ticipation in peace support operations will operate to a limited extent. Furthermore, as the unit will have an international chief, also give Bosnian officers the possibility personnel who are qualified for service as which can be interpreted as an expression to experience other areas of conflict in UN observers are perhaps not typical of of the groups not wanting to be under the world. This will give the officers an- the Bosnian military. Among other things, command from one of the other groups. other perspective on conflict resolution; the requirement for English skills means With the UNMIBH (UN’s mission in a perspective that they might use to gain that it will primarily be only younger and Bosnia-Herzegovina) as a mediator, an ac- a more objective understanding of con- well educated officers who will be em- ceptable structure for the organisation has flict resolution in their own country. ployed. According to representatives from been found, and the need for such a unit At the end of 2002 Bosnian participa- the international society as well as the Fed- in one of the UN peace support opera- tion in peace support operations was lim- eration, young officers are more positive tions is avaited (NATO, 2002b). The prob-

157 lems with setting up the logistics com- Baltic states to establish new defence bu- forces will contribute to stability in the pany might indicate the problems which reaucracies and encouraged the develop- country. The establishment of such con- might arise when the entities will be forced ment of a culture of democratic control trol is estimated to take place in the form to increase cooperation. The problems can within defence structures (Brett, 2001: 5). of three initiatives. be expected to increase along with the de- Because of the experiences from the Firstly, the existing military structures mands for operational complexity where Baltic states it is worth underlining the should be changed. The corps structure the establishment of a transport company, time perspective of the project. An im- as well as the big weapon depots are esti- seen in a military context, can be said to portant element in the project is to en- mated to be simply destabilising the be at the easy end of the scale. sure that Bosnia, independently of part- Bosnian society as they lack an external The deployment of the logistics unit ners, can take over all functions in the threat that justifies a mobilisation based will contribute in a positive way to mak- peace support units and that the exper- defence role. ing the Bosnian military interoperable tise will be transferred to the remainder Secondly, smaller, but well educated with NATO’s forces and improving co- of the Bosnian military. The equivalent and well equipped units should be estab- operation between the different military process has shown to be prolonged in lished. These units ought to be capable of structures. It will thus support the devel- the Baltic states, and there is no reason participating in peace support operations opment of one Bosnian military when to expect that it will be shorter in Bosnia and supporting civil society. The units soldiers with different ethnic background where the conflict of interests between will thus be able to make a positive con- gain experience in practical cooperation. the different groups is more tense. A tribution to NATO/PfP involvement in The project will also legitimize and make further development of the concept to- areas of conflict. the Bosnian effort in living up to the wards a build up of larger multiethnic Finally, there ought to be established a joint defence college that can provide international obligations visible in the entities will probably have a long term same way that has been the case with the the Bosnian officers with a common pro- planning timeframe. Baltic states’ build up of the combined fessional frame of reference across ethnic Baltic battalion BALTBAT (Brett and 5. Conclusion affiliation. By establishing a joint defence Metzsch, 2002: 3). Additionally, the expe- college and peace support units the expe- riences from the BALTBAT shows that the It can be argued that the creation of rience from the Baltic states will prob- administration of the project helped the objective control over the Bosnian armed ably be used. It will be beneficial to estab-

158 lish cooperation between a joint Bosnian Brett, Julian Elgaard & Michael Metzsch defence college and the BALTDEFCOL - Bibliography (2002), Dansk militærstøtte til Baltikum, DUPI a cooperation where the BALTDEFCOL Research Brief, nr. 17. could function as a base of experience. Allcock, John B. (2000), Explaining Yugo- Chandler, David (2000), Bosnia: Fak- None of the above initiatives can be car- slavia, New York: Columbia University Press. ing Democracy After Dayton, London: Pluto ried through either quickly or without BALTDEFCOL [Baltic Defence Col- Press. problems. Problems with doctrine, technol- lege] (2001), ”Report by the Joint Services Fitzgerald, Sgt. Peter (2001), ”The ogy, organisation, education and other is- Command and Staff College Validation Armed Forces in Bosnia and sues should be solved assuming that the will Team”, 15. juni 2001, [http://www.bdcol. Herzegovina”, SFOR Informer, 127, 28. is there. With Croatia’s and Yugoslavia’s eyes ee/bdcol/pdf_files/whitebook/ november 2001, [http://www.nato.int/ focused on the EU, one of the most consid- 12wb2001.pdf]. sfor/indexinf/127/p03a/chapter4.htm]. erable hindrances for integration in Bosnia BBC (2000), ”Srebrenica Timeline”, The Guardian (2001), ”Serb General is reduced, namely support from the two March 14, 2000, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Convicted of Genocide”, August 2, 2001. countries to their ethnic fellows. 1/hi/world/europe/675945.stm]. The Guardian, (2002), ”General The decisive factor is whether the BBC (2002), ”Kostunica Pushes for EU Hypocricy”, September 27, 2002. young and progressive officers succeed in Membership”, November 15, 2002, [http:/ Hansen, Kenneth Schmidt og Metzsch taking the leading posts in the armed /news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ Michael (2002), Et nyt albansk spørgsmål, forces. If not, the process of reform will 1024790.stm]. DUPI Report 2002/14, København. be particularly difficult. Boucher, Richard (2002), ”Bosnia and Huntington, Samuel P. (1957), The Sol- One can make a comparison with the Herzegovina – Successful Completion of dier and the State, Cambridge, Mass: The chicken and the egg: reforms will require Military Train and Equip Program”, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. that younger and dynamic officers take pressekonference, Washington D.C., Oc- IISS [The International Institute for the lead, but this is only possible when tober 30, 2002, [http://www.state.gov/r/ Strategic Studies] (2001), The Military Bal- the process has already started. Therefore pa/prs/ps/2002/14799.htm]. ance 2001/2002, Oxford: Oxford Univer- it must be the international community Brett, Julian Elgaard (2001), Lessons sity Press. in Bosnia that acts as a promoter and cata- Learned from the BALTBAT Project, IISS [The International Institute for lyst for the process. København: Forsvarsministeriet. Strategic Studies] (2002), The Military Bal-

159 ance 2002/2003, Oxford: Oxford Univer- Milisic, Mai 21, 2002, [http://www.nato. Radio Free Europe (2002a),”Bosnian sity Press. int/sfor/trans/2002/t020521a.htm]. Serb Leaders Rebuff NATO”, August 22, Jane’s (2002), ”The Balkans”, Jane’s Sen- Nielsen, K.V. (1986), ”Krigsfilosofi og 2002, [http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ tinel Security Assessment , 10, Mai 2, 2002. militærteorier” i Niels Berg (red.), Carl von 2002/08/220802.asp]. Kværnø (2003), Interview med Profes- Clausewitz, Om krig, København: Rhodos. Radio Free Europe (2002b), ”Bosnian sor Ole Kværnø, Institute for Defence Stud- OECD (2002), ”Stability Pact Anticor- Serb Leader Says Yes to NATO, No to ies, Baltic Defence College, februar 2003. ruption Initiative”, December 12, 2002, Ministry”, August 23, 2002, [http:// NATO (2001), ”Transcript: Joint Press [http://www1.oecd.org/daf/SPAIcom/.htm]. www.rferl. org/newsline/2002/08/ Conference”, Brigadegeneral Tom Strik OHR (2002), ”Speech by the High 230802.asp]. på SFOR pressekonference, October 11, Representative for Bosnia and Radio Free Europe (2002c), 2001, [http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/ Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown to the ”Kostunica’s Party Defends His Remarks 2001/t011011a.htm]. United Nations Security Council”, Octo- on Republika Srpska”, September 12, NATO (2002a), ”Questions & Answers ber 23, 2002, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr- 2002, [http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ during the Press Conference by Lord dept/presso/presssp/default.asp? 2002/08/120902.asp]. Robertson, NATO Secretary General fol- content_id=28226]. Radio Free Europe (2002d), ”Top lowing the Meeting of the North Atlan- OSCE (2002a), ”OSCE Reiterates the Bosnian Serb Defence Officials Ousted tic Council at the Level of Heads of State Call for Affordable Armed Forces in over Iraq Arms Scandal ”, October 29, and Government”, NATO’s secretary gen- Bosnia and Herzegovina”,March 4, 2002. 2002, [http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ eral George Robertson after the North [http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3 2002/10/291002.asp]. Atlantic Councils meeting at the level of ?news_id=2325]. Radio Free Europe (2002e), ” and heads of governments in Prague, Novem- OSCE (2002b), ”Military Expenditures SFOR Commander Says the Same for ber 21, 2002, [http://www.nato.int/docu/ Reduction Initiative” November 11, 2002, Bosnia ”, October 30, 2002, [http://www. speech/2002/s021121r .htm]. [http://www.oscebih.org/military/eng/ rferl.org/newsline/2002/10/301002.asp]. NATO (2002b), ”Transcript: Press Con- military.htm]. Ritzaus Bureau (1998), ”Domstol ference”, press conference in ”Coalition Racan, Ivica (2000), ”Making Up for dømmer tre bosniere for krigsforbry- Press Information Center” in Tito Bar- Lost Time”, NATO Review, 48:2, Summer- delser”, November 16, 1998. racks with the spokesman for OHR Oleg Autumn, pp. 8-9. Sell, Louis (2002, Slobodan Milosovic and

160 the Destruction of Yugoslavia, London: Duke The Word Bank (2002b), ”Memorandum 2 The concept “professionally based military” University Press. of the President of the International De- is applied as a term for an officer corps that has a professional and social sense of responsibility. Transparency International (2002), velopment Association to the Executive The term is not the same as “professional mili- ”Widespread Corruption Persists at all Directors on a Country Assistance Strat- tary” which just express that the military use per- Levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Banja egy Progress Report of the World Bank manently employed personnel such as conscripts. Luka/Mostar”, July 9, 2002, [http:// Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Re- 3 For instance, expressed by Lord Paddy port nr. 24978, October 15, 2002, [http:// Ashdown, UN High Representative for Bosnia- www.transparency.org/pressreleases Herzegovina in a speech to the Security Council _archive/nat_chaps_press/2002.07.09. www.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attach- in UN 23/10 2002 (OHR, 2002). bih_widespread.html]. ments/ CAS_INT/$File/WB-1-8_Page.pdf]. 4 In the Alliance’s strategic concept from 1999, Weber, Max (1971), Makt og byråkrati, PfP is thus one of the five core functions of NATO. Udenrigsministeriet (2002), ”Landeinfo 5 Oslo: Gyldendal. Yugoslavia has applied for a membership of om Forbundsrepublikken Jugoslavien”, the PfP on the 24th of April 2002 (Udenrigs- November 22, 2002, [http://www.um.dk/ ministeriet, 2002). 1 We would like to thank the people who helped 6 Besides the microstates Andorra, Liechtenstein, cgi-bin/dyn3nt/dyn3.exe?prog us to compose this publication. This applies to =show&pageid=96&land=108]. San Marino, Monaco, the Holy See plus the is- all the employees at the Nytorv-department for lands of Malta and Cyprus. The World Bank (2000), ”Bosnia and the Institute of International Studies (formerly 7 This is the way that statements which are in Herzegovina: A Diagnostic Survey of DUPI), particularly Kenneth Schmidt Hansen and favour of independence or territorial separation Corruption”, November 17, 2002, [http:/ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen for their advice and of the country or are referring to provinces as guidance. In relation with a study trip to Bosnia, sovereign territories as unconstitutional are looked /www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/ we would like to thank Carsten Svensson and upon (Chandler, 2000: 120-21). anticorrupt/ Bosnianticorruption.pdf]. Georg Güntelberg for invaluable and professional 8 That some Serbs still sympathize with those The World Bank (2002a), ”State Appa- assistance. We would also like to thank Ole goals the second round in the Serbian election Kværnø for a constructive and positive review ratus Spending 64 Percent of GDP In BIH”, campaign in September 2002 showed, where the reading as well as for input regarding the Baltic Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica during an Speech by the manager for the Word Defence College. In addition to this, Bent Hansen election meeting in the Serbian city Mali Zvornik Bank, Joseph Ingram, in Sarajevo, Novem- has done a tremendous work in proofreading. – apparently to please the nationalistic voters – ber 17, 2002,[http://www.worldbank. Also, we would like to thank Anni Kistensen for described the RS as a part of the family that was the printing ect. All have contributed to improve temporarily separated from its Serbian mother- org.ba/ECA/Bosnia&Herzegovina.nsf/ this paper. The responsibility for arguments and land. Subsequently members of the party of ECADocByLink/A26FE8668D3997C3 the remaining mistakes and flaws is solely the Kostunica defended the statement by saying that C1256C750033301F?Opendocument]. responsibility of the authors. they did not view the statement as controversial

161 but rather as a goal that they strived for (Radio weapons and materiel) plus the doctrines em- Free Europe, 2002c). ployed. It is assumed that the circulation is dy- 9 According to the OSCE Bosnia can only fi- namic and therefore a change of one factor will nance the maintenance of about half of the present cause changes of the other two as well (Nielsen, forces (OSCE, 2002b). 1986: 959). 10 The Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and 17 Two Bosnian-Muslims and a Bosnian-Croat the Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Raca stated in were thus sentenced to many years of imprisonment the autumn 2000 that their states would apply for for their role in a terror regime in the Celebici camp membership in the EU (BBC, 2000: Racan: 8-9). in central Bosnia in 1992 (Ritzaus Bureau, 1998). 11 In 2002 there have been made further reduc- 18 The now pensioned general was, during the tions cf. page 17 (OSCE, 2000b). Yugoslav civil war, at the top of the Croatian 12 According to Weber, the modern state is an military command and is charged with having organised power that within an area can claim committed war crimes against civilian Serbs in monopoly of the legitimate use of violence as a the Krajina province in Croatia in September 1993 political means and therefore has gathered the (Guardian, 2002). material machinery in the leaders’ hand (Weber 19 That is, among other things, the reason why 1971: 8). many initiatives have been taken to fight corrup- 13 The article will only focus on the officer corps tion in Bosnia, such as the Stability Pact’s anti and not on the non-commissioned officers and on corruptions initiative. Latest, the Bosnian minister privates, because partly it is officers who take the for foreign trade and economic relations Azra most important decisions in the military, and partly Hadziahmetovic, together with the World Bank Huntington sees the privates and non-commissioned and the UNHR, introduced a plan for fighting officers as practitioners of violence and not as offic- corruption involving the civilian Bosnian popula- ers who control violence (Huntington, 1957: 13). tion (OECD, 2002). 14 The most mentioned of these is the massacre 20 The first officers were fully trained in 2002, in Srebrenica, where Serbian militias attacked and and the College has been evaluated by the UK killed about 7000 Muslims in an area which was Joint Services Command and Staff College with a under the UN protection (BBC, 2000). positive result (BALTDEFCOL, 2001). 15 It is, among other things, claimed that it is some of the main problems for the implementa- tion of economic reforms in Bosnia (the World Bank, 2002). 16 A model to describe the coherence between the military organisation, technology (such as

162 Tartu in the 1941 Summer War

By Major Riho Rõngelep and Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen*

he centre of Tartu city was heavily effort of the Army Group North was in land bridge between the Võrts Lake and damaged in July 1941 in a few days the axis east of the Lake Peipsi. the Lake Peipsi. of combat. The fighting took place because Only weak forces were initially detached It also took place because the Emajõgi the momentum of the German invasion for operations against Estonia. These Ger- River connecting the two lakes and di- of the northern part of the Soviet Union man forces had their objectives in North viding the town gave support to the hast- lapsed after the first couple of weeks of and Northwest Estonia, including the is- ily improvised Soviet defence. The fight- rapid advance, making it possible for the lands. That part of the country was used ing had three phases: Soviet forces to stabilise the front for bases by the Soviet air force and na- • Initially the Estonian liberation and temporarily in central Estonia, and val aviation bomber forces. An Army defence of the southern part of Tartu and thereby gaining more time to prepare the Corps of two infantry divisions attacked Tartu county south of the Emajõgi. defences of Leningrad. towards Pärnu and Viljandi respectively, • Thereafter the German-Soviet fight for The fighting in and around the town when determined Soviet resistance control of the river line, both sides rein- was a tactical sideshow in an operational stopped their lead elements. forcing their initially deployed forces, the sideshow of a strategic sideshow. The Ger- The fighting in Tartu took place be- engagements gradually moving away from man Army Group North offensive was cause an Estonian armed rebellion had the town. secondary to the main German effort, the liberated the Southeastern part of the • Finally the isolation and defeat of the strategic offensive of Army Group Cen- country, making it logical for the Ger- Soviet forces north of the river, between tre against Moscow. The operational main man forces to test the possibilities of the the two large lakes. * Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College. Major Riho Rõngelep is a Directing Staff member at the Baltic Defence College.

165 Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive Courtesy of Tartu Map of Tartu 1927 Map of Tartu

166 It is no longer easy to uncover what ac- to build a heavy industry that could sup- European war was close, Stalin realised tually happened that July in and around port a massive, modern military machine. that he had to do everything possible Tartu. To the Soviet and German military By the mid-1930s he had succeeded in to compensate for his self-inflicted mili- historians it was an insignificant episode in creating a huge and well-officered force, tary weakness. He needed time to re- the fighting, preceding the Siege of in some conceptual and equipment areas stabilise the army. He also decided that Leningrad. To the Estonians it was much leading in the world. However, in his he needed geographical buffer space to more; it was an important manifestation of general campaign to destroy all other cen- reduce the strategic vulnerability which their will to regain independence. However, tres of independent power, the Soviet was the result of the 1920 borders. The from the return of the Russians in 1944 dictator turned against the Red Army’s Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave him and until the late 1980s, the anti-Soviet ris- leadership and destroyed it in 1937-38, both. ing of 1941 could not be researched. After leaving the Independence in 1991, the reconstruction force without has been severely hampered by the very lim- its professional ited amount of sources left in Estonia. The brain and hav- main basis of the sources was the original ing lost the will interviews with surviving witnesses. to show initia- This is the first attempt to place the tive and inde- Estonian popular rising in South Esto- pendent action nia and Liberation of Tartu in early July on a battle- 1941 within the framework of the Ger- field, which is man operations, giving a more complete the core of picture of the “Summer War”. military effec- tiveness. Prologue When it be- The cornerstone of the Defence League building at the meeting of came clear in Võru and Riia Streets was laid 3rd September. Since the late 1920s Stalin had brutally spring 1939 Four weeks later the first Soviet troops had entered Estonia. mobilised and enslaved the Soviet society that a general Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive

167 Late September the eastern half of Po- was winning the European war, and that risen to more that 500.000, increasingly land was absorbed, and when demands for he could ignore any – sentimental – French concentrated in the South, close to the bases in the Baltic states were backed by a and British support to the Baltic states’ German border. Thus the 11th Rifle Di- massive deployment of troops towards independence. The three states were in- vision, which arrived at Tartu in Febru- their borders, the three governments gave vaded mid June following an ultimatum ary from Kuressaare, moved on to Vilnius in to the pressure. By 28 September, Es- to each country and annexed into the in May (again according to the Swedish tonia entered a Pact of Mutual Assistance Soviet Union after rigged elections. Esto- intelligence). with the Soviet Union, accompanied by nia was invaded by 80.000 troops on 17 The situation in Estonia had become the deployment of 30.000 Soviet troops June. According to the Swedish intelli- disastrous. The Soviet Union controlled on its national territory (twice the Esto- gence, Tartu became the garrison of the all the institutions of the state, all areas of nian Defence Force total). The Soviet 90th Rifle Division. life. During that spring the pressure Union had gained rights to create naval The Estonian military leadership dis- against the Baltic peoples grew dramati- and air bases on the Saaremaa, the Hiiumaa appeared as a result of deportations and cally, with its peak in massive and well- and at Paldiski as well as the right to use death in prisons or camps. The army was prepared deportations on 14 June. Tallinn Port for two years. However, the transformed to form the main part of the Around 10.000 persons were picked up arriving generals also demanded air bases 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps of the Red in Estonia alone, including the families inland, and the Estonian government was Army (with the 180th, 181st and 182nd Rifle of those already deported or killed dur- in no position to reject that demand. Divisions, the first and last with head- ing the previous months. The pressure Where the Red forces established their quarters in Estonia). The surviving cadre and the risk of deportations led many to bases, Estonia lost all control. Thus, when was exposed to pressure and brainwash- hide in the woods to avoid being picked- the Soviet demands for bases in Finland ing. The voluntary defence force, Kaitseliit up, becoming “Forest Brothers”. were rejected by the Finns, and the Win- (Defence League) was disbanded and dis- The Baltic peoples had had their expe- ter War followed, the air bases in “inde- armed. The Baltic Sea Fleet moved its rience of what Soviet rule under Stalin pendent” and “neutral” Estonia were used headquarters to Tallinn, and the 8th Army meant. The naivety about what could be by the Soviet bomber forces. established itself in Rakvere. expected which had contributed to the In the early summer of 1940 it became In the late spring of 1941, the number decisions not to resist had gone. It was clear to Stalin that his partner, Germany, of Soviet troops in the Baltic states had concluded that only Germany could help.

168 June, splitting the defending Soviet 8 th the Finnish Gulf along the Luga river 22 June to 9 July – the framework and 11 th Armies. The Baltic Sea Navy ending at the Ilmen lake was now selected started to evacuate its bases in Latvia on as the main forward defence of the city. The German invasion came as a sur- 29 June. On that day Manstein broke out All construction work in the city stopped prise to Stalin, but his subordinates had of the Daugavpils bridgehead in spite of and 30.000 workers were sent to develop continued and intensified preparations for hard and aggressive resistance by the So- the defences in a special Rear Lines Con- war in the weeks of May and June. Even viet forces, and continued towards struction Administration created for that if the 14 June deportations may have been Ostrov. Other German forces captured purpose on 29 July. A special operational unconnected to the defence preparations, Riga on 1 July. group for the control of the defence line they added to the pressure on the Baltic The 18 th German Army1 that followed was established one week later. On 30 June populations and removed potentially dis- the Panzer Group and covered its West- the decision was taken to raise a locally loyal elements. ern flank, also attacked with its main ef- drafted militia army. Without training On 20 June followed the announce- fort East of the Lake Peipsi via Pskov. this loose mob was sent to man the Luga ment of General Mobilisation in Estonia, The Germans – correctly – did not expect line, only armed with light weapons – and including both the former national army, the Soviets to deploy large forces in de- slaughtered by the advancing Germans on now the 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps, and fence of Estonia, and the 18 th Army only their arrival. Everything had to be done young conscripts. The invasion of the sent the XXVI Army Corps2 with the 217 to gain time and weaken the German of- Soviet Union followed two days later. th and 61st Infantry Divisions up the coast fensive. Army Group North attacked into of the Riga Gulf, crossing into Estonia at The Soviets also attempted to stabilise Lithuania from East Prussia with the main Ikla on 7 July. Forces of the defending the situation by shuffling the command- effort in the direction via Kaunas and Soviet 8 th Army met the German advance. ers. On 4 July Lieutenant General P.P. onwards to the River Daugava. Kaunas The 10th Rifle Corps was used to delay Sobennikov, the commander of the 8th was liberated by the Lithuanians ahead of and stop the German corps. Army responsible for the defence of the the arrival of the Germans, and the lead- The threat to Leningrad was already Baltic coast – and Estonia – was moved ing elements of the Panzergruppe 4 un- clear one week into the war. The defence up to command the Front. Lieutenant der General Erich von Manstein succeeded preparations became desperate. A line 100 General F.S. Ivanov became the 8th Army in capturing bridges at Daugavpils on 26 kilometres southwest of Leningrad from commander.

169 Beyond the mobilisation of the former erated by Estonians before the arrival of In early summer of 1941 the young re- Estonian army that was going to be used the German units. In the Southwest, the sistance movement gathered information in the defence of the Soviet Union, the rebellions gained control up to the line about the communists and their move- authorities established ”Destruction Bat- over Viljandi-Pärnu, where the 8th Soviet ments, established contacts with the now talions” to remove or destroy everything Army was deployed in an attempt to stop growing number of “Forests Brothers” and that could be used by the advancing Ger- the German onrush. investigated the possibilities to get weap- mans: assets that could not be moved such From the first contacts, the relations ons. Some members of the organisation as infrastructure and industry. Estonian between the Estonians and German sol- infiltrated Soviet organisations and there- communists and everyone whom the So- diers were good. The invader was seen as after served as information sources. The viet authorities had succeeded in attract- a partner in the fight against a common resistance meeting place was in the previ- ing during the year of occupation manned enemy. The German High Command was ous Estonian Healthcare Museum just op- these units. approached several times with the requests posite of the NKVD (National Commit- The mobilising Estonians realised that for additional weapons and the Germans tee of Internal Affairs/Narodnij Kommi- their units would be used outside the responded positively to those requests even sariat Vnutrennih Del) building in Kindral country and against what most saw as their before their main units actually arrived. Põdra Street3 . national interests. They were to be sent to During early July of 1941 the activi- Leningrad, Pskov and Ostrov, and many Events up to 9 July preparing the fled and joined the ”Forest Brothers”, rebellion in Tartu ties of the organisation intensified fur- including a significant number of regu- ther, inspired by news from the Finn- lar officers who had not been removed Organised resistance in Tartu had al- ish radio about the approaching Ger- by the initial purges and the deportations. ready started in mid March 1941. One of man troops. The group decided to lib- The number of persons willing to risk the student groups took the initiative to erate the town and developed plans of and able to participate in an armed rebel- co-ordinate its actions with other similar action. It was understood that in order lion had thus been rising at the same time groups known to be active at the time. to avoid Soviet destruction of key in- where possibilities of success grew day by Like in most early resistance movements, frastructure, the liberation should take day. Thus during the first ten days of the initial aim was to collect and spread place prior to the arrival of the Ger- July practically all South Estonia was lib- information. man units.

170 Different groups were tasked to pre- severely damaging build- pare taking control over key objects: tele- ings in the old town cen- phone relay stations, postal offices etc. As tre with the falling large it was foreseen that the Soviets would granite stones. On that destroy the bridges over Emajõgi, it was day, 9 July, the only So- decided to concentrate all action and all viet armed elements re- forces in the parts of Tartu, south of the maining in Tartu were a river. The start of the operations against destruction battalion and the different objects would be co- some of the NKVD spe- ordinated. In June, agreement had been cial groups that had to reached between the resistance and Tartu destroy the town imme- University Hospital about the treatment diately prior to the ar- The Stone Bridge in 1939 seen from the South of casualties. rival of the Germans. On 6 July a squadron of German Liaison was estab- fighter aircraft attacked Raadi air base lished to the “Forest North of the river. That day the last mem- Brothers” to ensure their bers of the communist party left the town support for uprising. followed by the NKVD and the remain- Ensign Olev Reintalu was ing Red Army units. The pontoon bridge appointed as overall near the Market Hall was also demolished leader of the resistance, on that day. and during a meeting in On 8 July preparations started to blow- Estonian Healthcare Mu- up the Stone Bridge at the North end of seum on 09th of July it the City Hall Square. At 0637 the follow- was decided to start open ing morning a 1-ton charge was detonated, operations to liberate from the same place after the demolition. destroying the northern end of the 157 Tartu the next morning, Both photos are from Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp: years old bridge, and at the same time 10 July, at 0730. Tartu Kivisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941; Tallinn 1997

171 Ensign Olev Reintalu Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

Tartu City Centre 1938. Map: courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive.

172 On 9 July, the 61st German Infantry Captain Glasenapp, in Võru Street close The information about German units Division attempted an attack to the north to the down town. The German armoured in town caused the Soviets to withdraw close to Viljandi from Western side of the cars were part of the reconnaissance unit hastily across the river. Some of the Sovi- Võrts lake in order to reach Tartu with a that reached Võru4 . There was a short ets tried to hide in buildings to attempt reconnaissance patrol, but failed. engagement and this event triggered the an escape later. actual fighting for Tartu. Without meeting further resistance the 10 July – German reconnaissance element continued the Estonian liberation of Tartu to the centre of town, where one of the armoured cars continued along the At the time agreed, the activists gath- Emajõgi river, firing at the Soviet trenches ered at the museum. Shortly thereafter the across the river. first prisoner was taken, who was a mem- As the Germans moved deeper into the ber of a destruction battalion. Then the town, an increasing number of the Esto- situation got more difficult, as a combined nian resistance fighters joined them. The Soviet force of around 300 took up a po- appearance of the armoured cars was a sition close to the railway line on Riga great moral support for the members of Street, one of the most likely access routes resistance. The fact that German forces had into the town for the Germans. In addi- arrived to Tartu made the initially weak tion to this force, a number of NKVD Soviet forces cautious. They did not cross and destruction battalion members moved the river, therefore they could not imple- across the remaining Western-most “Lib- ment the destruction of Tartu. However, erty” Bridge” to the southern part of Tartu. the small unit left the town again the same Thus by early afternoon the Soviets had evening, around 1800. It had only lasted re-established control over the town. long enough to make the Soviets react The situation developed further, when Captain Kurt von Glasenapp and encourage the resistance. during afternoon a Soviet truck met three Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Thereafter the members of the resis- German armoured cars, commanded by II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957 tance discussed the implications of the

173 event during the meeting on Riga Hill. sectors along the river to stop possible of the town announced the return of The situation was critical. The Soviet Soviet attempts to cross. Others were used regular troops of the Red Army. What troops were still just across the river, and to “clean” the southern part of the town, probably had happened was that the news as the Liberty Bridge was still intact, noth- getting rid of the small groups or single of the German arrival had promted the ing kept them from returning. As the persons that had been left behind when Soviet 8th Army send the 16th Rifle Divi- number of organised resistance members the appearance of the German troops sion, the only available formation, to Tartu was still far too small to defend the town, caused panic among the Soviets. This took to meet the threat. That division was the recruiting amongst the remaining male the character of individual resistance mem- first element of the 11th Rifle Corps, which population started immediately. At the bers going hunting with pistols or rifles later got responsibility for holding the same time messengers were sent to Võru and delaying the proper organisation in area between the lakes of Peipsi and Võrts. where German units were stationed with units of many of the potential fighters. Together with the 10th Rifle Corps of the requests for weapons. In order to make it possible to distin- 8th Army it defended the approaches to Then information spread that a Soviet guish friend from foe (and as a result also Leningrad via Narva. attempt the night before had failed to to form the members of the resistance This Soviet reaction was matched by a destroy the armoury of the former 2nd into combatants under international law) parallel German decision. On that evening Estonian Division completely. It had been they were issued with white emblems with the 18th German Army placed the I Army abandoned, and the local population had the crest of the Estonian Republic or an Corps Reconnaissance Task Force succeeded in salvaging 300 rifles with armband with the Estonian national “Burdach”5 under command of the XXVI ammunition. The leader of the resistance colours. Corps for use in the axis via Tartu. Why made sure that the weapons were collected, The evening on 10 July brought the that decision was taken is not completely and that stroke of luck saved the situa- first phase of the battle and the first ele- clear. The most likely causes are the re- tion. ments of the second to an end. At 2040 ports of the armoured car patrol from The now better-armed members of the the Soviets blew up the remaining Lib- Võru and the contact thereafter made by resistance were organised close to the newly erty Bridge to avoid it being taken by the Estonian Resistance groups from built, former Defence League building on the Germans or the Estonian resistance. Tartu. Riga Hill (where the Baltic Defence Col- However, shortly thereafter the start The liberation of Tartu was meant to lege is today). Groups were dispatched to of artillery fire against the southern part protect the town against destruction by

174 demolition. However, now the southern medical kit for the fighters. The defence part of town centre along the river be- was continuously reinforced with the par- came exposed to an increasingly intense tisan groups arriving from all over South artillery barrage, as well as to the Soviet Estonia. On that day Major Kurg, another efforts to clear fields of fire by torching regular officer, arrived to town with his buildings on the northern side of the group. He thereafter, as the senior mili- river. During this first night, the artil- tary officer in Tartu, took over command lery fire was relatively light. It was prob- of the resistance forces. His command ably only meant to harass the deployment post with security elements was established of German troops. next to the Defence League Building. During the evening and night the Re- Contact was established with other resis- sistance deployed its forces in defensive tance groups East and West, thereafter groups along the river. Armed groups, forming an Estonian armed presence all which arrived from the surrounding along the river line. The forces in Tartu, counties reinforced the defence. The first a mix of the town resistance and arrived regular Estonian Army officers arrived to “Forests Brothers”, were now organised Tartu with their armed groups. Among as the “Tartu Partisan Battalion” with four first of them was captain Karl Talpak. normal and one “Guard” company. The The arrival of experienced officers in- strength increased gradually to around 700. creased the morale significantly. The night Captain Karl Talpak The total strength of the Resistance in the was relatively quiet. The Soviets tried once Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Tartu area is estimated to have been around to cross the river in the new workers resi- II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957 1000. The companies were assigned the dential area of Karlova around one following tasks: the 1st and the 3rd Compa- kilometre southeast of the town centre. During 11 June the Estonian effort nies were deployed to defend the South Captain Talpak’s group forced the at- took an increasingly organised form. The river bank in the town; the 4th Company tempt, probably a combat patrol, to re- members of Women Defence League took positions in Western Tartu where treat. organised field kitchens and prepared the North bank dominates the South bank

175 making the risk of crossing significant; rived in Tartu on the morning of 11 July, interpreters. The German units took po- the 2nd Company took positions 10 km capturing the town in a “daring raid”. sitions close to the Tähtvere manor house southeast to Tartu (probably covering the The Estonian Resistance is not mentioned. and park in the north western part of the area at Luunja and towards the East). The According to the Estonian sources, the town. Guard Company was responsible for Germans only arrived on the next day6 . guarding stocks and emerging town in- The liberation and defence of south- stitutions. ern Tartu is one of the most important The effort to “clean” the town of the achievements of the 1941 “Summer War”. remaining Soviet elements continued, It advanced and eased the German cap- when they made movement on the streets ture of Estonia, and her oppressed people dangerous by sniping at the members of hoped, in vain, that it would lead to a the Resistance. Now the incidents were renewed independence. It was initiated by taken care of by reaction groups com- a small group of patriotic students with- manded by an officer or a non-commis- out military expertise. Their action be- sioned officer (NCO). This was, as always, came an issue of national pride in the a very time consuming activity as build- long dark decades ahead. ings had to be searched completely. During the day the artillery barrage From 12 July – the escalation to intensified, resulting in some serious dam- larger scale German-Soviet fighting age. Soviet agents contributed to the de- struction by setting fire to a large num- On 12 July the first stronger German Major Friedrich Kurg ber of buildings with Molotov cocktails. elements from the Task Force “Burdach Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Other Soviet agents were found control- came to the support of the Tartu Partisan II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957 ling the artillery fire, hiding on high Battalion. It consisted of anti-tank gun ground or in church towers. platoons7 . German speaking students and On the arrival, the German units were According to the German narrative, Estonian army officers were assigned to met by accurate artillery fire, an indica- elements of the Task Force “Burdach” ar- anti-tank guns crews as liaison officers and tion of the effectiveness of the Soviet ar-

176 tillery observers who stayed behind. nian nor German narratives mention this Effective artillery fire led to a hunt for Heavy artillery fire against the area around – they both ignore the effort of the other the observers, and a vast number was the Riga Hill forced Major Kurg to move - there probably was division of respon- found and killed that day. Thereafter the his command post to the south eastern sibility leaving the Estonian Resistance to bombardment became less well-directed, part of the town, close to an exhibition defend the central and eastern parts of still, however, destroying a large number ground here. Even if neither the Esto- the town8 . of buildings. The destruction of Tartu was also continued in the northern part of the town, which was controlled by the Soviets. Buildings were burned down sys- tematically, street by street. The German narrative mentions that the Soviet air force bombed their positions in the Tartu area on that day. During the following days, the Task Force “Burdach” carried the main bur- den of fighting the 16th Soviet Rifle Di- vision. The Estonian narrative mentions a “stabilisation” of the situation, whereas the German narrative underlined how difficult it became to contain the Soviet formation’s aggressive forays across the river. On 12 July Army Group North ac- knowledged that the Soviets would fight hard for Estonia, not withdraw quickly The damaged town centre south of the river. as they had from Lithuania and Latvia. Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive. The German 18th Army realised now that

177 the 8th Soviet Army in Rakvere was de- From 18 to 20 July the pressure of the of Burdach’s force on their arrival on 21 ploying two Rifle Corps in the defence 11th Rifle Corps’ two divisions against the July10 . of North Estonia, and the 254th Infantry Task Force “Burdach” developed into a From 20 July, the 18th Army concentrated Division was sent from Võru to join the critical situation, and the 18th Army was its attention in Estonia. The mission was to 61st Division near Viljandi. The 291st In- forced to send the 93rd Infantry Division keep the Soviet forces in Estonia from rein- fantry Division was given orders to move to the Tartu front. Seconded elements forcing the defence of Leningrad. Its head- from Kurzeme (Kurland) to join the 217th from that division doubled the strength quarter (HQ) was now in Võru. Division North of Pärnu. Two more Soviet rifle divisions, the 48th and 125th were assembled by the 11th Rifle Corps in North Estonia on 14 July, and two days later they appeared on the northern side of the Emajõgi9 , relieving the 16th Division. The 48th Division had deployed to the West and the 125th had deployed to the East of Tartu. On that day the good summer weather was re- placed by rain and thunderstorms, wors- ening the road conditions and hamper- ing operations. On 16 July, the 18th Army also decided to employ its last reserve, the 93rd Infantry Division, in Estonia. XXVI Corps now resumed its offen- sive operations in Western Estonia on 17 July, but no significant progress was pos- sible until significant parts of the two The view of Soola Street towards the river. additional divisions became available. Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

178 the artillery left, leaving only a The last phase of the Tartu couple of rifle battalions as a screen. fighting, the destruction of The 93rd Division had created a the 11th Rifle Corps small flotilla of fishing boats and combat engineer assault boats. It On 21 July, the 18 Army decided to was now used to occupy the island accomplish its mission by an operation of Piirisaar in the Lake Peipsi and from the Viljandi area, initially cutting to land forces on the coast North off the 11th Rifle Corps by an advance in of the Emajõgi, and during the its back to the Peipsi Lake, thereafter cut- next days elements of the division ting of the rest of the 8th Army in North- advanced up the shore of the lake. west Estonia by an advance to the Finn- Forward elements of the 61st ish Gulf. Division reached the lake 7 Early next morning the offensive kilometres south of Mustvee on the started with the 61st, 217th and 254th Divi- night 24-25 July, and on the fol- sions. The 61th Division captured two lowing day the 254th Division oc- bridges in Põltsamaa intact at noon and cupied the town. Parts of the 11th continued towards Jõgeva, where Soviet Rifle Corps that had not escaped forces on 23 July fought to avoid the were surrounded, and the follow- Germans cutting the main road out of ing days the German forces had to Tartu to the North. The 11th Rifle Corps meet several attempts to break out. had realised the threat to the 125th and On 25 July, the 93rd Division got 48th Rifle Divisions. The Task Force command of all forces advancing “Burdach” and the 93rd Division found north from Tartu. that the resistance of the forces in front On 29 July, the 18th Army of them lessened. During the night 23-24 started the next part of the offen- July, the bulk of the Soviet forces with sive, the advance to the Finnish

179 Gulf to cut off and destroy the Soviet 58th Infantry Division east of Lake Peipsi, is estimated to have been around 100, forces in Northwestern Estonia. The XXVI the XXVI Corps offensive could swing mainly as a result of artillery fire. Army Corps commanded the 254th, 93rd, Northeast, after reaching Tapa and 61st and later the 291st Division in the Rakvere on the same day. The 254th Divi- offensive towards the Finnish Gulf. The sion reached Kunda and the coast two newly arrived XXXXII Corps would later days later. The continued offensive by command the offensive to capture North- the Corps met hard resistance that involved western Estonia and the islands. the survivors of the 125th and 48th Rifle Destruction of the surrounded rem- Divisions. It took 12 days of intense fight- nants of the 11th Rifle Corps was left to ing to capture Narva, and the XXVI Corps the 93rd Division and a task force from only crossed the 1920-1940 Estonian-So- the 61st Division. That mission was ac- viet border on 20 August. complished four days later, on 31 July, The XXXXII Corps with the 61st, 217th, Tartu south of the Emajõgi after the fight- bagging 8.794 prisoners, 68 artillery and 254th Divisions remained in Estonia. ing (a view along Aleksandri Street). Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive. pieces, 5 anti-tank guns, 5 tanks and 3 On 27 August, Tallinn was surrounded, and armoured cars captured. Thus the 1941 the following day the Soviets in the town The reason why the Estonian human fighting in the Tartu area ended, three gave up and surrendered, even if evacua- losses were relatively limited seems to be weeks after it was started by a small group tion of the communists and others from that after 10-12 July the fighting moved of Estonian students. the port was still ongoing. Haapsalu was away from the town centre toward the captured on 31 August. The German inva- river east and west of the town. That Aftermath sion of the Estonian Islands started 14 Sep- would also explain the very different Ger- tember and ended on 27 September. man and Estonian impressions of the In the offensive towards the coast, on In Tartu 1007 buildings had been de- events. That the Estonian picture of the 5 August, the 61st Division at Järva-Jaani stroyed. Purely Estonian part of the fight- period 12-24 July is less than complete is destroyed the 16th Rifle Division that had ing had been intense, but short. Only 19 confirmed by the interacting Soviet-Ger- fought the first days in Tartu. As a result resistance fighters had been killed and 23 man escalation in force build-up during of a successful advance towards Narva by wounded. The number of civilians killed that second phase, making it possible for

180 the Germans to bag most of two rifle di- evacuated Estonian communist leadership • Lars Ericson: “Buffert eller hot? De visions in the third phase. succeeded in getting permission to use baltiska staterna i svensk militär planering The Soviet choice to fight for Estonia the members of the construction battal- år 1941” in Bo Hugemark (ed.): I Orkanens that led to the fighting in Tartu did not ions to form the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps. öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet; Stockholm 1992. change anything. The terrain in the main It came to consist of 27.000, including • Germany and the Second World War. Army Group North axis did not allow around 23.000 Estonians. The Corps was Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union. much additional deployment of German used in the fighting of 1942 and 1943 Oxford 1998. forces, so the use of 5 infantry divisions and suffered massive losses, due to un- • Germany and the Second World War. in Estonia rather than in the main effort professional leadership. Between 1.200 and Volume IV. Maps. Stuttgart 1983. made no difference. Leningrad would 2.000 succeeded in surrendering to the • Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp: have survived anyway. Germans. The Corps was used in 1944 in Tartu Kivisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941; For the Estonians, however, that choice Estonia, especially in the hard fighting at Tallinn 1997. led to tragedies, far beyond the destruc- the Saaremaa at the foot of the Sõrve pen- • Werner Haupt: Baltikum 1941. Die tion and losses of the “Summer War”. The insula in the end of November. Here the Geschichte eines ungelösten Problems; Soviets used the time to “evacuate” ma- soldiers of the Corps fought against their Neckargemünd 1963. chinery, cattle, and vehicles as well as countrymen in German uniform – none • Vello Helk: Estlands Historie – kort fortalt. 25.000 Estonians to the East. On top of of them with a chance to escape. Thereaf- Odense 1993. that, 33.000 young Estonian men were ter more Estonians were mobilised into • Koguteos: Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Teises mobilised and transported to Russia. The the Corps before it was sent to Kurzeme Maailmasõjas IV; Stockholm 1957. mobilised 22nd Estonian Territorial Rifle (Kurland), ending the German-Soviet • Herbert Lindmäe: Suvesõda Tartumaal; Corps of about 7.000 Estonians was de- fighting for the reoccupation of Latvia. Tartu 1999. stroyed while fighting for the Soviets in • Tiit Noormets: “The summer War: 1941: 2.000 were killed, and 4.500 taken Bibliography the 1941 Armed Resistance in Estonia” in prisoner by the Germans. The rest, the The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States; recruits, were initially used in the “Con- • John Erickson: The Road to Stalingrad. Vilnius 1999. struction Battalions”, which were really Stalin’s War with Germany. Volume 1. Lon- • Erik Norberg: “Sjökrig i Östersjön. mobile forced labour camps. Then the don 1975. Sovjetiske planer och tysk aktivitet inför

181 uppgörelsen 1941” in Bo Hugemark (ed.): numbers of the units indicate that they were some 10 The 93rd Division (commanded by General I Orkanens öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet; of the original and thus best manned and Otto Tiemann), detached an infantry battalion equipped of the German army units. (II/ Infantry Regiment 270), one anti-tank battal- Stockholm 1992. 6 The Estonian sources identify the Germans as ion (number 193), one combat engineer company • Romuald Misiunas and Rein troops from the 93rd Infantry Division. This is a and one bicycle company to the task force. Taagepera: The Baltic States. Years of Depen- mistake. That division was still in Latvia, on the dence 1940-1990. Expanded and Updated way forward. It had been freed from the pool of reserve formations of the German Army and was Edition. London 1993. now the last reserve of the 18th Army. It was • “Estonia in World War II”, part of released for deployment to Estonia on 16 July. Tõnu Tannberg, Ain Mäesalu, Tõnis Lukas, The decision to use it in the Tartu area followed a Mati Laur and Ago Pajur: History of Esto- couple of days later, probably on 20th July, at the same time as the 18th Army established its HQ to nia; Tallinn 2000. Võru to concentrate its operations in Estonia. • Third Reich Factbook (www.skalman. On 21 July the division detached units to the nu/third-reich). Task Force “Burdach “ that doubled its strength. But the 93rd Division did not get command over the German forces in the Tartu sector until 25 1 Commanded by General Georg von Küchler July. (1881-1968) 7 The two Reconnaissance Battalions of the Task 2 Commanded by General Albert Wodrig Force consisted each of a horse cavalry squadron, 3 Named after General Ernst Põdder (1879- a bicycle squadron, and a heavy squadron with 1932), one of the War of Liberation commanders. one troop with three 37 mm anti-tank guns, a Now “Pepleri Street”. troop with two 75 mm infantry guns and a troop 4 This was probably a forward patrol from the with two armoured cars. There is no informa- later arriving I Army Corps Reconnaissance Task tion that the infantry battalion from Infantry Force “Burdach”. On the 10th it was still em- Regiment 2 was reinforced with anti-tank guns. ployed as a screen, linking the main force of the 8 The map of the official German history indi- 18th Army attacking east of the Peipsi, to its XXVI cates that the German line initially was extended Corps, attacking in Western Estonia. from the town towards the West along the river, 5 The task force under Major General Karl and only later to the East. Burdach (1891-1976) thereafter consisted of the 9 Both divisions had originally been based in Reconnaissance Battalions 1 and 11, as well as the Riga, had apparently been withdrawn via Pskov, First Battalion of Infantry Regiment 2. The low and were returning to the front via Narva.

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