Imploding Populations in Japan and Germany International Comparative Social Studies

Editor-in-Chief Mehdi P. Amineh Amsterdam International School for Social Sciences Research (AISSR)—University of Amsterdam and International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS)—University of Leiden

Editorial Board Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Simon Bromley, Open University, UK Harald Fuhr, University of Potsdam, Germany Gerd Junne, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Ngo Tak-Wing, University of Leiden, The Netherlands Mario Rutten, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Advisory Board W.A. Arts, University College Utrecht, The Netherlands L. Hantrais, Loughborough University, UK G.C.M. Lieten, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Willem van Schendel, University of Amsterdam/International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam L. Visano, York University, Canada

VOLUME 25 Imploding Populations in Japan and Germany

A Comparison

Edited by Florian Coulmas Ralph Lützeler

LEIDEN • BOSTON LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011 Cover illustration: Claus Harmer, DIJ Tokyo. “Population shortage nearing”

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Imploding populations in Japan and Germany : a comparison / edited by Florian Coulmas, Ralph Lützeler. p. ; cm. -- (International comparative social studies, ISSN 1568-4474 ; v. 25) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18778-8 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Demographic transition--Japan. 2. Demographic transition--Germany. 3. Population aging--Japan. 4. Population aging-- Germany. 5. Population--Japan. 6. Population--Germany. I. Coulmas, Florian. II. Lützeler, Ralph. III. Series: International comparative social studies ; v. 25. 1568-4474 [DNLM: 1. Demography--trends--Germany. 2. Demography--trends--Japan. 3. Aged-- Germany. 4. Aged--Japan. 5. Family Relations--Germany. 6. Family Relations--Japan. 7. Public Policy--Germany. 8. Public Policy--Japan. 9. Socioeconomic Factors--Germany. 10. Socioeconomic Factors--Japan. HB 3651]

HB887.I47 2011 304.6’20943--dc22

2011010105

ISSN 1568-4474 ISBN 978 90 04 18778 8

Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

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Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. CONTENTS

List of Contributors...... ix List of Abbreviations...... xi List of Tables and Figures...... xv

Population Implosion: Coping with the Unknown...... 1 Florian Coulmas and Ralph Lützeler

part i Societies of Population Decline

Confronting the Demographic Trilemma of Low Fertility, Ageing and Depopulation...... 35 Shigemi Kono Europe’s Demographic Future...... 55 Reiner Klingholz Flexible Employment, Flexible Families, and the Socialization of Reproduction...... 63 Wolfgang Streeck Economic Globalization and Changes in Family Formation as the Cause of Very Low Fertility in Japan...... 97 Shigesato Takahashi Income Inequality in a Rapidly Ageing Society, Japan: Focusing on Transformations in the Structure of Households with Elderly...... 115 Sawako Shirahase Ageing Societies: Present Challenges and Models for the Future...... 141 Gertrud M. Backes vi contents

part II Fertility Decline and Policy Implications

Japanese Family Policies in Comparative Perspective...... 151 Makoto Atoh Promoting Gender Equality, Birthrates, or Human Capital? Germany, Japan and Family Policy Discourse...... 175 Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Tuukka Toivonen Child Care and Work-Life Balance in Low Fertility Japan...... 203 Barbara G. Holthus Actors of Social Policy Making in Japan: A Look at the Individual Level...... 229 Axel Klein Growing Up in a Shrinking City: The Impact of Residential Segregation on the Qualitative Reproduction of Urban Society...... 247 Klaus Peter Strohmeier

part III Challenges and Chances of Ageing

Business Implications of Demographic Change in Japan: Chances and Challenges for Human Resource and Marketing Management...... 269 Florian Kohlbacher Silver Employment in Germany: Trends and Consequences for the Management of an Ageing Workforce...... 295 Christiane Hipp and Birgit Verworn New Housing Options for the Elderly in Japan: The Example of Tokyo’s Edogawa Ward...... 309 Maren Godzik The Political Economy of Health-Care Migration: A Japanese Perspective...... 323 Gabriele Vogt contents vii

Care for the Elderly and Demographic Change: Ageing and Migrant Nurses in the German State of North Rhine-Westphalia...... 347 Jens Friebe The Power of Address: Age and Gender in Japanese Eldercare Communication...... 361 Peter Backhaus Japan’s Adult Guardianship System: Statutory Guardianship and Volunteer Guardians...... 373 Junko Ando Japan’s Adult Guardianship Law: Current Status and Issues...... 383 Makoto Arai

part IV Regional Aspects of Ageing and Depopulation

Demographic Change and Challenges from a Regional Perspective: The Case of Germany...... 399 Franz-Josef Kemper Recent In-Migration to Peripheral Regions of Japan in the Context of Incipient National Population Decline...... 421 Yoshitaka Ishikawa Rural Depopulation and Economic Shrinkage in Japan: What Can Affected Municipalities Do About It?...... 443 Volker Elis Demographic, Economic and Institutional Shrinkage – from the Perspective of Rural Areas in Germany...... 461 Stephan Beetz Left Behind in the Global City: Spaces and Places of Ageing and Shrinking in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area...... 473 Ralph Lützeler

References...... 493 Index of Authors cited...... 529 Index of Subjects...... 535

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Junko Ando, German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo Makoto Arai, University of Tsukuba Law School Makoto Atoh, Waseda University, Graduate School of Human Sciences Gertrud Backes, University of Vechta, Centre for Ageing and Society Peter Backhaus, Waseda University, School of Education Stephan Beetz, Hochschule Mittweida (FH), Faculty of Social Work Florian Coulmas, German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo Volker Elis, German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo Jens Friebe, German Institute for Adult Education, Leibniz Centre for Lifelong Learning Maren Godzik, German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo Christiane Hipp, Brandenburg University of Technology, Organisation, Human Resource Management and General Management Barbara Holthus, Osaka University Yoshitaka Ishikawa, Kyoto University, Department of Geography Franz-Josef Kemper, Humboldt University, Institute for Geography Axel Klein, German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo Reiner Klingholz, Berlin Institute for Population and Development Florian Kohlbacher, German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo Shigemi Kono, Reitaku University, Economics and Business Adminis tration Ralph Lützeler, Ruhr University of Bochum, Centre for Interdiscipli nary Regional Studies (ZEFIR) Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, University of Oxford, Department of Social Policy and Social Work Sawako Shirahase, The University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology Wolfgang Streeck, Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne Klaus Peter Strohmeier, Ruhr University of Bochum, Centre for Inter disciplinary Regional Studies (ZEFIR) Shigesato Takahashi, National Institute for Population and Social Security Research x list of contributors

Tuukka Toivonen, University of Oxford, Green Templeton College Birgit Verworn, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research, Centre for Development and Scientific Controlling, Leipzig Gabriele Vogt, University of Hamburg, Asien-Afrika-Institut LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BBR Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung [Federal Office for construction and regional planning] BMFSFJ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [Federal Ministry for family, senior citizens, women and youths] BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung [Federal Ministry of Education and Research] BiB Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung [Federal Institute for Population Research]

CAO Cabinet Office CHLW Committee for Health, Labour and Welfare CEFR Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

DIE Deutsches Institut für Erwachsenenbildung [German Institute for Adult Education]

EPA Economic Partnership Agreements EU European Union

GCCIJ German Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Japan GDP Gross domestic product

HRM Human resource management

ILS Institut für Landes- und Stadtentwicklungsforschung [Research Institute for Regional and Urban Develop ment] IPSS National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (same as KSJK, KSJMK)

JILPT Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training JNA Japan Nursing Association JICWELS Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services JSPS Japan Society for the Promotion of Science xii list of abbreviations

KJK Kōseishō Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo [Population research institute of the Ministry of Health and Welfare] KRS Kōsei Rōdōshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare] KSJK/ Kokuritsu Shakaihoshō Jinkōmondai Kenkyūjo KSJMK [National Institute of Population and Social Security Research]

LDP Liberal Democratic Party VLFC Very-low fertility countries

MAGS Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales NRW [Ministry of labour, health and social affairs, North Rhine-Westphalia] MOJ Ministry of Justice [Hōmushō] MIAC Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications MHLW Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (same as KRS) MKS Monbu Kagakushō [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology] MLFC Moderately low fertility countries

NKKSK Nihon Kodomo Katei Sōgō Kenkyūjo [Japan Child and Family Research Institute] NIPPSR National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (same as KSJK) NPO Non Profit Organisation NRW North Rhine-Westphalia

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop ment

SJGKT Sōmushō Jichi Gyōsei-kyoku Kaso Taisaku-shitsu [Depopulated Areas Development Office, Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication] STHK Shōkibo Takinō Hōmu Kenkyūkai [Research association for small scale multifunctional residences]

TFR Total fertility rate TMA Tokyo Metropolitan Area list of abbreviations xiii

TJSK Tōkyō Jūtaku Seisaku Kenkyūkai [Institute for housing policy research Tokyo] TUHH Technical University Hamburg-Harburg

WHO World Health Organisation

ZEFIR Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Regionalforschung [Cen tre for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies]

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Coulmas & Lützeler 1. Demographic indicators for selected developed countries, latest available figures �� 10

Kono 1. Anatomy of population change: the case of Japan �� 40

Streeck 1. Change in regulation strictness of regular employment and of temporary employment in selected OECD countries, 1990–2006 �� 69 2. Germany: rate of economic activity and weekly working hours (men and women), 1970–2007 �� 70 3. Female employment and fertility in selected OECD countries, 1970 and 2005 �� 83 4. Combined spending on family and labour market policy (% of GDP) in selected OECD countries, 2005 �� 84 5. Rates of unmarried parenthood (%), by family policy spending and total fertility rates in selected OECD countries, 2005 �� 91

Takahashi 1. Number of children born to married women, by survey year (1977–2005) �� 105 2. Percentage of employed persons by major industry and sex �� 107

Shirahase 1. Three factors in the change of MLD among households with elderly members �� 126 xvi list of tables and figures

Atoh 1. Responses to the statement “Husbands work outside, and wives take care of the home” (%), Japan 1972–2007 �� 157 2a. Evaluations of and policy responses to fertility: moderately low fertility countries (MLFCs) �� 163 2b. Evaluations of and policy responses to fertility: very low fertility countries (VLFC) �� 164 3. Responses to the statement: “Husbands work outside, and wives take care of the home” in selected countries, 2002 �� 170

Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen 1. Women’s age at first childbirth in selected OECD countries �� 184 2. Fertility rates and share of births outside marriage �� 185 3. Maternal employment rates in selected OECD countries, 2005 (women aged 15–64) �� 186 4. Key child poverty indicators for selected OECD countries, mid-2000s �� 187 5. Trends in average annual working hours per person in employment �� 187 6. Supply of child care facilities (number of places as a percentage of age group), 1975–2006 �� 189

Holthus 1. Parental employment by marital status and age of children �� 208 2. Comparison of institutionalized child care options in Japan �� 211 3. Parental age distribution �� 216 4. Parental employment �� 218 5. Parental working hours �� 219 6. Distribution of household form �� 221 7. Care giver before day care enrolment �� 222 8. Care givers for day care runs �� 223 9. Sick child care givers �� 224 10. Surveyed day care centres �� 227 list of tables and figures xvii

Strohmeier 1. ‘Structure matrix’ of discriminant analysis: determinants of children’s health – comparison of problem group suffering multiple deprivations with problem-free control group �� 262

Hipp & Verworn 1. Measures to face demographic change and an ageing workforce �� 303

Vogt 1. “Were you aware the Japanese government would begin introducing foreign nurses to Japanese hospitals as a part of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Southeast Asian nations?” �� 337 2. “How do you feel about accepting foreign nurse trainees at your hospital?” �� 338 3. “Why do you want to accept foreign nurse trainees at your hospital?” (multiple responses possible) �� 338 4. “Why don’t you want to accept foreign nurse trainees at your hospital?” (multiple responses possible) �� 339 5. “What kind of support do you think the foreign nurses specifically will require?” (multiple responses possible) �� 341

Backhaus 1. Terms of address (Staff to residents) �� 365 2. Last name vs. first name address �� 365 3. Address vs. resident’s gender �� 366 4. Terms of address: residents to staff vs. staff to residents �� 368 5. Address terms used by the residents towards the staff �� 370

Ando 1. Applications for adult guardianship, April 2000 through March 2008 �� 377 2. Applications accepted per fiscal year from April 2000 through March 2008 �� 378 xviii list of tables and figures

Kemper 1. Share of population in spatial units with growth and decline by spatial level �� 400 2. Means for variables of natural change on the basis of counties by spatial categories �� 403 3. Means for migration variables on the basis of counties by spatial categories �� 405 4. Means for age-specific migration variables on the basis of counties by spatial categories �� 407 5. Regression model for population development of counties in 2005 �� 412 6. Means for indicators of ageing on the basis of counties by spatial categories �� 413

Ishikawa 1. Population change rates by prefecture (‰), 2007–2008. �� 423 2. New entry to agriculture (‘000s of people) �� 431 3. Net migration of age cohort 60–64 by prefecture, 2000 �� 432

Beetz 1. Demographic indicators for different spatial types in East and West Germany �� 463 2. Economic indicators for different spatial types in East and West Germany �� 464

Lützeler 1. Clusters based on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, municipalities of the Southern Kantō Region: simple means and eta squared �� 475

Figures

Coulmas & Lützeler 1. Family-related social expenditures in selected OECD countries, in per cent of GDP, 2005 �� 17 list of tables and figures xix

Kono 1. Trends in the TFR in major areas of the world, 1950–1955 and 2005–2010 �� 36 2. Trends in the TFR for 10 selected developed countries, 1920–2007 �� 37 3. Population trajectories for major European countries and Japan �� 39 4. Hypothetical population projections of Japan assuming instantaneous fertility recovery in 2007 to the replacement level �� 42 5. Percentage of men and women aged 25–29 still living with parents in European countries and Japan, 2002 �� 46 6. Potential impact of various policy reforms on the TFR �� 50

Klingholz 1. Share of working people as a percentage of the overall population between the ages of 55 and 64, 2006 �� 61

Streeck 1. The frequency of the term “flexicurity” in the German and English press, 1995–2007 �� 67 2. Divorces per 1,000 inhabitants in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005 �� 73 3. Proportion of births to unmarried parents in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005 �� 74 4. Total fertility rates in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005 �� 75 5. Decline in fertility by increase in illegitimacy in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005 �� 92

Takahashi 1. Actual and projected population of Japan, 1872–2105 �� 98 2. Trends in the three major population age groups: medium fertility (with medium mortality) variant �� 100 3. Age-specific fertility rates (1975, 1990 and 2005) �� 103 xx list of tables and figures

4. Age-specific proportion of married females (1975, 1990 and 2005) �� 104 5. Labour force participation rate of women by marital status and age groups �� 109 6. Employment of wives who have given birth to the first child, by year of childbirth �� 110 7. Number of female employees aged 35–49 by sex, main type of employment and income, 2007 �� 111

Shirahase 1. Trend in the structure of households with elderly members (%) �� 120 2. Poverty rates among households with and without elderly members �� 122 3. Trends in the poverty rate by type of household with elderly members �� 123 4. Trends in the extent of income inequality among households with and without elderly members �� 124 5. Intra-household effect on changes in the degree of income inequality (MLD) by household type �� 127 6. Poverty rate among three-generation households (elderly head versus non-elderly head) �� 129 7. Poverty rates among three-generation households by type of household head (elderly/non-elderly, breadwinner/non-breadwinner) �� 130 8. Proportion of public pension benefits in the income package of three-generation households with elderly members �� 131 9. Proportion of the income package in three-generation households (both elderly-headed and non-elderly-headed) accounted for by public pension benefits �� 132 10. Proportion of the income package in three-generation households accounted for by public pension benefits by household income decile (%) �� 134 11. Market income among elderly-only households by household income decile �� 136 list of tables and figures xxi

Atoh 1. Trends in the total fertility rate (TFR) and the annual number of births in Japan �� 153 2. Social security expenditure in Japan: total expenditure, elderly benefits and family benefits (ratio to national income), 1975–2007 �� 160 3. Trends in the number of nurseries and the number of children accommodated, 1950–2007 �� 162 4. Relationship between the ratio of family benefits to GDP and the total fertility rate among selected OECD countries, 2005 �� 166 5. Relationship between the labour force participation rate of women and the total fertility rate among selected OECD countries, 2005 �� 168

Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen 1. Fertility trends and important family policy events in Germany and Japan �� 177 2. How ‘challenges’ enter into political discourse and form into new interpretative patterns, leading to policy responses �� 178 3. Male and female labour force participation in Germany and Japan, 1970–2007 (15–64 year olds) �� 184

Holthus 1. Changes in the number of dual-income family households and male breadwinner family households, Japan 1980–2008 �� 207 2. Modes of child care in Japan �� 210 3. Number of children in the sample households �� 217

Strohmeier 1. Family policy in Germany – a new impact model �� 248 2. Day care supply (for 3 to 6-year-olds) and fertility rates in cities and districts of North Rhine-Westphalia �� 249 3. Dimensions of segregation: urban neighbourhoods in a three-dimensional space �� 250 xxii list of tables and figures

4. Variation in income and education of parents between 15 cities in North Rhine-Westphalia �� 253 5. Intra-urban variation in income and education of parents in three cities �� 254 6. Social area types in the Ruhr Metropolitan Area – results of a cluster analysis �� 255 7. Transition rates to sections of the secondary school system by social area type �� 256 8. Transition rates to secondary school forms in the cities of Gelsenkirchen and Essen (2003/04) �� 257 9a. Proportion of children with ‘nothing abnormal’ in medical school entry test �� 258 9b. Social assistance rates of children aged under 6 in 50 districts of the city of Essen �� 259 10. Child health (% ‘nothing abnormal’, only children of German citizenship) and voting rates in local elections in the 50 districts of Essen �� 261

Kohlbacher 1. Percentage change of working-age population (15–64 years), 2005–2020 and 2020–2050 (medium variant) �� 271 2. Revised Law Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older People (amendments 2006) �� 274 3. Average monthly consumption expenditures per household by age group of the household head in yen, 2008 (average spending for one person in two-or-more-person households) �� 276 4. Average savings and liabilities held per household by age group of household head in million yen, 2008 (average for one person in two-or-more-person households) �� 277 5. “Do you hire older people as regular employees (seisha-in)?” �� 280 6. “Which knowledge retention measure/method do you typically use? Select all that apply.” �� 281 7. “In which way did demographic change affect your sales/market(s)?” �� 282 8. “What kind of products/services have you been developing specifically for senior customers?“ �� 283 9. “Do you develop specific products or services for senior customers?” �� 284 list of tables and figures xxiii

Hipp & Verworn 1. Key competitive challenges of an ageing workforce �� 296 2. Value and number of ideas per employee for Location A �� 299 3. Value and number of ideas per employee for Location B �� 300 4. How companies prepare for demographic change and silver employment �� 306

Godzik 1. Living arrangements of elderly people �� 310

Vogt 1. Registered foreign residents in Japan, 1960–2008 �� 329 2. Regulations of the system of caregiver-migration from the Philippines and Indonesia to Japan, as stipulated in the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements �� 330 3. “Who would you prefer to help you with your intimate care should you no longer be able to perform it yourself?” �� 335 4. Number of nurses and beds in health-care facilities per 1,000 persons �� 337

Friebe 1. Migrant nurses by country of origin �� 350 2. Length of stay in the job as migrant nurse �� 352

Kemper 1. Population development, 1995–2005 �� 415 2. Net internal migration rate, 2005 �� 416 3. Education-oriented migrants, 2005 �� 417 4. Job-oriented migrants, 2005 �� 418 5. Migration of the young elderly, 2005 �� 419 6. Population aged 65 years and over, 2005 �� 420

Ishikawa 1. Population changes in Japan, 2002–2008 �� 421 2. Location of the prefectures, the regions, and the three largest metropolitan areas �� 425 xxiv list of tables and figures

3. Net migration of the three largest metropolitan areas �� 427 4. Sex ratio of age cohort 25–39 by municipality, 2000 �� 428 5. Migration rate by age groups in terms of out-migration from municipalities �� 434 6. International marriage trends in Japan �� 436 7. The relationship between the sex ratio of unmarried persons and the rate of international marriages �� 437 8. Contribution of international marriages to the increase of registered foreigners, 2001–2006 �� 439

Elis 1. Location of case study towns �� 452 2. Population decline in Ani, Koza and Ōya from 1965 to 2005 and projected further population losses �� 453

Lützeler 1. Distribution of municipalities classified into cluster 5 �� 477 2. Distribution of municipalities classified into cluster 6 �� 478 3. Distribution of municipalities classified into cluster 7 �� 479 4. Population change (per cent) during the period 1995–2005, Tokyo ward area �� 480 5. Neighbourhoods with the highest rates of elderly people (rank 1 to 50), Tokyo ward area, 2005 �� 482 6. Elderly people 65 years of age and over (per cent) by tenure of dwelling, Tokyo ward area, 1995–2005 �� 484 Population Implosion: Coping with the Unknown

Florian Coulmas and Ralph Lützeler

1. a New Chapter in History

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the realities of popula tion decline and ageing in Japan and Germany. In the absence of war, pandemics and famine, depopulation is a novel phenomenon not wit nessed anywhere at any time in human history. Japan and Germany are not the only countries affected by a sudden reversal from demographic expansion to decline, but these two countries appear to lead the way to a new population dynamics in the industrialized world. In the contri butions to this volume several other European and East Asian coun tries are referred to for comparison. With certain variations that reflect different cultural and historical preconditions they are set to follow the same or a similar path. Japan and Germany are prosperous countries. Why do their populations shrink? The answer to this ‘big’ question must be sought by considering many others. For instance, to what extent has the declining birth rate helped Japan and Germany to pros per, and to what extent has increasing prosperity depressed fertility? How do work, family and lifestyle interact? Do more women have fewer children because raising children has become so expensive; or do more women join the workforce because the family is dissolving? Is increasing female labour force participation a response to diminishing family incomes, or has increased female labour supply depressed the general wage level? Do young people leave rural areas because they do not find employment, or does business desist from investing in these areas because of the high average age of the local population? General questions of this sort are hard to answer, although many of the factors involved in recent population dynamics are well understood. Much has been written about, for example, the causes of extremely low fertil ity (Rosenbluth 2007); about rising life expectancy and the impact of social ageing on social welfare systems (Campbell 1992; Ikegami 2008); about the shrinking labour force (Conrad 2008), economic development and internal and international migration (Pekkala Kerr and Kerr 2008; Roberts 2008). The conditions and consequences of thetransformation 2 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler process that has lead in a relatively short time from population expan sion to contraction are many; they are intricately interlinked, and cause and effect cannot always be neatly distinguished. It cannot even be said with certainty that all of the factors that have a bearing on pop ulation development have been identified. Therefore, in order to understand what is going on, a wide canvas needs to be drawn that integrates empirical observation, theoretical analysis and policy designs. Demographic decline co-occurs with social changes, eco nomic changes, changes in social policies and cultural changes. And these changes interact in multiple ways. This requires the cooperation of experts from social, economic and cultural disciplines, as have been brought together in this volume. Each contribution deals with a par ticular aspect of population dynamics presenting different interpretive frameworks; collectively they combine to expose the extraordinary complexity of the developments that lead the most advanced countries to enter a period of negative population growth. It is the purpose of this book to contribute to a larger picture and a new understanding of demographic change in a divided world where the population contin ues to increase in developing and threshold countries, while some of the most affluent have entered an age of population decline. Until recently the entire discourse on population dynamics was dominated by catchwords such as ‘overpopulation’ and ‘population explosion’, and not without reason (cf. Kono in this volume). At 6.8 billion in 2010, the world population is roughly three times what it was 70 years ago. Since it is currently growing by about 70 million people per year – more than the population of Great Britain – this is cause for concern. Therefore nobody has much thought about depopulation. However, in recent decades it has become ever more evident that world population growth is accompanied by a growing demographic imbal ance. Most countries in the south, more specifically, inL atin America, Africa and large parts of Asia, continue to grow. According to the latest projections by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of theU nited Nations Secretariat (UN 2009), Africa will experience an average annual growth rate of 1.66 per cent until 2050, almost doubling its population, followed by southern and west ern Asia (0.89% annual growth). By contrast, many of the advanced industrial countries in the north have entered a period of structural demographic decline. This trend is particularly apparent in Europe (0.14% annual decline), but East Asia is now following suit (0.07% growth). population implosion 3

In East Asia, the transition from population growth to population decline has happened most suddenly and dramatically in Japan. Just a few generations ago, the Japanese state operated under the assump tion of strong population pressure, encouraging family planning. Immediately afterW orld War II, Japan experienced a population surge fed by the return of 6.6 million expatriates and demobilized soldiers precipitating a three-year baby boom. The birth rate was significantly higher than necessary for population replacement, and overpopula tion came to be perceived as the most serious threat to Japan’s wellbe ing. The Japanese government reacted with a policy of active fertility control. TheE ugenic Protection Law of 1948 provided for family plan ning services and legalized abortion under specific circumstances. In 1952 the law was amended to also allow abortion for economic rea sons, leading to a significant increase in the number of abortions, with more than one million being registered in accordance with the law in 1955 (Obayashi 1982). The total fertility rate (TFR) fell, but thanks to past birth surpluses and the near eradication of infant and child mor tality during the post-war decades, the population continued to grow, passing 100 million in 1967 and reaching its peak of almost 128 million in 2004. Since 1974 Japan’s TFR has been permanently below the replacement level to fall to a record low of 1.26 in 2005. Eventually, decades of below-replacement fertility took their toll in 2007 when for the first time in Japanese peacetime history the number of deaths exceeded the number of births (KSJK 2009). As a result of the co-occurrence of fertility decline and life expect ancy increases among the elderly, Japan became an aged society in 1996 with more than 14 per cent of the population 65 years and older. Since then, the proportion has continued to rise, reaching 22.7 per cent in 2009. According to some projections, one third of the Japanese popu lation will be aged 65 years and over by 2035 (International Longevity Center [Japan] 2009). At the end of the first decade of this century, Japan has the highest life expectancy of all large industrialized coun tries and the highest median age. Population ageing will continue at least until mid-century. At the same time, the Japanese population is entering a phase of increasingly rapid decline. This is inevitable because nothing suggests a turnaround of fertility trends, and even if fertility were to rebound it would take decades to reverse the current negative population growth, because the present generation of childbearing age is already smaller than the previous one. Prolonged low fertility always has a multiplier effect. Thus within a generation’s time the Japanese 4 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler population underwent a rather abrupt shift from growth to shrinkage. Statistical calculations by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research projected the population loss over the next half century at between 28.2 million, assuming high fertility and low mortality, and 45.4 million, assuming low fertility and high mortality (Kaneko 2008). Regardless of whether actual population development is closer to the low projection or to the high projection, this is a strik ing change and one that has never before been experienced by any large country. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Japanese population diminished by an estimated 75,000 people in 2009. As compared to a loss of some 6,000 in 2006 when natural popu lation decline began, this figure is indicative of the speed with which negative growth will accelerate (MHLW 2007b, 2010). Adding further significance to this change is the fact that living con ditions in Japan have never been more favourable: no war, no famine, no epidemics, better health care, greater wealth and unprecedented educational progress (Coulmas 2007a). Under these circumstances it is justified to speak of population implosion. Although this may seem a rather dramatic term, it stands for a dramatic phenomenon and helps us to come to grips with it. The notion of population implosion refers to rapid demographic decline in the absence of any of the traditional checks on population growth; that is, large-scale violence, pestilence or insufficient food sup ply, or other negative external forces; or, to put it even more cautiously, without any exogenous forces that we know. We do not want to suggest that we can fully explain why populations in the developed world started to shrink when they did, but we do know that population implosion opens a new chapter in history. It is brought about by a shift ing of the population structure that – in the case of Japan – transformed what was a very young society in the middle of the 20th century into the oldest one on the planet at its end. While this development was foreseen by demographers, it came as a surprise to the general public: the population was after all increasing until very recently. But rather than level off and stabilize at replacement level growth, it suddenly turned into an accelerating decline. While social ageing occurred faster in Japan than in any other coun try, population implosion can also be observed elsewhere. Indeed, most developed countries have shown birth rates below replacement for more than three decades (Atoh 2008; Kono in this volume), and more sensationalist terms than population implosion have been used population implosion 5 to refer to this situation. Drucker (1997: 7) describes the low fertility in the developed world as “the process of committing collective suicide” and claims to have the answer to the vexing question of why depopula tion in rich countries occurs. Young people, he explains, can no longer afford children, because they are staggering under the burden of hav ing to support a growing population of older, non-working people. There is little doubt that the growing share of dependent old people has a bearing on marital behaviour, family structure and fertility; yet the metaphor of collective suicide is problematic because it turns an indi vidual action into a social one. Clearly, throwing yourself in front of a train is radically different from opting against progeny. What is more, population dynamics are highly complex processes that do not allow for monocausal explanations. The dependency ratio is just one of the variables that enter the picture, but there are several others, such as individualism, shifting gender relations, the demands of consumerism, and the achievement of total fertility control – to mention but four important factors that are independent of the dependency ratio but like it affect reproductive behaviour. A great deal of research has been devoted over the past quarter century to uncovering the causes of fer tility decline in the Western world, and many enlightening explana tions have been offered tying demographic trends equally convincingly to both the economy and ideology. The cost of sustaining a rich, old population has been rising steadily, and this growing burden does not become easier to bear by the prevalence of individualism that has per meated European culture for centuries and determines both individu alistic marriage and individualistic control of wealth (Goody 1983; Gillis, Tilly and Levine 1992). However, these are only aspects of a more complex picture. The broad underlying historical causes of fertility decline that lead to depo pulation are still poorly understood. The debate about cause and effect in the interaction between economic, social and political changes on one hand, and population dynamics on the other, has not yet been con cluded, and perhaps never will. Because of the complexity of this phe nomenon we prefer the agentless term implosion rather than pointing to an act, albeit metaphorically, such as suicide. Below-replacement fertility and continuing improvements in lon gevity are common to almost all industrialized countries. This devel opment has given rise to the notion of a second demographic transition or SDT (Van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 2007). The first demographic transition (FDT) originated in late 18th-century in north-western 6 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler

Europe, and was characterized by a decline in the mortality of younger age groups first, followed by a decline in marital fertility, which led to rapid population growth in the interim, a process that is still continu ing in developing countries today. The second transition started dur ing the 1960s, again in north-western Europe, but is marked by life expectancy gains among elderly people. This is accompanied by a declining propensity among younger people to marry, which in turn contributes further to persistent sub-replacement fertility. This second demographic transition, like the first, is the result of a complex interaction of economic, social, political and cultural factors. Most researchers on recent fertility decline support one of two theo ries. One is an integral part of SDT theory. It stresses ideological fac tors, specifically value shifts towards more personal autonomy which inter alia reduces the acceptance of marriage as a natural, life-long commitment (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). More detailed analyses contend that very low fertility results from incongruence between gen der equity in social institutions such as education and the labour mar ket on one hand, and persistent traditional, patriarchal norms in family-related institutions on the other (McDonald 2000). The second theory emphasizes economic factors, pointing to globalization and increasing insecurity of employment. The future has become less pre dictable, and as a consequence the starting of a family has become a high-risk undertaking (Adserà 2004; McDonald 2006: 490–492; Streeck in this volume).

2. age of Uncertainty

In Japan and some other countries – notably South Korea and Taiwan in Asia, and the Germanophone, Mediterranean and Eastern European countries in Europe – fertility is far below replacement level. There is concern that these countries may be stuck in a ‘low fertility trap’ unable to recover even to moderate low-fertility levels of at least 1.5 children per woman (Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa 2006) because, in the long run, norms of ideal family size are likely to adjust to the low fertility reality. Although it has been counterargued recently that, since the trend towards later marriage has slowed down, the period of lowest-low fer tility (TFR below 1.3) in Europe and East Asia is coming to a close (Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene 2009), it is evident that these countries are nevertheless set to undergo rapid depopulation for dec ades to come. population implosion 7

There are two basic demographic factors that counteract population decline under conditions of persistent below-replacement birth rates: gains in longevity, and immigration. The former has been decisive in preventing an earlier onset of population decline in Japan, while the latter has played an even greater role in Germany and, recently, Italy. Both longevity and migration are variables that are extremely hard to predict. As for life expectancy, it is a hotly debated question whether the length of human life is genetically fixed or plastic. Migration flows likewise constitute a vexing problem. A simple ‘container’ theory would predict that population deficits in the north will absorb population surpluses from the south. However, since emigration and immigration are subject to economic conditions, political restrictions and social attitudes, forecasting migratory patterns is just as vague as other social behaviour, highly sophisticated statistical methods notwithstanding. The dynamics of depopulation not only cross national borders, but also concern the unknown. Experience cannot be a guide. Thus, popu lation implosion heralds an age of uncertainty: • Can the high standard of living characteristic of imploding socie ties be sustained, as the size of the labour force diminishes in the wake of population ageing? • Does population ageing lead to poverty and more social inequality? • How can central governments react to increasing regional dispar ities brought about by internal migration and differing ageing rates in rural and urban regions? • Will social security funding be sustainable? And can a new equi librium between working and retired people be found? • Is a zero-growth economy sustainable in the long run? • How will health care systems have to be reshaped to cope with hyperaged populations? • Can increased immigration alleviate the problems? • How will changing family patterns affect living arrangements? • How can market forces be harnessed to build a good society to grow old in, a humane society that accommodates millions of eld erly people no longer able to fend for themselves? • Who will speak with these people, and who will speak for them? • How will industry adjust to fewer and older consumers with dif ferent needs and demands? These are just some of the questions that arise in the face of population ageing and implosion. Developing policies to address these questions 8 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler is a huge challenge for governments precisely because there is no prec edent. Population implosion is a process that is reshaping the very struc ture of society. Policy makers are looking for recipes that will ensure a reasonable measure of affluence, social justice, and freedom of choice. Their task is like that of sailors, to borrow Oskar Neurath’s famous analogy, who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, never being able to start from scratch in a dry dock. To a much greater extent than is usual, policies designed to influence demographic behaviour are like experiments in a social laboratory, sometimes with unexpected out comes. For instance, in the Netherlands fertility increased in response to labour market reforms designed to combat unemployment. Britain’s population in 2008 saw the biggest year-on-year increase in three dec ades as a result of mass immigration, the majority of births being to women who were born outside Britain (Office for National Statistics 2009). As these two examples show, it is pointless to look for one policy that could halt population decline or, more realistically, soften its social consequences. Yet while until recently very few countries had a proac tive population policy, it is now widely agreed that ageing and popula tion decline in the developed world call for policy interventions (cf. Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen in this volume). The next section presents a number of the statistics that make such interventions desirable.

3. the Developed World Divided

A surprising fact discussed by Kono in this volume is the widening fertility gap within the group of developed nations. European societies and Japan are shrinking or will begin to do so before long, while the US is not. Therefore, this volume will make only occasional reference to the United States. What is more, on inspection fertility trends in Europe and East Asian countries exhibit a great deal of variation. While since the 1980s the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom as well as France and the Benelux countries saw a recovery of fertility rates to moder ately low or even near-replacement levels, fertility in southern Europe and the German-speaking countries remained below the threshold of 1.5 births per woman. In this they were joined in the 1990s by the post- socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the developed nations of East Asia. Since the latter group of countries also suffer large net migration losses or have a close-to-zero migration balance at best, it is small population implosion 9

wonder that according to UN statistics, among the 18 territorial states of one million inhabitants or more which showed population decrease in the period from 2005 to 2010, 14 were post-socialist countries, joined by Japan, Germany and two Caribbean states. During the period from 2009 to 2050, Bulgaria is expected to lead the list of imploding populations with a loss of more than 28 per cent of its inhabitants, fol lowed by Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and other post-socialist countries. Japan is in seventh place with a projected loss of 20 per cent, while Germany follows in eleventh place with a presumed loss of 14 per cent. To give a more detailed picture of the divergent demographic fea tures of major developed societies, Table 1 on the next page compares selected European countries, each representing a sub-continental region, as well as Japan and South Korea. Japan and Germany are the most advanced countries with regard to population ageing, and have already started to shrink, too. Bulgaria is a typical Eastern European case insofar as low fertility is complemented by low life expectancy and high net migration losses resulting in par ticularly severe depopulation. South Korea, by contrast, still has a rela tively young population having completed the first demographic transition only during the early 1980s. However, by mid-century the country will be the second-most advanced in terms of population age ing. The general idea that Table 1 conveys is that differences in the levels of ageing and overall population change among developed nations result from diverging fertility rates. Life expectancy, on the other hand, does not show much variation (except for Bulgaria) and can thus be considered as having only a minor effect on differing age ing rates. Migration, too, seems to be of minor importance, but one has to bear in mind that the effect of immigration on both the age struc ture and population growth differs widely depending on the age of the migrants and their propensity to stay and start families in the recep tion country. Thus, in order to halt population decline and slow down the ageing rate, fertility has to recover to at least moderate low levels such as recorded in the UK, France and Sweden, and immigration of young adults has to be promoted or at least not impeded. Policy- makers in the Mediterranean, German-speaking and East Asian nations have started to realize that their population balance will not return to normal automatically but will require decisive long-term policy interventions. 10 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler 0.49 0.54 0.49 0.39 0.53 –0.07 –0.09 –0.64 nnual population population nnual A 2005–2010 (%) change ecretariat ( UN 2009). ecretariat 43.2 55.1 49.5 51.7 50.5 42.5 53.7 44.8 Projected Projected median 2050 age ations S ations nited N nited edian edian 40.7 44.4 41.5 43.9 43.0 39.7 37.3 39.9 M age 2009 ffairs of U the ffairs 4.6 8.0 33.1 31.3 22.5 20.4 –3.3 ocial A –14.7 mmigrants mmigrants I per 100 2005 births conomic and S and conomic 82.7 73.2 80.9 79.4 79.9 81.2 81.2 79.4 ife expectancyife L birth at 2005–2010 1.27 1.40 1.87 1.22 1.32 1.38 1.89 1.84 otal fertility T 2005–2010 Demographic indicators for selected developed countries, latest available figures available latest selected countries, developed for indicators Demographic orea ingdom of K of ermany nited nited able 1 able weden ource: Population Division of the Department of E of the Department of Division Population ource: T S Japan Bulgaria S Republic Republic G I taly France U k population implosion 11

4. Policy Interventions

4.1 Introduction As we have seen, the combination of increased life expectancy of the elderly and reduced fertility results in ageing and, in turn, population implosion with concomitant shifts in social and economic condi tions, potentially endangering the wellbeing of society and the good of future generations. Policy interventions seeking to reverse or at least halt the downward fertility trend that leads to population implosion are therefore thought desirable by many. The urgency for policy-mak ers to address the demographic issue is underscored by population research predicting that “collective aging could impose economic pen alties even sooner than previously anticipated” (Vaupel 2006: 15). To date, countries most seriously affected by low fertility and ageing have discussed and implemented a variety of policy measures to deal with the fiscal, economic and social consequences. Policy measures that have been proposed to mitigate the negative consequences of low birth rates and population ageing include active pro-natal family policies, such as: • child benefits; • tax breaks for families with children; • public child care facilities; • health care for children. Other social policies that are expected to positively influence fertility indirectly involve measures designed to: • enable women to pursue careers without having to forego chil dren (work-life balance); • subsidize elderly care in order to relieve the pressure on the ‘sand wich’ generation to care for both parents and children; • subsidize housing for young couples in order to help them start a family. The third pillar of any population policy is immigration. In below- replacement fertility countries it is of obvious significance, but it is also a highly controversial policy issue. Since the developments that instigate population implosion are his torically unprecedented, there is no ready-made mix of policies that could be fine-tuned to specific applications.I t has also proved difficult 12 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler to assess the effects of specific policy measures and distinguish them from other policies and economic effects. Instead of offering general policy recommendations, we will review three policy areas in which measures have been undertaken in European and Asian countries to meet the challenges of the population developments described: child benefits, maternity leave, and immigration. We will first consider Europe, where in recent years both strongly interventionist states, such as France, and liberal market states, such as the UK, have been forced to deal with population issues in one way or another. Demographic trends across the continent foreshadow difficult times ahead for most European countries. Effective strategies to address the risks of popula tion implosion are therefore in high demand.

4.2 Child Benefits Germany1: The TFR in Germany has been very low for decades, espe cially since the country’s reunification in 1989.I n 2008 it was 1.38 chil dren per woman – up from 1.28 in 2007. German child benefits (Kindergeld) increase with the number of children: 164 euros per month for the first and second child, 170 euros for the third and fourth and 195 euros for all following children. In addition there is a lump sum annual allowance of 100 euros for every child entitled to child benefits for at least one month in that calendar year. United Kingdom2: At 1.96 children per woman in 2008, the British TFR is significantly above theE uropean average.3 Yet government expendi tures for family support are below the EU average. The UK govern ment provides 20 British pounds per week (approximately 95 euros per month) for the first child and 13.20 pounds per week for all following children. Netherlands4: The Dutch TFR in 2008 was 1.55, close to the European average (1.52). Child benefits in the Netherlands are indexed to age: 0–5 years of age 193.73 euros per month; 6–11 years 235 euros; 12–17

1 (Bundeskindergeldgesetz 92009). http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bkgg_1996/BJNR 137800995.html 2 Citizens Advice Bureau. http://www.adviceguide.org.uk/index/life/benefits/ benefits_for_families_and_children.htm#child_benefit 3 office for National Statistics. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=951 4 http://www.ruimtemonitor.nl/kennisportaal/default.aspx?menucomid=26&pid= 34&id=4585&themeId=329 population implosion 13 years 276.75 euros. In addition, there is a child budget5 for school-aged children indexed to parental income. France6: With just above 2 children per woman in 2008, the French TFR was at replacement level and as such, after Ireland, the highest in Europe. France rewards families with a large number of children. Child benefits (allocations familiales) are paid from the second child, 1,326.52 euros per annum, and 1,702.08 euros per annum for the third and all following children. Italy7: Fertility has been hovering at between 1.2 and 1.3 (2008) for many years, one of the lowest in Europe. Child benefits in Italy are indexed to parental income: 250 euros per month per child for families with an annual income of 11,422.98 euros or less, and 38.73 euros for an annual income between 27,000 and 30,403 euros. Families with an annual income over 43,000 euros receive no benefits (Palomba 2006). Bulgaria8: In a demographic development that was typical of post- transition countries in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria’s TFR plummeted from 1.9 in 1989 to 1.09 eight years later. By 2007 it had recovered to 1.42. Child benefits in Bulgaria depend on family income.E ntitlement is until the child’s twentieth birthday.

Japan: Since the early 1990s, Japan’s TFR has been constantly below 1.5. Child benefits are not paid to high-income families, excluding about 15 per cent of all children from the programme (Suzuki 2009a), and entitlement is restricted to children below the age of twelve. There is a monthly allowance of 10,000 yen (about 78 euros at the time of writing) for every child younger than three years. From three to twelve years the allowance is 5,000 yen (39 euros) for the first and second child each. For every additional child in this age group parents receive 10,000 yen per month (Naikakufu 2009a: 158–159). The Democratic Party of Japan-led government that came to power in September 2009 decided to significantly raise child-rearing benefits, promising to

5 http://www.toeslagen.nl/particulier/kindertoeslag2008/ 6 https://www.caf.fr/wps/portal/ [Keyword search (recherche): “allocation familiale”]. 7 missoC Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the EU Member States and the EEA. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/2002/it_part9 _en.htm 8 european Commission (2008a). http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?ta b=table&init=1&language=de&pcode=tsdde220&plugin=1; http://bulgaria.angloinfo. com/countries/bulgaria/socsecurity.asp 14 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler

provide monthly allowances of 13,000 yen in fiscal year 2010 and 26,000 yen from fiscal year 2011 for each child of junior high school age (i.e., until the age of 15) or younger.

Republic of Korea: South Korea saw a dramatic drop in its TFR from about 4.5 in the early 1970s to 1.08 in 2005. Since the memory of strong population growth is still fresh, policy makers were slow to react to the new situation. Although pro-natal measures have now been intro duced, child allowances are not part of the package (Suzuki 2008: 38).

Taiwan: Since Taiwan is considered a break-away province of China by many international bodies, comparable figures for the island popula tion are in scarce supply. However, Taiwan’s recent demographic change closely resembles that of Korea. With an estimated TFR of between 1.1 and 1.2, Taiwan has arrived near the bottom of international fertility rankings. The government has found it hard to adapt to the new chal lenges, but pro-natal policies have been initiated. As in South Korea, child benefits are not yet part of the package (Lin and Yang 2009).

4.3 Maternity and Parental Leave Germany: 14 weeks of maternity leave with full salary are guaranteed, plus three years of shared parental leave without pay, but with a paren tal allowance (Elterngeld) of 12 months with 67 per cent of the last income before leave. Parents with a low income (less than 1,000 euros) receive higher benefits.

United Kingdom: The law provides for 39 weeks of paid maternity leave and 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave for each parent. As of 2010, mothers who earn at least 90 pounds per week are eligible to 90 per cent of their income as Statutory Maternity Pay with a cap of 117.18 pounds per week for the entire year of maternity leave.

Netherlands: 16 weeks of paid maternity leave and two days of paid paternity leave are provided. Additionally 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave can be taken by either parent until the child’s eighth birthday.

France: 16 weeks of paid maternity leave and 11 days of paid paternity leave are granted. For three years after the child’s birth parents have the right to part-time work or job-protected leave. A compensation of 538.72 euros for full leave is paid for six months and 409.64 euros for up to half-time work. population implosion 15

Italy: Mothers are entitled to maternity leave of five months at 80 per cent of their last salary. In addition each parent is entitled to six months of parental leave with benefits of 30 per cent of their last income. Mothers without employment receive a one-time maternity grant of 1,747 euros.

Bulgaria: Mothers are entitled to 410 days of maternity leave. When the child has reached six months of age the rest of the leave period can be transferred to the father. Benefits of up to 90 per cent of the last sal ary are paid to beneficiaries who have worked for at least twelve months prior to taking maternity leave.

Japan: 98 days of maternity leave are guaranteed at 60 per cent of the last salary, paid by health insurance. Child care leave can be taken until the first birthday of a child. It is paid at rates ranging from 30 to 60 per cent of the father’s or mother’s previous salary (Suzuki 2009b; OECD 2009i).

Republic of Korea: 90 days of paid maternity leave plus three days of paid paternity leave during the first 30 days after the birth of the child are provided. One parent is entitled to one year’s parental leave until the child’s fifth birthday. During that time the leaver receives a lump sum of 500,000 won (about 300 euros) per month, paid by the govern ment (Suzuki 2009b; OECD 2009i).

Taiwan: 56 days of paid maternity leave and three days of paid pater nity leave are granted. Child care leave can be taken for two years and until the third birthday of the child but no benefits are given (Suzuki 2009b: 55). The recipients are restricted to employees in medium-sized and large companies who have been employed for at least one year at the time of the childbirth (Lin and Yang 2009: 108).

4.4 Family-related Policy Packages The above sketch of the basic components of child benefit and mater nity leave provisions illustrates (i) that all European countries and Japan have such provisions and (ii) that these provisions differ widely one from another. This reflects differential levels of wealth across coun tries – French city dwellers earn more than 25 times as much as rural Bulgarians – as well as variable courses of fertility decline. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, France was at the forefront of low 16 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler fertility in Europe, provoking an early promotion of demographic research and pro-natal policies (Quine 1996: 52–88). By contrast, South Korea and Taiwan, having completed their first demographic transition only during the 1980s, are still groping for suitable strate gies. Both countries have passed comprehensive policy proposals and guidelines in 2006 and 2008, respectively, to respond to extremely low fertility, but the implementation of these measures has only just begun. Due to feminist opposition in Taiwan and budget constraints in South Korea, the introduction of child allowances in particular is still highly contested (Suzuki 2008: 37–38; Lin and Yang 2009: 107–109). Another important fact to be kept in mind is that in every European country these two policies form part of a larger package of social pro tection consisting of cash benefits, tax exemptions and reductions, health insurance, subsidies, services, and ‘benefits in kind’ designed to alleviate the burden of child rearing. These social protection policy packages are a conspicuous feature of modern industrialized countries, and virtually all the states have a policy agenda to protect the family, thus acknowledging population development as an area of political responsibility. Comparing the amount of child benefits or the length of paid parental leave across countries can shed light only on partial aspects of what in every case is a complex whole of social policies. While some of these policies are designed to encourage young cou ples to start a family, other objectives such as the prevention of poverty, gender equality and generational justice are often served at the same time. What is more, policies in seemingly unrelated areas may affect the demographic behaviour profoundly. For instance, the birth rate may rise as a result of economic and labour market policies that lead to a substantial reduction in unemployment. In Italy as well as some Eastern European countries a tight real estate market is thought to be among the reasons for low birth rates. Not being able to afford a residence of their own, young men in particular stay in the parental home well into adulthood. Subsidizing mortgages for young couples may therefore be a more effective policy to lift the birth rate than increasing child benefits. At the same time, Italian women are better educated than ever and are therefore postponing marriage and childbearing. The average Italian mother nowadays is above thirty when she gives birth for the first time. Public child care is insufficient making it difficult Ifor talian women to reach a satisfactory balance of work and family life. These conditions combine to curb population implosion 17 young couples’ reproductive behaviour. More financial support for young couples could have a positive effect on the birth rate (Palomba 2006), but the government lacks the means to implement such a policy because of chronic budget deficits, very high public debt (105.9% of GDP, 2008) and a pension burden which is getting heavier and heavier as the population continues to age. Italy’s population growth has come to a halt. Only immigration has slowed Italy’s birth rate decline (see below). Recently, attention has been focused on two strategies which are regarded as the most effective in order to halt or at least mitigate popu lation decline: (i) promotion of immigration and (ii) social adjustment, especially concerning the organization of work and family. Although conceptually and politically distinct, they are not independent of each other and interact with other social policies. Europe as a whole, and increasingly East Asia, are moving towards a proactive population pol icy. However, promoting fertility in advanced industrial countries seems to be at least as difficult as limiting it in developing countries.

Source: OECD (2009j). Figure 1 Family-related social expenditures in selected OECD countries, in per cent of GDP, 2005 18 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler

An international comparison of public spending for families with children supports this assumption. Figure 1 suggests that countries with a near-replacement level birth rate or moderate low fertility are spending a larger part of their GDP for families than countries with a TFR below 1.5, which tend to be less generous. Thus policy interven tions meant to raise or sustain the fertility level do seem to make a difference. However, the composition of the policy package is no less important than the overall expenditure level. For instance, Germany’s expenditures are slightly above the OECD average of 2.02 per cent but its TFR has been below 1.5 for more than three decades. One explana tion for this apparent paradox is that Germany’s family policies con centrate on cash benefits, while the relative amount of money spent on measures to help women to combine children with gainful employ ment is even lower than in Italy. Conclusive evidence that subsidizing families with children with higher levels of cash benefits has a positive effect on stabilizing the birth rate is indeed hard to find. It seems that the amount of child benefits is not a decisive variable in the decision on the personal level to have children and, if so, when, because women do not calculate the opportunity costs of having children in economic terms alone. Relatively high fertility in France and the Scandinavian countries suggests that a social environment, cultural conceptions of family and motherhood, and working conditions that enable women to pursue careers without having to sacrifice family life, are conducive to higher birth rates. In industrial societies, initially the TFR decreased in response to increasing female labour participation rates (FLPR), but in advanced industrial societies the opposite is the case: the higher the FLPR, the higher the TFR (Yamaguchi and Lee 2008). Although it is still an open question whether this reversal must be understood as a reversal of the causal relationship between FLPR and TFR, policy makers of late have started to pin their hope on this assumption. There are at least three reasons for this. First, social secu rity programmes are strained by expenditures for pensions, health care insurance and long-term care insurance, making it difficult to raise additional funds for family support programmes. Second, promoting better work-family balance by means of labour market regulations such as job protection and flexible working hours can be easy on gov ernment finances. And third, immigration – the obvious alternative for shrinking countries that want to evade the low fertility trap – is not very popular. Nevertheless, immigration is a policy issue in most European countries. population implosion 19

4.5 Immigration The International Organization for Migration defines a migrant as “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual resi dence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence.”E ven on the basis of such a broad definition it is difficult to find comparable and reliable statistics on immigration and foreign residents across coun tries. Migration is tied to naturalization, citizenship and other statu tory provisions, as well as historical relationships, such as those with former colonial possessions. Definitions and data on the composition of the resident population therefore differ from one country to another. Relatively old nation states (European countries, Japan and South Korea) concentrate on producing data on foreign nationals, while immigrant countries such as the United States and Australia make a distinction between foreign-born and native-born populations. Because of these differences in focus great care must be taken when migration data are compared across countries. What follows is a brief account of diverse situations in Europe, followed by a sketch of current immigration policies in East Asia. In EU Member States immigration has two aspects, internal and international. Freedom of movement within the EU has led to a migra tion flow from east to west resulting in a positive migration balance in most old member states and a negative migration balance in new member states, with the exception of Hungary (European Commission 2008b). At the same time, Europe is experiencing considerable immi gration pressure from Africa and Asia, particularly at the southern periphery, pressure that has transformed countries such as Italy and Spain – countries that for a long time experienced net out-migration. In these and some other countries that have absorbed large numbers of migrants in recent decades it has become clear that because of the cul tural and linguistic issues involved, immigration is not just a matter of quota. The answer to the question of whether or not immigration is a feasible way of compensating for fertility decline and its consequences is to be found only partly in numbers. It was because of integration problems rather than population stagnation and decline that immigra tion has become an important policy concern across Europe. But because of slow or negative population growth in most European countries the issue of immigration can no longer be considered with out taking natural demographic change into account. 20 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler

Germany: A destination for long-term migrant workers since the 1960s, Germany has a high proportion of immigrants. About 20 per cent of the resident population have a non-German background, and 8.9 per cent are non-German nationals. TheG erman Immigration Act of 2005 provides for highly qualified persons to be granted permanent residency and permission to work from the outset if an offer of employ ment can be presented. Unskilled workers are granted permanent resi dency only after five years of continuous employment. In 2003, the foreign population was eight years younger than the German popula tion, which implies potentially beneficial effects for strained pension funds.

United Kingdom: Net immigration to the United Kingdom has been positive for many years. While acknowledging that the ethnic composition of the population is the most difficult of demographic sta tistics, the government estimates that 13 per cent of the resident popu lation, with or without UK citizenship, are of migrant background. In combination with a fertility rate above the European average the influx of immigrants, both from Eastern European EU Member States and from overseas, means that the British population continues to grow. Persons entering the UK to take up employment must possess a valid working permit.

Netherlands: The resident population includes a large number of ex- colonial inhabitants and migrant workers of non-western European background, making up about 10 per cent of the total population. Although the non-western European population will increase only slightly, it is expected to reach 17 per cent of the total population by mid-century. This effect is due to the negative migration balance in the Netherlands and to the fact that the non-western European population is young compared to the native western European population (Alders 2005: 15). In recent years immigration has become a contentious issue, as anti-immigration parties have made significant inroads at the polls. The rhetoric of ‘the boat is full’ has caught on prompting the govern ment to adopt a more restrictive immigration regime that seeks to attract highly qualified immigrants, while making it more difficult for unskilled workers to enter the country. This is in line with a study by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB Notitie 2007), according to which generous welfare states discourage higher- skilled immigration and encourage lower-skilled immigration. population implosion 21

France: The immigrant population is quoted as 10.18 per cent by the National Statistics Institute (INSEE 2007), while the foreign population amounts to 5.6 per cent. Since France adheres to the ius soli, granting French citizenship to those born on French soil, these figures do not reveal the extent of the ethnic population mix character istic of present-day France. If migrants of the third generation are included, the population with a migrant background amounts to a quarter of the total. The French immigration experience is moulded by colonial history and is today characterized by a deep social divide. The immigrant population from Sub-Saharan and North African countries is heavily concentrated in the suburbs of the big cities which have turned into focal points of social tension. Due to population ageing the French working population will decline, a process that is theoretically softened by the immigrant population, which is younger than the rest. However, long-term unemployment is higher among the immigrant population, whose skill level is below average. Since fer tility is high by European standards, France does not encourage immigration.

Italy: In the 2000s Italy became the destination of the largest migration influx inE urope afterG ermany and Spain. Morocco, Albania, Romania, the Philippines and China, in this order, were the most frequent coun tries of origin. Immigration is the principal reason why Italy’s fertility decline has come to a halt and has even showed a slightly upward trend, reaching 1.35 children per woman in 2006. During the first five years of the new century, the percentage of migrant children of the total child population more than doubled (Palomba 2006; Billari 2008). The immigrant population is still small compared to other Western Euro pean countries, but because of the recent nature of the phenomenon, and because of high unemployment rates, immigration is a divisive political issue. Rapid population ageing – Italy has the highest percent age of elderly people in Europe (Golini, Basso and Reynaud 2003) – would suggest that immigration, with its rejuvenating effect on the population, would be welcome. Yet, because of insufficient integration provisions, it is not. Rather, immigration opponents have gained con siderable political leverage. An additional reason for this is that illegal immigration associated with Italy’s large non-observed economy is particularly high. The 2009OE CD report on migration (OECD 2009h) estimates that at least one in four foreign residents are undocumented immigrants (clandestini) amounting to about 1 per cent of the total 22 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler population. Rather than encouraging immigration, the government has, therefore, adopted increasingly restrictive norms.

Bulgaria: The transition from communism to capitalism set off a wave of emigration from most Eastern European countries. Young people in particular moved westward in pursuit of better economic opportuni ties. This demographic development was most pronounced in Bulgaria, which lost up to an estimated 1.3 million inhabitants between 1989 and its accession to the EU in 2007. To address the population drain Bulgaria has opened its borders for all EU citizens as part of a compre hensive population policy. The government also hopes to attract return migrants by offering attractive conditions for starting a business. So far, however, immigration to Bulgaria has been of a transitory nature, with migrants arriving from crisis-torn countries like Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Iraq seeking opportunities to move further west. It is expected that Bulgaria’s migration balance will remain negative for some time (Kröhnert, Hoßmann and Klingholz 2008: 304–311).

To sum up, during the first decade of the 21st centuryE urope has been the destination of the largest number of immigrants worldwide. But there are considerable differences between rich and poor countries. In 2005, the foreign-born population in four countries (Switzerland, Austria, Estonia and Latvia) was in excess of 15 per cent, while another six countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden) had a foreign-born population of between 10 and 15 per cent. Of the 474 million inhabitants of the EU/EEA and Switzerland almost 10 per cent were born outside Europe. The question is: Should Europe tolerate or even encourage more immigration? Low birth rates would suggest that there is a more important role for immigration to play in the population equation. Several countries (the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Slovenia and Slovakia) have only showed population growth in recent years because of immigration (Muenz 2009). What is more, as the working age population declines as a result of ageing, labour shortages are expected in many countries. At the time of writ ing, the problem of labour shortage was overshadowed by the eco nomic downturn that severely affected all European countries. But in the long run the problem will return. The OECD, therefore, empha sizes the long-term nature of labour needs in many OECD countries, pointing out that it is “illusory to believe that such needs can be filled through temporary migration. Indeed, many migrants do not have a population implosion 23 preference for temporary migration. Governments therefore need to plan in terms of long-term migration and effective integration strate gies for immigrants and their families” (OECD 2009h: 10). TheEU is faced with the difficult task of promoting immigration, on one hand, and controlling (illegal) immigration on the other, in the best interests of EU citizens. In February 2009 the European Parliament therefore approved a package of regulations that toughens sanctions against employers of undocumented workers. However, a comprehen sive immigration policy cannot be designed with only the recipient countries’ economic needs in mind. Humanitarian considerations can not be ignored. Developing a long-term strategy is moreover fraught with difficulties because integration problems often turn immigration into an election campaign issue. For European economies immigra tion will continue to play an important role, but because of historical, cultural and legal differences between the member states, a unifiedEU immigration policy to compensate for low fertility will be a long time coming. The issue will remain on the agenda, if only because immigra tion cannot be dissociated from social policies designed to alleviate the negative effects of population stagnation, for these very policies can act – albeit unintentionally – as strong pull factors that encourage immigration.

Compared with European societies, East Asian civilizations have for most of their history shown a stronger tendency to insulate themselves from the outside world. Ius sanguinis is – and will probably remain – the uncontested principle of citizenship here. Also, thanks to a grow ing, young domestic labour force there had been no need to attract migrant labour. As a consequence, the share of foreign nationals and foreign-born citizens is still quite small in this part of the world. Meanwhile, however, the workforce in the developed East Asian coun tries has begun to grow older and shrink, or will do so before long. In time this may weaken resistance to immigration, although to date only isolated indications point to a paradigm shift in the region’s immigra tion policies.

Japan: By the end of 2008 the number of registered foreign nationals residing in the country was 2,217,426 (Chinese and Koreans account ing for just under 30% each), which corresponds to 1.74 per cent of the total population. Although numbers have significantly increased since the late 1980s, most newcomers stay for short periods only (e.g., as 24 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler college students or expatriates employed by international institutions). Officially, Japan is not open to the immigration of unskilled labour. The need to compensate for labour shortages in low-wage occupations such as manufacturing work in small- to medium-sized firms,however, has led to the creation of specific visa categories that may be labelled ‘side doors’ to the Japanese labour market. Such are the categories of ‘trainee’ (kenshūsei; 86,826 people or 3.9% of all documented foreigners in 2008), pre-college students of Japanese language schools (shūgakusei; 41,313 or 1.9%), or ‘long-term residents’ (teijūsha; 258,498 or 11.7%) – mainly used by South Americans of ethnic Japanese descent. Although immigration policy reform has been the subject of public debate for a long time, Japan continues to maintain its reluctant approach towards an influx of foreign labour. Demographic arguments have only rarely been put forth by those who advocate a more liberal immigration policy (Roberts 2008). However, increasing demand for long-term care services due to population ageing has led to the acceptance of nurses and care workers from Indonesia and the Philippines on the basis of Economic Partnership Agreements with the two countries. These agreements, which came into force in 2008 and 2009, respectively, might foreshadow more thorough changes in Japanese immigration policy (cf. Vogt in this volume).

Republic of Korea: Economic liberalization as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and ongoing political liberalization, rather than worries about impending demographic decline, have triggered fundamental changes in immigration policy and, subsequently, a steep rise in the number of foreigners. In 2003, a new Employment Permit System (EPS) was introduced. It legalized the entry of low-skilled labour, which much like in Japan used to be restricted to ‘trainees’. Foreign workers now enjoy almost the same labour rights as Korean citizens. As a result, the number of foreign nationals increased from 270,000 in 1995 to about one million in 2007 (2% of the total popula tion). Chinese constitute the largest share (44%), followed by US-Americans (12%) many of whom are of Korean descent (Kim 2008: 590–592; Kim and Torres-Gil 2008).

Taiwan: The lifting of Martial Law in 1987 and a swing towards eco nomic liberalization laid the groundwork for the liberalization of the immigration law in 1992. In 2008, out of 435,000 registered foreign nationals (1.9% of the total population, excluding Mainland Chinese), population implosion 25

373,000 were low-skilled foreign workers permitted to work in Taiwan for a maximum of nine years. While the opening of the labour market was first justified on the grounds of labour shortages in the manufac turing sector, by the late 1990s filling the gaps in domestic work and health care services became more important. Also, immigration policy is now an officially recognized element of the efforts to tackle incipient population decline (Suzuki 2009b: 55; Lee 2010: 335–338).

This short description of current East Asian immigration policies might tempt the reader to conclude that South Korea and Taiwan will fare somewhat better in the future with regard to population decline than Japan since these countries now allow even unskilled foreign workers to enter while Japan does not. However, the main motiva tion behind liberalizing immigration in South Korea and Taiwan is economic liberalization, rather than concern about future population loss. The liberalization of immigration therefore promotes increasing the number of temporary workers. But in order to fend off demo graphic decline it would be necessary to attract permanent immigrants. To allow large quantities of foreign migrants to settle freely as perma nent residents could ease problems that are due to low fertility much quicker than pro-natal measures which might take decades to produce the desired results – assuming they are effective. On the other hand, given the lack of experience with large groups of immigrants in most East Asian countries, such a strategy bears the risk of provoking cul tural and social tensions.

In sum, it is safe to say that no single policy intervention can effectively counter the forces of population implosion. That is not to say, how ever, that demographic behaviour cannot be influenced; the very exist ence of variable fertility in response to changing conditions suggests that it can. During the past three decades social policy reforms have been observed in most industrialized countries where the male- breadwinner family model has been gradually superseded by the dual- earner family. While these reforms were designed to accommodate the needs of working parents, low-income families and single parents, age ing and population decline have only recently found entry into social policy making. To date very few countries have adopted an explicit population policy that addresses the issues of elderly care, family sup port and immigration in an integrated manner with clearly defined demographic objectives. The chapters of this book demonstrate that 26 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler such an integrative view, fraught with complexities and difficulties as it may be, will be necessary for coping with the manifold challenges of population implosion.

5. structure of the Book

The structure of this book mirrors major aspects of the complexity of population implosion. Part I, “Societies of Population Decline”, pro vides a comprehensive overview of the social conditions of low fertility and demographic change. The first two chapters byS higemi Kono and Reiner Klingholz, pave the way by laying out the basic facts, providing a theoretically founded synopsis of recent demographic developments and the beginning of population decline. Kono explains the nexus between low fertility, social ageing and depopulation, pointing out the risk of sliding into a feedback loop which depresses fertility further for demographic, economic and social reasons. Painting a wide interna tional canvas, he identifies demographic commonalities of OECD countries as well as most of the developments that set Japan and other East Asian countries apart. In a complementary fashion, Klingholz analyses the European situation where low fertility and ageing have combined to make Western Europe the prime destination for interna tional migrants. Like Kono, he emphasizes the potential danger of a combined demographic and economic downward trend. How population decline interacts with different kinds of social and economic changes is the overarching question of the subsequent four chapters. Streeck discusses the temporal coincidence and causal inter action of weakening ligatures in the domains of work and family as the major social changes accompanying diminishing fertility. In a similar fashion, Takahashi diagnoses fundamental changes in family forma tion in conjunction with the increasing instability of Japan’s employ ment structure brought about by deregulation and globalization as the principal cause of low fertility. Competing interpretations of fertility decline are discussed in both of these chapters, Streeck offering as much detail for Germany (and other European countries) as Takahashi does for Japan. Since the 1980s both employment opportunities for women and the need for women to engage in paid work have greatly increased, implying changed patterns of marriage and domestic life. It emerges that in extremely low fertility countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Germany and Italy, a new equilibrium between work and family population implosion 27 life has not been found yet with the consequence that young couples shy away from making irreversible commitments. By postponing mar riage and childbearing they reinforce population ageing. Increasing economic inequality in societies that traditionally had low income dis parities – most notably Japan – is one aspect of the interaction of changes in the domains of family and work emphasized by Streeck and Takahashi. Against the background of demographic and family structure changes, Shirahase examines the socio-economic inequality experi enced by the elderly, comparing the situation of Japanese senior citi zens living in three-generation households and those living alone. In a society that until recently prided itself for and was actually character ized by the relative absence of social class distinctions and a low degree of income spread, the connexion between ageing and social class has not received much attention yet. By examining the resources available to elderly living in different forms of households, Shirahase’s chapter offers much insight into the intricate question of how the changing age structure of the population interacts with the restructuring of the social hierarchy. The growing number of isolated elderly citizens is a feature of present population dynamics that draws attention to the wider implications of changing life courses and restructuring the distribu tion of resources and burdens in ageing societies. This is the topic of Backes’s contribution, which also contemplates the question how old age is to be conceptualized under conditions of continuing life expect ancy gains and how age identities evolve. Part II, “Fertility Decline and Policy Implications”, focuses on policy responses to the most crucial element of demographic change and its social consequences. The policy field that receives most attention in research, planning and implementation is family policy, sometimes called social policy. Three of the five contributions in this section deal with various facets thereof. Atoh reviews Japanese family policies and government responses to declining fertility in the past with a focus on the family models they were based on. He also looks at budgetary limi tations of family policies, concluding that one cause of Japan’s extremely low fertility is that its family policies are comparatively weak compared to other OECD countries. Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen examine recent family policy shifts in Germany and Japan, concentrating on public debates. Analysing debates on gender equality, demographic trends, work-life balance and national competitiveness, they demonstrate how pro-natal policies are dependent on prevailing political environments 28 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler and the reactions of powerful stakeholders. Next, Holthus examines the interrelated issues of day-care provision and work-family balance which play an increasingly important role in family policy discussions. Her approach is empirical, she reports on the findings of a nationwide survey in Japan on how parent’s lives have been affected by recent pol icy measures designed to improve day-care provisions. The survey shows that in order to overcome current shortcomings, providing more places in public day care centres will not be sufficient. The quality of day care, specifically in case of children’s illness and overtime work, must also be improved in order to develop a better work-family bal ance. These and some other results underline the need for structural workplace reforms, if enticing young couples to have more children is the objective. Axel Klein analyses the motivations for policy initiatives directed at improving work-family balance from the point of view of policy makers who are directly concerned. His focus is on the impact on policy formation of the ‘intrinsic motivation’ on the part of male Japanese lawmakers who are fathers of young children. In addition to providing a concrete example of how personal circumstances influence policy formation, Klein’s chapter reveals some of the reasons why fam ily policy ranks low on the list of priorities of Japanese lawmakers. The final chapter of this part of the book offers a close-up view on another field of social policy in a case study of Germany. Based on extensive empirical research Strohmeier argues, and by adducing specific exam ples demonstrates that, in German cities, population decline increases residential segregation, as falling land prices encourage all but the most disadvantaged to move out of run-down neighbourhoods. Since in Germany the majority of children grow up in neighbourhoods that limit their opportunities, it is imperative for pro-natal policies to be complemented by local strategies to create supportive environments for families and children. Part III, “Challenges and Chances of Ageing”, examines various implications of population decline and ageing for the economy and at the interface of the private and public sectors. The first two chapters by Kohlbacher and Hipp and Verworn take issue with the economic repercussions of ageing and negative population growth. Japan is widely regarded as a model of older worker employment, as many companies have continuing and renewed employment schemes. Kohlbacher discusses the challenges of an ageing workforce and some of the solutions Japanese companies have developed. Ageing workers are, of course, also ageing consumers and as such have a bearing on the population implosion 29 other end of the economic process. Kohlbacher, therefore, also investi gates the implication of an ageing and declining population for busi ness from the point of view of marketing. In Japan, older customers are the only segment of the consumer society that continues to grow. Accordingly, the silver market, fuzzily delimited though it is, has attracted a great deal of attention in theory and practice, that is, both in scholarship and business. Kohlbacher’s perspective on Japanese cir cumstances is complemented by Hipp and Verworn’s chapter which discusses human resource management strategies German companies have developed and adopted for the retention of older workers in employment. A sector of the economy that is strongly affected by ageing is the housing industry. The receding incidence of three-generational cohab itation in Japan forms the backdrop of the chapter by Maren Godzik who introduces new living arrangements for senior citizens in Japan who cannot or do not wish to live together with their children, yet who do not want to live alone. During the past two decades state-run housing agencies have built many retirement institutions for low- income persons, and up-market senior citizens homes have multiplied. However, as Godzik shows, there are many private initiatives in- between, initiatives for alternative communal living arrangements that reflect the transition from a familistic society to an individualistic soci ety where ever more people seek to maintain their independence rather than relying on their family or the government. Yet, as the average life expectancy rises, the number of elderly in need of care also grows, with various consequences for the society and the economy, rapid growth in demand for elder care being one of them. Many industrialized coun tries, Japan among them, resort to import health professionals and car egivers of elderly patients, turning this segment of the labour market into one of the most affected by ageing and depopulation. This lucrative, international trade in human services is examined from a political science perspective in Vogt’s contribution on interna tional caregiver migration to Japan. Two policy fields, welfare and immigration, interact in a way not anticipated by many, as Japan’s strict immigration regime comes under pressure by a severe shortage of caregiving personnel. According to Vogt’s analysis, the Economic Partnership Agreements Japan has concluded with the Philippines and Indonesia in order to allow for controlled labour import in the care sector could eventually pave the way for opening the door to labour migration more widely. This is in stark contrast with Germany where 30 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler massive labour migration has been a political concern since the 1960s, and where elderly care is widely and routinely carried out by immi grants with various degrees of professional preparation. Friebe dem onstrates with a local case study how depopulation and ageing have turned migrant labour into an indispensable element of the health care and elderly care sectors in the German federal state of North Rhine- Westphalia, although many caregivers, mainly hailing from Eastern European countries, are employed privately without certification or documentation. One of the problems of providing elderly care is language. This is quite obvious when hiring immigrants to do this kind of work. However, upon closer investigation it turns out that few caregivers have received any training for the particular demands of communica tion in elderly care. Based on empirical research in a Japanese home for the elderly, Backhaus’ chapter provides insight into the everyday com munication problems that arise between residents and staff in an elder care institution. Not much research has been done in this field, which is not because it is marginal, but rather because it is difficult to collect data. There is little doubt that, as the population of elderly care- recipients grows, a better understanding of their communication needs will be required. This is as obvious as it is urgent in regards to elderly people with cognitive impairment. They need support and, as their mental capacities to deal with the affairs of everyday life diminish, guardianship. Since these are no longer isolated cases and the need to protect cognitively impaired elderly people from themselves and from abuse by others has become a major social tasks, adult guardianship laws have been enacted in recent years, both in Japan and Germany, the Japanese law being modelled on the German one. The Japanese law is discussed from a comparative point of view in the contributions by Ando and Arai. While Ando provides historical background informa tion about adult guardianship in Japan and the contents of the New Adult Guardianship Law of 2000, Arai analyses the changes in Japan’s Civil Code that were necessitated by the introduction of this law as well as statistical data about its application and the procedure of apply ing for adult guardianship. In Japan, the Adult Guardianship Law is applied with much lesser frequency than in Germany, a difference that is indicative of legal as well as cultural differences. The fourth and last part of the book, “Regional Aspects of Ageing and Depopulation”, deals with the sometimes dramatic ramifica tions of population implosion in rural and urban environments. population implosion 31

All contributions in this part lend support to the conclusion that regional demographic decline, rather than being an independent fac tor, is a largely unintended outcome of economic restructuring, hous ing policies and historical legacies. The first chapter by Kemper gives an overview of regional differences in demographic change inG ermany. He identifies a complex pattern of shrinking regions coexisting with growing ones. Twenty years after reunification, eastern Germany still suffers from net-outmigration and is thus more affected by population decline than the west. On this dichotomy are superimposed the nega tive effects of the settlement structure in old industrialized agglomera tions and peripheral rural areas. Kemper concludes that the regional diversity of demographic developments in Germany requires a diver sity of strategies in housing and labour market policies. Compared to Germany, the contrast between growing and shrink ing regions in Japan is much more pronounced while the regional pat tern itself is less complex. This is revealed in the next two chapters by Ishikawa and Elis who take a close look at regional differences of demo graphic dynamics in Japan scrutinizing the complex interrelations between demographic, economic and political aspects of severe depop ulation in rural areas. Ishikawa points out that the alarming situation of many rural municipalities is largely the result of prolonged migra tion by young people in search for better education and employment to metropolitan areas, Tokyo in particular. However, his analysis of population statistics reveals that of late both middle-aged to younger elderly Japanese including members of the post-war baby boom gen eration and non-Japanese women who have married Japanese farmers have moved to these areas. Ishikawa argues that, to stem further depopulation, these trends should be encouraged. Yet, based on fieldwork in three shrinking rural municipalities, Elis in his contribution stresses that most of the causal factors underlying rural depopulation transcend the possibilities of local actors. For economic and, subse quently, demographic decline in these areas result from long-term structural changes due in part to globalization and trade liberalization. In this respect, the situation in Japanese peripheral regions closely resembles that of rural areas in north-eastern Germany which are dis cussed in Beetz’s contribution. He takes issue with the current dis course on rural areas as being too narrowly focussed on demographic decline which, he argues, is just one element of the more comprehen sive process of ‘peripherization’. According to his analysis, this one- sided view impedes the development of local governance structures 32 florian coulmas and ralph lützeler that can generate adaptive and participatory solutions for the regions in question. Although many rural areas are depreciated as redundant ‘empty land’, rural pioneers and big energy investors are beginning to discover new forms of land use there. The section is concluded by Lützeler’s chapter on demographic decline in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (TMA). Although it is one of the few regions in Japan that still grow, high-speed population ageing and shrinkage have begun to affect out-of-the-way areas and munici palities that have undergone de-industrialization. On a micro level, in local government housing estates the share of elderly residents has reached high proportions of up to 50 per cent, a situation that is often compounded by high unemployment and other social problems. Lützeler argues that the increasing gap in the TMA between growing areas on one hand and ageing and shrinking ones on the other is largely the outcome of economic globalization and the introduction of ‘entre preneurial city politics’ which focuses on the economic performance of a city at the expense of providing services, facilities and benefits to its citizens. Counter-strategies to revitalize the estate areas exist, but they are intended to improve the outward appearances of the area rather than to promote social (re-)integration.

6. Conclusion

The collection of original chapters brought together in this volume offers insight into the multifaceted variety of problems associated with population ageing and decline. Taken together they demonstrate that these population changes are major challenges for the industrialized countries in Europe and East Asia, each of which exhibits distinctive characteristics, while sharing many aspects. Only detailed compari sons allow us to see which parts of the grand process of population implosion now being witnessed are universal and in this sense inevita ble, and which parts are country-specific and potentially subject to political intervention. This book does not pretend to present a simple answer to the chicken-and-egg question of whether socio-economic developments drive population shifts, or vice versa, or the question of how policy interventions can influence these developments. It does, however, offer insights as to how the complex interaction between population dynamics, social restructuring and market forces can be studied. part I

Societies of Population Decline

Confronting the Demographic Trilemma of Low Fertility, Ageing and Depopulation1

Shigemi Kono

1. the End of the Population Explosion

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the world’s population growing explo- sively. Population estimates indicate that from 1965 to 1970 global population growth was at 2.0 per cent per annum, whereas the developing world saw rapid growth of 2.5 per cent. During the next five years, from 1970 to 1975, the numbers fell only slightly: While global population growth stood at 1.9 per cent, the developing world continued to see rapid growth at 2.4 per cent. Although an increase of two per cent per annum may not seem like much, Ansley J. Coale (1974) estimated that were this rate to continue for 1200 years, the mass of all human beings would equal the mass of the planet. The P ‘ opulation Explosion’ was seen as the world’s greatest population-related problem at that time. However, while some population increase occurred in the developed world, from 1950 to 2005 the overwhelming majority of worldwide population growth – 90 per cent – occurred in the developing world. The Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) sounded the alarm that this planet on which humanity lives has its limits: if population growth were to continue at this pace, the planet would fill up with people, resources would be exhausted, environmental and ecological systems would be destroyed, and humanity would become extinct – projections which came as a huge shock to politicians, business leaders and scholars around the globe.

1 This chapter benefited from a dialogue with Professor David A. Coleman of Oxford University in October 2004. The author is grateful to Professor Coleman for this opportunity. Special thanks are also due to Motomi Beppu of the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research and Setsuya Fukuda of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Rostock) for assistance in preparing the figures and tables. 36 shigemi kono

2. fertility Falls to Below-Replacement Levels

By the beginning of the 1970s, however, the rate of global population growth had begun to decelerate, and birth rates around the world started to decline more quickly than anticipated (cf. Figure 1), and most rapidly in the developed world. Particularly sharp declines occurred in those developed countries where population movements had previously differed sharply: Europe, North America (US and Canada), Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Today, in all of these countries, fertility rates have fallen below replacement level (cf. Figures 1 and 2). And in Japan, the low fertility is attributed to behavioural changes among people of reproductive age, either postponing marriage and subsequent childbearing or to having fewer children. Since the 1970s the leading grand theory advanced to explain the change in the world’s population has been the theory of ‘demographic transition’, claiming that once the total fertility rate (TFR) falls to the replacement level, it will fluctuate in the neighbourhood of that level until finally settling down.H owever, during recent years the developed world (except for Ireland, the US and New Zealand) has seen the TFR

Source: United Nations (2009). Figure 1 trends in the TFR in major areas of the world, 1950–1955 and 2005–2010 demographic trilemma 37 remain below replacement level with no rebound. The final stage of the demographic transition – namely that population growth remains stationary at the replacement level – has not occurred. On the contrary, fertility rates have remained below replacement level in many developed countries for more than thirty years (cf. Figure 2), with Japan being a case in point. When fertility falls below the replacement level, the population begins to decline, unless compensated for by immigration. Today, populations have already begun to shrink in 17 countries within the developed world, of which 10 are members of the former Soviet Bloc. And in the future, the number of countries with declining populations is likely to increase, and their rate of decrease is certain to accelerate, if only slightly. If migration is ruled out, the replacement level of fertility is a water- shed at which populations will either continue to grow or decline. The actual figure for the replacement level is, however, affected by mortality as well as fertility. In Japan, Europe and the US, mortality rates are extremely low, and the replacement levels of TFR are below 2.1. In Africa, on the other hand, especially sub-Saharan Africa, today’s replacement level is similar to Japan’s prewar levels, i.e., higher than 2.5, because in those countries mortality rates are high.

Source: Based on national statistics data (cf. web pages of: Statistics Canada, U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Office for National Statistics [UK], Eurostat), Council of Europe (2005), Teitelbaum and Winter (1985), Frejka and Sardon (2004).

Figure 2 trends in the TFR for 10 selected developed countries, 1920– 2007 38 shigemi kono

Another demographic phenomenon worth noting is that falling fertility rates are not confined to the developed regions, but are also occurring in the developing regions. Countries in East Asia and the islands of the Caribbean have seen fertility decline below replacement level since the 1980s and other regions have started to record very low birth rates as well. According to the most recent UN projections (United Nations 2009), countries in which the fertility rate is now below replacement level account for a half of the world’s total population.

3. the 1930s Fertility Decrease in Europe and the US and the Subsequent Transition

Figure 2 illustrates the almost unknown but surprising fact that, during the 1930s, the decade of the Great Depression, the fertility rate of Europe as a whole already fell below the replacement level. At the time the replacement rate was higher than 2.1, and probably about 2.3 or 2.4. In 1936, the TFR for the US stood at 2.19, but the net reproduction rate had fallen below 1. Back then, at least 12 developed countries registered below- replacement fertility rates: the US, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand. All were either northern European countries, that is countries in which the Industrial Revolution first appeared, or former British colonies and the ‘Neo-European’ countries of the US, Australia and New Zealand. Countries in southern and eastern Europe, which lagged behind in industrialization and modernization, on the other hand, did not record below-replacement levels. But the 1930s were not the first time that fertility rates had declined below replacement level. During the decade that started in 1910 and included World War I, the TFR had temporarily dropped below 2.0 in England and Wales, as well as in France, where TFR had fallen precipitately to 1.2 around 1916. Fertility rates were also low in Sweden and Denmark. Today, according to UN projections (cf. Figure 3), there are several developed countries in which total population is declining. In this figure, the populations of the UK and France are shown as increasing and future growth is predicted. In Russia, Japan, Germany and Poland, however, population decline has only begun and is expected to accelerate from now on. Italy’s population is currently showing a slight increase, but is expected to decline soon. demographic trilemma 39

Source: United Nations (2009). Figure 3 population trajectories for major European countries and Japan

4. causes of Population Decline

There are three direct causes of population decline: (1) declining fertility, (2) increasing mortality, and (3) excess emigration. Population changes cannot be reduced to any one of these causes but represent the effects of all three. In the case of Japan, recent years have seen an increase in immigration over emigration, but the difference in absolute numbers is small. Changes in population are thus due to (1) changes in fertility and (2) changes in mortality. The reason for Japan’s current population decline is that the crude death rate (mortality) has risen above the crude birth rate. Yet higher average life expectancy has caused mortality per se to decline. Recent increases in the crude death rate are thus a reflection of an ageing population structure. In other words, the proportion of those aged 65 and over, and especially of those aged 75 and over, now accounts for a larger proportion of the population as a whole. The underlying cause of this change in population structure, the ageing of the population as a whole, is the cumulative effect of low fertility experienced in the past. Thus, the fundamental cause of population decline is fertility falling below the replacement level. The direct cause is lower fertility, the indirect cause the advancing ageing of the population. In the developed regions, the 1930s witnessed more than ten European nations with fertility rates below replacement level, but 40 shigemi kono populations did not decrease. Today, in the 21st century, however, low fertility rates appear to be driving population decline. Why is that? When fertility rates declined during the 1930s, these countries’ populations were still young and the proportions of elderly people were small, meaning that even if the number of births was small, that of deaths was even smaller. The situation of these countries back then resembles that of Japan between 1975 and 2005 (cf. also Atoh (Section 2) in this volume). In Japan, the number of births was more than double the number of deaths from 1947 to 1998. Even with lower fertility, the baby boomers born between 1947 and 1950 produced a relatively large second generation of baby boomers. At the same time, until 1995, the proportion of those aged 65 and over was still below 15 per cent, so the number of deaths was still smaller than the number of births. In the second half of the 20th century, Japan still had a large ‘reserve population’, so to speak. Then, as fertility continued to decline, one effect of the rapid ageing of the population was that the proportion of those aged 65 and over exceeded the proportion of those under 15 (cf. Figures 2 and 3). As the number of deaths increased, Japan began to ‘consume’ its reserve population. By 2005 the ‘reserve’ was exhausted and Japan’s population began to decline (cf. also Takahashi in this volume). Using Japan’s population as an example, Table 1 shows estimated changes in three age categories (i.e., under 15, 15–64, and 65+) in 1950, 2005 and 2050, and how changes in these single age categories affect the population’s overall age structure. From 1950 to 2005, Japan’s overall population increased by 44.57 million, but there are striking differences between the different age categories. During this period, the population aged 15 and over increased, but the population under

Table 1 anatomy of population change: the case of Japan

Year Total population 0–14 15–64 65+ (A) 1950 83,195 29,428 49,658 4,109 (B) 2005 127,768 17,585 84,422 25,761 (C) 2050 95,152 8,214 49,297 37,641 (B)–(A) +44,573 –11,843 +34,764 +21,652 (C)–(B) –32,616 –9,371 –35,125 +11,880 Note: Population in thousands. Source: NIPSSR (2007). demographic trilemma 41

15 years decreased. There were remarkable increases in the population aged 15–64 and 65+. Particularly noteworthy is that nearly 40 per cent of the population increase in that half century was due to an increase in the elderly population. At first glance, we knew that the reason for this increase in the 65+ category was the declining mortality in those elderly population and increase in their average life expectation. There were, however, two more reasons. First, there was a larger size of the birth cohort born before World War II; second is the cumulative effects of the low mortality rates over the entire postwar periods experienced by the cohort concerned of whom more than their majority survived up to the 65+ category in 2005. While the proportion of the population aged 65+ substantially increased, that of the younger population decreased, thus accelerating the ageing of Japan’s population. Turning, then, to future changes in Japan’s population from 2005 to 2050, projections indicate a decline of 33 million in total population. It is, however, extraordinary that these same projections show an increase of 12 million in the population aged 65+, while the young and adult populations will shrink. Whereas in 1950 Japan’s population structure was shaped like a pyramid, with a broad base at the bottom and a narrow peak at the top, the age pyramid in 2050 has been inverted. As the 65+ population becomes relatively larger, Japan will find itself in the same situation as some European countries today: If social insurance systems, such as pensions and medical and nursing insurance, remain on a pay-as-you-go basis, a heavy economic burden will be placed on the shoulders of those aged 15–64. In other words, the population problems confronted by the developed world in the 21st century are not confined to falling fertility rates and declining populations. As the ‘productive’ population of people aged 15–64 declines, the ‘dependent’ population of people aged 65+ will increase. These overlapping problems constitute a trilemma: As falling birth rates contribute to the ageing of society and populations begin to decline, the result will be further depressed birth rates, which in turn accelerates both the ageing of society and the overall population decline. There is the serious danger, then, that falling birth rates, ageing, and population decline will form a vicious circle.

5. the Road to Population Collapse

Figure 4 illustrates two hypotheses about how Japan’s population will develop. The first hypothesis assumes that fertility and mortality rates 42 shigemi kono will remain at 2007 levels. The second hypothesis assumes that fertility rebounds instantaneously to the replacement level, or around 2.07, and stays there afterwards. Under hypothesis 1, Japan’s population continues to decline from its current population of 128 million to less than 50 million by the year 2100, and to a mere 2.5 million in 2300. Under hypothesis 2, Japan’s population continues to grow until around 2020, then begins to decline, and by 2070 will have fallen to 109 million, where it stabilizes with minor fluctuations. Figure 4, however, demonstrates that even if the fertility rate were to return immediately to the 2.07 replacement level, the current population of 128 million cannot be sustained. Even if Japan’s fertility recovers to the replacement level and stays there until 2300, its population will stabilize at no more than 85 per cent of the current baseline population (i.e., the grey line). If, on the other hand, the fertility and mortality rates recorded in 2007 continue, then Japan’s population will be on the road to complete collapse, effectively ‘disappearing’ by 2300 (i.e., the black line). Barring an unprecedented economic recovery, strong enforcement of pro-natalist policies by the government, or the acceptance of a huge influx of foreign migrants, a return to Japan’s current population will not be feasible.

Source: NIPSSR (2009). Figure 4 hypothetical population projections of Japan assuming instantaneous fertility recovery in 2007 to the replacement level demographic trilemma 43

6. positive and Negative Aspects of Population Decline

It has to be added, though, that there are also positive aspects of population decline. This section attempts to summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of population decline for developed nations such as Japan (Coleman 2006). Negative consequences of population decline: • continued population decline is unsustainable; • psychological depression and anxiety about the future ensue; • signs of decline, decay and demise become apparent; • the country’s influence on the international stage is reduced; • diminishing demand for goods and supply of labour reduce economies of scale; • fewer children and more older people adversely affect the old-age dependency; • schools and colleges will suffer from a declining student popu lation. Positive consequences of population decline: • more space, greater freedom of movement, greater flexibility in land use; • less congestion and lower housing costs; • less environmental degradation; • lower unemployment and higher wages bring about more equity, • what may in turn promote fertility halting further population decline; • greater tolerance towards cohabitation and births outside of marriage, as well as more social flexibility and less social exclusion; • assuming that the decline must stop at some point, a moderate decline in population may not be a bad thing for Japan’s society, economy and environment.

7. the Developed World’s Fertility Divide

In Europe, fertility rates were high prior to World War II in the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece), whereas in countries north of the Pyrenees and the Alps (such as France, the UK and the Scandinavian countries) fertility rates were relatively low. In 1940, the TFR in Italy was 3.07, in Spain 3.09, and in Portugal 3.22. 44 shigemi kono

In France the TFR stood at 2.16, in the UK at 1.74, and in Sweden at 1.86. In 2006, however, TFRs for Italy, Spain and Portugal had fallen to 1.35, 1.38, and 1.36, respectively. In contrast, TFRs for France, the UK and Sweden stood at 1.98, 1.84, and 1.85, respectively. It was generally thought that lower fertility rates reflected higher levels of economic development, income, and female employment ratios. In recent years, however, this correlation appears to have been reversed. Todd (2006), showed that there is a clear fertility divide between countries in which the TFR is 1.4 or less and those in which the TFR is 1.5 or higher. (The only exceptions are Albania and the Muslim parts of former Yugoslavia.) The countries with TFRs of 1.5 or higher are located in northern and western Europe and include France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland). Countries with TFRs of 1.4 or lower include the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), the nations of southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece), and the nations of eastern Europe. The reasons for this divide are complex and its explanations various. Kono (1997) attributed the falling fertility rates in Italy and Spain to inadequate social welfare systems and paternalistic attitudes. In Italy and Spain the proportion of national budgets allocated to family policies was small compared to France and the countries of northern europe. Throughout southern Europe, so the argument went, machismo and patriarchal customs prevailed. According to Todd (2006), the distribution of higher and lower fertility rates is not accidental. The nations in the group with higher fertility rates prize freedom and individualism, while those in the lower fertility group have more authoritarian family structures and social institutions. Japan most closely resembles strong family-oriented countries such as Italy, Spain and the Germanic countries, where usually the eldest son is the family heir. And these, according to McDonald (2002), are precisely the countries where gender differences are most pronounced. According to Reher (1998) and Dalla Zuanna and Micheli (2004), the more that a country clings to strong families and close relationships between parents and children, relationships that in the past strengthened the propensity to reproduce, the more it falls behind in the creation of modern families: The age at which children leave home rises, cohabitation and births outside of marriage are rare, and fertility rates are low. When looking at countries around the Mediterranean littoral, where the number of children in strong and traditional families demographic trilemma 45 is low, an intriguing paradox reveals itself. In the past, cohabitation, childbirth outside of marriage, and divorce were thought of as factors that lowered fertility rates. Today, however, the opposite seems to be the case. Last but not least, Haub (2008) and Rindfuss, Guzzo and Morgan (2003) argue that Japan, much like Italy and Spain, is noted for a lack of flexibility in social institutions and low government spending for family policies.

8. causes of Declining Fertility

There are a plethora of theories why fertility rates in the developed world have fallen below replacement level since the 1970s. But while classic demographic transition theory saw populations shifting from high birth rates and high death rates to low birth rates and low death rates, it did not anticipate a decline of fertility rates to below replacement level. Therefore, recent years have seen a proliferation of new theories that see sub-replacement fertility as the norm. The ‘Second DemographicT ransition’ theory (Lesthaeghe 1995; Van de Kaa 2002) posits that there has been a fundamental change in values among young people: A previously child-centred set of values has been replaced by an adult-centred set of values. Key changes in values include a livelier sex life outside marriage – which is linked to an increase in later marriage or remaining single – cohabitation, childbirth outside of marriage, and divorce. In Europe this theory is widely supported, but it remains unclear whether it can sufficiently account for the differences between countries with and without ultra-low fertility rates. Several other theories can be divided into two categories: those that relate falling fertility rates to later and fewer marriages; and those that look at declining fertility among married unmarried couples. These theories conceptualize the reasons for falling fertility rates either in terms of lower marriage rates or a lower propensity to have children. Why, then, have fertility rates fallen in Europe and Japan? One often- cited reason is the growing number of people who delay marriage or never marry at all. In recent years, stagnant economies have prevented young people from finding permanent employment, making it difficult to leave their parents’ homes and become independent, thus making it difficult for them to marry. This phenomenon has been observed in 46 shigemi kono

Italy and Spain, where a strong family system has been diagnosed by historical demographers as an important cause of declining fertility. Figure 5 compares the proportions of men and women aged 25–29 who are still living with their parents in the Mediterranean countries and in northern and western European countries. It reveals striking differences. Japan falls between these extremes, with 50 per cent of both men and women aged 25–29 still living with their parents. Another frequently noted factor is the declining fertility rate in the married population, a factor that can be attributed to the economic situation and/or to social instability. However, in Japan and southern Europe we also find rigid social systems, not only in the form of strong traditions concerning the gendered division of labour within the household, but also especially rigid employment systems. In Japanese companies, for example, it is still difficult to take parental leave making it very difficult to combine family and work. In addition, with the trend towards increasingly late marriage, a large proportion of women now marry in their 30s and, even if they want two or three children, their biological capacity to bear children is reduced, and in a growing number of cases significantly so. Further, there is also the question of whether government support for child rearing and harmonizing women’s employment with bearing

Source: Fokkema and Liefbroer (2008); figures for Japan were computed by Toru Suzuki. Figure 5 percentage of men and women aged 25–29 still living with parents in European countries and Japan, 2002 demographic trilemma 47 and raising children is sufficiently generous for policies to have an effect on slowing falling birth rates.

9. ultra-Low Fertility Rates Appear in East Asia

Around 1970, Japan’s TFR was exceptionally low, standing at 2.14. At the same time, Korea’s TFR was 4.54, while Taiwan recorded 4.00 and the Peoples Republic of China 5.44. All these figures were characteristic of developing countries. In 2007, however, Japan’s TFR stood at 1.34, Korea’s at 1.26 (vs. 1.06 in 2005), Taiwan’s at 1.10 and the Peoples Republic of China’s at 1.6. With the exception of Mainland China, all these figures are concentrated in the same narrow band, and all represent ultra-low fertility rates, i.e. TFRs of around and below a level of 1.3. Among the demographic factors involved, the decline in the number of currently married people in their 20s and 30s plays a large role. In the past, 90 per cent or more of people in their 40s were married. Nowadays, one in four to five has never married. Since the fertile age is limited, if marriage is delayed, even if women want to bear three or four children, they commonly have only one or two. Leaving aside the details of East Asia’s ultra-low fertility rates, the following lists the underlying economic, social and cultural factors: 1. following World War II, the region experienced rapid industrialization, urbanization, and then demographic transition. 2. The transition from many births and deaths to fewer births and deaths is complete. The region may now have entered the ‘Second Demographic Transition’. 3. except for Japan’s ‘increase and multiply’ policy between 1940 and 1945, East Asian governments have formulated and implemented anti-natalist policies that promote birth control; they have little experience of pro-natalist policies. Historically, East Asia has been seen as a region of limited land, scarce natural resources and overpopulation. 4. female labour force participation has grown sharply in recent years. 5. confucianism has been a major influence. Education, discipline and hard work are highly valued. 6. traditionally, the work of the household head outside the home has been considered more important than family life. 48 shigemi kono

7. Male chauvinism remains strongly rooted. 8. ‘Work-life balance’ forms of employment are not yet widespread. 9. while education is seen as important, a disproportionate emphasis is given to graduation from famous universities in employment and promotion. This tendency intensifies competition to enter famous universities, imposing heavy psychological as well as financial burdens on families with two or more children. 10. In contrast to Europe and the US, East Asian societies offer few chances to those who have failed once to recover and achieve success.

10. countering Population Ageing and Depopulation

There are two possible scenarios for policies intended to counter population ageing and depopulation: (1) to use population and family policy to restore low fertility rates to the replacement level. Steps might include accepting more immigrants; (2) to minimize negative implications of population decline and ageing by adjusting socio-economic institutions and practices to demographic changes. Here we focus on the first scenario, disregarding the second.

10.1 Family Policy in the Developed World A comparison of family-related public spending as a percentage of GDP for seven developed nations, including Japan (OECD 2007b; MHLW 2008c), reveals that there are substantial differences from one country to another, but with some exceptions, higher spending correlates with higher fertility. In Japan in 2003, child and family-related public spending was 0.75 per cent of GDP (expected to rise to 0.83 per cent in 2007). That is lower than in the UK, Germany, France, and Sweden. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s annual report for 2008 calls for greater and more effective public investment in this area (MHLW 2008c). However, Japan’s total family-related public spending is only one quarter of that in France and one-fifth of that in Sweden. Italy spends more than Japan, but only half of what France spends and only one-third of that in Sweden. demographic trilemma 49

Possible factors contributing to a TFR of 2.10 in the United States in 2006 – the highest among the developed nations, even though its family policy-related spending as a percentage of GDP is smaller than in Japan – include (1) a large number of immigrants from Latin America and parts of Asia where fertility rates are high, (2) a wealth of natural resources and broad expanses of land that soften the population pressure experienced in Japan and Korea, and (3) the unexpected presence of a large number of ‘pro-life’ individuals who reject contraceptive pills, IUDs and other forms of artificial birth control. In contrast, in Germany, where support for families is generous, though not on the same scale as in Sweden, fertility rates are low: 1.33 in 2006 and 1.37 in 2007. Here the key factors may be an inflexible social structure and the continuing influence of paternalistic norms, as pointed out by Todd (2006).

10.2 Effects and Limitations of Population Policy In the 1930s, when the Great Depression sent fertility rates plummet- ing in Europe and North America and at least twelve countries saw fertility rates fall below replacement level, Sweden and other northern European countries (later followed by Great Britain in the 1940s) created population commissions to debate a broad range of family support and housing subsidies, measures that today would be equivalent to those against declining birth rates. Fertility rates did indeed subsequently recover, but it is hard to tell whether this was the result of a feeling of liberation after World War II, increasing economic prosperity, or government policies. Then, in the early 1970s, declining fertility rates became an increasingly pressing issue again. In contrast to the 1930s, however, declining birth rates were also accompanied by ageing populations and, under the label ‘family policy’, many governments increased child support allowances, lowered taxes for families with children, and provided housing- related support or support for married women to combine jobs with housework. The question, however, is how effective government population and family policies are. Quantitative evaluations of their effects are unex- pectedly rare, probably because population policy does not lend itself to controlled experiments. The usual conclusion in both econometric analysis and macro- and micro-simulation however is that the effects of such policies are far smaller than generally anticipated. 50 shigemi kono

Source: D’Addio and d’Ercole (2005). Figure 6 potential impact of various policy reforms on the TFR

Figure 6 shows the results of an OECD study, conducted as a series and based on a simplified set of assumptions, which estimated the possible effects of various policy reforms on fertility rates by simulating restored fertility rates for 19 OECD member countries. Falling fertility rates, according to OECD research, were due to a failure to adequately meet the following conditions: (1) to provide child support allowances or tax relief sufficient to offset the pressure imposed by child-rearing expenses on family budgets; (2) to extend currently insufficient periods allowed for child-rearing leave; (3) to provide sufficient public child-care facilities; (4) to provide increased opportunities for part-time instead of full- time employment. For the simulations, three or four countries that were deemed to have done an outstanding job in meeting these conditions were selected and simulations conducted using the averages achieved by these countries as the baselines for simulations of how much the TFR should recover if other countries adopted similar measures. The simulation results were positive, indicating that government policies that adequately met these conditions would have sufficient effects. Although in some cases the gains are insignificant, in others the predicted increases in fertility rates are substantial. While doubts remain due to the mechanical nature of these calculations, the results do at least serve an educational purpose. demographic trilemma 51

Japan scores low on meeting conditions (1), (2), and (3). Substantial improvements in meeting conditions (1) and (3) could, the simulation suggests, raise Japan’s fertility rate to the 2.0 level. Germany already satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (3). No further option remains but (4) increasing the number of women with part-time jobs. Given the OECD framework for child-care support and employment opportunities for women, Germany cannot hope to increase its fertility rate through these steps alone. Germany has already reached limits where additional effectiveness from family policy alone approaches zero. Family policy has undoubtedly been effective in Europe. Many scholars, however, argue that the effects have been very small when measured against expectations. In Germany and Austria, recent survey results indicate that both desired and ideal family sizes considered by women of reproductive age were below the replacement-level fertility rate of 2.1. Demeny (2008) warns that even if Germans and Austrians produce their ideal number of children, their fertility rates will still be below replacement level. If they foster a “low fertility culture,” it will be almost impossible for fertility rates to be restored. The policies that Demeny suggests include increasing pensions for those with more children, adding weight to votes cast in elections in proportion to the voter’s number of children, and providing special financial rewards and privileges for full-time mothers. His suggestions include policies formerly adopted by totalitarian countries, policies which are unlikely to be implemented nowadays. Both France and Scandinavia have in recent years proved that fertility rates can be restored to higher levels. It is clear that if family support policies are sufficiently generous over a long period of time, they can to some degree be effective.H owever, France, whose TFR returned to 2.0 in 2007, has pursued pro-natalist policies for a century, while the Scandinavian countries have provided support for working women and families with children through generous family support and housing policies since the 1930s. In Japan and other countries in Asia, where fertility rates are extremely low, recent years have seen dramatic increases in women entering the workforce, but neither ordinary social institutions nor government policies provide sufficient support for working women. In these countries, tradition places greater importance on work than family. Relations between parents and children have also been close, making it possible for children to delay setting up independent households. 52 shigemi kono

Historically, East Asian countries have been overcrowded and virtually all of them have until recently pursued family planning policies, a situation totally different from that in Western Europe.

11. conclusions and Further Perspectives

In the developed regions of the world there are two possible models for relatively high fertility rates. One is the Scandinavian neo-socialist model, the other the laissez-faire model found in the United States. To achieve close-to-replacement-level fertility seems to require either generous government support or a highly flexible social system. In the US, government support is virtually nonexistent, but the social system is extremely flexible. Germany and Austria on the other hand have implemented reasonably generous family policies, but their social systems are considered to be somewhat inflexible. In Italy and Spain, not only have government policies been inadequate, but social systems are traditional and rigid. Japan and Korea closely resemble Italy and Spain in this respect: Government-sponsored family benefits are few, and social systems are both inflexible and less family-friendly. Japan’s TFR has risen slightly from 1.26 in 2005 to 1.32 in 2006, 1.34 in 2007, and 1.37 in 2008. But the question remains whether this signifies a real turn-around towards more children. In 2007, Japan’s adjusted total fertility rate (i.e., TFR adjusted for postponement of births) was 1.5. This figure suggests that if ongoing trends towards later marriage and later childbirth would stop, Japan could attain a TFR of 1.5. An analysis of recent trends reveals a widespread turn-around in ultra-low fertility countries, including Japan (cf. Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene 2009). However, it is unlikely that Japan’s fertility will rise above 1.5. In recent years, both Italy and Spain have felt the effects of the second demographic transition. Cohabitation, births outside of marriage, and divorce have all increased. At the same time, the number of immigrants has also increased rapidly. Thus, in these two cases, theTFR too has started to increase. European demographers have observed that while the process of late marriage and childbirth has not stopped, it has decelerated in both countries, hence enabling a kind of fertility recuperation. In Japan, by contrast, cohabitation and births outside of marriage are still both negligible and stigmatized. For cohabitation and births demographic trilemma 53 outside of marriage to contribute to higher fertility, a higher degree of societal and familiar acceptance will be required. Demographers in Europe and America did not predict the low fertility rates of the 1930s, the long-term baby boom of the 1940s–1960s, and the subsequent declines of total fertility below the replacement level. To predict fertility rates 30 years or more into the future is nearly impossible. The suddenness of the decline in fertility in Europe and North America around 1965, for example, was due to the introduction of the contraceptive pill. The occurrence of a technological revolution of that sort is beyond our capacity to forecast. It may turn out that something will happen in Japan 30 years from now that seems unthink- able, given the pessimism that dominates current projections. Thus new values, new forms of male-female partnership, innovative population policies, and even childbirths by middle-aged women – thanks to the development of medical technology – all remain possible, if not all probable.

Europe’s Demographic Future

Reiner Klingholz

1. Europe and Japan as Pioneers in Demographic Development

The world’s population nearly quadrupled in the course of the past century. And it still grows by about 230,000 heads per day, moving up to 9.4 billion in 2050 (Population Reference Bureau 2009). It has always been clear that at some time in some region of the world this trend of unsustainable demographic development would reverse. This role has now fallen to Europe, Japan and South Korea. However, in contrast to Japan and South Korea, Europe records considerable immigration from other regions of the world, and can therefore be considered a pioneer in a demographic trend that sooner or later will reach many countries around the globe.1 Within Europe, Germany is at the forefront. The low total fertility rate of around 1.4 children per woman has meant that over the last 35 years, children have replaced only two-thirds of their parents’ generation. Furthermore, since 1972, Germany has not seen a single year in which the number of newborns exceeded the number of deaths. The lingering population decline has only been masked by high immigration surpluses offsetting the natural losses – at least that was the case until 2003. Since then, the overall population of Germany has been shrinking – so far by more than half a million. TheS tatistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office) expects that the nation will have twelve million fewer inhabitants by 2060 – a loss that is the equivalent of losing the population of eastern germany with the exception of the capital Berlin (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). Germany, along with Ukraine and Romania, leads the league of European countries with populations set to contract. With a fertility rate of 1.4, it is only a small step ahead of Europe as a whole, where on average 1.5 children per woman are born. In 1957, when the European Union was founded, every single one of today’s 27 EU member states had fertility rates above 2.1 children

1 All statistics in this chapter (if not indicated otherwise) are based on Kröhnert, Hoßmann and Klingholz (2008). 56 reiner klingholz per woman. Today, ten out of 27 EU nations already report an excess of deaths over births. Before mid-century, when the baby boomers will have died, a great number of nations will see dwindling population numbers, and by 2030, most Central and East European regions, including eastern Germany, will face serious population losses. These will be most severe in remote rural areas with weak economies. Stability or even growth can be expected only in and around the capital regions of Central and Eastern Europe, where most of the post-communist foreign investment has happened, and where most of the new jobs were created after the end of communism. The rural regions of countries with low fertility will shrink: Spain will shrink in the north and Italy in the south. On the other hand, countries with high fertility, like Norway, the UK, and France, might be able to offset these losses in their less-developed areas because of a growing overall population. According to common population projections, the EU will have lost some 50 million of its current inhabitants by the year 2050 through an excess of deaths over births – that is 10 per cent of today’s population, or roughly the populations of Poland and Greece combined. Most European countries will only be able to achieve population growth, or even stability, on the basis of immigration. In fact, the natural losses will almost certainly be compensated for by an equal number of immigrants over the next four decades. Despite low birth rates, the EU-27’s total population will remain more or less constant until mid-century according to the Eurostat baseline scenario projection (Eurostat 2008): From today’s 500 million, population will peak at 520 million around 2035 and decline afterwards. As non-EU countries like Ukraine or Belarus are not likely to gain enough immigrants to compensate for the low fertility, Europe in total will almost certainly shrink. Europe’s demographic share will also decline as all other continents continue to grow: the Americas and Asia will grow by about 30 per cent; Africa’s population will have doubled by 2050. As a result, some scholars expect “massive shifts in economic and military potential” and “significant security challenges to Europe over the next two decades” (Goldstone 2008).

2. Differing Fertility Levels

These population developments, however, do not necessarily mean that Europe is on the road to ruin. Rather, it means that its societies face europe’s demographic future 57 multiple challenges which differ widely from country to country, and even more so from region to region. Especially remote rural areas in Central and Eastern Europe might get more or less depopulated over the next decades. In detail, demographic trends follow different paths in the different European countries, one reason for this being that fertility levels are distributed unevenly across the continent. Not a single one of the EU-countries has a fertility rate above 2.1, the rate needed to ensure a growing population in the long term. Only in small and poor Kosovo, which is not a member of the EU and is a relic of former Yugoslavia, is the fertility rate higher (2.7). While nearly all countries in Central, South and Eastern Europe report around or below 1.4 children per woman, the figure in Europe’s fertility belt between Finland, Norway, Sweden, UK, Ireland and France is between 1.9 and 2.0. Interestingly, there is almost no middle ground of fertility in Europe and, even more interestingly, the fertility gaps between the different nations can be clearly traced along the national borders, making it highly plausible that the different fertility levels can be explained by different national family policies. Declining birth rates worldwide are associated above all with the changing role of women in society. Since the 1960s, European women have gained equal access to education and they have made good use of it. In most European countries young women are better qualified than their male counterparts. It is unsurprising that these women want to use their education to help them get a job and earn an independent income. Some demographers argue that prosperity and increasing personal freedom leads a society into a ‘demographic-economic paradox’ (Birg, Flöthmann and Reiter 1991): The further a society is developed in economic terms, the fewer children its women will tend to have. According to this theory, population decline is the price to be paid for modernization and prosperity. But today there is no statistical proof that the demographic-economic paradox is true. A negative correlation between fertility and female employment was true in Western Europe only until the 1980s. Before that, countries with high female labour force participation had the lowest birth rates and vice versa. Today the reverse is true: In Western Europe – as in all the world’s industrial nations – there is a positive correlation between female labour force participation and fertility rates. In high-fertility countries, like Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Denmark, far more women are employed than in low-fertility countries like Italy, Greece, Spain, and even Germany (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2008). 58 reiner klingholz

In simple terms, where parents have the chance to easily combine family life with a job, and where high-quality childcare facilities and full-day schools are the standard, the fertility rate is high. Moreover, it is the Calvinist countries that record the high birth rates, perhaps because the Calvinist work ethic expects all members of a society – women and men – to contribute to it through work. These countries, therefore, invested earlier than other countries in equal education for men and women. And they realized the need for consistent and modern family policies to prevent the fertility rate from dropping.

3. Ageing Continent

As people in all European countries several decades ago used to have more children, and life expectancy has continued to rise, the older generations make up an increasing proportion of the total population, resulting in markedly ageing societies all over Europe. At the same time, the working population, the labour force, is declining rapidly, meaning that overall production might decline as well. The median age of the European population, which stood at 31 in 1950, had reached 38 in 2005 and is set to rise to 48 by 2050. Put another way, Europe’s population is ageing by roughly two days a week, so that elderly people will soon outnumber young people. Europe will reach the peak of its ageing process around 2045. After that, the baby boom generation will leave the population pyramid and Europe will turn a new page in its demographic chronology. Until then, it will be necessary to adapt pension and health care systems to the large increment of elderly people. Most European countries will see a decline in their workforces over the next several decades – mainly very-low fertility nations such as Germany, Italy, and Poland. High fertility nations such as France and Ireland, by contrast, can expect the numbers of their working-age populations to remain unchanged; but their populations will grow over time, so that the relative share of their labour forces will be reduced. In all of Europe, the number of people over age 60 is set to rise by more than 50 per cent between 2004 and 2030. The size of the working-age population (those aged between 15 and 64) stood at 333 million in 2008, and it will shrink to 328 million in 2025, and to 294 million in 2050. At today’s labour force participation rates, the number of people in the actual workforce will drop from 238 million in 2008 to 207 million in 2050. Without immigration the number would drop to europe’s demographic future 59

169 million. At the same time, these countries will face the challenge of keeping productivity high in order to remain competitive on a global level. Even so, the fast-growing economies in Asia and Latin America are likely to surpass Europe in economic productivity.

4. rising Numbers of Migrants

Today, Europe’s prosperity is making it increasingly attractive for people from other regions of the world. Nearly all of the EU countries, as well as its associated members of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, have growing immigrant populations. In 2006 there were some 30 million foreign nationals living in the EU-27+3 nations – that is close to 6 per cent of the overall population. First- and second-generation migrants who have already assumed citizenship in their new home countries are estimated to account for roughly the same share. Together, these citizens with a migration background make up 12 per cent of the entire EU-27+3 population. Even before 2004, all 15 original EU member states had become countries of immigration. Recently, the most attractive nations for migrants have been countries that themselves have a long emigration record: Spain, where the number of non- nationals grew almost eight-fold between 1990 and 2006; Italy, where the figure tripled; and Ireland, where it doubled. The origins of most migrants to Europe have either a historical or geographical basis. The largest group of immigrants in Greece, for example, stems from neighbouring, poverty-stricken Albania. In Portugal, Spain and France the largest groups are made up from people of former colonies. In Germany the biggest group of foreign nationals, attracted in the post-war economic boom phase, are originally from Turkey. Today, 2.8 million people of Turkish background live in Germany (Woellert et al. 2009). An even bigger number of migrants – 4 million – are descendents from former German Aussiedler (Bade et al. 2007) who had migrated to Eastern Europe and Russia between the 14th and 19th century. These emigrants are granted German citizenship on their return. In absolute terms, Germany has by far the largest foreign-born population, followed by France, the UK, Spain, and Italy. In relative terms, the very small countries of Luxembourg and Liechtenstein have the largest stock of immigrants, followed by Switzerland. In Germany, first- and second-generation migrants account for 19 per cent of the population, but – due to higher fertility 60 reiner klingholz rates among migrants – already close to one-third of the under- ten-year-olds come from migrant families. Similar figures are reported in France. All European countries have problems integrating their migrants adequately into society. Most immigrants have poor qualifications, and their children tend to follow the same trend. This has served to colour the public’s perception of this population group, a fact that makes it difficult for European governments to justify further immigration of qualified migrants to fill the gaps in the labour market.

5. No Solutions – Only Adaptation

All these demographic trends – ageing societies, shrinking populations, and insufficiently integrated migrants – will cause problems, and there is no magic solution. There is only one way out: Europe’s populations and governments will have to learn to deal efficiently with the coming changes in order to prevent them from growing in scope. These challenges harbour great chances for reform and renewal: As Europe will have fewer young people to generate higher productivity in the future, member nations can compensate for the demographic losses only by providing more and better education. The continent’s most important resources – its minds and talents – will be valued even more highly in the future. But individual European countries differ considerably in terms of the progress they have made in the transformation from industrial to knowledge-based societies. Some countries invest more efficiently in education, science and technology than others, and have many highly qualified workers, a fact that directly translates into higher productivity and income. The prosperous societies of Switzerland and the Scandinavian nations are clearly the leaders in this field. More than 40 per cent of Sweden’s workforce is active in science and technology. Over half of these workers are university-trained. In every OECD-PISA study comparing international education, Finland’s schools have shown their excellent capacity, making it the backbone of the nation’s successful ‘Nokia’ economy. While education is the central answer to Europe’s demographic problems, it is also a necessary precondition for another policy option: working longer. In more than half of the EU nations the retirement age is currently below 60, and for women it is even lower. As a consequence, the employment rate in the age group 55–64 is as low as 40 per cent. europe’s demographic future 61

In many European countries life expectancy (today it is on average 77 years for men and 82 years for women) continues to rise by three years per decade; and for some Europeans, the length of their retirement will soon exceed that of their working life. This trend is not sustainable and the luxury of early retirement would bankrupt all pension systems. The old arguments for early retirement programmes, which date back to a time when the baby boomers were entering the job market, seem to rest on a mistaken premise, namely that they would alleviate unemployment among young people. But if one takes a closer look at the basic statistics,

Source: Eurostat (2008b). Figure 1 share of working people as a percentage of the overall population between the ages of 55 and 64, 2006 62 reiner klingholz it becomes clear that the lowest overall unemployment rates are to be found in countries and regions where employment rates for the age group 55–64 are highest (cf. Figure 1). In these countries (mainly Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), people aged 55 and older apparently are so productive that they create more jobs than they displace. But if, for demographic reasons, companies start to employ more elderly persons, they will necessarily have to invest more in skills- enhancement. This is exactly what these countries already do today, and what other countries still have to learn. Participation rates in skills-enhancement programmes (4 per cent in Portugal and 6 per cent in Italy, as opposed to 32 per cent in Sweden) show that the economic usefulness of elderly people is widely underestimated in many countries. As a consequence, the demand for lifelong learning will grow fast. Gender equality in family, work and pay is another issue. The economy needs women no less than it needs children. And it will, for purely economic reasons, have to ensure that family and job are compatible, on equal terms, for both partners. Again, there are good examples in Europe of how to achieve much higher female labour force participation. Women work in greater numbers in countries in which many people aged 55 or older also work. Qualified women in the labour force make these economies even more productive and competitive. Interestingly, these countries show disproportionately high fertility rates, thus proving that modern family policies make sense for not only economic reasons. These shining examples of Europe’s competitiveness are good news: Europe, with its huge number of cultures, concepts and ideas, already has a good number of models for dealing with demographic change. Some nations are better prepared than others, but if they learn from each other, the continent would be not only a pace-setter in the process of demographic change, but also a pioneer in dealing with problems that, sooner or later, the rest of the world will also face. Flexible Employment, Flexible Families, and the Socialization of Reproduction

Wolfgang Streeck

1. introduction

Free markets can be demanding on societies, and this in turn can be expensive for governments. The spread of markets undermines traditional social obligations and communal ways of life, draining important sources of social integration and stability. This is why capitalist market economies tend to generate a continuous stream of demands for social reconstruction by public policy. Relations of solidarity that become defunct with the advance of markets call for replacement with functionally equivalent public institutions; formal regulation must substitute for informal social control; mutual confidence needs to be restored where traditional self-restraint has eroded; and emerging new risks require containment and insurance by public authority. Far from making the state disappear, capitalist progress gives rise to ever new pressures for political compensation of its adverse side-effects on social life, and indeed on economic life as well. Instead of withering away, modern states seem to be experiencing a growing gap between increasing expectations for reconstructive political intervention and the limited resources that a private economy and a free society are willing to concede to them to pay for it. In fact, a driving force behind political-economic liberalization in the past two decades seems to have been attempts of governments to defend their capacity to govern by returning responsibility for coping with the consequences of market expansion to societies and markets themselves. If nothing else, the 2008/09 financial crisis has made it a central political question how states and governments can satisfy increasing demands for public intervention with the limited means they have available, and which social dysfunctions generated by an expanding capitalist market economy they can afford not to address. Which claims for reconstructive social surgery by public provision can governments fend off without causing unacceptable risks for political and social stability? What are the likely consequences of states being unable or unwilling to intervene 64 wolfgang streeck in societies and economies in response to the socially destructive side- effects of expanding markets? And what are the conditions under which states can stand back and leave it to their societies and economies to deal with the social repercussions of markets and capitalism on their own? Exploring the relationship between expanding markets, changing social structures and political intervention, the present chapter looks at the way in which the physical reproduction of society has or has not become a subject of public policy in the course of the accelerated commodification of labour in the past two decades and the simultaneous transformation of the post-war family. It begins by recounting the advance of labour market flexibility after the 1970s; the political attempts to make that advance compatible with individual security and social stability; and the laissez-faire default option, which is acceptance of social and economic dualism. Next, it asks why the destruction of the post-war standard employment relationship met with so little resistance, suggesting that one reason was that the rise of flexible employment was intertwined in various ways with a transition to more flexible families. The chapter discusses how the two developments – intensified commodification of labour, in particular the increased labour market participation of women, and the deinstitutionalization of family relations – may together relate to the secular decline of fertility in advanced industrial societies, and how this has tended to make the production of children a public responsibility in some countries but not in others. To illustrate the multifaceted nature and the inherent complexity of the relationship between markets, families, social performance and public policy, and to identify issues for further, in-depth research, the chapter compares the very different experiences of three countries in particular, Social-Democratic Sweden, the free-market United States, and Christian-Democratic Germany. Among other things, it casts doubt on the now apparently received belief that government family policies can effectively improve reproductive performance, also in comparison to the market-based alternative way of combining high fertility with high female labour market participation that one sees in the United States. It also explores the paradoxically negative impact of the persistence of traditional family structures on fertility as seen, for example, in Italy and Japan. Finally, the chapter concludes with general observations on the costs of markets to societies and states. Active labour market policy and the socialization of reproduction 65 new family policies in various European countries are discussed as attempts by governments to deploy public policy and public funds to create substitutes for embedded and instituted social solidarity sub- verted by the progress of marketization. Similar pressures for political compensation of the effects of markets on social structures and their performance were at work in the current financial crisis, which used up public funds at an unprecedented scale to balance potentially crip- pling dysfunctions of progressive marketization. The chapter raises the question how long governments will be able to afford the continuing transfer of solidarity from an increasingly market-driven society to public budgets.

2. Flexible Employment

The rise of flexibility as a paramount concern in industrial relations and labour market policy began with the decay of the post-war settlement in the 1970s (on the following cf. Streeck 2008b). As the Wirtschaftswunder, the trentes glorieuses, the “Golden Age” of the post- war boom faded out, the advance of mass production became stuck, and the global monetary regime with the US as benevolent hegemony broke apart, flexibility began its ascent as a leading objective in the organization of labour markets and employment, as reflected in a rapid increase in the number of articles on the subject in professional journals. After first appearing in the 1970s, the concept of “flexibility” took off in the subsequent decade, and finally became dominant in the second half of the 1990s. For a while, different versions of flexibility coexisted and indeed competed with one another. When employers and governments began to ask workers to allow them more flexibility and become more flexible themselves, a typical response in countries with strong unions and a broad skill base, such as Germany, was to offer functional, or internal flexibility in lieu of numerical, or external flexibility (Streeck 1987). In other words, workers were willing to switch jobs inside their existing workplace on the condition that they were guaranteed continued employment in one form or another, and that employers provided them with the required additional training. Other proposals to avoid external flexibility included more variable working time arrangements, such as yearly working time accounts, and even variable pay. Ultimately, however, all of this seems to have been to no 66 wolfgang streeck avail. Functional flexibility may have delayed, but could not prevent the arrival of numerical flexibility – either because its potential was exhausted too soon, or because employers resented the additional efforts, organizational and otherwise, that it required them to undertake, or because of declining trade union power. The way in which flexibility, in the end, came down to a massive reopening of external labour markets is again reflected in the literature, where a steep decline in the number of articles dealing with functional flexibility was paralleled by the late 1990s by continually increasing interest in numerical flexibility. Functional flexibility as a socially benevolent alternative to numerical flexibility was associated with M“ odel Japan” or “Model Germany.” However, neither of these survived the 1990s and the increasingly successful attempts by employers to escape from the social obligations inherited from the 1970s. The success of the worldwide effort to dereg- ulate employment at the end of the century is reflected by the index of the Overall Strictness of Employment Protection Law that the OECD began to calculate in 1990. For the nine selected countries that are of particular interest here, the average value of that index fell from 2.3 in 1990 to 1.9 in 1998, and further to 1.7 in 2003 and 2006. With external flexibility having eventually prevailed over internal flexibility, new national models emerged in Europe that stood for alternative ways for public policy to make the increased commodification of labour socially acceptable, in particular the Netherlands and Denmark. It is in one of these countries that the latest lead concept in labour market policy was invented: “flexicurity”. Its first appearance in the newspapers dates from the late 1990s in both the English and the German press; from 2004 on, it became firmly established as a topic of public interest (cf. Figure 1). A little later, with the usual time lag, “flexicurity” also became current in scholarly journals.1 As has often been noted, it is not easy to say what “flexicurity” really means (Viebrock and Clasen 2009) – which makes it ideally suited for all sorts of rhetoric. In light of its origins, we may broadly define it as a form of social security, or protection of social stability, that is intended

1 ebsco host registers 16 scholarly articles on the subject from 2001–2005, and 58 in 2006 and 2007. In other databases, the take-off year for articles on “flexicurity” is 2005. socialization of reproduction 67

Source: Database search using EBSCOhost.com Figure 1 The frequency of the term “flexicurity” in the German and English press, 1995–2007 to be compatible with high turnover and mobility in external labour markets. It may also be described as a set of public policies designed to replace employment security with job security – guaranteeing workers not a given job in a given place of employment, but some job in some place of employment, and if necessary, a rapid succession of jobs. In its more euphemistic self-advertisements, flexicurity aims to replace “old,” “outdated” forms of social security with “new,” more “modern” ones which are allegedly better adjusted to the assumed “needs” of a more competitive and faster-changing economy – with institutions designed to support and embrace rather than prevent more intensive commodification of labour while, it is promised, still protecting workers from the uncertainties associated with it. Be this as it may, while it is clear that flexicurity involves the disman- tling of old forms of protection for workers, there is still much debate and experimentation on what should take their place. The only thing we know for certain is that where flexicurity is intended to mean more than just flexibility, social security systems have to maintain workers at public expense during the frequent if short and temporary spells of unemployment they are expected to accept for the benefit of economic progress. Denmark, where flexicurity seems most advanced, is exemplary in this regard. There is hardly any employment protection in Denmark – at least by Continental European standards – which allows 68 wolfgang streeck employers to hire and fire their workers freely “at will,” making the Danish labour market more market-like than any other labour market on the European Continent. At the same time, unemployment benefits are high, offering workers income security in compensation for little if any job security. Moreover, as high rates of income replacement carry with them what economists call a “moral hazard,” the government must have the capacity to make workers take almost any job that is offered to them, regardless of pay and location. This requires a powerful and expensive labour market bureaucracy, one that not only has complete information about job openings but also commands effective means to sanction unemployed workers who are unwilling to return to the labour market when told to do so.

3. labour Market Reforms

It is not surprising, then, that in 2003 the Danish state had to spend an unequaled 4.6 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product on labour market policy. About three percentage points went into unemployment benefits, while the rest covered the costs of so-called “active” policies, mostly training and job referral. The other home country of flexicurity, theN etherlands, ranked second in spending among OECD countries, at 3.6 per cent. Note that the UK and the US, the two countries classically associated with flexibility uncompensated by politically provided security – with solidarity vested, if at all, in informal private communities rather than formal public institutions – spent no more than 0.8 and 0.7 per cent of their GDP, respectively, on labour market policy. This was roughly as much as Japan (0.7 %), the traditional country of functional flexibility, where the costs of employment stability are, or used to be, absorbed by employers (Eichhorst, Thode and Winter 2004: 218). Labour market reform in the 1990s was not intended to increase public spending on social security; in fact, in most countries the opposite was the case. This may be the most important reason why flexicurity remained no more than a slogan in most countries and why the meaning of the second element of the concept – for which the “-curity” part of the term stands – has remained so vague. In any case, what can be observed is that labour market reform in most countries consisted not of a general shift from old to new forms of employment security, but simply of an expansion of “precarious,” “atypical,” non-standard socialization of reproduction 69 employment on the fringes of national labour market regimes. The extent to which this was the case can be seen if we calculate the OECD Strictness of Employment Protection Index separately for regular and temporary employment (cf. Table 1). Looking at differences between 1990 and 2006, in the case of regular employment we find on average no change at all for our nine countries, with a decline in just one country balanced by an increase in three countries. In the case of temporary employment, by comparison, protection declined in no less than six countries, with an average decline for all nine countries of 1.1 units. From the perspective of governments, labour market reform and the increased external flexibility it conceded to employers was intended above all to raise the general level of participation in paid employment while reducing unemployment and dependence on social assistance. In most countries this worked, but in many only at the price of a dramatic increase in precarious employment. The result was a new dualism (Berger and Piore 1980) in labour markets that came to be characteristic of employment systems almost everywhere in the formerly corporatist countries of Western Europe, with flexibility achieved not by the publicly compensated removal of “rigid” protections from incumbents in the primary sector, but by assigning newcomers to

Table 1 change in regulation strictness of regular employment and of temporary employment in selected OECD countries, 1990–2006 Regular employment Temporary employment

Denmark 0.0 –1.7 France +0.2 +0.5 Germany +0.1 –2.0 Italy 0.0 –3.3 Japan 0.0 –0.5 Netherlands –0.5 –1.2 Sweden 0.0 –2.5 United Kingdom +0.2 +0.1 United States 0.0 0.0 Average 0.0 –1.1

Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_2649_33927_42695243_1_1_1_1,00 .html#data (last accessed 22 January 2010). 70 wolfgang streeck a deregulated marginal, secondary sector. In the German case, for example, vitally needed gains in employment were made possible through a policy of “activation,” involving the deregulation of part- time, marginal and temporary jobs and more effective work incentives for individuals previously shielded from market pressures, in the form of shortened unemployment benefits and fewer opportunities for early retirement. Also, which is particularly relevant in the present context, single mothers had often been excused from having to take a job, and were awarded comparatively generous social assistance; this also was sharply curtailed. As protective regulations were cut back, the result was a sharp rise in atypical employment in the decade between 1997 and 2007, from 17.5 to 25.5 per cent of the workforce (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008b). This was closely associated with steadily increasing employment of women, which paralleled developments in all other countries of the OECD world (cf. Table 2). Female employment grew especially in the years after 2005.A verage working hours for women fell sharply after the 1970s, much more so than for men, indicating that the increase in female participation

Table 2 Germany: rate of economic activity and weekly working hours (men and women), 1970–2007 Rate of Economic Average Weekly Activity Working Hours

Men Women Men Women 1970 87.7 45.9 45.2 39.2 1975 83.1 46.4 42.2 35.9 1980 82.5 48.3 42.4 35.2 1985 76.3 47.0 41.4 34.4 1990 78.5 53.8 40.7 31.9 1995 74.7 55.1 40.8 33.1 2000 74.3 57.7 40.6 29.8 2005 73.3 59.5 38.2 27.9 2006 74.5 61.4 38.3 27.8 2007 76.0 63.1 37.9 27.6

Note: Data until 1990 refer to West Germany only. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2008b) (economic activity); Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2008) (working hours). socialization of reproduction 71 took place largely in the form of part-time work. In Germany as in many other countries, expansion of employment and the corresponding decline in unemployment was accomplished to a large extent by refusing social protection to outsiders and newcomers in the labour market – protections which had in the past deterred employers from taking on new workers while enabling workers to reject offers of what were then considered unacceptable forms of employment. Rising employment generated by more flexible labour markets coincided with a sharp rise in unstable and low-wage employment and, subsequently, in poverty – not in the core but in a growing fringe of the employment system and of society.2 Looking again at the German case, while until the late 1980s, (West) Germany was widely known for having a low wage spread and a low Gini coefficient, especially for a large country, in the early 2000s it rapidly closed the gap to the OECD average. Moreover, income poverty, which had also been comparatively low, began to grow as well in the early 1990s until in the middle of the present decade it, too, equaled the OECD average. Cutbacks in social policy spending caused a widening gap between the low and the high end of the labour market and a growing division in German society.

4. Flexible Families

Labour market liberalization involved a profound redefinition of the meaning of social and economic citizenship: from public protection from the market to public activation for the market, combined, perhaps, with public assistance within it. Clearly this must be the reason why the departure from the standard employment relationship proceeded at such different speeds in different countries.S till, it went surprisingly smoothly overall. Certainly in part, the ease of the transition was due to the fact that it proceeded only gradually and, at least initially, left the core of the employment regime untouched. But this can be only half the answer. Institutionalist accounts of labour market flexibility tend to forget that the standard employment relationship of the

2 how core and fringe relate to one another under the new dualism may be regarded as an open question. In the past, the existence of a secondary sector was often seen, famously by Berger and Piore (1980), as functional for the stability of the primary sector. Today it may rather seem that the emergence of a growing fringe tends to under- mine the institutions regulating the core, and indeed to eat into it (Streeck 2009). 72 wolfgang streeck post-war era had supported a particular social structure that had emerged together with it, which was a contemporary variant of the nuclear family. How closely the new type of family was related to the production system of the “Golden Age” is reflected in the fact that it retrospectively came to be called the “Fordist family,” referring to a stable union of husband and wife, with the husband as single earner and the wife taking care of two or more children. Materially the Fordist family was sustained by a “family wage” that, together with various welfare state benefits, was enough to secure a decent standard of living for all its members. Stable employment was an essential ingredient of this package and indeed a central pillar of the newly settled way of life sought by men as they returned from the battlefields, as well as by women coming home from the armaments factories or the military hospitals (Judt 2005). Very soon, one of the emblems of post-war civilization became the baby boom of the late 1950s and the 1960s. Obviously the Fordist family was, in current jargon, highly “gendered,” and this is why already at the time of its invention the concept had a more than slightly derogatory connotation. Keynes had once defined full employment as less than five per cent of males between 18 and 65 being out of work. Women were not mentioned, since they were assumed as a matter of course to be in the house and provide for their families outside the market. It was this world of stable patriarchal families in integrated social communities that someone like Karl Polanyi would have expected to be defended by what he believed was an inevitable “counter-movement” against more than marginal commodification of the fictitious commodity, labour (Polanyi 1957 [1944]). In the view of Polanyi and many of his contemporaries, human beings needed and wanted the security that was offered by a stable society, an indispensible element of which was stable families. Since such security was incompatible with permanently changing relative prices in self- regulating markets, for labour as well as for its products, a good life for the great majority of people presupposed strong institutions that contained the impact of markets on social life and protected individuals and their families from the destructive dynamism of a modern capitalist economy. Why was it, then, that no significant resistance arose to stem the trend towards more flexible employment?S earching for an answer one notes that the social and family structure that the standard employment relationship had once underwritten has itself dissolved in a process of socialization of reproduction 73 truly revolutionary change.3 In fact, it appears that the Fordist family was replaced by a flexible family in much the same way as Fordist employment was replaced by flexible employment, during the same period and also all across the Western world. A few select indicators must suffice here. Divorce rates (cf. Figure 2) increased everywhere after the end of the post-war era until they stabilized, at a much higher level, in the mid- 1980s. Exceptions were low-divorce countries like Italy and Japan, where the increase continued, and the US, where divorce has always been extremely frequent and where it started to decline around 1980. (Still, divorce rates in the US – incidentally the classical country of “employment at will” – have remained by far the highest in the world.) Moreover, new marriages declined during the same period until the ratio of marriages over divorces converged in six of our seven countries, at roughly 2:1 in the middle of the present decade.4

Source: OECD (2009e). Figure 2 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005

3 The following draws on and expands the argument in Streeck (2008a). 4 an exception is Italy, where divorce is still rare, having been not legally possible until well into the 1970s, and to some extent, Japan. 74 wolfgang streeck

As marriage declined, cohabitation increasingly took its place. In Germany, statistics on cohabitation, which had not been considered worth collecting before 1978, show an increase in the percentage of unmarried couples by a factor of more than six in roughly a quarter of a century, from 2 per cent in 1978 to 13 per cent in 2005 (own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2008c). Since the denominator of the relationship includes all couples, young and old, cohabitation among the younger generation can be assumed to be much more widespread. Simultaneously, births to unmarried parents, which were very rare outside Scandinavia until the 1980s, increased dramatically in almost all countries, from an average in 1970 of 7.5 per cent of newborns in our seven countries to no less than 33 per cent in 2005 (cf. Figure 3). As a consequence, single-parent families proliferated. In relatively conservative Germany, 27 per cent of families with children were headed by a single parent or an unmarried couple in 2005, doubling the figure from the end of the 1970s and, we may reasonably assume, much more than doubling that from the 1960s (own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt 2008c).

Source: OECD (2009e). Figure 3 proportion of births to unmarried parents in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005 socialization of reproduction 75

Source: OECD (2009e). Figure 4 total fertility rates in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005

Finally, as family ties became progressively less institutionalized through the easier availability of divorce and growing social acceptance of cohabitation as a legitimate alternative to marriage, birth rates fell steeply. All over the Western world, the breakup of the Fordist family-cum-employment regime was accompanied by a rapid decline in the number of newborn children, a process that continued well after reliable contraception and legal abortion had first become available (cf. Figure 4). Being easily the most lasting and least revocable social commitment people can make, having children seems to have appeared increasingly incompatible to a new generation with the more flexible and unsettled life associated with both more market-driven employment and less binding social relations.

5. market Attractions, Market Pressures

One explanation, then, for why flexible labour markets became toler- able after the end of the “Golden Age” – contradicting the Polanyian conjecture that the desire for social stability would impose tight limits 76 wolfgang streeck on the commodification of labour – may be that society, and in particular the family, had itself become more flexible. Cultural change – the spread of non-standard forms of social life – may have paved the way for economic and institutional change, in particular the rise of non-standard forms of employment, with deregulation of society as a forerunner to deregulation of the economy. In fact, it seems that the decay of the post-war family was already well under way when the attack by employers and economists on the standard employment relationship had yet to start in earnest. Note that the concept of liberalization may refer not just to an economic, but also to a social and indeed cultural process, and that shedding social obligations may hold attractions not just for employers in labour markets, but also for individuals in families and communities. Cultural revolutions, like the one in Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, do not necessarily require external causes, as there may be enough internal discontent inside a social order to make it change from within. What is deemed a good or appropriate life may change profoundly, not just between but also within generations. In any case, transition to a more flexible labour market regime after the 1970s does not seem to have been obstructed much by resistance of ideas from the 1960s about a livable society. In fact such ideas seem to have given way with surprising ease to cultural tendencies highly favourable to an expansion of markets, in particular the rise of attitudes and dispositions for which markets are as much an attraction as a threat. With fewer and less binding family obligations, living with less stability and more adventure seems to have become more acceptable in the worlds of work as well as employment. Causal relations are obviously highly complex and seem to work in both directions. The erosion of the standard employment relationship may have made family formation difficult for young people, just as it may offer an excuse for postponing or avoiding altogether entry into binding social commitments, such as marriage and childbearing, which in turn may make it less urgent to look for stable employment. Moreover, cultural definitions of what constitutes and is implied in social relations seem to be important background factors, as suggested by the astonishing paral- lels in rates of separation in marriage on the one hand and in employment on the other, over time as well as between countries like Japan, Germany and Italy versus the United Kingdom and the United States. Clearly, the decisive development in this context was the mass entry of women into paid employment, which eventually came to be socialization of reproduction 77

celebrated across the political spectrum as a long-overdue liberation from servitude in the feudal village of the patriarchal family. Especially for the liberal wing of the rapidly growing feminist movement, the associated increase in economic uncertainty and social instability appeared to be a price worth paying for what was seen as secular social progress. Commodification of labour, once perceived by the Left as a threat to the dignity of the individual and the stability of society, became redefined as a desirable alternative to a repressive, pre-modern way of life, or at least a necessary answer to a new generation of men who could no longer be relied upon to accept traditional social obligations as husbands and heads of families. It remains a puzzling question how it was that cultural change favouring more flexible social relations and defining uncertainty as a welcome opportunity for personal growth and self-assertion happened just at a time when labour shortages and the resulting wage inflation seriously impeded further economic growth and made employers desperately search for ways of expanding the labour supply.

6. increasing Female Employment

Economically and politically, female progress in employment had to be achieved in opposition to the Fordist labour market regime, which was soon to be denounced by feminist commentators as a male construction founded on female domesticity and subservience. In Germany, where post-war labour market institutions were more resilient than elsewhere, it took time for the growing number of women attracted, according to the liberal-liberationist narrative, by the freedom of the market to wear down the institutional barriers against employment expansion inherent in the family wage system and a male-breadwinner social security regime. Even here, however, rigid institutions protecting the historical prerogative of males to sell their labour power for money, and sustaining with it the established family system and its “gendered” division of labour, finally had to give. Of course, flexible labour markets open to all, expected to accommodate what was in effect a doubling of the labour supply, could no longer offer the same sort of security and stability as the labour markets of Fordism with their tightly restricted supply. Nor could they continue to pay one worker enough to feed an entire family. But women, the new enthusi- astic constituency of open and competitive labour markets, were clearly 78 wolfgang streeck less concerned about employment security than the sole breadwinners of yesteryear, and they certainly did not require a family wage given that, under the rule of the new individualism, they ideally had to take care of only themselves. There is, however, another, alternative account of the simultaneous rise of flexible employment and flexible families. Whereas the liberationist story, embraced by feminists as well as by employers enthusias- tic about the prospect of a massive increase in the labour supply, emphasizes the attractions of the market for the individual, the alternative, if you will: Polanyian account focuses on the pressures markets exert on society. According to it, beginning in the 1970s stagnant real wages and rising unemployment compelled households to supply more labour to the market to defend their accustomed standard of living. Eroding social protections and the declining efficacy of social rights, caused by intensified competition in product markets and mounting political offensives by employers against the post-war labour regime, increasingly exposed workers and their families to market uncertainties. Consequently they found themselves forced to supplement single- earner incomes by married women taking up employment – part-time where it was available – in order to cope with accelerating industrial restructuring. A side effect was intensified wage competition and pressures on the conditions of employment – or, where these were successfully defended, a trend towards labour market dualism. Among the young generation, formation of stable family relations was postponed or abandoned altogether as market uncertainty made entry into a settled life increasingly difficult. One result was and continues to be a growing number of unstable families and single mothers living near the poverty line. Indeed having children, especially more than one, became the most important cause of poverty for individuals as well as for families. As all sorts of “atypical,” flexible employment proliferated, so did the pressures on the standard employment relationship at the centre of the employment regime. In any case, although it is unlikely that the re-commodification of labour after the end of the “Golden Age” was driven by a mass desire for economic adventure, the willingness to defend the post-war social order against the pressures and attractions of the market seems not to have been nearly as strong as someone like Polanyi might have expected. To many, escaping from the Fordist family was more important than defending the standard employment relationship, and their interests coincided in non-trivial ways with those of others who were keen on socialization of reproduction 79 abolishing the latter for very different, economic purposes.O ne reason why the labour market regime of the post-war settlement was vulnerable not just economically and, as it were, from without, but also culturally and from within seems to have been the vulnerability of the culture it was supposed to protect to what Boltanski and Chiapello have called the “artistic critique” of industrial society (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005): the claim that life in that society offered little if any opportunity for individual autonomy and personal authenticity. “Artistic” discontent with life in the 1950s and 1960s prepared the way for the cultural megatrend of the second half of the twentieth century, individualization. In the process exit, or the option of exit, became more highly valued than loyalty – which not only made for more flexible families but apparently also made more acceptable an emerging employment regime that both required and offered more flexibility. At some point in the late 1960s, the prospect of spending one’s entire working life with the same employer in the same occupation seems to have begun to appear as confining as life-long monogamy.5 In this way, ascendant individualism seems to have both allowed for and required a new quantum leap in the commodification of labour, with many more people than might have been expected turning out to be prepared to enjoy, or at least to know of no alternative to, a much more market-driven way of life as part and as a condition of individual autonomy.

7. the Socialization of Reproduction

A little later, in the ageing societies of the industrialized world, falling birth rates became a prominent subject of public concern and public policy. In the immediate post-war years, when children were born in large numbers, having children was considered in most countries to be a private affair. An exception was what was at the time the ultimate country of social engineering, social-democratic Sweden. Here, early state-feminism went hand in hand with pro-natalism and extensive eugenic intervention in reproductive behaviour. In Germany, by contrast, Konrad Adenauer, Roman-Catholic that he was, became famous

5 coincident with the sexual revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s, whose traces can be found in the rising divorce rates, it became commonplace to ridicule the “golden watch” employers would award workers when they retired from lifetime service. Its place was taken by the “golden handshake” paid upon dismissal. 80 wolfgang streeck for his dictum, “Kinder kriegen die Leute sowieso” (“People have children anyway”). Later, in the 1970s, Helmut Schmidt held the view that “what people do in their bedrooms” had to be of no interest to the government. Clearly, this reflected the memory of Nazi population policies, which made pro-natalist state policies taboo throughout the history of West Germany. Today, however, the number of children has become a highly salient political issue even in Germany – the universally accepted principle being that having too few children is danger- ous to the health of a society and that therefore the rate of births is a matter of legitimate and indeed urgent public interest. That children do not fit comfortably in androgynous labour markets has become commonplace in recent years. A family that sells, or must sell, 3,400 “person hours” a year to the labour market has less time to devote to children than one that sells only 1,700 hours. The new social- democratic orthodoxy, where Social Democracy increasingly includes liberal as well as conservative parties, is public provision of child care together with a wide variety of other public services, subsidies and incentives designed to make high labour market participation of women compatible with a high, or at least higher, birth rate (Esping- Andersen 2009; Kröhnert, Hoßmann and Klingholz 2008). Various reasons are given for why female employment must be maintained and indeed increased, ranging from modern women, if forced to choose, preferring the freedom of paid employment over life-long bondage to children; to women being compelled by new family structures to earn a living for themselves; to commodifying labour market policies; the disappearance of family wages; increasing consumption standards; and an alleged general need to raise overall labour market participation in order to overcome bottlenecks in the labour supply or secure the continued funding of the welfare state. Whatever the case may be, we can observe that the physical reproduction of society, long considered a family matter, is rapidly becoming socialized, or nationalized, in a number of countries – as we will see, at high public expense. Here, too, the principle that seems to be at work is that as markets penetrate into social relations and strategic utility-maximizing replaces traditional norm-following, gaps emerge in the social fabric that call for political compensation unless a society is prepared to live with them. Like Danish labour market policy, the new family policies in Continental European countries are intended to neutralize the negative side effects of increased flexibility on social life, socialization of reproduction 81 not only in the case of employment but also in that of family relations. A return to less flexibility, in labour markets or families, is advocated only rarely: Easy divorce and legal abortion are politically sacrosanct,6 and an expansion of employment rights or a return to family wages are economically unrealistic. Almost as a matter of course, the state is expected to maintain, at public expense, an infrastructure that facilitates the expansion of market relations and compensates for its social dysfunctions. Here as elsewhere, as rational individualism takes the place of social obligation, states are coming under pressure to provide collective remedies for the demise of traditional cultural norms and normative restraints. Policy measures aimed at increasing birth rates are not limited to the expansion of free child care. Governments fear, probably rightly, that child care alone will not be enough to induce prosperous middle- class families in particular, who are used to high levels of time- consuming consumption, to accept the sacrifices of income and leisure that come with having children. Several European countries are therefore devising new social policies that involve extensive cash transfers to parents, in particular double-career families in, still, stable employment. The idea is to replace a significant share of one of the parents’ income during a significant span of time after the birth of a child, so as to make the loss of income associated with caring for a small child – ideally until it can be turned over to a public child care centre – less painful. Although the distributional effects of such policies are highly degressive, as high-income couples receive higher benefits than low- income earners or the unemployed, public concern with demography has become strong enough in a variety of countries to generate support for them even among Social Democratic parties (cf. the discussions of Sweden and Germany below). Across the political spectrum, the con- viction is spreading that in contemporary societies, spontaneous reproduction is no longer enough, and that having and raising children cannot any more be left to families – or what is left of them – and must become a public responsibility if it is to happen at all.

6 contemporary efforts at social engineering undertake to re-educate fathers to share responsibility for child-rearing. However, introducing a cooling-off period in divorce proceedings for couples with small children is deemed too intrusive on individual freedom and seems in any case politically infeasible. 82 wolfgang streeck

8. more Female Employment, Higher Birth Rates?

For some time now, claims have been made that the new social policies are beginning to be effective and that there are first indications of a turnaround in fertility trends in market societies. TheOECD , the leading advocate of labour market flexibility and female employment, reports that since the mid-1980s, the correlation coefficient between total fertility and female labour market participation rates in OECD member countries has turned positive, from −0.50 in the 1970s to +0.58 in 1995 (Ahn and Mira 2002). However, there are good reasons to take this with more than just a grain of salt. Looking at our seven countries, we find that total fertility has increased only slightly in the past decade or two, if at all (cf. Figure 4 above). Apart from in the US and, perhaps, France, fertility is still far from replacement level, which most countries still exceeded in 1970. This seems to suggest that the reversal in the direction of the correlation between female labour market participation and fertility may have been due, not to an increase in fertility in countries with high female employment and few children, but to a continuing decline in fertility in countries with low labour market participation of women and, in the past, many children. Further down, I will discuss a possible explanation for this relationship. More detailed inspection of our sample of seven countries confirms that matters are far from simple. In particular, it casts doubt on the optimistic expectation that the effects of increased commodification of labour on the physical reproduction of society can easily be compensated by political intervention. In 1970 just as in 2005, Germany ranked low, and the US and the UK high, on both female employment and fertility. Sweden and Japan were high on employment and low on fertility, and Italy and France low on employment and high on fertility (cf. Table 3). All in all, no relationship between the two variables was in evidence. In 2005, however, there was, as countries were either low (Germany, Italy, Japan) or high (Sweden, the UK, the US) on both variables, the only exception being France, due to the country’s generally low rate of economic activity. That the non-correlation of 1970 was transformed into an almost perfect positive correlation 35 years later was due to the fact that three countries had changed cells: Japan, with a slower increase in labour market participation than the other countries; Italy, due to a precipitous decline in fertility accompanying a doubling of its par ticipation rate, which was originally very low and still is relatively low; socialization of reproduction 83

Table 3 Female employment and fertility in selected OECD countries, 1970 and 2005

Total Fertility Rate Low High Female Labour Low Germany 1970 France 1970 market Participation (47/2.03) (47/2.48) Rate Germany 2005 ← Italy 1970 (67/1.34) (29/2.43) Japan 2005 France 2005 (61/1.26) (64/1.92) Italy 2005 (50/1.32) High Japan 1970 ↑ USA 1970 (53/2.13) (49/2.48) Sweden 1970 → UK 1970 (59/1.94) (47/2.43) UK 2005 (70/1.79) Sweden 2005 (78/1.77) USA 2005 (69/2.05)

Source: Own calculations.

and Sweden, which further increased its already high participation rate of 1970, accompanied by a moderate decline in fertility. In any case, refusing to live with the social problems caused by a market economy may be expensive. In 2005, the high-fertility countries of Sweden, the UK and France spent 3 per cent and more of their GDP on family-related social policy programmes (cf. Table 4).7

7 more research is needed to determine to what extent the British figure includes spending on general anti-poverty measures dressed up as support for families (see the discussion of the US case below). Generally, much fine-tuning has yet to be done in order to establish the exact comparability of national accounts of family as well as labour market policy expenditures. 84 wolfgang streeck

Table 4 combined spending on family and labour market policy (% of GDP) in selected OECD countries, 2005 Labour Market Family Policy Policy Total

France 3.0 2.5 5.5 Germany 2.2 3.2 5.4 Italy 1.3 1.4 2.7 Japan 0.8 0.7 1.5 Sweden 3.2 2.5 5.7 United Kingdom 3.2 0.6 3.8 United States 0.6 0.3 0.9

Source: OECD (2009b, 2009d).

Japan and Italy, by comparison, where fertility is low, spent only 0.8 and 1.3 per cent. In the off-cells, as it were, we find theU nited States with high fertility and even lower spending than Japan (0.6 %) and Germany with low fertility and – moderately – high spending (2.2 %). I will discuss these two cases shortly. Expenditure on family policy appears to be highly correlated with spending on labour market policy (cf. Table 4). Countries that spend highly on programmes to moderate the social impact of markets, such as France, Sweden and Germany, devote between five and six per cent of their GDP to the two policy areas combined. Japan and the United States, by comparison, largely abstain from intervention and leave it to firms and families, and the forces of the market themselves, to take care of the social dysfunctions of market expansion. Countries that relieve firms and families of social obligations by socializing some of their traditional functions – like the provision of employment security or the rearing of children – make life cheaper for market participants and thereby enhance their competitiveness. At the same time, as they convert private obligations into public ones and thereby monetarize them, they become increasingly cash-hungry since they run up public expenses which need to be covered by taxes or borrowing, or both. Countries like France – and, even more so, Sweden and other Nordic countries – are under pressure to maintain tax regimes that extract for public purposes a significant share of the income of firms and, even more so, of citizens. At a time of advancing economic socialization of reproduction 85 internationalization, when markets are expanding beyond national boundaries, this may become increasingly difficult, even in Sweden. The Swedish case is instructive for yet another reason. Today, Sweden’s total fertility rate, at 1.77, is at the same level as in 1975, which is of course far below the rate of replacement. The rate declined in the 1970s when it fell to 1.68 in 1980; it recovered during the next decade to reach 2.14 in 1990, and declined again sharply in the subsequent decade of liberalization, to 1.55 in 2000. More research will be needed to determine how changes in public spending on family policy were related to the ups and downs in total fertility. Nevertheless, upon inspection, Swedish efforts to make high female labour market participation compatible with high fertility appear less effective than they are sometimes made out to be, given the additional fact that very high spending on families is complemented by highly regulated, family- friendly employment conditions in the public sector, with extensive job protection and generous entitlements to maternity leave and other benefits.I f anywhere in the Western world, it was in the Swedish public sector that the general movement towards employment flexibility was checked by effectively organized employees and their allies in government, defending worker and family-friendly employment and working conditions against pressures for liberalization.

9. the United States: Low Spending, High Fertility

As already noted, the United States, and perhaps also the United Kingdom,8 represents an alternative path to high fertility that differs profoundly from the French and the Nordic approaches – one that works at very low cost to the state, although its social costs may be high. The US stands out as a country that refuses to collectivize, or socialize, the costs of physical reproduction to compensate for the pressures or attractions of markets, just as it is reluctant generally to accept collective responsibility for the externalities of expanding markets. As it turns out, this is not at all detrimental to national fertility. In fact, the US has by far the highest fertility rate in our sample, in spite of the absence of public spending on family support and against the odds not just of high female labour market participation, but also of

8 cf. Footnote 7. 86 wolfgang streeck very long working hours, extreme flexibility of employment, and almost no public entitlements to job protection or maternity leave. All of this makes the United States the polar opposite of Sweden. How does the United States combine very high labour market flexibility with very high birth rates? In stark contrast to Sweden and France, the American solution is a free market one: to remedy the adverse side effects of the free play of market forces on social performance, it relies on more market forces. American fertility thrives on high social and economic inequality, as brought about by free markets and reinforced by extensive immigration, especially the illegal immigration of low- skilled workers. High income differentials, as are characteristic of unregulated labour markets, enable the gainfully employed and increasingly homogamous middle class to pay for private child care. At the same time, inequality makes for an ample supply of cheap labour, in particular women from poor families who are often immigrants working illegally. Societies with high inequality are divided, or segregated, not least between those who can afford private services and those who have no choice but to offer them at competitive market prices. (This is, in part, what is often referred to as a “service economy.”) Where market pressures are strong enough, time-pressured two-income couples can, and in fact have to, avail themselves not only of commercialized child care, but also of commercialized cleaning, cooking, counselling and even shopping, replacing an ever-growing share of what used to be transactions within families based on reciprocity with monetarized market transactions between strangers (Hochschild 1997, 2003). Poverty furthermore contributes to high birth rates in that the poor, in addition to being available to care for the children of the well-to-do, have many children themselves, due to lack of opportunity in labour markets, to traditional ways of life imported from their countries of origin, or both. If their children later fail to meet the demands of a high-technology “knowledge society” because of lack of parental support and an overburdened and underperforming public school system, they are welcome to replenish the low-wage service sector as emerging needs for highly-qualified labour can easily be filled by – this time legal – immigration at the upper end of the social spectrum.

10. Germany: High Spending, Low Fertility

The German welfare state has long been known for its inefficiency, with high spending producing poor results. One example of this is socialization of reproduction 87 labour market policy, where Germany spends more than most other countries (cf. Table 4) and still suffers from comparatively high unemployment. This is often explained by the fact that the German welfare state is heavy on transfers and weak on services, not only because public services are difficult to organize in a federal state but also because of a historical impasse between Catholic subsidiarity and Social Demo cratic statism. That impasse tends to force governments to serve two constituencies and their different political philosophies at the same time, doubling the costs of political intervention and preventing the bundling of scarce resources for one coherent approach. Low fertility came to be recognized as a political problem under the second Schröder government (2002–2005) and attained prominent status under the Grand Coalition that followed it. Driven by the concerns of employers as well as social policy makers over low labour market participation among women, and pressured by a new generation of female voters in urban areas, the Christian Democrats essentially adopted the Social-Democratic approach, which largely followed the Scandinavian one. Expansion of public child care to cover all one to three-year-olds will, however, take time and it is not clear, given the precarious condition of public finances, who will be able to pay for it (Streeck 2007). Moreover, traditionalist defenders of familialism, with their strong base in the Christian Democratic parties, demand that families that raise their children at home, with just one or no parent in employment, be given cash transfers equivalent to the average cost of public day-care provision. Eventually, the government introduced a transfer programme for couples with two jobs which replaces two- thirds of one parent’s net income if he or she stays at home for up to a year after the birth of a child (Elterngeld). Benefits increase with income foregone, up to a cutoff point of 1,800 euros a month.Elterngeld is paid for two more months if the second parent, usually the father, devotes at least two of the then 14 months of government-paid leave to full-time child care. Although the new transfer programme is funded in part by cuts in subsidies to low-income families with children,9 and benefits increase with income, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has unambiguously supported it. To an extent, this may have been because of its feminist

9 Elterngeld replaces an older transfer programme, Erziehungsgeld [child-raising benefit], which excluded middle- and high-income households and paid low-income families a maximum of 7,200 euros per child, with benefits declining with income. 88 wolfgang streeck appeal, which lies in the use of economic incentives to persuade fathers to expose themselves to first-hand experience in caring for small children. But this cannot explain why the SPD did not object to the new family policy’s middle-class bias, which it undoubtedly would have done only a few years earlier. Indications are that underneath the surface of the public discourse – suppressed as yet but already virulent – lies a widely understood ethnic and classist subtext, in particular a deep-seated concern over the fact that a growing share of the children born in Germany, as in other European countries, are born to immigrant families or to women from the lower classes who have little education and, supposedly, intelligence.10 Such women are increasingly believed to have children only because they have no opportunities in the labour market, or because they prefer to live on transfer payments.11 Moreover, their children are considered to be the problem youths – and, later, the unemployed workers – of the future. To avoid a demographic degeneration of domestic human capital and the economic problems that are feared to come with it, even blatantly degressive dis- tributive policies seem to be acceptable today if they promise to motivate the production of “high-quality” children by couples with high intelligence, academic training and good working habits. Almost two years into the new cash transfers compensating double- earner families for income lost by taking time off to care for a newborn child, the desired increase in the number of middle-class babies has yet to materialize. Immigrants still have much higher birth rates than indigenous Germans, although exact numbers are hard to come by since naturalized citizens are not counted as immigrants. Moreover, German women with limited labour market opportunities and unfavourable consumption prospects continue to choose motherhood comparatively frequently as a traditional alternative to participation in employment. Inevitably, this increases the percentage of children

10 in 2008, 81 per cent of German women between 35 and 49 years who had no occupational qualifications had at least one child. For women with a university degree this was true for only 66 per cent. 11 While in the middle of the current decade, 91 per cent of women with low incomes (less than 10,000 euros) had children, the respective figure for women with high incomes (more than 40,000 euros) was only 60 per cent. More than two-thirds of households earning less than 2,000 euros per month reported an increase in household income after birth of a child, while two-thirds of households with an income above 3,000 euros reported income losses. socialization of reproduction 89 in Germany, still a rich country, that live in poverty. Given the new flexibility of families as well as of employment, it also adds to the number of single mothers entitled to social benefits in spite of the new labour market policies of “activation,” especially if a woman has more than one child and no affordable child care is available. While the government and the public still consider it urgent that something be done to alleviate child poverty, there are also rising suspicions that higher benefits for children and mothers, even if they are far lower than the benefits paid to the middle class, may make women produce children as a way of securing an income and not having to look for employment at, inevitably, low wages. Here, something like the “welfare mothers” debate in the USA may be in the offing, if not in the context of social policy, then in that of family policy and of the still latent but nonetheless widely popular distinction between high-quality and problem children.12 Will there be more middle-class children once the public child care system will be fully in operation (if it ever will)? Of course, even an increase in fertility to the Swedish level (i.e., based on 2005 figures, from 1.34 to 1.77; cf. Table 4 above) would be far from bringing German birth rates back to replacement level. Moreover, there are good reasons to doubt that under the conditions of normal capitalism, public policy and social engineering can offer sufficiently effective compensation for the pressures and attractions of markets. The high-stress life of full- time working parents in a tightly organized and highly competitive society like Germany, with its increasingly flexible labour markets, was recently depicted vividly in a study commissioned by the Adenauer Foundation, a policy think-tank associated with the Christian Democratic Party (Merkle and Wippermann 2008). The picture that emerges is that life for the market can be quite consuming, of time as well as energy. Weekend partnerships and long-distance

12 it is impossible to explore the full complexity of the politics of this matter here. One facet is the future of the public school system. Among the reasons why the German middle class seems to defend segregated schooling today more passionately than ever – in particular, the distinction between Gymnasium and Hauptschule – is that in comprehensive schools, their children would now be a dwindling minority compared to children from immigrant and lower-class families. Concern over the changed and further-changing composition of the young generation would perhaps abate if the middle class, like their counterparts in most urban centers of the US, were to opt out of the public school system and send their children to private schools. 90 wolfgang streeck commuting – which have become quite frequent in today’s unisex labour markets – are clearly not conducive to having children. Nor is the risk of poverty associated with divorce and subsequent single parenthood. The same holds true for delayed formation of families because of uncertain employment prospects and low income. In many ways, Germany, like probably a number of other countries too, seems uncomfortably poised somewhere in the middle between the United States and Sweden, as well as between Christian Democratic familialism and Social Democratic statism. Unless immigration and the dualization of German labour markets continue unabated the supply of low-wage labour along the lines of the American pattern may never be sufficient to enable middle-class parents to purchase the private services they would require for market-based relief from the double duty of work and child-rearing. However, an extension of employment protection and, in particular, public sector employment similar to the Swedish model, which would also make work and family easier to combine, seems even less likely. Most women in Germany work in the private sector, where the trend continues to be towards flexibility rather than security. Movement in the Swedish direction would amount not to the further commodification of labour, but to a return to de-commodification – to less rather than more flexibility – which was clearly not the idea when post-war capitalism began to liberate itself from the constraints of the standard employment relationship.13

13 That the key to combining high fertility with high female employment may lie in the conditions of employment, and only to a much lesser extent in the provision of child care, might be a lesson we could learn from the former GDR. In 1965, fertility rates began a steep decade-long decline in both East and West Germany, and were in fact practically identical for the two countries. While in West Germany they remained low, however, in East Germany they increased sharply beginning in 1975, from about 1.5 to about 2.0 five years later. This was clearly in response to a government programme that offered mothers long periods of fully paid leave in case of childbirth and an unlimited and unconditional right of return to their former jobs. Leave periods could be combined ad libitum as more children were born. In addition, families could pay back sizeable government loans by having a certain number of children (a practice that came to be referred to, in untranslatable German, as abkindern). Although East German fertility slowly declined again in the 1980s, it remained above the West German level until unification. Thereafter, with employment having become endlessly more “flexible,” East German fertility rates dropped far below the West German level for an entire decade, even though child care facilities continue to be in abundant supply in the East for traditional reasons. socialization of reproduction 91

11. Winding up the Family

A final facet of the complex relationship between labour market flexibility, family structure and fertility is that today’s birth rates co-vary strongly, and strongly positively, with the rate of single motherhood at birth. In fact, if there is any one influence that, in our sample of seven, accounts for high fertility, it is not high government spending on family policy but the rate of illegitimacy (cf. Table 5). This holds true across both the free-market Anglo-American countries and the state-feminist countries of France and Sweden. No such relationship existed in 1970.14 Moreover, when we plot the increase in illegitimacy between 1970 and 2005 against the decline in fertility during the same period, we find that the number of children declined least in countries where giving birth outside formal marriage was or was becoming more common (cf. Figure 4.5). Childbirth outside marriage indicates less formally institutionalized – and, one would think – less stable and secure family relationships.15 Illegitimacy is likely to have different meanings for lower-class

Table 5 Rates of unmarried parenthood (%), by family policy spending and total fertility rates in selected OECD countries, 2005

Total Fertility

Low High Low Spending Japan (2.0) US (36.8) Italy (15.4) High Spending Germany (29.2) UK (42.9) France (48.4) Sweden (55.5)

Source: cf. Figures 3, 4 and Table 4.

14 at that time, Italy and Japan, where almost no children were born outside of marriage, had high or medium-high birth rates whereas Sweden, with a very high rate of illegitimacy by the standards of the period (18.6 %), had the lowest fertility rate of the seven countries (which at 1.94 was above the country’s current, relatively high fertility rate). 15 countries with low illegitimacy (Italy and Japan) also have (comparatively) low divorce rates. TheUS has medium-high illegitimacy combined with very high rates of divorce. 92 wolfgang streeck

Source: cf. Figures 3 and 4. Figure 5 decline in fertility by increase in illegitimacy in selected OECD countries, 1970–2005 and middle-class women, particularly in a country with a polarized social structure like the United States. In the lower classes, men may be historically or culturally unwilling to make lasting commitments to a wife, whereas in the middle class of today women as well as men may prefer their personal independence. Furthermore, while in the lower classes men may be unable to support a family economically, middle- class women may no longer be in need of male economic support, as entering the labour market has enabled them to live, and even raise children, on their own. In any case, the evidence clearly seems to refute the Polanyian conjecture that less stable family structures should deter women from having children. In fact, today the opposite seems to be true: Societies that expect women to enter into a formally institutionalized family relationship before having a child – societies which still cling to what is now called “familialism” – may be putting up too high a threshold for having children, for which they pay with comparatively low birth rates. Unlike in the 1960s, women at the beginning of the twenty-first century have more children in countries where cultural norms and social, economic and legal conditions enable them to have socialization of reproduction 93 them outside of formal marriage and, if necessary, bring them up as single mothers. The policy implications of this would seem to be profound. Whatever new forms of social stability and security a society may want to provide to its members in order to increase its birth rate, they cannot be condi- tioned on the restoration of traditional relations of solidarity within traditional families. Very likely, they must contribute to their further erosion.16 After the cultural sea change of the 1970s, a growing number of women in today’s more individualistic societies obviously find it easier or are more willing to have children by themselves than to enter into formal marriage. In societies where having a child is normally expected to be preceded by marriage – as it apparently still is in Italy and Japan – women who do not get married remain more or less voluntarily without children. Across a wide range of countries, marriage seems to have become a commitment that is increasingly difficult for women to make – and, as indicated by rising rates of illegitimacy, increasingly more difficult than bringing up a child outside marriage. This is especially true in social environments where childbirth “out of wedlock” is no longer socially disapproved of and is in fact supported by government policies, for example through broad provision of child care and generous child allowances. Countries that want to raise their birth rates, that is to say, can no longer afford to wait for men to be willing to become husbands, or for women to become wives; instead they must find ways to make reproduction independent from this happening. This requires a social policy that offers encouragement not to the formation of families, but to single motherhood, by making it possible for women to combine having children, not just with a job, but also with the individualistic way of life for the sake of which many of them have chosen to enter the labour market in the first place.

12. more Market, More State?

Plugging the holes torn by advancing markets in the fabric of mutual obligations and social solidarity inherited from pre-capitalist traditions

16 This seems to be the fundamental problem ofC hristian Democratic family policy – and the most important difference between family policies in countries like Germany, Italy and Japan on the one hand and Sweden, where the bourgeois family has early been dispensed with, on the other. 94 wolfgang streeck or from organized capitalism can be expensive.17 Employment and family relations seem to be subject to the same logic in this respect, and so are, apparently, relations of credit. Where rational egoism is allowed or indeed invited to supersede traditional social obligations of employers to provide workers with security in addition to pay, and society is not willing to live with the consequences, political restoration of solidarity requires high public spending on labour market policy to compensate workers for their loss of industrial or organizational status. Furthermore, if societies consider their physical reproduction important, even though family obligations have been destabilized by the pressures and attractions of markets, unpaid informal labour inside families must be replaced with paid labour, either in the private sector or, if the conditions and consequences of this are unwelcome, in the public sector. Similarly, in the 2008/09 financial crisis, when the erosion of traditional restraints on profit maximization in the money- making industry undermined creditors’ confidence in the capacity of debtors to live up to obligations engineered with the help of ever more complex financial technologies, the state had to take promises of repayment that had become “toxic” upon itself, at enormous expense, and restore the functioning of money markets by deploying its unique resource, public authority, to assume the role of society’s debtor of last resort. The exact mechanism by which markets may become materially demanding on societies has yet to be spelled out. Apparently as markets expand, traditional solidarity embedded in informal social relations is eroded, often resulting in governments trying to replace it with formally instituted solidarity, or social obligations, through legal regulation. Further progress of marketization, however, tends to weaken the legitimacy and effectiveness of formal institutions as well. As employers clamour for the right to fire workers more freely, and husbands and wives for the right to fire each other, governments come under pressure to liberalize regulatory regimes and soften whatever obligations they may have instituted to strengthen or replace embedded solidarity. In a capitalist market society, an obvious way of funding public spending to compensate for the destructive side effects of marketization is further marketization and commodification of social relations,

17 a similar argument has recently been developed by Jens Beckert, in an as yet unpublished paper felicitously titled “Die Anspruchsinflation des Wirtschaftssystems” (2009). socialization of reproduction 95 which causes the money economy, and with it the tax base, to grow. For example, increasing women’s participation in the labour market seems to be the only way in Germany today to secure the public revenue needed to keep the social security system afloat. Like a vicious circle, however, the cure may exacerbate the disease in that it adds to the problems that social policy must address. In fact, a now frequently asked question is how long the states of social-democratic capitalism will continue to be able to foot the bill for the reconstructive interventions that are expected of them. In recent years, family policy was the big growth item in public budgets, along with education where much money was spent, with overall little success, on adapting schools to a new type of family lacking the time or the skills to offer much assistance to children and teachers. Today European governments are supposed to rescue not just banks from insolvency, but also children from the poverty associated with single parenthood or divorce. They also are to create incentives of all kinds for middle-class families to produce more offspring; to re- educate men to accept responsibility for their children; to provide meals at school to a growing number of children who do not receive meals at home because their parents are too busy or too poor or both – and to pressure mothers and fathers to participate in the labour market, if need be for very low wages supplemented, of course, by money from public coffers. Clearly there is little reason to expect the state to disappear as markets become more market-like, and social structures more market-driven. But there is very good reason to ask whether and under what conditions governments will continue to afford accepting responsibility for the growing costs to society of the private pursuit of advantage in ever freer markets. Is it as likely as it sometimes seems that as markets keep expanding, welfare states will eventually have to surrender and abandon the future of societies entirely to the logic of market relations?

Economic Globalization and Changes in Family Formation as the Cause of Very Low Fertility in Japan

Shigesato Takahashi

1. introduction

The size of a population and its age distribution are closely related to the underlying socioeconomic system, and the population and socio- economic system have continued to change while mutually influencing each other. Japan’s lowest-low fertility has become less than the population replacement level and life expectancy has improved, and as a result major changes have occurred in the population’s age distribution, thus affecting various areas of social security, such as the public health care system, public pension system, public care nursing system and other welfare measures. In addition to affecting social security, these changes have also led to declines in the working population and consumption, and have had adverse effects on economic growth. According to the 2005 census figures, Japan’s total population for that year was 127.77 million. Judging from the number of births and deaths in recent years, as well as trends in international migration, Japan’s population appears to have reached its peak and has entered a period of decline. This major change from an increasing population to a decreasing population is viewed by many Japanese as an indication of a weakening Japanese society, where lowest-low fertility and a hyper- ageing population are accelerating (Atoh 2002; Takahashi 2008). This article reviews future Japanese population trends and considers changes in demographic factors (such as births and life expectancy) that cause population fluctuations, as well as the socioeconomic factors behind these changes.

2. historical Changes in the Total Population

A look at historical trends in the Japanese population, according to modern demographic statistics first recorded in 1872, shows that the total population in that year was 34,806,000 (NIPSSR 2008a). 98 shigesato takahashi

Subsequently, Japan’s total population increased rapidly at an average annual growth rate of around 1.5 per cent reaching 55,963,000 in 1920, when the first national census was conducted. The upward trend continued, and the total population surpassed 70 million in 1936, 80 million in 1948, and 100 million in 1967. Japan’s total population grew at a rate of around 1 per cent until the late 1970s, but the rate declined rapidly afterwards and finally fell into negative level from 2004 to 2005, partly due to a rise in the mortality rate. According to the 2005 census figures, Japan’s total population stood at 127,768,000, signalling the end of the long-standing population boom (cf. Figure 1). Leaving aside future developments in international migration figures, demographic changes concerning the falling number of births and increasing number of deaths occur due to the following mechanism: first, the increasing number of deaths is caused by a growing number of deaths concentrated among the elderly as the age distribution centre rises due to increased longevity. In addition, Japan saw a historic increase in the number of births beginning at around the 1910s, and this large number of births was maintained until the 1950s. Since the 1980s, the people born during this time have successively entered the older age group, which has led to an increase in the number of deaths, and this trend is expected to continue. On the other hand, the falling number of births is caused by the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)

Note: Projection as of December 2006 Source: MIAC (2009d); NIPSSR (2006). Figure 1 actual and projected population of Japan, 1872–2105 family formation and very low fertility 99 falling below 2.07, the level at which the population of the succeeding generation equals that of the parent’s generation. Incidentally, the TFR stood at 1.37 in 2008, and the number of births is expected to drop further as the parenting generation declines. Taking a look at future total population changes (cf. Figure 1), the results of future population projections released by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in December 2006 (NIPSSR 2006) makes demographic projections of future fertility rates, life expectancy and international migration based on assumptions. Changes in future fertility rates are indicated in terms of three assumed values: medium-variant (assuming a long-term TFR of 1.26), high-variant (assumed TFR of 1.55), and low-variant (assumed TFR of 1.06). The total population of Japan, which has been gradually falling since 2005, is projected to drop to 115.22 million under the medium-variant projection, 118.35 million under the high-variant projection and 112.58 million under the low-variant projection by 2030. Thus, the population is expected to decline by approximately 800,000 to 900,000 annually in the 2030s. In 2055, the total population is projected to fall to 89.93 million under the medium-variant projection, 97.77 million under the high-variant projection, and 84.11 million under the low- variant projection – which is equal to between 65.8 and 76.5 per cent of the 2005 population. Thus, although the population has grown 3.6 times since 1872, when a total population of around 35 million was recorded, current Japanese society is witnessing a major demographic turning point where the population has started to decline.

3. changes in the Population’s Age Distribution

3.1 Changes in the Working-age Population Not only has the demographic change in fertility and mortality since the mid-1970s caused a decline in the total population, it has also changed the population’s age distribution. Focusing on changes in the age distribution since the 1950s, Figure 2 shows the population broken down into the younger-age population (0–14 years), working- age population (15–64 years), and older-age population (65 years and over). 100 shigesato takahashi

Note: Projection as of December 2006. Source: NIPSSR (2006). Figure 2 trends in the three major population age groups: medium fertility (with medium mortality) variant

Japan’s working-age population has increased consistently since the 1950s. The size of the working-age population, which stood at slightly below 50 million around 1950, grew rapidly to 60 million in 1960 and to just over 75 million in 1975. In 1995, the working-age population hit a peak of around 87 million, approximately 1.8 times the working-age population of 1950. Since then, however, the working-age population has entered a period of decline, falling to just over 84 million in 2005. Thus, the size of the working-age population witnessed a major change in the mid-1990s. According to the results of the NIPSSR’s future population projection, the working-age population will continue to fall significantly. Specifically, it projects that the working-age population will drop to just over 67 million in 2030, which is around 77 per cent of its peak in 1995, and, in 2055, this number will be around 46 million, which is 53 per cent of the peak level.

3.2 Acceleration of Population Ageing The population has been ageing rapidly due to a declining fertility rate since the mid-1970s. This population ageing is in part a relative phenomenon, caused by the continuation of an extremely low TFR of around 1.3. That is, ageing – or an increase in the proportion of people family formation and very low fertility 101 aged 65 or older in the total population – caused by a decrease in the total population, which is the denominator. The other type of population ageing is caused by an increase in the absolute number of senior citizens due to a drop in the mortality rate and greater longevity. Needless to say, this type of population ageing includes an increase in the number of elderly people due to the ageing of the generation that was born during the period of high fertility more than 50 years ago. Thus, the ageing of the population is caused by the following three elements: (1) the current ultra-low fertility rate (declining fertility rate); (2) a decline in the mortality rate (greater longevity); and (3) past changes in the number of births (an increase in the number of births since at least before World War II and its recent decline). The number of elderly people aged 65 or older has increased gradually since the 1950s (cf. Figure 2). According to the 1947 census figures, the number of elderly people was 3.74 million, a mere 4.8 per cent of the total population. Subsequently, the elderly population grew gradually and increased to just over 5 million in 1960, but the proportion of elderly – which indicates the level of ageing – remained at 5.7 per cent of the total population. However, in the 1970 national census, this indicator of the level of ageing exceeded 7 per cent for the first time in demographic history when the number of elderly people aged 65 or older surpassed 7 million. The population began to age rapidly from around this time. The elderly population surpassed 10 million in 1979, and the proportion of elderly people reached 8.9 per cent. Approximately 20 years later, in 1998, the elderly population doubled to 20 million, with the proportion of the elderly hitting 16.2 per cent. Since then, the elderly population has continued to rise at a rapid pace and, according to the 2005 census figures, the number of people aged 65 or older came to slightly below 26 million, a proportion that exceeds 20 per cent. Thus, the population ageing that began in earnest in the 1970s is characterized by both an increase in the number and a rise in the proportion of the elderly population aged 65 or older. Looking at future changes in the number of elderly people, according to the results of the NIPSSR’s future population projections, the elderly population will continue to grow rapidly and is expected to reach almost 33 million in 2014, when the baby boomers born between 1947 and 1949 will have all reached 65. After that, the increase will gradually slow down, and the elderly population will begin to decline slowly in the 2040s. Thus, the number of elderly people aged 65 or 102 shigesato takahashi older is expected to rise at a fast pace towards the 2020s, but the growth is seen to slow down afterwards. However, the proportion of the elderly population aged 65 or older, which indicates the level of ageing, is likely to show a different trend. The proportion of the elderly population, which stood at 20.2 per cent of the total population in 2005, is projected to reach 26.3 per cent in 2014 and will continue to rise sharply. While the projected rise in the proportion will begin to differ in the 2020s, depending on the assumed fertility rate, the proportion will, in any case, continue to increase towards 2055, the final year of the future population projection period. The proportion is projected at 40.5 per cent in 2055 under the medium-variant projection, meaning that one in every 2.5 people is an elderly person. Between 2030 and 2040, people currently in their 30s, who are the second-generation baby boomers, will enter their 60s and become elderly people. Among people of this generation, the trend not to marry has accelerated considerably, and married couples tend to bear fewer children. As a result, while the size of the elderly population will grow more slowly, the proportion of the elderly population will continue to rise. This is the hyper-ageing of the population that is taking place in Japan.

4. acceleration of the Declining Fertility Rate and Its Causes from a Socioeconomic Perspective

4.1 Demographic Causes of the Declining Fertility Rate One of the major causes of a declining and rapidly ageing population is the drop in the fertility rate. Looking at annual changes in the number of births and the TFR, the number of births has continued to fall since peaking at 2.09 million in 1973, and is currently at levels of slightly under 1.1 million. Needless to say, the baby boomers born between 1947 and 1949 married around 1973 and generated an increase in the number of births over several years. Since then, however, the number of births has fallen in line with a drop in the parents’ population due to the ending of the baby boom (Kaneko 1999; Takahashi 2004). The TFR was 2.14 in 1973 but dropped to 2.05 in the following year and had fallen sharply to 1.74 by 1981. The rate subsequently showed a slight increase, but declined again, falling to 1.39 in 1997 and family formation and very low fertility 103 to 1.29 in 2003. In 2005, the TFR hit a record low of 1.26, but has since risen slightly, standing at 1.37 as of 2008. When looking at the decline in the fertility rate from a demographic standpoint by comparing fertility rates by age group in 1975, 1990, and 2005 (cf. Figure 3), the age-specific fertility rate was the highest in 1975 among 25-year-old women and was concentrated in women in their mid-20s to late 20s. However, in 1990, the fertility rate for women in their early 20s to mid-20s fell sharply; the fertility rate peaked among 28-year-old women and rose among women in their 30s. In 2005, the fertility rate for women in their 20s declined further; the rate peaked among women aged between 29 and 30 and, while it rose among women in their 30s, the rise was not enough to offset the decline in the fertility rate among women in their 20s. The demographic cause of the declining fertility rate lies in the changes in marriage formation and changes in the reproductive behaviour of married Japanese couples. Another factor is the number of illegitimate births. According to 2005 vital statistics, illegitimate births accounted for 2.0 per cent of total births. Given that the TFR is calculated from the total number of women as the denominator, this means that if the female population has a growing tendency not to marry, the number of married women declines, and it is possible that

Source: NIPSSR (2008b: 27–28). Figure 3 age-specific fertility rates (1975, 1990 and 2005) 104 shigesato takahashi the TFR will decline even if married women’s reproductive behaviour does not change. Looking at the change in marriage formation in terms of the proportion of never-married women by age group, the proportion remained stable from 1955 to the mid-1970s, hovering around 70 per cent for women in their early 20s and around 20 per cent for women in their late 20s; Japan at the time was a society of almost universal marriage. However, the proportion of never-married women in their 20s has risen since the mid-1970s and, in particular, the proportion of never-married women in their late 20s exceeded 30 per cent in the mid-1980s and reached 40 per cent in 1990, increasing by another 10 percentage points in the five years since 1985. The proportion has continued to rise and stood at 60 per cent in 2005. In addition, the proportion of never-married women in their 30s or older is also on the rise, albeit somewhat later than the proportion of those in their late 20s. Looking at the change in marriage formation by comparing the proportion of married people by age group in 1975, 1990, and 2005, Figure 4 shows that in 1975 married people accounted for 66 per cent of the total population of 25-year-olds, but the proportion fell to 39 per cent

Source: Own calculations based on MIAC (various years). Figure 4 age-specific proportion of married females (1975, 1990 and 2005) family formation and very low fertility 105 in 1990 and to 24 per cent in 2005. Similarly, the proportion of married 30-year-olds dropped from 88 per cent in 1975 to 78 per cent in 1990 and to 56 per cent in 2005. Thus, it can be seen that the married population declined considerably overall for people in their early 20s to late 30s. In a society in which 98 per cent of births are between married couples, such a major change in the proportion of married people has led to a decline in the TFR. A look at the National Fertility Survey (cf. Kaneko et al. 2008a) shows the change in the reproductive behaviour of Japanese married couples. For our purposes, the number of childbirths by couples who have been married for 15 to 19 years is assumed to be the total number of children that the couples will have and is called the ‘completed family size’. The number of children of married couples was 2.19 in 1972 and, even 30 years later, stood at 2.23 in the 2002 survey, thus showing stability (cf. Table 1). However, the number dropped to 2.09 in the 2005 survey, indicating a downward trend for the first time. Couples who had been married for 15 to 19 years at the time of the 2005 survey were those

Table 1 number of children born to married women, by survey year (1977–2005)

Survey 1 2 3 4 children Completed (year) None child children children or more fertility

7th Survey 3,0 % 11,0 % 57,0 % 23,8 % 5,1 % 2,19 (1977) 8th Survey 3,1 % 9,1 % 55,4 % 27,4 % 5,0 % 2,23 (1982) 9th Survey 2,7 % 9,6 % 57,8 % 25,9 % 3,9 % 2,19 (1987) 10th Survey 3,1 % 9,3 % 56,4 % 26,5 % 4,8 % 2,21 (1992) 11th Survey 3,7 % 9,8 % 53,6 % 27,9 % 5,0 % 2,21 (1997) 12th Survey 3,4 % 8,9 % 53,2 % 30,2 % 4,2 % 2,23 (2002) 13th Survey 5,6 % 11,7 % 56,0 % 22,4 % 4,3 % 2,09 (2005)

Note: Data refer to women who have been married for 15 to19 years. Source: Kaneko et al. (2008). 106 shigesato takahashi who married between 1986 and 1990, and in most cases, the women in these couples were born in the early 1960s. Thus, this result indicates a trend for couples married in the late 1980s or later to have fewer children. From a demographic perspective, it can be seen from the above that the declining fertility rate since the mid-1970s is caused by (1) changes in marriage formation, whereby people tend to marry later or not at all, changes that have had a significant negative impact on the fertility rate as the proportion of married people (who account for most childbirths) has fallen considerably among women in their early 20s and late 30s; and (2) changes in married couples’ reproductive behaviour, as fertility has trended downward for women who were born in the early 1960s, married in the late 1980s or later.

4.2 Socioeconomic Factors Behind the Declining Fertility Rate Socioeconomic changes lie behind the changes in marriage formation and married couples’ reproductive behaviour, changes which have brought about the declining fertility rate. In the case of the generation before these changes took place, there existed employment structures and various social systems, structures and practices that were based on the values, norms and economic structures of that generation (McDonald 2006). Notably, changes in the way people work have had a significant impact on marriage and reproductive behaviour. Following the 1973 oil shock and subsequent economic crisis, Japan experienced an end to manufacturing-led economic growth and entered a period of low growth. At around the same time, Japan went through a gradual change in industrial structure, whereby the economy went from one centred on the secondary sector to one centred on the tertiary sector, and labour patterns changed accordingly. Having overcome the recession of the mid-1980s, Japan’s economy has come to be led by domestic demand. This led to the acceleration of a service- oriented economy and increased women’s participation in the labour force. Table 2 shows changes in the industrial structure and employed population since the beginning of the period of rapid economic growth. In regards to the number of workers by industry in 1955, when the fertility rate was stable, 41 per cent worked in the primary sector, 23 per cent in the secondary sector, and 36 per cent in the tertiary sector. In terms of gender, men and women made up a roughly equal proportion in the primary sector, each accounting for approximately family formation and very low fertility 107

20 per cent. In contrast, the secondary sector showed a male-dominant employment structure, with men accounting for 17.6 per cent and women for 5.8 per cent. The tertiary sector showed a similar gender composition. Thus, a male-dominant employment structure existed when the period of rapid economic growth began, with the exception of the primary sector. Later, close to the end of the period of high economic growth in 1970, the number of workers in the primary sector fell considerably and the proportion of workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors grew, but the male-dominant employment structure remained throughout the period of high economic growth. The primary sector has declined significantly since 1975, and the number of people employed in the secondary sector fell gradually as well, while the tertiary sector saw major growth. As of 2005, the proportion of workers by sector was 4.8 per cent in the primary sector and 26.1 per cent in the secondary sector – of which men accounted for 19.2 per cent, women for 6.9 per cent – thus showing a decline while maintaining the male-dominant employment structure. In contrast, 67.2 per cent of workers were employed in the tertiary sector, of which men accounted for 35.0 per cent and women for 32.2 per cent. The tertiary sector had grown and there was a significant narrowing of the gender gap in the number of workers. The female to male ratio among tertiary sector workers (the ratio for men being 100) rose significantly from 67 per cent in 1970 to 92 per cent in 2005. Thus, while the male-dominant employment structure that existed during the period of stable fertility rates played a part in producing a society with clear gender role divisions, the economic globalization

Table 2 percentage of employed persons by major industry and sex Primary Secondary Tertiary industry industry Industry Unknown Employed Year persons male female male female male female male female 1975 100,0 7,0 6,8 24,5 9,5 31,2 20,6 0,1 0,2 1980 100,0 5,7 5,2 23,7 9,9 32,6 22,8 0,1 0,1 1985 100,0 5,0 4,3 22,9 10,2 33,1 24,2 0,1 0,2 1990 100,0 3,9 3,2 23,0 10,3 33,2 25,8 0,3 0,2 1995 100,0 3,3 2,6 22,3 9,3 34,0 27,8 0,4 0,3 2000 100,0 2,8 2,2 21,3 8,2 34,4 29,9 0,7 0,5 2005 100,0 2,8 2,0 19,2 6,9 35,0 32,2 1,1 0,8

Source: MIAC (various years). 108 shigesato takahashi that has accelerated since the 1980s, as well as the development of a service-oriented domestic economy, has led to an increase in employment opportunities for women in the tertiary sector. However, at the same time, non-regular employment has increased.

5. changes in Demographic Attributes of Working Women

Figure 5 shows the demographic characteristics of working women in terms of the labour force participation rate of women by marital status. Comparing the female labour force participation rate in 1985 and 2005, the age curve seen in 1985, known as the M-shaped curve, had changed considerably by 2005. In 1985, the labour force participation rate for women in the 25–29 age group was 54.1 per cent, but it had risen nearly 18 percentage points to 71.6 per cent by 2005, signifying the increased participation of women in their late 20s in the labour force. When taking marital status into account, the percentage for unmarried women nearly doubled to 50.8 per cent from 27.0 per cent in 1985. At the same time, the percentage for married women dropped from 25.7 to 18.5 per cent, showing a trend for women in the labour force not to marry. This trend is also seen for women in their 30s and 40s, and the rise in the female labour force is a result of the prolonged employment of unmarried women, which is closely linked to the rise in the percentage of unmarried people in their late 20s and 30s. Strong gender role divisions that existed during the period of high economic growth from the 1960s to the mid-1970s meant that women shifted directly from their parents’ household economies to their husbands’ household economies upon marriage. As a result, marriage had an economic rationality when seen from the standpoint of household economy. According to the NIPSSR’s latest national fertility survey, 90 per cent of single men and women wish to marry. Despite this fact, it can be speculated that the trend not to marry has continued largely due to an increasing diversity in women’s choices involving the timing of marriage, and whether to marry at all. The very meaning of marriage has changed for a generation of women who started working after graduating from university and earn their own income. Marriage has become a means of self-realization achieved through romantic relationships. family formation and very low fertility 109

Source: Own calculations based on population census data (MIAC 1985, 2005). Figure 5 labour force participation rate of women by marital status and age groups 110 shigesato takahashi

Meanwhile, there is a clear delay in the reproductive behaviour of married couples born in the 1960s or later, and the average number of children a woman bears in her lifetime is on a downtrend. Married couples who were expecting to have children in the early 1990s later grew seriously concerned about the outlook of Japanese society following the collapse of the bubble economy, which is likely to have affected the process of family formation. Difficult circumstances have continued in terms of balancing work and child-rearing. Figure 6 shows the employment record of women by the year their first child was born. The most common type of employment record for women whose first child was born between 1985 and 1989 was maternity retirement, which stood at 35.7 per cent, while those who were unemployed prior to becoming pregnant stood at 34.6 per cent, and those who continued to work stood at 25.0 per cent. However, of the women who continued to work, 5.1 per cent took child-care leave, while 19.9 per cent did not. The employment record of married women had not changed significantly by 2000–04. In fact, maternity retirement had risen to 41.3 per cent, while those who were unemployed prior to becoming pregnant had dropped to 25.2 per cent. While this can be viewed as a result of progress in female employment, the percentage of those continuing to work has hardly increased, standing at 25.3 per cent. The statistical data suggest that the government’s measures to tackle the declining fertility rate, which aim at supporting

Source: Kaneko et al. (2008). Figure 6 Employment of wives who have given birth to the first child, by year of childbirth family formation and very low fertility 111 how women balance work with child-bearing and rearing, are not effective in increasing the number of women who continue to work after having children. The increase in working women, that is, the increase in women’s labour force participation and wage levels, has resulted in a rise in the opportunity cost of child-rearing (the income earned if a woman continued to work instead of staying at home to bear and rear children = lost earnings). This rise in opportunity costs is likely to have diminished women’s motivation to have children, the more so in cases where child-raising support is insufficient and balancing work and child- rearing is difficult for the mother. Concerning the actual employment type and incomes of women who are raising children, Figure 7 shows the number of workers aged between 35 and 49 by gender, annual income bracket and employment type, obtained from the 2007 Employment Status Survey (MIAC 2009c). The income distribution for men is comprised of regular staff and employees, and takes a form close to a normal distribution, centering on annual incomes of 4.0 to 4.99 million yen. In contrast, there are two bumps in the income distribution for women: one is the bump of regular staff and employees peaking at an annual income of

Source: Own calculations based on MIAC (2009c). Figure 7 number of female employees aged 35–49 by sex, main type of employment and income, 2007 112 shigesato takahashi

3.0 to 3.99 million yen, and the other is the bump of non-regular workers such as part-time workers, peaking at an annual income of 500,000 yen to 990,000 yen. In terms of women’s employment type, regular staff and employees account for 41.0 per cent of all working women, while the remaining 59.0 per cent are in non-regular employment. Of the non-regular workers, 46.8 per cent earn incomes of less than 1 million yen, and 73.5 per cent earn less than 1.5 million yen. As seen from the above, the fact that many women work in non- regular employment positions following marriage results in extremely high opportunity costs. In other words, for single working women, the shift from being single to being married involves a high loss in potential earnings.

6. issues for a Society with a Declining Population

The major demographic changes brought about by declining fertility rates and increasing longevity are a decline in Japan’s total population and a society with a rapidly and highly ageing population in the long term. In order to support elderly people’s lives and people who need social assistance for various reasons, such as illness or unemployment, each society provides social security and other safety nets in one way or another. In Japan, systems such as medical insurance, social insurance, nursing-care insurance, and employment insurance have been created and managed. In addition, in the area of social welfare, various systems such as welfare benefits and child benefits are in place. Nevertheless, the rapid acceleration of a hyper-ageing society is a problem that could rock the foundations of the safety net system. Japan’s declining fertility since the mid-1970s has led to the emergence of a low-fertility society with a TFR of around 1.3, which is extremely low among developed countries. This extremely low fertility rate will result in a massive population decline in the long term, unless the fertility rate recovers. But even if it recovered, it would merely slow the acceleration of the hyper-ageing population slightly, as long as it remains below 2.07. Some take the view that since the declining fertility rate is due to both the rise in the percentage of unmarried people and declining fertility of married couples due to freedom of choice, we should accept a society with a declining population and readjust various systems to suit such a society. At the same time, it can be said that these phenomena family formation and very low fertility 113 are the result of various existing systems and structures that make it difficult for people to realize their desire to marry and have children. Fertility rate trends in other countries are varied, but in Northern Europe and many Western European countries such as France, fertility rates are on the rise again following reforms in working patterns, social systems, and the labour market. Looking at these countries’ experiences and trends, the issue of declining fertility and the resulting issues of population decline and ageing appear to be caused by a mismatch between the system, structure, and practice of Japanese society and natural human reproductive behaviour, and dealing with these problems should be one of the main tasks for modern society.

Income Inequality in a Rapidly Ageing Society, Japan: Focusing on Transformations in the Structure of Households with Elderly1

Sawako Shirahase

1. debate on Income Inequality Since the Late 1990s

Since the mid-1980s, the speed of Japan’s population ageing has accelerated; that is, the phenomenon of what we now call an ‘ageing society’. This demographic transformation has occurred rapidly in Japan in a relatively short time, similar in pace to the phenomenon of high economic growth in the 1960s. When social change takes place that quickly, people have little time to prepare themselves psychologically and to adjust Japan’s new social environment accordingly. Because of the immensity of such changes, people can easily end up being confused by what has happened and is happening in their society. They become uneasy for their own future and, more concretely, for that of the next generation, since there is no longer a guarantee that their offspring will be happier than they are, economically and psychologically. Partly because of such uneasiness towards the future, discourses on social inequality gained prominence at the beginning of the 2000s as, for instance, the extreme discourse of ‘the winners’ and ‘the losers’ (the haves and the have-nots) which made people aware of poverty as a social problem. In recent years, attention has also shifted from ‘socio- economic inequalities’ to other issues related to inequality such as ‘net café refugees’ and the ‘working poor’. The post-1990s discourse on economic inequality can be largely divided into two camps. The first holds that the extent of income inequality has become as high as in the United States, emphasizing the

1 This study was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) (number 20223004) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). An earlier ver- sion of this chapter appeared in Japanese as “Kōreiki no setai hendō to keizai kakusa [Change in the household structure and economic inequality later in life]” in the volume Shakai Hoshō to Keizai 2: Zaisei to Shotoku Hoshō [Social security and economy 2: Public finance and income support), edited by H. Miyajima, S. Nishimura and T. Kyōgoku (University of Tokyo Press, 2010). 116 sawako shirahase dramatic widening of income inequality (cf. Tachibanaki 1998). The second interprets the changes in income inequality more cautiously (cf. Ohtake 2005; Ohtake and Saito 1999) and sees the main reason for its increase since the mid-1980s in the ageing population: the overall degree of income inequality has increased because it is relatively high among households with elderly members, and the number of households with elderly members itself has increased because of ageing. This is, the second camp holds, why a substantial increase in income inequality occurred. The Japanese government welcomes the view that the post-1980s increase in overall economic inequality in Japan is merely the consequence of the changing demographic structure in which the proportion of the elderly has rapidly increased. In other words, once the change in the demographic structure represented by ageing is taken into account, the substantial increase in the degree of income inequality will disappear. Thus, reads another message from the second camp, we should be cautious about any discourse that overemphasizes the increase in the degree of income inequality. While I agree with the second camp as to the causes of the increase in income inequality, there remains the important question of why income inequality is higher among households with elderly than among those without. This chapter explores the mechanism behind why income inequality among households with elderly is relatively high, and what factors and changes have contributed to this. There are two main theories concerning the issue of economic inequality among the elderly. The first states that because the proportion of public and private transfers is higher, represented by pensions in the income packages of the elderly, the overall degree of economic inequality is likely to be less than among the working population, whose income packages largely consist of their market incomes represented by wages (Pampel 1981; Hurd and Shoven 1985). The second posits that old age is the final stage of socio-economic inequality accumulated over the course of a person’s life, and that, as a result, the extent of income inequality among households with elderly inevitably becomes even greater than among those without elderly (Crystal and Shea 1990). This latter perspective has its origins in Merton (1968), who developed an argument based on the structure of academic careers, and is taken up by Elder (1995) who also uses the notion of ‘life course’ to show how advantages and disadvantages can accumulate over the course of one’s life. Research thus far on the sources of inequality income inequality and ageing 117 among the elderly has used this concept of ‘accumulation’ in the realm of health (O’Rand 1996; Shuey and Willson 2008), as well as in other applications outside the realm of inequality. As Fujimura (2001) posits, it is not only one’s financial situation that matters, inequality can also be seen in the size and quality of the network by which the life of the elderly is supported: When one becomes older in a relatively favourable livelihood environment, one’s later-stage life can be even more favourable and advantageous; whereas an unfavourable environment tends to make old age even more disadvantageous. This is called the cumulative disadvantage/advantage for the elderly, namely that old age has the effect of exposing pre-existing inequalities in economic and social capital in a blindingly vivid way. The combination of the low birth rate and the rapid ageing of society accelerates imbalances between generations in Japan, with the burden being borne almost entirely by the working population. The total fertility rate in 2009 was 1.37; that is, much lower than the level required for population replacement of 2.08. The government has not yet made clear what plans it will develop to put a stop to these alarming trends. Today, Japan’s social security system is groaning under the burden of the much larger proportion of elderly in the population, but policy itself appears to be focused primarily on the declining birth rate. In fact, the Japanese social security system has long been skewed to old- age benefits, but now that young people have difficulties in finding stable jobs and young families with small children are likely to face severe economic difficulty, the government is trying to shift its policy emphasis towards the younger generation. I have no objection to a restructuring of the system so that, given limited budgets, more social benefits are targeted to members whose needs are highest. However, I would like to pose the question of whether the government should really be making policy on the basis of ‘young versus old’ or ‘households with elderly versus households with children’. It is true that among young people both unemployment and non- standard employment is rising. There are also signs that economic disparity within relatively young age groups is increasing. However, it should be kept in mind that the elderly are not a homogeneous age group, and it is not appropriate to regard the elderly as a burden to be borne by the younger generations. Just as the lives of young people and adults are diverse, so are the lives of the elderly. Recalling the aforementioned accumulation-of-inequalities thesis, old age is the period in which various kinds of inequalities become more obvious, 118 sawako shirahase and socio-economic advantages/disadvantages cumulate (Shirahase 2005). Although the degree of income inequality, represented by Gini coefficients, among elderly households has declined since the mid- 1980s – mainly due to the decline in poverty rates among female one- person households – we should not overlook the fact that the degree of income inequality among the elderly is overall larger than that among middle-aged and young households (Shirahase 2009). The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the meaning of economic inequality among the elderly in Japan, with ‘the elderly’ defined as aged 65 and over, examining changes in the degree of income inequality, important factors to explain economic inequality in Japan’s ageing society, and changes in the position of the elderly within households. The income packages of households in which elderly members reside with their child’s family will be analysed, and the contribution from public pensions will be compared with that of market incomes earned usually by other prime-age family members. Then, focusing on elderly-only households (those with either one person only or a couple only), I will investigate the degree to which the wages of those currently employed affect the economic and financial conditions of the elderly. The phenomenon of an ageing society manifests itself not only in changes in the age distribution of the population, it is also accompanied by changes in households; that is, in the basic unit of people’s lives and the most critical unit of analysis when investigating the extent of economic well-being. While the total number of one-person households (where the person is the household head and breadwinner) has recently increased, the majority of people live in households with others. In these shared households it is important who is the ‘head’ and breadwinner. In principle, the age of the household head is used to determine how the extent of income inequality varies by the different stages of the life course; and regarding income inequality among the elderly, the Gini coefficients of the household whose head is 65 or over is calculated. This is mainly due to the fact that data on income levels takes as the unit of analysis the income of the entire household. In this context, focusing on the age of the head of the household is under- standable. However, it is also problematic, because the oldest person in a household is not always the one designated as the ‘head’. There are in fact many cases in which the younger generation (the child of the elderly member) fills the role of the ‘head’ in the three-generation household. income inequality and ageing 119

The classification of households according to the age of their heads has meant that all households in which an elderly person is a member but not the head were excluded in studies of economic inequality. Therefore, in this chapter, I will take into account not only the age of the household head but also the structure of the households in which an elderly person resides as a member. Based on data from the Kokumin seikatsu kiso chōsa (Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions of the People on Health and Welfare) conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) in 1986, 1995, and 2004, the income under analysis is the disposable household income in which the direct income tax and social insurance are subtracted from the gross income with an equivalent scale of the square root of the number of household members.

2. where are the Elderly? Households with Elderly Members

The economic well-being of the elderly varies largely by the type of households in which they reside, and hence this age group is not homogeneous along with the increase in its proportion, that is ageing. In the past, the elderly used to live with their child’s family and enjoy basic livelihood security there. The family was expected to and did play the main role in providing basic livelihood security to their elderly family members, and this has been the basis of Japan’s social security system, a social security system known as the ‘Japanese-style welfare state’. However, as the number of elderly who live alone or with only their spouse started to increase, the average size of households with elderly members decreased. It was no longer safe to assume that ‘the family’ or ‘the household’ would play the role of providing the economic security or basic care to the elderly members. Family sociologists define the disintegration of the family unit and the growing emphasis on the individual in society as ‘the collapse of the post-war family system’ (Ochiai 1994; Yamada 2004). From the perspective of social policy, both globalization and individualization happened at the same time and together illuminated the fact that there were limits to what ‘the state’ could provide in terms of livelihood security (Takegawa 2007). Shirahase (2002) pointed out that – in contrast to Western Europe – the welfare of the elderly, and the degree of economic well-being of Japanese elderly, is largely influenced by the type of household in which 120 sawako shirahase they live: namely, whether they live alone or with their children. Differences in the types of household containing elderly members imply the extent to which the household and the family provide economic security for the elderly. Smeeding and Saunders (1998), who analysed data on Taiwan, claim that living in three-generation households provides economic security for the elderly. In sum, there is empirical evidence that the family plays an important role in Taiwan and Japan. Figure 1 depicts the transformation of the structure of households in which elderly members reside. The percentage of households in which an elderly person resides grew from 26.2 per cent of the total number of households in 1986 to 34.5 per cent in 1995, and 47.1 per cent in 2004. In 2007, almost half of all households in Japan included at least one person aged 65 and over. Whereas the elderly made up just 10 per cent of the entire population in the 1980s, today they make up 20 per cent. However, it should be noted that the proportion of the elderly is not the same thing as the proportion of households with elderly members. As the population has aged, the ‘place’ where the elderly spend their daily lives has also been transformed. In the 1980s, half of

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 1 Trend in the structure of households with elderly members (%) income inequality and ageing 121 all households with elderly members were made up of three generations: the elderly together with the families of their children. However, twenty years later that number has halved. In its place is the household comprised of an elderly couple. At the end of the 1980s these elderly couple households comprised just one-fifth of the total number of households in which elderly people lived; by the mid 2000s the figure was two-thirds. Moreover, one- person households of an elderly female grew from 10 per cent of the total number of households with elderly members in the 1980s to 19 per cent in the mid 2000s, while there was no comparable increase in the proportion of one-person households of an elderly male. However, taking into consideration the fact that the number of people who have never been married has increased in recent years, reaching 15.6 per cent of the population in 2005 (NIPSSR 2008b), it is quite possible that single elderly male households will increase in the future.

3. Income Disparities Across Households with Elderly Members

What is the relationship between the change in household structure and economic inequality among the elderly? This section examines income inequality using two measurements: the mean log deviation (MLD)2 and the poverty rate3. Figure 2 compares the poverty rates by households with and without elderly members. In the mid-1980s the overall poverty rate across all households was 11.5 per cent. By the mid-1990s it had grown to 13.2 per cent, and by the mid-2000s it was at 17.1 per cent. The increase in the poverty rate from 2000 was particularly large. The poverty rate differs significantly depending on whether an elderly member resides in the household. For all time periods, the poverty rate is lower for households without elderly members than for those with elderly members. The difference between the two became

2 11m =−m MLD =∑∑ ln ln ln yi nyiii n n = sample size, yi = disposable income of the household i, and µ = the mean disposable income of the total of households. 3 The poverty rate is calculated as the proportion of households whose disposable income is less than the median disposable income of total households in the society. 122 sawako shirahase

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 2 Poverty rates among households with and without elderly members particularly pronounced in the mid-2000s: the poverty rate for households with elderly members increased to over 20 per cent. Figure 3 presents the change in poverty rates by the type of household in which elderly members reside in order to examine how the poverty rates differ by the types of households with elderly members. The poverty rate across all types of households with elderly members is declining overall. The household type with the most dramatic decline in the poverty rate is the one-person household. In the mid- 1980s, about 50 per cent of male one-person households were in poverty, whereas by the mid-2000s, the figure had decreased to 30 per cent. The poverty rate among female one-person households was even higher, and the decline more dramatic: over 70 per cent in poverty in the 1980s, falling to 48.5 per cent by the mid-2000s. Although there has been a clear decline, the poverty rate among elderly women living alone remains quite marked. With longer life spans and a growing tendency to remain unmarried, it is possible that the poverty rate of single elderly female households will remain high or become even higher. And given that the poverty rate among three-generation households with elderly members is lower than 10 per cent, it is safe to conclude that living alone as an elderly person entails considerable economic risk. income inequality and ageing 123

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 3 Trends in the poverty rate by type of household with elderly members

The overall poverty rate has increased among households in which an elderly person resides. Yet the trend in the poverty rate of some household types with elderly members residing shows a decline. Although the overall poverty rate is increasing, why is the poverty rate of certain household types declining? How can these contrasting trends be explained and what do they mean – especially since there are indications that the overall poverty rate across all types of households with elderly members has improved over the last twenty years? However, elderly one-person households have a much higher poverty rate than three-generation households. What is occurring here is that the percentage of the total number of households with relatively high poverty rates has increased, so consequently the overall poverty rate among households with elderly members has also increased. This suggests that both the proportional distribution of household types and the poverty rates by household type with elderly members have to be taken into account when assessing changes in income inequality among the elderly. Figure 4 shows a change in degree of income inequality represented by the so-called mean log deviation (MLD) in households with and without elderly members in 1986, 1995 and 2004. The overall extent of income inequality increased from 0.180 to 0.227 during this period. The change in poverty rates, however, indicates different directions 124 sawako shirahase

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 4 Trends in the extent of income inequality among households with and without elderly members between households with and without elderly members. While the extent of income inequality has increased among households without elderly members, it declined among those with elderly members from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. What has not changed is that the extent of income inequality is greater for households with elderly members than for households without. However, the difference between the two groups has become smaller over time. An examination of poverty rates (cf. Figure 2 above) reveals that there is a contin- ual improvement in poverty among households with elderly members, and there is also some evidence that the extent of economic inequality has declined in recent years. It is important to bear in mind how much the households with elderly contribute to the overall degree of income inequality. Here again, change in income inequality derived from the change in household structure should be distinguished from the change in the extent of income inequality within each household type. In order to explain the reasons for the change in the extent of income inequality, I divided it into three factors: (1) the effect due to changes within household types; (2) the effect from changes in the distribution of household types over time; and (3) the effect from changes in the difference between household types. These three effects correspond to the following questions: (1) whether changes in the degree of income disparity were caused by a rise in the degree of income inequality income inequality and ageing 125 within a particular type of household; (2) whether it occurred due to a change in the overall distribution of household types; or (3) whether it depended on changes in the mean difference between the household types over time. To break down changes in the degree of income inequality into these three factors, I have adopted a method from the study by Nishizaki, Yamada and Ando (1998). For example, to explain the change in MLD from 1986 to 1995, I break it down into three kinds of factors. The first part depicts the intra-household effect, the second and the third denote the distributional effects of the household structure, and the fourth examines the inter-household effects:

1995 1986 ∆−MLD = MLD MLD  m m =a∆ MLD + MLD ∆+a ln ∆aa+ ∆ln  ∑i ∑∑i  ii ∑ m mi i iii i

ai: the mean proportion of the household category i in 1986 and 1995 MLDi: the mean MLD of the household category i in 1986 and 1995

µi: the mean disposable income of the household category i in each year µ: the mean disposable income of the total of households in each year

Table 1 shows the results of breaking down the three factors in the change of MLD among households with elderly members. When comparing 1986 to 1995, the overall degree of income inequality increased from 0.239 to 0.252, a difference of 0.013. The major factor in explaining this change is the distributional change of the households between 1986 and 1995. The degree of income inequality within each household type has slightly increased, and the distributional change in the household structure represented by the decline in three-generation households and the rise in one-person households and couple-only households largely explains the increase in the degree of income inequality between these two periods. On the other hand, the inter- household difference has declined. The difference in the mean disposable income by household type became smaller in these years. In a cross-national analysis, Shirahase (2002) claims that a characteristic of income inequality in households with elderly members in Japan is that the level of economic well-being of the elderly differs significantly depending on the type of household in which they live. 126 sawako shirahase

Table 1 Three factors in the change of MLD among households with elderly members Intra- Inter- Difference household Distributional household in MLD effect effect effect

1986~1995 0.01310 0.00066 0.02384 −0.01141 1995~2001 −0.02200 −0.02938 0.01039 −0.00305

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004).

For instance, the economic well-being of the elderly who live alone is much more disadvantageous than those who live in a three-generation household. In contrast to Western Europe, living arrangements of the elderly are quite diverse in Japan, and this is one of the reasons why the extent of income inequality is much larger in Japan than in Europe. As the nation’s social security system, particularly the pension system, has improved, the poverty rates among the elderly, particularly elderly women living alone, have decreased markedly. And because of improvements in the social system, the overall extent of income inequality by household type has declined in Japan. However, there is still ample space for further improvement. From 1995 to 2004 the overall extent of economic inequality improved from 0.252 to 0.230. One of the major reasons for this was a decline of income inequality within particular household types. Inter- household differences narrowed in the period from 1995 to 2004, though to a lesser extent than in the previous period. The decline in economic inequality from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s mainly occurred due to the improvement in intra-household inequality (−0.029), and the extent of income inequality within household types became smaller between 1995 and 2004. However, the effect of the distributional change in the household structure has remained positive, which means that this change, represented by the increase in one- person and couple-only households, leads to an increase in the overall degree of income inequality. On the other hand, the effect of intra- household changes on the extent of income inequality overcame distributional changes in the household structure with elderly members between 1995 and 2004, and consequently, the overall extent of income inequality has declined since the mid-1990s. income inequality and ageing 127

Regarding changes in the composition of households with elderly members, the mean size of the household has become smaller due to the increase in the number of one-person households and couple-only households. Whereas formerly the majority of the elderly used to live with their child’s family in three-generational households (where they could enjoy basic livelihood security including income security within the household), at present the number of one-person households and couple-only households has increased, so that the decrease in household size is positively related to the high extent of income inequality. However, the inter-household difference in the level of economic well- being has also become smaller, and the gap between the elderly in three-generation households and in one-person households is no longer so large. This is the main reason why the overall extent of income inequality among the households with the elderly has declined recently. My results confirm that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the extent of income inequality within certain household types lessened and thus led to the lessening of the overall extent of income inequality among households with elderly members. Figure 5 depicts how the

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 5 Intra-household effect on changes in the degree of income inequality (MLD) by household type 128 sawako shirahase weighted extent of income inequality within one household type contributed to the overall extent of income inequality, which corresponds to the first component in the equation shown earlier. Figure 5 reveals that a large proportion of the recent reduction in the extent of economic inequality across all households with elderly members was caused by a reduction in inequality within couple-only households. The negative effect derived from female one-person households (which traditionally have had a high poverty rate) on the overall change in the extent of income inequality is similarly significant, but not to the extent of that of elderly couple-only households. This result can be interpreted thus: the contribution of a reduction in the extent of income inequality in one-person households is relatively smaller than that in couple-only households, a difference that is partly due to the fact that the proportion of the former is smaller than that of the latter. Couple-only households make up over one-third of all households, and as of 2004 this was the largest single group by type of household. The lessening of the extent of income inequality within this group – the couple-only households – has mostly contributed to the reduction in the overall degree of economic inequality among households with elderly members. Improvements in the public pension system are likely to be a major reason for this reduction.

4. economic Inequality within Three-Generation Households

In the previous section, I found that the elderly members of three- generation households are relatively better off economically, compared with those living in other types of households. In fact, the poverty rate of elderly living in three-generation households is the lowest, and consequently, the extent of income inequality is the smallest. Yet, the number of elderly living in three-generation households has been declining, even though the Japanese-style welfare system is based on this model. The transformation in the structure of households with elderly members means that these three-generation households are no longer as common as they used to be, and that the elderly can no longer expect to enjoy the livelihood security provided by family members. This section pays closer attention to these ‘three-generation households,’ which today constitute one-quarter of the total number of households with elderly members, focusing on the economic position of the elderly member within the household. income inequality and ageing 129

First, I would like to examine the definition of ‘household head’. As the person who represents the household, the household head is usually expected to play the role of breadwinner. As of 2004, about 90 per cent of household heads were breadwinners. When looking at households with elderly members, however, this is not always the case. In fact, there are cases in which an elderly father remains the head of the household, whereas the actual breadwinner is a son. From 1986 to 2004, the percentage of three-generation households that designated an elderly member as head increased from 20 to 36 per cent. Figure 6 shows that the poverty rate for households in which the head is non-elderly declined slightly from 10 per cent in 1986 to 8 per cent in 2004, and that among households with an elderly head it increased from 8 per cent in 1986 to 11 per cent in 1995, and then dropped to 9 per cent in 2004. Interestingly, whereas in the mid-1980s the poverty rate among elderly-headed households was lower than among non-elderly-headed households (where usually a son was the head), from 1995 onwards the poverty rate among elderly-headed households was higher. It is likely that both types of households (elderly-headed and non-elderly-headed) were affected by the Heisei- era recession, though differently.

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 6 Poverty rate among three-generation households (elderly head versus non-elderly head) 130 sawako shirahase

Given that the household head traditionally plays the role of breadwinner, the increase in the proportion of elderly heads in three- generation households would mean that the elderly continue to play a major role in supporting the family economy. Before 1995, elderly members in three-generation households used to enjoy economic security by living with the married son, who had taken over the role of breadwinner. After 1995, however, a shift in the dynamics of family roles occurred, and it was no longer the case that the position of the elderly member of a household was guaranteed to be beneficial, a change that calls for an in-depth examination of the economic role that these elderly people played after 1995. Figure 7 presents the poverty rates among three-generation households by combining the age of household head and of household breadwinner. The dominant combination (60 %) is that of a non- elderly head who is also the breadwinner (Type 1). About 17 per cent of three-generation households have an elderly head who is also the breadwinner (Type 2). In almost 20 per cent an elderly person holds the position of household head but is not the main earner (Type 3). And in a minority of cases (4 %), a non-elderly family member is the household head, but is economically supported by an elderly member (Type 4). The highest poverty rate is found in Type 4. An example of a Type 4 household is one in which the son takes the position of household head, while the family economy is supported by the elderly parent or

Source: MHLW (2004). Figure 7 Poverty rates among three-generation households by type of household head (elderly/non-elderly, breadwinner/non-breadwinner) income inequality and ageing 131 the grandson. However, because of the small number of these household types, the results call for careful interpretation. The lowest poverty rate, on the other hand, can be seen in Type 1 households, in which a non-elderly member takes the position of household head, earns the most, and supports the household economy. Therefore, it can be supposed that the elderly member in a conventional three-generation household would gain economic security by sharing the household with the younger generation. However, while the majority of three- generation households are of this type, the proportion is decreasing, and it can be speculated that the so-called Japanese-type welfare state, in which the young generation provides the elderly members of the household with basic livelihood security, is fading. Figure 8 shows the proportion of total income of three-generation households accounted for by public pension benefits between 1986 and 2004. In 1986, in 84 per cent of all three-generation households, public pension benefits contributed less than 25 per cent to the total household income; in other words, most income was derived from employment and self-employment. In the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, however, public pensions came to constitute a higher

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 8 Proportion of public pension benefits in the income package of three-generation households with elderly members 132 sawako shirahase

proportion of total three-generation household incomes. In the mid- 1990s, the number of households that relied on public pension benefits for 25 per cent of their income or less still formed the majority, but had fallen to roughly 70 per cent of the total, whereas households depending on public pensions for between 25 to 50 per cent of their total income increased to almost 20 per cent, and households depending on public pension benefits for over 75 per cent of their income formed a minority of only 6 per cent. Thus, the income structure of three-generation households (consisting of an elderly member living with his/her children and grandchildren) is comprised, for the most part, of income from those currently employed (the children of the elderly person). While the contribution of the elderly member by way of public pension benefits is small, it plays a role in supporting the household to some extent. And there are some cases where the public pension – which is supposed to provide the economic security to the elderly – is the major source of household income. These are cases in which the younger generation also faces economic difficulties.

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 9 Proportion of the income package in three-generation households (both elderly-headed and non-elderly-headed) accounted for by public pension benefits income inequality and ageing 133

Figure 9 shows the proportion of the income package in three- generation households accounted for by public pension benefits. It takes into account the age of the household head and offers an answer to the question of why elderly members remain as the household head in a number of three-generation households. Obviously, elderly-headed three-generation households show a higher proportion of public pension benefits in the household income than those with a non-elderly head. In 1986, public pensions accounted for less than 25 per cent of the income packages of three-generation households with a non- elderly head in almost 90 per cent of cases, and in these households the overwhelming majority of household income was derived from market income. The corresponding figure among three-generation households with an elderly head dropped to 67 per cent – a difference of about 20 percentage points. From 1986 to 2004, this difference increased to 33 percentage points. Therefore, the question of whether or not the head of the household was an elderly member became closely associated with the income package of three-generation households, and further, with who the breadwinner of the household was. What is particularly important based on these results is that while the number of three-generation households is decreasing, the proportion with an elderly member as the household head is increasing, and so is the proportion of total household income accounted for by public pension benefits. In sum, whereas the income structure of three-generation households in which the elderly member is not the head has not changed significantly over the last twenty years, there is a clear increase in the importance of public pensions to the household income of elderly- headed three-generation households in which the elderly member continues in the role of breadwinner. In 2004, in more than 20 per cent of three-generation households with an elderly head, the majority of the household income was derived from public pension benefits. It appears that here public pensions act as income security not only for the elderly, but also for the entire household including the younger generation. While three-generation households offer social as well as economic security, today there is an increase in cases where the elderly person continues to be the household head remaining in charge of preserving the household’s livelihood and income. While it cannot be denied that by living with his or her children the elderly person is afforded greater life security, in recent years the elderly have begun to play more of a 134 sawako shirahase role in caring for their children. Put differently, due to the worsening labour market, many young people with non-standard jobs have been forced to live with their elderly parents in order to support their own family. The elderly parents are becoming the only place where they can seek help, although not every young family has elderly parents they can rely on. Thus, we should not overlook the situation in which living with one’s elderly parents can help young people, and co-residency no longer benefits only the elderly. Rather than characterizing this situation as a malfunction of the pension system, we should instead recognize it as a sign of insufficient economic support for young families. It is essential to develop a system of economic support in which young families do not have to rely on their elderly parents. Examining the proportion of household income accounted for by public pension benefits by decile of the disposable income of three- generation households, reveals how much public pensions contribute to the entire household economy and what economic role the elderly play in three-generation households. Figure 10 confirms that the proportion of income accounted for by public pension benefits decreases as the income level of the household becomes higher. In three-generation households in the first decile (lowest income group), the proportion

Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 10 Proportion of the income package in three-generation households accounted for by public pension benefits by household income decile (%) income inequality and ageing 135 accounted for by public pensions was close to 40 per cent in 2004, while its corresponding figure at the tenth decile (highest income group) was less than half of that. It is likely that three-generation households in low-income groups rely more on public pension. The proportion of income of three-generation households accounted for by public pension benefits has increased across all income levels since the mid-1980s. It seems likely that the recession after the economic boost hit the prime-age population forced some of them to stay in their parents’ house with their family to gain the economic benefit of co- residency with the elderly parents by pooling the family budget including public pensions. In bleak economic times, thus, it appears that the role of three- generation households in terms of livelihood security for the elderly has changed to some extent. The elderly member in a three-generation household can no longer enjoy the status of beneficiary, but has to remain the breadwinner to support the family, including the younger generation. In fact, the family played a role in absorbing the economic shock felt by young people. Three-generation households do not only help the elderly, but also the children of the elderly and their grandchildren, particularly in times of a weak labour market. In fact, I do not think that there are many people who cannot rely on the parental home for solving the financial problems of their own family, since the family has traditionally played the major role in handling socio-economic risks such as unemployment and divorce. However, the size of multi- generation households in which family members cope with various social risks by supporting family members across generations is declining: an alternative model is needed. It should be emphasized that, based on these results, it is not that one can avoid risk if one has a family, but rather the fact that the elderly, whose own economic foundation is uncertain, are in fact contributing significantly to the life security of other family members. The government must seriously consider providing livelihood security not only to a particular age group such as the elderly, but also to younger and middle-age groups, most of whom have their own family to support.

5. Income Structure of Elderly-only Households

Japanese elderly are characterized by a relatively high rate of employment, a fact that has caught the attention of scholars from other OECD 136 sawako shirahase countries (Shirahase 2002). In Europe, the interest in old-age employment stems from the fact that the budget for public pension is becoming strained. And for countries designing policies that will draw elderly people back into the workforce, the Japanese case is regarded as a good example. However, what lies behind the high rates of employment among Japanese elderly is not only the notion that working gives meaning to life and acts as an activity to which one can dedicate oneself, but also the fact that working is merely necessary in the absence of other supportive social structures. This section focuses on elderly-only households (consisting of either one elderly person or an elderly couple) and investigates the change in proportion of earnings derived from current employment in the household income. The earnings examined in this section constitute the total income from labour and self-employment, including farming, and can be called the market income. Figure 11 shows the breakdown of earnings among elderly-only households by income decile. Since the mid-1980s, the proportion of market income has declined considerably in households comprised

Note: Elderly-only households include both elderly one-person and elderly couple- only households. The market income includes wages, income from self-employment, farm income, and family-work income, and is calculated as its proportion of the disposable household income. Source: MHLW (1986, 1995, 2004). Figure 11 Market income among elderly-only households by household income decile income inequality and ageing 137 only of elderly members. Especially in the eighth to the tenth decile (the higher income brackets), a rapid decline in the proportion of market income can be seen. In 2004, among those households in the highest income group, the proportion of market income was 45 per cent, a drastic change from 1986, when the corresponding figure was 81 per cent. This means that the extent of contribution from social security benefits (including public pensions) has increased even in the high income groups of households consisting of only elderly members. While the market income represented by earnings from employment is critical in determining the level of economic well-being for the elderly, in recent years the decline in its proportion out of the household income would imply that the effect of the difference in work status on the level of household income is lessening. This can be partly explained by the worsening of the labour market for elderly people, represented by an increase in non-standard jobs, so that working or not working does not make as much difference to the level of economic well-being as it used to. Returning to the finding that the extent of income inequality among the elderly has been declining in recent years (although it is still larger than that of working-age groups), it is clear that such a decline can be partly explained by the change in income structure among households with elderly. The extent of income inequality within one household type with elderly members has declined, which leads to a decrease in the overall degree of income inequality among households with elderly, as shown in Figure 4 above. This decline in income inequality within a household type is derived from the change in the income structure that has shifted to depend much more on social security benefits including public pensions. The larger proportion of public pension benefits in the income package of elderly households makes their income structure more homogeneous and, as a consequence, the extent of income inequality among elderly households has become lower.

6. economic Inequality among the Elderly and Livelihood Security

At the beginning of this chapter two somewhat contradictory perspectives towards income inequality among the elderly were introduced. Analysis has revealed findings that apply to both perspectives. It was confirmed that there has been an increase in the proportion of social 138 sawako shirahase security benefits, including public pensions, in the income package of households with elderly, coupled with a decline in the proportion of earnings from employment, which is one of the factors explaining the reduction in the degree of income inequality among the elderly (Shirahase 2006). On the other hand, the increase in the number of households consisting of one elderly person or an elderly couple has been accompanied by a decline in three-generation households – the household model on which the Japanese-type welfare society used to be based. The decline in the size of the household works to expand the extent of income inequality among the elderly, but because the extent of income inequality within elderly-only households has declined, the overall extent of income inequality among households with elderly has declined. It is difficult to say whether this decline in economic inequality among the elderly will continue or not. The financial crisis of 2008/09 has hit the labour market with full force. Unemployment has risen and even if one is lucky enough to obtain a position as a temporary employee, it is very difficult to find a better job. If this situation continues, many more elderly will end up pension-less as a result of employment histories that do not qualify them for a pension. Furthermore, the decline in economic security among the elderly brought about by a reduction in benefits is causing levels of security among the elderly – once improved – to fall again. Once, the high extent of economic inequality among the elderly in Japan was a conspicuous feature. However, from the mid-1990s to the 2000s, the disparity among Japanese elderly improved and the level of security approached that of Western Europe. While many people clamour to overhaul Japan’s welfare system, which is largely focused on old age, one danger is that they are likely to further increase the extent of economic inequality within such old-age groups. What should Japan do now? From the perspective of livelihood security, elderly people who live in three-generation households are in an advantageous position. However, just because they live in a three- generation household does not mean that they can enjoy a secured livelihood anymore. Surprisingly, this is because, within many of these three-generation households, the elderly are not ‘care-receivers’ but rather the ‘heads’ of the households, expected to support the household, playing the role of the major breadwinner. The ageing of the population will likely continue and result in plac- ing even greater strain on social security finances. However, this does income inequality and ageing 139 not mean that we should develop policies that make better use of the hidden asset of the family, recommending that elderly live in three- generation households. The Attitudes Survey of the Elderly towards their Houses and Living Environments (Kōreisha no jūtaku to seikatsu kankyō ni kan-suru ishiki chōsa) conducted by the Japanese Govern ment’s Cabinet Office in 2005 indicates that more and more people hold negative attitudes towards the elderly living with their children (Naikakufu 2008a). We cannot compel people to change their lives back to how they were in the past. Furthermore, labour shortages forecast to occur in the near future (as a side effect of the declining birth rate) suggest that it would be advantageous to develop policies that encourage the elderly to stay in the labour force. However, at the same time, we should take into account substantial differences in the economic situation between the elderly who work and those who do not work. In the past, elderly people continued to work primarily because there was an economic incentive for them to do so. With the cooling of the labour market, however, new ways of working such as ‘work sharing’ are now being discussed. No matter how much we urge elderly people to stay in the labour market, some kind of new approach is needed. By ‘a new approach’, I mean a comprehensive and ‘global’ labour policy that includes other age brackets, such as the young and middle-aged, and not a labour policy focused exclusively on elderly people. It is necessary to find some way of apportioning the social risks of poverty and unemployment across all generations. As I have shown above, the transformation of income structure has become entangled with income inequalities among households with elderly members, including three-generation households. A majority of Japanese households today have elderly members. We desperately need to formulate a new public consensus on a social policy that can deal with the transformation of the social system that is about to occur with a change in the population structure, and to rebuild the welfare state based on the new paradigm of generational relations in Japan’s ageing society.

Ageing Societies: Present Challenges and Models for the Future

Gertrud M. Backes

1. introduction

Demographic change challenges modern societies such as Japan and Germany. What are these challenges and what will the future look like? Other contributions to this volume focus on the challenges and opportunities which arise from ageing societies with declining populations, discussing the social inequality brought on by demographic ageing, regional (socio-spatial) disparities, as well as the opportunities and challenges within the silver market, the situation of older employees, and so on. The vision for the future of ageing societies seems to be ‘grey’, so to speak; however, in some societal sub-areas a ‘silver’ line can be seen. In order to translate these visions into new (better) societal perspectives, the initial efforts in shaping societies must be continued, especially efforts that aim at changing the construction of people’s life courses, the division of labour and social inequalities, but above all efforts that prevent the widening of social inequality between age groups and gender. This chapter investigates what societies – especially by way of a comparison between Germany and Japan – can learn from each other and what can be done to provide for the present and the future. These questions will be approached in three steps: First, an overview of the ana- lytic points relevant to ageing societies and ageing as a so-called ‘societal problem’ will be given (Backes 1997). Second, against this background, the chapter will focus on the challenges of dealing with ageing societies in social discourses and used measures. Third, the chapter stresses perspectives concerning the future; that is, the demands to draw out a model of a society of socially balanced longevity based on a political philosophy of living and ageing. 142 gertrud m. backes

2. Status Quo

2.1 Ageing Societies – Analytical Focus The analytical focus stems from critical gerontology and the political economy of ageing. From this theoretical perspective, society as a whole has to deal with the challenges of ageing in the context of demographic change and of broad societal change. Demographic ageing and the structural development of age and ageing, although important, are only a part of societal change as a whole. Demographic change (i.e., declining birth rates, increasing life expectancy, shrinking populations) and the ageing process of society (i.e., the ‘societal ageing’ of institutions and individuals) are defined as both a result and an interwoven part of societal change. Additional and amalgamated parts in the larger context of present (and future) societal change are, for instance, gender-related issues, the individualization of life courses, as well as the on-going processes of migration, social diversification and globalization. These changes have significantly affected all sub-areas of society (at the social, individual and institutional level); that is, on the cultural, political and economic systems (for Japan see Hewitt 2002); on education, the labour market, markets for goods and services, social services, family and neighbourhoods; and on people’s individual life decisions (socially located in specific cohorts and generations, as well as particular social situations, and influenced by gender, ethnicity and other social factors). At the level of society and identity, important elements of structure and change are gender, social class, and ethnicity – all amalgated with age.

2.2 Concept: Ageing as a ‘Societal Problem’ Changes within ageing societies produce new and modified problems or challenges on a quantitative and qualitative level. When developing different aspects of the theoretical notion of ageing as a ‘societal problem’ (Backes 1997), it is important to fully realize its implications within society and to acknowledge its societal causes, conditions and consequences, which must all necessarily be approached with societal tools, tools in the form of discourses and concrete measures. Age(ing) today – as a ‘problem’ and/or as a ‘developmental task’ – affects not only a few individuals (‘individual problem’), but large groups and institutions as well (‘social problem’), and society as a whole (‘societal problem’). Socio-political processes diagnose so-called ‘social (and ageing societies 143 individual) problems’ in order to deal with them; for example, the implementation of long-term care insurance in Germany and Japan as a new tool. But there is a mismatch between the societal aim of solving the problem and the real situation of overcoming the problem as a societal one, both at the level of diagnoses and discourses and at the level of measures (i.e., resources and constrains); for example, the reform of long-term care insurance in Germany shows that the implemented tools are insufficient. It is becoming clear that old age and ageing are not only an individual or social/socio-political problem, but a problem that challenges society as a whole – hence the notion of age(ing) as a ‘societal problem’ (Backes 1997). Conventional (socio-political) regulations (such as age- limits and social security) have proved insufficient. And former models of living, working and caring are becoming obsolete and have to be restructured or developed in new ways. However, most new ways of dealing with this challenge can be characterized as normatively and instrumentally underdeveloped. It seems to be an anomic situation. The challenges of ageing societies have not yet successfully been overcome. It is agreed that age(ing) is a problem for society, but age(ing) is not accepted as a ‘societal problem’ – a problem that has broad societal causes and conditions, as well as forms and consequences, and which can only be overcome by societal effort at all levels.

3. identifying and Dealing with Challenges

3.1 Challenges in Ageing Societies The main challenges in ageing societies are manifold. The growing imbalance in resources and strains between age groups and cohorts has produced growing disparities and inequalities, including even between gender, classes, regions and ethnicities. There are many indicators of this in Japan and in Germany. Division of labour and the forms of institutionalization of life course and ‘sociation of age(ing)’ (Vergesellschaftung des Alter[n]s) (Backes 2000) have become the subject of discussions and of efforts towards legitimization. Furthermore, there are many challenges for innovation that focus on: the contract between generations; the distribution of resources, opportunities, burdens and strains; the forms of work in private and public sectors, in family work, caring and employment; over the life course, between families with and without children, in different cohorts and age groups; 144 gertrud m. backes and between ethnicities, gender, social classes and regions. All these challenges have been acknowledged and discussed from different angles, including in terms of new disparities, international migration of caregivers, changing family composition, and so forth (see other contributions in this volume). Accepting the thesis that age(ing) is not only a problem for society but a ‘societal problem’ per se means acknowledging that ageing societies are underdeveloped in both normative and instrumental ways. It means acknowledging that there are problems in managing the challenges of ageing and demographic change in the broader context of social change, and leads directly to the question of what the discourses are within which these challenges are currently dealt with.

3.2 Discourses on Ageing in Ageing Societies The discourses on ageing and the measures already in effect in Japan and Germany are both symptoms of a failure to address the multifaceted or complex societal problem of ageing. Today there are few differences between these two societies. Within both, common the- matic threads or discourses on ageing can be identified: (1) ageing people as a ‘societal burden’ and (2) ageing people as a ‘societal potential’ (Amrhein and Backes 2007, 2008; Coulmas 2007b). Both discourses identify elderly people as the black-sheep of society – even in the form of a rescue resource – and in so doing reflect different kinds of ageism (intersected with sexism in a latent way at least). The argumentative lines in Discourse 1 (ageing people as a ‘burden’), which is based on a deficit model of ageing, are: deficit ageing proposals, societies with an imbalance in age groups, intergenerational gap, economic and social burden, political danger, and a (possible) threat to social peace. The argumentative lines in Discourse 2 (ageing people as a ‘potential’), which is based on a competence model of age(ing), are: active ageing proposals, cultural and societal productivity, intergenerational solidarity, social and economic resources, political and social participation, and an opportunity to realize social peace. Differences, on the other hand, can be found in discussions based on different culture and historical specifics and arguments, influenced by a varying level of ageism (intersected with sexism).

3.3 A Critical Discourse Perspective From a critical discourse perspective, based on critical gerontology and the political economy of ageing, the question is not so much ageing societies 145 whether one discourse has legitimacy or hegemonial superiority over the other in so far as elderly people can be both a ‘burden’ and a ‘potential’ in ageing societies; rather the question is what implicit interests, conflicts, power relations and inequalities (such as ageism combined with sexism) are at work in these discourses. From a critical discourse perspective, this type of hidden content can be seen behind the two main discourse topics, constituting the inherent contradictions and ambivalences that exist in these present discourses (and even in concrete measures). In Germany, for example, political interest focuses on elderly people and old age as a ‘problem for society’, instead of factor- ing these issues into a consideration of society as a whole. In this sense diverse forms of ageism (both latent and manifest) can be diagnosed in German society.

3.4 Concrete Measures in Ageing Societies Concrete measures that have been implemented to shape ageing societies, and which are also contained in the two main discourses outlined above, include diverse examples such as inconsistent age-related interventions (such as retirement age), long-term care insurance which combines traditional and new tools, and some measures towards activity which focus on voluntary participation or generational solidarity of elderly people, rather than on their employment (Amrhein 2002, 2004; Brandt et al. 2008; Coulmas 2007b; Shimada and Tagsold 2006). In addition, there are also implicit elements that focus on the division of labour between age groups, generations and gender – elements that are the hidden guidelines to shaping society in the future. Most concrete measures, however, mainly focus on the present only. The consequence of discourses about age(ing) as either a ‘potential’ or a ‘burden’ is that many projects have emerged which investigate an intergenerational way of communication, solidarity or voluntary participation, for example. In Germany, this is one attempt to solve the problems of the ageing society. From an analytical point of view, however, this is too short-sighted. Most of these measures are concentrated only on change affecting the elderly people themselves and their activities (i.e., successful, active and productive ageing), as well as on shaping the later part of people’s life courses (Amrhein and Backes 2007, 2008). In other words, these measures do not push society as a whole towards change, and many contradictions and ambivalences can be found. To summarize, these measures show normative and instru mental insufficiency, an underdeveloped status that corresponds to 146 gertrud m. backes

predominant discourses. These discourses, however, are not only a mirror of the fears and hopes of most people and – last but not least – of the political scene; they also reflect the main topics of concrete measures, measures that have proved unsuitable to solve “ageing as a societal problem” in the context of broader societal challenges (Backes 1997, 2006, 2008).

4. into the Future

4.1 Critical Perspective – Future Guidelines The critical reflection on the challenges faced by an ageing society, the symptomatic discourses and corresponding measures, reveal that there are many visions in and of ageing societies and many activities for shaping old age and the elderly. From a critical perspective, some essential hidden contents can be identified behind the ‘potential’ and ‘burden’ discourses and their respective measures. These hidden contents are: the changing division of labour (employment, care, volunteering, domestic work) during the life course between gender, social classes, ethnicities; more social equality and balance; new gender-age relations and structures; and a different model of the institutionalization of people’s life courses. Here, future guidelines can be found that are similar to the political philosophy of ‘societies of longevity’. For example, the life courses of women and men will be structured differently in the future, assis ted by concrete measures in different cohorts and generations (such as another form of complementarity between living and working conditions). From an analytical point of view, however, it may be inferred that it is not enough to apply measures to the third and later stages of life course, or to concentrate measures at the level of individuals and the interactions between them. Measures must apply to all social levels: the so-called macro-, meso- and micro-levels. And in order to succeed, what has to be taken into account is the very complex relationship not only between quality of life (Lebenslagen) and working and living conditions during the whole life course, but also bet ween structural changes in age(ing) and in other societal sub-areas. New forms of institutionalization of life course and sociation (Vergesellschaftung) of ageing – intersected with and interdependent on gender – are emerging and have to be developed in a socially balanced way (Backes 2008). ageing societies 147

4.2 The Future: A Political Philosophy of Living and Ageing Looking at some founding concepts and consequences for future development based on the future guidelines outlined above, I began by focusing on a political philosophy of living and ageing; next I addressed the concept of a society of socially balanced longevity. A consideration of both perspectives leads to the following discussion: all discourses and measures that are aimed only at the elderly of today are far too short-sighted. To sustain human dignity means moving away from the notion of old age as a problem inherent in elderly people alone. Furthermore, it is the negative perception of old age that is the problem, in so far as it impairs the development of new ideas. Elderly women and men are not a ‘burden’ to society and they do not selfishly retain their ‘potentials’. These ideas are crucial to any effort to reach a society of socially balanced longevity. The concept of a ‘society of longevity’ refers to a society that is focused on the multi-faceted developmental task and/or social challenge of ageing and longevity, and which is made up of individuals conscious of their own longevity (see, for example, “homo vitae longae” in Backes 2005, 2008). This puts special emphasis on an infrastructure that focuses primarily on community. Using this critical perspective in focusing on the consequences of specific division of labour, work and solidarity exemplarily shows that a new social balance is needed.

4.3 A Society of Socially Balanced Longevity Finally I come to a brief presentation of what a society of socially balanced longevity would look like. New forms of sociation of age and ageing over the life course would have to be developed, meaning primarily that the gendered as well as the age-related life course in the intersected form would have to be restructured. At the level of social structures, a growing social inequality would have to be defended against, especially when focusing on elderly people of the future. The quality of life at every stage would be seen as a consequence of previous developments during a person’s life course. Therefore a new form of social structure for age and for ageing would have to be developed. The challenge would be to shape the gender-, cohort-, class-, ethnicity- specific life courses of different generations with the aim to reach a mostly equal distribution (i.e., through networks and not only through material benefits) between and within generations and social groups 148 gertrud m. backes

(Backes, Amrhein and Wolfinger 2008; Backes, Wolfinger and Amrhein 2008; Wolfinger, Backes and Amrhein 2008). This will only be possible by developing a new way of caring at the local level by way of infrastructural improvements that entail a fairer distribution of resources, burdens and strains, as well as participation in all sections (caring, employment, volunteering) in a widely accepted and legitimated form. These efforts will lead us to take into consideration existing convergences and diversities in culture and social structure within ageing societies. A society is needed in which individuals care for one another by way of solidarity in the form of infrastructure and by fostering a sense of community. This means a change in the system of subsidiarity, instead of benefits exchange in the social networks at the level of community. Part II

Fertility Decline and Policy Implications

Japanese Family Policies in Comparative Perspective

Makoto Atoh

1. Introduction

Today, most developed countries have fertility rates below replacement level. It is clear that so long as such below-replacement fertility continues, these countries will have declining and eventually more aged populations. Below-replacement-fertility countries are divided into two groups: ‘moderately low fertility countries’ (MLFCs) and very low fertility or ‘very low fertility countries’ (V = VLFCs) (Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald 2002; Kohler, Billari and Ortego 2002; Atoh 2005a). The former group comprises countries whose total fertility rate (TFR) has never dropped below 1.5; generally these are English-speaking countries such as the US and the UK, Northern European countries such as Sweden and Norway, as well as France and the Benelux countries. The latter group comprises countries whose TFR has plunged to below 1.5 and has never recovered. Among these are Japan and the Asian NIEs (Newly Industrialized Economies), Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain, Germany and Austria, as well as some Eastern European countries. Compared to MLFCs, the VLFCs (including Japan) will have more rapidly declining and more severely aged populations, a tendency that will negatively affect their economies and societies in the future. Faced with such more or less gloomy demographic forecasts, many governments in developed countries have, explicitly or implicitly, implemented new policies or strengthened existing ones: We can group these policies together under the term family policies. This chapter describes how the Japanese government has responded to declining fertility, evaluating the levels of its family policy inputs and their effectiveness in comparative perspectives.1 Specifically, it discusses whether

1 In this chapter, the developed countries that are compared with Japan are mainly EU countries, except some Eastern European ones, and English-speaking countries, 152 makoto atoh the persistent very low fertility situation in Japan is due to the inade- quacy of the direction of family policy efforts, the paucity of policy inputs, or the more general social, economic and/or cultural milieu beyond family policies. For our purposes, family policies are defined as that part of government social policies which aim at raising the well-being of families, particularly families with children (McDonald 2004).2 On the other hand, fertility policies are defined as that part of government population policies which aim at affecting fertility. The direction of the policy is either pro-natalist or anti-natalist, but there is also a neutral position on fertility – an option of no intervention. Theoretically, pro-natalist policies include measures which are not necessarily compatible with family welfare; for instance, prohibiting the sale of modern contracep- tives. But as long as pro-natalist policies are based on the principle of reproductive rights as a human right (United Nations 1994), most measures for pro-natalist policies overlap those of family policies.

2. changes in Fertility and Family Policies in Japan

An overview of post-war fertility trends in Japan is given in Figure 1, which shows the annual number of births and the total fertility rate (TFR). It is clear that they are divided into three distinct periods (Atoh 2000a). The first period, from 1947 to around 1960, marks the transition from the traditional high-fertility regime to the modern low-fertility regime. In this period, birth control behaviour diffused dramatically and the average number of children born to married couples over their lifetime decreased from around five to around two, resulting in a reduction of TFR to just below the replacement level. In the second period, from around 1960 to the mid-1970s, the because these countries and Japan share a common democratic political system, a market-economy, and have experienced more-or-less steady economic growth since the Second World War. 2 mcDonald says that with respect to policy objectives family policies are comprised of (a) legal foundation of families, (b) the economic support of child care and the support for work and family life balance, and (c) reproductive health. Among the three the main interest of this chapter is (b). Furthermore, Gauthier (1996) divides measures directly targeted at families with dependent children, from a different viewpoint, into four areas: (a) direct and indirect income transfer for families with children, (b) services to families (e.g., daycare centres), (c) other services and benefits in the field of housing, education and health, and (d) legislation directly affecting families. In this case, (a) to (c) are relevant to our discussion. japanese family policies 153

(million) 3 5 Era of Era of Era of Below Replacement Fertility Fertility Replacement 4.5 2.5 TransitionFertility Number of 4 Births Moderately Very Low 3.5 2 Low Fertility Fertility 3 1.5 2.5 2

1 Total Fertility Rate Annual Number of Births TFR 1.5 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 1945 1950 1955 1960 19651970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Source: Vital Statistics of Japan (KRS 2008d). Figure 1 trends in the total fertility rate (TFR) and the annual number of births in Japan

TFR remained around the replacement level. Marriage was comparatively late but almost universal, and the average number of children remained at slightly more than two per married couple. The third period, from the mid-1970s until today, is characterized by marriage being continually postponed and the proportion never- married rising successively for younger cohorts who reach reproductive age in this period – two developments that, in turn, have brought about the postponement of childbearing and eventually the decline of cohort-completed fertility, leading to a steep decline in the TFR to far below the replacement level (Kaneko 2004). This period can be subdivided into two phases: that of ‘moderately low fertility’ from the mid-1970s to around 1990, and that of ‘very low fertility’ after around 1990. The first half of the third period saw fertility in Japan drop below the replacement level. However, since fertility levels remained among the highest for developed countries with a market economy, the view that fertility decline was temporary was dominant among Japanese demographers – a view that is reflected in official population projections undertaken in the middle of the 1980s that assumed the TFR would soon return to somewhere around the replacement level (KJK 1987). This was ultimately the reason why the government adopted a neutral position on fertility, and did not change its family policies. The second 154 makoto atoh half of the third period started in 1990 with the ‘1.57 shock’, as it was named by the mass media, after the government released the previous year’s vital statistics showing that the TFR had dropped to 1.57, the lowest in Japanese vital statistics history. Since then, the Japanese government has begun to change family policies by connecting them, first implicitly and gradually explicitly, with declining fertility. The following two chapters will examine changes in family policies in Japan, focusing on the latter half of the third period, during which time very low fertility has prevailed (Appendix). The argument is divided into two aspects: family policies in relation to fertility policies (Section 2.1), and the changes in standard family models (Section 2.2).

2.1 Family Policies in their Relation to Fertility Policies The ‘1.57 shock’ in 1990 was a good starting point for the government to discuss family policies, directly or indirectly, in connection with fertility trends. The fertility implications of the government’s family policies was not publicly expressed by the government until the 2000s, but its concern about the continuous decline in fertility was implicit in successive administrative and legal actions related to family policies. However, the immediate response to the ‘1.57 shock’ back in 1990 was for the government to establish, in the Internal Affairs Council Room in the Cabinet Secretary, a committee “for building a social milieu favourable for childbearing and child care,” and to release a brief guideline note on the matter in January 1991. This guideline note stressed the necessity of building a social milieu favourable for family formation. Specifically, it included: (1) support for the compatibility of occupational life with family life; (2) support for improving the community environment for child care; (3) economic support for child care (Atoh 2000b). Since then, the government has launched various policy packages, but until the beginning of the 2000s, it had continuously maintained a policy stance that stressed the importance of support for child care. Although shōshika taisaku [countermeasures against low fertility] appeared as a policy term for the first time in 1999, when the government established a Ministers’ meeting related to shōshika taisaku and released the basic principles promoting these countermeasures,3 there was no mention of fertility recovery.

3 The government’s hesitancy to express explicitly a pro-natalist policy was based on broadly negative public opinion derived from: (1) fierce post-war critique of the japanese family policies 155

In 2001 the TFR declined to 1.3 and new official population projections were released which showed that fertility would not only stay at very low levels even by the cohort measures in the future, but also that the Japanese population would soon be much more aged and start to decrease much earlier and more rapidly than previous projections had indicated (KSJK 2002). Faced with such shocking statistics, the Basic Law for Measures to Cope with a Low Fertility Society (Shōshika shakai taisaku kihon-hō) was enacted in 2003. In this law, ‘the stopping of fertility decline’ was explicitly mentioned as its objective, demonstrat- ing that the government’s policy stance had shifted clearly from fertility-neutral to pro-natalist. Since the Cabinet Office is in charge of all the Basic Laws, it also took charge of the Basic Law on Fertility: a special Minister was appointed and the basic principles for tackling a low fertility society were decided. The Ministry started publishing an annual White Paper on a Low Fertility Society in 2004. Also enacted in 2003 was the Next Generation Nurturing Support Measures Promotion Law (Jisedai ikusei shien taisaku suishin-hō), proposed by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). Under this law, all companies with more than 300 employees, and all government offices (central and local) in Japan were requested to submit to the MHLW their own action plan with a timetable for improving employment rules, customs and benefits to favour their employees with children (Naikakufu 2004).4 In terms of its coverage of all workplaces nationwide, public or private, but excluding small and middle-sized firms, this Next Generation Law had a strong pro-natalist flavour. Since the 1970s, the United Nations Population Division has reques ted all member-state governments to submit responses to requests for the evaluation of and policy responses to various aspects of their population trends. While between 1975 and 1985 the Japanese government responded that it recognized fertility to be satisfactory, and from 1986 to 1997 it reported that it recognized fertility to be too low but did not intervene, in 2003 it changed its position and announced that it recognized that fertility was too low and announced its aim to raise fertility (United Nations 2004, 2008; also cf. Table 2).

pre-war expansionist and pro-natalist policies undertaken by the then military government, and (2) the impact on the feminist movement of the idea of reproductive rights highlighted at the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994 (Atoh 2000b). 4 The Next Generation Law was revised in 2009 to extend its applicability to companies with more than 100 employees (Naikakufu 2009a). 156 makoto atoh

2.2 Changes in Specific Programmes and Standard Family Models 2.2.1 Changes before 1990 On examining how specific programmes and standard family models of family policies change in an era of below-replacement fertility, it has to be noted that before 1990 family policies had been divided into ministry-specific programmes. These programmes included child welfare programmes run by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (including child care facilities, child allowance, and assistance for mother-child families); programmes for female workers run by the Ministry of Labour (including childbearing leave); as well as the Ministry of Finance’s tax exemption for households with children; and the Ministry of Education’s programmes related to kindergartens, school fees in general or scholarships. Although not necessarily coordinated systematically as family polices as a whole, these programmes seemed consistent with contemporary public opinion on work, families and gender roles (Atoh 2005a). These views held that after graduating from school, women became employees, but quit their jobs when they got married and devoted themselves to housekeeping and child care as full-time housewives. Accordingly, women’s jobs were limited mostly to routine work, with a sex-segregated wage and promotion system, since women were expected to resign after a short time.E mployment of male workers, on the other hand, was characterized by lifetime employment and a seniority-based wage and promotion system, which implied that their income and company’s family benefits depended on their life-stage. The government’s family policies were based on this male-centred, breadwinner-versus-homemaker family model: full-time housewives were protected by measures such as tax exemptions and special tax exemptions for non-working marriage partners, as well as a widow’s pension scheme, and the exemption of social security premiums for housewives. Interestingly, the number and the proportion of pre- school children enrolled in kindergartens – which were utilized almost exclusively by single-earner families – increased dramatically during the 1970s and 80s (MKS 2008). Since the middle of the 1970s, public opinion on work, families and gender started gradually to change from favouring the breadwinner- homemaker family model to embracing a dual-earner model, as shown in Table 1. Not only did college enrolment rates for women increase rapidly in the 1970s, female labour force participation rates too started japanese family policies 157

Table 1 responses to the statement “Husbands work outside, and wives take care of the home” (%), Japan 1972–2007

Don’t Survey Sub-total Rather Sub-total Rather know; No Year (Agree) Agree Agree (Disagree) Disagree Disagree response 1972 83.2 48.8 34.4 10.2 7.6 2.6 6.6 1982 71.1 33.2 37.9 23.7 17.8 5.9 5.3 1992 55.6 19.8 35.8 38.3 26.4 11.9 6.1 2002 43.3 12.8 30.5 51.1 29.4 21.7 5.6 2007 39.8 12.0 27.8 56.9 30.7 26.2 3.2

Note: Respondents in the 2002 survey are women aged 20–49; those in the other four surveys are women aged 20–59. Source: Naikakufu (2003, 2008b); Sōrifu (1973, 1993). to increase by the middle of the 1970s. Finally, promoted by the ratifi- cation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Equal Employment Opportunity Law was enacted in 1985 which legally prohibited discrimination against women in the areas of employment, wages and promotion, and at the same time abolished various legal codes for ‘protecting’ female workers.

2.2.2 Changes after 1990 After the ‘1.57 shock’ in 1990, family policies came to be affected by trends in fertility. The first response was the introduction of the Child Care Leave Law (Ikuji kyūgyō-hō), enacted in 1991 and revised subsequently in 1994, 2001, 2004 and 2007: The most recent legal code relating to child care leave entitles one working parent to take a one-year leave when they have children aged under one year old, plus a half-year leave if necessary, with the exemption of premiums of social insur- ances for three years and an income compensation of 50 per cent of pre-leave wages. Furthermore, three five-year programmes for expanding institutional child care services provided for pre-school children and school children have been implemented – named respectively Angel Plan (for 1995–99), New Angel Plan (2000–04), and Plan for Supporting Children and Child Care (for 2005–2009) (Naikakufu 2007). These programmes aim to support dual-earner families, implying a transition of family policies in which the breadwinner-homemaker 158 makoto atoh model was regarded as the standard. However, in terms of family models, family policies have not been integrated as much as these programmes might suggest. Indeed, both the White Paper on Population, released in 1997 by the Advisory Council on Population Issues, and the White Paper on Health and Welfare, released in 1998 by MHW, emphasized that it was necessary to revise the custom of fixed gender division of work and employment that sacrificed family life, and to support the achievement of balancing work, family life and child care for dual-earner families (Atoh 2000b). In addition, the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society was enacted in 1999, through which the promotion of women’s social, economic, administrative and political status became an important objective of government policy. In other developments, economic support for child care has been strengthened in terms of four revisions of child allowance in 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2007. Currently, the monthly payment is 10,000 yen for children aged under three and, for children from the age of three until the end of primary school, 5,000 yen for first and second children, and 10,000 yen for the third and later children (Naikakufu 2008c). Child allowance is a measure that supports any type of family with children, and it is said that increases in child allowance tend to suppress other competing programmes, especially the expansion of child care services, for the limited fiscal resources of cities and towns. also, licensed nursery schools tend to be utilized mainly by low-income dual-earner families, and their supply has not been elastic in response to demand from middle-class families. Tax exemptions and exemption of social insurance premiums for non-working married women, however, have persisted. These programmes thus seem to favour full-time housewives, or the breadwinner-homemaker family model.

3. evaluating Japanese Family Policies

3.1 Fiscal Changes in Family Policies Through the gradual increase in the effect of fertility trends on family policies, to what extent have the policies been fiscally strengthened? Between 1975 and 1990, while total expenditure on social security increased approximately fourfold, expenditure aimed at children and japanese family policies 159 families5 increased only 2.4 times. In contrast, between 1990 and 2007, while total expenditure increased by 1.9 times, expenditure aimed at children increased by 2.2 times (KSJK 2009). Therefore, it can be dis- cerned that the government has strengthened family policies financially after they were connected with fertility concerns. Although the proportion of child expenditure in the total social expenditure has gradually risen, it is still less than 4 per cent, and its ratio to national income was only 0.95 per cent in 2007 (cf. Figure 2). On the other hand, expenditure on the elderly6 has also increased by 2.28 times between 1990 and 2007, and its proportion of total social security expenditure was 69.5 per cent in 2007. Judging from such fiscal trends, the ratio of child benefits to elderly benefits in the social security account remains almost constant at 1 to 18. It is safe to say that the government’s policy stance of favouring elderly people has not changed, and that its support for families with children, comparatively, has not improved dramatically during these 17 years.

3.2 Effectiveness of Family Policies The strengthening of family policies since 1990 in connection with declining fertility has not resulted in an increase in fertility. Therefore, as far as the policy objective of raising fertility is concerned, these family policies and programmes have not been effective.O f course, it could be argued that fertility might have declined much more, if there had been no policies, but specific programmes of family policies have goals other than raising fertility. For instance, the effectiveness of child care- leave programmes can be evaluated by the proportion of workers who utilize them, and that of child care-service programmes by the extent to which their demand is met. If both of these programmes aim to make work compatible with family life, then their effectiveness can be evaluated by the proportion of women who kept their job after childbirth.

5 Benefits for children and families include child allowance, subsidies for welfare services for children (nurseries), income compensation for child care leave and benefits for maternal leave (KSJK 2009). 6 Benefits for elderly people include those related to pension, elderly medical care, welfare services for the elderly (long-term care) and subsidies for extended employment of the elderly after retirement age (KSJK 2009). 160 makoto atoh

Source: KSJK (2009). Figure 2 social security expenditure in Japan: total expenditure, elderly benefits and family benefits (ratio to national income), 1975–2007

First, when evaluating the Child Care Leave Law, which entitled one working parent with children under one year old to take child care leave, it can be observed that, according to government surveys, the actual proportion of parents taking the leave remained very low directly after the law’s enactment.A fter several revisions of the law, the proportion then rose from about 50 per cent in 1996 to about 90 per cent in 2008 for female employees, while for male workers the figure remains just over 1 per cent even in 2008 (KRS 2008a). From this it could be argued that the revisions of the Child Care Leave Law enabled at least working women to balance work and child care. However, this indicator is problematic because it is calculated using as its denominator women who continued their job after childbirth, while it excludes women who quit their jobs just before or after childbirth. According to retrospective surveys on women’s life courses, the proportion of women who had their first child between 2000 and 2004, and who had no job before their pregnancy, was about 25 per cent, while the proportion of women who quit their job at around the time their first child was born was about 50 per cent. In other words: only japanese family policies 161 one in four women continued her job after marriage and first birth. Surprisingly, these figures are almost the same as those for women who had their first child between 1980 and 1985 and thereafter (KSJK 2007a), meaning that the Child Care Leave Law did not bring about significant overall changes.7 This finding was reconfirmed by the results of large-scale panel surveys undertaken by the MHLW which showed that, among women whose first birth was in 2001, the proportion having no job one year before the birth was 25.6 per cent; the proportion quitting their job just before or after the birth was 47.0 per cent; the proportion continuing their job one year and half after the birth was 16.9 per cent; and the proportion quitting temporarily but soon taking another job was 9.5 per cent (KRS 2008b). From this data it can be concluded that the difficulties for women in reconciling work with child care have not changed much since the government initiated policy responses to declining fertility in 1990. Second, when evaluating the expansion of child care services, it has to be asked to what extent they meet their potential demand. In this regard, the government has implemented such programmes as the so- called ‘Zero Waiting List for Day Care’ with the aim of expanding the capacities and services of licensed nurseries and child care facilities, and thus reducing the number of children aged zero to 6 years who were on the waiting lists. Indeed, between 1995 and 2003, the number of children using licensed nurseries increased by 369,000 from 1,679,000 to 2,048,000 at the national level (cf. Figure 3). Nevertheless, the number of children on the waiting lists of licensed nurseries increased from 28,000 (in 1995) to 43,000 (in 2003) by a broader definition and decreased only gradually from 21,000 (in 2001) to 18,000 (in 2007) by a stricter8 definition (KRS 2008c; NKKSK 2009). The fact that the number of children on waiting lists has not decreased substantially, although the number of children accommodated by licensed nurseries has increased, suggests that there is such a high potential

7 actually, the proportion taking child care leave has increased only among those working women who continued their job after marriage and first births (KSJK 2007a). 8 children on waiting lists for licensed nurseries were officially defined, up to 2000, broadly as those who submitted application forms for licensed nurseries to municipalities, were evaluated to be eligible for them, but not accommodated. After 2001, however, they were more strictly defined so that the lists excluded children who waited for licensed nurseries despite the availability of non-licensed nurseries, as well as children who were enrolled into non-licensed but municipally-authorized facilities (KRS 2001). 162 makoto atoh

Source: KRS (2008c); NKKSK (2009). Figure 3 trends in the number of nurseries and the number of children accommodated, 1950–2007 demand for licensed nurseries that an increase in supply generates even more demand.9 This is also reflected in the large gap among women in their 30s between the proportion of non-working women and the proportion of those working or desiring to work, namely 64.0 per cent versus 84.5 per cent in 2007 (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 2009). From this data it can be concluded that, although the supply of capacities and services of licensed nurseries has gradually increased, it is still far lower than the potential demand for them.

4. evaluating Japanese Family Policies and International Comparisons

4.1 The Relevance of Family Policies to Fertility According to the UN inquiries on governments’ evaluation of their own fertility levels and their responses to them, out of 23 developed

9 according to a survey undertaken in 2008 by MHLW, it was estimated that there were 850 thousand women with children aged zero to 6 who desired to utilize licensed nurseries and start to work within one year; of these, 590 thousand women had children aged zero to 2 (Asahi Shimbun 8 April 2009). japanese family policies 163 countries only four reported in the 1970s that they were ‘not satisfied’ with their fertility levels and only three countries intervened in their fertility trends (cf. Tables 1 and 2). Subsequently, the number of governments which reported they were ‘satisfied’ decreased, until ten countries in 2006 evaluated their fertility levels as ‘too low’ and nine countries reported they intervened to ‘raise fertility’. Among these latter countries, which clearly changed their position, were Japan, some Southern European countries, and Asian NIEs; that is, mostly very low fertility countries (VLFCs). Most moderately low fertility countries (MLFCs), with the exception of France, on the other hand, responded that they are ‘satisfied’ with their fertility rates and would not intervene in them. This is either because their fertility has not dropped very far below the replacement level, or because their government or public opinion respects

Table 2a evaluations of and policy responses to fertility: moderately low fertility countries (MLFCs), 1976~2006 TFR Satisfactory Too Low No Maintain No Maintain/Raise invention invention 1.75 or Australia (76~86) Australia (03) Australia (06) more Denmark (76~06) Finland France (76~03) Iceland (76~96) (96~06) New Zealand France (06) (76~03) Iceland Norway (76~06) (03, 06) Sweden (86.06) Ireland United States New Zealand (76~06) (06) United Kingdom (76~86,07) 1.5 ~ less Canada (76~06) Luxembourg Luxembourg than Netherlands (76~06) (03) (76~03) 1.75 United Kingdom (96~03)

Source: United Nations (2004, 2008). 164 makoto atoh

Table 2b evaluations of and policy responses to fertility: very low fertility countries (VLFCs) TFR Satisfactory Too Low No Maintain No Maintain/ invention invention Raise 1.75 or Austria Greece more (76~86) (76~86) Japan (76~86) Portugal (76~86) Singapore (76) Spain (76~86) 1.5 ~ less Italy (76~86) Japan (96) Singapore than 1.75 Korea (96) Switzerland (86) Switzerland (96) (86) 1.0 ~ less Austria (96) Germany Austria than 1.5 Italy (96) (96~06) (03~06) Spain (96) Italy (03) Italy (06) Korea (03) Japan (03~06) Portugal Greece (96, 03) (96~06) Spain (03) Korea (06) Switzerland Portugal (06) (03~06) Singapore (03~06) Spain (06)

Source: United Nations (2004, 2008). reproductive rights, or both. It should be noted, however, that whether a government’s policy position is pro-natalistic or fertility-neutral does not necessarily correspond to the quality and quantity of family policy inputs, as will become clear in the following three points of comparison.

4.2 International Comparison of Specific Family Policy Measures First, concerning child care leave as a measure to balance work and child care, the Japanese law is comparable to laws of MLFCs, as the japanese family policies 165 income compensation rate during child care leave was recently raised to 50 per cent of the wage before leave. Only Scandinavian countries have higher beneficiary income compensation during child care leave than Japan (Fukuda 2003; Naikakufu 2005a). There is scant evidence showing to what extent existing child care facilities meet potential demand for child care in each country. However, when comparing the proportion of children who are accommodated in child care facilities (either public or private kindergartens or nurseries) among developed countries, the figures are around 70 per cent for children aged 3 to 5, with little variation, including Japan; however the figures vary dramatically from zero to 58 per cent for children aged zero to 2, with Japan recording 20 per cent and thus ranking eighth among 15 developed countries (Kammerman 2000). Second, concerning economic support for child care, although child allowance in Japan has been recently extended to children at the end of primary schools, the eligible period in Japan is shorter and the amount of money smaller than in MLFCs, excluding the US and other English- speaking countries (Naikakufu 2005a). Since child care economic support policies include not only child allowance, but also tax exemptions, lump-sum transfers at childbirth and others, Bradshaw and colleagues invented a model-family method in order to evaluate the total level of economic support for children. Based on this model, a study by Fukuda (2003) placed Japan fifth from bottom among 17 countries in 2000 in terms of the level of economic support for children. It shows that the Japanese government’s economic support for child care is comparatively weak. Third, concerning expenditure for children as a proportion of Japan’s total social security expenditure, if family benefits are defined as the sum of child allowance, child benefits for mother-child families, lump-sum transfers, benefits tied to child care leave, as well as pre- school educational costs as defined by the OECD, then for Japan the ratio of family benefits to GDP was 0.81 per cent in 2005 – that is, about a quarter of those for other MLFCs (cf. Figure 4). Japan ranked third from bottom among 23 countries. In addition, the ratio of family benefits to elderly benefits, which include old age pension and long-term care services, was 9.0 per cent for Japan – that is, the lowest of 23 countries. And while Japan’s level of family benefits is comparable to those of some Southern European countries, included in VLFCs, with between 10 and 19 per cent, it is far lower than that of other MLFCs, which stand at more than 28 per cent, except United States. 166 makoto atoh

2.2

US France 2.0

1.8 Sweden

1.6

1.4

Total Fertility Rate r=0.58 Italy Germany 1.2 Japan

1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 The Ratio of Family Benefits to GDP(%) Source: OECD (2009a). Figure 4 relationship between the ratio of family benefits to GDP and the total fertility rate among selected OECD countries, 2005

It can be concluded overall that the Japanese government, in international comparison, is friendlier to elderly people than to children.

4.3 International Comparison of Family Policy Outcomes Based on trends in women’s emancipation and changing value systems towards gender equality, many governments of developed countries have implemented programmes for balancing work and child care as a central pillar of family policy. Among developed countries in the 1970s, women’s labour force participation rates and fertility were negatively correlated, as expected from economic theories of fertility (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Naikakufu 2005a). In Northern European and English-speaking countries, where women began to be more involved in labour markets in the 1970s, fertility declined due to emerging difficulties of combining work with child care. In Japan and Southern European countries, on the other hand, where the breadwinner-homemaker paradigm was dominant and women were less involved in labour markets, fertility remained around the replace ment level. japanese family policies 167

In the 1990s, however, women’s labour force participation rates and fertility became positively correlated among developed countries (cf. Figure 5) (Atoh 1996; Tsuya 2007). In MLFCs, socio-economic and policy changes between the 1970s and 1990s made it easier for women to combine work with child care, so that the increasing involvement of women in labour markets was compatible with moderate fertility recovery. In Japan and Southern European countries, on the other hand, such social, economic and policy changes were not fully promoted in this period, so that the moderate rise in women’s employment brought about a rapid decline in fertility. Indeed, in Japan, the proportion of both single women and married women in the workforce increased between the mid-1970s and somewhere around 1990, and since around 1990 the increase of single women in the workforce has become central (KRS 2009a). The fact that the increase of labour force participation is most conspicuous among single women in their 20s and 30s suggests strongly that women’s emancipation is not compatible with family formation in contemporary Japan. In the case of Northern European countries and France, the social and economic changes that enabled working women to combine their work with child care were brought about mainly by family policies (Nayer 2003; Andersson 2008; Fagnani 2003; Thevenon 2008). In the case of English-speaking countries and the Netherlands, however, these changes were brought about mainly by the development of a flexible labour market and child care market. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that the higher involvement of men in family matters too was related to changes in these countries (Tsuya 2007); as such, the social and economic changes, which enable working women to combine work and family, are not brought about by family policies alone. In the case of Japan, which has sought the compatibility of work with family life mainly through family policies like the Northern European countries, it can be argued that these family policies have been, so far, ineffective for promoting work/family life balance. Lastly, a look at the results from international comparative surveys for five countries (Naikakufu 2006) reveals to what extent people are satisfied with family policies. In these surveys, respondents aged 20 to 49 were asked: “Do you think it is easy to raise children in your country?” While the proportion responding “yes” was 97.8 per cent for Sweden, 78.2 per cent for the United States and 68.0 per cent for France, 168 makoto atoh

Source: OECD (2009a). Figure 5 relationship between the labour force participation rate of women and the total fertility rate among selected OECD countries, 2005

it was only 47.7 per cent for Japan and 18.6 per cent for South Korea. These results clearly show that younger people – who are central in family formation – do not regard Japanese society as child-friendly, in contrast to respondents from MLFCs – a result that indirectly also implies that Japanese people are not satisfied with their government’s family policies.

5. concluding Remarks: Why have Japanese Family Policies been Ineffective at Raising Fertility or for Combining Work and Child Care?

Since 1990, the Japanese government has started to connect family policies with low fertility concerns and strengthened programmes to support child care, especially programmes that aim at balancing work and family life, and since 2003 has explicitly announced the aim of japanese family policies 169 raising fertility. However, judging from the above analyses, Japanese family policies have failed to meet either objective. A possible reason for this failure is scarce fiscal resources spent for family support in Japan, a situation similar to that of Southern European countries, and one that the Japanese government seems now to have recognized. In both the final report of the advisory groups’ meeting, under the Cabinet’s Ministry, on ‘strategic points of Japan supporting children and families’ in 2007, and in the final document of the National Conference on the Social Security System in 2008, it was concluded that – in order to affect fertility by means of family policies – programmes to support working women combine work with child care, focusing on the increase of capacities of child care facilities, had to be expanded first and foremost; and that for this purpose expenditures for children and families had to be expanded at least 1.5 times, from 4.33 trillion yen in 2008 (Naikakufu 2008b, 2009a).10 But one issue remains, namely the question of why fiscal resources for family policies have not increased more, despite new packages of family policies having been proposed since 2003 when the Japanese government explicitly announced the aim of raising fertility (cf. Appendix). Furthermore, why have programmes such as child care leave not been taken up by women – despite the programmes having been revised to be more or less similar to those in MLFCs? And finally, are there any other important background factors that are not usually covered by family policies? To answer these questions adequately, we have to take into account social, economic and cultural background factors beyond family policies. Among these background factors, the following three are especially important: (1) the culture of work in Japanese companies which urges employees to work long hours, including routine (and often unpaid) overtime; (2) the increase in unemployment, irregular workers, freeters and NEETs11 among young people, an increase that was brought about

10 at the general election for the Lower House on August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a historic victory over the Liberal Democratic Party, which had been in power in most of post-war period. The DPJ had made the economic support for child care one of the three major programmes in its election manifesto; more specifically, the introduction of a new child allowance scheme in which all children would be eligible for 26,000 yen per month until the end of their compulsory education. 11 ‘Freeter’ and ‘NEET’ became popular Japanese words in the 1990s and 2000s: ‘Freeter’, meaning ‘free arbeiter (worker in German)’, is officially defined as people 170 makoto atoh by the tightening of the personnel management of many companies pressed by globalization in the 1990s and 2000s; and (3) the prevalence of traditional family and gender norms which prevent women continuing to work after marriage and childbirth (Atoh 2005a). The reduction of customary long working hours in Japanese companies has long been an important labour policy issue that was stressed again in the recent Charter on Work-Life Balance.12 Measures to tackle issues related to unstable, low-income jobs among young people became an important policy issue related to both labour and family policies (Naikakufu 2004, 2008b). Leaving aside the problem of how long it will take to achieve these objectives, the government has at least clear policy goals formulated for these two issues.

Table 3 responses to the statement: “Husbands work outside, and wives take care of the home” in selected countries, 2002

Source: Naikakufu (2003).

aged 15 to 34 who are or want to be engaged in part-time jobs; and NEET is defined as people aged 15 to 34 who are ‘not in education, employment or training’. The freeter population increased from 0.5 million to 2.01 million between 1982 and 2005, and the NEET population is estimated to have been around 600,000 between 2002 and 2008 (KRS 2009b). The total proportion of irregular workers increased rapidly from 16 to 34 per cent between 1985 and 2008. 12 The Charter on Work-Life Balance was agreed upon by representatives of MHLW, Rengo (the Japanese Trade Union Confederation) and Nihon Keidanren (the japanese family policies 171

In contrast, it is not so easy for the government to make family and gender norms a policy matter. As already mentioned, norms on breadwinner-homemaker families have gradually weakened in Japan and those on dual-earner families have been strengthened. Compared to MLFCs, in which gender equality is already – more or less – a dominant value (cf. Table 3), Japanese society is currently divided into two groups in terms of views on families and gender: One half favours a fixed gender role division; the other half favours gender equality.13 The Japanese government too has an ambivalent view on the standard family model, favouring either the breadwinner model or the dual- earner model. And although the government has stated repeatedly that a cornerstone for tackling the low fertility issue is to allow people to combine work with child care, the budgets for expanding the services and capacities of child care facilities have not noticeably been increased – a fact that seems to reflect the cleavage in the government’s value system concerning family and gender. The government enacted not only the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society in 1999, but also the Basic Law for Measures to Cope with a Low Fertility Society in 2003. The extent to which the government aims sincerely to construct a gender-equal society may affect the public opinion on this matter, which, in turn, may affect the effectiveness of family policies and fertility trends themselves.

Japanese Business Federation) in 2007 (Naikakufu 2008b). The charter contains specific objectives to be achieved in one decade, including (a) reducing the number of employees who work 60 hours or more in a week from 10.8 to 5.4 per cent, (b) increasing the proportion taking annual paid leave from 46.6 to 100 per cent, and (c) increasing the proportion of working women who continue their jobs after having their first child from 38.0 to 55 per cent. 13 In addition to views on a fixed gender role division, views on other aspects of families and gender – such as tolerance towards divorce, cohabitation, the accommodation of children aged under three years old in nurseries in order for mothers to work – are sharply divided in half according to national surveys undertaken in the 2000s (Atoh 2004; KSJK 2007c). 172 makoto atoh

Appendix

Chronology of Policy Responses to Declining Fertility in Japan 1990/06 ‘1.57 shock’. 1991/01 Internal Affairs Council Room, Cabinet Secretariat (Naikaku Kanbō Naikaku Naisei Shingishitsu): ‘On building a social milieu favourable for childbearing and child care’. 1991/05 Enactment of the Child Care Leave Law (one year). 1992/11 Agency for Economic Planning, White Paper on the National Life: ‘The coming of a low fertility society and its consequences and responses’. 1994/06 Exemption of social security premiums (one year) and income compensation of 25 per cent of employee’s salary for child care leave. 1994/12 Angel Plan (1995–1999), aiming at expanding child care facilities and their services. 1997/10 Advisory Council on Population Problems, White Paper on Population. 1998/06 Ministry of Health and Welfare, White Paper on Welfare, featuring ‘a low fertility society’. 1999/05 Establishing Ministers’ regular meetings on shōshika taisaku [countermeasures against low fertility]. 1999/06 Enactment of the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society. 1999/12 Minister’s meeting, Basic Principles on Countermeasures against Low Fertility. New Angel Plan (2000–2004). 2000/06 Extending the eligibility of child allowance from children aged under 3 to pre-school children. 2001/07 Policy for combining work with child care (Zero Waiting List for Day Care). 2001/11 Raising income compensation of child care leave up to 40 per cent. 2003/07 Enactment of the Basic Law for Measures to Cope with a Low Fertility Society. Enactment of the Next Generation Nurturing Support Measures Promotion Law. 2004/06 Basic principles for tackling a low fertility society. Extending the eligibility of child allowance to children under 4th grade in primary schools. japanese family policies 173

2004/06 Expanding exemption of social security premiums (3 years) and extending child care leave to one year and a half, if necessary. 2004/12 (The 1st annual) White Paper on a Low Fertility Society. Plan for Supporting Children and Child Care (2005–2009). 2005/04 Implementing the Next Generation Law. 2006/06 New countermeasures against low fertility. Extending the eligibility of child allowance to children prior to completing primary schools. 2007/03 Revising child allowance: Raising benefits for children under 3 years old to 10,000 yen for any birth order. 2007/04 Raising income compensation of child care leave up to 50 per cent (provisional). 2007/12 Final document by the meeting of the Key Strategy Council for ‘Japan Supporting Children and Families’. 2008/11 Final document by the National Conference on the social security system.

Promoting Gender Equality, Birthrates, or Human Capital? Germany, Japan and Family Policy Discourse

Martin Seeleib-Kaiser and Tuukka Toivonen

1. introduction

The comparative welfare state literature has identified social democracy together with organized women’s movements as the key drivers of employment-oriented family policies in Western democracies (Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Stephens 2008). However, we are presently witnessing a puzzling expansion in precisely these kinds of policies in countries where social democratic and feminist forces are much weaker. While shedding light on the logic of salient new programmes, recent studies have run short of explaining why and how family policies have emerged in ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ welfare states in the first place (e.g. Lewis and Campbell 2007a; Orloff 2006). Even less progress has been made in explaining such developments in East Asian contexts. This study addresses such gaps in our understanding regarding the development of employment-oriented family policies in ‘unlikely’ environments by focusing on the cases of Germany and Japan in the 2000s. As is well known, in the comparative welfare state literature Germany has been identified as the proto-type ‘conservative’ welfare state, while the categorization of Japan has been more contested (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1997; Goodman and Peng 1996). In the domain of family policy, however, both countries long promoted a strong male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992) by enforcing a clear gender-based division of labour, providing a family wage, discouraging married women from engaging in full-time work, and promoting family-based social care (Ōsawa 2004). The approach of both countries to family policy has, however, shifted quite remarkably in recent years (Peng 2002; Toivonen 2007; Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2009; Henninger, Wimbauer and Dombrowski 2008). Germany has introduced an earnings-related parental leave scheme in addition to expanding child care provision, 176 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen and Japan has likewise begun crafting a family policy regime with apparent ‘Nordic shades’. These policy changes are not well explained by the ‘usual suspects’ of party competition or the activities of women’s groups. Neither do very low fertility rates – assumed by many to cata- lyze family policy expansion – drive reforms in any direct sense. Figure 1 traces trends in fertility rates in Germany and Japan between 1960 and 2006 while indicating when the issue of dwindling births emerged as a serious public concern – i.e., as a ‘social problem’ – in these countries. In addition the figure shows the timing of landmark reforms in parental leave. The first thing we note from here is that, once these countries had plunged into sub-replacement-level fertility (i.e., a TFR lower than 2.1), birthrate worries remained largely off the public and political radars for a substantial stretch of time – up to around 15 years in Japan and 35 years in Germany. It seems indeed puzzling from the vantage point of the present that low fertility should have remained ‘invisible’ for so long, especially in the case of Germany where the TFR sank to the region of 1.5 already in the mid-1970s and has remained more or less flat thereafter. We also see from figure 1 that relatively generous, income-related parental leave schemes appeared in these countries only after the emergence of low fertility as a public issue, at seemingly random points in time. Although the TFR is indeed not the only important demographic variable – nor is parental leave the only noteworthy new policy measure – this brief exercise suggests that instead of focusing on any presumed, direct effects of demographic trends on policy change, we must analyse much more closely the processes that lie in between. Examining earlier family policy developments in Germany, Seeleib- Kaiser (2002) and Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004) have demonstrated the importance of changing discourses in the reform process, while Henninger, Wimbauer and Dombrowski (2008), in pondering whether demography might act as a ‘push’ to gender equality, agree that “fiscal and economic as well as demographic challenges are not challenges per se, but become so in a process of collective interpretation and are framed quite differently in diverse national contexts” (Henninger, Wimbauer and Dombrowski 2008: 307). In order to fully benefit from this critical insight, however, we must conceptualize more concisely how challenges enter discourse and how discourse, in turn, translates into policy. Figure 2 provides an accessible illustration of our theoretical schema. First, in accordance with the so-called Thomas theorem that stipu- lates situations are real in their consequences when people define them germany, japan and family policy 177

Source of TFR statistics: OECD (2009c). Figure 1 Fertility trends and important family policy events in Germany and Japan

as ‘real’, we posit that various socio-economic occurrences become ‘problems’ only when they are so perceived and constructed. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, purported ‘challenges’ enter the policy discourse through the claims and pronouncements of relevant actors, including interest groups, academics and others with access to effective media, all of whom are, to some degree at least, exposed to international discourses (or ‘ideas’). These actors put forth contesting framings that prescribe how given ‘challenges’ are supposed to interact with the welfare state (or social policies or communities) and how they should be addressed. Influenced but not predetermined by prevailing power relations, from this struggle new dominant ‘interpretative patters’ emerge that powerfully shape subsequent policy responses (Seeleib-Kaiser 2002: 37; Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). These interpretative patterns “combine various themes, set preferences among them, link the positions (pro or con) with the various themes, and set the various themes in relation to abstract values, which at the same time connect the themes on a generalized level” (Gerhards 1995: 224, authors’ translation). 178 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen

Source: Adapted from Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004) with modifications. Figure 2 how ‘challenges’ enter into political discourse and form into new interpretative patterns, leading to policy responses

They moreover evolve within the constraints of normative frames (or ‘principled beliefs’) and designate causal relationships. Although it is not always possible to describe in complete detail the emergence of new interpretative patterns, this approach directly informs our investigation and can be built upon in related accounts. Scrutinizing key developments in German and Japanese family policy in the 2000s from such a theoretical standpoint, we find that towards the middle of this decade, new family policies came to be justified by key actors in both countries with recourse to human capital arguments. More so than general concerns over demographic decline, work-family conflict or indeed gender equality objectives, employing and retaining female workers with high human capital while prompting them to reproduce (Germany) and raising worker productivity (Japan) became pivotal to the legitimization of new employment- related policies for families. Intriguingly, German reform efforts in fact led to a limited success – an entitlement to a more generous, income- related parental benefit in 2007 – whereas the Japanese ‘Work-Life germany, japan and family policy 179

Balance’ campaign struggled to produce substantial reforms in policy and practice. This differential success of human capital discourses in Germany and Japan can, we argue, be understood in terms of the formation and non-formation of powerful new interpretative patterns. This underscores the need to examine national discourses in depth and contests the proposition that low birth rates directly drive family policy expansion. This chapter proceeds through four further sections. First, we review the current international literature on family policies, discerning four prominent lines of argument in favour of family policy expansion (Section 2). We then examine related socio-economic trends in Ger many and Japan (Section 3) and sketch out the ‘family policy legacies’ of these nations since the 1970s (Section 4). In what is the core section of the chapter, Section 5 analyses family policy debates in both countries in the 2000s. Finally, we gauge the critical similarities and differences of German and Japanese family policy discourses and briefly consider implications for further research.

2. international Academic Discourses on Family Policies

Family policy has become a prominent subject in mainstream comparative academic and policy debates only very recently. It was as late as the 1990s that most European countries seriously began designing new family policies to support women’s employment, although Scan dinavian nations had started doing so considerably earlier (Esping- Andersen 2002). The UK, for example, “had no identifiable model for ‘reconciling’ or ‘balancing’ work and family” before 1997 (Lewis and Campbell 2007b). One can interpret family policy reforms as governments’ efforts to counter so-called ‘new risks’ (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2005) that spring from the growing labour market participation of women and from the family’s decreasing stability and ability to furnish social care, or, following Esping-Andersen (2009), they may be seen as adaptations to an (as of yet) ‘incomplete revolution’ where women’s work and reproductive patterns have undergone a fundamental upheaval. Needless to say, however, the arguments put forth in support of new family policies have not converged around a single line of reasoning, but have remained impressively diverse. In the following we identify four prominent, distinctive family policy discourses that are put forward within the international academic discourse. This exercise 180 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen supplies us with a critical conceptual background to our subsequent analysis of specific German and Japanese discourses.

Gender Equality: Salient gender equality arguments posit that women and men have equal rights and should thus be treated equally in society, and they typically recognize that women are systematically disadvantaged vis-à-vis men due to their different relationship to the labour market (e.g. Daly and Rake 2003: 89). Although the precise meaning of ‘gender equality’ (in labour markets and welfare states) remains subject to debate, it is usually pointed out that women have caring duties which put limits on their involvement in paid work, reduces their earnings capacity and shapes their careers; that this tends to make women dependent on their partners; and that welfare states have, more often than not, actively reinforced such dependence while undervaluing informal care (Lewis 1992; Ōsawa 2004). It follows that to promote gender equality, measures that put women on par with men in terms of access to work, diverse careers, and earnings are demanded, and it is simultaneously required that men increase their participation in care and house work. Gender equality objectives had a major impact on the development of Nordic family policies in particular, as women asserted in the 1960s and 1970s that they, as citizens of democratic countries, also had the right to engage in paid work (Huber and Stephens 2001; Sainsbury 2004). Measures such as maternal and parental leave – the latter made available to both women and men – as well as high quality child care (also to very young children) are examples of family policies that can potentially promote gender equality, especially in the ‘social democratic’ sense. They do so particularly when they facilitate mothers’ swift return to the labour markets after child-bearing.

Work-Life Balance / Work-Family Reconciliation: Work-life balance and work-family reconciliation have become popular ways to frame debates on family policy in North America and Europe. While the ter- minology of ‘work-life balance’ originated in the US and has been propagated internationally by American multinational companies (Gambles, Lewis and Rapoport 2006: 34), ‘work-family reconciliation’ is favoured in Europe where the EU has actively promoted it. In terms of social policy, these ‘balancing/reconciliation’ discourses can be used to argue for measures that would also be supported by gender equality advocates, including well-compensated family leave, germany, japan and family policy 181 accessible child care services, working hour reductions and flexible work arrangements, but with relatively more emphasis on the latter two. Since they tend to de-emphasize gender, however, ‘balancing’ discourses do not necessarily demand that policies actively promote a more equal sharing of work and care duties between men and women. Although potentially related to a variety of considerations, the case for ‘balancing/reconciliation’ is often made with direct reference to human capital concerns. Consequently, it is proposed that work-life balance policies can reduce employee stress, depression and absenteeism, which accordingly is seen to increase worker loyalty, motivation and productivity (OECD 2007a: 185). ‘Family friendly’ company policies can help recruit and retain highly skilled workers who tend to be difficult to replace and in whom companies invest considerable resources. The case for such policies appears to be most persuasive for large companies requiring workers with (high) general skills, as opposed to smaller (manufacturing) companies that require workers with industry-specific skills (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2009; also OECD 2007a: 186). On a more macro level, ‘work-life balance’ policies can maximize the supply of high quality human capital by making talented females more available for work. Such policies are thus inherently desirable from the point of view of labour market efficiency and productivity, but companies are likely to support them most actively during labour shortages or when they feel that the existing (male) labour force is not sufficient to fulfil their needs.H uman capital arguments for family policies may thus be used to promote measures similar to those favoured by gender advocates (including raising the female employment rate), but their underlying premises are very different and more contingent on the state of the labour markets as well as industry needs.

Social Investment: The argument that family policy should be viewed as a ‘social investment’ is most lucidly put forth by Esping-Andersen (2002, 2009) who incorporates a variety of concerns under the umbrella of a ‘child-centred social investment strategy’. For him, supporting mothers’ employment is imperative not only to increase the labour supply but also to reduce child poverty. Combating child poverty is crucial as early development has a tremendous impact on individuals’ cognitive skills and life chances, hence influencing the quality of the (future) human capital stock of each country. According to Esping- Andersen gender equality policies are compatible and synergistic with 182 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen human capital development, national productivity as well as competitiveness, and also hold the promise of higher fertility. Women’s paid employment (alongside skills training) is thus framed as something of a panacea to a range of concerns, but only if it is of sufficiently high quality (also Giddens 1998; Jenson and Saint-Martin 2006).

Raising Fertility: Finally, there are arguments that are more expressly concerned with raising the TFR in a given country or across a set of countries (as in the EU) through devising family policies. Although unequivocal evidence does not exist, it is now implicitly assumed in many studies and reports that policies that support women’s employment are closely connected to higher fertility (Bonoli 2008 for a review). Castles (2003) posits that there has been a ‘reversal’ across the OECD: ‘familial’ countries that used to have the highest fertility rates now have the lowest, and Nordic countries where female employment is high produce comparatively more children. Governments that are concerned about their countries’ fertility levels and the future implications of ageing and shrinking populations thus look to new family policies as potential ‘solutions’. The paradox is that, despite the fact that most OECD countries now have sub-replacement levels of fertility, raising the birth rate through policy measures is not an explicit public policy objective except in a handful of countries (OECD 2007a: 13). This may be because of the politically sensitive and highly personal, private nature of the issue, the salience of other family policy priorities, or the wish to promote fertility only in implicit terms. Fertility arguments thus form a conspicuously ‘muted’ discourse compared to the other three included in this review. Striving to raise fertility in current democratic contexts would, plausibly, imply a wide package of family policies that, among other things, would facilitate female labour market participation and offset both the direct and indirect child-rearing costs incurred by parents. On the other hand, while such a package would indeed have to be extensive and expensive, it would not necessarily be consistent with gender equality concerns. For example, a particular group of women could be encouraged to stay at home to produce and take care of a large number of children, or, alternatively, highly educated elite women who wish to work continuously could be made into the prime target of pro- fertility policies. Moreover, if the goal is merely to increase the number of births, alleviating child poverty would not necessarily have to be part of a fertility-centred approach. germany, japan and family policy 183

In addition to these four streams, there are of course other arguments that have been put forth in favour of particular family policies. Daly and Rake (2003) and Hochschild (1995) have highlighted ‘care deficits’ and pressures, but this view is rather rarely articulated by governments and in current mainstream debates. We are also cognizant of demands that governments should protect the normative, male-breadwinner/ female-caregiver family institution, but these demands tended to define earlier conservative family policy agendas and have now largely taken a backseat to the four discourses we have outlined above.

3. the Socio-Economic Context for Family Policy

Having set out prominent academic family policy discourses above, we provide essential context to family policy developments in Germany and Japan here through a brief review of recent socio-economic trends. As we have pointed out in our introduction, while socio-economic trends never directly translate into policy responses, they do structure policy in manifold ways when constructed by actors as ‘challenges’. In this section we strive to capture key dimensions that have shaped both German and Japanese family policy debates. Sharing a common trend with the majority of other developed nations, both Germany and Japan have witnessed a gradual rise in the labour force participation of women in the past decades (Figure 3). Although a much higher share of Japanese than German women were engaged in paid work in the 1970s, as a result of a substantial upwards leap in the early 1990s in the German rates, this situation has now reversed, with female employment rates in Germany being nearly four per cent above those in Japan. In both countries male and female employment rates are undergoing a process of convergence. In social policy literature, it has been noted with equal frequency that as the rate of working women has increased and as more have progressed to higher education, women have begun to bear children much later and in fewer quantities than before. As Table 1 illustrates, closely reflecting trends elsewhere,G erman and Japanese women now have their first babies when they are slightly over 29 – a delay of 5.1 and 3.5 years, respectively, compared to 1970 levels. The precipitous drop in the German and Japanese birth rates that was illustrated in Figure 1 above is set into a wider context in Table 2. What we see from here is that Germany and Japan are not the only countries experiencing extremely low total fertility levels – they are 184 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen

Note: Data for Germany before 1991 refers to West Germany. Source: OECD (2009e). Figure 3 male and female labour force participation in Germany and Japan, 1970–2007 (15–64 year olds)

Table 1 Women’s age at first childbirth in selected OECD countries 1970 1980 2000 2005 Canada 23.7 24.9 27.1 28.0 Denmark 23.8 27.3 28.4 Finland 24.4 27.4 27.9 France 24.4 27.8 28.5 Germany 24.0 28.2 29.1 Japan 25.6 26.4 28.0 29.1 Korea 27.7 29.1 Norway 26.9 27.7 Sweden 25.7 25.3 27.9 28.7 Switzerland 25.3 28.7 29.5 United Kingdom 29.1 29.8 United States 24.1 22.7 24.9 25.2

Source: OECD (2009c). germany, japan and family policy 185

Table 2 Fertility rates and share of births outside marriage Share of births Total Fertility Rate outside marriage Canada 1.54 24.5 Denmark 1.85 46.4 Finland 1.84 40.6 France 1.98 49.5 Germany 1.33 30.0 Italy 1.35 18.6 Japan 1.32 2.1 Korea 1.13 1.5 Norway 1.90 53.1 Spain 1.38 28.4 Sweden 1.85 55.5 Switzerland 1.44 15.4 United Kingdom 1.84 43.7 United States 2.10 38.5 OECD-28 1.61 32.9

Source: OECD (2009c). joined by ‘familialistic’ Mediterranean nations such as Italy and Spain, as well as by South Korea. Japan, alongside South Korea, stands out in one aspect: it is home to a conspicuously low share of out-of-wedlock births (Hertog 2009). At the other end of the spectrum we observe that all of those countries where close to or more than 40 per cent of births occur outside marriage enjoy TFRs higher than 1.8. In the context of declining fertility, more attention has been given not only to female labour force participation in general but also to maternal employment in particular. The ability of mothers with small children to partake in paid work and generate substantial earnings is, as we have already seen, an issue of high relevance to almost all family policy agendas, from gender equality and work-family reconciliation to ‘social investment’ and raising fertility. Table 3, while not showing trends over time, reveals that significant cross-national differences still exist on this dimension, with Nordic countries occupying the top end and Germany and Japan finding themselves at the bottom as far as the mothers of under six year old children are concerned. Not unrelated to maternal employment rates, child poverty indicators also belie some interesting trends that are, if anything, becoming 186 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen increasingly central to family debates (see Section 2). If OECD figures are to be trusted (Table 4), Germany in particular has seen a massive increase in the share of children living in poverty since the mid-1990s, although its child poverty rate (16 per cent) is still below that of the United States (21 per cent), yet slightly above that of Japan (14 per cent). Poverty in households led by a non-employed single-parent is high across the board, albeit sharply lower among households headed by single parents who work. Most striking here is the almost negligible differential between the poverty rates of households led by non- working single parents and those headed by employed single parents in Japan (60 per cent against 58 per cent). This can be partly explained with reference to a persistently strong male-breadwinner system, women’s low average earnings vis-à-vis men, and the fact that up to half of the female labour force in Japan is engaged in ‘irregular’ (part- time and limited-period contract) jobs. If only to highlight a crucial difference in the family policy landscapes of Germany and Japan, it is informative to see how annual working hours differ between these countries.A lthough both societies have seen steady declines since the 1980s, aggregate data still shows that the Japanese annually spend nearly 500 hours longer at paid work than the Germans (Table 5). While a detailed breakdown of this

Table 3 maternal employment rates in selected OECD countries, 2005 (women aged 15–64) By age of youngest child 0–16 <2 3–5 6–16 Canada 70.5 58.7 68.1 71.1 Denmark 76.5 71.4 77.8 77.5 Finland 76.0 52.1 80.7 84.2 France 59.9 53.7 63.8 61.7 Germany 54.9 36.1 54.8 62.7 Japan 52.4 28.5 47.8 68.1 Sweden 82.5 71.9 81.3 76.1 Switzerland 69.7 58.3 61.7 77.0 United Kingdom 61.7 52.6 58.3 67.7 United States 66.7 54.2 62.8 73.2 OECD average 61.5 51.9 61.3 66.3

Source: OECD (2007a: Table 3.2). germany, japan and family policy 187

Table 4 Key child poverty indicators for selected OECD countries, mid-2000s Poverty among Poverty in households children with children Mid- Point All Single 2000s changes Level, Change Level, mid-2000s since mid- from mid-1990s Not Working 2000s 1995 working Canada 15 2.2 13 1.6 89 32 Denmark 3 0.8 2 0.7 20 4 Finland 4 2.1 4 1.9 46 6 France 8 0.3 7 –0.2 46 12 Germany 16 5.1 13 4.2 56 26 Japan 14 1.6 12 1.2 60 58 Norway 5 0.9 4 0.6 31 5 Sweden 4 1.5 4 1.5 18 6 Switzerland 9 1.2 6 1.3 – 22 – United 10 –3.6 9 –3.7 39 7 Kingdom United States 21 –1.7 18 –1.1 92 36 OECD 10 0.9 8 0.7 50 19

Note: Poverty thresholds are set at 50 per cent of the median income of the entire population. Data for changes refer to the period from 2000 to 2005 for Switzerland. Data are based on cash income. Source: OECD (2008a: Table 5.2).

Table 5 trends in average annual working hours per person in employment 1983 1994 2004 2008 Germany 1621 1474 1364 1352 Japan 2098 1904 1840 1836

Note: Japanese data refer to workplaces with 30 or more regular employees. 1983 German data refer to West Germany only. Source: OECD (2009f: Table F). data would provide a more nuanced understanding of trends, this suggests one reason why family policy imperatives in Germany and Japan may be quite different indeed. 188 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen

Following this short review of key socio-economic trends, we proceed to examining the respective family policy ‘legacies’ of Germany and Japan to provide a richer platform for understanding the more recent changes analysed in Section 5.

4. Family Policy Legacies

4.1 Germany1 The family policy legacy ofG ermany is essentially the story of a strong male breadwinner-female caregiver regime to which progressive modifications are gradually made from the 1980s onwards, after which paradigmatic changes unfold in the 2000s. Starting in the mid-1980s, family responsibilities were increasingly socialized. Family-oriented benefits were introduced into the formerly strictly earnings-related pension system and were subsequently expanded.2 To reconcile employment with the desire to care for small children personally, the state also enacted an entitlement to unpaid parental leave in 1986. Concomitantly the state introduced and subsequently expanded a flat parental benefit to two years (initially limited to ten months) after the birth of a child. This benefit gave both fathers and mothers the opportunity to continue to work or opt out of the labour market and commit themselves to child-rearing for a limited time period. Crucially, the employer was now required to guarantee the parent’s reemployment in a similar position and with equivalent remuneration following the parental leave. Effective as of 2007, the parental leave benefit was eventually converted into an earnings-related benefit (67 per cent of previous earnings, capped at €1,800 per month) paid for a maximum of 12 months, with two additional months for the other parent. (Henninger et al. 2008). Child care was also subsequently expanded (Table 6) and in 1992, the government established a right for every child between the ages of three and six to a place in a child care facility. Because of implementation problems at the local level, the entitlement only became effective in 1999 (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). Beginning in 2002, improving day care facilities for children under the age of three became a priority and, based on a compromise between the political parties of the Grand Coalition government in 2007, the capacity of publicly

1 This section draws heavily on Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004). 2 meyer (1998) on the significance of this reform. germany, japan and family policy 189

Table 6 supply of child care facilities (number of places as a percentage of age group), 1975–2006 Age Year 0 < 3 years 3–6.5 years 6–12 years 1975 <1 66 N/A 19851 1.6 69.3 3.0 1990 1.8 (54.2) 69.0 (97.7) 3.4 (32.4) 19952 2.2 (41.3) 73.0 (96.2) 3.5 (22.6) 1998 2.8 (36.3) 86.8 (111.8) 5.9 (47.7)3 7.0 89.5 12.6 2002 4.2 (37.0) 90.6 (105.1) 6 (67.6)3 8.6 92 14.3 2005/06 9.6 (39.8) N/A N/A 13.7

Notes: 11986; 2 1994; 3age 6–10. The numbers in brackets are for the territory of the former East Germany and the numbers in italics are for unified Germany. Data over the years are not fully comparable. Source: Seeleib-Kaiser (2007). subsidized child care is anticipated to fully meet demand by the year 2013. By this point, the government has agreed to introduce an individual entitlement to child care for every child, not only for those aged three to six. It is estimated that the number of places will reach 750,000 by 2013, increasing coverage for that age group from approximately 14 per cent in 2005/06 to 35 per cent (Seeleib-Kaiser 2008).

4.2 Japan The Japanese family policy legacy bears some critical similarities to that of Germany both in the post-war and pre-war periods. Up to the late 1980s, caring for small children was seen in Japan strictly as a private duty to be performed by the mother in the home with mini- mal interference or economic assistance from public authorities. That the ‘professional housewife’ (sengyō shufu) – a concept inclusive of mothers working part-time – would act as the primary provider of such care was the norm throughout this period. This norm was enforced not only through labour market conventions that excluded married women, but through the belief that infants should be raised at home until their third birthday for developmental reasons (e.g. MHW 1997: 129). Interestingly, amid the extreme labour shortages of the 1960s, the labour market exclusion of women was sustained by the 190 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen influx not of foreign immigrants but of rural youth who migrated to industrial growth centres with support from a national, highly coordinated recruitment system. In the sense that post-war policies were targeted only at the most ‘needy’ families where mothers ‘had to’ work, Japan’s family policy legacy closely resembles that of western Germany in ideological orientation. Part and parcel of this legacy is a system of tax exemptions for married couples (fuyō kōjo) that has discouraged married women from earning more than around one million yen per year (as surpassing this amount can lead to a decrease in household income), essentially limiting them to low-paid part-time work. In the early 1990s this state of affairs began to show signs of change, not least due to the so-called ‘1.57 shock’ of 1990. Related to the fact that the fertility rate for 1989 (published in the following year) turned out to be even lower than for the inauspicious year of the fire-horse (1966),3 this widely recognized shock made it easier for media and interested actors to frame declining fertility as a serious problem (e.g. Roberts 2005). This ‘discovery’ of low fertility not only led to vig- orous debate, but contributed to some substantial new policy initiatives, including the 1992 child care leave legislation (reborn in 1999 as the child care/family care leave law) and the so-called Angel Plan (the Basic Direction for Future Child Rearing Support Measures). Formulated in 1994 and carried out between 1995 and 1999, the Angel Plan was the most comprehensive governmental package to improve the child-rearing environment in Japan to date, and quite revolutionary in its acknowledgement that caring for children was no longer the sole private duty of families – the national government, local administrations as well as companies now also had a role to play. The reform drive continued with Angel Plan II in 1999 that aimed to further speed up the improvement of child care infrastructure. As a result, the total child care enrolment rate of those aged below six rose from roughly 22 per cent to 29 per cent over this ten-year period, but waiting lists remained relatively long; since this was so especially for the one to two year olds, it could scarcely be said that Japan’s parental leave scheme and child care services were well-integrated at this point (Toivonen 2007).

3 This year was highly symbolic as it was believed that women born in 1966 would bring misfortune, and eventually death, upon their future husbands. As a result, the TFR dropped to a level of 1.58. germany, japan and family policy 191

None of the above reforms marked a complete or lasting about-turn in Japanese family policy, however. While the introduction of an income-related child care/family care leave scheme in 1995 was something of a breakthrough (this has gradually been strengthened so that by 2001 it paid out a monthly benefit equalling 40 per cent of wages), over two thirds of Japanese women who have children still leave their jobs at child birth. Although women’s labour force participation has generally increased, most of the increase has taken place in part-time employment (Rebick 2005), with the consequence that a substantial share of female workers do not in practice qualify for parental leave (those on fixed-term contracts are also among the ineligible). In sum, then, Japan’s family policy approach remained essentially ‘conservative’ – indeed more so than Germany’s – up to the 1990s when it began to shift and exhibit ‘social democratic’ features in principle, but less so in practice. No consensus emerged around this time about the role that the state should play in supporting families or about how women should balance work and family duties, but the steadily declining birth rate became a serious and sustained concern even as relevant explanations diverged. We will see in the following sections how this and other competing issues were framed anew under the guise of ‘Work-Life Balance’ towards the mid-2000s.

5. Family Policy and ‘Human Capital’ Imperatives in the 2000s

5.1 Germany: Raising Fertility and Promoting Mothers’ Employment Although the Christian Democrats had pushed family policy onto the political agenda during the 1980s, the primary focus of the political discourse was that the family in the past had been neglected and that more support was needed. Both major political parties supported this interpretative pattern. Furthermore, the family policy debate focused very much on increasing the choice of parents. All incremental changes in the parental leave benefit during the 1990s and early 2000s were justified with the argument that they would increase parental choice. Nevertheless, significant differences remained with regard to the provision of child care. While the Christian Democrats promoted a policy to introduce a new family benefit providing families with more choice, the Social Democrats favoured a policy of expanding child care services to increase choice (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). 192 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen

Due to fascist policies promoting a Volksgemeinschaft in the 1930s and 1940s, explicit population policies and explicit measures to increase the fertility rate were off the policy agenda in the Federal Republic of Germany until very recently. However, a sudden change took place in the early 2000s when a number of scholarly articles appeared that related certain family policies with an increase in fertility (Engelbrech 2002; Hank, Kreyenfeld and Spieß 2004). The promotion of gender equality had until then been a driving rationale for the expansion of employment-oriented family policies. However, after the firstR ed-Green government (1998–2002) had failed to enact a gender equality bill the Family Ministry began to rethink the approach to family policy. It developed the concept of ‘sustainable family policy’ along the following five indicators: improvement of the fertility rate, improved reconciliation of work and family life, increased employment rate of both parents to reduce the risk of poverty, improved early childhood education and competency of parents in childrearing (Ristau 2005). Within the ministry the crucial indicator to assess the success of the policy reorientation soon became the fertility rate.4 Furthermore, the Ministry commissioned research reports that highlighted the positive impacts of a reformed family policy on the fertility rate and employment rate of mothers, which would have a positive impact on the economy (Rürup and Gruescu 2003). The Family Ministry sought the active cooperation of the social partners, especially the employers’ associations, to build momentum for the new approach. Jointly with the employers’ associations the Family Ministry organized conferences around the theme “Family – the success factor for the economy” and developed a strategy paper clearly focusing on the demographic aspect of family policies (BDI, BMFSFJ and IW 2004). In 2005, the President of the German Employers’ Association stated: “Based on the increased scarcity of skilled employees, we can no longer forgo the potential of highly qualified women and mothers.”5 In other words, the German employers’ associations not only became ‘consenters’ in the drive for the expansion of employment-oriented family policies, but promoters with the first order preference to change the existing family policy framework which was heavily reliant on

4 interview with a high-ranking civil servant in the Family Ministry. 5 Cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 April 2005 (authors’ translation). germany, japan and family policy 193 transfers. Based on their economic assessment employers actively promoted the expansion of child care facilities for children below the age of three and supported a reformed and earnings-related parental leave benefit (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2009). With regards to the latter they emphasized that it would be greatly beneficial if parents/mothers returned quickly to work after giving birth. Long-term leave policies would lead to a de-qualification (de-skilling) of parents. After the federal elections of 2005, a Grand Coalition government between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats continued to expand employment-oriented family policies. Although the political responsibility for the Family Ministry was handed over to the Christian Democrats, policy proposals did not significantly change. The process of changing existing family policies even accelerated. To sum up, the political discourse around family policy in Germany changed significantly in the early 2000s. After having identified the family as in need of greater support as well as the need to help parents in reconciling work and family responsibilities in the 1980s and 1990s, an expansion of employment-oriented family policy was justified as benefitting theG erman economy, especially through an increase in the fertility rate and maternal employment rate. Key for the success to enact an employment-oriented family policy was the support of the employers’ associations for the concept of ‘sustainable family policy’.

5.2 Japan: The Rise of ‘Work-Life Balance’ As Section 4.2 already made clear, up to the late 1980s, Japanese family policy discourse reinforced a stark male-breadwinner/female-caregiver division even amid steadily growing female labour force participation rates (Section 3). However, underpinning the family policy reforms reviewed above, remarkable discursive shifts were witnessed from the early 1990s onwards. These shifts had begun to brew already in the early 1980s when the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) advanced the neoconservative discourse of ‘Japanese-style welfare society’ that reaffirmed the role of the family as the prime care provider. It was as a backlash to this discourse and accompanying reforms that the idea of the ‘crisis of the family’ surfaced, becoming central to the debate in the 1990s thanks to the efforts of groups representing women and the elderly people (Peng 2004: 409). Interestingly, the demands of such civil society groups 194 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen started to merge with those of state bureaucrats and some politicians who became concerned with the implications of rapid ageing for pensions, the labour supply and economic growth. From this sense of ‘crisis’ over the family and demographic trends, attention shifted gradually towards women’s changing employment and marriage patterns. This fresh interest in women’s behaviour and roles was, again, essentially rooted in steeply declining fertility as symbolized by the ‘1.57 shock’ of 1990, but it was also catalyzed by political changes that elevated urban female voters into a significant constituency (especially for the opposition Democratic Party) and that allowed for mobilization around more divergent interests (Peng 2004: 410).6 This created a new opening for gender equality campaigners as well as progressive bureaucrats who wished to promote work-life harmonization in the hope of salvaging the birth rate. Momentum was clearly building up for paradigmatic change in Japanese thinking on family policy, with the political scientist Schoppa (2006) agreeing that the above-mentioned groups indeed had had relative success in the late 1990s with promoting the view that better support provision (by the state, employers and husbands) would allow women to have more children.7 Unfortunately from their point of view, however, progress on this issue was deflated by the ‘parasite single’ argument put forth by Yamada Masahiro at the end of the decade (Schoppa 2006: 155–156; also Yamada 1999). Yamada’s widely dissem- inated account implied that Japan was home to masses of young women who, far from struggling economically or otherwise to start their own families, were quite happy to live with their parents who provided them with free accommodation and domestic services as well as the possibility to channel their incomes to entertainment and luxury goods. This had a sharp impact on family policy discourse as it became harder to argue that more generous support to working women would lead to more marriages and births. Yet, family policy reform efforts did not altogether die or undergo a change of direction. Indeed, encouraging companies to become more ‘family friendly’ (famirī furendorī) became all the rage within some

6 in 1993, the long-ruling LDP was temporarily thrown out of power, although it recovered its majority in 1994 and continued to rule until a crushing defeat in the August 2009 Lower House elections. 7 The achievements of these actors and their political allies were far from insignificant (e.g. Ōsawa 2000). One key achievement was the creation of the Council of Gender Equality within the Cabinet Office in 1996. germany, japan and family policy 195 sections of the government, as exemplified by a report titledAiming for ‘Family Friendly’ Corporations edited by the Women’s Bureau of the Ministry of Labour in 2000. The list of ‘family friendly’ measures considered in government surveys and reports at this time became in fact impressively comprehensive, ranging from child care regulations and financial support for child care to care leave provisions and flexible working time arrangements (Roberts 2005: 182–183). What is most intriguing, however, is that the notion of ‘family’ was now extended from households of married couples to more diverse families (including single households); that not just women but also men were posi- tioned as targets of ‘family friendly’ measures; and that cultural change – not only the formal introduction of support provisions – was being demanded of companies by the government (Ministry of Labour Women’s Bureau 2000). Although ‘family friendly’ never became a household idea in the public consciousness, its evolution was paralleled in the media by frequent discussions regarding the ‘reconciliation’ of work and family, or of work and child-rearing. These discussions reflected not just bureaucratic concerns but a steadily growing desire among women to combine careers and families amid a situation where their majority was still prompted to choose between one or the other. While ‘reconciliation’ did not become incorporated verbatim into any official policy slogan (in the same sense as ‘low birthrate countermeasures’ and ‘gender equality’ had done), this theme was taken up in the mid-2000s by a high-profile campaign built around the more fashionable English- language term ‘Work-Life Balance’. Tracing this term on the pages of the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s largest and more progressive newspapers, reveals its quick rise onto the public radar: mentioned only in two articles in 2004 and in nine in 2005, in 2008 as many as 107 articles used the term ‘work-life balance’ and discussed some aspect of it. If bureaucrats and a handful of companies such as IBM and Shiseido also played important roles, the scholars Hiroki Satō, Emiko Takeishi and Machiko Ozawa became the foremost public patrons of ‘Work- Life Balance’ in the 2000s. In an early volume that made the case for men taking child-rearing leave, Satō and Takeishi articulated the key argument that has since been used consistently to ‘sell’ work-life balance measures to private companies. Positioning such measures explicitly as a ‘personnel management strategy’ (jinji senryaku), they claimed that, amid conditions where the preferences and characteristics of workers had diversified so that not all could or wanted to devote all 196 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen their time to the company, employers could raise employee motivation through pro-actively accommodating various ‘life-styles’. By doing so, they could also raise the latter’s level of productivity and creativity, ultimately making their companies more competitive (Satō and Takeishi 2004: 60–69). Adding that such a strategy would also help promote the recruitment and retention of talented employees, Satō and Takeishi explained that the reconciliation of work and life must now be seen as a ‘new form of compensation’ – a point which Satō has repeated elsewhere (e.g. Satō 2008). Ozawa has also made a significant contribution to the construction and popularization of the Japanese variety of ‘Work-Life Balance’ through her books that have, in a similar fashion, stressed positive synergies between individual well-being and company productivity, achievable through a mix of private and public support measures (Ozawa 2006, 2008). It was thus hardly surprising that in 2007, both Satō and Ozawa were called to join a special state-society ‘work and life harmonization’ committee which was coordinated by the Cabinet Office but led by the influential heads of the Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Business Organizations) and Sōren (Japan Trade Union Confederation). It was this committee and an affiliated working group (which included representatives of labour and capital as well as seven experts) that produced, in December of the same year, the landmark ‘Work-Life Balance Charter’ (Shigoto to seikatsu no chōwa kenshō) as well as an action plan to guide implementation. Neither was linked to any new legislation; their main purpose seemed to be to raise awareness, create societal consensus and build momentum for diverse, largely voluntary measures. The ‘Work-Life Balance Charter’ departed from three core areas of concern around which a new societal ‘vision’ and concrete proposals were then built. These claimed that in present Japanese society, there were a large number of people who could not reach economic independence due to unstable employment; who were overwhelmed by work, which inevitably damaged their health; and who struggled to combine work with child-rearing and elderly care duties (Cabinet Office 2007: 1).S ome of the key factors thought to underlie these problems included a polarization of the work-force into overworked regular employees and insecure irregular ones; persisting gender-based division of labour (despite an increase in couples where both members worked); and a lack of time available for activities with the family and local community, viewed as a partial cause of the low birth rate. germany, japan and family policy 197

Accordingly, the Charter prescribed that ‘work-life harmonization’ would make it possible for all to not only reach independence through paid work, but to secure enough time for ‘healthy and prosperous’ living in a context where individuals could choose ‘diverse work-styles and life-styles’ (Cabinet Office 2007: 3).I n the accompanying action plan, altogether 14 achievement targets – divided into the three domains of economic independence, sufficient time for healthy living, and diverse life/work-styles – were specified. Of these, the following were central:

1. increasing the labour market participation rates of prime-aged men, women and 60 to 69 year olds, with 25–44 year old women’s rates climbing from 64.9 per cent in 2007 to 69–72 per cent by 2017; 2. increasing the growth rate of labour productivity per hour from 1.6 per cent in 1996–2005 to 2.4 per cent by 2011; 3. Cutting the share of those working over 60 hours per week by half from 10.8 per cent by 2017; 4. having workers exhaust all their paid holidays by 2017 as opposed to the current utilization rate of 46.6 per cent; 5. having 55 per cent of those female workers giving birth to their first child return to work within one year (current rate: 38 per cent); 6. increasing the child care leave take-up rate of women and men with newborn babies from 72.3 per cent and 0.50 per cent respectively to 80 per cent and 10 per cent by 2017.

To be fair, many of these objectives were indeed quite progressive in their spirit, including, as they did, targets for men’s participation in housework and child-rearing. However, most crucially, they were full of loop-holes, ambiguities and watered-down aspirations. For example, regarding target 1 above, no specifications were made whether employment should be increased through the provision of (presumably) stable labour or less secure temporary jobs; as for the fifth target, it was not clarified whether women should return to the same jobs they had prior to child-bearing or simply find new, possibly part-time, ones. Two further things to note about these achievement targets include the fact that they were organized into an implicit hierarchy where the explicitly gender- and child care-related items were placed at the bottom, and the fact that they did not contain any mention of the birth 198 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen rate per se. This stands at a stark contrast to theG erman vision of ‘sustainable family policy’ where raising the fertility rate was a declared goal. What was perhaps most remarkable about Japan’s ‘Work-Life Balance’ action plan (in comparative terms) was its sheer scope, ranging as it did from employment rates, working hours and holiday take- up to child-care issues, and the fact that it identifies not only women, but also men and managers as key target groups. This expressed an awareness among state bureaucrats and leading analysts that piecemeal programmes geared mainly to support women’s child-rearing duties were not enough: nothing less than a fundamental change in the Japanese way of working and the employment system could bring about desired improvements. To understand the compromised character of the above ‘Work-Life Balance’ targets, it is instructive to note the stance of the leading employers’ federation, Keidanren. This was, in fact, crystal clear: the federation was adamant that the promotion of work-life harmonization should be based on the self-directed, voluntary initiatives of companies and their workers – no uniform regulations or laws should be imposed since suitable responses differed according to company scale, type and employment system (Kiriku 2007: 9; Keidanren 2006, 2007). As Keidanren would have it, the correct role of the state was to create a supportive ‘environment’ for work-life harmonization, for instance by brokering replacement workers and advancing labour market flexibili- zation. With employers’ representatives occupying the top positions in the committee drafting Japan’s work-life balance charter (and remaining, in general, vastly more powerful than the representatives of labour), these views effectively set the boundaries for the whole campaign and the attendant targets. In the absence of momentous changes in public opinion, Keidanren’s position may well have been more or less in line with public values, meaning that it could promote its interests without any major backlashes. Although influential academics, the key policy entrepreneurs Satō, Takeishi and Ozawa were not in a position to challenge employers’ views; their efforts have indeed consistently aimed at persuading employers of the need for new policy measures.

6. discussion

This chapter set out to address the broad puzzle of why and how employment-related family policies are being enacted in staunch germany, japan and family policy 199 male-breadwinner countries such as Germany and Japan. Upon surveying international discourses, socio-economic trends and policy legacies, we turned our attention to national family policy discourses and their promoters. This confirmed that, instead of social democratic forces or women’s movements,8 in the 2000s (as in the preceding decade) critical reforms were advanced under conservative political leadership and with the strong involvement of certain policy entrepreneurs in both Germany and Japan. In the former country, we saw that the new ‘sustainable family policy’ vision in fact transcended changes in ruling coalitions, whereas in the latter, the Work-Life Balance Charter (2007) as well as notable earlier family policy reforms were pursued under the long-ruling and conservative Liberal Democratic Party. We can conclude from this firstly that, at least in the two countries we have observed, conservative parties no longer seem ‘genuinely conservative’ with regards to the family, which is to say that a considerable transformation has now taken place in this domain. If the outlines of family policy change appear similar in Germany and Japan, what about the details of their national family policy discourses? ‘Human capital’ arguments have indeed moved to the centre of reform efforts in both countries, while gender equality goals have arguably grown more marginal. But this is as far as the similarities go: Our analyses of Germany and Japan found that the economic arguments they put forth in the 2000s in fact differed critically in content, with the former stressing the better utilization of female labour and the boosting of the birth rate through family policy, while in the latter it was stressed that ‘Work-Life Balance’ would lead to higher worker productivity on the company level. Moreover, the Japanese discourse, unfolding after one and a half decades of fertility worries, clearly de-emphasized the issue of raising the birth rate. This prompts us to reaffirm our point that, despite some evidence of international diffusion, we must indeed delve deeper into national discourses when analyzing recent family policy changes, as they remain considerably diverse. Moreover, contrasting the German and Japanese cases demonstrates very well that low fertility has no direct, predictable relationship to family policy expansion: its interplay with policy can

8 This is not to neglect the fact that women’s movements and gender equality campaigns have made significant long-term advances in both countries, going a long way towards mainstreaming gender and enhancing female participation in political decision-making. 200 martin seeleib-kaiser and tuukka toivonen only be understood with close attention to particular contexts and discourses. If we move to consider the strategies of German and Japanese policy actors in the 2000s, it is noteworthy that, compared to their predecessors, key actors seem to have targeted their discourses squarely at employers, with the aim of persuading them to go along with reform efforts.N ow, this inevitably raises thorny questions over whom new family policies are being enacted for, and whether, under the for- midable weight of economic, essentially utilitarian arguments, gender equality principles have had any real influence at all in the policy process. In any case, from the perspective of the present account the important point is that in Germany this strategy seems to have worked, yet in Japan it floundered – why? L‘ egacies’ certainly provide a partial explanation: unlike Germany which had already introduced a strong entitlement to parental leave in the 1980s, Japan boasted no relevant pre-existing entitlements – had they existed, it would surely have been easier to argue for their modification in the 2000s. Yet our detailed accounts of discursive changes (provided in Sections 5.1 and 5.2) lead us to argue that in Germany these changes were clearly more decisive, resulting in a new interpretative pattern that successfully linked highly qualified women’s human capital and the birth rate to Germany’s economic future. In Japan, however, despite its tremendous visibility, the ‘Work-Life Balance’ campaign bred no new interpretative patterns that could have pushed policy forward. The Japanese debate continued to be characterized by a lack of consensus regarding family policy among key players. To be fair, this apparent lack of family policy change in Japan would benefit from a more thorough treatment than has been possible to provide in this chapter. Although Schoppa (2006), examining relevant reforms in the 1990s, attributes family policy stagnation primarily to the absence of strong women’s pressure groups that could push policy and help tailor it to better suit women’s needs, our comparative account has shown that the issue is vastly more complex than this implies, and that substantial change (including the introduction of robust entitlements) is indeed possible even without the leadership of women’s groups, as demonstrated by the recent German parental leave reforms. In addition to national discourses, key actors’ strategies, employers’ positions and policy legacies, we would do well to also consider public opinion data, which in Japan’s case shows a much more germany, japan and family policy 201 modest shift away from ‘conservative’ family values than that seen in Germany.9 The upshot from this and the foregoing analysis is that, given the complexities of family policy development and the implementation of key programmes, and given that change can rarely be explained fully with reference to a single dimension only, there is in fact a real need for more comparative studies that consider multiple levels of policy in a systematic fashion. A point we have wished to make in this chapter is that there is ample evidence now to argue that discourse should, indeed, be one of the key levels included as part of such holistic investigations if we are to better grasp the dynamics of family policy change in ‘conservative’ welfare states in Europe, East Asia and beyond.

9 german women’s responses to the question ‘Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all when there is a child under school age?’ have undergone a staggering shift between 1988 and 2002: the share of those who thought the mother should stay at home declined from 73.9 to just 37.6 percentage points in this brief period (ISSP, Family and Changing Gender Roles, available online at http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules- study-overview/family-changing-gender-roles/). Japanese women’s responses have changed much less impressively: those favouring the stay-at-home option dropped from 63.4 per cent in 1994 to 52.4 per cent in 2002.

Child Care and Work-Life Balance in Low-Fertility Japan

Barbara G. Holthus

1. Introduction

Total fertility rates in both Germany and Japan are far below the replacement level of 2.1 and below the OECD average, calculated from the fertility rate of 25 countries. They hover around 1.37 (i.e., Germany in 2007, Japan in 2008) and are caused by multiple factors, among them the delay of marriage and motherhood. Faced at the same time with rapid ageing, policy makers in both Germany and Japan try to reverse the trend and raise their fertility rates through numerous social programmes and policies. But enticing their citizens to have more children is a difficult challenge. Both countries look enviously to countries like Sweden and France, where the birth rate is admirably high in comparison.1 These countries are used for comparison and as role models of countries that have succeeded in managing to reverse their fertility rate trends successfully. Ever since Japanese policy makers have started to concern themselves with the declining birth rate – a trend that began in the early 1970s, but was not a public (or political) issue until 19892 – the provision and improvement of child care, specifically day care services, were at the forefront of governmental concerns and efforts. These low fertility countermeasures3 (summarily called shōshika taisaku) have remained an important issue until today. In recent years – and much later than Japan – the German government too has put a special focus on improving the net of institutionalized day care provisions. In addition, as recently as 2007, the Japanese government, specifically the Cabinet Office (Naikakufu), turned to the improvement of people’s

1 In the year 2005, Sweden had a total fertility rate of 1.77 and France of 1.94, in contrast to 1.34 in Germany and 1.26 in Japan (OECD 2008b). 2 In this year the total fertility rate fell to a record low of 1.57. The media coined the term “1.57 shock” to accompany this process with numerous articles on the fertility issue. For more information, see Naikakufu (2009a: 2–3). 3 In regards to improving the day care system, the government developed several plans (e.g., the Angel Plan and New Angel Plan). For detailed information on the dozen plus policies and measures, see Naikakufu (2009a: 28–33). 204 barbara g. holthus work-life balance as the latest possible solution in the fight against the low birth rate. That is why, in December 2007, the government created the so-called Charter for Work-Life Balance and the Action Policy for Promoting Work-Life Balance, and announced the year 2008 as ‘Work- Life Balance Gannen’, the inaugural year of work-life balance. Specific goals of the work-life balance charter include: increasing the employment rate of women and the elderly, reducing part-time work and overtime, and increasing the rate of people taking their annual paid leave from currently 47 to 100 per cent. Yet obstacles in implementing these goals are plenty, such as insufficient financial backing by the government and a charter that ‘lacks teeth’, because penalties for non-compliant companies are nonexistent. Without penalties, compliance is likely to remain low. Expe rience with the 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) has shown that it is easier to change social policy programmes and laws than ingrained habits, customs, and social norms (Holthus 2008a).4 This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, but from a partially comparative German perspective. Combining the two elements of child care and work-life balance in a nationwide, non-representative survey for parents who have at least one child enrolled in a day care centre, this chapter aims to facilitate understanding of how these elements actually play out in peoples’ everyday lives. Questions of the 2008 survey were geared to help understand parental utilization of as well as experience and satisfaction with institutionalized child care services, and thus the parents’ actual work-life balance, their challenges of combining employment with raising children, as well as the roles, use and necessities of other care givers beyond the net of parental and institutionalized child care.

2. low Fertility and Female Employment

A major contributing factor to the declining fertility rate in Japan and Germany is the fact that many women delay having children to a

4 The work-life balance campaign of the Cabinet Office urges people to change and improve their personal work styles, suggesting that making a daily To-Do list and trying to keep meetings to one hour, for example, can lead to changes of people’s lives. But the efforts are put solely into the hands of individual employees, freeing companies of their responsibility to do their part: “A no-cost idea with a cute mascot – but with a doubtful outcome” (Holthus 2008c: 1). child care and work-life balance 205 later age. In Japan, the fertility rate of women aged 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 has greatly declined. The fertility rate of women aged 30 to 34, on the other hand, has actually increased slightly since 1975, and the rate of women aged 35 to 39 even more so.5 In Germany, the delay of motherhood is equally significant. The changes for the age ranges 25 to 29 and 35 to 39 are particularly telling. Whereas in 1994, 37.4 per cent of women gave birth at the age of 25 to 29, the number fell to 27.7 per cent in 2004. On the other hand, whereas 9.9 per cent of new mothers in 1994 were between the ages of 35 to 39, their share doubled by 2004 to 18.9 per cent. In 2004, married women living in Germany had their first child on average at the age of 29.6 years. The second child was born to mothers aged 31.3, and the third one at the age of 32.8 years. These numbers however vary by region, as married women living in western Germany (the former territory of the Federal Republic) had their first and second children later thanmarried women living in eastern Germany (the territory of the former GDR) (Germer and Holthus 2008; Holthus 2009a). However, there is an important difference between Germany and Japan. While in Japan births outside marriage account for only about two per cent of all births (Hertog 2009: 2) making marriage and childbirth almost synonymous, in Germany the rate of children born outside of marriage stands at 31 per cent (European Commission 2009: 14). In Japan, low fertility is first and foremost a problem of nuptuality; that is, a problem caused by the delay or the abandonment of marriages. Yet, in recent years, the concern has also focused on the decline in marital fertility. Not long ago, marital fertility in Japan had been well above the replacement level of 2.1. Recent years however have seen slight decreases here as well, and it remains to be seen how this will develop in the future (Shibata 2008). Other factors influencing the fertility rate – factors that are not limited to Japan or Germany – are poor economic performance and instability of labour market conditions, which lead to uncertainty about the future among the population (further delay in starting a family). Furthermore, Japan has seen rising costs of children and their education. Changes in women’s life courses are also blamed for the decline in the fertility rate (Hank and Kreyenfeld 2003a),

5 kōsei Rōdōshō (KRS). http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/suii03/ brth1–2.html (last accessed 28 January 2010). 206 barbara g. holthus most notably higher education levels of women, higher rates of female labour force participation, and an increasing number of women in career-track positions (although in Japan this number is still comparatively low). In Germany, the comparison of employment rates between women with and without children living in the household reveals clear differences in active labour participation. The younger the child, the less likely women are to work. Similar to Japan, a large proportion of mothers living in Germany quit their jobs for a while at the time of childbirth, returning to the job market once the children are older. About 75 per cent of mothers with a child under four years are not in the paid labour force. Full-time employment rates for mothers are low; the majority of them are employed part-time. And of the 33 per cent of employed mothers with children under three years, 63 per cent work part-time. Overall, in 2005, 70 per cent of all part-time work was performed by women, meaning that part-time work has remained the domain of women – at least in western Germany (Germer and Holthus 2008). In both Germany and Japan we still see the persistence of fairly ‘traditional’ ideals of how mothers and fathers should allocate their time and roles in balancing work and family life. These ideals favour the father as sole breadwinner, and the wife either as a full-time housewife or, if needs be, a part-time employee. In Germany, mothers are still sometimes labeled Rabenmütter [bad mothers; literally: raven mothers], if they do not care for their offspring themselves (Boling 2008a; Kegel 7 January 2005). And in Japan, the saying that children best stay with their mothers until the age of three is also a persisting stereotypical view on child care ideals. Concurrent with that, in both countries even the income tax system encourages married women’s withdrawal from or very limited role in the labour market. Nonetheless, the number of double-income families both in Japan and Germany is on the rise. Today not only single but also married women are in the labour market in higher numbers than before. In Japan, since 1996, the number of dual income family households (Figure 1) has superseded family forms in which the father is the sole breadwinner. As can be seen in Table 1 below, in the case of children in the household, significant differences of mothers’ employment status can be identified depending on the age of the children and the type of household. The employment rate of mothers is 45.5 per cent in households of parents and children only, whereas in three-generation households child care and work-life balance 207

Source: Naikakufu (2008b: 56). Figure 1 Changes in the number of dual-income family households and male breadwinner family households, Japan 1980–2008 the percentage lies at 65.4 per cent, and is as high as 77.1 per cent in the case of mother/child(ren) households. In regards to the age of children, the younger the child the less likely the mother is to work and the more likely a father is to work. Furthermore, in the case of children under the age of one, in only 20.5 per cent of nuclear families are both parents employed, whereas in three-generational households it is 31.4 per cent of the parents. So mothers’ employment seems to be more achievable in the living arrangement of a three-generational household, where other family members, such as grandparents, can assist and thus make child care easier. Of the full-time employed Japanese women who quit their jobs to raise their children, only 9.2 per cent successfully re-entered the job market later as full-time employees; 90.8 per cent of the women had to re-enter as irregular, non-full time employees (Nihon Fujin Dantai Rengōkai 2007: 81).6

6 For more detailed information on female employment in Japan after marriage and childbirth, see the survey results published by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT 2008). 208 barbara g. holthus 3.0 5.2 4.3 2.3 9.8 0.9% 1.3 0.9 0.8 11.5 66.7 17.9 Mother and and Mother father unemployed 6.5 - 31.0 61.8 43.0 23.2 10.3 11.3 52.5% 77.6 63.6 40.1 Only father father Only employed 8.5 1.6 9.2 8.9 0.9% 0.3 0.6 1.2 77.1 33.3 75.6 77.7 Only mother mother Only employed - - - - 57.3 31.4 43.3 65.4 45.5% 20.5 34.7 57.7 Father and and Father mother employed 3 A L aikan (2006: 27). aikan T 191 846 659 123 533 912 O 3,100 2,063 8,810 3,186 4,712 T iku K y ō iku A L A L A L T T T O O O okuritsu Josei K Josei okuritsu T 0–1 1–6 6–18 T 0–1 1–6 6–18 T 0–1 1–6 6–18 Age of child of Age ō jin K Parental employment by marital status and age of children of age and status marital by employment Parental able 1 able households unmarried child(ren) unmarried child(ren) Three-generation and parents Single Parents and and Parents T ō sei Gy H Dokuritsu Source: child care and work-life balance 209

Naturally, if the ratio of dual-earner families is increasing, then the need of parents of young children for external help in child care is also increasing, because parental child care is limited due to the parents’ working hours. Overall, research shows that female labour force participation is considered to have a negative effect on fertility. But it can be assumed that there is a positive correlation between child care provisions and female employment rates (Hank and Kreyenfeld 2003a). So child care (i.e., institutionalized child care) helps to keep women in the labour market and, more importantly, makes it possible in the first place. As for the correlation between child care and fertility rate development, academic research is equivocal. A study of Italy (Del Boca 2002) has shown only a weak positive influence of the existence of child care on the likelihood to have a child. In Sweden, a very recent study has suggested that lowering the costs of already very affordable child care, or making it completely free of charge, would significantly increase fertility (Mörk, Sjögren and Svaleryd 2009). In the case of Germany, however, Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003a) have shown that this correlation stands only in eastern Germany, and not in western Germany. In the case of Japan, Date and Shimizutani (2007) for example have identified growing costs of child care and a shortage of child care services, among other factors, as negatively affecting the fertility rate. At any rate, governments think that investment in day care as part of the social policy mix helps efforts to increase the fertility rate.

3. Institutionalized Child Care

For Japan, child care can be divided into four main forms: parental care, social networks, institutionalized child care, and alternative forms of child care (Figure 2).7 In terms of parental care, the majority of work in Japan is still done by mothers.8 In regards to social networks, besides siblings and neighbours, it is the role of grandparents that is most significant here.

7 For how this looks in regards to Germany, Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003b). 8 In Japan, fathers’ involvement in housework and child care up to age 6 is 33 minutes per day on average for child care and one hour total including housework. This is by far the lowest figure among the US, Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway. In Germany, fathers spend on average 3 hours on housework, of which 59 minutes are spent for child care (Naikakufu 2008b: 60). 210 barbara g. holthus

Source: Adapted from Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003b).

Figure 2 Modes of child care in Japan

Alternative forms of child care are child minders (hoiku mama), babysitters, and – in recent years – family support centres. However, the role of these alternative forms is still very limited. And while the government is trying to increase the number of hoiku mama many fold in the near future, quality concerns among the Japanese public remain. In terms of institutionalized child care, Japan still has a bifurcated system (Oishi 2008; Zhou, Oishi and Ueda 2002). In Japan the fundamental distinction for pre-school education/child care is between hoikuen [day care centres] and yōchien [preschool/kindergarten]. The German equivalent for hoikuen would be a mix of Krippe and Kindertagesstätte (Kita). Since 2006 a third type of institutionalized pre-school child care has been created, the so-called kodomo-en.9 The main foci of and differences between the three forms of pre-school institutionalized child care are listed in Table 2. Hoikuen care is available from as early as the 57th day after birth, until as late as the child’s entry into elementary school at the age of six. They operate under the authority of the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, and as a result their main focus is on providing full-time

9 The fourth element listed under institutionalized child care in Figure 2 is gakudō hoiku (i.e., after-school care for school-age children). However, gakudō hoiku is omit- ted below because a detailed analysis of this type of child care would go beyond the scope of this chapter. child care and work-life balance 211

Table 2 Comparison of institutionalized child care options in Japan Kindergarten Day care centre (hoikuen) (yōchien) Kodomo-en Ages: 0–6. Earliest Ages 3–6 Ages 0–6. First enrolment is 57 days centres were after birth, but only established as 5% of all children in recently as 2006 day care are younger and are a success than age 1 Under the authority Under the authority Under the joint of the Ministry of of the Ministry of authority of both health, Labour Education ministries and Welfare Care, not necessarily Education takes much Combines education education higher priority here with extended care than in the hoikuen hours Full-day care available, Usually part-time care, Both part-time and mostly for 9–11 hours about 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 full-time care (private hoikuen even p.m.; extended care available longer) until 5:00 p.m. Exclusively for Full-time employment Possibility for dual-earner families not possible with these full-time hours, thus mothers employment of are often full-time both parents housewives

Source: Data based on own survey and research.

care on behalf of working parents, even though in recent years some hoikuen have added some educational aspects into their care programmes. Their original aim – the firsthoikuen was founded in 1900 – was to aid poor working-class parents by providing basic care for their offspring.10 Yōchien care is for children from ages three to six, and are under the auspices of the education ministry. The most significant difference between these two child care forms is the opening hours. Yōchien have very limited opening hours, on average only until about 2:30 p.m.,

10 Uno (1999) for a detailed account of the history of hoikuen and yōchien in Japan. See also Holthus (2009b). 212 barbara g. holthus which does not make them an option for full-time working parents. And whereas yōchien focus on early childhood education, hoikuen were designed exclusively as care facilities for children of two-earner families or single (working) parent families and thus have extended opening hours until evening. The declining fertility rate in Japan is reflected in the declining demand for yōchien. Their enrolment figures have steadily dropped since as early as 1975. At the same time, however, the number of children in hoikuen has been growing, underlining an increased need for such facilities. Each year, the deadline for parents seeking to place their children in public hoikuen is at the end of January, and the term starts on April 1, mirroring the Japanese school system. Yet many children cannot find care: a total of 19,794 children remained on the waiting lists of public day care centres in 2006 (Holthus 2008b), and their number increased to 25,384 children in April 2009 (I-Kosodate Netto 2009). This bears testimony to the fact that, due to the rise in the number of dual-earner families, the need for institutional child care continues to increase – despite declining fertility and the so-called ‘new zero waiting list’ policy enacted by the Japanese government in 2008 (Naikakufu 2009a: 29). Moreover, there are many regional variations of the waiting list with a clear urban-rural divide. Whereas in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area demand for child care and thus the number of children on waiting lists are extremely high (7,939 children in Tokyo-to; 1,293 in Chiba-ken; 3,245 in Kanagawa-ken; 1,509 in Saitama-ken), several other prefectures have no children at all on their waiting lists, including Yamanashi, Fukui, Ishikawa, Miyazaki, and Toyama. It comes as no surprise that the fertility rate, broken down by prefectures, shows Tokyo as having the lowest fertility rate in the country with 1.05 in 2007 (Naikakufu 2009a: 7). As noted above, reforms of this bifurcated child care system are under way. Most importantly, in October 2006, the first kodomo-en, a unique mix of hoikuen and yōchien, were opened. Kodomo-en are under the joint authority of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare – an important ‘first’ in politics – and combine education with extended care hours like day care centres, which makes them a viable and highly attractive option for working parents. Already by August 2007, less than a year after the first kodomo-en opened its doors, the number of kodomo-en had risen to 105 nationwide, clearly showing that this new concept is highly successful. child care and work-life balance 213

In regards to hoikuen, it is important to understand the diversity among them. And here is a significant difference to German day care centres. First of all, in Japan there is a basic distinction between licensed (ninka) and unlicensed (mu-ninka) day care. Among licensed day care centres, a further distinction has to be drawn between private and public centres. Unlicensed day care centres are all private, be they for profit or non-profit. The trend in recent years is away from public day care centres, towards more private care. Public day care centres charge fees based on parental income and are on average cheaper than privately-run institutions. They also have shorter opening hours on average. While public day care centres are open until 7 or 8 p.m. at the latest, private, licensed facilities are often open as late as 10 p.m. Currently, public day care service is provided for 20.3 per cent of children under the age of three. In comparison to Germany, that number falls somewhere in between eastern and western Germany. In Germany, on the other hand, institutionalized child care is primarily public and fees, which like in Japan are charged according to household income, are relatively affordable. Since 1996, parents in Germany are legally entitled to half-day institutionalized care for children aged three to six in a public day care centre. Although this is a step in the right direction, half-day care still does not allow the main care-giving parent to pursue full-time employment. The situation for children under age three is still lacking that provision, but changes are to be implemented (see below) (Germer and Holthus 2008; Holthus 2009a). Like Japan, where regional differences in child care provision and waiting lists are marked, it is equally difficult to talk about Germany as a whole. Even though Germany’s reunification occurred twenty years ago, many differences between the former eastern and western part remain quite visible – in employment rates, population ageing, fertility rates, social problems, in the role of women and men in society and household, and in the system of institutionalized child care (Holthus 2009a). For example, in regards to institutionalized child care nationwide in Germany, there is space for 22.1 per cent of all children under the age of three; in eastern Germany day care space is available for 36.7 per cent of all children under the age of three, while in western Germany it is available for only 9.6 per cent of all children (BMFSFJ 2007: 3; Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2004). This shows that 214 barbara g. holthus the availability of day care facilities in Germany, and particularly in western Germany, is limited and less than in Japan. Besides these quantitative shortcomings, there are further problems in the German system. Opening hours are limited, with day care centres often closing at 5 p.m., or by 6 p.m. at the latest. Opening hours beyond 6 p.m. are rare. A further serious shortcoming is that about 50 per cent of all day care centres still close for lunch, effectively ruling out any full-time employment of the care-giving parent. Furthermore, half of all employed people in Germany work either on weekends, at night, or as shift-workers, yet the majority of day care opening hours are not flexible and do not include weekends or nights.11 Whereas in Japan since 1990 policies have been designed to increase the number of day care facilities, in Germany such policies developed several years later. The policies themselves however are very similar. From 2005 to 2009, Ursula von der Leyen, herself a mother of seven, was Minister of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. Putting a lot of effort into tackling the shortcomings of day care supply in Germany, her efforts were successful in so far as the German government decided in 2007 that the number of day care places for children under the age of three was to triple by the year 2013 in order to provide space for 35 per cent of all children in that age group,12 even though recent reports show that the need will likely be significantly higher than 35 per cent (Spiegel Online 8 January 2010; Bechtold and Rei mann 7 January 2010). Nonetheless, beginning in 2013, parents will have the legal right to claim a day care place for children under age three in addition to the already existing entitlement for children aged three to six.

4. Parental Survey

4.1 Methodology As noted above, much has been written about Japan’s low birth rate, and it has been suggested that the provision of day care for children has

11 In Japan, too, shift-workers have a hard time finding care and thus often are forced to turn from public to private day care options. 12 In addition, if parents do not put their child into day care, they are nonetheless entitled to a cash payment of 150 euros per month to support their care-giving at home. child care and work-life balance 215 a bearing on it. However, surveys on day care and actual parental experience with it are few and far between (Boling 2002: 15). This section aims to reduce the resultant lack of knowledge of how people use day care services and what they think of them. In order to reach out to people who have first-hand experience with child care issues and day care, I conducted a qualitative and quantitative survey in 2008 with a sample of parents who have at least one child in a public or private day care facility (hoikuen).13 Survey sampling also took regional variations of day care experiences into consideration. In the first stage, five private day care centres were selected through a convenience sample of personal contacts. Their selection does not present a regionally representative sample. Informal permission was obtained from each of the centres. The selection of public day care centres aimed at maximum diversity: rural and urban areas, suburban areas, regional centres other than Tokyo, and centres in Tokyo proper (from the urban metropolitan centre of the city to the outskirts).14 First, I defined seven large rural regions, and then chose one prefecture each, which was considered representative for each of the regions: Okinawa, Miyazaki, Okayama, Shiga, Gifu, Tochigi, Akita. Second, for surveying the urban area, I chose Tokyo and, in order to achieve variability for this large city, I split it into four sub-regions. Third, for rural and urban areas, I chose another non-Tokyo industrial area, Amagasaki, as well as two non- Tokyo regional centres, Sendai and Fukuoka. This made a total of 15 areas, from which to choose public day care centres.15 Permission was eventually granted by eight (seven)16 public centres. A complete list of the total of 13 private and public day care centres is given in the Appendix of this chapter. It provides basic information on location, size, type (public or private), and opening hours. In this nationwide yet

13 As public day care centres charge fees based on parental income and are on average cheaper than privately-run institutions, the type of hoikuen can be one of several helpful markers for social stratification indicators of parents. 14 I would like to thank PD Dr. Ralph Lützeler for his geographical knowledge in helping with the selection process. 15 I would like to thank Eiko Sugimoto for her untiring assistance in making endless phone calls to the local government offices and the hoikuen directors, in order to get approval for submitting the surveys. 16 The town hall in Naha mistakenly suggested a private day care facility, not a public one. As contacts to the public day care centres were only possible through the local government offices, I had little influence on their choice of day care facility for my survey – the only exception being that the number of parents at a given day care centre should ideally be 100 or more. 216 barbara g. holthus non-representative sample, out of a total of 1,215 parents contacted, 350 parents responded (a response rate of 29%) to my questionnaire of 48 questions. The survey questions focused on general information about the parents (demographics, employment, working hours, etc.), their day care selection process for their children, how they combined day care drop- offs and pick-ups with their work schedules, their additional usage of babysitter services and other care givers, their opinion on their personal work-life balance, a consideration of their future situation (once their children entered elementary school), their general thoughts on the institutionalized child care system, and finally thoughts on governmental efforts in helping with the improvement of work-life-balance and fostering an increase in the birth rate (shōshika taisaku).

4.2 The Parents: Demographics and Employment At the time of the survey, the 350 parents had a total of 623 children. This makes a (survey) fertility rate of 1.78, which is much higher than the national overall TFR of 1.34, though significantly lower than the national marital fertility rate of 2.09.17 The majority of surveyed mothers and fathers were born in the 1970s, with the fathers overall being slightly older than the mothers (Table 3). The mothers were born between 1957 and 1988, with the majority being born in the 1970s. The fathers were born between 1952 and 1988, also with the majority being born in the 1970s.

Table 3 Parental age distribution Birth cohort Mother Father 1950–1959 2 (0.6%) 10 (3.4%) 1960–1969 88 (26.2%) 113 (38.2%) 1970–1979 215 (64.0%) 157 (53.0%) 1980–1989 31 (9.2%) 16 (5.4%) TOTAL 336 (100.0%) 296 (100.0%)

Source: Data based on own survey and research.

17 This difference could be due either to the fact that parents may yet have further children, or that the sample population of this survey over-represents dual working parents. child care and work-life balance 217

Their first children were born between August 1984 and January 2008.18 As is revealed by Figure 3, the majority of parents have either one or two children. The highest number of children in a family is six (0.3%; one family only). In order to understand the constraints in parental work-life balance, it is important first to understand their employment situation and status, which, as we have seen, follows a fairly typical pattern. Almost four out of five fathers are in regular employment (78.6%), whereas as much as 32.5 per cent of mothers are employed as part timers (cf. Table 4). In terms of occupation, 60.1 per cent of fathers and 41.7 per cent of mothers are professional, technical, managerial, or official workers.Y et 31.2 per cent of mothers are employed in clerical positions (in contrast to only 8 per cent of the fathers), which correlates with their high part- time employment rates in the general population. It is not surprising then that overall much more fathers than mothers regularly work long hours. Whereas 71.2 per cent of fathers work 8 to

Source: Data based on own survey and research. Figure 3 Number of children in the sample households

18 Second children were born between 1993 and 2008; third children between 1999 and 2008. 218 barbara g. holthus

Table 4 Parental employment Employment status Mother Father Regular staff 151 (44.2%) 232 (78.6%) Part-time worker 111 (32.5%) 10 (3.4%) Temporary worker (arubaito) 14 (4.1%) 6 (2.0%) Self-employed 26 (7.6%) 36 (12.2%) Not employed 13 (3.8%) 2 (0.7%) Other 27 (7.9%) 9 (3.1%) TOTAL 342 (100.0%) 295 (100.0%)

Source: Data based on own survey and research.

10 hours daily, and 22.2 per cent between 11 and 15 hours daily, about half of mothers work 8 to 10 hours (49.1%), and only 1.2 per cent work longer hours (cf. Table 5). An even bigger difference lies in overtime work. Only 54.3 per cent of mothers work overtime, whereas an astounding 99.6 per cent of fathers do. And while the majority of mothers work overtime only between one and four times per month, the majority of fathers work overtime almost every day. What the survey data point to is that overall fathers are employed more often in full-time positions, have higher-ranking occupations, and that their working hours (including overtime) are significantly higher, compared to mothers.

4.3 Institutional Child Care On average, the first-born children were 16 months old when their parents placed them into day care. Of the children that entered private day care facilities, 41 per cent entered before the age of one (12 months old), but only 20 per cent of the children in public day care entered before they turned one. Of the 350 parents, 144 (41.1%) had their children in a private day care facility, and 206 (58.9%) in public day care. Parents were asked in qualitative questions about the different existing forms of day care, and what they considered to be the advantages and disadvantages of each. The differences turned out to be marked. For public day care, the most significant advantages mentioned were the low costs (60 parents) and the quality of care (71), in particular the long experience of ‘veteran care givers’ (beteran no hoikushi); as disadvantages they cited short opening hours (63) and an overall child care and work-life balance 219

Table 5 Parental working hours Average daily working hours Mother Father 0 (not working) 4 (1.2%) 2 (0.7%) 1 to 7 hours 160 (48.5%) 17 (5.9%) 8 to 10 hours 162 (49.1%) 205 (71.2%) 11 to 15 hours 4 (1.2%) 64 (22.2%) TOTAL 330 (100.0%) 288 (100.0%) Overtime work (yes/no) 54.3% 99.6% Length of overtime Mother Father in hours per day 1 to 4 hours 114 (85.0%) 164 (80.0%) 5 to 9 hours 12 (9.0%) 28 (13.7%) 10 hours and more 8 (6.0%) 13 (6.3%) TOTAL 134 (100.0%) 205 (100.0%) Frequency of overtime Mother Father per month 1 to 4 times 57 (41.6%) 21 (10.0%) 5 to 9 times 30 (21.9%) 31 (14.7%) 10 to 14 times 23 (16.8%) 38 (18.0%) 15 to 19 times 9 (6.6%) 29 (13.7%) 20 and more times (daily) 18 (13.1%) 92 (43.6%) TOTAL 137 (100.0%) 211 (100.0%)

Source: Data based on own survey and research.

inflexibility (daytime PTA meetings, strict rules and regulations, high degree of bureaucracy). For private day care centres, the most frequent disadvantages mentioned were high cost (63 parents) and that staff were often young and inexperienced (17). These disadvantages, however, were outweighed by the advantages: long opening hours (46), educational aspects, flexibility and individuality (45), and good quality (62). Asked about their motives for choosing either public or private day care, respondents revealed that their choice was not only influenced by cost, quality of care, and opening hours, but also to a significant extent by location. Proximity to home was considered important as it had the potential to significantly affect morning and evening commuting times. 220 barbara g. holthus

Parents were also asked about their second-hand knowledge and opinions of kodomo-en. Even though the news media has to a certain extent reported on these new types of day care, numerous parents did not yet know anything about them. However, all parents who were aware of kodomo-en, had only heard positive things. Several mentioned that they wished a kodomo-en would open in their area, so that they could send their child there.

4.4 Parental Care Versus Grandparental Care According to Boling (2002: 5), there is no data available on the extent to which child care is provided by family members in Japan. Thus questions geared particularly towards grandparental care – its extent and what it encompasses – are of utmost interest as this is seemingly the least well-researched aspect in regards to child care in Japan. In recent years, however, some research in Japan has identified the importance of grandparental child care, in particular the surveys conducted by the research institute of Benesse Corporation (Benesse Jisedai Ikusei Kenkyōjo). One survey, conducted in 2006 (Benesse 2007), included questions on the involvement of grandparents in child care. It has to be noted though that among the sample population in this survey only 18 per cent of parents had their children in regular institutionalized care, and that the survey was limited to expectant mothers and parents of children up to the age of two. In another survey by Benesse from 2007, the sample is nationwide and was conducted among working mothers with children up to age one. This second survey showed that if the grandparents live close by, they have a strong presence. However, the survey also identified cases in which the grandparents are still working themselves, so that even though they might live close by, they cannot help out at short notice, for example when the child is sick (Tamago Kurabu and Hiyoko Kurabu 2008: 81, 108–109). Proximity, therefore, is not the only indicator for the possibility or likelihood of grandparents being able to help with child care duties. In my own survey, the household composition is slightly different from the national data. In my sample population all parents have children. Therefore, to make the data comparable, I calculated the national percentages leaving out households without children (cf. Table 6, right column). My survey over-represents nuclear family households by 10 per cent. Three-generational households are only slightly overrepresented. However, when analyzing the extent of grandparental child care and work-life balance 221

Table 6 Distribution of household form Own survey data National average data (2000) Household % with Household forms Cases % forms % children Single mother + child 32 9.2 Single parents 8 15.4 + children Single father + child 1 0.3 Parents + 32 61.5 children Mother, father, child 251 71.9 Three- 8 15.4 generational households Three-generational, 33 9.5 Households 4 7.7 with maternal together grandparents with other relatives Three-generational, 25 7.2 Single 27 – with paternal households grandparents Household together 7 2.0 Couples 21 – with relatives other without than grandparents children TOTAL 349 100.0 TOTAL 100 100.0

Source: Own survey data; Takeda and Kinoshita (2007: 21). involvement in child care, it is important to factor in how far away grandparents live from the nuclear family in those cases where they do not live together. I found that half of all grandparents live within a one-hour travel radius from the family, which (theoretically) allows them to help out when necessary.19 Several questions in my survey focused on understanding the role of parental care versus grandparental care, and their significance in addition to institutional child care. These questions were geared towards identifying (i) the child care provider during the period before enrolment into day care, (ii) the child care provider responsible for the day

19 The survey did not ask whether grandparents are still actively employed, thus possibly preventing them from care-giving. Also not inquired about were health status or other factors that could prevent care-giving as well. 222 barbara g. holthus care runs twice a day, and (iii) the child care provider during a child’s illness and its often sudden inability to attend day care.

Care giver pre-day care: For the question ‘Who provided the majority of care for your child before you enrolled him/her in this day care centre?’ multiple answers were possible (cf. Table 7). In the overwhelming majority it was mothers who provided care for the child before enrolment in a day care centre. Fathers were indicated as care givers in 15 per cent of cases; however, this occurred only in combination with the mother as additional care giver. Grandparents were checked in a total of 22 per cent of the cases, with the parents of the mother taking a larger role than the parents of the father.

Day care runs: The question on who does the day care runs in the family shows that, in the mornings, the majority are mothers (78.6%), with only 32.6 per cent fathers (114) taking their child to day care in the morning. However, when looking at how many fathers are solely responsible for taking their child to school in the morning, the number falls to just 13 per cent (47 fathers). The grandparental role in the morning is rather limited (8.6%). In the afternoon or evening, the percentage of mothers collecting their child from day care (cf. Table 8) is even higher than in the morning (84.9%). The same goes for the share of grandparents, which is also higher in the afternoon/evening (from 8.6 per cent in the mornings to 20.9 per cent in the evenings). This reflects the parents’ longer work- days, which makes picking up children very difficult, particularly for

Table 7 Care giver before day care enrolment Care giver* Cases Percentage Mother 307 87.7 Father 52 14.9 Grandparents (mother’s side) 54 15.4 Grandparents (father’s side) 23 6.6 Other public day care centre 11 3.1 Other private day care centre 43 12.3 Child minder (hoiku mama) 3 0.9 Other 18 5.1 Note: * Multiple answers were possible. Source: Data based on own survey and research. child care and work-life balance 223

Table 8 Care givers for day care runs Afternoon/evening Care giver* Morning drop-off pick-up Mother 275 (78.6%) 297 (84.9%) Father 114 (32.6%) 90 (25.7%) Mother and father 15 (4.3%) 21 (6.0%) together Grandparents 30 (8.6%) 73 (20.9%) Other 7 (2.0%) 23 (6.6%)

Note: * Multiple answers were possible. Source: Data based on own survey and research. fathers since they are the ones with the greatest amount of and most frequent overtime.

Sick child care giver: When a child is sick and cannot attend day care, the prevalence of maternal care, even among these mostly working mothers, is again obvious (83.4%). When the children are sick, it is usually up to the mothers to call work to ask to stay at home for the day. Sick child leave is usually up to the mother as only very few fathers manage to pitch in and take days off work when the child is sick. So it is usually the mother who has to inconvenience her co-workers when she calls in sick. Taking into consideration how much one inconveniences fellow colleagues is strong among mothers and fathers, but mothers report having more understanding colleagues than the fathers do. The role of grandparents too is revealed through these three questions. Their role becomes most significant in the event of their grand- child becoming sick. In 51.4 per cent of cases grandparents were checked as taking over full time as care givers (cf. Table 9). All these factors point to a significant role of grandparents in caregiving, even though the children are in day care. Thus in Japan it is not so much an either/or choice between day care and grandparental care, but rather a combination of both that is often relied upon by working parents. In the case of Germany, Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003a) point to the significance of non-institutionalized child care arrangements by grandparents in western Germany, and the significance of institutionalized child care in eastern Germany. However, in western Germany, it is a question of grandparents acting as care givers instead of institutional 224 barbara g. holthus

Table 9 Sick child care givers Care giver* Cases Percentage Mother 292 83.4 Father 88 25.1 Grandparents 180 51.4 Family support centre 9 2.6 Babysitter service 14 4.0 Other 44 12.6

Note: * Multiple answers were possible. Source: Data based on own survey and research. child care, mainly because the supply of day care centres is inadequate and parents are thus unable to secure a day care place for their children. In the case of eastern Germany, with its considerably higher satu- ration of day care centres, it is the existence of day care centres which influences and facilitates the transition to a first child.

4.5 Alternative Care Options Last but not least, the survey results clearly show that caregiver options falling under the category of ‘alternative care givers’ (cf. Figure 2 above) play only a limited role. For example, asked whether they had ever used a babysitter, parents indicated obvious hesitation, antipathy and even anxiety regarding babysitters in the qualitative comments they gave. Very few parents (42) had ever employed a babysitter (12%). The most frequently voiced concerns were: ‘I can’t entrust my child to a stranger’, ‘I can’t trust a stranger in my house/apartment, while I am not home’, and ‘A babysitter is too expensive’. Some parents also mentioned that they did not have any information about the availability of babysitters and thus had not used them (yet). However, asked about their level of satisfaction with their babysitter, the overwhelming majority of parents who had experience with babysitters was ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ (27 of 41 parents, 65.9%) and would use one again.

5. Conclusion and Outlook

As the number of double-income families in Japan is on the rise, it is to be assumed that the provision of day care is also a concern for an increasing percentage of these families. Thus this issue is of growing child care and work-life balance 225 social importance and therefore highly relevant for understanding contemporary Japan. The analysis of parental working hours showed that work-life balance remains a struggle and a serious obstacle for married couples when deciding to have more children. In my survey the parents pointed to the need for multi-level government aid. Parents were very vocal on qualitative questions about how they think the government could improve their work-life balance and thus make it more attractive for parents to have children. The main points, in order of frequency, are as follows:

(1) Financial support. Parents wanted, among other things, day care to be made cheaper and/or free; medical care for children to be provided for free; child support payments to be increased; child care leave to be financially supported by the government; and support for babysitter services to be provided. (2) Improvement of workplace conditions. Parents suggested that overtime work be reduced or prohibited; companies that force employees to work overtime be punished; working hours be shortened and made more flexible; and more work sharing and parental leave be provided, in particular for fathers. These answers express a desired value change in gender roles. (3) Improvement of the hoikuen situation. Suggestions include reducing waiting lists, providing sick child day care, making day care cheaper, prolonging opening hours, and improving the overall quality. (4) A more child-friendly environment. Suggestions to improve or create a more child-friendly environment include more parks and child-safe streets.

The findings concerning the role of the different forms of child care can be summarized as follows:

– ‘Traditional’ patterns of care-giving persist (i.e., the prevalence of maternal care versus paternal care). – Institutionalized care – compared to Germany – is ‘better’ in Japan (more care facilities, longer hours on average, relatively high quality, existence of a private child care market). Yet, from the point of view of parents, there is still ample room for improvement: demand for 226 barbara g. holthus

more and cheaper or even free child care, a reduction in waiting lists for public day care, extended hours, and sick child care. – Care-giving in numerous forms by grandparents in Japan is an un- derstudied but significant element in caring for Japan’s young – even today. The fact that grandparents to a large degree help out when the child is sick points to a great need for institutionalized child care facilities for sick children, so that the burden lies not so heavily on mothers, (fathers,) and grandparents. – The two main arguments against not using babysitters are that parents considered them too expensive and see them as strangers and therefore hard to trust. Grandparents on the other hand seem ideal to fill that gap, since their ultimate advantage can be seen in the fact that they are free and that parents can trust them. child care and work-life balance 227 ) eturn rate eturn ( Continued 27 (50%) 13 (81%) 51 (50%) 22 (35%) 13 (24%) 17 (13%) 19 (21%) 28 (22%) 30 (23%) 39 (26%) R 54 16 63 55 89 102 130 130 128 150 Sample Sample size 7:00–19:00 7:15–19:15 7:15–19:15 7:00–19:00 7:00–19:00 7:30–19:00 7:00–19:00 7:30–22:00 7:00–19:00 7:00–19:00 Opening hours (founded in 1965) (founded care) day (catholic (opened in 2007**) (opened 2 years 0 to ages 6 years 0 to ages 2 age to 3 months 5 years 1 to ages 6 age to 6 months 6 years 1 to ages 6 age to 8 weeks 6 years to 57 days 6 age to 8 weeks Additional Additional information child/other) of (age 6 age to 8 weeks Appendix ochigi- ken ken anagawa- , T okyo okyo okyo , K , T , T , Chiba- ken , T ken , Shiga- ken , Gifu- shi iratsuka- , Shikoku ken agawa- ocation ku Shinjuku- ku Shibuya- , Shikoku Ehime- ken K shi Utsunomiya- shi Urayasu- Seki- shi Ōtsu- shi ku Shinjuku- L H Surveyed day care centres care Surveyed day ype (private/public) able 10 able hoikujo* hoikuen* * hoikujo ninkagai Private, hoikujo* ninka Private, ninkagai Private, hoikujo* ninka Private, Public Public Public Public ō ninsh Private, T T Public 228 barbara g. holthus ninshō 50 (38%) 18 (20%) 23 (31%) eturn rate eturn 350 (29%) R 92 75 131 1,215 Sample Sample size Ninkagai hoikuen Ninkagai resemble 7:00–19:00 7:30–19:00 7:00–19:00 owever, whereas these provide care for children children for care provide these whereas owever, Opening hours H okyo-government licensed and subsidized day care facil - care day subsidized and licensed okyo-government T : hoikujo Ninshō 5 months to age 6 age to 5 months ages 1 to 6 years 1 to ages 6 age to 3 months Additional Additional information child/other) of (age ken y ō go- mu-ninka , mu-ninka hoikuen which are unlicensed day care facilities. , H ken , Fukuoka- ken , Okinawa- ocation shi Naha- Amagasaki- shi shi Fukuoka- L okyo-government licensed and get subsidies from their local ward office. office. ward local their from subsidies get and licensed okyo-government T Surveyed day care centres (Contd.) centres care Surveyed day Ninkagai : hoikuen Ninkagai Not to be confused with ype (private/public) able 10 able are limited until age 2 or 3, thus are only for very for small children. only are 3, thus 2 or age until limited are hoikuen ninkagai school, elementary their entry 0 until into age from up-scale an runs furthermore company successful very This Japan. in providers care day private largest the of one by run is centre care day This ** service also service added care the elderly. recently for and babysitter ninka hoikujo* ninka Private, T otal Public facility. care day licensed government National hoikujo: * Ninka Notes: Public ity. , they are also are they , hoikujo T T Actors of Social Policy Making in Japan: A Look at the Individual Level

Axel Klein

1. introduction

As other contributions in this volume show, low fertility in combination with increasing life expectancy has been a growing threat to basic systems that move Japanese society. Since the early 1990s, the political elite has agreed on the urgent need for effective political responses to this major socio-demographic problem and, since then, the goal of pro-natal policy has not been contested by any political party (cf. Cabinet Office 2009: 41–76). In spite of this unanimity, however, Japanese governments for the most part did not present the issue as a priority on their agenda; their policy output has not only failed to substantially reverse the trend, but also been produced with comparatively little determination. Surely, opinion may be split regarding the political resolve underlying the efforts in the policy field. The 2009 White Book on a Society with Low Fertility published by the Cabinet Office (2009: 29) lists 17 initiatives from 1994 to 2009, presenting a comprehensive set of approaches to the problem. Studies that direct their attention exclusively towards these pro-natal policies often suggest that the Japanese government has been quite active in fighting low fertility (e.g. Coleman 2008). But when examined from a comparative perspective, it becomes obvious that in spite of the colourful White Books, the long list of policy approaches and the occasional media attention, low fertility has been sidelined on the political agenda for most of the last 20 years. For example, over the ten-year period of the coalition of LDP and Kōmeitō, only Jun’ichirō Koizumi became engaged in the policy field of low fertility. The other five Prime Ministers of theLD P1 neither mentioned low fertility in their campaigns for leadership nor did they declare it a central policy issue for their administrations.

1 Keizō Obuchi, Yoshirō Mori, Shinzō Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, Tarō Aso. 230 axel klein

There is further evidence of the comparatively little attention low fertility was given by most LDP-governments. First of all, the departments in charge of fertility policy in the Cabinet Office and in the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) had considerably less staff than, for example, those dealing with long-term careinsurance, health care or the pension system.2 Second, financial resources allotted to family policies (of which fertility policy is just one part) on average made up only 3.58 per cent of the total budget allotted to social expenditure over the period from 1990 to 2007.3 Third, and in contrast to other policy fields, fertility attracted almost no ‘tribe politicians’ (zoku giin); that is, lawmakers from the ruling parties who through their engagement in a policy field have acquired deeper knowledge and often represent the interests of a particular industry or lobby.4 Without zoku giin, the policy field lacked an important political driving force. But even if these points fail to convince the reader, there should be agreement over the assumption that there was (and still is) not only considerable room for more political energy and financial resources to be applied to the fight against low birth rates, but also the political and social need to do so. The struggle against low fertility and the resulting ageing of society simply require more effort than Japan has seen so far. One important question to be asked then is why pro-natal policy in Japan has taken this particular (underdeveloped) shape. There are social, historical, economic and political factors that need to be taken into consideration, many of which are examined in this volume. Among the political factors, however, there is one that has not attracted much attention: the individual policy makers. Although they are the ones who sign themselves as responsible for policies and are in positions to shape and implement them, an actor-centred approach that examines these individuals remains a gap to be filled in social science research. Among the many academic studies that deal with low fertility, only a smaller part touches upon these political actors. Those that

2 interview with Kumiko Bandō, Director General, Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office (Tokyo, November 2007). 3 The lowest share was 3.3, the highest 4.1 per cent. In the year 2005 these figures were lower than those of the US (4.21%) and Germany (7.08%) (IPSS 2009). 4 hrebenar described zoku giin as the “spearhead of pressure group politics” (2000: 139). In the policy arena of fertility, only LDP politicians who represented the interests of the cram school industry apparently pushed policies to improve work-life balance and to financially support the education of children (Interview with Yutaka Fukushima, Member of the House of Representatives for Kōmeitō, Tokyo, September 2008). social policy making in japan 231 do conduct their analysis at the organizational level, examining parties, committees and other involved groups. Individual actors only seem to attract attention when they are in exposed positions.5 The following pages contain an attempt at filling this research gap. The approach applied will be a psychological one, the leading hypothesis being that intrinsic motivation of policy makers affects the degree of engagement in a particular policy arena. The idea that motivation affects behaviour is basic, but psychological approaches to Japanese politics are rare and have never been applied to the explanation of fertility policy. Academic studies on pro-natal policy in Japan (and other areas of public policy) have hardly ever gone beyond the assumption that a male-dominated government has in general been passive to demands that challenge the traditional family model and gender roles (cf. Schoppa 2006: 195). This article presents a test of applying a psychological approach and in order to do so proceeds in a simple manner. After a short review of the literature on low fertility and pro-natal policy in Japan, Section 3 will explain the basic theory of intrinsic motivation. Based thereupon Section 4 will present the method and research design selected for this study, and Section 5 discusses the results. As the concluding Section 6 summarizes, applying a psychological approach indeed seems to hold considerable potential for future research.6

2. Politics in the Literature on Low Fertility

The number of sophisticated academic studies on Japanese fertility development is too huge to be enumerated in this article. Other contributions to this volume give an idea of how intensively Japanese and foreign scholars have examined the field. Most of them have concentrated on two points: the causes that led to the fertility rate’s significant decline since the mid-1970s and its consequences. Major factors now widely understood to have influenced Japanese fertility include fewer and later marriages, the rise in human capital investments, rising opportunity costs for women, Japanese work culture, and

5 examples are Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi and the first Minister in Charge of the Low Birth Rate, Kuniko Inoguchi. 6 On this research question the author has also published an article in German which is based on a partly different empirical basis (Klein 2011). 232 axel klein declining employment chances for young graduates from high school and colleges. In the light of their results some studies have also evaluated public policy and deducted (more or less general) policy recommendations from their findings (Boling 2008b; Lee, Ogawa and Matsukura 2008; McDonald 2008; Roberts 2003; Shirahase 2007; Takeda 2005). In addition, some studies have compared policy measures in Japan with those of other countries (Atoh 2005b; Suzuki 2006), or tried to evaluate them empirically (cf. Date and Shimizutani 2007: 29–32). Nevertheless, there is hardly any study that would declare pro-natal policy in Japan to be either successful or sufficient in the way it was designed over the almost 20 years from its beginning in 1990 to the end of the LDP-led governments in August 2009. In some studies, the pro-natal legacy of Japan’s wartime past is regarded as a major factor that suppressed fertility policy for most of the time since 1945 (Schoppa 2006; Takeda 2005). Low fertility, however, also stayed low on the political agenda until 1990 because it was hardly considered a problem until then. From the early 1990s on it earned political as well as media attention, but still fell short of having anywhere near the political significance that social policy fields like health, pension or long-term care gathered. The key for understanding why pro-natal policy from then on has taken its particular shape can be found in the political decision centre.7 Despite the possibilities for interest groups, academics and the mass media to influence the process and outcome, the governing parties and the ministries have been the major players in policy making. Taking an actor-centred approach, there are two complementary ways to analyse the policy making process: One is to focus on the organizational or group level, another one is to go deeper and look at the individual policy makers. The first option clearly has been dominant in academic research, while there has been hardly any attempt to apply the second. Some major studies on fertility from recent years prove this point. Takeda (2005), for example, presents in detail social developments and state interventions since the Meiji period.

7 The term ‘political decision centre’ refers to the ruling parties and their politicians, to parliament, the cabinet and the ministries. Quite a number of studies use the terms ‘state’, ‘government’ and/or ‘LDP’ almost synonymously to name the source of public policy and political decision making, but for the purpose of this study ‘political decision centre’ is more appropriate. social policy making in japan 233

She focuses on parties, committees and other groups of actors, but hardly mentions individuals and when doing so does not add a closer analysis of them. Ōbuchi and Atoh (2005) in their edited volume present articles on many policy aspects regarding low fertility, but again the analyses of actors stay mostly at the organizational level. Schoppa’s focus is on why Japanese women have not “rebelled” against the “system of convoy capitalism” (2006: 204) that has been far from supportive for them in many respects, one of them being pro-natal policies. Although Schoppa does look deeper into the workings of ministries and the LDP, he hardly touches the level of individual politicians. Furukawa (2003) in his study on social welfare in Japan argues along the lines of theories of bureaucratic dominance, in which politicians do not play a decisive role in policy formation. Although he enumer- ates all actors that potentially could participate at some stage in the policy process except political parties, his explanations remain rather unspecific. Masuda (2008), a former bureaucrat at the MHLW and later professor for social welfare at Tokyo’s Sophia University was personally involved in drafting pro-natal policies from 2004 until 2007. His report is critical with the policies themselves, but mostly positive when it comes to the work and cooperation of the responsible departments within the ministry and the LDP. Still, this study also falls short of analyzing individual actors.

3. intrinsic Motivation

When turning to the individual level, one possible aspect to focus on is motivation. Motivation is central to understanding what people do, why and how they do it. As Beck (2000: 2) puts it, “[m]otivational concepts are supposed to help explain the fact that under virtually identical external circumstances, there are great variations in individual behaviour.” For one, psychology has gone to great lengths to examine the kind of motivation that Lamming (2004: 2) described as “a pro- gram of action specified within the individual […] a repertoire of instinctive, ‘hardwired’, patterns of behaviour” that can be triggered by an appropriate stimulus. The purposive approach to motivation, on the other hand, has focused more on the cognitive side of behaviour and emphasized “the goal-directed nature of behaviour” (Beck 2000: 25). The concept of intrinsic motivation is based on the assumption that 234 axel klein

“people are active organisms working to master their internal and external environments,” as Deci and Ryan explain, adding that intrinsic motivation refers to the “innate, organismic needs for competence and self-determination[, needs which] function as an important ener- gizer of behaviour” (Deci and Ryan 1985: 32, 35). This concept is often contrasted with extrinsic motivation which evolves out of external rewards for certain behaviour. Pupils, for example, are exposed to numerous extrinsic rewards at school, like marks, praise from their teachers and parents, and so forth (cf. Lens 2001). There are a number of approaches to define and conceptualize intrinsic motivation, and psychology has developed the concept farther than is needed here. For the purpose of this study it seems sufficient to keep in mind what Deci and Flaste (1995) explain, namely that intrinsic motivation requires three necessary conditions: self-determination, personal relatedness, and a sense or the perception of accomplishment. By analyzing to which degree these three elements are given in the case of a sample group of lawmakers, it can be better understood why and how its members act in the policy arena of low fertility. The existence ofself-determination , which is closely related to autonomy, implies that an actor can choose between alternatives. In the concept of intrinsic motivation, choice is not synonymous with decision, as choice only exists when the actor is not restrained in his decision for one alternative. Deci and Ryan (1985: 154–156) assert, for example, that automatic responses or behaviour controlled by reinforcement contingencies are not self-determined. As Pomerantz, Grolnick and Price put it, “individuals need to experience their behaviour as ema- nating from themselves, so that they feel they are acting out of their own choice” (2005: 260). In the world of politics, lawmakers are constrained in their activities by many factors, but usually have a sufficient amount of autonomy to choose freely some of the policy fields they get engaged in. Personal relatedness is an enhancing factor for the emotion of interest, which again is a directive force in behaviour closely linked to intrinsic motivation. While the term ‘personal relatedness’ often refers to inter-personal relations as, for example, in studies analyzing parents and their children, here it is used in the broader sense of a personal link – generally based on experience – that connects an individual with a particular phenomenon. The assumption that personal relatedness is a significant factor in motivation and resulting activities of individual actors, is not only basic knowledge in psychology, but also seems to be social policy making in japan 235 a matter of course in almost all spheres of public political discourse. A prominent example is the assumption that a higher share of women in parliament, parties or other kinds of political organizations will generally be conducive to the causes of women. One hypothesis of this study follows the same logic, namely that politicians experience more motivation and consequently show more interest for areas they are personally related to. A sense of accomplishment is the third necessary condition for intrinsic motivation. It derives from the assumed organismic need for competence and effectance in interactions with the environment (White 1959; Deci and Ryan 1985). Psychological theories agree on the assumption that achievement co-determines behaviour and is important for motivation (cf. Beck 2000: 326–333). Applied to the world of politics, this means that lawmakers tend to show more motivation to engage in policy arenas in which the probability of achievement is higher.

4. Method and Research Design

The aim of this study is to analyse to which degree these three necessary elements for intrinsic motivation can be found among a group of those lawmakers of the ruling parties who by position were in charge of fertility policy. At first, the research programme therefore required the identification of the sample, a step for which I gathered data on potential interview partners from their websites and publications as well as from official records and party publications.I n a second step, a semi-structured questionnaire was prepared and interviews conducted. Based on the responses I then tried to answer the question of how intrinsic motivation has affected both policy choices and the degree of engagement of my sample group.

4.1 Sample There are several groups within Japan’s political decision centre that exerted influence on fertility policy during the period under examination, albeit to different degrees. One group is politicians from opposition parties who were able to put forward their demands in the diet and its committees as well as via the mass media, but their impact was mostly negligible. Another group is bureaucrats from relevant ministries, first of all the MHLW (Kōsei Rōdōshō) and the Cabinet Office 236 axel klein

(Naikakufu), who were in positions to affect, among others, the policy agenda, technical details of bills and the process of implementation. The group this study focuses on, however, consists of parliamentarians from both ruling parties, the LDP and Kōmeitō. Only these lawmakers were in positions to provide the necessary sponsorship for fertility policy, making them potential key actors in the policy arena. Strangely, Kōmeitō has been ignored by almost all studies on low fertility from the last ten years, although the party was in general more active in the field of family policy than the Liberal Democrats. One major reason for this oversight surely is the narrow, but widespread understanding of Kōmeitō as being the political arm of one of Japan’s biggest new religious movements, Sōka Gakkai (SG). As Article 20 of Japan’s constitution requires a separation of state and religion, Kōmeitō’s participation in government drew immediate criticism, an issue that dominated the perception of the party by the public. More than that, however, rumours and negative media coverage of SG and its electoral activities have shaped the image of both organizations in the public mind and, unfortunately, also among many academics – one result being that the party has not been subject of many policy studies. One of the very few exceptions was recently published by Suzuki (2008), who confirms that Kōmeitō was very much engaged and influential in shaping family policy.8 As assumptions regarding the voters of Kōmeitō, however, are often limited to the idea that members of SG routinely support the party, not many have recognized the fact that Kōmeitō politicians do cater to the needs of particular cleavages within Japanese society that exceed the narrow boundaries of SG-membership. One of these target groups are low income families with children.9 It was for this reason that Kōmeitō would rightly claim credit for all raises in child allowance since 1999, the 36,000 yen of ‘special allowance to support child-raising’ (kosodate ōen tokubetsu teate) and the 12,000 yen of ‘fixed benefit’ (teigaku kyūfūkin) for every citizen plus an additional 8,000 yen for children under 19 years of age in 2009.10

8 Suzuki’s study looks at three pieces of child-related legislature and weighs the role of both ruling parties within the respective policy process. His analysis hardly ever leaves the party level and treats LDP, Kōmeitō and the bureaucracy as homogeneous actors. 9 interview with Isamu Ueda, Member of the House of Representatives for Kōmeitō (Kanagawa, August 2009). 10 Family members 65 years and older also received an additional premium of 8,000 yen (see the party’s website at: http://www.komei.or.jp/policy/results/index.html [last accessed 20 January 2010]). social policy making in japan 237

Given the significance of Kōmeitō lawmakers in social policy making, they together with all national LDP parliamentarians made up my initial group from which I selected my sample. Interviews were conducted from summer 2007 to summer 2009, a period that also set the general time frame for my study. In order to ensure that interview partners were in fact dealing with fertility policy, I further narrowed my target group down to the LDP and Kōmeitō members of the diet committees for health, labour and welfare (CHLW, Kōsei Rōdō Iinkai), as well as committees within both ruling parties that dealt with low fertility.11 Among the 45 diet men and women appointed to the relevant committee in the lower house, 28 belonged to the LDP and two to Kōmeitō. In the Upper House, nine of the 25 members were Liberal Democrats and two from the junior coalition partner. The list of members of the party committees overlapped widely with these 41 parliamentarians, but would also include other names. I finally arrived at a list of 52 politicians for the two year period under examination. In order to ensure that my sample group would have a stronger degree of personal relatedness to the social content of the policy field, I chose those lawmakers among the 52 who themselves had at least one child. Naturally, politicians without children can just as well feel personally related. Seiko Noda, for example, intended to have children while serving as a Member of the House of Representatives for the LDP and for years was engaged in the policy field of fertility without actually being a mother (cf. Noda 2005). When she got pregnant by artificial insemination at the age of 49, she informed the media about it which reported the story widely.12 In the case of Noda, her openness made it possible to identify her as a politician with a high degree of personal relatedness to the policy field. Other politicians without children, however, do not pursue such an open dialogue with the public

11 Although ideally, lawmakers remain with their committees, the LDP would exchange some members with the beginning of each ordinary diet session (tsūjō kokkai) in January each year. Within the LDP, low fertility was mainly discussed at the party‘s equivalent to the CHLW, the Kōsei Rōdō Bukai. From there, smaller subgroups emerged like the Study Council on Low Fertility (Shōshika Kenkyūkai). Prime Minister Koizumi added the Research Council on the Problem of Low Fertility (Shōshika Mondai Chōsakai) and convinced three former Prime Ministers (Kiichi Miyazawa, Ryūtarō Hashimoto and Yoshiro Mori) to (at least formally) participate in order to stress the importance of the problem. Kōmeitō had established a Headquarters for General Policy Measures against a Society with Fewer Children (Shōshi Shakai Sōgō Taisaku Honbu). 12 See, for example, Asahi Shimbun (26 August 2010). 238 axel klein regarding their family planning. It is therefore hardly possible to detect the degree to which they are personally related to the policy field. The only reliable indicator, therefore, is the existence of children. This choice can also be justified by research interest and the preliminary nature of this study. It appeared unnecessary to include all politicians who ever paid attention to the issue. After all, this chapter is not a representative study, but still a preliminary step to examine the explanatory power of the concept of intrinsic motivation, a task that I finally approached with a sample group of eight lawmakers. Most interviews were conducted in the official parliamentary offices in Tokyo’s government district Nagatachō and lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. A list of all interviewees can be found in the appendix to this article.

4.2 Questionnaire and Interviews The interview guide and the semi-structured questionnaire were developed from the considerations laid out in Section 3. Key elements were the three conditions of intrinsic motivation: self-dependence, personal relatedness, and a sense or the perception of accomplishment. Strictly speaking, the element of self-dependence refers to the individual perception of autonomy, and not to the actual degree of it. One set of questions therefore was directed at the personal assessment of self- dependence. To a certain degree, personal relatedness had already been established in the process of sample selection. My questions then were meant to investigate further into the quality of personal relatedness. As individual experiences can be very different, personal relatedness does not necessarily produce the same attitude among all members of a sample group. Finally, I asked questions that would produce information regarding the perception of accomplishment. What kind of expectations did lawmakers hold with regard to possible achievements in the field of low fertility? The key points from which I deduced my questions were as follows: 1. Which factors are influential for your choice of policy (fields) in committee X?13 2. Which of your personal experiences are relevant or helpful for you to understand the policy field of fertility?

13 here I asked for the parliament or party committee on low fertility that the politician was a member of. social policy making in japan 239

3. What is your take on the causes of low fertility? 4. how do you assess your chances to successfully fight low fertility? When requesting an appointment, I informed my interview partners of the general topic of my questions, namely low fertility, but did not go into details. Although in qualitative research it is generally prefera- ble to record interviews, I decided against it. Considering my research interest it seemed more important not to disconcert interviewees and to allow for an unconstrained, informal atmosphere in order to elicit as many open comments as possible. In addition, my former experience in recording interviews with politicians had taught me that in many cases the frankest information comes between turning off the recorder and leaving the politician’s office (cf. Parker 2000: 236). I also went alone and guaranteed anonymity.14

5. results

While keeping in mind that my sample was not a representative one, the results of my research produced two suggestions: first that a lack of intrinsic motivation among formally relevant politicians helped to prevent fertility policy from rising higher on the policy agenda over the period under examination, and second that a psychological approach does indeed reveal new insights into the reasons for the state of pro-natal policy in Japan. My sample group considered itself quite self-dependent in the choice of policy fields they would get engaged in. Most of my interview partners also confirmed a high degree of personal relatedness to the issue of low fertility, but for several reasons that did not always translate into political activity. At the same time, the assessment of chances to politically achieve a turnaround in this broad social development was highly pessimistic.

5.1 Self-dependence Overall, respondents stated that they felt autonomous in their choice for or against the policy field of fertility, although the decision to become a member of the CHLW was co-determined by party

14 When I arrived at an interview, politicians would often be surprised to see that their foreign interview partner was not female. 240 axel klein headquarters.15 Nevertheless, all interviewees confirmed that their assignment to the committee corresponded with their written preferences and none of them was sent there against their will. They also were free to choose between the single policy fields related to that committee. This choice was based on three major considerations, one of them being electoral attractiveness. As stated above, pension, health and long-term care were generally regarded to be of high interest to constituencies, while especially LDP politicians perceived fertility to be a less rewarding issue. Their general impression was that fertility does not win votes (hyō ni naranai). A second factor that influenced respondents’ choices of policy fields was strategic consideration regarding their political career, and a third aspect was based on professional experience as well as former positions and activities. Fertility, for example, appealed to those with a past in a child-related working environment (e.g., nurses, doctors), or those who had been active in child-related NPOs, although only two members of my sample group had such experience. The ability to weigh these factors and decide freely about the policy fields in which to get engaged in, however, was clearly affirmed by my sample group.

5.2 Personal Relatedness The selection process of the sample group ensured a certain degree of personal relatedness to the field of fertility policy. Because of their official parliamentary position and their parenthood, all respondents shared at least two attributes to this effect. A closer look at the quality of personal relatedness and its consequences, however, revealed some factors that affect individual perspectives on the fertility issue. Low fertility in Japan is first of all caused by the social phenomenon of later and fewer marriages. As having children generally entails

15 All LDP-lawmakers are usually asked to write down three personally preferred committees. Party officials then assign committee positions on the basis of these requests and other criteria. In general, political attractiveness of committees differs widely, and the number of years spent in parliament is another criterion for the assignment of committee membership. While senior party politicians were rather often members of the budget committee (Yosan Iinkai) or land and infrastructure committee (Kokudo Kōtsū Iinkai), less experienced colleagues were often sent to the committees for environment (Kankyō Iinkai), judicial affairs (Hōmu Iinkai), or the CHLW (Interviews with Yōko Kamikawa, Member of the House of Representatives for the LDP, Shizuoka, March 2009, and Tsutomu Tomioka, Member of the House of Representatives for the LDP, Tokyo, March 2008). social policy making in japan 241

matrimony, the postponement of this decision reduces the time window in which women can give birth. Women who stay unmarried almost never have children. Politicians in my sample group obviously do not belong to the group of childless Japanese, but they also have the experience of being single and childless. In addition, they can personally relate to the decision to form a family. Personal relatedness, however, only goes so far, and judging from the answers to my questionnaire this is an important reason why intrinsic motivation does not reach higher levels. In general, personal experience often seems to fail to link up to the social causes behind low fertility at two crucial points. The first one regards young, single Japanese who, although in their majority wish to get married and have children, do not do so (cf. Tanaka-Naji 2009). There are several causes for this phenomenon, among which are the higher opportunity costs for women and increasing difficulties for men in securing the economic basis considered necessary for family formation. But in spite of this evidence, half of my respondents took a different perspective on the issue. Four (male) politicians criticized unmarried young people for being too indecisive, shying away from the responsibilities that having a family entails. In two cases, Masahiro Yamada’s (1999) book on ‘parasite singles’ was invoked to describe presumed hedonistic tendencies especially among young Japanese women. Two other respondents shared this opinion without mentioning the book. Young men, on the other hand, were in three cases described as too soft, allegedly a result of education and a more and more feminine socialization process. The second gap between the personal experience of my sample group and Japanese in their reproductive years is related to the major reason for parents to have fewer children than they actually wish. According to surveys (cf. IPSS 2006b: 6), low marital fertility is first of all caused by the perception of parents that their financial possibilities are insufficient to bring up another child. The costs of education seem to be especially prohibitive for many fathers and mothers to have another child. The members of my sample group, however, appeared to be fortunate enough not to be economically constrained in such a way. Although not all politicians can be considered well-off, my sample group obviously did not feel the constraints of many Japanese parents: Compared to a total fertility rate of 1.36 or lower for all of Japan (1999–2009), the arithmetic average among my interviewees was 2.3. 242 axel klein

A phenomenon that adds to these two gaps and also evolves out of personal relatedness is the precasting of opinions. Politicians tend to approach a social issue from their own experience, making it harder for them to process other, sometimes contrasting information. Although all respondents confirmed that they knew about studies on the causes of low fertility, their personal take on the issue often showed a bias that correlated with their personal situation. In the case of all male LDP politicians it was the wife who was or had been in charge of raising the couple’s children. In some cases, wives were assisted by grandmothers. While stressing that as a diet member they were working out of commuting distance to their families and could spend only very little time with their children, all Liberal Democrats considered this type of work- sharing between themselves and their spouses to be generally favourable for the development of their children. Five of them contrasted their family model to that of working parents and expressed their personal preference for a full-time child-rearing mother. In sum, my interviews suggest that members of the sample group do not share some of the important experiences that cause low fertility in Japan. Accordingly, personal relatedness does not have the quality to evoke higher levels of intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, personal relatedness in this case may even impede political activity for measures generally considered to be conducive to raising the birth rate (e.g., those facilitating ‘work-life balance’) as those policies run counter to the experience of my sample group. In three cases, male interview partners even warned explicitly that an increased supply of child care institutions would also increase the demand, resulting in fewer mothers raising their children at home.

5.3 Accomplishment In general, the questions regarding the expectations for any form of achievement of fertility policy produced a very congruent set of negative answers and even displayed a certain amount of fatalism among half of the respondents. The perception of possible personal accomplishments was low, the chances for fertility policy to substantially lift the birth rate were considered small. One major obstacle to successful fertility policy was believed to be a lack of financial resources. The budget that most respondents considered necessary for achieving noticeable improvement seemed to be out of reach politically. A second factor regularly mentioned was the impotence of a state to sufficiently social policy making in japan 243 influence the force and direction of social developments like those underlying low fertility. What do these results imply for intrinsic motivation? While the sense of self-dependence is clearly existing, personal relatedness falls short of creating the kind of interest needed to turn politicians into policy sponsors. The pessimistic views regarding chances for political achievement add a second factor which suggests that intrinsic motivation cannot reach the level required for lawmakers to become active in the relevant policy arena. This certainly does not hold true for all members of my sample group. Very few of them have different experiences and although being not overly optimistic regarding the chances of accomplishment, they still have enough hope to turn to fertility policy. Compared to the political energy found in other areas of social policy, however, their efforts are small.

6. conclusion

This study set out to test a new approach to the question of why pro- natal policy in Japan has taken its particular underdeveloped form. Based on psychological theory, the results suggest that one factor inhibiting the development and implementation of more effective fertility policy during the period under examination may have been a lack of intrinsic motivation among those lawmakers who by position could have been expected to provide policy sponsorship. Although they shared a distinct perception of autonomy and a higher degree of personal relatedness to the policy issue, the quality of this relatedness failed to connect most members of the sample group to two major social cleavages relevant for low birth rates: young, unmarried Japanese and parents with less than the desired number of children. In addition, the sample group displayed very little expectations as to possible accomplishments of political responses to low fertility. As a result, most of those lawmakers lacked intrinsic motivation to become policy sponsors in the policy arena of low fertility. It should be noted that the sample group of this study was rather small and taken from a time frame that consisted of a little less than two years. If one were to look at the complete phase of 20 years during which low fertility has been on the political agenda, there surely have been episodes with more fertility-related activity in the policy arena, especially during the Koizumi government (2001–2006). Future 244 axel klein research could examine intrinsic motivation of lawmakers relevant for fertility policy during those times and see if their activities were driven by more than extrinsic motivation produced by Koizumi’s leadership. But no matter who the sample group will consist of, taking psychological approaches to the politics of fertility will continue to be a promising avenue for future research. social policy making in japan 245

Appendix

Interview Partners:

Members of the House of Representatives Yutaka Fukushima (Kōmeitō), September 2008 Yōko Kawakami (LDP), March 2009 Shinji Inoue (LDP), February 2008 Kōichirō Shimizu (LDP), March 2009 Tsutomu Tomioka (LDP), March 2008 Yasutoshi Nishimura (LDP), January 2009 Toshitsugu Saitō (LDP), January 2009 Isamu Ueda (Kōmeitō), August 2009

Member the House of Councillors Seiichi Etō (LDP), February 2008

Others Kumiko Bandō (Cabinet Office), November 2007

Growing Up in a Shrinking City: The Impact of Residential Segregation on the Qualitative Reproduction of Urban Society

Klaus Peter Strohmeier

1. ‘Family Policies’ in a Shrinking Society

Germany was one of the last developed nations in the world to start a debate on population decline. In post-war Germany, ‘population’ and ‘fertility’ were non-issues. On the other hand, after 1945, Germany has always been one of the very few European countries with an explicit ‘family policy’. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, protecting ‘the family’ has been one of the primary duties of the State, as defined in the Constitution; yet the democratic State was denied a legitimate interest in declining or growing birth rates. The enormous decline in fertility from 1965 to 1975 in West Germany, thus, happened practically unnoticed. Only in the late 1990s, when it became obvious that people who were born in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not having children, was German family policy re-labelled ‘population policy’. Given that historical background, the actual impact model of the State’s family policy published in the government’s “Family Report” (Familienreport) in 2009 was revolutionary, because in it for the first time the demographic motive is to the fore. The new model in theFamilienreport 2009 (BMFSFJ 2009; cf. Figure 1 below) reflects the lessons learnt from international comparative studies – such as those edited by Kaufmann et al. (1997, 2002). That is that countries with good day care facilities and high labour force participation of women and particularly mothers – such as the Scandinavian countries, France and the Netherlands – do have relatively high fertility rates. Consequently, an expansion of services supporting working mothers is recommended. The model, however, ignores the local level, the level at which such policies (like expansion of day care services) will be implemented. The research by Kaufmann et al. shows that locally high fertility and relative population growth are accompanied by a poor supply of public day care services. 248 klaus peter strohmeier

Source: BMFSFJ (2009: 9), author’s own translation. Figure 1 family policy in Germany – a new impact model

2. Suburbanization and Segregation in a Shrinking Population

At the local level there is a redistribution of population and households, which – under conditions of a shrinking population – is facili- tated and accelerated by relaxed housing markets. The two correlated processes are continuous suburbanization (which refers to the exodus of mobile middle-class families and households from the urban cores to the fringe and to the surrounding countryside after the 1970s) on the one hand, and growing intra-urban segregation (describing the pattern of socio-spatial reorganization of shrinking urban populations) on the other. In the rural and suburban areas of the federal state of North Rhine- Westphalia (on the right in Figure 2) we find more and larger families with working mothers, most of them of middle-class background (and, due to increasing demand, suffering from the worst supplies of public day care). In the cities, however, families with children form only a minority of households (everywhere less than 20 per cent of all households). To a large extent, those few families are poor (among them many single mothers and/or immigrants), many of them are single-earner families with mothers not gainfully employed and, most important, they are neighbours. ‘Segregation’, thus, refers to structures and processes of a concentration of parts of the urban population sharing similar properties in shrinking cities and residential segregation 249

Source: Centre for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies (ZEFIR), Ruhr University Bochum (internal material). Figure 2 day care supply (for 3 to 6-year-olds) and fertility rates in cities and districts of North Rhine-Westphalia

specific subareas. Urban sociologists, after the early studies of Shevky and Williams (1949) and Shevky and Bell (1955), have found three (quasi-universal) dimensions of intra-urban segregation: • social (socio-economic) segregation, i.e. an intra-urban concentration of households of similar income, education or occupational status; • demographic segregation, i.e. a spatial concentration of age groups and household types; • ethnic segregation, i.e. the concentration of certain ethnic or sub- cultural groups in certain neighbourhoods.1 The primary driving force behind these processes is the housing market. A secondary process is symbolic identification of people with places and social distinction. Everywhere the rich are the most

1 in this text, the terms ‘neighbourhood’ (referring to social space) and ‘district’ or ‘subarea’ (referring to an administrative subdivision in the city) are used as synonyms, although, in practice, this needs validation. Nevertheless, more and more cities construct their administrative subdivisions based on segregation patterns. 250 klaus peter strohmeier

segregated social group. Population decline particularly aggravates poverty segregation, because many households (except the poorest) will find feasible alternative locations in town due to a relaxed housing market. National and communal housing policies form a third driving force, as it concentrates poor households by administrative action (cf. also Lützeler in this volume). Any urban neighbourhood can be located in a three-dimensional space (cf. Figure 3). However, categorizing the urban subareas of the ‘Ruhr’2 area over the series of national censuses after 1949, Strohmeier, Köhler and Laaser (2002) as well as Strohmeier and Alic (2006) found an increasing correlation of these three dimensions of segregation. Simply put: The poorest areas in big cities today are also those with the highest proportions of immigrants; these neighbourhoods also contain the majority of family households, and it is here where, in a number of cities, the majority of children grow up – many of them poor and the majority of them immigrants. Due to shrinking demand, the supply of day care services in those areas is quite good. But the problems to be

Source: Strohmeier and Alic (2006). Figure 3 dimensions of segregation: urban neighbourhoods in a three- dimensional space

2 Germany’s largest metropolis with 5.5 million people, incorrectly referred to as ‘Essen’ by the UN, because Essen is the name of the city right in the middle of this multi-centric metropolis. shrinking cities and residential segregation 251 solved (or the bottlenecks in family life) are of a different nature here than in middle-class suburbia.

3. ‘More Children’ is Not Enough – the Quantitative and Qualitative Reproduction of Urban Society

The average German family has two children. Growing childlessness leads to the polarization of society into a shrinking family sector and a growing non-family sector. Returning to the family policy impact model cited above, it can be said that it does meet the needs of a shrinking proportion of (mainly suburban) middle-class families with two or more children, whereas in the inner-urban family milieu the bottleneck in daily life is not combining a job with family life, but rather poverty, bad health, no jobs, no qualifications or (the will to) work, cultural and life-style deficiencies, child neglect, unstable neighbourhoods, and bad housing conditions (MAGS 2009). Such factors define life chances of an increasing part of the coming generation and they shape the ‘human asset’ (Humanvermögen) of urban society. To sustain it, modern society needs a coming generation not only sufficient in size but also sharing basic competencies and social motives, such as health, the ability and the will to learn, trust, as well as the will to participate, solidarity and empathy. This is the long- forgotten message of the scientific commission that wrote the fifth “Family Report” (“FünfterF amilienbericht”) of the Federal Government (BMFSJ 1994). Debates on the population question (and the related discourses on ‘family policy’) today are dominated by a concern with quantities (i.e., fertility), but they still neglect those qualitative aspects that are visible when examining local structures and processes. The challenge that local policies face is that, within one individual city (be it growing or shrinking, poor or rich) both segregation and a variation of “worlds of childhood” (Bronfenbrenner 1970) at the urban district or neighbourhood level are found – a variation that is larger than the one between the cities in a state. Such segregation follows a trend towards polarization. And such disparities, as will be shown by examining intra-urban inequalities in children’s health and educational chances, have a decisive impact on the quality of children growing up in the city. They affect the ‘human capital’ (i.e., vocational qualifications) of the coming generation as well as the ‘human asset’ and the future of urban society. 252 klaus peter strohmeier

3.1 Segregation – the Variance of Social Contexts of Children and Families In the last five years the Centre for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies (ZEFIR) has produced local family reports on about two dozen cities, many of them in the Ruhr area.3 Combining official statistics and survey data, these reports give a specific picture of the living conditions of urban families in different neighbourhoods and describe their needs and their evaluation of local policies. Moreover, they also provide socio-economic and socio-structural data on families and family forms, data that German cities normally do not have. When comparing (on the basis of 15 municipalities) inter-city differences in household income (calculated as a mean weighted equivalent income [Äquivalenzeinkommen]) and educational status (measured by parents’ average number of school years), a clear hierarchy becomes visible, down from the richest and most educated city of Mülheim, where the most income millionaires in North Rhine-Westphalia live, to the poorest and least educated city of Gladbeck (cf. Figure 4). It has to be noted, though, that these data only describe family households with children and not the entire population. When selecting the richest and most educated, the poorest and least educated, and one of the few average cities in order to compare education and income of parents over the districts in these three cities, it becomes evident that, in reality, ‘average’ refers only to a small number of neighbourhoods. In fact, in all three cities there is a variance of children’s living conditions at the neighbourhood level exceeding the variation between cities. In particular, the ‘average’ city from Figure 4 (Castrop-Rauxel) shows a variation almost covering the span from the most educated and richest districts in the top city to the least educated and poorest in the bottom city as is shown in Figure 5. In the districts in the left third of Figure 5 the majority of children are from immigrant families. In the (upper) right third of the neighbour hoods indigenous Germans grow up with only a few (mainly middle- class) immigrant neighbours. This is the three-dimensional structure with correlated dimensions described above.

3 Cf. http://www.faktor-familie.de shrinking cities and residential segregation 253

Source: ZEFIR, author’s own calculation. Figure 4 variation in income and education of parents between 15 cities in North Rhine-Westphalia

3.2 Segregation and Chances to Learn Germany’s largest ‘city’, the Ruhr, consists of more than 400 subareas belonging to neighbouring, though politically independent cities and districts. In developing an educational monitoring system for the entire region, the Centre for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies (ZEFIR) analysed official school statistics on the basis of a classification of segregation patterns of all districts. The typology of segregation patterns consists of six ‘social area types’ found by factor analysis and subsequent cluster analysis. For reasons of brevity, only the extreme clusters are described in more detail: • Social Area Type 1: Areas with German-born middle and upper- class populations, generally older, with few children, few immigrants, low unemployment and few poor households receiving social assistance. • Social Area Type 6: (Former) industrial working-class areas with highest unemployment and high poverty rates (high social assistance 254 klaus peter strohmeier

Source: ZEFIR, author’s own calculation. Figure 5 intra-urban variation in income and education of parents in three cities

rates), young population, many children, many of them from immigrant families. As the profile inF igure 6 shows, the scale is almost ordinal. The values of columns are z-scores; that is, the vertical line in the middle is the average, the units are standard deviations from the average, columns extending left indicate values below average, those extending right indicate values above. The dependent variable of the study is the proportion of children who, after four years of compulsory primary school, move to the different sectors of German secondary education. The German secondary system is highly selective and socially exclusive, its foundations are historical (and not easy to explain). The different school types are: • Gymnasium, the top section leading to university entry qualifica tion, • Realschule, offering a qualification one step lower, and • Hauptschule, the lowest level, today offering the worst job chances. shrinking cities and residential segregation 255

Source: Terpoorten (2007). Figure 6 Social area types in the Ruhr Metropolitan Area – results of a cluster analysis

• Gesamtschule is a fourth, comprehensive type that offers children qualifications which, in reality, compete with the latter two school types, making this type a kind of extended Hauptschule. • Förderschule (formerly Sonderschule) describes a special school type for children with various kinds of learning problems and disabilities. Figure 7 reveals that there is a clear socio-spatial pattern of transition rates for all sections of the secondary school system. Again, the values are z-scores. The middle-class SocialA rea Type 1 (bottom of Figure 7), where few children live, has the highest transition rates to the top-level school form and the lowest transition rates to the bottom-level one. Vice versa, the picture is the same for the other school forms, including even the special schools for children with learning problems. Poor neighbourhoods (top of Figure 7) send more of their children to those special institutions than the well-off areas. A key determining factor of a German child’s school career is the address where it grows up. This, of course, is partly also a function of 256 klaus peter strohmeier

Source: Terpoorten (2007). Figure 7 transition rates to sections of the secondary school system by social area type the ‘supply’ of educational infrastructure, as well as a function of institutional selection processes (or ‘institutional discrimination’) and of an intergenerational transmission of educational poverty in the disadvantaged urban milieus. The following map (cf. Figure 8) shows such an exemplary spatial pattern in the neighbouring cities of Essen (South) and Gelsenkirchen (North). The poorer districts are marked in a darker grey. The relative diameter of the pie charts expresses the absolute numbers of children entering secondary school forms. About three quarters of the children in these two cities live in Gelsenkirchen and the North of Essen. Only in the rich South of Essen is the Gymnasium the dominant selection (maximum 80 per cent). In the North the pie charts are dominated by other school forms, and the lowest transition rate to the Gymnasium is 14 per cent. Also found in the schools of the North are the largest proportions of students leaving school with no formal qualification at all. shrinking cities and residential segregation 257

Source: ZEFIR. Figure 8 transition rates to secondary school forms in the cities of Gelsenkirchen and Essen (2003/04)

3.3 Segregation and Children’s Health Apart from local family reporting and educational monitoring, the Centre for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies (ZEFIR) has, in cooperation with a few cities, developed a socio-spatial monitoring of children’s health, which serves as a data source for public health research and as a practical tool for effective prevention and intervention in the city as unequal situations demand unequal treatment. An important data source is the obligatory medical school-entry test taken by children at 258 klaus peter strohmeier the age of five. The test consists of 48 health items and development indicators, and collects data on the family background of the children, and names the nursery, in which the children have been and the school to which they will go. In about one-third of about 6000 cases in Essen (screened annually) doctors using the test marked none as ‘negative’. While some of these children may have health problems, they are already being looked after. One-third of children of German nationality and one-third of children without German citizenship come out as ‘healthy’ in that respect. The following map (cf. Figure 9a), however, will show that there is a strong spatial variation over the 50 districts of the city of Essen. Even a quick glance reveals that this distribution is strongly correlated with poverty (cf. Figure 9b). In the areas of the well-off South of Essen, far more than half the children were in a perfect ‘healthy’ condition. In stark contrast, in one

(Source: ZEFIR) Figure 9a proportion of children with ‘nothing abnormal’ in medical school entry test shrinking cities and residential segregation 259

(Source: ZEFIR) Figure 9b Social assistance rates of children aged under 6 in 50 districts of the city of Essen 260 klaus peter strohmeier poor area in the North only 14 per cent passed the test as fit for school with no further treatment recommended. The most frequent problems were adiposity, body coordination problems, language deficits in both speaking and comprehension, bad teeth and the like. In the depressed neighbourhoods the test uncovered problems in the management as well as the material and social resources of daily life of the families, problems in knowledge and preventive activities of parents, and problems of lifestyle and habits. While looking for a good estimate of the proportions of children with good or bad health in an urban neighbourhood (not every city has such good health statistics as the one described above), we made a surprising observation: The best predictor of average child health in a given area is not the poverty ratio, but the voters’ participation rate in local elections as well as the fluctuation rate of the residential population – both of which are easily available even in the worst equipped statistical office. Low election participation of people who have the right to vote is characteristic of those districts in the bottom third of the diagonal in figure 10 (Social Area Type 6); that is, districts where the highest proportions of non-Germans – who have no right to vote – are recorded. High participation rates are typical of the upper- und middle-class neighbourhoods in the top third of the diagonal (Social Area Type 1). Low election participation is an indicator of apathetic resigna- tion, social isolation, as well as a lack of social control and stability of urban milieus; in short, it is an indicator of social disintegration. These neighbourhoods also show the highest rates of population fluctuation. In the bottom third areas in Figure 10, the maximum fluctuation is 60 per cent of all residents per year, and nowhere in the poor areas is it less than 30 per cent. The upper third of the neighbourhoods in Figure 10, on the other hand, record values of less than 8 per cent per year. Thus, along the poverty line there is also a differentiation of social integration and of social stability in the city. Unfortunately, about two- thirds of children in the city of Essen grow up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, where the daily experience of ‘normal’ behaviour and lifestyle would elsewhere be regarded as quite extraordinary. The mayor of one of the 15 cities mentioned above (cf. Figure 4), for example, stated that in his city there are neighbourhoods where children do not see a single adult regularly going to work. shrinking cities and residential segregation 261

Source: ZEFIR. Figure 10 Child health (% ‘nothing abnormal’, only children of German citizenship) and voting rates in local elections in the 50 districts of Essen

3.4 A Brief Multi-level Analysis of Individual Children’s Health So far we have only examined ecological correlations of neighbourhood properties. These correlations, however, do not always permit conclusions as to the behaviour of individuals and its causes. As for the health status of children, I was given access to the individual test reports so that I could also analyse the individual and contextual (family and neighbourhood) determinants of the children’s health and their relative impact. By means of statistical discriminant analysis of two groups of children – a ‘problem group’ with multiple health problems, and a ‘contrast group’ with no problems – I found a set of 15 indicators (in the official health statistics data set) which permitted a ‘theoretical’ 262 klaus peter strohmeier classification of the children into to the two groups, which in 81 per cent of the cases fitted their actual group ‘membership’ (predicting the ‘problem children’ better than the control group).

Table 1 ‘Structure matrix’ of discriminant analysis: determinants of children’s health – comparison of problem group suffering multiple deprivations with problem-free control group Function Coefficients Socio-economic status of family −0.628 German nationality −0.597 * Proportion of households receiving social assistance +0.450 in neighbourhood Father has a job −0.449 * Voting participation at local elections 2004 in −0.448 neighbourhood * Proportion of Non-Germans in neighbourhood +0.429 * Birth rate +0.405 Number of siblings +0.401 * Transition rates to Gymnasium in neighbourhood −0.398 Father is unemployed +0.398 * Proportion of Turkish nationals in neighbourhood +0.390 * Proportion of single parents in neighbourhood +0.370 Mother has a job −0.360 * Fluctuation rate (in-migration plus out-migration +0.336 per 1,000 inhabitants) in neighbourhood Percentage of owner-occupied dwellings in −0.336 neighbourhood Mother is housewife +0.333 * Percentage of people aged 60 and above in −0.333 neighbourhood * Average size of dwelling in square metres per −0.316 person in neighbourhood * Population density in neighbourhood +0.294 * Percentage of buildings with one or two households −0.262 in neighbourhood Child lives with parents −0.258 * Percentage of population living for more than −0.239 20 years in neighbourhood Number of months spent in nursery school −0.229 Child lives with mother (father) only +0.227 shrinking cities and residential segregation 263

Table 1 ‘Structure matrix’ of discriminant analysis: determinants of children’s health – comparison of problem group suffering multiple deprivations with problem-free control group (Contd.) Function Coefficients * Percentage of population living in neighbourhood +0.205 for less than three years * Percentage of people aged under 18 in neighbourhood +0.199 * Mortality in neighbourhood per 1,000 inhabitants −0.153 * Day care for children aged under 3 in neighbourhood +0.140 * Long-term unemployment in neighbourhood +0.135 * Percentage of state-subsidized dwellings in +0.118 neighbourhood * Net migration rate in neighbourhood −0.094 * Child’s weight at birth −0.049 * Day care for children aged 3 to 6 in neighbourhood −0.026

Note: * = neighbourhood variables. Source: Strohmeier (2010).

The numbers (leaving aside the positive or negative signs) in Table 1 mark the relative weight of the indicators at hand for the correct distinction of ‘problem children’ and problem-free ‘control group’ children. The full set of indicators allows more than 80 per cent of the children to be classified correctly. If only the neighbourhood variables (marked in Table 1 with an asterisk) are used, the accuracy of prediction only falls to 71 per cent. This means that for far more than two-thirds of children entering school the characteristics of the neighbourhood in which they grow up allows a valid estimate to be given of their health status at school entry. To summarize: A child’s address is the best predictor of both its health and educational career (Strohmeier, Köhler and Laaser 2002).

4. discussion – Two Worlds of Childhood

In his book entitled Two worlds of childhood, Urie Bronfenbrenner (1970) compared the radically different worlds in which children grew up in the USSR and in the USA during the Cold War of the 1960s. The title of the book can still be used today to describe the effects that 264 klaus peter strohmeier intra-urban segregation has on the development of children growing up in the polarizing ‘worlds’ of segregated urban neighbourhoods. In shrinking cities, a particularly rapid polarization of children’s worlds can be observed, with a happy life existing only in the bourgeois quarters, where stable (though not too close) social relations in the neighbourhood form a basis of optimistic trust and public participation; where the experience of poverty, unemployment and related problems is still exceptional. By contrast, a growing majority of children grows up in disadvantaged and disadvantaging neighbourhoods that radically limit their life prospects. The correlation of the contextual properties of neighbourhoods, such as the poverty ratio, election participation, and fluctuation in children’s individual health status (cf. Table 1), is no ‘ecological fallacy’. Rather, it describes the local conditions necessary for the ‘good’ development of children: (1) social integration and informal social control in heterogeneous neighbourhoods, instead of anonymous non-relations, social isolation and withdrawal, which in highly fluctuant milieus is a rational form of behaviour; and (2) optimistic trust and participation (Luhmann 2000 [1988]), instead of mistrust and resignative apathy as elements of a “natural attitude” (Schütz 1981). Comparing the ZEFIR’s studies on the transitions to secondary school forms and on children’s health with other analyses on urban family problems, it should be noted that the problem areas in each city are more or less the same in terms of various related aspects, namely: unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, bad health and bad education (as well as violent crime and vandalism, the rates of which are highest in some – though not all – of these areas). Although these studies do more or less talk about the same neighbourhoods and about the same people, administrative and political responsibilities are still split and ineffectively coordinated. Health is among the responsibilities of the health department; responsibility for schools, for housing and for the environment are located in three other departments of the city administration; unemployment and poverty are the concern of two more mutually uncooperative administrations. In areas where children hardly know any adult who goes to work in the morning, areas where sometimes more than half the neighbours disappear after a year, where only one in ten adults (or even less) show an active interest in public matters, and where this public climate also extends into everyday family life – in such depressed areas, a broad coalition of different actors is needed to create supportiveenvironments shrinking cities and residential segregation 265 for both children and families. Such basic social conditions, including effective health prevention for children and effective schooling, need the cooperation of both individual and corporate actors who, in general, do not only have different individual interests, but will not have cooperated much in the past and therefore often do not know how to do so. The ‘human asset’ has an essential function as the social foundation of society, but it is a ‘local product’ produced by local actors. The cities definitely do not have enough resources to do this job alone. Cities should be motivators and moderators of a set of various actors’ activities. Housing companies and private landlords, for example, are other actors of prime importance in the creation of family-friendly and ‘healthy’ living conditions. They are in a position to reduce high fluctuation rates, which is still mainly a function of the quality and the price of housing and which facilitates anonymity and isolation as prime conditions of urban disintegration. A good example of supportive action of private actors are the new private “Housing Improvement District” initiatives, recently founded by private landlords in a number of German cities such as Hamburg and Dortmund (Krüger 2008). Another good practical example is a successful private neighbourhood school in a depressed area: the Prot estant Church’s Comprehensive School in Gelsenkirchen-Bismarck4, which, accepting all children from the area, is performing well as a good school for all children with or without a migration background, and equally well as an integrative community centre in a Social Area Type 6 neighbourhood. Unfortunately, even some professionals working in directly adjacent areas have not heard about these examples. A number of successful strategies for integrative urban development with high-quality civic participation were developed after the late 1990s in the course of the “Soziale Stadt” (Socially Integrative City) Federal urban renewal scheme5 and other urban renewal programmes. So far, however, too much of this has been exemplary (some critics even say ‘symbolic’) politics; too little good and/or bad practice information has been spread. It is high time to generalize the successful approaches developed in the course of such programmes and to finally give up inefficient and ineffective strategies. To make cities better places for children, unequal situations have to be treated unequally, and it takes ideas and people rather than money.

4 Cf. http://www.e-g-g.de/ 5 Cf. http://www.sozialestadt.de/en/programm/ 266 klaus peter strohmeier

A poor city like Gelsenkirchen in the Ruhr area has developed ideas and programmes to support families and children, ideas that were later adopted by cities with far greater financial resources (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). To avoid wasting public and private resources, however, it would help to enter into an open and critical discourse on projects which – under specific conditions – have proved successful, and (even more) on those projects that have failed. Failure in one place need not be repeated elsewhere, whereas successes should be noted and mimicked. A precondition of such productive discourse is good monitoring (ILS/ZEFIR 2004), which makes transparent the conditions, the forms, and the impact of segregation. Such information definitely must be public and open to everyone. Treating unequal situations unequally, demands regular reallocation of public and private resources to areas with particular problems. Such redistribution needs public legitimization. Segregation itself is an essential urban feature and, given free housing markets, cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, investment in people rather than ‘things’ has the potential to stop the vicious circle in which a growing number of shrinking cities find themselves trapped. part III

Challenges and Chances of Ageing

Business Implications of Demographic Change in Japan: Chances and Challenges for Human Resource and Marketing Management1

Florian Kohlbacher

1. Introduction

Among the wrenching transitions that are changing the very basis of the Japanese economy, none is more dramatic and none more certain than the transition from a rapidly growing and youthful population to a rapidly declining and ageing population. (Abegglen 2006: 56) Demographic change has emerged as a powerful megatrend affecting a large number of countries around the world. The ageing, and in some cases shrinking of the population has vast overall economic, social, individual and organizational consequences (Drucker 2002; Dycht wald and Flower 1990; Magnus 2009). Japan is both the most severely affected country by the demographic shift (Coulmas 2007a; Coulmas et al. 2008) and the most advanced in terms of product development and innovation with very affluent, free-spending but also demanding customers (Herstatt et al. 2006; McCreery 2000). Japan’s popula tion started to shrink in 2005, and as of October 2009, people aged 65 and older account for 22.7 per cent of the population, with those at least 50 years old making up more than 43 per cent of the population (MIAC 2009a). These deeply rooted changes in the structure of the Japanese popu lation raise a number of critical questions that companies need to address. The impact of demographic change on human resource man agement, marketing management and sales, as well as other business

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Pascal Gudorf and Cornelius Herstatt who worked with me on “Silver Business in Japan: Implications of Demographic Change for Human Resource Management and Marketing,” a study published by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Japan (GCCIJ) in 2010. The study forms the basis of this chapter and reports in detail the results of our survey of German compa nies in Japan. I would also like to thank my research assistants (in chronological order) Andrea Weihrauch, Sarah Jacoby, and Andrea Hideg for their help in researching sta tistics, creating graphs and proof reading. All mistakes are solely mine. 270 florian kohlbacher functions is tremendous. Without doubt, demographic change will be one of the challenges that both domestic and multinational compa nies will need to face now and in the future. Although in times of a global economic and financial crisis many companies are dealing with topics that seem to be more urgent, companies doing business in Japan need to tackle the challenges of demographic change if they want to be successful in this market in the long run. At the same time, being engaged in a rapidly ageing market like Japan provides the chance to learn early from successful examples and solutions, and apply them to the global market situation. Demographic change reflects a global trend affecting not only most of the industrialized nations, but also several of the emerging markets. Indeed, the experi ences encountered in the Japanese ‘lead market’ may provide not only valuable insights into the societal implications of demographic change but may also uncover trends, opportunities and innovative approaches for markets in other countries (cf. also Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt 2011). The rapid demographic change in Japan bears vast consequences for firms and other organizations (Conrad, Heindorf and Waldenberger 2008; Kohlbacher and Herstatt 2011). On the one hand there will be challenges and threats, such as potential labour shortages and knowl edge loss, as well as a shrinking customer base; on the other hand there will be chances and new business opportunities, such as the so-called ‘growth market age’ or ‘silver market’. Despite the importance of these issues, the business implications of demographic change in Japan remain largely under-researched and are not fully understood yet. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview and evaluation of the challenges and opportunities of demographic change for corporations in Japan. Data from a survey of German companies in Japan will be used to corroborate and exemplify my arguments.

2. Challenges and Opportunities

On a general level, the business implications of demographic change can be divided into those concerning the internal management of the organization – that is, issues of human resource management (HRM) – and business implications relating to the engagement with the external environment of the organization, particularly its market and custom ers – that is, issues of marketing management (Kohlbacher 2007). business implications of demographic change 271

In the following paragraphs, I will briefly outline the most important demographic developments in Japan that influence both HRM and marketing management. In 2005, Japan’s population declined for the first time along with its workforce. Should no measures be taken to increase the number of seniors and women in working life, the working population will dra matically decline. According to a white book by the Cabinet Office (2009), the labour force of 66.57 million in 2006 will decline to 42.28 million by 2050. Already by 2030, a decline of more than ten million is feared. The outlook for Japan is indeed gloomy by international stand ards, as shown by the percentage change in the working age population (15–64 years of age in Figure 1). Predictions tell us that one quarter of all Japanese people will be aged 65 or over by 2015, and that by 2025 that proportion will have risen to one third. Japan’s age structure will deviate more and more from the conventional pyramidal shape. In coming years, it will have the shape of a kite, the classic demographic structure will literally turn upside down. The number of senior people in Japan will increase further, while the population in general will decline to 95 million by 2050 due to the low birth rate.

Source: United Nations Population Division DESA (2009). Figure 1 percentage change of working-age population (15–64 years), 2005– 2020 and 2020–2050 (medium variant) 272 florian kohlbacher

2.1 Labour Shortage and Loss of Expert Knowledge One of the challenges resulting from a shrinking and ageing work force is exemplified by the so-called ‘Year 2007 Problem’ (nisen- nana-nen mondai) in Japan (Conrad 2008; Kohlbacher 2007; Nihon Rōdō Kenkyū Zasshi 2006). This name was given to the anticipated retirement of the baby boomer generation from 2007 onwards. The Japanese baby boomer generation consists, by narrow definition, of those born between 1947 and 1949 and comprises a significant per centage of the labour force. Taking the broader definition into account, which includes the years from 1950 to 1951, there are a total of 10.7 million people in Japan in this generation, with 8.2 million belonging to the labour force in 2006 – more than 12 per cent of the entire labour force. Originally, it was anticipated that a large percentage of these baby boomers would retire when they reached their 60th birthday between 2007 and 2009. The expected retirement wave in combination with the ageing and shrinking population would have caused severe problems on a micro- and macroeconomic level. For one thing, a large percent age of the potential retirees were knowledge experts; for another, the looming labour shortage was a cause for worry. Companies need to expect that sooner or later the work pool of younger Japanese people is going to decline considerably. This development – paired with a shrink ing total population – will force companies to adjust to a higher aver age age of their employees in the coming years. Furthermore, work procedures and the working environment are likely to change in the long term, as older employees at the workplace have different physio logical as well as psychological capabilities and needs (cf., e.g., Mertens, Russell and Steinke 2011). Among the ageing employees there are often experts, whose approaching retirement may lead to loss of know-how and experience. This is of special concern if the people of the baby boomer generation all retire at the same time – as was expected in Japan – and a company has to cope with the loss of several experts. Another important factor that comes into play is the Japanese approach to managing knowledge in organizations, based on tacit know-how, which is difficult to encode and thus to store in a database (cf. also Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Since Japanese companies focus on the direct transfer of know-how via personal communication and interaction, much of the knowledge base business implications of demographic change 273 has never been externalized, that is, translated from tacit to explicit knowledge. Now, this know-how may ‘leave the company’ when the baby boomers retire. Moreover, the need for systematic and explicit documentation of knowledge is far less important in companies with a traditional Japanese employment system – lifetime employment and the seniority system – than in companies with a higher turnover, as is the case for many companies in Europe and North America. Know- how in Japanese companies is mainly passed on personally – during working hours as well as during social occasions in the evenings – and intrinsically in the context of on-the-job training. Of course, the trans fer of tacit knowledge and its externalization require time, and thus the simultaneous retirement of several experts creates a significant prob lem (cf. Kohlbacher 2006, 2007). The anxiously expected retirement wave has not yet occurred. According to the Labour Force Survey of the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW 2007–2009), the number of employees aged between 60 and 64 increased between 2007 and 2008 by 9.3 per cent and then again by 4 per cent between 2008 and 2009. This fact clearly challenges the assumption of a large number of reti rees in this age group. A baby boomer survey conducted by the Japan Organization for Employment of the Elderly and People with Disabil ities (JEED 2009) in August 2008 painted a similar picture: 20.6 per cent of the surveyed baby boomers said that they were not working. More than three quarters are still working full-time and about the same number said that they were still working due to financial necessity (cf. also Williamson and Higo 2009). Another observation, which refutes the retirement wave ‘theory’, is the high labour force participation rate among the older cohorts, especially men: the labour force participa tion rate of males aged 60–64 increased from 70.9 per cent in 2006 to 76.5 per cent in 2009; for those males aged 65–69 it stands at 49.4 per cent and for those males older than 69 it is still 19.9 per cent (MHLW 2009: Table 15). Between 2005 – the year before the amendment of the Law Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older People – and 2009, the number of regular employees aged between 60 and 64 increased by 80.8 per cent and the number of those who are older than 64 increased by 104.9 per cent (MHLW 2009b) – a clear consequence of the amendment, which went into effect in 2006. Companies, whose retirement age is less than 65, therefore have the option to modify the internal retirement policy by offering continuous employment, raise 274 florian kohlbacher the retirement age, or simply abolish the retirement age. The target is a retirement age of 65 by the year 2013 (cf. Figure 2).2 Irrespective of when exactly a particular generation retired or will retire, a retirement wave did not occur in 2007. Moreover, even when changing the retirement age to 65, a subsequent ‘Year 2012 Problem’ does not seem to be realistic in light of the numerous options for com panies and employers, as well as of the effective retirement age being higher than the official one (almost 70 years for men). As a matter of fact, Japan has the highest number of working pensioners and a very high labour market participation rate of the older cohorts (Meyer-Ohle 2008; Williamson and Higo 2009). According to Conrad (2008: 995), the most urgent issue for HRM in relation to age is the restructuring of seniority-based pay practices, even though he is positive that “Japanese HRM practices will be fit to face the ageing labour force once appraisal systems and pay systems have been sufficiently fine-tuned”. Overall, the challenges associ ated with an ageing and shrinking population are long-term, as are

Source: MHLW (2006). Figure 2 revised Law Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older People (amendments 2006)

2 for a detailed discussion of the revised law and the corporate responses, refer to Fujimoto (2008). business implications of demographic change 275 the problems corresponding to ageing staff and labour shortage that require solutions in all areas of corporate strategy.

2.2 The Golden Silver Market Demographic change will also shift market segments. In considering the number of young people, a declining youth segment can be antici pated, which behaves in the opposite way to the continuously growing senior segment (Kohlbacher 2007; Kohlbacher and Herstatt 2011). In fact, many market participants are worried about the shrinking cus tomer base of young, dynamic buyers and the demands of an older target group, which are still not very well understood. Thus, demo graphic change could cause problems for companies that do not adjust their product range or do not include new target groups as potential customers. The number of potential customers alone, however, does not determine new business opportunities. Purchasing power and consumer behaviour too play significant roles and can possibly com pensate for the declining overall number of customers. Definitions of the silver market or the ‘growth market age’ vary sig nificantly; it includes people older than 49 or 54 years of age(generation 50+ or 55+) up to the age of 90 to 100. That is, included in this segment are both age groups younger than the baby boomers as well as age groups that are older. Currently, the business world in Japan is highly attentive to the baby boomer generation, which represents the most important group of older customers (cf., e.g., Dentsū Shinia Purojekuto 2007). The baby boomers have always been highly active, energetic, consumption-oriented and formed a wealthy subgroup, being curious about technological innovations and having a shopping-related men tality (cf. McCreery 2000). Along with retirement comes newly gained free time. This is the reason why the baby boomer generation, which has high purchasing power and propensity to consume, is a very attrac tive potential target group for companies in the silver market (Kohl bacher 2007; Sekizawa 2008). Moreover, seniors tend to spend their accumulated income and wealth instead of concentrating on savings and investments (Gassmann and Keupp 2005). Japanese private house holds with heads 50 years of age and older spend considerably more money per head than the age group between 30 and 49 (cf. Figure 3)3.

3 These figures need to be interpreted with caution. First of all, they are averages and do not tell anything about the exact distribution within the whole population 276 florian kohlbacher

Source: MIAC (2009b: Table 3.2). Figure 3 average monthly consumption expenditures per household by age group of the household head in yen, 2008 (average spending for one person in two-or-more-person households)

The high purchasing power of seniors also stems from their financial wealth: Japanese households with heads 60 years and older have, on average, savings of almost 20 million yen. Seniors are therefore the top group of all age groups in terms of savings. Broken down per person, the generation of people aged 70 and older has savings of more than 10 million yen, closely followed by the 60 to 69 year olds with 8.6 million yen (cf. Figure 4). As a matter of fact, according to the latest estimates from 2009, older people hold a disproportion ately large amount of personal financial assets, with those in their 50s and their 60s owning 21 per cent and 31 per cent respectively of the total and those aged 70 years and older holding 28 per cent, which means that people aged 50 years and older hold about 80 per cent of total personal financial assets in Japan (The Nikkei Weekly 11 January 2010: 3). Furthermore, older Japanese generally have no debts and own their own property (cf. Conrad 2007). Many of the elderly in Japan

(which is all the more important due to the rising social inequalities in Japan). Second, the data are aggregated on the household level and do not reveal who actually controls and spends the money. Nevertheless, these figures give a good overview of the finan cial situation of the silver generation in Japan. business implications of demographic change 277

Source: MIAC (2009b: Table 8.5). Figure 4 average savings and liabilities held per household by age group of household head in million yen, 2008 (average for one person in two-or- more-person households) are financially secure and have therefore been labelled rōjin kizoku [elder nobility] (Coulmas 2007a: 75). However, this does not apply to all of the elderly in Japan, and the number of poorer seniors is expected to rise in the future (e.g., Fukawa 2008). Still, however, the silver market is a growing market in terms of demand and supply. In fact, since the mid-1980s, private expenditure of people aged 60 and over has increased considerably more than that of 35 to 39 year olds (Conrad 2007). On the supply side, new industries and business opportunities are developing as a response to the ageing population and their emerging needs. Various Japanese companies have already success fully started to adjust existing products and develop new products and technologies for this target group. As shown by user-friendly cell phones, robots that take care of the elderly, and premium offerings for enjoying life after retirement, more and more Japanese companies are adapting to the growing market with innovative products designed for the ageing population. However, this is true for only a limited number of pioneer firms, and even these have touched only the tip of the iceberg. 278 florian kohlbacher

3. study of German Companies in Japan

This section briefly presents the main findings from a study Gof erman companies doing business in Japan and how they deal with the impli cations of demographic change. The study is based on an online survey carried out by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Japan (GCCIJ), and jointly conducted with the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) Tokyo and the Institute for Technology and Innovation Management at Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH) in Germany. Between May 23 and July 14, 2008, the survey asked 411 German companies in Japan about the implications of demographic change on their business in Japan. The analysis was car ried out based on 135 completed questionnaires, which corresponds to a representative response rate of 32.8 per cent. The responses stem from various industry sectors, primarily from the areas of machinery and engineering, automotive, consumer goods, services and health care. The key points of the questionnaire were, on the one hand, the challenges and threats posed by demographic change such as labour shortage, loss of knowledge and a shrinking customer base, and, on the other hand, new business opportunities. In addition to the survey, interviews were carried out with selected German companies in Japan to add experiences to the quantitative data as well as case studies and best business practices. The interviews took place from March 20 to April 3, 2009, and consisted of face-to-face meetings with 20 company representatives from various industry sec tors. The detailed results of the study are documented in Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt (2010) and also include examples of management strategies and successful products from Japanese companies.

3.1 Effects of Demographic Change on Human Resource and Knowledge Management The workforce ofG erman companies in Japan had an average age of 41 in 2008, which is more than two years older than the average work force of Japanese companies at that time. It can be concluded that the age of employees in German companies will further rise as it is gener ally difficult for foreign companies in Japan to find young, qualified personnel. In the near future, the fight for talented individuals may become more intense. The study revealed that almost two thirds of all German companies expect workforce-related difficulties in Japan. business implications of demographic change 279

Of the surveyed companies, 53.5 per cent said that they were – at least partially – affected by the year 2007 problem. Because the ‘retire ment wave’ will continue for several years – albeit to a smaller extent than expected – the corporate world will be confronted with this prob lem for some years to come. The subsequent loss of know-how due to the retirement of high competency employees and the acute shortage of employees are problems almost all German companies will encoun ter in Japan. Similar to their local competitors, these German compa nies are using common strategies such as raising the retirement age and keeping workers employed beyond the official retirement age. The retirement age is 60 in 57.8 per cent of all cases, and one quarter of all companies have already increased the age to 65 at the time of the survey. More than half of all German companies said that they will keep full-time employees on their payroll even after they exceeded the retirement age. Most companies changed the rules regarding continu ous employment for older employees who have reached retirement age. The legislator supports continuous employment for everyone; however, the hiring managers differentiate between good and poor performers and the need to provide low performers with compensa tion packages. An employee who decides to continue working is often re-hired under considerably worse conditions (cf. also Williamson and Higo 2009). As Japan’s labour law lacks contract rules for senior employees, these contracts are sometimes customized to individual needs but mostly to corporate needs. In addition to the option of keeping or re-hiring employees after they reach retirement age, the recruitment of external candidates at the age of 60 and older is rarely undertaken (cf. Figure 5). Two out of three companies said that they sometimes employ applicants between the age of 50 and 60. In the case of candidates aged 60 or older, the number of companies that will consider hiring from this age group, usually under exceptional circumstances, drops to one third. Hiring rarely occurs at the age of 65. A few reasons for the dismissive attitude towards seniors as poten tial candidates were explained by German companies in interviews as follows: many surveyed companies believe that employees who have spent their entire career in one company are not able to adapt easily to a new corporate culture. In addition, they lack technical know-how and corporate-specific knowledge. The companies asked were also critical about the motivation of older employees and preferred to keep their team as young as possible. There were also doubts about their 280 florian kohlbacher

Source: Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt (2010: 14). Figure 5 “Do you hire older people as regular employees (seisha-in)?” ability to use new media and concerns about how to update their tech nical knowledge. Only in exceptional cases are employees older than 59 or 64 actively recruited; for example, when a well-connected expert in a particu lar sector, who has important corporate contacts, is sought. A few companies look specifically for older, more experienced candidates when they want to support younger managers. Also, regarding busi ness negotiations involving older or highly respected people (such as doctors), older employees are regarded as more suitable to talk to the customers on an ‘equal’ level. In general, middle-aged candi dates with career experience (mid-career) are preferred. It is known to many companies that this selection will probably be a temporary indulgence and that older, long-term employees will play a more prominent role. The risk of losing know-how is another challenge related to demo graphic change, in addition to the ageing workforce. Among future retirement candidates are important experts with tacit knowledge, especially in the area of production and engineering. Thus, there is a fear that knowledge and expertise will be lost. However, most of the surveyed companies are aware of the possible risks of losing business implications of demographic change 281 knowledge. Among the 135 surveyed companies, 94 consider the risk of losing knowledge as an important issue and 12 view it as extremely important. Despite this awareness of possible risks, the process of systematic data collection and storage of critical knowledge has not been imple mented by the majority of the companies. Only 49.5 per cent of the surveyed companies said that they would systematically save their knowledge, skills and competencies, while almost the same propor tion, namely 45.5 per cent, do not have any systematic process in place to secure knowledge. Principally, the externalization and passing on of knowledge, as well as the systematic documentation of knowledge and its preservation, is a process that requires much effort. Furthermore, it includes a wide range of instruments and methods, which can be adapted specifically to the situation and the company’s needs, and combined accordingly. The range of options is also reflected in the companies’ responses. The emphasis was spread almost evenly over different databases, follow-up project reviews, group discussions, mentoring and coaching (multiple answers were possible). Furthermore, 11.9 per cent of the companies also included exit interviews with employees who are about to leave, and 7.4 per cent included story-telling (cf. Figure 6).

Source: Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt (2010: 16). Figure 6 “Which knowledge retention measure/method do you typically use? Select all that apply.” 282 florian kohlbacher

3.2 Product Development and Marketing in Times of Demographic Change The vast majority ofG erman companies are convinced of the business opportunities in the silver market. More than 90 per cent of all compa nies inquired believe that the senior segment will develop into an interesting market within the next five to ten years. However, only 45 per cent of companies see potential business opportunities for their own company and believe that ageing will dramatically influence their business model in the coming years. Most of the other business- to-business subcontractors feel that they will hardly be affected by demographic change on the market side (see also below). Although there is potential, the marketing and the development of new customer groups in the silver market is still new territory for many German companies in Japan. One in four companies noticed that demographic change directly affects their businesses. A quarter of the companies that noticed these effects reported a decline in sales or changes in the customer base and the target market (cf. Figure 7). Among the relevant companies, 16 per cent reported they were able to profit from demographic change through increased sales. Several examples illustrate how companies are taking advantage of demo graphic change and, as a result, improving their business opportunities.

Source: Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt (2010: 14). Figure 7 “In which way did demographic change affect your sales/ market(s)?” business implications of demographic change 283

According to the survey, one out of five German companies in Japan offers products and services for older consumers. These are not only items related to medical devices and health care, but also include food supplements, clothing, transport and walking aids, household appli ances, as well as services such as financial and insurance products (cf. Figure 8). Among the companies profiting from demographic change, there are not only many firms from the health care sector, but also compa nies in the financial and insurance sectors. In the case of Allianz, for instance, demographic change in Japan was a reason for the company to offer, for the first time in April 2008, life insurance products. ThyssenKrupp Access, a ThyssenKrupp subsidiary, realized that Japan’s ageing society is an opportunity to gain entry to the Japanese market with the “Flow” stair lift product. Most of the 135 companies surveyed, however, are very cautious about conducting business in the silver market. This is true across dif ferent sectors and applies to market research and marketing efforts, as well as product development for seniors. Only ten out of the 135 com panies said that they carry out market research among the elderly, indicating that the age of survey and focus group participants is not perceived to be an obstacle. Only 10 per cent of the companies thought

Source: Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt (2010: 16). Figure 8 “What kind of products/ services have you been developing specifi cally for senior customers?“ 284 florian kohlbacher that surveys among the elderly were more difficult than among other age groups. Marketing activities specifically directed at older consumers are still rarely carried out. The vast majority of the surveyed companies, namely 92.2 per cent, said they did not market any products for older target groups. Only 5.4 per cent of the companies conduct marketing directed towards seniors for a limited portion of their products. These compa nies are pioneers trying to appeal more strongly to seniors by either adjusting or expanding their product range and also by strategically reorienting their communication. The number of companies developing products for seniors (cf. Figure 9) is very limited: 79.9 per cent of German companies in Japan do not develop products or services specifically for the elderly. Only 6.5 per cent responded that they developed products designed to meet the needs of older customers. Other companies offer products featur ing ‘universal design’ or else have modified existing products.H owever, the finding that hardly any product development takes place in Japan reflects the fact that research and development is, in many cases, tied to the parent company in Germany. Finally, manufacturing companies have argued in surveys and dur ing follow-up interviews that business-to-business companies, which

Source: Kohlbacher, Gudorf and Herstatt (2010: 23). Figure 9 “Do you develop specific products or services for senior customers?” business implications of demographic change 285 do not manufacture products for final customers, do not need to deal with the silver market. However, it should be kept in mind that machines and other equipment, as well as the workplace and the working environment, must be adjusted to suit the needs of senior employees (cf. also Mertens, Russell and Steinke 2011). As a starting point, it is useful to provide ergonomically designed, easier and intui tively usable items or easily legible characters and signs on machines. Such products, designed specifically for the physical as well as the mental needs of older employees, are often innovative and useful for younger staff as well.

4. Business Management Implications

In the areas of human resource management, knowledge management and product innovation, demographic change affects business man agement strategies to a different extent.A few companies in Japan have already responded to the new challenges with a variety of approaches and solutions.

4.1 Human Resource Management As for human resource management strategies in relation to the baby boomer retirement in Japan, Mitani (2008: 20) found that many firms emphasize the employment of older workers as well as females, along with the development of the employees’ competences. Recent surveys show that a large majority of Japanese companies use a continuous employment system: after reaching retirement age, employees are either directly re-employed or their employment is extended without discontinuation. Generally, the pattern is for a one-year contract that is renewed every year. The main reason for choosing this option is to reduce cost, as the employees usually earn significantly less after being re-hired (Conrad 2008; Williamson and Higo 2009). Mitani (2008: 20) concluded that while many firms are planning to adopt human resource management strategies for promoting the employ ment of older workers, only a small number are actually extending the mandatory retirement age or continued to employ all those who wish to continue working. Mitani sees this as proof of the firms’ cautious attitude in expanding the employment of older workers. As for the three measures specified by the revised Law Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older People that became effective in 286 florian kohlbacher

2006 (cf. Figure 2 above), data analysis by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW 2009b) shows that, as of June 2009, 97.2 per cent of all companies with 50 or more employees introduced one of these three measures (98.7 per cent of companies with 300 or more employees and 95.3 per cent of small- and middle-sized businesses with between 30 and 300 employees). According to Fujimoto (2008), most firms implemented one of the measures within about one year after the amendment took effect. Large companies were required to implement one of the three measures by March 2009, while smaller companies need to comply with this rule by the end of March 2011. As of today, 44.6 per cent of all companies allow all employees who wish to do so to continue working until 65 and beyond; the proportion of companies where employees can work until 70 is 16.3 per cent, although the fact that this figure is almost twice as high for smaller and medium-sized businesses than for large corporations indicates that the demand for continuous employment seems to be considerably higher in smaller and medium-sized companies (MHLW 2009b). An increasing average workforce age sooner or later poses new challenges to the workplace. Physical abilities tend to decline with age and may influence employees’ productivity. In many cases, this can be compensated for by experience and routine, but in general the demands that senior employees place on their employers are different to those of (young) university graduates. The physical fitness of senior employ ees is critical, and adjustments to the workplace and the working envi ronment will be required. It is important that machines and other devices be modified to account for possible ‘delayed’ user response time; operations should become more intuitive, machine control but tons must be larger, and work instructions need to be easier to read. In addition, further automation will be unavoidable in the future to increase efficiency and to facilitate work for senior employees. Carrying aids and new developments in robotics have great potential to meet the needs of silver generation employees. Note however that many of the adaptations and improvements in terms of assistance, ergonomics and usability will of course be helpful to younger employees as well, thus benefiting the entire workforce of the company (cf. Mertens, Russell and Steinke 2011). Systematic health management for employees and suitable adapta tions of the workplace and job duties will play an increasingly impor tant role. Furthermore, age discrimination is becoming more and more relevant. Unequal treatment based purely on age is unacceptable and business implications of demographic change 287 usually related to common prejudices or misunderstandings, such as the myth of age-related declining output, which has not been proven (with the exception of exclusively physical work).4 An empirical study in Japan by Yamada and associates (2005) found that lower levels of perceived ageism in the workplace led to higher organizational com mitment, lending support to the hypothesis that organizations with an environment free of age discrimination are potentially more produc tive. The problem of age discrimination is therefore relevant for all employees, old and young. Unfortunately, even acknowledged experts obstinately stick to this outdated view and argue that younger employ ees are more productive and that “[a]ging depresses the average quality of the workforce and lowers labour productivity” (Matsutani 2006: 78). A shift in the way age and ageing are perceived is clearly necessary. But there are also certain problems that can be anticipated with respect to continuous employment or recruitment of senior employees (cf., e.g., Murata 2007). In the case of re-employment or continuous employment on a contract basis after retirement (or after reaching the company’s retirement age), the employees must accept salary cuts of up to 50 per cent (cf. Williamson and Higo 2009). Younger employees, previously low in the hierarchy, now work in higher positions and/or are even direct superiors. Thus, many employees who continue to work or are re-hired, prefer to be transferred to another department, sub sidiary or sister company. But even if they can avoid former colleagues and subordinates, they are still ranked lower in the hierarchy than younger employees. This is difficult in Japan because of the strongly anchored seniority system. The younger generation feels restricted in pushing for innovations and changes because of the senior employees who continue to work or who are re-hired. These issues, which arise from the fact that the Japanese baby boomers did not retire as expected but rather stayed on to work, were summarized by business and demog raphy expert Hiroyuki Murata as resulting from what he calls a ‘Retire Moratorium’ (Murata 2007). It has to be noted that the real dimension of these issues also depends on the situation of the individual employee and the individual company and their preferences, which makes it difficult to give overall, across-the-board recommendations. Finally, teams consisting of mixed ages are potentially highly crea tive and innovative, and this creativity and innovation can be unlocked

4 Cf. Güttel et al. (2009) for a discussion of the relevant literature. 288 florian kohlbacher with appropriate leadership and personnel management. As Meyer- Ohle (2008: 960) aptly put it: “With a record number of employees approaching retirement age and a lower number of younger people available, corporations might therefore well discover the value of their older employees by themselves.” But it is also obvious that in the long run, Japanese companies will not be able to maintain the traditional lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion and compensa tion system against the backdrop of massive demographic changes (Conrad 2008; Matsutani 2006).

4.2 Knowledge Management The measures taken by Japanese companies to prevent the risk of knowledge drain include four common practices: (i) raising the retire ment age set by the company, (ii) re-employment after retirement, (iii) setting up or expanding corporate universities or technical train ing centres, and (iv) externalizing tacit knowledge and systematic documentation and storage of knowledge (Kohlbacher 2007). The first two measures – raising the company retirement age and re-employment after retirement – are very popular and important measures due to the immediacy and urgency of the problem. But they cannot be seen as effective solutions in the medium and long term, as they only delay the problem without offering a permanent solution. They help companies in using employees’ expertise, knowledge and experience over a short or extended period, offering them more time and capabilities to train successors as well as to transfer and save criti cal knowledge. In light of people’s higher life expectancy and more productive life-cycles, it is certainly meaningful to re-evaluate current retirement as well as employment rules and practices. Interestingly, a few companies, including McDonalds Japan and Mayekawa Manu facturing, even decided to completely abolish the company’s retire ment age, so that employees wishing to continue to work can do so as long as they want. This is again possible thanks to the revised Law Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older People. Toyota introduced a re-employment system after it became obvious that in engineering alone approximately 3,000 of their employees would retire in Japan between 2006 and 2008. The aim was to select particular experienced employees – often called ‘veterans’ in Japan – for re-employment after their official retirement, in most cases without a time gap. In fiscal year 2006, for example,T oyota re-employed almost business implications of demographic change 289

56 per cent of all its employees who had reached the nominal retire ment age. The selection and decision-making process considers a sys tematic and regular performance evaluation, as well as the outcome of meetings with the relevant employees throughout the year. Other companies also decided to use comparable measures. The third measure – setting up or expanding corporate universities, technical training centres, etc. – is often used in combination with the second approach, because selected seniors are often used as mentors/ coaches or lecturers at in-house training centres and corporate univer sities. This scenario often applies to industrial manufacturers (e.g., Panasonic – previously known as Matsushita Electric Industrial – and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries). Toyota has created several Global Production Centers (GPCs) for global training and knowledge transfer purposes (cf. Ichijo and Kohlbacher 2008). The fourth measure – externalizing tacit knowledge and systematic knowledge documentation and storage – includes a variety of tools and methods that need to be combined and modified to suit the situa tion and needs of individual companies. Thus, it is difficult to provide general recommendations, and many companies get support from out side consultation in selecting, compiling and adjusting their lists of measures. Nissan, for example, asked a renowned consulting company to conduct systematic knowledge retention of veteran and technical expert knowledge. These consultants conducted detailed interviews and surveys with experienced engineers, and collected and processed all relevant information to document any critical expert knowledge in a systematic and accessible form, thus providing access to successors and other employees. Another popular and effective measure is the introduction of a knowledge-transfer system based on teamwork and mentoring, i.e. by pairing up seniors with novices (e.g., as practiced by Nippon Steel).

4.3 Product Innovation/Marketing Japan is often regarded as being in the forefront of the silver market. This is partly related to the demographic development of the country, but also to consumer behaviour and the innovative capacity of Japanese companies. Japanese customers have generally been considered as very quality oriented and therefore demanding. This characteristic is con sidered especially true for mature customers, given their life experi ence and financial resources. High quality and excellent service are 290 florian kohlbacher therefore indispensible for reaching wealthy Japanese customers. There is also a greater openness to technological novelties compared to other countries. However, the assumption that senior customers are gener ally also ready to pay a premium price must be questioned. On the contrary, Japanese consumers have recently reduced their expenditure and are now questioning their well-known inclination to pay for con venience (Salsberg 2010: 82). Even affluent older consumers in the babyboom cohort are saving their money or are using it to support their children or grandchildren in this time of economic downturn, instead of spending it on themselves (The Nikkei Weekly 11 January 2010: 3). This means that, despite the high potential demand, compa nies face consumers with a very tight grip on their purses, which fur ther exacerbates the demographic challenge. The silver market – due to its wide age range – is by no means a homogeneous market segment. Accessing the market appropriately therefore requires a consideration of not only cohort-specific behav iour, but also of age-specific preferences. To exclusively define the target group according to age is insufficient, because the biological age of people does not reveal much about their performance- and activity- related condition, nor about their individual predispositions, needs and preferences (cf., e.g., Moschis 1994). Generally, most seniors feel ten years younger than they actually are or identify themselves strongly with persons ten years younger than themselves. This phenomenon of a young cognitive age is especially important when trying to appeal to the silver market target group (cf., e.g., Van Auken and Barry 2009). In advertising, the use of ‘cognitive-age congruent’ models or spokes persons should prove fertile, since a consumer’s cognitive age interacts with the perceived age of the model or spokesperson seen in an adver tisement, and can consequently influence the response to the advertis ing message (Chang 2008; Van Auken and Barry 2009). This may also explain why older people are under-represented in TV commercials in Japan (Prieler et al. 2009). Leaving work and starting retirement represents a break, so that the silver market can be split, regardless of age, into the groups of ‘pre- retirement’ and ‘post-retirement’. The wants and needs of seniors are comparably diverse and the areas and industry sectors that feed the silver market can also profit from this development. The following segments in the Japanese senior market are often seen as being very promising: medical and gerontechnological devices, elderly care, rehabilitation, preventive medicine, cosmetics, nutrition products, business implications of demographic change 291 automobiles, hobby equipment, household appliances, home acces sories, clothing, financial and insurance products, continued educa tion and travel. A further important area includes luxury items and retro-products (cf. Conrad and Gerling 2005; Coulmas 2007a; Kohlbacher 2007). The silver market can be roughly divided into the following three sub-segments (Kohlbacher 2007): 1. Easy-to-operate and easy-to-use products. A classic example in the Japanese market is the “Raku-Raku” phone, a mobile phone with easy-to-read fonts, larger-sized keyboard, less complex functions and simple and intuitive operation. Its noise-detection system, which automatically adjusts the volume of the other caller’s voice according to the surrounding noise level and suppresses back ground noise, ensures that the user’s voice is transmitted clearly (cf. also Kohlbacher and Hideg 2010). 2. Luxury goods for wealthy seniors. As shown above, these demands are not exclusively or necessarily age-related. Senior customers need the same or similar products and services as other age groups. Because of their financial position as well as the increased time they have to shop after retirement, it is possible to specifically attract this customer group. Successful examples are (group) travel and yachts as well as retro-products such as electric guitars and certain types of motorcycles. In general, Japanese companies assume that senior consumers will eventually have higher expectations with respect to product design, quality and services, and they offer products and services accordingly. 3. ‘Gerontechnology’ or support and care devices for seniors with disabilities or limited mobility. Due to the increasing number of seniors and the growing needs for the elderly, gerontotechnological devices are important silver market products, and at the same time they can be used by younger patients. Special growth areas are household robots as well as the health care and nursing sector. The automobile industry has also adjusted to the constantly growing number of sen ior drivers with ‘silver cars’ (cf., e.g., Moerke 2008). Regarding the silver market and its age-specific segmentation, it is important to note that successful new products oriented to the needs of seniors are not restricted to use by the elderly. Practical, helpful and easy-to-use products offer additional value for all consumers, regardless of age. For this reason, new products that are not related 292 florian kohlbacher to age – that is, universal – can be used effectively and successfully by young and not-so-young customers alike. In this context, key words like ‘ageless marketing’ or ‘age-neutral marketing’ (Stroud 2005; Wolfe and Snyder 2003), ‘universal design’ as well as ‘transgenerational design’ (Pirkl 1994) play a key role. Universally designed products should be usable by everyone regardless of age, including people with age-related restrictions, but they should be so without emphasiz ing this aspect to avoid putting off younger customers. An interest ing example of a transgenerational product is Nintendo’s hugely successful Wii game console, which deliberately seeks to bring several generations together through common games and therefore makes it appealing to the whole family, even grandparents. In addition, games are available that are designed to keep seniors – as well as younger people – physically and mentally fit. Finally, the three topic areas of human resource management, knowledge management and product innovation/marketing cannot be seen separately in the reality of business. In this respect, senior employ ees can often understand the wants and needs of their age-equivalents better than younger people, and can therefore become key figures in product development, marketing and sales. On the other hand, older customers also prefer to be served by people of their own age, espe cially when personal consultation is required, as is the case for hygiene or cosmetic products, as well as for technical appliances whose func tions need to be explained. Furthermore, senior employees are likely to have long career experience, expertise, leadership potential and a large network of contacts, making them a valuable resource for innovative or strategic projects to help train younger employees and take on responsibilities.

5. Conclusion and Outlook: Demographic Change – Crisis or Opportunity?

Japan is, of course, not the only country expecting an ‘age wave’ or the ‘baby boomer tsunami’. Generally, all developed nations and many developing countries are affected by the changing demographic struc tures. Those companies that are active in these markets should start to think about dealing with topics such as an ageing working population, lost knowledge and lack of (skilled) labour, as well as producing suita ble products, innovations and technological devices for older people. business implications of demographic change 293

Because Japan is one of the first countries to be directly confronted with the effects of the changing demographic structure, it can play a valuable pioneering role for other countries in adequately han dling these problems, not only because demographic change has pro gressed significantly already, but also because Japanese companies have adjusted better to an ageing customer base. It has to be kept in mind, however, that even in a pioneering country such as Japan, the potential of the silver market has by no means been fully recognized or fully leveraged. In every crisis there is also an opportunity. Indeed, the so-called demographic crisis too can offer opportunities that do not seem so obvious at first. In light of the higher life expectancy and longer productive life spans, some of the current retirement and employ ment rules and practices seem to be outdated. In 2004, the American demography and management expert Ken Dychtwald and his team postulated that It’s time to retire retirement (Dychtwald, Erickson and Morison 2004). The raising of the retirement age alongside a more flex ible re-arrangement of work relations in Japan seems to be an impor tant step in the right direction. The crisis, therefore, helps to identify rigid labour market structures and soften them to cater to the actual needs of employees as well as companies. Indeed, Mitani (2008: 7) notes that the retirement of the baby boomers is also associated with positive aspects, such as a reduction in labour costs, a solution to the shortage of available posts, and rejuvenation of the labour force – aspects that all lead to a more balanced generational structure than we have now. The silver market offers additional opportunities: a potential target group that is high in purchasing power and willing to consume, and highly motivated potential employees or consultants, rich in experi ence and with a precise knowledge of the Japanese market and its com panies. In addition, part-time or consulting contracts with high-level baby boomers can be financially attractive for companies because a reduction in income is expected – even in the case of continuous employment at the same company – upon reaching retirement age. The silver market is seen as a very lucrative market segment, mostly due to the economically attractive baby boomers that will retire in the coming years, presenting them with the free time to spend their wealth. The main focus, at the moment, is on the ‘old, rich and healthy’; the ‘old, poor and sick’ are receiving significantly less attention. There are signs that the silver market of the future is going to look completely 294 florian kohlbacher different and that the group of the ‘old, poor and sick’ could form a clear majority due to (i) increasing social stratification in general (key word: kakusa shakai), (ii) the increasing number of people aged 75 and over (this is the age after which physical decline is said to accelerate considerably, and since November 2007 this segment accounts for more than 10 per cent of the Japanese population); and (iii) the high number of non-regular employees with insufficient social security (more than one third of all employees in Japan). As a matter of fact, income and economic inequality as well as poverty among the elderly are issues of rising concern in Japan (Fukawa 2008; Ohtake 2008; Shirahase 2008). This could become a demographic time bomb and leads to the question of a corporate social responsibility to provide products and services that support seniors in their everyday lives and enable them to grow old in a humane way. Given the right business model, socially and ethically responsible action can also yield econom ically responsible profits, not to mention positive reputational effects (cf. Kohlbacher and Weihrauch 2009). The current growing market ‘age’ in Japan, as we know it, might just be a ‘window of opportunity’ that could soon close. It is therefore important to prepare today for the silver market of tomorrow and to leverage the demographic crisis as an opportunity. Silver Employment in Germany: Trends and Consequences for the Management of an Ageing Workforce

Christiane Hipp and Birgit Verworn

1. population and Workforce Ageing in Germany

A demographic transition has taken place in many developed nations, including Japan and Germany, and is expected to occur also in developing nations (Alley and Crimmins 2007) as populations are ageing due to declines in fertility and mortality (Fougère and Mérette 1999). In the former West Germany, population ageing is caused by a constant low fertility rate of about 1.4, while in the former East Germany fertility declined after unification in 1990.A t the same time, in Germany as a whole, life expectancy at birth has increased. Naturally, these developments will be reflected in the working-age population (Hedge, Borman and Lammlein 2006; Leibold and Voelpel 2006). The share of people aged 50 to 64 years will increase from about 30 per cent of manpower potential in 2005 to about 38 per cent in 2050; at the same time, the number of people aged 20 to 64 years will fall from 50.1 million in 2005 to 39.1 million in 2050 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006a). Although the government is considering raising the retirement age to 67 or higher, the workforce will continue to age and will fall to 41.1 million people in 2050 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006a). In addition to changes in workforce demographics, typical patterns of employment are also changing. Stable employment and typical career paths are no longer the rule (Arthur 1994). Therefore, the traditional psychological contract in which an employee enters a firm, per- forms well, and thus receives rewards and job security has been replaced by a new form of career based on change, flexibility and lifelong learning (Hall 1994). All these aspects present a challenge to individuals as well as human resource management within organizations. Ageing employees, a shrinking workforce and knowledge loss due to the retirement wave of the ‘baby boomers’, as well as disruptions in the employment resumes might hamper not only the ability of companies to change, but even of whole nations to remain competitive. Knowledge management, 296 christiane hipp and birgit verworn

qualification programmes and increased recruiting efforts arebecoming critical for the future success of enterprises in Germany and Japan. This chapter is organized as follows. Following this introductory section, we present theoretical considerations of an ageing workforce in Section 2. Section 3 briefly summarizes empirical findings, and a short case study is presented in Section 4. Suggestions on how to manage the ageing workforce are made in Section 5, followed by a short summary in Section 6.

2. theoretical Background

What effects will an ageing workforce have on companies in the future? Leibold and Voelpel (2006) identified several risks for a company’s com petitive capabilities, including labour costs, performance, and quality (cf. Figure 1). This is in line with the ‘depreciation model’ and ‘deficit model’, which suggest that older employees are less innovative than younger employees. The ‘depreciation model’ views older workers as increasingly less valuable and dispensable (cf. Hedge, Borman and Lammlein 2006; Yeatts, Folts and Knapp 1999), while the ‘deficit model’ explains the

Source: Leibold and Voelpel (2006: 33). Figure 1 key competitive challenges of an ageing workforce managing an ageing workforce 297 process of ageing from a gerontological point of view. This model assumes that, compared to younger people, older people tend to lose important capabilities and develop deficiencies and defects that hamper their ability to change and learn (cf. Cohen 2001; Meyer 2007). These assumptions are not shared by Baltes (1997) and his selection, optimization, and compensation theory (SOC theory), which is based on the premise that successful individual development (including ageing) is a process and combination of these three components. Successful development is defined as the simultaneous minimization of personal capability loss (e.g., of physical capabilities) and compensation as well as maximization of capability gains (e.g., through knowledge and skills acquisition). However, how these components of adaptation are realized depends on the specific personal and societal circumstances that individuals face as they age and therefore can be supported by specific instruments, incentives, and positive experiences (Freund and Baltes 2000).

3. empirical Evidence

To date, researchers have focused on the performance of the ageing workforce, concluding that total performance does not decline with age (McEvoy and Cascio 1989; Waldman and Avolio 1986). For performance, the deficit model is widely rejected. For both the deficit model and the SOC theory there is little empirical evidence related to creativity, learning, change, and innovation. According to a study by Meyer (2007) of 374 German firms, an older workforce is inversely related to the likelihood of new or significantly improved technologies being introduced into the operating process. Furthermore, Rouvinen (2002) found a negative influence of average employee age on process innovation probability in manufacturing industries. Hoisl (2007) and Henseke and Tivig (2007) found an inverted u-shaped relationship between the age of an inventor and his inventive output (patents). All these findings support the deficit model. However, there is also contradicting evidence. Janssen (2000) found that neither self-evaluated nor leader-evaluated innovative work behaviour was age-dependent. Verworn and Hipp (2009) showed that German companies with a high proportion of older employees were as innovative as ‘younger’ companies. The following short case study will present some of these findings in detail. 298 christiane hipp and birgit verworn

4. Short Case Study

We analysed data obtained from the employee suggestion system of a large European company. We selected two locations in Germany, ‘A’ and ‘B’, where the suggestion system was implemented in 2005. In both locations, every employee was invited to submit ideas independent of seniority level. Therefore, theoretically, there should not have been a systematic positive bias towards older employees. Most suggestions came from manual workers. Every suggestion underwent a systematic evaluation process to assess its quality in terms of potential revenues or company savings. If an idea was implemented, the employee was rewarded with a percentage of the resulting revenues or savings. Employees of Location A were rewarded with 20 per cent of the estimated savings, while employees of Location B were rewarded with 35 per cent. We analysed data collected between 2005 and 2007, following a proposal from Leach, Stride and Wood (2006) to focus only on ideas that were successfully implemented. This eliminates duplicate ideas or ideas where the costs are as high as the benefits. Furthermore, successfully implemented ideas fulfil Amabile’s definition of innovation within an organization (Amabile 1988). Between summer 2005 and February 2007, a total of 633 ideas submitted in Location A and B led to monetary rewards. The average age of those who had submitted an idea was 41.8 years in Location A and 42.7 years in Location B. In both locations, approximately 7 per cent of the idea submitters were female. Almost 50 per cent of all employees in Location A were older than 45 years and their ideas led to revenues and savings of almost 800,000 euros in total between summer 2005 and February 2007. The age structure of the workforce in Location B was slightly more age-centred, with almost 60 per cent being 45 years of age or older. Realized revenues and savings in Location B were higher than in Location A and amounted to 1,784,923 euros. This difference is not only due to the larger number of employees in Location B, but also to the higher average realized savings per employee – about 400 euros, compared to 280 euros in Location A. In order to calculate the average number of ideas per employee and the average value of those ideas, we first determined the age of each employee who had submitted a successfully implemented idea. We then counted the number of ideas submitted by each age cohort and summed up the value of all ideas within that cohort. Finally, for each managing an ageing workforce 299 age cohort, both values were divided by the total number of employees in that cohort. For Location A, both the average number of ideas and the average value of those ideas did not decrease with employee age (cf. Figure 2). The most valuable ideas came from the age cohorts 36–40 and 51–55, with these cohorts also achieving the highest average value per employee of 341 to 489 euros. Employees of the oldest age cohort (55 or older) submitted the most ideas through the suggestion system (0.33 ideas in about one and a half years). The results for Location B were similar. Although employees 55 or older submitted more ideas than other age cohorts (cf. Figure 3), no general increase in the number of ideas with age was observed. In contrast to the assumptions of the deficit model, older employees submitted more valuable ideas than younger employees. The most ideas and the most valuable ones came from employees aged 55 or older, who also achieved the highest average value per employee of 24,918 euros. Overall, our case study does not support the deficit model. In fact, we found just the opposite: in Location B we observed an increase in the quality of ideas with employee age. A possible explanation for this might be the greater experience and expertise of older workers, compared to younger workers, in a specific domain (cf.E ricsson and Smith

Source: Own calculation.

Figure 2 value and number of ideas per employee for Location A 300 christiane hipp and birgit verworn

Source: Own calculation. Figure 3 value and number of ideas per employee for Location B

1991; Rathunde 1995). As proposed by the SOC theory, potential capability loss due to ageing may be compensated for by an increase in productivity and, if no loss occurs, may even lead to higher productivity. In line with this reasoning, Dollinger and Dollinger (2003) propose that individuality grows from young to middle adulthood and, therefore, the ability to create something unique grows as well.

5. managing an Ageing Workforce

Germany’s employment rate for the 55–64 year group is only slightly above the OECD average of 46 per cent (OECD 2008b), because until recently the German pension system supported early retirement (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2005). Today, the system is in great financial distress and a series of reforms has been introduced. For instance, the German government is planning to gradually increase the official retirement age. Despite this, some German companies are trying to rejuvenate their workforce by continuing their early retirement schemes – a practice that is costly, since the German pension system no longer supports it. Additional attempts have been made to acquire highly-skilled labour from foreign countries, and family programmes have been introduced to ensure flexible and affordable child care, managing an ageing workforce 301 which will allow parents to continue working outside the home. However, these programmes have been started only recently. The positive effects will not be seen for several years, and these efforts are not expected to solve the problems posed by an ageing workforce within the next 10 to 20 years. In consequence, the proportion of elder employees will increase significantly in the coming years. Companies are in a key position to adapt to the ageing workforce on several levels (cf. chart below). The goal of these measures is to support the recruiting process, to stabilize the performance, quality and motivation of ageing employees, and to ensure knowledge transfer and savings.

Challenges for human resource management

Stabilizing Ageing and shrinking performance, quality workforces and motivation

Lack of young human Recruiting / resources / Disruption Knowledge transfer / in employment Knowledge saving

On an organizational level, age-sensitive job designs, such as ergo- nomic workplace design, flexible working hours and health management, help employees stay fit and healthy as long as possible. Recent studies have shown that prevention can significantly reduce labour costs (Sockoll, Kramer and Bödeker 2008). In addition, personal skills and job requirements need to be regularly assessed, evaluated and adopted to ensure a good match. The job content should be demanding and stimulating for employees to develop cognitive performance (Deller et al. 2008). Job rotation, freedom of action, and feedback from managers and supervisors are possible instruments to achieve employability of the ageing workforce (Wolff, Spieß andM ohr 2001; Stegmaier et al. 2006). On an individual level, lifelong learning also ensures performance and maintains motivation for all age groups. Tivig and Hetze (2007) have shown that the labour force participation of people aged between 50 and 64 years increased from 4 per cent in 1979 to 17 per cent in 2003. However, this is still very low compared to the 36 per cent of participants in training who are between 35 and 49 years old. Possible reasons for the unwillingness of companies to invest in educating their elder employees are high opportunity costs, higher salary costs of older 302 christiane hipp and birgit verworn workers, and the short payback time until retirement (Buchholz, Hofäcker and Blossfeld 2006). A shift in the youth-centric organizational culture towards non-stereotypical, non-discriminating thinking is needed in many German companies (Bullinger and Buck 2007). However, stabilizing performance, output quality, and motivation is just one aspect (cf. Table 1). In Location B of our short case study, it was older employees who presented ideas with the highest saving potential. Therefore, the question also arises of how to transfer the knowledge and ideas of older workers and employees to younger ones. With the baby boomers’ retirement wave to come, many companies face the problem of losing knowledge and ideas. Organizations should be aware of the potential loss of know-how and firm-specific knowledge, if a disproportionately high number of workers retire simultaneously, and consider knowledge transfer strategies to prevent these losses. Organizations that are able to transfer knowledge effectively and efficiently from older to younger employees, are likely to be more productive and thus more likely to survive than those that are less adept at knowledge transfer (Argote and Ingram 2000; Argote et al. 2000; Szulanski 2000). Traditional, well-established strategies are mentoring and coaching projects. On-the-job training, especially in mixed-age teams, as well as different technology and non-technology-based knowledge management tools can also help to ensure knowledge transfer between those employees leaving and those taking over new jobs or entering the company. A report by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry published in 2009 shows that German companies located in Japan are aware of the importance of using many kinds of knowledge transfer and knowledge saving instruments. However, most of them have not established systematic knowledge management processes, and use (if at all) traditional databases like yellow pages or content and data management systems. Furthermore, companies also need to rethink their recruiting strategies. Until now, most German companies have persisted with traditional recruiting patterns. According to a study undertaken by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF 2005), 80 per cent of companies follow a strategy of recruiting young people to balance for retirement waves. These companies mainly focus on cooperation programmes with schools and universities, as well as trainee and internship programmes. In the former West Germany, 92 per cent of all newly recruited employees are younger than 50 years managing an ageing workforce 303 ) uality / uality ( Continued in participation Active health training, and management, self-development Performance-oriented system compensation development, Career job including etc. rotation, job design Age-sensitive health management, (e.g., flexibility) Age-sensitive culture organizational otivation erformance / Q erformance P M • learning Livelong • • • • • • support Technical vangelist”) E ecruiting (“ structure Dynamic age analysis with Cooperation universities in Participation Active R ecruiting R • • management Diversity • branding Employment • • ound ound management Knowledge culture and systems and project age Mixed / R teams working tables with Cooperation external experts Coaching in participation Active sharing knowledge nowledge transfer / Saving transfer nowledge K • • • • Mentoring • • easures to face demographic change and an ageing workforce ageing an and change face demographic to easures organizational level organizational anagement and and anagement able 1 able m ndividual level ndividual T I M 304 christiane hipp and birgit verworn uality / uality otivation age-sensitive of Support education and training care home and Child care programmes erformance / Q erformance P M • • against regulations and Laws discrimination age support to Incentives recruiting ageing-sensitive Open towards up highly-skilled foreigners ecruiting R • • • development of Support transfer knowledge of measures work Mandatory for programmes citizens senior nowledge transfer / Saving transfer nowledge K • age retirement Flexible • • easures to face demographic change and an ageing workforce (Contd.) workforce ageing an and change face demographic to easures social level olitical and and olitical able 1 able m T P the authors. by up D rawn Source: managing an ageing workforce 305 old, while in the former East Germany the figure is 82 per cent, which shows that companies still follow a largely youth-centric recruiting policy. However, due to the current demographic changes, companies will not be able to continue this strategy in the future. First, the recruiting process should be based on a much more comprehensive, elaborated personal age structure analysis that takes dynamic effects into account (Buck, Kistler and Mendius 2002). Companies need to build up knowledge and instruments to better understand the future development of their employees’ age structure. Second, companies should improve their process management and increase labour productivity through re-organization and technological support (i.e., machinery, information and communication technologies, software, etc.). However, since the unemployment rate is currently very high in Germany, and due to the economic crisis further job losses are probable. In contrast, experts expect a shortage of highly skilled employees in the future, a shortage that cannot easily be compensated for by technology. Third, older and female job applicants as well as immigrants need to be equally taken into account (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008). Recently, diversity programmes and employment branding efforts have received more attention on organizational and management levels. It might also be possible to encourage employees to participate in recruiting efforts, following the concept of word-of-mouth communication (Ellison and Fudenberg 1995). Figure 5 on the next page shows that German companies are already using some instruments to prepare for the challenges of an ageing workforce. Especially important are training and a performance-oriented compensation system. Mixed working teams and regular health checks are also on the agenda of German companies. However, cultural aspects like sensitizing workshops still do not attract much attention from German or other European companies.

6. Summary

The most successful strategy to motivate older employees and achieve employee retention is to appreciate and value the experience, knowledge and performance that older employees bring (Armstrong-Strassen 2006). Therefore, it is crucial to establish an organizational culture 306 christiane hipp and birgit verworn

Source: Data are based on Addecco Institute (2008). Figure 4 how companies prepare for demographic change and silver employ ment

which supports learning and overcomes stereotypes and discrimination. Tews (1995) has shown that stereotypical thinking about older people has three main sources: (1) own knowledge about age; (2) own expectations on ageing; and (3) own experiences interacting with older people. Measures can be implemented through knowledge management and training to address all three. For example, age awareness issues can be integrated into management training sessions with the aim of reflecting upon stereotypical thinking, to fill knowledge gaps, and to reduce individual fears about ageing. Moreover, mixed working teams or tandems can intensify contact among different generations, encouraging positive cross-generational experiences as well as knowledge transfer. Additionally, a culture of knowledge sharing needs to be integrated with awareness and active participation of individuals in transferring tacit knowledge. Japan is one of the world’s leading nations in terms of corporate knowledge management, and therefore can serve as a benchmark for German companies. On an organizational level, early retirement programmes to rejuvenate the workforce should be the exception rather than the rule. Managers should instead follow an analysis-based human resource strategy which takes a balanced age structure into account and actively managing an ageing workforce 307 supports lifelong learning, health management, as well as individual- ized, flexible job and remuneration design. Companies and nations also need to open up to new forms of human resource management instruments. Storytelling, mandatory senior work programmes, cross- company exchange of skilled employees and the integration of unemployed people over 50 years of age are recent concepts used on different levels to overcome the challenges of an ageing workforce. At the same time, far more effort and creativity is needed to overcome discrimination and foster lifelong employability.

New Housing Options for the Elderly in Japan: The Example of Tokyo’s Edogawa Ward

Maren Godzik

1. introduction

With Japan’s elderly people accounting for already more than 20 per cent of the population in 2008, a figure that is estimated to grow to 30 per cent by 2025, an enormous transformation of Japan’s society is taking place. The increasing proportion and number of elderly people in Japan have significant implications for the housing and living arrangements of the elderly, including care systems for elderly people requiring help. Although 45 per cent of people aged 65 years and older still live in three-generation households or with their (unmarried) children, the number of elderly people living only with their spouse or living alone has grown considerably in the last twenty years, resulting in more and more elderly-only households (cf. Figure 1 below). Reasons for this development are, among other things, longer life expectancies, the process of urbanization and migration that dates back many decades and which left rural regions with a significantly higher percentage of elderly people in comparison to the metropolitan areas, as well as changes in attitudes concerning the family, new lifestyles of the younger and the older generations. This transformation as well as growing insights into the influence of the social environment on the well-being of elderly people have made it necessary to take measures in various policy fields. Elderly-only households are not a problem per se. Given the fact, however, that sooner or later a large proportion of elderly people will require help or care, the living arrangements of elderly people have to be looked at in connection with the care arrangements provided or accessible. With the living arrangements changing, the care arrangements too are subject to change. The traditional caregivers – mainly daughters-in-law – are not available any longer to the same extent they were in the past. Higher employment rates of women (who still are the main caregivers) and new requirements for care-giving, due to medical progress resulting in longer periods of time that people have to be 310 maren godzik

Source: Naikakufu (2009b: 16). Figure 1 living arrangements of elderly people cared for, have made it more difficult to provide care, even where traditional living arrangements are maintained (Long 2008). Taking into account the predicted increase in the number of elderly people, the Japanese government felt impelled to change the welfare system and, beginning in the 1990s – with the introduction of the Gold Plan – the problem of elderly care officially ceased to be only a private matter to be solved within families.1 Along with a home helper system

1 a number of measures have been introduced in the field of elderly welfare and housing before, but they were usually targeted at elderly people who could not rely on a family. Enacted in 1963, the Law for the Welfare of the Elderly (Rōjin fukushi-hō), for example, which recognized elderly welfare as a comprehensive task of the state for the first time, did not lead to a new policy concerning the elderly in practice (Maeda 2000: 37). The first measure considered to have been a shift away from the family duty of elderly care, was the state-subsidized launching of geriatric health-care facilities (rōjin hoken shisetsu) for elderly people with chronic illnesses in 1988. Their aim was “to fill the gap between nursing homes and hospitals” (Maeda 2000: 42–44) and were to be used by every older person, independent of family situation or income. In the field of housing, the eligibility for public housing for elderly people (i.e., elderly couples or one elderly person together with other family members) since 1964 and for single elderly people since 1980 were major changes (Ōumi 2002: 169), just as much as the introduction of Silver Housing (shirubā haujingu) in 1987. The latter is a housing new housing for the elderly 311 and day care facilities, which were, however, still limited in scale, Japan started with the provision of an increased number of conventional care institutions such as nursing homes (Campbell 2000: 90–91). With the introduction of the long-term care insurance in 2000, eventually, the basis for a new approach was laid that does not mainly rely on institutional care. The demand for institutional care had risen strongly, foreshadowing massive future costs. The long-term care insur ance system aims at reducing these costs (while making care available theoretically for every older person in need of care). The concept of care shifted fromeither facility-based or in-home care to a new concept connecting various types of housing and care solutions (Takahashi 2009). These measures were a start to dissolve the “package of both housing and service” which until then had been prevalent in elderly care (Gottschalks and Wilderom 1992: 49). The new approach aims at more flexibility and diverse possibilities that meet the individual needs and preferences, and takes into account the wish of the majority of the elderly population to grow old in a familiar environment (Naikakufu 2005b). In fact, today, nearly 70 per cent (Naikakufu 2009b: 30) of all care recipients within the long-term care insurance system receive care at home. This chapter aims to shed light on current developments on the local level, taking Tokyo’s Edogawa ward as an example. The role and aims of important actors involved in this process are presented. Some results from recent fieldwork are included to give an up-to-date picture of the housing situation of elderly people in Japan. The development observed can be characterized as a shift from general solutions to local decisions according to specific needs, from big-scale care institutions to small- scale institutions and from institutionalized care to ageing in place, backed up by a variety of support systems giving people a wide range of choice concerning their individual living arrangements.

2. the Actors in the Current Care and Elderly Housing Field

Before the introduction of the long-term care insurance, the families of elderly people were the main actors, with the government providing scheme that combines public housing and assistance for the elderly and will be referred to later in this text. 312 maren godzik care facilities for only those people who could not rely on their families. Up-market old people’s homes could be used by a small number of people with sufficient financial means; they, moreover, often refused clients with a high demand for care. The new system in contrast – at least in theory – allows every person in need of care to benefit from the new measures. The implementation of the new system resulted in a number of new actors emerging in the field of elderly housing and elderly care, as well as the old actors extending their tasks: – in addition to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare responsible for the regulatory framework of the welfare system, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism became strongly involved in policy fields concerning elderly welfare. Cooperation between the two ministries in fields such as sheltered housing has become more frequent. – since April 1993 the local authorities have been in charge of the implementation of elderly care, with their responsibilities growing. On the basis of the reform of long-term care insurance regulations, local governments have been establishing so-called Comprehensive Community Support Centres (chiiki hōkatsu shien sentā)2 in every municipality since 2006. These centres can be seen as the successors of the former In-home Long-term Care Support Centres (zaitaku kaigo shien sentā), but the new centres’ scope has been largely extended. Their aim is to give advice and provide information about the choice of care possibilities, but also to support elderly people and/or their families, irrespective of the elderly person being officially acknowledged as needing care or not, since one of the main objectives is to reduce care requirements in general, by providing preventative measures, alongside reducing residential care by strengthening community care. – The “quasi-governmental” care providers (shakai fukushi hōjin, Social Welfare Corporations) (Salamon and Anheier 1996: 94) mainly involved in conventional nursing homes – that is, Social Welfare Corporations – have extended their operational sphere to other care segments such as day care centres and in-home care. Additionally, multifunctional and small-scale facilities, so-called

2 The local authorities have to decide independently on the size of a centre’s area of responsibility in accordance with its demographic structure, the availability of financial means, and the daily life sphere of its citizens. new housing for the elderly 313

community-based services (chiiki mitchaku-gata sābisu)3 have also been introduced since April 2006, providing care at a local level to be used only by inhabitants of a specific area, usually referred to as the daily life sphere (nichijo seikatsu ken’iki).4 These services, too, are often managed by Social Welfare Corporations, among others. They offer day care and over-night stays, 24-hour-emergency care, and short stay services. However, as a rule, most of these facilities have places for less than 25 persons. Part of this concept is a small- scale nursing home.5 In contrast to ‘traditional’ large-scale nursing homes outside the cities, where people are separated from their familiar surroundings and acquaintances, these more flexible facilities aim at supporting ageing in a familiar environment. – Commercial care and housing providers have been especially active in the field of private residential homes (yūryō rōjin hōmu). The Min istry of Health, Labour and Welfare divides these homes into three types, in accordance with the services provided: (1) full-care service provided directly by the home, (2) care services that are provided by in-home care services and for which contracts have to be concluded individually, and (3) housing for relatively healthy people who have to leave the home when care is required. Private residential homes, therefore, can have characteristics similar to nursing homes as well as retirement communities. In contrast to the various types of public nursing homes, the number of private residential homes has been rising strongly over the last few years (Kōsei Rōdōshō 2007). – in order to encourage commercial housing providers to become active in the field of elderly housing, new forms of housing were devised that are officially recognized as being appropriate for elderly tenants due to a diversified supply of help and care services. Some subcategories of these new forms of housing, such as kōreisha

3 according to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, there are six categories ranging from day care to small-scale nursing and support for people suffering from dementia. For the different categories in detail, see: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/ saikin/hw/kaigo/service07/yougo.html (last accessed 18 April 2009). 4 Community care has been discussed widely since the late 1990s in Japan, although Shigeo Okamura had published his pioneer work on community care, Chiiki fukushi- ron, as early as 1974. 5 pioneers of the concept of small-scale care institutions are privately organized neighbourhood activities which provide day-care services, short stay facilities, home help and housing for elderly people and others in need of care; that is, so-called takurōsho [community-based small-scale facilities for the elderly] which have been in existence since the middle of the 1980s (STHK 2001). 314 maren godzik

sen’yō chintai jūtaku [rental housing for the elderly], require certain features, including barrier-free premises, emergency call devices, and support services such as the provision of meals. Others are financially supported by the local government, such as kōreisha- muke yūryō chintai jūtaku [good quality rental housing for the elderly]. These new forms of housing may also include care services and thus are hardly distinguishable from private residential homes. Yet others offer housing for elderly people without any special features. In order to enable older citizens – who are often less welcome in the mainstream private rental market, because house owners often reject elderly people for fear of them causing fire, not paying the rent or dying unnoticed (Arai 2008: 10) – to find these houses, a registration system (i.e., kōreisha enkatsu nyūkyo chintai jūtaku tōroku seido)6 for house owners who accept elderly people as tenants was started by both the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism on the national level at the end of 2005. – Volunteer groups have been involved in elderly care since the 1970s and it is important to note that they pioneered some of the features that were taken up by Japan’s new welfare system (cf. also Footnote 4). With the Law on Non-profitO rganizations (Tokubetsu hieiri katsudō sokushin-hō), which came into effect in 1998, they gained official status allowing them to work within the framework of care insurance. Equally important, however, is the work that these volunteer groups accomplish in niches, where they provide services that are not included in the official system and which are often geared to the needs of a specific neighbourhood and/or individuals (Adachi 2000; Adachi (no date)). – The integration of citizens in general is part of the reform, making them actors too. However, the way they should be involved is not quite clear. Informal help concepts seem to be the ideal, but in most cases they receive little support or back-up from local authorities (Shimada and Tagsold 2006). In the following part, an example of the local level, Tokyo’s Edogawa ward, was chosen in order to give a concrete picture of the choice of housing and care of elderly people in Japan.

6 see: http://www.senpis-koujuuzai.jp/ (last accessed 28 April 2009). According to the magazine Shūkan Daiyamondo (2/9 May 2009: 58), regulations are planned to be worked out concerning the minimum standards of registered housing as part of the revision of the Elderly Residence Law (Kōreisha kyojū-hō). new housing for the elderly 315

3. the Local Level – The Example of Edogawa Ward

In many respects Edogawa is a very average ward with features that can be found in many urban places in Japan.7 Some facilities in Edogawa, however, are rather rare in Japan. An analysis of Edogawa, therefore, opens up the possibility of examining an average place in order to get an idea of the diversity of the care arrangements. Edogawa is located at the eastern periphery of Tokyo and, with 673,468 inhabitants in 2008, is one of the most populous wards. The rate of elderly people was 17.0 per cent in October 2008; and thus Edogawa’s population is slightly younger than Tokyo’s with an ageing rate of 19.7 per cent and Japan’s with 22.1 per cent (Naikakufu 2009b: 29). According to the ward’s statistics, 114,251 elderly people lived in Edogawa in October 2008. The ward has seven areas with considerable differences concerning the number of inhabitants and their demographic composition. Whereas the ageing rate in the Koiwai area amounts to 21.1 per cent, it is extremely low – only 10.4 per cent – in the Kasai-minami area, a waterfront area that is preferred by families with children (Edogawa-ku 2009: 17). The great majority ofE dogawa’s elderly people live in ordinary housing. Just over 10 per cent receive some kind of assistance or care on the basis of the long-term care insurance, of whom some 18 per cent8 live in residential care facilities such as nursing homes.

3.1 Residential Care Facilities Concerning conventional residential care facilities, Edogawa does not differ much from other places inT okyo.9 As in other wards in the Tokyo

7 The situation in rural areas is different in many respects and requires specific approaches towards elderly housing. Therefore rural areas are not discussed in this chapter. 8 Half of them live in Edogawa, the others live in nursing homes and other facilities located in other areas. People living in private or public old people’s homes without entitlement to care insurance are not included in this figure. Based on statistics entitled “Kaigo no tōkei jōhō Heisei 20-nen” of October 2008, published on the “Edogawa- ku – kaigo hoken no pējī” website. http://www.kaigo.city.edogawa.tokyo.jp/statistics/ 2008.html (last accessed 18 November 2009). 9 edogawa has 14 nursing homes (tokubetsu yōgo rōjin hōmu) for roughly 1,000 people, one “care house” (kea hausu), two old people’s homes (yōgo rōjin hōmu), and 22 private residential homes (yūryō rōjin hōmu), as well as 24 “group homes” (gurūpu hōmu) which offer 402 places for persons with dementia. A list of residential elderly facilities is published by Edogawa ward: http://www.city.edogawa.tokyo.jp/ shisetsuguide/bunya/kenkofukushi/jukunensha/home/index.html (last accessed 18 November 2009). 316 maren godzik

Metropolitan Area, the number of public residential care facilities is insufficient.I n 2006, the number of people on waiting lists for nursing homes in Edogawa was twice as high as the number of people already living in the homes on average.10 On the national level, about 450,000 people were said to be waiting for a place in a nursing home (tokubetsu yōgo rōjin hōmu) in 2008 (Nakata 2008). Depending on the level of care, it is presumably not unusual for people to have to wait for a place in a public residential care facility for a few years, or until they are sent or can move voluntarily to a nursing home somewhere in a rural area – a fact that is indicated also by the relatively large proportion of Edogawa citizens living in care facilities not located in Edogawa. However, a few of Edogawa’s care facilities are pioneering in metropolitan Tokyo. One is an old people’s home that has a child care centre integrated into its daily life.11 Leng Leng Thang wrote in detail about this institution called ‘Kotoen’ in her book Generations in Touch (2001). Another exceptional facility of residential care is Tokyo’s first community-based facility for long-term care, which is located in the Shishibone area of Edogawa and which opened in October 2006.12 In principle, small-scale nursing homes such as this provide space for not more than 29 individuals (cf. Section 2). Due to the building regulations in Shishibone, there was only space for a building with rooms for 20 residents. The residents live divided into two units on two different floors. On the ground floor a day care service has been integrated into the home. Compared to common nursing homes I gained the impression13 of a relatively homely atmosphere with the care staff being able to react in a flexible manner to the residents’ needs and wishes.T ime schedules here are much less strict than in common nursing homes. However, due to the relatively small number of residential facilities on the whole, the average care level of 4.3 (on a scale from 1 to 5) in Shishibone is

10 according to estimates by the Japanese Council of Senior Citizens Welfare (Zenkoku Rōjin Fukushi Shisetsu Kyōgikai) and based on surveys of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Welfare of 2006 (cf. http://kaigo.homes.co.jp/s/list/ad11=13/ area=8/). 11 The nursery was started by theK otoen old people’s home in 1970. Since 1987 the old people’s home (and other facilities for the aged) have been in the same building (Thang 2001: 23). 12 until May 2009 only two other such facilities had been built in Tokyo, both located in the western part of the metropolitan area, namely in Kokubunji (opened April 2009) and Hachiōji (opened May 2005) (telephone information acquired from the Tokyo-to Welfare Division, 18 May 2009). 13 Visit to Watonaru on 4 September 2008, interview with the head of the facility, Mr. Shichinohe. new housing for the elderly 317 high. An interview with the manager revealed that the 20 inhabitants were all from Edogawa, though not exclusively from the Shishibone area. That means that some of the residents are now living rather far away from their former homes. According to Edogawa’s strategy (Edogawa-ku 2009), one of this kind of nursing homes is to be built in each of its seven areas, but as these small-scale nursing homes are not particularly profitable, care providers willing to make the investment are not easy to find – in spite of the necessary land often being provided by local authorities at well below market price. For the Shishibone facility the profits made by the integrated day care are crucial; and as it is a new facility, the integration into the neighbourhood is still in its initial stage – which is the reason why this facility seems little-known in the ward.14 According to the nursing home operators, strategies to strengthen the integration into the neighbourhood are yet to be developed.

3.2 Conventional Housing In general, the number of people living in care facilities is low. Among elderly people in Edogawa the probability of living alone, as a couple or with one’s family in an ordinary household is about 30 per cent respectively (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 2005), whereas the rate of home-owners among elderly people amounts to 70 per cent. Elderly inhabitants benefit from a number of services provided by the local government and by non-profit organizations. The fifteen Comprehensive Community Support Centres, implemented by the local government in Edogawa and operated mostly by care institutions, provide information for those in need of it (e.g., about barrier-free measures for one’s home or help and care) for both people living at home and those preparing to move into a residential facility. The criticism has been made that in most municipalities these centres have to cover too large areas, which is also true of Edogawa. Today, each centre is responsible for a high number of inhabitants and an area consisting of diverse neighbourhoods, both with very different needs. In contrast, researchers consider one centre in every middle-school district as a minimum (e.g., Ishii 2008: 137). In the case of Edogawa this would imply a total of 33 centres, each responsible for about 3,500 elderly people on average, instead of nearly about

14 information gained at the Edogawa Volunteer Centre (Edogawa-ku Borantia Sentā) on 1 May 2009. 318 maren godzik

7,500 at present.15 According to the district’s documents, additional centres or branches are being planned, eventually resulting in 21 centres in 2011 (Edogawa-ku 2009: 25, 31). Probably as important as the total number of inhabitants in a certain area is the integration of the centres into the community as well as their accessibility. Edogawa has a tradition of programmes supporting the elderly with exercises and sports to prevent or delay care needs and enable people to live independently in their own homes for as long as possible (Thang 2001: 20), an aim that was again strongly emphasized when the care insurance was reformed in 2006. Information on the various activities is provided by the Comprehensive Community Support Centres. Rooms for the elderly to gather are offered at no charge by the local government. As in other places in Japan, people who continue living in their own homes and who are entitled to the benefits of the long-term care insurance, can use home helpers as well as day care provided by commercial or non-profit providers. The new community-based services, however, are still rare and, apart from the above-mentioned small-scale nursing home, only four of them are available in Edogawa. For those living alone, on the other hand, the local government in cooperation with the Support Centres has arranged a so-called Network for Support ing a Secure Life (Anshin Seikatsu Ōen Nettowāku). For the price of 3,000 yen per month, volunteers such as the newspaper delivery staff, for example, will check if one’s post box has been regularly emptied (Edogawa-ku 2009: 26). Numerous non-profit organizations are also very active in providing various kinds of services. As in most places in Japan, the ward office or the local Social Welfare Council (Shakai Fukushi Shingikai) has a so-called volunteer centre, where residents can offer their help and receive information about NPOs including those active in elderly help and care. In addition, rooms are provided for volunteers to hold meetings and information about NPOs is also compiled on the centre’s homepage. As documents of the district (Edogawa-ku 2009) and my own investigation revealed, the work of NPOs is certainly seen

15 in Yokohama, which is said to have been a model for this new concept, 101 regional centres (chiiki kea puraza) exist in districts that at present match the catchment areas of middle schools (approx. 20,000 inhabitants each). The concept was first developed in 1989 (Ishii 2008: 122, 140–143). new housing for the elderly 319 positively, but there is no regular or formal cooperation between the local authorities and the NPOs or even between individual NPOs. Instead, the local government cooperates more closely with traditional organizations such as local neighbourhood associations (chōkai) and the so-called rōjin kurabu [organizations for the elderly].

3.2.1 Social housing for the elderly In 1980, the regulations for social housing (kōei jūtaku) were changed. From its inception in 1951, social housing was meant for people (families) of lower income. From 1980, it has gradually been turned into a form of housing mainly available for disadvantaged groups (e.g., single mothers, victims of violence, and disabled people). Defined as one of these disadvantaged groups, elderly people aged 60 and over amount to about 50 per cent of all social housing residents today (cf. also Lützeler in this volume). However, these housing units were not necessarily adjusted to the needs of elderly people. Starting in 1987, social housing units have been modified to meet the needs of those who are unable to fully rely on themselves but do not require continuous care. As a rule, singles and couples aged 60 and over are entitled to these remodelled units called Silver Housing (shirubā haujingu). These units are built barrier-free, support and information is provided by so-called Life Support Advisors (LSA) who are available 24 hours, and emergency call facilities are installed. The number of these Silver Housing units, however, is small. In Edogawa, only 50 of such units have been built (i.e., 50 of only 22,561 units in the whole of Japan [Kokudo Kōtsūshō 2008]), and an additional 90 social housing units have been adjusted for wheelchairs.16 These numbers reflect the relatively small percentage of households in social housing (about 4%) in Japan in general (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 2008).

3.2.2 Commercial housing for the elderly In Edogawa, the commercial actors in the field of providing special housing for the elderly are slightly more active than the social housing sector. In late April 2009, 30 houses with 358 flats were registered as elderly-friendly housing in the official database.17 Not even one unit

16 see the Tōkyō-to Toshi Seibikyoku website at: http://www.toshiseibi.metro.tokyo .jp/juutaku_keiei/toei/264-23.pdf (last accessed 28 April 2009). 17 see the Kōreisha Jūtaku Zaidan website at: http://www.senpis-koujuuzai.jp/ (last accessed 28 April 2009). 320 maren godzik is registered in the category of houses especially designed for the elderly – a fact that leads to the conclusion that landlords apparently do not mind renting their property to elderly people, and that the development of commercial housing for the elderly – that is, providing extra facilities and services – still seems to be in its infancy. Similarly, the homepage of Edogawa ward informs its citizens that some real estate agents that do assist elderly people finding a home have stickers on their window panes that read ‘We are senior friendly’ (jukunen-sha ni shinsetsu-na mise), a piece of information that also hints at the difficulties elderly people in need of rental living space have.18

3.2.3 Alternative living Alternative housing forms are not yet significant in number, although they are a good indicator of social change and the activities of non- profit organizations and citizens in the field of housing and elderly care. Edogawa is home to such a new form of living, the so-called group house (gurūpu hausu) or group living (gurūpu ribingu). Group houses are (usually) rental houses for six to fifteen elderly people, offering them their own – independent – living spaces and a large common space. Mutual help, self-organization of the residents and support by volunteers (mostly organized in NPOs) are common features. Nursing care is not available as a standard, but arranged when needed (provided by volunteers or professional home helpers and covered by long-term care insurance). Group houses are usually funded privately; official support is usually not provided. How these group houses are organized in detail, however, depends on the people involved – the residents and the NPO. The group house in Edogawa started in December 2005 and is located in a residential area near the ward office. It was built for ten residents living on two floors with a common space (including kitchen facilities) on each floor. A restaurant, operated by volunteers and used by the residents as well as the public, is on the ground floor of the building. During the day, volunteer staff provide support if needed. Currently, two students also live in the house to help if necessary, especially in emergency cases during night time. The residents learned of this house mainly by word-of-mouth. Most of them,

18 see the Edogawa-ku website at: http://www.city.edogawa.tokyo.jp/kurashi/ fukushi/jukunen/sumai/sumaisagashi/index.html (last accessed 28 April 2009). new housing for the elderly 321 their ages ranging from 60 to over 80, are still healthy enough to care for themselves. Various regular activities are organized by the NPO, such as lectures and concerts, as well as by the residents themselves (e.g., mah-jong, gymnastics with karaoke, calligraphy and needle- work). All activities are usually open to everyone interested, including young people from the neighbourhood who also take part in them, and this has earned the group house a good reputation in the ward.19 Living in an environment where help is available whenever needed and not being alone, are two common reasons why the residents chose to live in this group house, but also leading one’s own life not determined by others was an important motif.20

4. Concluding Remarks

As the example of Edogawa has shown, new actors in the field of elderly housing and care have emerged in the last few years, widening the choice of housing and care for the elderly. In comparison to Germany and other Western countries, sufficient institutional care has never existed in Japan (Izuhara 2009: 132). Ageing in place, therefore, is not new, but the modalities have changed and are likely to further change in the future. The implementation of the Long-term Care Insurance Law (in spite of justified criticism concerning its original and revised versions and its rising costs) has contributed considerably to both the emergence of new approaches to elderly care in Japan and a changing attitude towards care provided by non-family members. Features of community care that allow people to stay in familiar neighbourhoods, such as community-based facilities, were integrated into the general welfare system, with the aim of combining ageing in place with various institutional forms of care – an aim that is also being propagated in Germany. Its realization, however, is difficult to achieve and sometimes seems to conflict not only with certain paternalistic tendencies of the Japanese government, but also with general financial constraints on the part of local governments. Today, the number of community-based facilities is still insufficient; and whether their integration into neighbourhoods is successful, will probably become apparent in a few years’ time.

19 Visit to Edogawa-ward Volunteer Centre on 1 May 2009. 20 interviews with residents were conducted in March 2009. 322 maren godzik

Most types of commercial housing do not differ much from ordinary housing or nursing homes, depending on the services provided, but they offer an additional choice. Usually, however, they are not well integrated into their surroundings and thus do not add to a transformation of social structures in neighbourhoods, a transformation that will become increasingly important in order to cope with the growing number of elderly people in the future. Much more successful in finding new forms of living have been non-profit organizations that offer more than just allowing people to live an independent and self- determined life in familiar surroundings for a longer period of time. Alternative housing, such as the “group house” in Edogawa, often have a positive impact on the neighbourhood as a place of communal gathering, information and exchange. General support of these projects and encouragement of cooperation between various NPOs and governmental and private sector actors, however, are [Godzik], at present, usually not provided by local governments, although the building of networks and platforms would be essential for involving non-profit organizations and citizens actively in the welfare system (Hiroi 2006; Ishii 2008). Plans for comprehensive integrated neighbourhood development – plans that take into account the specific needs of a certain area by combining urban planning and care concepts as well as the involvement of citizens – are mostly missing. The necessary transformation of society that meets the requirements of Japan’s ageing society in the field of elderly housing and care still remains to be developed. The Political Economy of Health-Care Migration: A Japanese Perspective1

Gabriele Vogt

1. Introduction: The Crisis

A story that often has been told as a symbolic event for the beginning of modern Japan is that of Commodore Matthew C. Perry who, in July 1853, with four ships sailed into Edo Bay. Perry presented a letter by the president of the United States pressing for American trade privileges in Japan. As history tells us, Perry’s expedition came to a successful end, and he himself won “fame as the man who ‘opened’ Japan” (Jansen 2000: 275) after two and a half centuries of closed-country (sakoku) policies under the leadership of the Tokugawa shoguns. The American warships used by the Perry expedition were half a dozen times the size of any ship in Japan, and “their dark hulls earned them their ‘black ships’ (kurofune) name in Japanese lore” (Jansen 2000: 277). Some 150 years later, the term kurofune is still around. It is being used as a metaphor for something that triggers fundamental changes in Japa nese society, politics or economics. Most often these changes hold an inherent quality of leaving Japanese traditions behind and reorienting towards Western models; in any case, however, these changes are groundbreaking and almost revolutionary ones. To the careful reader of migration literature on Japan it will not have gone unnoticed that for a handful of years now not only is a change in the nation’s migration policy seriously being discussed among politicians, but also among the public and business world alike. Moreover, this predicted change is being characterized as a kurofune to Japan’s migration policy. It is expected that Japan’s migration policy will no longer hold onto its two principles which for decades have shaped its characteristic structure: the limitation of labour migration to Japan to

1 I am grateful to Hiromi Tanaka-Naji for the time she took to discuss my very first ideas for this chapter. Reiko Ogawa and Paul Talcott directed me to some very helpful data, which found its way into this study. Ruth Achenbach assisted with the design and translation of the figures and tables, and made sure our supply of hot tea did not fade in this cold Hamburg winter. 324 gabriele vogt highly skilled professionals and the limitation in duration of stay for all migrants to a short-term stay. The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that Japan signed with the Philippines in 2006 and with Indonesia in 2007 contain a new system for labour migration of health- caregivers from the two Asian countries to Japan, and offer to them at least a theoretical perspective for long-term stay in Japan.2 Nothing symbolizes the fundamental change in Japan’s migration policy more than these two EPAs. Unsurprisingly scholars and journalists started to call them kurofune to Japan’s migration policy. Masahiko Ishizuka of Waseda University’s Graduate School of Jour nalism, for example, refers to the EPA as “Japan’s third opening to the rest of the world in its modern history” (Ishizuka 1 September 2008), in line with the original kurofune and the occupation period following World War II. Health-care journalist Keiko Inaba (2008: 30–31) in her book on Filipina caregivers in Japan picks up on a series of articles in the Yomiuri Shimbun entitled Sakoku kaigo genba [The on-site reality of caregiving institutions as a ‘closed country’]; that is, the ‘closed country’ before the arrival of Perry’s ships. Shifting the focus from employees to employers, sociologist David Chiavacci (2006: 27) characterizes the increasing popularity of foreign firms in Japan as a kurofune phenomenon to Japan’s labour market. Drawing on the kurofune symbolism, Ishizuka, Inaba, Chiavacci, and others, too, all share an understanding of the opening of Japan’s labour market to foreign capital and foreign workers as an answer to a crisis. Yasushi Iguchi (2001: 44), a Kwansei Gakuin University economist, was first to frame this sense of a crisis (kikikan) about a fundamental yet involuntary reorientation in migration policy as one induced by Japan’s demographic change. In contrast to what Iguchi calls the first discourse on an opening of Japan’s domestic labour market to foreign workers, which largely stood under the impact of an economic relative high-growth era (i.e., the ‘bubble era’) and a resulting shortage in workers, the current, second discourse on international labour migration to Japan is driven by a distinct fear of the negative economic impacts of population ageing and low fertility rates (Iguchi 2001: 40–45).

2 Both EPA are mainly trade and tariff agreements between the nations involved. As part of cross-border movements both agreements elaborate on the “movement of natural persons.” The Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), for example, states that “natural persons […] who engage in supplying services as nurses or certified care workers” (JPEPA Article 110/1/f) are a specific group for whom cross-border movement to Japan will be made possible. health-care migration 325

It is no coincidence that the fundamental change in Japan’s migration policy, as symbolized in the two recent EPAs, starts from the health-care sector. Due to low wages and low prestige as well as hard working conditions, this sector for years has been unattractive to the domestic workforce. The health-care sector already today suffers from severe labour shortages. Under the impact of demographic change these shortages can be expected to become much more severe on the grounds of two developments: First, a decline in working age population in the short-run brings along more opportunities for those in the workforce. The labour market will need to compete hard for the best workforce, and any sector unattractive to workers is likely to loose out in this competition. Second, population ageing goes along with a numerical increase of those who might need to receive professional health-care in the future. In fact, population ageing has recently become a new strong pull factor in global migration flows of caregiving personnel (Oishi 2005: 2–3). The crisis scenario of a predicted decrease in caregivers and increase in patients is the simple mathematics that lies behind choosing the health-care sector as a ‘guinea pig’ for a new system of controlled labour migration to Japan. This chapter presents research on the political economy of international caregiver migration to Japan. Two developments will gain specific attention in Section 2: first, the socialization of care, which is currently also under way in Japan. The socialization of care is a break with the traditional understanding of health-care as reproductive labour to be managed in the family, that is, in particular by women. The second development that will frame this study is the feminization of migration, a global trend that goes along with an increasing importance of service sector professions as receiving markets of migration workers. The socialization of care and the feminization of migration are the two major developments that underlie Japan’s new EPA-guided migration system. Both developments have the potential to bring about huge changes in how health-caregiving is being organized in Japan and how labour migrants are being welcomed by the Japanese state and society. This chapter argues that despite holding this potential for change in both policy areas, the EPA-guided migration system falls short of living up to its potential. After introducing relevant figures and facts to both policy areas in Sections 3 and 4, Section 5 will study the first data available on the on-site reality of this new migration system. Section 6 will tie together the macro- and micro-data of this study. It will be argued that instead of bringing about fundamental 326 gabriele vogt changes of kurofune quality, what the EPA-guided system really does is to reinforce traditional structures: Instead of pursuing a ‘real’ socialization of care, it is still almost exclusively women who are conducting reproductive labour, albeit no longer daughters or daughters-in-law, but migrant women from Asian countries. Moreover, instead of fundamentally changing the principles of Japan’s migration policy, the current system at a first glance allows for ‘real’ practical change; on a second look, however, the hurdles to this change are probably too high for most migrants to clear anyway. Thus labour migrants are still confined to their roles of ‘guest workers’ rather than having a fair chance for social, political, and economical integration into the destination society.

2. framework: The Gender Aspect in Migration Studies

Feminization of migration is one of the central trends in international migration.3 In the past, global labour migration was male dominated, whereas female migration mostly occurred under the category of family reunion. It has only been since the 1960s that women have started to play a more central role in labour migration themselves (Castles and Miller 2003: 9). In the four decades between 1960 and 2000, the number of female migrants increased from 35 million to 85 million, and by 2000, “women constituted 48.6% of the world’s migrants” (Oishi 2005: 2). Much of the rise in numbers of female migration is grounded in a global economic restructuring that increases the demand for “cheap and docile migrant female labour” (Oishi 2005: 2) most obviously in the tertiary sector. Female dominated professions in service became available on a global scale, and professions such as, for example, nursing soon were “advertised as a ‘portable profession’” (Kingma 2006: 2), which would open doors of opportunities of landing financially lucrative jobs abroad. A highly segmented labour market and the restricted opportunities it poses to potential migrants, in particular to migrant women, in many cases “has meant downward mobility” (Brettell 2000: 111) to migrants. In fact, migrant women in a framework of political economy have been attributed a “‘triple invisibility’ […] based on factors of class, ethnicity, and gender” (Brettell 2000: 111). These three factors make

3 Others are acceleration and differentiation, as well as a growing politicization of migration (Castles and Miller 2003: 7–9). health-care migration 327 migrant women a particularly vulnerable human resource in the global and national labour market. As a research area, feminization of migration generally is divided into two sub-fields: negotiating gendered identities of migrants on the one hand, and the political economy of migration on the other. The first sub-field – from an anthropological and/or sociological perspective – studies the migrants’ individual life-courses and the impact that their work abroad and, in most cases, their becoming the main breadwinner of the family has on domestic roles and domestic power within their home-country households. The second sub-field of studies contains two main aspects: (1) the political participation of female migrants, for example, their formal and informal strategies of resistance and/or their participation in group-based political action; and (2) the labour market participation of female migrants, an aspect that is at the core of studies on the political economy of feminization of migration, with central issues such as global capitalism and worker mobility (Brettell 2000: 106–113). In order to understand the economic and political relevance of Japan’s bilateral EPAs and the newly established labour migration channel it defines for health-caregivers, this chapter focuses on the aspect of female migrants’ recent labour market participation in Japan’s health-care sector. Rather than choosing a narrow focus of analysis in terms of actors involved, my aim is to show a comprehensive picture of evolving interests and ideological variations inherent in actors of politics and business on a macro-level, as well as in actors at the ground level of labour migration, most importantly, migrants’ employers and migrants themselves. Making use of this multilevel and multi-issue approach, the chapter aims to bridge the existing gap between migration studies in international political economies that tend to either concentrate on “the play of interest […] or on ideas and institutions […] to explain why states risk migration” (Hollifield 2000: 153). As a case study on health-care migration to Japan, this chapter intends to contribute some thoughts on one of the central puzzles political economists in migration studies pose, namely “that the supply of immigrants does not always match demand” (Hollifield 2000: 145). Acquiring data for any study on recent developments is never an easy task. Neither was it for this project. While there is a significant body of literature on Japan’s health-care sector (e.g., Long 2000; Ikegami and Campbell 2007), on the gender dimension of reproductive labour in Asia and Japan in particular (e.g., Gills and Piper 2002; Yoshida, 328 gabriele vogt

Yamane and Sugii 2005), and on labour migration to Japan (e.g., Iguchi 2001; Tanaka 2007), hardly anything so far has been written on EPA- administered labour migration to Japan. Exceptions are studies by female migration scholars in Japan, for example Reiko Ogawa (2008) and Nobue Suzuki (2007) as well as journalistic works such as by Yasuhiro idei (2009) and Keiko Inaba (2008). Additionally, there is one source of extremely rich data about the on-site reality of caregiver migration to Japan: survey data compiled by the Kyushu University Asia Center (Kyūshū Daigaku Ajia Sōgō Seisaku Sentā). Following the methodology of qualitative content analysis, Sections 3 and 4 will bring these sources – some of which are now available in English language for the first time – together and put the findings into the context of political economy in migration studies.

3. macro-Structures: Labour Migration to Japan

Migration literature in recent years has started to include the case study of Japan among recent countries of immigration (Tsuda 2006). The acknowledgement of Japan as a case study of international migration flows, on the one hand, reflects a shift in awareness among migration scholars who for many decades centred on case studies of European states and their former colonies. On the other hand, and more importantly, Japan increasingly becomes relevant when studying countries of transit or destination of international migration in a global perspective as well as within the particular region of Asia. The numerical development of Japan’s foreign population shows a steady increase in both their actual numbers and their proportion of the overall population (cf. Figure 1). The most recent data published by Japan’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ, Hōmushō) show that by the end of 2008, roughly 2.2 million (2,217,426) persons of non-Japanese nationality were living in Japan. This amounts to 1.74 per cent of the total population. Since 1990, over the course of less than two decades, we have witnessed the doubling of both the actual number of foreigners migrating to Japan and their proportion of the overall population. Yet, compared to other OECD nations, the current figures are still relatively small (MOJ 2008, 2009; OECD 2009g). The increase in the foreignpopulation in Japan, which in particular is an increase of the Chinese and Brazilian populations, has seen this surge ever since 1990 due to a revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Shutsunyūkoku health-care migration 329

Source: MOJ (2008, 2009). Figure 1 Registered foreign residents in Japan, 1960–2008 kanri oyobi nanmin nintei-hō). This law revision expanded the visa category of ‘long-term resident’ (teijūsha) to include descendants of Japanese nationals, the so-called nikkeijin; most of the migrants coming to Japan on what colloquially came to be known as the nikkeijin- visa are descendants of Japanese emigrants to Brazil. Furthermore, in 1990, the trainee system’s availability was expanded to include small businesses, and preparations started for an introduction of a specialized trainee programme (senmon kenshū) from 1993 on. Three quarters of trainees in Japan now are Chinese nationals; meanwhile, the trainee system is broadly being criticized for its exploitative character. Both reforms, the opening of migration avenues to descendants of Japanese nationals as well as to those interested in internships, has had a direct impact on Japan’s labour market. Both newly established migration avenues opened supply chains for Japan’s low-wage sector, and reinforced an already existing gap between Japan’s migration policy output and policy outcome.4 While Japan’s migration policy output in a nutshell reads ‘migration only of a highly skilled workforce and only on a temporary basis’, its policy outcome draws a vastly different picture: 64.7 per cent of all registered foreign nationals in Japan are on a visa that is being granted without any connection to the professional skills of the holder. That is, 64.7 per cent of all registered foreign nationals in Japan do not necessarily need to be highly qualified professionals. Deducting the 11.7 per cent of ‘long-term residents’ (mainly

4 cornelius and Tsuda (2004), originally in the mid-1990s, introduced the ‘gap hypotheses’ into migration studies. 330 gabriele vogt nikkeijin), the remaining 53.0 per cent of all registered foreign nationals in Japan do not face any restriction on their duration of stay in Japan (MOJ 2009). With the bilateral EPAs, Japan for the first time leaves the path of the two principles that comprise its official migration policy. EPA-administered caregiver-migration is a nation-specific and sector-specific migration avenue that openly caters to non-highly skilled workers, and offers to them an opportunity of a permanent stay in Japan. In terms of realpolitik, the EPAs build a bridge over the prevailing gap of Japan’s migration policy output and policy outcome (cf. Vogt, forthcoming).

Source: Based on Inaba (2008: 39).5 Figure 2 Regulations of the system of caregiver-migration from the Philippines and Indonesia to Japan, as stipulated in the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements

5 Translations in Figure 2 and Tables 1 to 5 were composed by Ruth Achenbach. health-care migration 331

The EPA-administered migration system, however, is not as liberal as it may seem at first glance (cf. Figure 2). It distinguishes between nurses (kangoshi) and care workers (kaigo fukushi-shi).6 Health- caregiving staff are recruited via a call for applicants directly in the sending countries of Indonesia and the Philippines, where potential candidates are identified and invited to multi-day assessment centres. This screening event is organized and carried out by the Japan Inter national Corporation of Welfare Services (JICWELS, Kokusai Kōsei Jigyō-dan), founded in 1983 as an integral body to what is presently the Ministry for Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW, Kōsei Rōdōshō). JICWELS is also in contact with hospitals and nursing homes in Japan, which are interested in employing migrant caregivers. After choosing candidates who, judging from their training record (health-care schooling and work experience) and an individual interview, seem suitable for working in Japan, JICWELS is in charge of matching the candidates and their prospective employers. ‘Mismatching’ can occur. That is, in some cases the candidates’ profiles and employers’ offers cannot be matched. Upon arrival to Japan, the successfully matched candidates of both groups need to undergo six months of intensive training in the Japanese language and culture, as well as some introductory on-the-job training. The classes of this training period are designed and administered by the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS, Kaigai Gijutsusha Kenshū Kyōkai), which in 1959 was founded by what is presently the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, Keizai Sangyōshō). The mission of AOTS is to train engineers and managers from developing countries in the Japanese language and culture in order to promote cross-cultural understanding. The Association also is a major player in Japan’s trainee system and operates on funds from Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. After the training period, nurses relocate to hospitals where they take up their work as assistant nurses irrespective of the degree of qualifications they so far have obtained outside of Japan. During this time they stay in Japan on one-year renewable visas of the category of ‘designated activities’ (tokutei katsudō). After three years, at the latest, of working as candidate nurses (kango joshu), they are required to take the national exam for nurses. This exam needs to be taken in Japanese.

6 In this chapter the term ‘(health-)caregivers’ is being used to refer to both groups equally. 332 gabriele vogt

If they pass the exam, Indonesian nurses will be granted an indefinite residency and work permit to Japan; nurses from the Philippines will be granted renewable multi-year visas. In the case that candidates fail the exam, their residency and work permit to Japan will be termi- nated, and they will need to leave Japan. The system works more or less the same for care workers. These, however, are granted a four-year stay before having to face the national exam. Also, most likely by 2012 or 2013, an ‘exit strategy’ will have been introduced for those care workers who failed the exam. Failing in the exam in the future might simply mean that candidates cannot upgrade their status to that of a certified care worker, but still are able to continue to work in Japan as assistant care workers (jun kaigo fukushi-shi) (Inaba 2008: 36–40; Suzuki 2007: 368–373). Via the EPA-administered migration system, in the long-run 1,000 caregiver migrants per nation and per year are invited to receive training and work in Japan. During the start-up phase of the system, in 2008 and 2009, however, the quota was 1,000 caregivers per nation over two years. While these numbers do not seem overly ambitious – neither against the backdrop of the caregiver shortage in Japan (cf. subsection four) nor in relation to, in particular, the Philippine’s strong standing as a labour exporting nation7 – not even the lower quota of 1,000 migrants per nation per two years could be filled with applicants.8 This is evidence for the unattractiveness of theE PA system to potential health-care migrants. Factors that make this system so unattractive are the high degree of Japanese language skills that is being required, and the comparative irrelevance of professional skills the care giver migrants hold. No matter what their qualifications are, they will need to start working as candidate nurses and care workers. The pay during the period of candidacy is low; and compared to wages that nurses can receive in the US or Canada, the pay even of full nurses or registered nurses in Japan is low. Also, candidates have to cope with a significant uncertainty in terms of life-course planning before passing the national exam: as long as they hold the candidate status, family reunification is impossible. Passing the exam and thereby building a

7 “It is estimated that 2,300 persons are deployed overseas every day and the total mass of [Filipino] migrants send back 8 billion dollars in savings every year” (Kingma 2006: 21). 8 In 2008, roughly 40 per cent of the target number of Indonesian caregiver migrants could be recruited (Kobayashi and Sato 1 August 2008). health-care migration 333 future with a long-term perspective in Japan, is no easy task. Data for 2008, published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, show that only 30.6 per cent of all applicants that year passed the national exam for caregivers (MHLW 2008a). To a non-native speaker of Japanese the exam will be even more difficult. While financial remuneration is a structural problem of the health-care profession in Japan and many other countries, the other above-mentioned factors which make caregiver migration to Japan so unattractive are factors inherent in Japan’s bilateral EPA system. Initially strongly opposed to EPA-administered caregiver migration, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare pushed these very factors into the EPA system. The Ministry saw itself intensely lobbied by the Japan Nursing Association (JNA, Nihon Kaigo Kyōkai) and other labour associations that aimed at promoting better working conditions and better pay for domestic staff in order to raise the attractiveness of the sector to many trained nurses and caregivers who left the profession due to harsh working conditions and low pay. It was only in 2006 that the Japan Nursing Association acknowledged a staff shortage attributing this development partially to Japan’s population ageing: “However, demands for nursing workers have outpaced the suppl[y], due to the development of advanced medicine, [an] increase in the number of hospital beds and the ageing of patients. Japan is now in the state of chronic nurse shortages in terms of both quality and quantity” (JNA 2006). Only from then on did the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare support the EPA negotiations, and largely influenced the design of the newly established migration channel. Other actors, in particular the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry as well as Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), were in no position to push for a more easily accessible migration system (Vogt 2007).

4. macro-Structures: Health-Caregiving in Japan

A closer look at the macro-structures of health-caregiving in Japan is necessary in order to understand the (ir)relevance of EPA-administered caregiver migration to Japan for this business sector. Most importantly it needs to be noted that professional health-caregiving has seen a growing demand from patients and their families for some years now. This development can be understood as the proceeding socialization of care and is rooted in two main causes. The first one is a story quickly 334 gabriele vogt told: Japan’s population is ageing rapidly, and the personal risk of being in need of health-care services rises with age. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare calculated that this personal risk rises from 3.8 per cent for a 65 year old to 24.1 per cent for a 75 year old. Following data compiled by Japan’s National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Kokuritsu Shakai Hoshō Jinkō Mondai Kenkūjo), Japan’s old-age ratio (i.e., those 65 and over as a per cent of total population) is predicted to rise from 20.2 per cent in 2005, to 30.5 per cent by 2025, and to 40.5 per cent by 2050. Having a closer look at the age distribution among those aged 65 years and older, we see an increase in the 65 to 74 years bracket (11.1 per cent in 2005; 12.3 per cent by 2025; 14.6 per cent by 2050). We do, however, see an even sharper increase of the population segment aged 75 years and older (9.1 per cent in 2005; 18.2 per cent by 2025; 24.9 per cent by 2050). This means that the personal risk of being in need of health-care services will rise tremen- dously. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare predicts that the number of elderly beneficiaries to the state-run Long-term Care Insurance (LTCI, kaigo hoken) will increase from 4.5 million in 2007 to 8.4 million by 2025 (MHLW 2007a; NIPPSR 2008: 15–16). The introduction of LTCI to Japan’s elderly care in April 2000 is closely connected to the second reason for a growing demand for professional health-caregiving in Japan: a changing attitude among Japanese towards institutionalized health care, in particularly for the elderly. Institutionalized elderly care next to, for example, a community-based voluntary care system, became one opportunity of how to organize elderly care (Campbell and Ingersoll-Dayton 2000; Coulmas 2007b: 98–112; Fukawa 2008). The societal taboo of relying on elderly care provided outside the family faded. This is shown in data of a longitudinal survey conducted by the Cabinet Office in Japan (CAO, Naikakufu). The survey presents data on preferred forms of elderly care from 1995 and 2003, thereby allowing us to contrast the attitude towards institutionalized elderly care before and after the introduction of LTCI to Japan. The changing attitude is significant, and – most importantly – is reflected among the care-receiving as well as the care giving generation. Whereas in 1995, 57.3 per cent of elderly people agreed with the statement that “[i]t is just natural when children provide care to their own parents,”9 this figure fell to 48.6 per cent in

9 “Kodomo ga oya no kaigo o suru koto wa atarimae no koto da.” health-care migration 335

2003. On the other hand, while in 1995 only 28.7 per cent of the caregiving generation agreed with the statement that “[j]ust because I am their child does not mean I will need to provide care for my parents,”10 this number rose to 36.1 per cent by 2003 (CAO 2004). Another and more recent survey by Unicharm, a large company in health-care products, also shows a general compliance with the idea of institutionalized elderly care. Substantial differences between the sexes, however, become clear (cf. Figure 3). On the question of “[w]ho would you prefer to help you with your intimate care should you no longer be able to perform it yourself,”11 66.7 per cent of men answered they would like to be helped by their spouses. Only 20.7 per cent of women answered with the option of “spouse” and 46.9 per cent of women

Source: Unicharm (2008). Figure 3 “Who would you prefer to help you with your intimate care should you no longer be able to perform it yourself?”12

10 “Kodomo dakara to itte, kanarazushimo mizukara oya no kaigo o suru hitsuyō wa nai.” 11 “Moshi jibun ni haisetsu kea ga hitsuyō ni nattara?” 12 0.8 per cent of the men and 1.4 per cent of the women did not respond to this survey question. 336 gabriele vogt would rather receive help from a professional caregiver or home- helper. Among men this option only drew 25.8 per cent of responses (Unicharm 2008). While different preferences of family care and institutionalized care may indeed prevail between men and women, it is fair to conclude that the acceptance of institutionalized care in Japan – supported by structural changes such as the introduction of LTCI and societal changes such as the fading taboo of outsourcing reproductive labour – is on the rise. This increasing demand for institutionalized care, however, is not yet matched by a sufficient supply of professional caregivers. While the number of staff in health facilities for the elderly in Japan almost tripled between 1996 (13,181 employees) and 2005 (35,494 employees), the actual ratio of staff (in this case: registered nurses) per 1,000 persons is still extremely low. It stands at 6.4 nurses per 1,000 in Japan compared to 10.6 in Sweden, 9.9 in Canada and 9.7 in Germany. Japan, however, in an international comparison, does show the highest ratio of beds in health-care facilities per 1,000 persons: 12.8 beds in Japan as opposed to 2.2 in Sweden, 2.9 in Canada and 6.4 in Germany (JNA 2008). This data suggests that the shortages in Japan’s health-care sector are indeed shortages in personnel (cf. Figure 4). International health-caregiver migration might thus be a solution to Japan’s health- care shortages.

5. micro-Level: Health-Caregiver Migrants in Japan

The Japan-Indonesia EPA was put into practice in August 2008 with the first batch of Indonesian caregiver migrants arriving in Japan; the Japan-Philippines EPA followed suit in May 2009. Just about half a year before EPA-administered caregiver migration became reality in Japan, in February 2008, a research group on labour migration to Japan situated at the Kyushu University Asia Center conducted a large-scale survey among hospitals in Japan, asking about their opinion on the EPA-administered avenue for international health-care migration to Japan (Kawaguchi, Hirano and Ohno 2009). The survey focused on hospitals with more than 300 beds, which were identified via the National Hospital Database.13 A six-page questionnaire was sent to a

13 No explanation has been given as to the selection criteria of 300 plus beds. health-care migration 337 total of 1,604 hospitals across the country. With 541 questionnaires returned, the response rate stood at 34.1 per cent. In the following, five of the survey questions are introduced (cf. Tables 1 to 5).

Source: JNA (2008). Figure 4 Number of nurses and beds in health-care facilities per 1,000 persons

Table 1 “Were you aware the Japanese government would begin introducing foreign nurses to Japanese hospitals as a part of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Southeast Asian nations?” Yes, I am very familiar with it 280 (51.8%) I have heard about it, but don’t know the details 250 (46.2%) No, I haven’t heard of it at all 11 (2.0%)

Note: N = 541. Source: Kawaguchi, Hirano and Ohno (2009: 54).14

14 Original question: “Nihon seifu ga tōnan Ajia shokoku to no keizai renkei kyōtei (EPA) ni shitagatte, gaikokujin kangoshi o dōnyū shiyō to shite iru koto o gozonji desu ka?”; answers: “yoku shitte iru”, “gutaiteki ni wa shiranai ga, kiita koto ga aru”, “shiranai”. 338 gabriele vogt

Table 2 “How do you feel about accepting foreign nurse trainees at your hospital?” I am very eager to accept them 38 (7.0%) I would like to accept them if possible 166 (30.7%) I am not very eager to accept them 284 (52.5%) I do not wish to accept any 50 (9.2%) No answer 3 (0.6%)

Note: N = 541. Source: Kawaguchi, Hirano and Ohno (2009: 55).15

Table 3 “Why do you want to accept foreign nurse trainees at your hospital?” (multiple responses possible) To engage in international exchange 109 (53.4%) To countermeasure the shortage of nurses 108 (52.9%) To observe their communication skills with patients 107 (52.5%) To observe their communication skills with 103 (50.5%) Japanese staff To observe their nursing skills 83 (40.7%) To collect information assisting me in my decision whether 79 (38.7%) to employ foreign nurses To countermeasure the shortage of care workers 48 (23.5%) To observe their Japanese reading and 42 (20.6%) writing proficiency To cooperate with national policies 36 (17.6%) Other reasons 13 (6.4%)

Note: N = 204. Source: Kawaguchi, Hirano and Ohno (2009: 55).16

Almost all of the surveyed hospitals (98.0%) were aware of the EPA- system soon to be introduced to Japan.17 While just about one-third

15 Original question: “Kiin de wa, gaikokujin kangoshi no ‘kenshūsei’ no ukeire ni tsuite, dono yō ni o-kangae desu ka?”; answers: “zehi ukeirete mitai” “dekireba ukeirete mitai”, “amari ukeiretakunai”, “mattaku ukeiretakunai”, “fumei”. 16 Original question: “Kiin de gaikokujin kangoshi no ‘kenshūsei’ o ukeirete mitai riyū wa nan desu ka?“; answers: “kokusai kōryū no ikkan toshite kyōryoku shitai kara”, “kango rōdōryoku no fusoku o sukoshi demo kaishō shitai kara”, “kanja to dono teido komyunikēshon ga toreru no ka o mite mitai kara”, “kango gijutsu no nōryoku o mite mitai kara”, “seiki saiyō suru sai no handan zairyō to shitai kara”, “kaigo rōdōryoku no fusoku o sukoshi demo kaishō shitai kara”, “nihongo no yomikaki no nōryoku o mite mitai kara”, “kuni no seisaku ni kyōryoku shitai kara”, “sono hoka”. 17 In more than 50 per cent of the cases the respondent of the survey was the director of the nursing service department. health-care migration 339

(37.7%) were positive about accepting foreign nurses into their hospitals, almost two-thirds (61.7%) felt negatively about such a prospect. Among those who considered accepting foreign nurses, more than 50 per cent each mentioned these four reasons for doing so: “to engage in international exchange”, “to countermeasure the shortages of nurses”, “to observe their communication skills with patients” and “to observe their communication skills with Japanese staff”. Other answers

Table 4 “Why don’t you want to accept foreign nurse trainees at your hospital?” (multiple responses possible) Because of concerns about their communication skills 203 (60.8%) with patients Because of the manpower and time required to 185 (55.4%) train them Because I am not familiar with their nursing 157 (47.0%) skill levels Because of concerns about their communication skills 151 (45.2%) with the Japanese staff Because of concerns about their Japanese language reading 142 (42.5%) and writing skills Because there is no guarantee that they will stay to 90 (26.9%) work continuously in our hospital Because I am not familiar with the benefits for the 75 (22.5%) hospital if accepting foreign nurse trainees Because I do not expect them to make an immediate 64 (19.2%) contribution to our hospital Because I do not think patients and families 60 (18.0%) will accept them I do not understand the aim of this national policy 48 (14.4%) Because I do not think the Japanese staff will 19 (5.7%) accept them

Note: N = 334. Source: Kawaguchi, Hirano and Ohno (2009: 55).18

18 Original question: “Kiin de gaikokujin kangoshi no ‘kenshūsei’ o ukeiretakunai riyū wa nan desu ka?”; answers: “‘kenshūsei’ wa kanja to no komyunikēshon nōryoku ni fuan ga aru kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ no shidō no tame ni hitode ya jikan o torareru kara”, “dono yō na reberu no kango gijutsu o motsu ‘kenshūsei’ ga kuru ka wakaranai kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ wa sutaffu to no komyunikēshon nōryoku ni fuan ga aru kara”, “ ‘kenshūsei’ wa nihongo no yomikaki nōryoku ni fuan ga aru kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ ga shōrai mo koko 340 gabriele vogt included: “to collect information assisting me in my decision whether to employ foreign nurses” (38.7%) and “to observe their Japanese reading and writing proficiency” (20.6%). Alongside with the two answers on foreign nurses’ communication skills, these indicate that a main reason for accepting foreign nurses in the first place – that is, as assistant nurses for three years (cf. Section 3 for the EPA system) – is to gain a picture of their skills in order to be able to make an informed decision on whether or not to employ them permanently. Among those who refused to employ foreign nurses one pragmatic reason for this decision was mentioned by more than half of the respondents: “because of the manpower and time required to train them.” Indeed hospitals and nursing homes accepting health-caregivers need to ensure that there always is a Japanese staff ‘on call’ for problems that might arise during the migrant caregiver’s shift. Also, the institutions need to provide time to migrant caregivers for a continuous Japanese language education, and bear the financial costs of the classes. Other answers often mentioned to this question of reasons behind the refusal to accept migrant caregivers all hint towards an insecurity and fear when it comes to the migrants’ language proficiency and professional abilities. These answers include: “because of concerns about their communication skills with patients”, “because I am not familiar with their nursing skill levels”, “because of concerns about their communication skills with the Japanese staff” and “because of concerns about their Japanese language reading and writing skills”. Language obviously is a huge issue when it comes to labour migration to Japan. A growing body of Japanese textbooks for caregivers reflects the necessity of addressing this issue also practically and not only in political discourse (Japan Foundation 2009).19

no byōin de keizoku shite hataraku to iu hoshō ga nai kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ o ukeireru koto ni yoru byōin ni totte no riten ga wakaranai kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ wa koko no byōin no sokusenryoku toshite kitai dekinai kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ wa kanja ya kazoku ni ukeirerarenai to omou kara”, “kuni no seisaku no mokuteki ga yoku wakaranai kara”, “‘kenshūsei’ wa nihonjin sutaffu ni ukeirerarenai to omou kara”. 19 While serving as Vice-Minister of Justice, Tarō Kōnō, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, in an in-house report on future strategies for Japan’s migration policy was the first to suggest connecting issuing visas for potential migrants to the demonstrable language proficiency of the applicants (MOJ 2006). health-care migration 341

Table 5 “What kind of support do you think the foreign nurses specifically will require?” (multiple responses possible) Daily living and working advice when necessary 111 (76.0%) An exchange network between foreign nurses 92 (63.0%) and the Japanese nurses in our hospital The provision of Japanese culture (customs and rules) 88 (60.3%) workshops The provision of nursing skill workshops 83 (56.8%) The provision of Japanese language and conversation 79 (54.1%) workshops The provision of workshops for the Japanese staff 68 (46.6%) concerning the foreign nurses’ culture and language The provision of Japanese reading and writing 60 (41.1%) workshops Making Japanese staff familiar with foreign languages 55 (37.7%) supervisors An exchange network between foreign nurses at 53 (36.3%) different hospitals An exchange network between foreign nurses at our 48 (32.9%) hospital The provision of workshops for patients and families 29 (19.9%) concerning the foreign nurses’ culture and language I don’t know 3 (2.1%)

Note: N = 249. Source: Kawaguchi, Hirano and Ohno (2009: 56).20

20 Original question: “Gaikokujin kangoshi ni taishite, gutaiteki ni dono yō na sapōto ga hitsuyō da to omoimasu ka?”; answers: “shigoto igai no seikatsujō no koto ni tsuite jōkyō o haaku shi, adobaisu suru”, “innai ni kinmu suru gaikokujin kangoshi to nihonjin kangoshi no kōryū no ba o mōkeru”, “gaikokujin kangoshi o taishō toshita Nihon bunka (seikatsu shūkan ya reigi sakuhō nado) ni kansuru benkyō no kikai o teikyō suru”, “gaikokujin kangoshi o taishō toshita kango gijutsu ni kansuru benkyō no kikai o teikyō suru”, “gaikokujin kangoshi o taishō toshita nihongo no kaiwa nōryoku ni kansuru benkyō no kikai o teikyō suru”, “nihonjin sutaffu o taishō toshite, gaikokujin kangoshi no shusshin chiiki no bunka ya kotoba ni kansuru benkyō no kikai o teikyō suru”, “ gaikokujin kangoshi o taishō toshita nihongo no yomikaki nōryoku ni kansuru benkyō no kikai o teikyō suru”, “gaikokugo ni seitsū shita nihonjin kangoshi o shidōsha toshite tsukeru”, “tabyōin ni kinmu suru gaikokujin kangoshi dōshi de no kōryū no ba o mōkeru”, “ innai ni kinmu suru gaikokujin kangoshi dōshi de no kōryū no ba o mōkeru”, “kanja oyobi kazoku o taishō toshite, gaikokujin kangoshi no shusshin chiiki no bunka ya kotoba o rikai shite moraeru yō na kikai o mōkeru”, “yoku wakaranai”. 342 gabriele vogt

Again, when it comes to the question of what kind of practical support migrant caregivers will need to receive, the respondents stress the importance of improving the migrants’ language proficiency and strengthening their social network: “[building] an exchange network between foreign nurses and the Japanese nurses in our hospital”, “provision of Japanese culture (customs and rules) workshops” and “provision of Japanese language and conversation workshops”. The answer given most often was a general one: “daily living and working advice when necessary”. The overall picture we gain from this survey data is that the potential employers of migrant caregivers from Indonesia and the Philippines were rather sceptical as to the practical use of this migration system shortly before the system came into effect. This picture did not change drastically even after the migrant workers took up their new positions in institutions across the country. In February 2009, the first 208 Indonesian care-migrants to Japan finished their six-month long Japanese language education and started working in 98 hospitals and nursing homes for the elderly dispersed over 34 of Japan’s 47 prefectures. One month later, on March 2, the Asahi Shimbun ran a two-page special on the daily working live of Japan’s first generation of Indonesian caregivers. The main character of the feature article is a 27-year old called Zaini Warudani Shitorusu21 who is working in a nursing home for the elderly in Chiba Prefecture. She is one of five Indonesians working in this institution all of whom came to Japan under the EPA. Zaini holds a nursing degree from an Indonesian caregiver school and has three years of working experience in a hospital in Saudi Arabia. The doctors she is working with in her Chiba nursing home praise her professional skills. Yet when she recently took a mock caregiver examination, she only got 30 out of 240 questions right. Language is the main problem; she herself, her Indonesian and Japanese co-workers, the institution’s doctors and the head of the institution all agree. Ever since Zaini and her four Indonesian co-workers took up work in the nursing home, they only get to spend two afternoons a week in a Japanese language class, sponsored by their employer. Also, there is no curriculum on which their class is based; their teacher, Noriko Ōgawa, has to develop suitable material herself, and is unconfident as to how well she

21 This is a transliteration of her name given in the article in katakana characters only. health-care migration 343 can prepare the migrant care workers for the tasks ahead, and for the national caregiver exam in particular (Asahi Shimbun 2 March 2009).

6. macro and Micro: Tying the Ends Together

Only recently did Japan jump on the bandwagon of what came to be known as the “‘global care chain’” (Oishi 2005: 3). Via two Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively, Japan became a care-importing nation. Two developments that were preconditions to this policy shift, and in return also were furthered by it, are the socialization of care and the feminization of migration. The socialization of care in Japan is largely connected with the introduction of the state-run Long-term Care Insurance system in 2000, and – even if to a lesser degree – with the 1998 Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities. The LTCI Law made institutionalized health- care accessible even to the economically disadvantaged elderly. It also triggered a shift in awareness: state-funded elderly care was no longer stigmatized as a last resort of the poor, but became acknowledged as a payment of public funds to elderly citizens, just like pension funds. The NPO Law contributed to the socialization of care, that is, to the outsourcing of care from families into the public realm, by laying the groundwork of a broad network of voluntary groups engaged in elderly care. As of 1998 it became easier for voluntary groups to incor- porate themselves as a legal person, thereby increasing their public legitimacy and practical capacity to act. NPOs in elderly care enjoy a particularly favourable political opportunity structure since they take over tasks that state actors are no longer willing or able to provide themselves; furthermore, NPOs shape a field of engagement to senior citizens themselves, thus fostering social capital (Potter 2008). Via these two laws the socialization of care has – also in an economic sense – been furthered significantly since they created the structures for the process and triggered a shift in attitude among Japanese citizens. They did not, however, manage to reform the prevalent cliché of the female caregiver as the ‘natural’ one to take over reproductive labour and emotional work. Rather than being challenged, the cliché of the female caregiver is being enforced via the EPA-administered care-migration system. During the matching process of successfully screened Indonesian 344 gabriele vogt

caregiver candidates and Japanese hospitals and nursing homes willing to accept them, 20 per cent of the potential care-migrants (i.e., 86 persons) could not be matched. It produced uproar in the Japanese press when it became clear that 66 of these 86 unmatchable candidates were male (Kobayashi and Sato 1 August 2008). Apparently the Japanese institutions were concerned about the additional marginalizing factor next to ethnicity, namely gender. Another important aspect in the context of EPA-administered care-migration reinforcing the prevalent cliché of the female caregiver is the role of female caregivers from the Philippines. “The encounter of Filipino entertainers in the 70s with the Japanese male workforce” (Ballescas 2009: 128) is a piece of more recent history that might lead to false expectations among migration agents and employers of caregivers; and which to caregivers themselves poses a threat of being prostituted, as Ballescas notes: “[…] what is there to stop the agents from making them [the care migrants] do care work during the day and entertainment at night? What is there to stop […] caregivers [from] transfer[ing] to more lucrative but unauthorized work like entertainment once inside Japan?” (Ballescas 2009: 137). In a twist of history, there now is a trend among Filipino residents to Japan (most of them married to Japanese husbands and some of them with a background of working as entertainers) to aim for a home-helper license in Japanese caregiving classes. Some 150 of them have started to organize their interests in an association entitled Licensed Filipino Caregiver Association in Japan (LFCAJ) (Ballescas 2009: 132–133). Reinforcing the role of the female as a caregiver also means strengthening the “gender relations within the Japanese employment system and the continuing gender segregation of the Japanese labour market” (Piper 2002: 195). Moreover, it also means pushing the feminization of migration as part of the global care-chain, and – most importantly in the case of Japan – as a temporary ‘guest worker’ system. Citizenship rights are generally acknowledged as “one important mechanism by which legal protection [of migrants] could be guaranteed” (Piper 2002: 190). While a convergence of norms in international migration to some degree also can be traced in Japan (Surak 2008), Japan is still a long way from granting citizenship rights to its migrants. As political scientist Atsuko Abe explains, “Japanese citizenship is completely overshadowed by the concept of nationality” (Abe 2006: 114). This might be due to a terminological problem. While the widespread term kokuseki refers to ‘nationality as legal citizenship’, the term shimin-ken refers to health-care migration 345

‘citizens’ rights’ and would probably be the more fitting term when pinpointing a modern understanding of citizenship. Shimin-ken can also be granted on a local level, thereby guaranteeing migrants access to social, political and economic integration into the communities of their residency (Tsuda 2006). Japan’s EPA-guided migration system, however, does not have any dimension inherent that would point to an understanding of caregiver migrants as new citizens. On the contrary, the hurdles of professional qualifications that migrants will need to clear before being granted more than a renewable one-year residency permit are extremely high. While at the time of writing this chapter, the first batch of caregiver migrants has not yet faced the national exam, it seems highly unlikely that migrant applicants will have a fair chance of passing it. The yet- to-be-established avenue of working as an assistant care worker (jun kaigo fukushi-shi) is one that many of them might find themselves in after having failed the national exam. This low status employment would leave caregivers as particularly vulnerable workers in a highly marginalized segment of the labour market, workers that need to cope with a “‘triple invisibility’ […] based on factors of class, ethnicity, and gender” (Brettell 2000: 111). While these thoughts fall into the realm of speculation, what can be concluded with regard to the EPA system’s relevance to feminization of migration and socialization of care in Japan, is that the shift from unpaid to paid care work brings “racial division to reproductive labour without challenging the current gender order” (Ogawa 2008: 9). In other words, the EPA-guided migration system passes up a chance for challenging the current gender order in the caregiving sector and the Japanese labour market in general. Also, it misses out on the opportunity of shaping a fundamentally new migration policy for Japan, one that not only bridges the existing gap between policy output and policy outcome by adhering to a neo-liberal system of labour migration, but instead would have created a modern framework of sustainable policies aimed at current and future citizens.

7. conclusion

In the summer of 2008, when the first Indonesian caregivers entered Japan under the newly established Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan in turn entered a new phase of its migration policy. Japan no 346 gabriele vogt longer exclusively holds onto its two main principles for labour migration to the nation: migration only of the highly skilled workforce and only on a temporary basis; but – in however miniscule dimensions – tests new waters with bilateral agreements that open its national labour market to nation-specific and sector-specific migration flows. This chapter framed Japan’s latest revision to its migration policy against the backdrop of two global trends: the socialization of care and the feminization of migration. Both trends can also be observed in Japan. Via the implementation of Japan’s EPAs with Indonesia and the Philippines, Japan, however, reinforces rather than challenges social models that underlie these two processes: the gendered division of Japan’s labour market and the marginalized role of migrants as non- citizens of Japanese society. It is ironic that the new migration avenue should skilfully strengthen old patterns prevalent in Japan’s society and economy, in particular in times when the nation is challenged drastically by population ageing. New and innovative approaches from all walks of life including the border-crossing walks of migration will be necessary to cope with the enormous tasks ahead. Care for the Elderly and Demographic Change: Ageing and Migrant Nurses in the German State of North Rhine-Westphalia

Jens Friebe

1. introduction

Germany is an ageing society. Three factors have important effects on demographic change in Germany: low birth rates, increasing life expectancy, and immigration. Germany is also an immigrant society. According to the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006b), a fifth of the German population belongs to migrant groups. Regarding the field of geriatric care, a survey in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) found out that nearly 30 per cent of nurses working in homes for the elderly were not of German origin. This chapter presents findings from this survey as well as experiences of training measures with migrant nurses. The research results show that it is important to enhance awareness about diversity in nursing and to see the chances as well as the problems of migration in elderly care, for assistance and care for elderly people will become a fundamental challenge in the future.

2. Background of Demographic Change

The demographic change will produce modifications of the German population structure in the coming years, which will affect the biogra- phies of individuals and at the same time the organization of the labour world. In the future, fewer middle-aged people will support the older age cohorts (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006a: 59). These developments have an effect on the health sector: There will be more older staff and a shortage of younger workers. Demographic ageing is a continuous process which will accelerate in the next two decades in Germany. According to the German Federal Institute for Population Research, the average life expectancy stood at 82 years for women and 77 years for men in 2006 (BiB 2008: 46), while the total fertility rate stagnated at a low level, hovering below 1.40 children per woman (BiB 2008: 61). 348 jens friebe

Forecasts suggest that the population of Germany will decline and that one-third of Germans will be 60 years or older by the year 2050. This does not mean thatG ermany has to expect a society consisting mainly of people in need of care. Concepts of active ageing may well contribute to an extension of “healthy life expectancy” (WHO 2002). Nowadays there are fewer infectious and acute life-threatening diseases that produce enduring health risks; but chronic syndromes and multimorbidity develop mostly in later life.1 Therefore, statistics indicate, more care and health services are needed as a consequence of long-lasting and multifactorial disabilities of elderly people. Nearly 70 per cent of older people in need of care in Germany are looked after in their own homes, mostly cared for by family members and/or nurses working for ambulatory care organizations. Today, Germany has about 10,000 residential care homes for the elderly with 700,000 residents and 350,000 health professionals working in these institutions (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008a). However, there is little data on the biographical background of the nursing staff, especially of those with a migrant background. Elderly care in Germany is very much shaped by demographic change and migration, so that in nursing homes there are both residents and nurses with migrant backgrounds. People from the first immigrant generation, who came to Germany in the 1960s and stayed after retirement, are themselves potential clients for the health and care system, whereas staff with migrant backgrounds have already been working in nursing and care for the elderly for a long time.

3. migrant Nurses in Stationary Elderly Care

Even today no accurate figures about the state of working nursing personnel of migrant background are available. It is reasonable to use the category ‘of migrant background’, a category which is also used by the Federal Statistical OfficeS ( tatistisches Bundesamt 2006b) in its German population estimates. The term ‘migrant background’ is used for foreign nationals living in Germany, ethnic non-Germans with German citizenship, second and third-generation immigrants, as well as for ethnic German immigrants. In the federal state of North

1 medical scientists speak of a “chronic disease cycle” (Schwartz et al. 2000: 14). ageing and migrant nurses 349

Rhine-Westphalia in 2005 (IT.NRW 2005), nearly 23 per cent of its inhabitants had a migrant background. On behalf of the German Ministry for Work, Health and Social Affairs, the German Institute for Adult Education (DIE) carried out a survey entitled “Migrants in Elderly Care” as part of a project of the same name in selected nursing homes of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the most populous and industrialized state in Germany, and one that is particularly shaped by demographic change. Many older people and persons of migrant background live in the bigger cities of NRW. Actually, today, more than 20 per cent of the NRW population is 65 years or older, a rate that will increase to more than 30 per cent by 2030 (IT.NRW 2009). At the same time, the rate of people needing care will have increased from 2.5 to 4 per cent of the population. During the last few years, the staff requirement in residential elderly care increased by 3 per cent each year (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008a). At the same time, the conditions and requirements for nursing have become more difficult as more and more elderly people are in urgent need of care. The DIE’s survey asked about the migrant background of the nursing staff. Data for approximately 100 in-patient care nursing homes and 25 out-patient care nursing organizations were considered in the survey (Friebe 2006). The results show that 29.9 per cent of the staff in the survey was of migrant background, a figure that was significantly above the NRW population average. More than half (58%; Friebe 2006: 14) of the nursing staff of migrant background are defined as ‘ethnic German immigrants’, who came from Eastern Europe. 26 per cent of nurses of migrant background are ‘first-generation migrants’ who came toG ermany mainly from South ern Europe and Turkey. Around 12 per cent are ‘second-generation migrants’. They were born in Germany or immigrated as small children, but German is not their mother-tongue. ‘Migrant nurses’ came from more than 30 different nations (cf. Figure 1; Friebe 2008: 36). In the history of Germany, the immigration of nursing staff began to increase significantly at the beginning of the 1970s. At the time, Germany faced a health-care crisis with a shortage of nursing staff in hospitals and nursing homes. In order to recruit staff, the institutions for patient care applied similar measures as were used in the 1960s for ‘guest worker recruitment,’ attracting personnel from southern Europe and some Asian countries such as the Philippines and Thailand. Some NRW hospitals made use of existing contacts with mining companies in Korea to recruit nurses there. This marked the beginning of the 350 jens friebe

Source: Friebe (2008: 36). Figure 1 migrant nurses by country of origin immigration of nursing personnel to Germany the repercussion of which are still being felt today. The health-care sector experienced a second labour shortage towards the end of the 1980s. This time nurses demanded better working conditions (Beneker and Wichtmann 1994: 11). This crisis was alleviated by a second wave of immigration after the opening of the borders of former socialist countries such as Poland and Russia, which allowed for higher labour mobility. Numerous women who already had medical preparatory training at that time, or who received additional training with the support of the Federal Employment Office, were employed as nursing assistants and have since been working in all fields of the care system.

4. migrant Nurses in Home Care

The DIE survey “Migrants in Elderly Care” focused on stationary care in homes for the elderly and therefore produced little data about the situation of in-home care. Most elderly care recipients are looked after in their homes by family members and/or ambulant nurses. However, indirect evidence suggests fewer migrant nurses are working in in- home care than in homes for the elderly. ageing and migrant nurses 351

Working in ambulatory care is different to the situation in stationary care. Usually, nurses working for an organization care for clients in their homes for only one or two hours per day (e.g., help them getting up, washing them, and bringing them to bed).2 A special situation is 24-hour home care which is rare and expensive. Most of the nurses in this sector come from Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, etc. There are many agencies that specialize in 24-hour home-care, such as Seniocare.3 What is remarkable, however, is the image that some agencies convey on their websites,4 where nurses from Eastern Europe are described as ‘warm-hearted and motivated’. They are the ‘good souls’ who are always ‘ready to fulfil all duties’ and ‘demand only little’. In return, ‘patience’ must be shown with the nurse and her limited German language ability. Parts of this special health-care market are operated illegally – a problem that is part of the international transmigration process of women who live as domestic workers in private households. Often nurses work only on a tourist visa and without any social insurance or protection against violence and exploitation, a condition that also bears risks for the elderly care recipients. These jobs are mostly shared by two women, each of them in turn staying three months in the German household and three months in their home country. This situation causes problems both for Germany, in the form of wage dumping and uneven quality of service, and for the countries of origin, in the form of ‘brain drain’. That is, supported by international agencies nurses move to countries with higher salaries and better working conditions (Kingma 2006: 11). For nurses of migrant background, working in private homes is very challenging as cooperation with family members is indispensable. Also, the work is quite insulated and less structured compared to working in geriatric homes. The close proximity of the nurse with the care recipient implies intensive interaction since in many cases the client has few other people to communicate with all day. Highly developed communication skills on the part of the nursing staff are thus desirable.

2 The long-term care insurance inG ermany covers services like personal care, feeding, mobility and housekeeping (Long-Term Care Insurance Act § 14 SGB XI.). 3 http://www.seniocare24.de 4 They place nurses with fewG erman language skills for 1300 euros per month, and nurses with excellent German language skills for 1800 euros. This price list is discon- certing given the importance of communication in elderly care. 352 jens friebe

However, the employment of immigrant health professionals is not adequately regulated to meet these needs.

5. nurses of Migrant Background: Possibilities and Limitations

The DIE study also focused on the skills of and attitudes towards staff of migrant background using data collected through interviews with managers, head nurses and migrant nurses working in homes for the elderly. According to the managers, limited German language skills are the most serious problem. They also listed poor skills in the areas of nursing documentation, professional communication and understanding, teamwork, problem solving, and individual care. Asked about the strengths of the nurses, they cited their ability to fulfil daily tasks, being ready to fulfil stand-by duties, being trustworthy, reliable, committed, friendly, and responsible, and described them as hard-working, highly flexible and possessing great stamina. None of the respondents, however, saw any special strengths of migrant nurses, such as life experience or multilingualism, when compared to German staff, despite having been long-time members of staff (cf. Figure 2; Friebe 2006). Language and communication skills are a central element in caring, for caring is a human, very personal and interactional service. However, most migrant nurses do not speak German as their first language – and even ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe spoke German

Source: Friebe 2006. Figure 2 length of stay in the job as migrant nurse ageing and migrant nurses 353 in the family context only. Poor communication and/or language skills cause serious problems, yet we found that no language training adequate to the task is provided. In their daily work, nurses use several “language registers” (Maas 2005: 102); that is, when they communicate with the patient at a level close to family language, when they communicate their impressions to the team, and finally when they need to communicate, document and plan the care in technical language. Language, terms and expressions are bound up with context, conceptions, expectations and ideas, all of which require an understanding of the culture and lifestyle of the interaction partners. The language registers and communication levels in elderly care can be summarized as follows: Elderly care requires the ability to speak on three language levels: • private level: Nurses have to be very close to care recipients, who may be distressed, angry or disorientated; • informal level: Nurses have to talk to relatives and communicate with other members of the team; • formal level: Nurses have to keep records and speak to other medical professionals. Switching between levels and a good understanding of the care recipient’s situation is a key for: • risk identification; • clarification of nursing diagnoses; • discovering resources of rehabilitation; • managing the activities of daily life. Very little is known about the interactions between nurses (of migrant background or otherwise) and care recipients, because only a few case studies have been conducted. Some examples, however, indicate that migrant nurses often use a simplified language during contact with care recipients (Switalla 2005: 55). Also, their language is often characterized by short and appellative sentences that are necessary in caring situations with the care recipients. Furthermore, language deficits often collide with standards of process-oriented care planning and accurate documentation. While inadequate German language skills of migrant nurses are often regarded as individual deficits caused by a lack of effort and willingness to integrate, the multilingualism of nurses is hardly ever 354 jens friebe acknowledged, either as an individual skill or a general resource. There are, however, several reasons why multilingualism should be recognized as an important resource and promoted in geriatric care. Not only has migration made German society, its culture and language more diverse; language problems between nursing staff and older persons occur especially when the care recipients have language deficits, when they speak dialect, or suffer from diseases such as aphasia, psychological disorders or dementia (Hinneberg 2005). Deliberate attention to language can support and improve the communication with older patients in difficult situations. Nursing staff of migrant background often holds a special potential for problem solving. Generally, they have experience in dealing with the difficulties of expressing themselves in a foreign language, and they know that words not only refer to objects and facts, but that they can give them a certain meaning depending on the context of the environment. In this sense, their experience of migration can be seen as a valuable resource for communication in geriatric care.

6. training Concepts in Elderly Care

TheDIE study “Migrants in Elderly Care” not only analysed the working situation of nurses, it also developed and tested seminars designed for nurses of migrant background. In cooperation with the participants, the research results could be updated and at the same time a wider dissemination of concepts was possible. Seminar participants found that they had generally good caring skills and knowledge, but they also acknowledged their insufficient language skills. Many had acquired higher education degrees in their country of origin and thus their particular competences and capabilities to fulfil special care requirements were highlighted. Before a qualification could be developed, problems of interaction had to be analysed in greater depth. Special needs of further education that we identified resulted from the following factors: • language awareness is fundamental for nursing interaction; • cultural knowledge is a requirement for biographical caring approaches; • intercultural competence is a fundamental skill in geriatric care. These factors formed the basis for our training concept and programme for nurses of migrant background. The programme is called “Content ageing and migrant nurses 355 and Language Integrated Learning,” and comprises the topics of ‘nursing process’ as an instrument of planning and control, nursing documentation and reports, team meetings, and case management, and combined nursing problems with language exercises to promote comprehension. The qualification included the following topics: • communicating with clients in geriatric homes; • collecting information; • planning and carrying out care; • documentation of care; • case reviews in a multicultural team. In order to better meet and fulfil the complex demands and standards in geriatric care, concepts that promoted a ‘cultural and language consciousness’ were applied with the aim of facilitating comprehension in the field of intercultural communication.

Cultural consciousness as a component of competence in care Culture is a dynamic factor in nursing interaction processes. It includes personal values, needs, ideas, religious attitudes, native language, etc. Culture influences individuals’ lifestyles, personal identity and their relationships with others. Cultural awareness begins with an examination of personal values and beliefs. Cultural identity also influences people’s health beliefs and practices. Therefore, nurses and older people interact as members of cultural, social and generational groups. Different models describe intercultural and transcultural com petence as an element of care competence. Researchers of nursing science at Middlesex University of London for example have developed a model of phases that help learners to develop cultural competence in care that is based on cultural awareness, cultural knowledge and cultural sensibility (Papadopoulos 2003: 87). The qualification concepts that are introduced here refer to the first phase of the project, called ‘cultural awareness’, and broach the issue of self-reflection in the context of care, experience and culturality of the other person. The aim of this approach is to open the door to the biography of the older person.

Language consciousness in care interaction The concepts of the Council of Europe (2001) to promote ‘functional multilingualism’ and the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) have set new priorities for learning languages. 356 jens friebe

At its centre are those competences that are constitutive for the learn- er’s oral language skills. Language consciousness comprises linguistic capabilities in different vocational, public and private situations. This implies reflection on the language intention, meaning of words and coherence between talking and acting. A survey of the German Institute of Adult Education about language learning needs at the workplace (Grünhage-Monetti 2006) showed how migrant nurses have to combine the linguistic requirements with working tasks, team coordination, achievement and documentation. A specific competence of migrants is their intercultural perception of elderly people of migrant background. The group of elderly migrants will grow during the next ten years in Germany. Further education courses that are culturally sensitive can help to develop an intercultural care competence that nurses with migrant backgrounds do not automatically possess. Thus the participants of training measures get a chance to discover their cultural awareness as a first step to culturally competent nursing. The participants, who took part in the evaluated qualifications measures carried out during the DIE project, were very motivated and experienced in working with older persons. Most of the nurses of migrant background had the experience of leaving their countries and of being a foreigner. They can thus understand the situation of older people who had to leave their homes and their families, are feeling lonely and have to communicate in a foreign environment. Shared experiences are a starting point for developing those intercultural competences that are so important in geriatric care, especially for older people with aphasia, or sensory/perceptual alterations, mental distress, social isolation, anxiety, etc. This affirms the need for continuing learning measures in the workplace in elderly care. Some examples of intercultural competence training are presented below:

Communication levels (1) Private patient level: What is the difference between these pains: ‘it’s painful’, ‘it hurts’, ‘it aches’, ‘it’s sore’? Is it a huge pain, an intense pain, a racking pain, a pressure pain, a pulsing or stabbing pain? Nurses observe different qualities of pain. Pain is a central alarm signal for health disorders – but the feeling of pain is always highly individual. “Pain is whatever the patient says it is” (Ebersole and Hess 1990: 228). The first step in providing pain relief is to listen to the patient. ageing and migrant nurses 357

(2) Informal team level: For migrants it might be difficult to understand ‘informal’ expressions. What are bed-gallows? It is a com- posite word with a new meaning and therefore difficult to understand for non-native speakers. And why would a ‘duck’ be needed in elderly care? It actually refers to a urine bottle for men, a bottle that looks a little bit like a duck. These kinds of language metaphors are often part of internal communication and typical for daily working life. (3) Formal level: Working with nursing plans requires knowledge about special terms like ‘assessment’, ‘goal-setting’, ‘practice’ and ‘controlling’. At the same time, nurses need to allocate the words of a patient to nursing diagnoses: Which diseases correspond to these expressions: sad, empty, heavy, tired, useless, etc.? Which words are used for positive feelings? To answer these questions nurses need biographical information about their patients.

Communication and nursing assessment The (first) conversation with clients follows certain intentions of professional care (Friebe 2006: 28–29) and it should: • produce a good climate for discussion; • collect relevant information; • initiate a process; • prepare actions to be agreed upon. Concerning the discussion, however, the question arises what kind of problems can occur in information gathering if nurses are not native speakers.

Relevant terms for geriatric care (1) Health and illness: Health refers to a state of well-being that is culturally defined, valued and practised, and which reflects the ability of individuals (or groups) to perform their daily role activities in culturally expressed, beneficial and patterned ways of life. Illness refers to an unwanted condition that is culturally defined and is responded to (Papadoupulos 2003: 89). (2) Nursing: Nursing is a learned activity aiming at providing care to individuals in a culturally competent way. (3) Activating: The nursing staff motivates the clients to participate in activities and to stay active: for example to wash or to mobilize themselves if possible. 358 jens friebe

Relevant terms in monitoring illnesses • the cough is: dry, wheezy, gasping, throaty, raspy, barking; • the urine is: brown, dingy, lacteal, ill smelling; • the feces are: black, the colour of tar, light, bloody (Ebersole and Hess 1990: 96).

Relevant terms in care activities5 Activities of The older person is The person needs The person is daily living independent assistance dependent

Bathing Receives no Receives assistance Receives assistance assistance in bathing only in bathing more (gets in and one part of the than one part out of tub, if tub body (such as of the body is the usual the back or leg) (or not bathed) means of bathing) Dressing Picks clothes Picks clothes Receives assistance and gets and gets dressed in selecting dressed without assistance; clothes or in without except for getting dressed assistance tying shoe laces or stays partly or completely undressed

The nursing process is complex.I n our training nurses learn in authen- tic situations. Working with case studies promotes understanding of the situation of older migrants. Special “scenarios” of conversations (Grünhage-Monetti 2006) were analysed regarding the used words, the intentions and contexts. Based on this, more suitable language use was learned, for example by focusing on issues like making and maintaining contact, expressing feelings, sharing of meaning and information, or motivating a person to do a certain thing. The approach thus sets language teaching in the context of the profession, and the artificial separation of learning languages and a professional qualification is removed.

5 in an analogous manner other activities were analysed, as toileting, transfer, continence and feeding (Ebersole and Hess 1990: 96). ageing and migrant nurses 359

Learners are very heterogeneous. Qualification concepts must recognize this and therefore include different learning elements. Self- learning, learning at the workplace, as well as learning in the form of seminars can – if systematically planned and continuously carried out – help to solve the problems of migrant nurses described at the beginning of this chapter.

Learning methods The qualification concept is based on three elements: (1) Self-learning activity: Self-learning with educational media. How can I keep a personal dictionary, where can I find supplemental courses, what books are available and what does the Internet offer? (2) Training on the job: Support through practical training, learning- tandems and regular conversations. Different learning methods at the workplace can be embedded in team meetings, when handing over to colleagues, in quality circles or job rotation. (3) In-house training: Specially designed courses and intercultural training measures. Events for nurses of migrant background that address intercultural topics, deliver actual information, help to sort out one’s own experiences, offer possibilities for self-evaluation and show new qualification paths.

7. Conclusions

Focusing on the situation of migrant nurses in elderly care, this chapter pointed out the importance of further education and training in the elderly care sector. And while education alone cannot solve all social and caring problems, it may contribute to empowering nurses, care facility managers as well as politicians to reflect upon and improve the situation of older people who are in need of care. Further education and training may promote not only the integration of nurses of migrant background into a professional environment, but also into society as a whole. In response to discussions about quality standards in modern health care and elderly care, the study found out that both the intercultural competence of nurses of migrant background and diversity management are important elements of quality processes in nursing and care for the elderly. 360 jens friebe

At the same time, the professional knowledge that these migrant nurses have and their foreign language learning experiences, as well as their further cultural and language education are valuable for the entire caring team and potentially also for the clients in geriatric care, because communication and information exchange is vital in everyday nursing care. TheDIE survey showed that linguistic and communicative problems in elderly care are not restricted to nurses of migrant background. They also exist between native speakers from different regions and, in general, between younger and older people. The improvement of communication between German nurses and their colleagues of migrant background may influence teamwork and cooperation as an element of good quality in elderly care. Demographic changes in Germany will make the recruiting of migrants necessary in the future. The ageing of society will reduce the number of younger people in the workforce, while the number of persons needing geriatric care will increase. The number of persons of migrant background who are 65 years or older and in need of care will also increase and, in consequence, the need for migrant nurses will grow. In the future, the health-care system will be even more dependent on qualified migrant nursing staff. The prerequisites to meet this demand should be created today in order to be prepared. At present, however, the immigration of qualified personnel to Germany is decreasing. In conclusion, demographic changes demand a continuing immigration of motivated and qualified nurses into the elderly care sector, taking into account international social standards for migration. In addition to this, Germany must recruit more personnel from among migrants who are already living in the country and qualify them for nursing. If continuing education and training become a fundamental element of nursing, migrant nurses hold out the promise of significantly enriching the elderly care sector. The Power of Address: Age and Gender in Japanese Eldercare Communication

Peter Backhaus

1. Introduction

Japan is in need of care. According to the latest figures by theM inistry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW 2009a), 4.7 million persons were acknowledged to be eligible for benefits from the national long- term care insurance as of 2009. This is no less than 3.7 per cent of the country’s total population. More than 826,000 of the entitled persons receive benefits for institutional care services, such as home care, day care, and various kinds of residential care. Though institutional elderly care is becoming an ever more important issue, little is known as yet about life inside the caring facilities. This holds particularly true for the linguistic properties of institutional care, which only very recently have started to be included on the agendas of Japanese researchers (Suzuki 2001; Katō et al. 2004; Komatsu, Kuroki and Okayama 2005; Kitamoto 2006; Onoda 2007). This chapter1 aims to contribute to this developing strand of research in Japan by focusing on one of the classic variables in sociolinguistic research: terms of address. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the theoretical background and the main findings in previous research on the topic. Section 3 gives a basic outline of the empirical study that provides the data discussed in this chapter. The subsequent two sections present the main part of the analysis: Section 4 examines how the care workers in my study address the residents, while Section 5 looks at the address behaviour of the residents towards the care workers. The concluding section provides a brief summary of the major findings.

2. Theoretical Background and Previous Research

Residential eldercare facilities are a type of ‘total institution’. This well- known term was first defined by Goffman (1961: xiii) as “a place of

1 I would like to thank my colleague Carola Hommerich for her help with the data analysis presented in this chapter. 362 peter backhaus residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.” Com munication in such institutions is marked by an inherent power asymmetry between the representatives of the institution and its users. These become manifest in interaction through various discursive features, such as amount of talk, absence of response tokens and back- channel cues, distribution of conversational rights, and, with special relevance to the present study, terms of address (for an overview refer to Sarangi 2001). One specific feature of communication in eldercare institutions is what is commonly known as ‘patronizing communication’ (Hummert and Ryan 1996). The basic characteristic of this way of speaking is an over-accommodation to elderly people’s linguistic needs based on stereotyped expectations of incompetence and dependence. This mode of speech has frequently been criticized by communication researchers for being disrespectful and potentially harmful to an elder person’s wellbeing (e.g., Ryan et al. 1995). With regard to terms of address, frequently quoted features of patronizing communication are the use of first names and nicknames, terms of endear- ments such as ‘sweetie’ or ‘honey’, childlike terms like ‘good girl’ or ‘naughty boy’, third-person reference, and inclusive ‘we’ as in ‘How are we today?’ An early empirical study on terms of address in elderly care was conducted by Wagnild and Manning (1985) in geriatric long-term facilities in Texas. Observing resident-staff interaction during bathing procedures, it was found that while the majority of the residents were addressed by their last names, there were also instances of first name address and various terms of endearment. The study further revealed a lack of symmetry regarding the corresponding address behaviour by the residents, who hardly ever seemed to address the staff directly by name. Looking more closely into this matter, Wagnild and Manning in follow-up interviews found that only 15 per cent of the residents reported knowing the name of the nurse they had been assisted by. Comparable asymmetries have been identified by Sachweh (2000: 242–249) in an empirical study in German nursing homes. Her analysis shows that the residents in most cases appeared not to know the last name of the care workers and consequently had to rely on alternative ways of address such as the somewhat antiquated but still very common Schwester [nurse; literally: sister]. eldercare communication 363

Before looking into the way terms of address are used in the Japanese case study, a few general remarks on Japanese address terms need to be made.2 In everyday linguistic interaction, an addressee is usually identified by one of the following options (Yamaguchi 2007: 139–150): • No direct reference at all, because there is no syntactic obligation to name the subject of a sentence. Instead the reference to the addressee is established through a well-developed system of honorifics. This also explains the low use of personal pronouns in Japanese. • Addressee’s name. According to circumstances either first name (more intimate) or last name (more respectful) may be used. Usually, the person honorific -san is attached. Other common options with slightly different connotations are -sama (very formal), -kun (for young males), and -chan (for young females). • Reference through role relationship terms such as sensei [teacher, doctor], kachō [section head], or okāsan [mother]. Related to this last point, a frequently observed phenomenon in Japan is the fictive use of kinship terms towards elderly people. Accordingly, people of higher age may be addressed as ojīsan [grandfather] or obāsan [grandmother] even when no real kin relationship with the speaker exists. This way of address in recent years has been increasingly criticized as inappropriate and detrimental to an elderly person’s physical and mental health (cf. Backhaus 2008: 458–560). The following sections will present the findings of a larger empirical study in a Japanese caring facility with special focus on what forms of address are being used between residents and staff.

3. research Setting

Data were collected in a Japanese elderly care facility referred to here by the pseudonym ‘Edogawa Care’. Located in Saitama Prefecture on the northern outskirts of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, Edogawa Care is officially designated as a ‘geriatric health-care facility’ (kaigo rōjin hoken shisetsu), one of several types of Japanese caring institutions.

2 Address as understood here includes both vocative address, as the ‘sir’ in ‘Excuse me, sir’ and referential address, as the ‘you’ in ‘Could you please shut the door?’ (cf. Fillmore 1997: 119). In Japanese the distinction between the two is less clear-cut than in most western languages. 364 peter backhaus

Geriatric health-care facilities offer short-stay programmes, usually between three and six months, with a special focus on rehabilitation. Borrowing from previous approaches to the topic (Gibb 1990; Grainger 1993; Sachweh 2000; Wadensten 2005), conversations between residents and staff were recorded during the morning care activities. Actions performed during the morning care include waking up the residents, washing and dressing them, and supporting them with going to the toilet. My sample consists of 107 mostly dyadic resident-staff conversations recorded by a small digital recorder that was placed in the pocket of one of the care workers on shift. All recordings were made on the second floor of Edogawa Care, which accommodates relatively healthy residents with few or no symptoms of dementia. A total of 23 residents were recorded, 14 of them females and 9 of them males. The average age of the residents was 77 years.O n the part of the care workers, 4 females and 2 males participated in the study. The oldest of them was a male care worker aged 33, the youngest was a 22-year-old female care worker.

4. How the Care Workers Address the Residents

A quantitative analysis of the 107 interactions shows that there are two basic ways of how the care workers in Edogawa Care address the residents. As can be seen in Table 1, the most frequent choice is a resident’s last name (LN) plus the honorific suffix -san. It is used in almost 60 per cent of the cases. Another comparatively frequent way of addressing a resident is using his or her first name (FN) plus -san. This more intimate type of address is chosen by the care workers in 18 per cent of cases. A third common pattern is using no term of address at all, as was done in 22 per cent of the conversations. The two cases that do not fall into one of these three categories will be discussed at the end of the section. Taking a closer look at the way each of the 23 individual residents is addressed reveals that the choice between last name address and first name address is relatively stable. Most residents are called either exclusively LN-san (n = 16) or FN-san (n = 4) by the caring staff. As can be seen in Table 2, only three of the 23 residents are addressed by their first name by some staff members and by their last name by others. This finding suggests that there is some sort of implicit agreement by the care workers on how a given resident in Edogawa Care should best be addressed. eldercare communication 365

Table 1 Terms of address (Staff to residents) Term of address Frequency LN-san 63 (58.9%) FN-san 19 (17.8%) None 23 (21.5%) Other 2 ( 1.9%) Sum 107 (100%)

Note: LN = last name, FN = first name. Source: Data based on own research.

Table 2 last name vs. first name address Residents called Frequency Only LN-san 16 (70%) Only FN-san 4 (17%) LN-san and FN-san 3 (13%) Sum 23 (100%)

Note: LN = last name, FN = first name. Source: Data based on own research.

What factors influence the choice between first name and last name address? One obvious thing to look at is the age of the residents. In order to keep the analysis simple, the 23 residents have been catego- rized into two basic groups: those for whom first name address does occur in the data, in some or all of the cases (n = 7), and those for whom it does not (n = 16). A comparison of means with the residents’ age suggests that there may indeed be a relationship between the two variables. While the mean age of residents for whom first name address is not an option is 76.4 years, the mean age of residents for whom it is rises to 83.1 years. Though the small number of cases does not allow for tests of statistical significance, this suggests that there is a tendency to address residents of a comparatively higher age by their first name. In other words, the older a resident the more likely a first name address will become. A second factor that has been tested is the residents’ gender. The results are presented in Table 3, which gives a cross tabulation of the two variables. One clear tendency is that male residents are not usually addressed by their first name. Indeed, there is only one exception to this rule in the data. Though these tendencies, too, due to the small 366 peter backhaus sample size are below statistical significance, my findings suggest that a resident’s gender might be an important factor in determining the way he or she is addressed by the staff. As the data show, reservations on the part of the caring staff to use a resident’s first name are much less pronounced when talking to a woman than when talking to a man. It can be summarized that both a resident’s age and gender seem to influence the way he or she will be addressed by the staff in Edogawa Care. What possible reasons are there to account for these two tendencies? With regard to age, the findings are well in line with the basic findings in ageing research discussed in Section 2, particularly the concept of patronizing communication. As to the gender variable, the tendency to prefer first name address for female residents may have various reasons. One may be that, as Sachweh (2008: 138) has pointed out, women in cases of advanced dementia may have problems recog- nizing their last name if, as is commonly the case, it is not their maiden name. As regards the situation in Edogawa Care, however, most of the residents on the floor where the recordings were made suffered from dementia only slightly or not at all. Therefore this explanation does not seem feasible here. A second, more likely, reason is that the gender imbalance in terms of address usage simply reflects social imbalances as regards the different degrees of respect considered appropriate towards males as opposed to females in Japan (and in most other societies, for that matter). As decades of sociolinguistic research on language and gender have shown, most languages of the world share gender-related differences regarding the way people speak and – more relevant to the present problem – are spoken to. McCormick (2001: 345) in a recent overview on the topic summarizes that the inequalities observable in the language used towards males vs. females are “an extension of the prevailing

Table 3 Address vs. resident’s gender Residents called Male Female Total Only LN-san 8 8 16 Only FN-san 1 3 4 LN-san and FN-san 3 3 Sum 9 14 23

Note: LN = last name, FN = first name. Source: Data based on own research. eldercare communication 367 power-relations between them in non-linguistic fields.” It is most likely that these unequal power-relations account for the differences in terms of address usage towards the residents in Edogawa Care. A third reason to be briefly discussed here relates to Japanese writing practices. Japanese uses a mixed writing system that combines logographic letters (kanji) with syllabic letters (kana). Person names are usually written in kanji, but there may be exceptions with regard to first names. My sample contains four such exceptions: Mina, Katsu, Sen (all three written in kana), and Kiyoko (written in kana-kanji combination). The interesting thing about these four persons is that all of them fall into the minority group of residents addressed by their first name. Though the number of cases is too small to read an overall pattern into this, it may well be the case that the way a name is ‘spelled’ (in terms of script choice) influences its being used or not used in linguistic interaction. This would mean that, at least on the surface, graphemic rather than social reasons account for the observed regu- larities in address patterns. On the other hand, the very fact that the chances to have a kana first name are much higher for women than for men (Jugaku 1979: 62) necessarily brings us back to the social inequalities underlying these naming practices. Before closing this section, we will take a brief look at the two conversations classified as ‘other’ in the initial calculation presented in Table 1 above. Both interactions could not be characterized as one of the three major groups because they feature a switch in the address forms used by a care worker towards a resident. The first one is a conversation during which a male care worker shifts from a resident’s first name to her last name in an (unsuccessful) attempt to engage in some small talk (#101). The shift has been preceded by two instances of disagreement between resident and care worker on the issue of getting up, which the latter has just managed to conclude in his favour (cf. Backhaus 2010: 81–84). The care worker’s recourse to a more respectful address form at this point in the interaction can be seen as an attempt to make up for the loss of face he has just incurred on the resident. This is in line with common politeness theory (Brown and Levinson 1987) and shows the high relevance of address terms in managing social interaction. In the second exception, a female care worker addresses a female resident by her last name throughout the interaction, but at two instances calls her okāsan [mother] (#85). This happens during a longer crying fit of the resident and the care worker’s increasingly flustered attempts to calm her down. The use ofokāsan thus occurs in a situation 368 peter backhaus of high psychological stress for the care worker. Once she has settled down again half a minute later, she shifts back to last name address. This is the only instance in the sample where a resident is addressed by a kinship term – and not ‘grandma’ but the somewhat less age-indicative ‘mother’ – which shows that the frequently criticized fictive use of kinship terms is not a common practice in Edogawa Care.

5. How the Residents Address the Staff

Having identified a few basic patterns in the address behaviour of the staff, the following will now take a comparative look at the address behaviour of the residents. The most basic distinction that can be made here is between those conversations that do contain a direct address to the care worker as opposed to those that do not. The results are presented in Table 4, which also gives a complementary categorization of the previously discussed staff-to-resident address behaviour. As can be seen at first sight, most of the conversations do not comprise any terms of address used by the residents towards the care workers. Only in 11 of the 107 cases (10.3%) does a resident directly refer to a care worker by a term of address. This finding is in stark contrast to the address behaviour of the staff, which in the large majority of cases (78.5%) does contain a direct address to the person spoken to. How can this strong asymmetry in the address behaviour of residents and staff be explained? There are several, in part interrelated, reasons to be taken into account here. First of all, the scarcity of naming on the part of the residents may be a result of growing cognitive deficits. As already mentioned, the participants in the present study did not suffer from severe dementia. Nevertheless some of them may have found it difficult to memorize each care worker’s name and properly allocate each name to the appropriate person.

Table 4 Terms of address: residents to staff vs. staff to residents Term of address Residents to staff Staff to residents Not used 96 (89.7%) 23 (21.5%) Used 11 (10.3%) 84 (78.5%) Sum 107 (100%) 107 (100%)

Source: Data based on own research. eldercare communication 369

This relates to a second aspect, which is an institutionally defined inequality of access to information (e.g., Hagstrom 2004). As far as the care workers are concerned, it is part of their job to have an intimate knowledge about each single resident. This goes far beyond full name identification to matters such as age, physical and mental condition, daily medication, and even bowel movements. All of this is recorded and readily available to the caring staff in the medical files stored in the nurse station. By contrast, the residents have very few opportunities to receive any information whatsoever about the care workers. Since no identification tags are used by the staff, even their names to many residents may be hard to come by. The observed differences in address behaviour can be considered most obvious reflections of these inequalities in information access. This is in line with the findings of previous studies in other cultural settings (Sachweh 2000; Wagnild and Manning 1985) as discussed in Section 2. Previous research in institutional contexts has further shown that the right to name in itself is usually a prerogative of the institutional representatives. For instance, Weinhold (1997: 171–188) in a study of nurse-patient communication in a German hospital has identified naming as an important way of controlling the flow of an interaction. Her data show that this control is exercised for the most part by the nursing staff. Similar observations have been made by Sachweh (2000: 286). A third reason that may account for the differences in address behaviour in my data then is the unequal power relations between residents and staff in Edogawa Care. Having said this, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at the few cases in which the residents do use a term of address towards the caring staff. The eleven conversations are listed in Table 5. The first thing tobe noted about these cases is that there is no identifiable pattern with regard to the person addressed. All six care workers, including the two males, are potential candidates for direct address. As to the terms of address themselves, use of a care worker’s last name is the most frequent option (#11, #84, #98, #99, #107). In two cases, last name address occurs in combination with the second person pronoun anta (#26, #59). Other options are pronouns only (#37, #97), the nominal honorific sensei [teacher, doctor] (#46), and a care worker’s first name plus the diminutive honorific -chan, occurring in combination with the second person pronoun omae (#82). As to the residents using these terms, it turns out that almost half of the cases (#11, #46, #59, #82, #99) feature one specific speaker,R m093. 370 peter backhaus

He is a man in his late 70s, who is still relatively independent and likes to talk a lot with the staff. Unlike most of the other residents, Rm093 shows a vivid and explicit interest in what is going on in Edogawa Care, including the people working and living there. As the contents of the recorded conversations with Rm093 show, he uses the morning care interactions with the staff as a vital tool to learn about these matters first-hand. This is a clearly exceptional state of affairs that is also reflected in his very confident use of address terms. Particularly noteworthy is interaction #82, where the resident calls the 31-year-old station nurse by her first name attached by the diminutive person honorific -chan. The -chan address indexes an element of cuteness and as such is most commonly used when talking to babies or younger females (Ide and Yoshida 1999: 471). Its occurrence in the present context deviates from common institutional naming practices, as it contains both a grammatically and pragmatically non-obligatory index of the institutional representative’s age and gender. This temporarily shifts the power balance between the interlocutors in favour of the resident. This impression is corroborated through the talk that is being exchanged by the time the FN-chan address occurs (cf. Extract 1). The extract starts just after the nurse has entered the room and an opening

Table 5 Address terms used by the residents towards the staff Case Resident Staff Term(s) of address #11 Rm093 Sf4 LN-san #26 Rm094 Sf6 LN-san, anta #37 Rf053 Sf5 Anta #46 Rm093 Sm1 Sensei #59 Rm093 Sm2 LN-san, anta #82 Rm093 Sf5 FN-chan, omae #84 Rf162 Sf5 LN-san #97 Rf051 Sf3 Anata #98 Rf112 Sf3 LN-san #99 Rm093 Sm1 LN-san #107 Rf112 Sm1 LN-san

Note: LN = last name, FN = first name. Source: Data based on own research. eldercare communication 371 greeting has been exchanged, with the resident telling the nurse that he has been waiting for her without calling (line 1). He addresses her by the very informal pronoun omae. The reason why he refrained from using the nurse call, as he is eager to tell in line 3, is “because you [FN-chan] are a poor girl.” The nurse laughingly protests to this by saying that she is not a poor girl, though without using any direct form of address towards the resident herself.3 Taken together, this passage features an interesting role reversal between carer and cared-for: It is the resident who assumes the caring role here, while the care worker is the one who is, or does her best at not being, patronized. This temporary suspension of the institutionally ascribed roles, exceptional as it is, exemplifies the power of language in creating different types of realities in and through linguistic interaction. This is well in line with the main tenet of conversation analytical research (e.g., Psathas 1995). On the other hand, it is likely that the gender constellation (male resident talking to female care worker) facilitates the role reversal between the two interlocutors at this point.

Extract 1 1 Res. omae kuru made damattetan dayoo I’ve been waiting for you without calling. 2 Nurse assoo. omachidoo sama I see. Sorry for keeping you waiting. 3 Res. FN-chan kawaisoo dakara yo Because you are a poor girl. 4 Nurse nande yoo (laughing) What do you mean? 5 kawaisoo ja nai yo I’m not a poor girl.

3 To be precise, the Japanese original does not contain the expression ‘poor girl’. It was considered appropriate here not only for translational ease, but also because of the patronizing tone of the Japanese utterance arising from the first name address, the -chan suffix, and the term kawaisō [poor, pitiful]. 372 peter backhaus

6. Conclusions

This chapter has looked at the use of address terms in Edogawa Care from two complementary angles. The first has been from the point of view of the care workers and the way they address the residents. The two basic options that could be identified were first name address and last name address. Subsequent analysis of the data has shown that the choice between these two options is clearly determined for most of the 23 residents spoken to in the sample. Looking more closely into the possible reasons for the choice between first name and last name address showed that both age and gender of the residents seemed to influence the address behaviour of the staff. The somewhat more intimate and less respectful address by a resident’s first name was particularly frequent towards residents of a higher age and/or female residents. These findings relate to the concept of patronizing communication in ageing research, as well as to common observations in research on language and gender. A third noteworthy finding is that the fictive use of kinship terms, which has been a frequently criticized phenomenon in elderly care, is not common practice in Edogawa Care. Neither do we find terms of endearment, nicknames, or other types of patronizing terms of address commonly mentioned in the literature in other cultural contexts. The most important observation regarding the corresponding point of view of how the residents address the staff is that in most cases no terms of address are used. Three interrelated reasons have been proposed to account for this ‘namelessness’ of the care workers as opposed to the ease of ‘addressability’ in the case of the residents: cognitive deficits on the part of the residents, disparities between residents and staff regarding access to knowledge, and institutionally determined inequalities with respect to the power of addressing itself. A more focused analysis of one of the few deviant cases has shown that the observed power imbalances between residents and staff, as suggested by their asymmetric address behaviour, are not necessarily predetermined. Instead, they can be negotiated, suspended, and, for some time at least, reversed in the linguistic interaction between the two groups of interlocutors. Most of the time, however, it seems that the common address patterns identified in this study serve to reproduce rather than dissolve inequalities with regard to age, gender, and institutional role between the people living and working in Edogawa Care. Japan’s Adult Guardianship System: Statutory Guardianship and VOLUNTEER Guardians

Junko Ando

1. Introduction

In April 2000, Japan introduced a long-term care insurance system and new adult guardianship system as measures taken in response to the nation’s ageing population. With the introduction of long-term care insurance, welfare services whose content had been defined by government decisions were changed to services whose content is determined by contracts between private service providers and recipients. With the contractualization of welfare services, it became necessary to provide support for individuals unable to conclude contracts independently due to dementia, mental retardation or impaired decision-making ability resulting from mental illness or disorders. The old guardianship system was amended and the new system implemented at the same time as the new long-term care insurance system. It will soon be a decade since the new adult guardianship system was introduced (cf. Arai in this volume for a general account). In this essay I investigate the need for volunteer guardians, a topic now drawing much attention, taking into consideration actual use of the system as well as describing the social background to the current adult guardianship system, summarizing the system, and identifying problems with the new system.

2. demographic and Social Background

The most prominent needs associated with adult guardianship in Japan are those associated with the ageing of Japan’s population, a phenomenon attracting attention worldwide. Since 1970, when the proportion of individuals aged 65 and older exceeded 7 per cent, the ageing of Japan’s population has been among the most rapid in the world.1 In 2007, the proportion of elderly individuals exceeded 21 per cent. In the

1 In Japan those aged 65 or older are counted as “elderly.” 374 junko ando period from 2012 to 2014, Japan’s ‘baby boomers’ (i.e., those born between 1947 and 1949) will all enter the elderly category. Thus in 2014, the proportion of elderly people is expected to reach 26.2 per cent, meaning that more than one in four Japanese will be aged 65 or older. Projections further tell us that the proportion of elderly people in Japan’s population will continue to increase until it peaks in 2042 and then begins to decline. If, at that point, very low birth rates still prevail, however, the proportion of the elderly will not halt in its rise, and by 2055 will reach 40.5 per cent (IPSS 2006a). Japan will be, indeed, an aged society. Turning to living arrangements of the elderly, we find that in 2008 households including members aged 65 or older already accounted for 19.777 million households, i.e., 41.2 per cent of all households. Of these, 22.0 per cent (4.352 million) were individuals living alone, 29.7 per cent (5.883 million) were elderly couples living by themselves, 18.4 per cent (3.634 million) were parents with unmarried children, and 18.5 per cent (3.667 million) were three-generation households (MHLW 2008b). If we look at the 9.252 million households all of whose members are aged 65 or older, we find an almost fifty-fifty split, with individuals living alone accounting for 47.0 per cent (4.352 million, 12.5% male and 34.5% female) and couples living by themselves accounting for 49.5 per cent (4.582 million). It is likely that couple-only households will become households in which one aged person cares for another or neither is capable of providing the care that the other needs. According to Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare estimates, the number of Japanese individuals suffering from dementia stood at 2.05 million in 2005. This figure is expected to rise to 3.02 million in 2015 and to 4.45 million in 2035 (Asahi Shimbun 6 July 2008). If we add the mentally retarded and those with judgment impaired by mental illness or severe loss of brain function to those unable to make decisions for themselves, the total number of those requiring adult guardianship is already around 5 million (Ōnuki 2010: 5). It is not, of course, the case that every one of these potential candidates will require adult guardianship, but steps to address what will clearly be a growing need have already begun. I will discuss these further in Section 5 below.

3. adult Guardianship in Japan

Under the new adult guardianship law that went into effect in 2000, rules governing the old guardianship system based on ‘incompetency’ japan’s adult guardianship system 375 and ‘quasi-incompetency’ that had been in effect throughout the period between 1898 and 1999 were totally revised. Under the old system there were multifarious reasons to not use or avoid use of guardianship. Systemic issues included the separation of guardianship, which required a declaration of incompetency based on a persistent state of mental disorder, from curatorship, which required a declaration of quasi-incompetency based on feeble-mindedness or wasteful habits. There was no system available for individuals with minor disabilities. In addition, because of the weight given to the family, greater emphasis was placed on preserving ward’s assets than on respecting his or her individual wishes. Family court judgments of incompetency or quasi-incompetency were entered in family registers and anyone with sufficient reason could request an official copy of the whole or part of a family register. If, as a result, judgments of incompetency or quasi-incompetency were leaked to the public at large, not only the individual but the whole family in question might have become stigmatized and treated prejudicially.2 Employment opportunities for those judged incompetent or quasi-incompetent were restricted. Finally, the high cost of obtaining a judgment was another reason for not applying (Kamiyama 2007: 26–31). Revisions to the adult guardianship law reflected these concerns about the old system. The system based on incompetence and quasi- incompetence was abolished. In place of the old distinctions between guardians and curators, a system of three types of adult guardianship was established: guardianship proper for those completely or almost completely unable to make decisions for themselves; curatorship for those visibly lacking the ability to make decisions3; and assistance for those with minor impairments. The scope of rights to consent to, annul or delegate decisions varies depending on the type of adult guardianship; but under the new system, even guardians who have full power of attorney to manage and dispose of assets cannot annul all actions of those under guardianship. They are not allowed to undo expenditures related to everyday life, such as the purchase of daily household items (Civil Code, Section 9). Decisions of a highly personal nature, such as wills, marriages, adoptions, or other changes of status, or to

2 public access to family registers was, in principle, abolished in May 2005. 3 Those deemed to be wasting assets are excluded from the scope of conservatorship under the new system. 376 junko ando invasive medical procedures do not require prior agreement from the adult guardian. The new system abolishes the old system’s requirement that declara- tions of incompetency or quasi-incompetency be included in family registers. A new system for recording guardianships is designed to protect the private information of the wards. The range of individuals who may request copies of the records of judgments is restricted. The new system’s basic principles include respect for self-determination, empowerment, and normalization. Respect for the wishes of the wards includes not only management of personal assets but also proper care for mental and physical well-being and the conditions under which they live (Civil Code, Section 858). The guardian is held responsible for ensuring that the ward benefits to the greatest possible extent from the guardian’s work on his or her behalf. On the other side of the coin, the new system retains the provisions of the old system under which the right to vote (Public OfficeE lectoral Law Section 11.1) and the right to register seals are lost when guardianship is required. Those under curatorship do not lose the right to vote or to register seals but are excluded, as they were under the old system, from serving as lawyers, doctors, or local or national government officials. Whether to revise or abolish these restrictions is an issue for the future. A more profound and as yet unresolved issue is whether to require the consent of the person under guardianship to medical treatment. This principle is already incorporated into guardianship law inE urope and the United States, but Japanese law regarding adult guardianship leaves this question unresolved. In the case of the adult guardianship system, this issue as it relates to invasive medical procedures, has been tabled due to lack of consensus, not only among guardians but also among the public at large (MOJ 1998: 43). If the ward has the ability to accept or reject the treatment in question, his or her wishes are respected. When the ward lacks the ability to agree or to express an opinion, the guardian is supposed to act in accord with generally accepted thinking and to seek agreement concerning medical treatment from family members or other close relatives.4 The problem arises in cases in which the ward lacks the ability to agree or to

4 There is no legal requirement that the right to make medical decisions be dele- gated to family members or other close relatives. japan’s adult guardianship system 377 express an opinion and either there are no family members or close relatives to consult or their agreement is not forthcoming. In many cases, it is left to the guardian to sign the consent form required by the hospital.

4. usage

When we compare the number of applications under the current system from those under the old system, we find that in 1999, the last year in which the old system was effective, there were 2,963 applications for guardianship and 671 applications for curatorship, for a total of 3,634. In 2000, the first year of the new system, there were 7,451 applications for guardianship, 884 applications for curatorship, and 621 applications for assistance, totalling 8,956 in all (cf. Tables 1 and 2). Since fiscal year 2001, applications for assistance have increased by 7 per cent, on average, applications for curatorship by 15.4 per cent, and applications for guardianship by 19.1 per cent. During the eight- year period ending in fiscal year 2007, there were a total of 146,496 applications of which 120,157 were granted. These figures are,however, far below the 1 per cent of total population anticipated based on the experience of adult guardianship systems in other countries. Japan is often compared with Germany, which has a population of 82 million,

Table 1 applications for adult guardianship, April 2000 through March 2008 Fiscal Year Assistance Curatorship Guardianship Total 2000 621 884 7,451 8,956 2001 645 (+4%) 1,043 (+18%) 9,297 (+25%) 10,985 2002 737 (+14%) 1,521 (+46%) 12,746 (+37%) 15,004 2003 805 (+9%) 1,627 (+7%) 14,462 (+13%) 16,894 2004 784 (−3%) 1,687 (+4%) 14,532 (+ 0%) 17,003 2005 945 (+21%) 1,968 (+17%) 17,910 (+23%) 20,823 2006 859 (−9%) 2,030 (+3%) 29,380 (+64%) 32,269 2007 967 (+13%) 2,298 (+13%) 21,297 (−28%) 24,562 Total 6,363 13,058 127,075 146,496

Note: Figures in parenthesis are year-on-year changes. Source: Supreme Court (2000–2007). 378 junko ando

Table 2 applications accepted per fiscal year fromA pril 2000 through March 2008 Fiscal Year Assistance Curatorship Guardianship Total 2000 272 240 2,980 3,492 2001 472 713 6,630 7,815 2002 550 962 8,966 10,478 2003 670 1,316 12,023 14,009 2004 684 1,271 12,309 14,264 2005 853 1,806 14,498 17,157 2006 799 1,932 27,558 30,289 2007 856 2,040 19,757 22,653 Total 5,156 10,280 104,721 120,157

Note: Acceptance figures in each fiscal year include applications made during the previous fiscal year. Source: Supreme Court (2000–2007). of whom 1.2 million are wards under guardianship (Betreuung). But, even if Japan’s adult guardianship system and Germany’s guardianship law (Betreuungsrecht) share the same objectives, their social and cultural backgrounds as well as the laws themselves are strikingly different. We must be careful, then, in making comparisons between them. One reason for the slow growth in usage of Japan’s adult guardianship system is that the negative image of the old system’s incompetence and quasi-incompetence provisions remains strongly rooted, especially among older people. We should also note that, compared to the introduction of the long-term care insurance system, insufficient effort was put into informing the public about the new adult guardianship system. To this we must add the complicated procedures and heavy costs required to apply. These are another reason why people hesitate to use the system.5 Efforts were made to disseminate information about the adult guardianship system in 2006, when the Services and Supports for Persons with Disabilities Act and the Act on Prevention of Elderly Abuse and Support for Attendants of Elderly Persons were implemented. Shortly before, two nearly eighty year-old sisters living in Saitama Prefecture, who suffered from dementia, lost all of their assets to a scam. The case became a nationwide cause célèbre.

5 The most expensive item is the assessment, which is now 50,000 yen, half of what it used to be. japan’s adult guardianship system 379

Opportunities to talk to the media about the adult guardianship system increased, leading to greater awareness and use of the system in recent years (Asahi Shimbun 4 July 2005). If we look at age and gender breakdowns of the wards, we find that in terms of age 60 per cent are aged 65 or older. Between the ages of 20 and 69, there is a higher proportion of men than women. From the age of 70 onward, the proportion of women becomes dramatically higher than that of men. The highest proportions of wards for both men and women are among those in their 80s or older. In Japan, the right to apply for guardianship is restricted to the individual in question, his or her spouse, relatives within four degrees of kinship, guardian supervisors, investigating officials, or mayors of villages, towns and cities. In over 90 per cent of cases, the applicant is a relative, with the highest proportion (40%) of those the child of the individual for whom guardianship is sought. Forty per cent of applicants and 30 per cent of appointed guardians are the children of the wards. The elderly account for a large proportion of all applications. Sixty per cent of applications are related to managing assets, 18 per cent to care for the person in question, and 9 per cent to division of estates (Supreme Court 2000–2007).

5. Volunteer Guardians

In fiscal year 2000, when the new adult guardianship system was introduced, the guardian and the ward were relatives in 90 per cent of cases; third-party professional guardians appeared in only 10 per cent. Subsequently, the proportion of professional guardians increased, while the proportion of relatives declined. In fiscal year 2007, only 72 per cent of guardians were relatives; the proportion of professional guardians had increased to 28 per cent (Supreme Court 2000–2007). Professional bodies that registered potential adult guardians included those for lawyers (3,200), judicial scriveners (5,000), social workers (3,500) and tax accountants (1,300); but of the approximately 13,000 individuals registered, only around 10,000 are actually expected to serve as guardians (Ōnuki 2010: 8). While at present the number of guardianships does not exceed 120,000, if the projected ageing of Japan’s population continues as predicted, the number of available guardian candidates may be insufficient. Taking note of this trend, local municipalities and NPOs began, around five or six years ago, to 380 junko ando offer training courses for volunteer guardians. Since, however, volunteer guardians have no professional organization like those from whose ranks professional guardians are drawn, they have no large network through which to exchange information. There are no shared guidelines for the courses offered by the various organizations that train lay guardians; nor are there shared ethical rules for lay guardians. Since some guardians have already been appointed by the family court from among those who have completed training courses, we should soon see what sorts of problems may arise.6 In order to form a central organization for volunteer guardians, its legal status must be determined. In the summer of 2008, the Ministry of Justice started preparations for revisions of the adult guardianship law, but the completion of this process is likely to take several years. What professional guardians want is a clear division of labour between volunteer guardians, who lack professional qualifications, and professional guardians. Cases in which volunteer guardians are selected should only be those in which asset management is trouble-free and limited to everyday cash disbursements. Volunteer guardians should also be sufficiently able to oversee the care provided to the wards for whom they are responsible. In cases like those in which mayors take charge of applications to begin guardianship because the person in need lacks both assets and relatives able to provide the needed support, there has been no alternative to the family court appointing a professional guardian, even if the person in question is unable to pay for the service. Volunteer guardians now offer an additional option. However, ample personal supervision that requires frequent meetings with the ward and facilities personnel is only possible when the guardian and the ward live close together. In the case of urban areas where there may be waiting lists of hundreds or thousands of individuals seeking admission to the special nursing homes equipped to provide the care they need, it may be necessary to accommodate them in facilities two or more hours away from where they have been living, even outside the city or prefecture in question. In these cases there is neither local knowledge nor benefit to be had from close local connections. It will, then, with an eye to the future, be valuable to set up an information network that makes it possible to take advantage of the

6 since 2008, the Setagaya Social Welfare Council in Tokyo’s Setagaya Ward, for instance, has trained 50 lay guardians, of whom 20 have been appointed guardians by the Tokyo family court. japan’s adult guardianship system 381 good offices of guardians who live closer to the facilities to which a ward is assigned. The fortunate among us may never have to use the adult guardianship system, but for those who require the system it is a necessity. To fulfil the ideals for which an adult guardianship system is created will also require cooperative linkages with other systems involved in meeting the medical and long-term care needs of the elderly.

Japan’s Adult Guardianship Law: Current Status and Issues

Makoto Arai

1. introduction

This essay reviews Japan’s New Adult Guardianship Law and analyses the realities of its application eight years after its going into effect.I n it I examine the statistical data provided by Japan’s Supreme Court in Seinen kōken jiken no gaikyō [Summary of adult guardianship cases] covering the eight years since the new law went into effect in April 2000 (data for nine years have been published as of this writing). After some analysis of those data, I present what has been learned from those eight years of experience, discuss issues this experience raises, and suggest future directions.

2. new Thinking and New Systems

The changes in Japan’s Civil Code that accompanied the introduction of the New Adult Guardianship Law were exceptionally large in scale, in both quality and quantity, for a country in which, except for the Commercial Code, revisions in the area of basic law are rare. It must be noted that these changes went far beyond technical corrections in existing language. They introduced such new principles as “normalization,” “respect for self-determination,” and “respect for personal welfare.” They were, then, an attempt at radical reform based on careful rethinking of the principles underlying the system. As a result, the introduction of the new law was accompanied by the introduction of concepts previously unknown in Japanese civil law scholarship. The classic examples include the following four systems.

2.1 Voluntary Guardianship Adult guardianship systems can be broadly divided into two types: voluntary guardianship and statutory guardianship. Under voluntary guardianship, the person being protected clearly expresses their own 384 makoto arai wishes concerning property management and personal welfare prior to lapsing into a state in which guardianship is needed. The guardian’s subsequent actions must conform to those wishes. This system is, in other words, a preventive measure. In contrast, under statutory guardianship, the person being protected lapses into a state requiring guardianship without having clearly expressed his or her own wishes. The guardian acts paternalistically, not based on the protected person’s thinking. This is, in other words, a system applied after the fact. Both systems have distinctive characteristics. The most desirable stance is, then, to construct an overarching framework aimed at systematic coordination between them that makes effective use of the benefits of both. Prior to the introduction of the new law, however, adult guardianship had for a long time been de facto construed in terms of only two forms of statutory guardianship: one for incompetency, the other for quasi- incompetency. The fact that a system of voluntary guardianship had been ignored in the past is probably why insufficient legislative provision was made for ensuring the proper implementation of the new voluntary guardianship system. In these circumstances, the Act on Voluntary Guardianship Con tract (hereafter Voluntary Guardianship Act) effected a total transformation of existing law. Adopting “the principle that priority is given to voluntary guardianship” as providing for a system that respects self- determination as its basic principle, it gives priority to voluntary guardianship over statutory guardianship (Voluntary Guardianship Act, Sections 10:1 and 4:2). The framework for the voluntary guardianship system under the Voluntary Guardianship Act consists of the following two elements: (1) a contract between two parties, the voluntary guardian (the person who will assume the responsibility of guardianship) and the person being protected, and (2) the appointment of a guardian supervisor by the family court to ensure that the guardian does not abuse his or her powers under the terms of said contract. Making the contract the foundation of the system maximizes to the greatest possible extent the self-government (self-determination) of the person under guardianship and minimizes the public involvement needed to achieve the objective of protecting the individual (indirect control by the family court via the guardian supervisor). The combination of these two provisions in establishing the new system has brought a fresh stimulus to civil law scholarship, in both its principles and its technical dimensions. japan’s adult guardianship law 385

2.2 Advisership The new law not only restructures incompetency and quasi-incompetency in terms of guardianship and conservatorship in light of new principles. It also establishes a new system of advisership: a totally new type of statutory guardianship. Advisership is a system that applies to persons who were not included in the earlier system of statutory guardianship. Under the advisership system, those with impaired judgment due to minor mental or psychological disability are included within a framework of statutory guardianship, whose greatest distinguishing feature is to preserve to the maximum possible extent the ideal of respect for self-determination. The ideal of respect for self-determination includes primarily the following specific points. First, whether requested by the individual in need of protection or by someone else, advisership can only be initiated with the agreement of the protected individual. Second, the choice of the nature of the protection (giving power of attorney and/or the right to conclude and dissolve agreements to the adviser) is made by the party making the application. Third, as in the choice of the nature of the protection, the scope of the advisership (the scope of legal actions to which the power of attorney and/or right to conclude and dissolve agreements applies) is also decided based on the application by the party concerned, with the initiative in making these decisions left in the hands of the person making use of the advisership system. In contrast to the earlier law of statutory guardianship, which only considered protection from the point of view of a paternalistic guardian, advisership, a new type of statutory guardianship, adds the point of view of respect for self-determination to the rules governing advisership. This change arguably has provided a major stimulus to new thinking in civil law.

2.3 Obligations Related to Personal Welfare In the past, statutory guardianship was biased towards management of assets, and the personal welfare of the user (consideration of the user’s health, daily life and welfare) was neglected. In contrast, changes in the new law concerning the guardian’s duties give increased weight to personal welfare in, for example, medical care contracts, contracts related to residence, contracts related to admission to institutions or facilities, nursing care contracts, and contracts concerning education and rehabilitation. Specific provisions make consideration for the personal 386 makoto arai welfare under guardianship a legal obligation of all protective insti tutions involved in adult guardianship, including the three types of statutory guardianship and voluntary guardianship, as adult guardians, curators, advisers, or voluntary guardians (Civil Code, Sections 858, 876:5:1, 876:10; Voluntary Guardianship Act, Section 6). As a result, all protective institutions must, in their exercise of guardianship (power of attorney, exercise of the right to conclude and dissolve agreements), exercise due care for the personal welfare of the individual under guardianship. The guardianship system continues as before to protect the assets of the individual under guardianship, but as part of the inclusion of an obligation to consider the personal welfare of the individual, provisions concerning asset management for the sake of personal welfare (active use of assets to improve the individual’s quality of life) have been strengthened. The newly established obligation to consider the welfare of the person introduced a new perspective on the guardianship system as a means of providing assistance in living for the individual. The guardianship system is now required to enhance that person’s quality of life, a perspective that had been lacking in the understanding of guardianship law in civil law theory. The addition of that perspective is bound to have a major impact on the study of civil law.

2.4 Authorization to Apply to Commence a Statutory Guardianship by the Mayors of Local Jurisdictions The law contains new provisions authorizing the mayor of a city, town, or village, upon receipt of information from a welfare commissioner or others involved in welfare issues, to apply promptly and precisely to initiate statutory guardianship proceedings for persons with no relatives, when such persons suffer from dementia, are intellectually disabled, or are psychologically disabled, to ensure that appropriate protective measures are put into effect, as prescribed in the Act on Social Welfare Service for Elderly, Act on Welfare of Mentally Retarded Persons, and Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled (Act on Social Welfare Service for Elderly, Section 32, Act on Welfare of Mentally Retarded Persons, Section 27:3, Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled, Section 51). These laws empower mayors to apply for judgments to commence the advisership, conservatorship, or guardianship of elderly people suffering from dementia, the intellectually disabled, or the psychologically japan’s adult guardianship law 387 disabled, whenever the person’s welfare makes such steps necessary. Given that in the past authorization to apply to commence statutory guardianship was almost entirely limited to family members, extending this right to mayors of local jurisdictions is expected to lead to a major change in the statutory guardianship system (the socialization of guardianship, by making it a public decision).

3. analysis of Implementation

3.1 Voluntary Guardianship I would like to begin by considering voluntary guardianship, because voluntary guardianship embodies the most visible and distinctive characteristics of the new adult guardianship system. Relatively few individuals have been appointed as supervisors of voluntary guardianships in the eight years for which we have data: only 1,201. The number of voluntary guardianship contracts signed and recorded has reached 27,281. If the goal of the voluntary guardianship system is to ensure that individuals can feel secure knowing that proper preparations have been made for when their mental abilities diminish or are lost, the number of voluntary guardianship contracts signed is more important than the number of individuals appointed as supervisors of voluntary guardianships. In that sense, the 27,281 voluntary guardianship contracts signed are a substantial number. The steady growth of a voluntary guardianship system is a deeply emotional matter. Given that under Britain’s law providing for a continuing power of attorney, the model for Japan’s voluntary guardianship system, 42,405 voluntary guardianship contracts have been entered into in the 11 years since the system was established (Arai 1999: 14), more needs to be done to ensure that the system spreads and becomes firmly rooted in Japan. We cannot, of course, say that the voluntary guardianship system has operated perfectly. There have, in particular, been questions about the suitability of those selected as guardians. While not clear from the data in the Supreme Court’s summary, in almost all cases the voluntary guardians are relatives of the individuals concerned. On the one hand, it is perfectly natural for familial feeling to dictate the selection of a relative as the guardian. It is also true that if the guardian is a relative, the need to compensate the guardian may be eliminated, reducing the economic burden on the individual in question. On the other hand, there is strong concern that if the guardian is a relative there will be a 388 makoto arai conflict of interest. There have, in fact, been cases in which an individual was urged to sign a voluntary guardianship contract in order to give one set of relatives complete control of his or her assets and others in which, in a dispute within the family over assets, a voluntary guardianship contract has been signed to avoid proceedings to institute statutory guardianship. The law governing voluntary guardianships includes provisions under which persons would be judged disqualified or unsuitable to become guardians (those who accept the responsibility of guardianship) (Section 4:1:3). How to interpret what constitutes unsuitability as specified in the phrase “reasons for unsuitability to perform the duties of guardian” is, however, an issue. For notaries, the Civil Code, Section 843:4, includes a list of items to be considered when notarizing the selection of an adult guardian. The notary should interview the proposed guardian as well as the individual in question; in cases where there is strong doubt concerning suitability, the notary is required by the Regulations for Implementation of the Notary Law, Article 13, to provide proper warning, instruction, and advice. Nonetheless, the principle of self-determination makes it desirable for the individual seeking guardianship to be free to choose the voluntary guardian for himself or herself. Thus, barring reasons to nullify the contract as illegal or invalid or because of restricted capacity, the notary cannot refuse to provide notarization. It is pointed out that the suitability of the guardian, in the last instance, should be decided by the Family Court (Satō 2000: 347). That is very appropriate. This author regards it as strongly desirable, however, that whenever there is strong concern about injury to the interest of the person being protected, effective warning, instruction and advice be provided at the stage of preparing the notarized documents. Moreover, in my opinion, if the guardian is not suitable or there is a clear pattern of abuse, then, going back to the basic principle of the guardianship system, protecting the individual in question, the notary should reject the request for notarization when the notarized documents are being prepared.

3.2 Advisership My next point is that, despite the inclusion of advisership as one of the pillars of statutory guardianship, use of this provision is not increasing. Of the 120,157 cases accepted for adjudication since the start of statutory guardianship, only 5,156 have been related to advisership. japan’s adult guardianship law 389

Advisership is included in only one out of five voluntary guardianship contracts. The Supreme Court’s 2000 summary stated, “since advisership is a new system, as awareness of the system increases, the number of related cases is also expected to increase.” An analysis of the trend since then reveals, however, that more widespread utilization of the advisership system has not occurred. The hope was that “the newly established advisership system will, in practice, function mainly as a system that will permit a choice of a flexible, partial power of attorney with limits on legal capacity as in the voluntary guardianship system. It will, with the voluntary guardianship system, play a central role in the new adult guardianship system from 2000, as a flexible system that can respond promptly to the diverse needs of the aged or disabled suffering mild dementia or intellectual or psychological disability” (Iwai 1999: 62). That hope has not been realized; the reality is, in fact, quite different from the basic thinking behind the adult guardianship system.

3.3 Time Required for Proceedings The new system dramatically reduces the time required for hearings and assessments and lowers the costs of assessments. While time and cost reductions were not newly mandated, that these results are occurring indicates that the success or failure of the adult guardianship system depends on the efforts of those charged with implementing it. Here I would like to express my appreciation for the hard work of all concerned.

3.4 Applicants and Motives for Applications During the eight years under review, mayors of municipalities have accounted for only 4,605 (4 per cent of the total) applications for adult guardianship. The goal implicit in authorizing mayors to apply to commence a statutory guardianship cannot be said to have been realized. The purport of the new act is that a mayor, upon receipt of information from a welfare commissioner or others involved in welfare issues, could apply promptly and precisely to initiate statutory guardianship proceedings for persons with no relatives who suffer from dementia, are intellectually disabled, or are psychologically disabled, to ensure that appropriate protective measures are put into effect. For this reason, the Act on Social Welfare Service for Elderly, Section 32, Act on Welfare of Mentally Retarded Persons, Section 27:3, Act on Mental Health 390 makoto arai and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled, Section 51:11:2 were newly established to give mayors authorization to apply to commence statutory guardianship. Local public bodies are, of course, responsible for taking administrative action to preserve the safety, health, and welfare of residents and visitors (Local Autonomy Law, Section 2). In that sense, mayors were already responsible for plans to ensure the welfare of aged persons with dementia, the intellectually disabled, and the mentally ill. Submitting applications for judgments to commence statutory guardianship should be a fundamental duty under the Local Autonomy Law. The primary motive for applying for guardianship is to deal with the management of assets (on average, 60 per cent of cases over eight years). Next is the need to provide for personal welfare (on average, 16 per cent of cases over eight years). Concluding a contract for long-term care insurance is, by comparison, rare, only 3 per cent of cases in the eight years. The adult guardianship system is intended to provide sufficient support for legal actions directed at care for personal welfare. What is, then, notable here is the dramatic increase in the number of applications spurred by issues relating to personal welfare instead of asset management alone. Applications related to the personal welfare of the individual concerned or nursing care contracts account, however, for only a strikingly small 19 per cent of the total. More needs to be done to spread awareness of the importance of protecting personal welfare as part of the adult guardianship system.

3.5 Relationship to the Protected Individual An examination of the relationships between adult guardians and the individuals they protect reveals that an overwhelming majority of guardians are relatives of the protected individual. The proportion of relatives has, however, gradually declined: from 90 per cent in 2000, to 86 per cent in 2001, 84 per cent in 2002, 83 per cent in 2003, 80 per cent in 2004, 77 per cent in 2005, 83 per cent in 2006, and 72 per cent in 2007. In contrast, the proportion of third parties who are not relatives has gradually risen: from 10 per cent in 2000, to 14 per cent in 2001, 16 per cent in 2002, 17 per cent in 2003, 20 per cent in 2004, 23 per cent in 2005, 17 per cent in 2006, and 28 per cent in 2007. In view of the intention in the adult guardianship system to achieve more active use of third-party guardians, a further push is needed to accelerate this trend. japan’s adult guardianship law 391

4. Future Issues

In the preceeding section, I analysed the summary data published by the Supreme Court. Overall, the results for the six years after the implementation of the new adult guardianship law are steadily improving, especially in comparison to the old system. The new system’s goals and ideals seem to be winning broad public acceptance and to be well- regarded. On the other hand, growth in the number of applications for advisership is slow. Active steps are needed to encourage mayors to initiate applications, and something needs to be done to stimulate increases in the number of applications related to personal welfare and conclusion of contracts for long-term care insurance. A further issue is the need to dramatically increase the number of third-party non-relatives chosen as guardians. Here, then, I would like to discuss in greater detail the issues now confronting the adult guardianship system in Japan.

4.1 Issues in Civil Law Theory First, there are issues that civil law scholarship needs to address. If the adult guardianship system is to operate on the basis of new ideas including self-determination, normalization, and greater emphasis on concern for the personal welfare of the individuals being protected, scholarly approaches to the interpretation of the civil code must break out of the existing framework and offer interpretations with greater flexibility and resiliency. Is, however, civil law theory responding as it should?

4.1.1 The rise and fall of voluntary powers of attorney One issue is the resolution of voluntary powers of attorney after the individual in question has become mentally impaired. Concerning this point, Civil Code Section 111, which regulates the expiration of powers of attorney, only mentions the death of the individual granting power of attorney as a reason, arising from that individual, for the expiration of those powers (Section 11:1:1). Nothing is stated directly about that individual’s mental impairment. Under the interpretation commonly accepted in Japan, an individual’s loss of mental capacity is not regarded as a reason for powers of attorney to expire. The power of attorney remains in effect without special provision to allow its continuation after the granter of that power becomes mentally incapaci- tated (Yonekura 1991: 52). Is that generally accepted interpretation 392 makoto arai sustainable after the introduction of the voluntary guardianship system? If the generally accepted interpretation still applies, this would completely ignore the significance of introducing the voluntary guardianship system, yet those supporting the generally accepted interpretation have yet to propose an interpretation under which it can be reconciled with the new system. Civil law scholars must come up with interpretations that provide greater incentives to make use of voluntary guardianship.

4.1.2 Powers of attorney related to advisership Concerning the necessity and scope of power of attorney in cases of advisership, there is an influential body of opinion according to which, “it is necessary to be careful to ensure that powers of attorney given to the person providing advisership cannot be exercised too easily. That is, considering that the individual receiving advisership still retains considerable powers of judgment, only powers of attorney limited to specific matters should be granted, and these should be exercised with due respect to the wishes of the individual in question (see section 876:5:1, which applies to section 876:10:1)” (Uchida 2000: 116). That position provides no incentive for utilizing the system and may be one reason why use of the advisership system has not become widespread. Those with limited degrees of dementia or mental or psychological disability may find it difficult to choose appropriate representatives; in light of the advisership system’s goal of protecting those receiving advisership via clearly defined transactions by legal representatives appointed by the family court, it is contrary to the ideal of protection to restrict powers of attorney. Civil law scholars should, then, be debat- ing how to provide greater incentives for use of the advisership system.

4.1.3 The realities of personal welfare What, then, are the realities of personal welfare? Let us consider how this question relates to voluntary guardianship. Powers of attorney related to personal care, including contracts related to medical care, hospitalization, residence, admission to institutions or facilities, nursing care, education, and rehabilitation can be granted to a voluntary guardian. On the other hand, because, legally speaking, a voluntary guardianship contract is a delegation agreement, most legal scholars do not regard quasi-mandated actions as falling within the scope of the contract. The implicit scope of legal actions related to the exercise of japan’s adult guardianship law 393 the power of attorney, however, includes responsibilities that arise from the performance of the role of legal guardian. These should not be excluded from our understanding of the provisions of the voluntary guardianship contract. Moreover, the law governing voluntary guardianship includes “the obligation of care for personal welfare” (Section 6). Care for personal welfare is not limited to the legal act of entering into an agreement related to care for personal welfare (execution of power of attorney). It can be interpreted as falling within the scope of the items entrusted to a guardian, including supervision and oversight of the other after the contract is signed (including, for example, keeping close watch on the individual who requires guardianship). The responsibility in question is one of broad scope, in both character and time required. The obligation to keep a close watch on the person under guardianship is already well understood. It would, however, be good to see more debate among legal scholars leading to a more mature and robust interpretation of the nature of this obligation.

4.1.4 Position in relation to the legal system There are also issues related to the position of the Adult Guardianship Act in relation to the legal system as a whole. Japan’s system for providing social welfare services is undergoing a major shift from the place- ment system to a contract system. Since the Long-term Care Insurance Act went into effect inA pril 2000, the provision of long-term care services has shifted to a contracted approach.S ince the introduction of the supplementary payment system in April 2003, provision of welfare services for the physically and mentally disabled on a contract basis has also become dominant. As provision of welfare services is thus restructured on a contractual basis, providers and recipients of services are now related to each other, conceptually, as parties to contracts. Many recipients of welfare services, however, suffer from handicaps that affect their ability to enter into contracts, and the greater their need for such services, paradoxically, the greater their difficulties in accessing them. To avoid that regrettable situation, it is imperative that a system be put in place to assist users in concluding contracts. In this sense, the adult guardianship system should be considered one of the most important foundations of Japan’s social welfare system. Adult guardianship, moreover, is more than a system in civil law or family law; it functions as a bridge to all laws related to social welfare (Kamiyama 2000: 4). The majority of civil law scholars still see adult guardianship within the restricted framework of civil law, but what is 394 makoto arai needed is the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach that continues to respect the nature of civil law.

4.2 The Socialization of Adult Guardianship If adult guardianship provides access to social services, it becomes a social safety net for a wide range of citizens. As part of the social welfare infrastructure, it is seen as the responsibility of the national and local governments. This is whatI mean by the phrase “the socialization of adult guardianship.” There are several issues associated with this project.

4.2.1 The Yokohama ordinances Yokohama is an example in which the socialization of adult guardianship has been incorporated into city ordinances. In the Yokohama City Ordinance to Provide Support to the Disabled in Need of Adult Guardianship, implemented in July 2002, the city is required to “consider steps required to provide support for the disabled in need of adult guardianship” (Section 3). “To cooperate with efforts to make it possible for the disabled who require adult guardianship to live a safe and secure life” is defined as a public responsibility (Section 4). Concerning the obligations of disabled persons, “disabled persons under adult guardianship are required, while receiving appropriate support, to make an effort to live on their own as members of the local community” (Section 5). Based on these criteria, the city provides the following types of support (Section 6): (1) The city provides consultation, advice and guidance on daily living to the disabled requiring guardianship. (2) The city provides the support necessary to apply for a judgment that guardianship, conservatorship, or advisership is required. (3) The city ensures that disabled persons requiring guardianship have a place and funds required to live in their locality. (4) The city provides advice or mediation required to preserve or employ assets belonging to disabled persons requiring guardianship. (5) The city provides consultation, advice and guidance to the parents and other relatives residing in the city and currently caring for disabled persons concerning support for disabled persons requiring guardianship. (6) The city provides other support deemed essential for disabled persons requiring guardianship. These ordinances give concrete form to the socialization of adult guardianship. It is to be hoped that close attention will be paid to how japan’s adult guardianship law 395 these ordinances are employed in Yokohama and also that they spread throughout Japan.

4.2.2 Training The socialization of adult guardianship requires broad public support for provision of individuals qualified to serve as adult guardians. In most cases it has fallen to relatives to provide the manpower to fill this role. Given, however, an ageing society increasingly composed of nuclear families and international statistics that suggest that about 1 per cent of population will require adult guardianship (approximately 1.2 million individuals in the case of Japan; Arai 2002: 44), the need for third parties to serve as adult guardians is inescapable. Third parties may include acquaintances, friends or volunteers, but given the current state of social consciousness in Japan, professional guardians are likely to be the most appropriate solution. Professional organizations of lawyers, judicial scriveners, social workers, and accountants deserve the highest praise for efforts already underway to provide professional guardians. That said, however, I hope that all of these professional organizations will consider how best to provide an adequate supply of professional guardians before demand for adult guardianship increases, as it surely will.

4.2.3 The role of corporate guardians Among third-party guardians, corporate guardians play a central role. The benefits of corporate guardians include (1) the relative ease of providing continuing long-term service; (2) the relative ease of handling a broad coverage region; (3) the possibility of rotating the responsibilities of guardianship; (4) the reliability of corporations and the lessening of the psychological burden on the person serving as guardian; and (5) the relative ease of handling cases difficult for individual guardians to manage (Maeda 2002: 23–24). German law does not provide for corporate guardians; but Japanese law does. Japanese law includes neither the national guardianship provided by continental law nor the public backup provided by Anglo-American law; in this context, corporate guardianship is indispensable in Japan. In view of corporate guardians’ having to handle cases involving criminal insanity, stub- bornly interfering relatives, and victims of organized crime, the need for a fully fledged corporate guardianship system cannot be denied. My hope is that we can break out of the current situation in which 396 makoto arai corporate guardianship is provided only by some legal support, social welfare councils, and public social welfare corporations, and that more corporations will be prepared to stand up and become another source of corporate guardianship.

4.2.4 Authorization to apply to commence a statutory guardianship by the mayors of local jurisdictions There is one additional element in making the socialization of adult guardianship a reality, authorization to apply to commence a statutory guardianship by the mayors of local jurisdictions. The results, however, have not been very satisfactory. During the past eight years, applications by mayor have accounted for only about 4 per cent of the total of adult guardianships. The cases in which mayors have filed applications for guardianship fall into two types: first, a high proportion involved nominating third-party guardians, and, a high proportion in which the objective is personal welfare. Overall, these are the types of cases in which the socialization of adult guardianship has already reached a high level (Kamiyama 2000: 10). We should note, too, that the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has begun taking concrete steps to promote applications by mayors. The same ministry has publicly stated that “authorization to apply to commence a statutory guardianship by the mayors of local jurisdictions is not limited to cases in which there are relatives within the four degrees of kinship.” This interpretation is entirely appropriate and an opportunity to press for greater use of the mayors’ right to file applications. The same ministry has, moreover, since 2005 included “support for the use of the adult guardianship system” in its menu of services designed to prevent the need for long-term care and to provide support for assisted living. It is also noteworthy that this ministry provides adviserships from public funds for low- income persons unable to afford the costs of adult guardianship. My hope is that this system for providing adviserships will also promote greater use of the mayoral right to file applications for adult guardianship. part IV

Regional Aspects of Ageing and Depopulation

Demographic Change and Challenges from a Regional Perspective: The Case of Germany

Franz-Josef Kemper

1. Introduction: Regional Contrasts between Growing and Declining Areas

Public discussions on demographic change in Germany tend to focus on ageing and population decline. Whereas natural change has been negative since the 1970s, migration gains compensated for birth deficits until 2002, when the total population of Germany reached a maximum of 82.5 million inhabitants. In the following five years, with shrinking migrations from abroad, the population fell by 0.4 per cent.1 According to population projections of the Federal Statistical Office (11th coordinated projection, variant no. 1 with low migration gains), further decline will be relatively moderate until 2020 (−3.0 per cent), followed by accelerated decline in the next decades so that by 2050 the projected decrease will be 17 per cent (Eisenmenger, Pötzsch and Sommer 2006). However, despite this moderate development in recent years and the near future, there are large regional contrasts between growing and declining areas within the country. The most important demographic division is still between West and East, between the old and the new federal states (Länder). Whereas in the West total population increased between 1990 and 2007 by nearly 7 per cent, the East (excluding the city of Berlin) has been characterized by a decline of 11 per cent. This chapter focuses on regional contrasts in population development. After a description of such contrasts, the different components of population change are analysed. Following an examination of regional variations in fertility and mortality, the major part of the chapter deals with migration. First, the regional effects of international and internal migration are compared. Because different age groups show divergent migration flows, a second topic is the question of which

1 for a general overview cf. Kröhnert, Medicus and Klingholz (2006); Mai and Micheel (2008). 400 franz-josef kemper selective regional effects of different age groups can be observed. These selectivities have recently changed and could give rise to a trend of reurbanization. The last part of this study discusses demographic consequences of population processes, with a focus on shrinking regions and cities and population ageing. In every section, maps on the basis of counties (Kreise) are presented as well as tables showing values for different parts of Germany and different types of settlement structure, with corresponding descriptive statistical measures indicating the degree of internal homogeneity. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows population developments between 1995 and 2005 on the basis of the 439 counties, revealing that beyond the East-West divide there are parts of the new states with population increase, especially suburban regions around Berlin and other big cities, whereas pockets of population decline can be observed in the old states, for instance in the old industrial agglomerations of the Ruhr (Essen, Dortmund) and Saarland or in some rural regions (Northern Hesse or Bavarian Forest). The spatial variation of growth and decline depends on the scale of the spatial units. The finer the spatial detail the larger the variation. This can be seen in Table 1, where the inhabitants in units with increasing population between 1997 and 2005 are differ- entiated by scale. On the basis of the federal states, a relatively homogeneous development seems to be predominant: only 19 per cent of the German population are living in shrinking states. But on the basis of the counties 37 per cent of the population reside in declining areas,

Table 1 share of population in spatial units with growth and decline by spatial level Population Population Population Population in units in units in units in units with with with with natural migration growth decline decrease gain Spatial level (in 2005) (in 2005) (1997–2005) (1997–2005) Municipalities 58.0 42.0 67.1 67.0 Counties 63.3 36.7 69.5 73.4 Regions 61.1 38.9 74.2 79.0 Federal States 80.7 19.3 87.2 82.3

Source: Bucher and Schlömer (2007). demographic challenges in germany 401 and on the basis of the yet smaller municipalities it is even 42 per cent. A reversal trend characterizes proportions in growing areas. These opposite developments of growth and decline, which will be relevant also for the near future, are connected with very different consequences for housing markets, local or regional consumer services, planning for infrastructure, etc. In this chapter the different demographic processes, which are responsible for such spatial disparities, will be presented and discussed in more detail. These are not only processes of internal and international migration, but also natural change matters. In spite of the long-standing national trend of birth deficits, one-third of the population lives in municipalities with surplus of births (cf. Table 1).

2. regional Developments of Fertility and Mortality

In East Germany the years after the ‘political turn’ of 1989 were characterized by a heavy birth decline. While in the 1980s, the total fertility rate (TFR) was clearly higher than in the West, the rate fell to well below 1.0 children per woman in the first half of the 1990s and then slowly increased to the slightly fluctuating level of West Germany. In 2007, both parts of the united country had the same rate of 1.37. Despite these convergences there are still important differences in fertility behaviour between East and West, with a lower average age at maternity and a much higher proportion of births outside marriage in the new Länder (cf. Dorbritz 2003; Cassens, Luy and Scholz 2009). This East-West difference can still be seen in the mid-2000s. For the old states, fertility varies between low rates in many core cities and high rates in suburban areas. A typology of the counties according to their settlement structure, developed by the Federal Institute for Building and Spatial Planning (BBR 2008), can be used to better describe these differences, types that can be assigned to three large-scale types of regions. The first four types belong to ‘agglomerations’, with county Type 1 denoting big core cities and the other ones being suburban ringlike areas with decreasing densities towards the outermost ring. Second, intermediate core cities (Type 5) and two suburban rings belong to ‘urbanized regions’, whereas the third category of ‘rural regions’ consists of counties with higher (Type 8) and lower population density (Type 9). The values in Table 2 show that the average fertility rates by county type differ from rather low values in core cities – particularly in the medium-sized cities, 402 franz-josef kemper many of them dominated by universities and a high proportion of students – to the highest values in suburban counties. Contrary to former decades, rural regions are no longer characterized by high fertility, but show average rates. A descriptive measure for the homogeneity of the types is eta-squared known from the analysis of variance, with values between 0 (when the classification cannot contribute to any reduction in the variance of the rates) and a maximum of 1 (with a total reduction of variance). In this case (Table 2) eta-squared is 0.105, indicating a fair amount of variance reduction and of separation between the types of settlement structure. Nevertheless, East-West differences in fertility were still more important with an eta-squared value of 0.174. Sometimes it is argued that North-South variations between more prosperous regions in southern Germany and northern regions lagging behind – variations which were much discussed in former West Germany during the 1970s and 1980s (Friedrichs, Häußermann and Siebel 1986) – have now returned and are supplemented by a similar differentiation in the new Länder. Therefore, a variable with a North-South separation of the states is included.2 As can be seen in Table 2, however, this classification variable has no effect for the fertility rates. Since the late 1970s, the second component of natural change, mortality, was characterized by expanding East-West differences, leading to wide disparities with higher mortality in the East until unification. The indicator of life expectancy at birth (i.e., ‘e0’) shows minor improvements for both sexes in East Germany and convergent trends since unification, more so for the female than for the male population (Maier and Scholz 2004). Still, the present spatial pattern of life expectancy in Germany reveals East-West differences, particularly for men. High values can be found in southern Germany (Bade-Wurtemberg, southern Bavaria) and in other prosperous areas of the old states. These observations are confirmed by the eta-squared values in Table 2. Most important are East-West disparities followed by the categories of settlement structure with contrasting values of favourable mortality conditions in the suburban rings of the agglomerations and less favourable conditions in rural regions. North-South disparities fall behind, but

2 The states of Bavaria, Bade-Wurtemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Hesse, Saxony, and Thuringia have been assigned toS outh Germany, all other states to North Germany. demographic challenges in germany 403

Table 2 Means for variables of natural change on the basis of counties by spatial categories e0 female e0 male Spatial category TFR (2003–2005) (2005) (2005) East Germany 1.28 80.8 74.6 West Germany 1.40 81.4 76.3 Eta-squared 0.174 0.066 0.292 North Germany 1.37 80.9 75.4 South Germany 1.36 81.4 76.2 Eta-squared 0.003 0.059 0.089 Type of settlement structure: 1 Big core cities 1.33 81.2 76.0 2 suburban, dense 1.38 81.7 77.0 3 suburban, lower density 1.39 81.4 76.4 4 suburban, rural 1.37 81.4 75.8 5 Medium core cities 1.25 81.4 75.9 6 suburban, dense 1.38 81.4 76.1 7 suburban, rural 1.41 81.3 75.6 8 rural, higher density 1.35 80.9 75.5 9 rural, peripheral 1.37 80.6 74.6 Eta-squared 0.105 0.108 0.184

Source: Own calculations based on BBR (2008). are still relevant. For female life expectancy the pattern changes, since the values are much more spatially homogeneous and settlement structure is now the most important predictor. Altogether, these results on indicators of natural change show that until recently East-West differences have characterized the spatial patterns, but have converged in recent years. Nevertheless, these differences will have considerable demographic consequences for the future as, for example, major birth deficits in the new Länder affect the age structure and the size of cohorts.

3. regional Developments of Migration

3.1 International and Internal Migration For most spatial units, migration processes are more important concerning their population developments than processes of natural 404 franz-josef kemper change. Therefore, in this chapter a special focus must be given to migration. A first differentiation is between international and internal migration. TheF ederal Republic of Germany has been a de facto country of immigration for decades. Several waves of in-migration can be distinguished. In the first wave of the 1960s and early 1970s, so-called ‘guest workers’ were the dominant group. While many of these first guest workers returned to their home countries, the years around 1980 saw a second wave characterized particularly by family migrants. Heavy inflows of migrants made up a third wave during the years of the political upheaval in Eastern Europe and of unification, when ethnic Germans, refugees and asylum-seekers flocked toG ermany. During that time, Germany was one of the most important countries of in- migration in the world, with a peak inflow in 1992, when a net migration balance of nearly 800,000 people was registered. In recent years the inflows have decreased considerably and since 2003 net migration has fallen to a level of under 100,000 per year. The spatial distribution of recent immigrants withinG ermany shows a rather homogeneous structure. The mean values in Table 3 show similar migration rates both in East and West Germany, in northern as well as in southern counties.3 Moreover, agglomerations as well as rural areas register moderate inflows of migrants from abroad, with the big cities being a special attraction. The inferior degree of spatial concentration is confirmed by the very low values of eta-squared. An important determinant for this is a deliberate policy of equal burden sharing for ethnic Germans and asylum-applicants, who are distributed according to quotas to the different states and their regions. By contrast, internal migration is characterized by considerable spatial differences. In Figure 2, which shows net internal migration rates of the counties, the East-West divide with out-migration from the new Länder comes to the fore. Exceptions are suburban areas around Berlin and – a new phenomenon of recent years – core cities, particularly in Saxony and Thuringia. Similarly, big West German cities register relatively high migration gains (e.g., Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Frankfurt, Nuremberg and Munich), and the same is valid for suburban

3 In this table and the next the county of Göttingen had to be excluded because of extreme values. Within the county the reception centre of Friedland for ethnic Germans has high numbers of in-migrants from abroad and also high numbers of out- migrants to other parts of Germany. demographic challenges in germany 405

Table 3 Means for migration variables on the basis of counties by spatial categories International net Internal net migration migration (per 1,000 (per 1,000 inhabitants; Spatial category inhabitants; in 2005) in 2005) East Germany 0.298 −5.055 West Germany 0.231 0.935 Eta-squared 0.000 0.233 North Germany 0.504 −1.346 South Germany 0.073 −0.107 Eta-squared 0.022 0.013 Type of settlement structure: 1 Big core cities 0.888 1.281 2 Suburban, dense −0.030 0.595 3 Suburban, lower density −0.038 0.195 4 Suburban, rural 0.222 0.904 5 Medium core cities 0.628 2.352 6 Suburban, dense −0.160 −1.167 7 Suburban, rural 0.344 −2.606 8 Rural, higher density 0.478 −0.281 9 Rural, peripheral 0.302 −3.405 Eta-squared 0.052 0.092

Note: Without county of Göttingen. Source: Own calculations based on BBR (2008). counties in agglomerations (e.g., Hamburg, Rhine-Main around Frankfurt, Rhine-Neckar, Stuttgart, Munich). Rural regions, however, show different developments: while regions with picturesque landscapes and tourist attractions such as pre-alpine areas or counties by the sea attract migrants, peripheral rural regions like the Bavarian Forest record net out-migration. The mean rates inT able 3 confirm the urban-rural gradient in internal migration rates, with the highest gains in the core cities, as well as the predominant effect of the East-West divide. In comparison, North-South differences are less significant. Out-migration from the new Länder mirrors the disparities in the labour markets, because unemployment in East Germany is still much higher than in West Germany, where North-South differences in unemployment are important. Since the ‘political turn’, i.e. for nearly 406 franz-josef kemper

20 years, economic disparities between East and West have persisted and, by consequence, have effected migration from East to West Germany, despite some fluctuations due to business cycles and differences in unemployment rates. Particularly important is that these flows are selective with regard to age, sex and education, and therefore have a strong influence on the population size as well as the population structure in the areas of origin and destination (Kemper 2004; Schlömer 2009). Out-migrants from the East are concentrated in age groups between 18 and 30 years, with a bias towards young women and persons with relatively high qualifications. Many regions in the new Länder are affected by this migrant selectivity and, in particular, by the out-migration of potential mothers (Mai and Scharein 2009), which has led to sharply rising birth deficits due to fertility decline. It can be expected that a proportion of the young out-migrants will return to East Germany at some point, but the number of return migrants has always been small compared to the number of out-migrants.

3.2 Internal Migration by Age Groups Selectivity by age is one of the most relevant characteristics of migration processes and has different effects on the regional redistribution of the population. A typology of age groups has been developed by the Federal Institute for Building and Spatial Planning (BBR), with age groups being relatively homogeneous across the main motivations of migration, showing that the most mobile groups are the 18–24 and 25–29 year olds. These groups encompass ‘education-oriented migrants’, who select places for higher education, and ‘job-oriented migrants’, who react more sensitively to regional differences in job availability. The third group, that of ‘family migrants’, combines persons aged 30–49 years and the population under age 18, and they have different preferences for housing and neighbourhoods than the often smaller households of the first two groups. The fourth group, ‘elderly migrants’ aged 50–64 years, and the fifth group, ‘retirement migrants’ aged 65 years and over, are mostly not dependent on jobs and the economic prosperity of a region and mobility rates in these age groups are rather low. Figure 3, which shows net migration of ‘education-oriented migrants’ reveals not only that cities and agglomerations are very much preferred both in East and West Germany, but also that a large proportion of migrants leaves the new Länder. And the eta-squared values in Table 4 reveal that the relationships between net migration rates and demographic challenges in germany 407 settlement structure were very strong in 2005, followed by the effect of East-West disparities. North-South differences show the expected direction with more negative rates in northern counties, yet the relationship is rather weak. For ‘job-oriented migrants’ in the age group 25–29, the East-West variable is most significant, whereas the effects of settlement structure are less marked. Like the age group 18–24, core cities are preferred, whereas suburban and rural areas have migration losses on average. However, the big cities with a great variety of jobs dominate, while medium-sized cities and towns fall back because many of them have specialized labour markets (e.g., as university towns). Figure 4 shows that, apart from big core cities (like Berlin, Hamburg,

Table 4 Means for age-specific migration variables on the basis of counties by spatial categories Internal net migration by age group (per 1,000) in 2005

Spatial category 18–24 25–29 30–49 50–64 65+ East Germany −35.77 −24.04 −2.18 0.44 0.59 West Germany −3.10 −3.45 1.41 1.38 0.92 Eta-squared 0.143 0.198 0.083 0.015 0.002 North Germany −17.49 −11.31 0.25 1.252 0.793 South Germany −7.44 −7.02 0.64 1.055 0.858 Eta-squared 0.017 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.000 Type of settlement structure: 1 Big core cities 31.48 11.15 −3.21 −1.77 −2.88 2 Suburban, dense −11.39 −3.96 3.11 −0.42 1.02 3 Suburban, lower density −20.86 −7.00 3.28 0.95 2.26 4 Suburban, rural −32.67 −9.49 5.78 3.67 3.71 5 Medium core cities 49.08 1.40 −5.53 −0.82 −1.75 6 Suburban, dense −17.32 −11.51 0.82 1.07 0.81 7 Suburban, rural −31.83 −16.30 0.55 1.84 1.31 8 Rural, higher density −9.93 −11.59 0.60 2.58 1.55 9 Rural, peripheral −34.18 −20.11 −0.82 2.81 1.55 Eta-squared 0.409 0.177 0.229 0.213 0.239

Note: Without county of Göttingen. Source: Own calculations based on BBR (2008). 408 franz-josef kemper

Stuttgart and Munich), suburban areas in large metropolitan regions are attractive for job-oriented migrants. In the other age groups, migration intensities are much lower in comparison with the two most mobile groups and, as Table 4 shows, migration directions are clearly changing with regard to settlement structure. Family migrants leave core cities and move in particular to suburbia. As for elderly migrants, negative rates characterize not only cities but also relatively densely built-up suburban rings, whereas rural regions are preferred, as can be seen in Figure 5 showing migration gains in many peripheral rural areas near the seaside and mountainous areas in southern Germany. For retired migrants aged 65 years and over the results are similar.

3.3 Reurbanization as a New Trend of Migration? The migration data, which have been presented in the preceding paragraphs, characterize the situation in the first decade of the 21st century. It is well known that international as well as internal migrations often show considerable temporal fluctuations. By contrast, population projections normally assume long-term constancy of migration rates. Migration rates by certain age groups have indeed shown stability for some decades, particularly in relation to the categories of settlement structure. Young migrants aged 18–24 have always preferred cities and towns, whereas elderly and retired migrants left the cities in favour of suburban areas with low population density and attractive rural settings. However, considerable variations can be observed for the job- oriented migrants: Nowadays core cities are preferred in particular, whereas in the 1990s a trend of suburbanization or intraregional deconcentration was dominant, and in the first half of the 1980s in the old Länder intraregional as well as interregional deconcentration was typical (Gans and Kemper 2002). Therefore, for this age group, there is a transition from counterurbanization in the 1980s to urbanization in the 2000s, a transition that is also relevant if total internal migrations are considered. In Germany, as in other industrialized countries, there are nowadays many discussions about whether the current trend of ‘reurbanization’ as it is called will continue or whether it is a short-term deviation from intraregional and interregional deconcentration (cf. Köppen, Mai and Schlömer 2007; Hesse 2008; Kemper 2008). Theoretical approaches suggest that reurbanization is a consequence of general social and demographic challenges in germany 409 economic developments in Western societies. In a first argumentation, reurbanization is interpreted as a consequence of demographic change, particularly changes in household and family structures (Buzar et al. 2007). Traditional nuclear family households, which have been an important pillar of suburbanization, are declining in favour of non- traditional forms like singles, cohabitating couples or single parents, which are particularly found in cities and densely built-up neighbourhoods. A second theoretical approach draws on economic changes and new agglomeration economies in the growing knowledge-based economic sectors (Häußermann, Läpple and Siebel 2008). Due to factors such as long and variable working hours, new space-time configura- tions for the organization of work and life are developing, so that the ‘creative class’ is overrepresented in cities and urban areas. Yet, as could be seen above, reurbanization runs parallel to suburbanization, which is still dominant for groups such as family migrants. More importantly, there are many uncertainties surrounding the future of both internal and international migrations. Due to the selectivity of migration, these uncertainties also refer to the future demographic structure of different regions, for which regionalized population projections often predict developments which are then taken as defini- tive. Regional redistributions due to migration seem to be particularly relevant in periods of demographic stagnation or decline, when municipalities and regions compete for every inhabitant.

4. demographic Consequences of Population Processes

Future demographic developments, and particularly those in the regions, are difficult to predict due to too many uncertainties, yet current demographic trends do provide a guide for the future. In Germany demographic change is usually characterized by three trends: the population becomes ‘fewer’, ‘greyer’, and ‘more diverse’. The last part of this chapter will deal with the first two of these trends from a regional perspective.

4.1 Growing and Declining Regions As we have seen, an overall decline in national population can go hand in hand with regional population growth as well as decline. With an increase of only 0.13 per cent between 1995 and 2005, national population development was almost static, but there were considerable 410 franz-josef kemper regional deviations from this general trend (cf. Figure 1 in the Appendix). Particularly inhomogeneous were the new Länder, where suburban counties around Berlin and other cities like Rostock and Leipzig registered population gains of more than 10 per cent, whereas medium-sized cities with mono-functional economic structures, particularly in manufacturing, lost more than 10 per cent. An extreme case is the New Town of Hoyerswerda with 29 per cent population decrease. These eastern towns and cities suffered from birth deficits and out-migration to West Germany as well as to suburban areas. As a consequence of the population decline, vacancy rates in the housing stock strongly increased, and big housing corporations run by local authorities in the East put the government under political pressure to relieve this situation: a programme called “Stadtumbau Ost” [Urban Restructuring in the East] was implemented in 2000 by the Federal government together with the affectedLänder (Göschel 2003). This programme gives financial subsidies for the demolition of vacant buildings as well as for the improvement of remaining houses and neighbourhoods. Some years later, a similar programme called “Stadt umbau West” was created for declining cities in the old Länder. Altogether it is characteristic that the first regionalized programmes for shrinking regions after unification concentrate on towns and cities, because these spatial units suffered particularly from population decline in the late 1990s. Yet in recent years the situation has changed towards reurbanization, meaning that increasingly rural regions are the ‘losers’ of population redistribution. The situation is particularly difficult in peripheral rural areas with low population densities, areas in which the provision of community services, medical care, public transport, schools, etc. is threatened (cf. also Beetz in this volume). For a more detailed investigation into the determinants of recent population change, multiple regression analysis was employed. As the dependent variable, ‘population development of the counties in 2005’ was chosen. In contrast to longer-term developments this variable is characteristic of the new trends, including reurbanization. The first and most important group of independent variables consists of indicators for the economic situation and the labour market. Whereas the rate of unemployment and wages are general and often- used predictors for the attractiveness of a region for migrants, the sector change from manufacturing industries to a post-industrial economy is characterized by the proportion of jobs in manufacturing industries demographic challenges in germany 411 and in business services, as well as the percentage of employees with high qualifications chosen as an indicator of the ‘creative class’. The second group of predictors describes the social situation of the population, with the indicators of population receiving social assistance and without secondary school qualifications.A merican studies of reurbanization have shown that population development in ‘distressed’ cities with many social problems was clearly negative (Furdell, Wolman and Hill 2005). The third group, indicators of density, were selected to characterize the urban-rural continuum. The first of these density indicators is ‘woodland density’, expressed as area of woodland per inhabitant, which is highly correlated with population density. This indicator was chosen over population density because it can additionally differentiate between areas with low density that are attractive because of their woodlands and other low-density areas. The second indicator in this third group is ‘car usage’, measured by the number of cars per 100 inhabitants. In studies of US cities this variable of urban sprawl was positively correlated with population growth. The third and final indicator is ‘tourist intensity’, defined by the number of tourist nights per inhabitant, which is interpreted as an indicator of attractiveness for urban as well as for rural regions. Results of the multiple regression are shown in Table 5. As can be seen from the beta values, the most important predictor by far is the rate of unemployment, which characterizes the East-West differences. Other significant economic predictors are manufacturing industries with a negative effect on population development and the indicator for the ‘creative class’ with a positive effect. Wages and business services, on the other hand, are not significant. The two indicators of social problems show effects near zero. Obviously, unemployment is the most important indicator of ‘social stress’ and it is sufficient to describe the social situation of a spatial unit. However, the density indicators and tourist intensity all have significant values. Both ‘woodland density’ and ‘car usage’ show negative values, and therefore counties with few woodlands and low car usage, or otherwise good public transport, in densely built-up cities and towns have population growth. Altogether, the results confirm that, apart from the economic situation, settlement structure is an important indicator of current regional population development and that the recent trend of reurbanization characterizes regional differences. 412 franz-josef kemper

Table 5 regression model for population development of counties in 2005 Predictor Beta t Sig. Rate of unemployment −0.770 −12.258 0.000 Average wages 0.059 0.984 0.326 Jobs in manufacturing industries (%) −0.128 −4.057 0.000 Jobs in business services (%) −0.024 −0.524 0.601 Employees with high qualifications (%) 0.145 3.197 0.001 Population without secondary 0.008 0.216 0.829 school qualifications (%) Population receiving social assistance (%) −0.030 −0.584 0.560 Woodlands per population −0.330 −6.350 0.000 Motorcars per population −0.169 −3.904 0.000 Tourist nights per population 0.177 5.294 0.000

Note: R2 corr.: 0.595. Source: Own calculations based on BBR (2008).

4.2 Population Ageing In contrast to recent population developments with wide regional variations of growing and shrinking populations, ageing is a component of current and future demographic change relevant for all regions in Germany. However, regions differ in the degree of ageing, which depends on natural change, selective migration processes and initial age structures. Figure 6 shows the percentages of the population aged 65 years and over by counties. High proportions of elderly population can be seen particularly in the southern parts of the new Länder, where fertility was relatively low before unification. Nevertheless, the pre- unification population of East Germany was younger on average than the population of West Germany. This situation has reversed in the last two decades. Selective out-migration of young people, low fertility and increased life expectancy in the new Länder have led to this rapid increase in ageing (Mai 2003). Within West Germany there is a juxta- position of areas with high ageing as a result of retirement migration (e.g., counties by the seaside, in southern Bavaria, in low mountain ranges; cf. Friedrich 2008) and of out-migration of younger adults (i.e., Saarland, Ruhr area). The data in Table 6 confirm the significance of East-West differences by a relatively high value of eta-squared. Compared with this, the variations by settlement structure are low. demographic challenges in germany 413

Table 6 Means for indicators of ageing on the basis of counties by spatial categories Population Population 60+ 2020 Spatial category 65+ 2005 (%) (%, projection) East Germany 21.2 35.5 West Germany 19.3 28.7 Eta-squared 0.159 0.586 North Germany 20.0 31.1 South Germany 19.6 30.0 Eta-squared 0.005 0.021 Type of settlement structure: 1 Big core cities 19.6 28.2 2 Suburban, dense 19.4 29.3 3 Suburban, lower density 19.7 30.6 4 Suburban, rural 19.0 30.6 5 Medium core cities 19.8 30.2 6 Suburban, dense 19.8 30.2 7 Suburban, rural 19.7 31.0 8 Rural, higher density 20.3 30.7 9 Rural, peripheral 19.8 32.8 Eta-squared 0.020 0.082

Source: Own calculations based on BBR (2008).

Ageing is characteristic of core cities as well as suburban areas, for agglomerations as well as for rural regions. According to the regionalized population projection of the BBR, ageing will progress considerably in the next decades. A slightly different indicator, the percentage of the population aged 60 years and over, describes the regional differences in 2020. It is particularly interesting that the regional disparities in ageing will be higher than today. As can be seen from the percentages and the increasing eta-squared values, the difference between East and West Germany will increase substantially. With regard to the categories of settlement structure, the highest degrees of ageing will change to low-density suburban areas and to rural peripheral areas. This process has already begun, as can be seen from the relative development of the elderly population in recent years. Therefore, provision and care for the elderly will be needed particularly in low-density areas. If these age groups become less mobile 414 franz-josef kemper during their life course, more mobile services for medical care, retail and consumer services will be necessary.

5. conclusion

Demographic developments in Germany are characterized by substantial spatial differences. During recent years as well as in the near future, regions of population decline coexist with regions of population growth; shrinking cities with growing cities; areas of rapid ageing with areas of slower ageing. Therefore, in many cases, the challenges for public and private actors vary according to the spatial unit in question. For example, housing policies in shrinking areas have to cope with vacancies, restructuring and demolition, whereas in areas of growing population and household numbers the problems are housing shortages, high rents and replacement processes of low- income households. Regional labour markets may develop in different directions due to selective out- and in-migration, causing a shortage of highly qualified labour in some agglomerations of East Germany as well as increasing regional disparities in socio-economic structures in the near future. To cope with these disparities, new regional policies have to be developed. Some regionalized programmes like “Urban Restructuring in the East” with a focus on shrinking cities have already been established. In Germany there is now much discussion on such new regional policies and new role models for regional developments as a consequence of demographic change. The main problem now is how to combine economic efficiency with social justice and ecological sustainability from a regional perspective – a question that is beyond the scope of this study. demographic challenges in germany 415

Appendix

Source: BBR (2008). Figure 1 population development, 1995–2005 416 franz-josef kemper

Source: BBR (2008). Figure 2 net internal migration rate, 2005 demographic challenges in germany 417

Source: BBR (2008). Figure 3 education-oriented migrants, 2005 418 franz-josef kemper

Source: BBR (2008). Figure 4 Job-oriented migrants, 2005 demographic challenges in germany 419

Source: BBR (2008). Figure 5 Migration of the young elderly, 2005 420 franz-josef kemper

Source: BBR (2008). Figure 6 population aged 65 years and over, 2005 Recent In-Migration to Peripheral Regions of Japan in the Context of Incipient National Population Decline

Yoshitaka Ishikawa

1. Introduction

Just as Japan entered the 21st century, it saw a peak and then a decline in its total population. From this period onward, significant concerns began to be raised about the problem of population decline, a problem that has become a key word in countless books and media articles. Japan’s total population peaked at 127.779 million in 2004, and then, in 2005, declined by 19,000 (cf. Figure 1). From 2006 to 2007, it increased only slightly and recorded yet another decline in 2008. It is expected that from now on, over the long term, the population decline will gradually accelerate year by year (Kaneko et al. 2008b).

Source: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jinsui/2008np/index.htm (last accessed 19 January 2010). Figure 1 Population changes in Japan, 2002–2008 422 yoshitaka ishikawa

Current publications covering this population decrease feature many varying points of view. However, many of these publications do not always take into account that there are clear regional differences. This chapter examines the differences from the viewpoint of population migration, paying special attention to the peripheral regions of Japan where the problem of population decline is more severe.1 Discussed in turn will be the importance of a regional perspective, the role of migration, and two case studies of population flows to peripheral regions: the inflow of middle-aged persons upon retirement and the inflow of foreign women marrying Japanese men.

2. the Importance of a Regional Perspective

In order to indicate the validity of a regional perspective on population decline, Table 1 shows the rate of population changes by prefecture from October 1, 2007, to October 1, 2008, the most recent period for which data is available. This shows that there were only seven prefectures with population increases: the prefectures of Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, as well as the prefectures of Aichi, Shiga, and Okinawa in the rest of Japan. From a total of 47 prefectures, 40 recorded a decrease, a fact that makes one realize that Japan has indeed entered an era of population decline. Even so, there are significant differences in the extent of decline among these 40 prefectures: in Shizuoka, Mie, and Fukuoka the rate of decline held to a small level of less than 1 per thousand; at the other end of the scale, there were prefectures such as Aomori, Akita, and Kōchi in which the annual decrease was more than 10 per thousand. Overall, the farther a prefecture is from the three largest metropolitan areas, the greater the extent of their population decline. Decline is not occurring uniformly across the country and is accompanied by large differences among prefectures. Unless one is aware of this situation, measures devised to solve various problems connected with population decline are likely to end in failure. As the demographic equation shows, population changes over a fixed time period can be decomposed into two factors. One factor is

1 The author would like to thank the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for its financial support by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) (grant number: 21242032). domestic migration and population decline 423

Table 1 Population change rates by prefecture (‰), 2007–2008.

Population Natural Net Change Increase Migration Japan −0.6 −0.3 −0.3 Hokkaidō −6.3 −2.1 −4.2 Aomori −10.7 −3.5 −7.2 Iwate −8.9 −3.4 −5.5 Miyagi −3.1 −0.3 −2.8 Akita −11.4 −5.4 −6.0 Yamagata −8.5 −3.7 −4.8 Fukushima −6.8 −2.1 −4.7 Ibaraki −1.6 −0.7 −0.9 Tochigi −1.2 −0.4 −0.9 Gunma −1.9 −0.7 −1.3 Saitama 3.1 1.4 1.7 Chiba 3.9 0.9 3.0 Tokyo 6.3 0.7 5.6 Kanagawa 4.2 1.9 2.3 Niigata −5.7 −2.7 −3.0 Toyama −3.9 −2.4 −1.6 Ishikawa −1.8 −0.5 −1.3 Fukui −4.4 −1.2 −3.2 Yamanashi −7.0 −1.9 −5.1 Nagano −4.5 −1.8 −2.7 Gifu −1.7 −0.5 −1.2 Shizuoka −0.2 −0.2 −0.0 Aichi 5.9 2.3 3.6 Mie −0.3 −0.9 0.6 Shiga 4.3 2.0 2.3 Kyoto −2.5 −0.5 −2.0 Osaka −0.6 0.5 −1.2 Hyōgo −0.5 −0.0 −0.4 Nara −4.5 −1.0 −3.5 Wakayama −7.7 −3.6 −4.1 Tottori −7.8 −3.0 −4.8 Shimane −8.4 −4.4 −4.0 Okayama −2.2 −1.0 −1.3 Hiroshima −1.6 −0.6 −1.0 Yamaguchi −7.1 −3.6 −3.5 Tokushima −7.2 −3.6 −3.7

(Continued) 424 yoshitaka ishikawa

Table 1 Population change rates by prefecture (‰), 2007–2008 (Contd.)

Population Natural Net Change Increase Migration Kagawa −3.2 −1.9 −1.3 Ehime −5.5 −2.9 −2.7 Kōchi −10.4 −4.6 −5.8 Fukuoka −0.3 0.4 −0.7 Saga −4.0 −1.4 −2.6 Nagasaki −9.1 −2.4 −6.7 Kumamoto −3.8 −1.3 −2.5 Ōita −2.4 −1.9 −0.5 Miyazaki −5.7 −1.2 −4.4 Kagoshima −7.6 −2.6 −5.0 Okinawa 2.1 5.3 −3.3

Source: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001054002 (last accessed 19 January 2010).

natural increase: the number of deaths subtracted from the number of births. The other factor is net migration (or net inflow): the number of persons migrating out of a place subtracted from the number of persons migrating into it. Table 1 shows results in terms of these two factors. The spatial patterns of the natural increase and the net migration are similar and, thus, show a high correlation. However, looking closely at the data reveals that, for most of the 47 prefectures, the net migration rate is larger than the natural rate. This means that changes in population are largely determined by migration, a factor that calls for particular attention. For the purposes of this study, I would like to distinguish between a core – that is, the three largest metropolitan areas consisting of 11 prefectures – and a periphery made up of the remaining 36 pre fectures (cf. Figure 2). While the former consists of the Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka Metropolitan Areas, the latter consists of peripheral regions such as Hokkaidō, Tōhoku, Chūgoku, Shikoku, and Kyūshū. The distinction between the three large metropolitan areas and the peripheral regions is a dichotomy often used in Japan regarding the national territory. In Japan as a whole, population decrease has just begun, but in peripheral regions the population has already been declining for many domestic migration and population decline 425

Source: Drawn by the author. Figure 2 location of the prefectures, the regions, and the three largest metropolitan areas years. It is forecast that even prefectures that belong to the three largest metropolitan areas – prefectures that have seen population increases – will experience decreases due to population ageing in the future, following a path similar to that of the peripheral regions. At the current stage, population decline is indeed serious in prefectures located in 426 yoshitaka ishikawa peripheral regions, and it is severe in farming and mountainous areas, which include numerous marginal settlements (genkai shūraku) where more than half of the residents consist of elderly people 65 years of age or older and the community is near to extinction (e.g., Sakuno 2006; Matsutani 2009).

3. the Role of Migration

3.1 Recent Trend Figure 3 is based on the Annual Report on the Internal Migration in Japan Derived from the Basic Resident Registers, a leading source of population migration data in Japan, which is published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC). It summarizes net inflow into the three largest metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya with respect to internal migration in postwar Japan. Until the 1960s, the three largest metropolitan areas registered overwhelming net inflows.A fter the migration turnaround in the 1970s, however, net inflows decreased dramatically.S ince then, the level of net inflows into the Osaka and Nagoya areas has stayed at a low level. In contrast, only the Tokyo area, with troughs in 1976 and 1994 and peaks in 1987 and 2007, has shown repeated increases and decreases. In 2007/08, only the seven prefectures of Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Mie, and Shiga recorded net inflows (cf. Table 1 above), whereas all other prefectures recorded net outflows. Particularly noticeable population decline occurred in the regions of Hokkaidō, Tōhoku, Chūgoku, Shikoku, and Kyūshū. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, population and high-order urban functions have concentrated in the Tokyo area, giving rise to the expression ‘mono-polar concentration in Tokyo’ (Tōkyō ikkyoku shūchū), an expression that is frequently used to describe this situation.2 The main reason for the population decline in peripheral regions is the outflow of young people to the three largest metropolitan areas, and particularly to the Tokyo area. Investigating these movements more closely by gender reveals some interesting phenomena: (1) these flows from peripheral regions to the three largest metropolitan areas are composed predominantly of males; (2) the trend among females

2 In comparison, the decentralized regional structure of Germany has often been discussed favourably (Morikawa 2008: 144). domestic migration and population decline 427

Source: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001054292 (last accessed 19 January 2010).

Figure 3 net migration of the three largest metropolitan areas who move away from their parents’ home is to migrate to a larger city within the same prefecture, particularly to prefectural capital cities; whereas (3) the proportion of females who move to another prefecture is small. This matter has been discussed in detail by the Canadian geographer Liaw (2003). However, whereas gender imbalance in migration is barely visible in Canada, Liaw devoted his attention to such imbalance as a tendency peculiar to Japan, pointing out that this imbalance in migration has given rise to a complicated spatial imbalance of gender in origin and destination areas.

3.2 Impact of Gender Differences in Migration The spatial imbalance of the sex ratio has become a powerful background influence on regional differences in marriage. Specifically, the following tendencies at the two different spatial scales can be pointed to: (1) At the prefectural level, the sex ratio is high in prefectures in eastern Japan, generating a serious marriage squeeze for the male population; whereas in prefectures in western Japan, the sex ratio is low and the marriage squeeze is not as severe. (2) At the municipality level within prefectures, the sex ratio is high in farming and mountainous areas, so that young men there have difficulty getting married; 428 yoshitaka ishikawa whereas in more urbanized areas, including the prefectural capitals, the sex ratio is low so that young men have less difficulty getting married (Ishikawa 2003, 2007b). The total population decline of Japan is due to a significant drop in the birth rate to below the replacement level, a phenomenon that started in the mid-1970s and which, due to gender differences in spatial patterns of migration, has led to area-specific imbalances in sex ratios and thus to marriage squeezes in contemporary Japan, leading to an overall lower rate of married people (or more single persons) and ultimately fewer children being born. Figure 4 shows the sex ratio for persons 25 to 39 years old by municipality. Note that the sex ratio is usually expressed in terms of the male population to the female population. A value of 100 denotes a situation in which the number of males and females is equal. A value of more than 100 denotes more males than females, suggesting a marriage squeeze for males. A value of less than 100 denotes the opposite. Regarding the spatial scale, it has also to be noted that data for unmarried persons only are unavailable. The figure therefore also includes married persons, displaying the totals of all marital categories (i.e., never married, married, divorced, and widowed), which makes the

Source: MIAC, 2000 Population Census of Japan. Figure 4 sex ratio of age cohort 25–39 by municipality, 2000 domestic migration and population decline 429 values of all municipalities approach 100. Even so, Figure 4 shows that, at the macro level, the marriage squeeze is high in eastern Japan and low in western Japan; whereas, at the micro level, it is high in farming and mountainous areas and low in the major cities. Although the gender difference in migration has given rise to a complicated spatial imbalance of sex ratios in origin and destination areas, it seems difficult to satisfactorily explain why there are sex ratio and marriage squeeze differences between eastern and western Japan. Possible reasons for the imbalance in eastern Japan are as follows. In the Tōhoku region, in particular, the norm of stem families is strong, and thus, it can be expected that the rate at which the oldest son stays at home to take care of the family is relatively high. Moreover, Tokyo is of huge significance in terms of population scale and employment opportunities, the latter being a reason why huge numbers of single males migrate to the Tokyo area. As noted above, the current Japanese population decline mainly affects peripheral regions, where the situation is aggravated by the outflow of young people to the three largest metropolitan areas, particularly the Tokyo area. However, it is not the case that there are only population movements from the peripheral regions to the three largest metropolitan areas. Japan has also seen various migrations from metropolitan areas back to peripheral regions, population flows that are of great interest since Japan entered the era of population decline, and particularly since the population decline has become more severe in recent years. Peripheral regions have seen some population inflow – specifically of middle-aged people (including baby boomers) and non- Japanese women marrying Japanese men. The question is whether these recent trends can save these peripheral regions that have been suffering from various problems related to population decline.

4. the Inflows of Middle-aged Persons

4.1 Recent Trends In Japan, in the second half of the 1940s, millions of babies were born to become the so-called baby boomers. In the 1950s, however, the number of births suddenly slowed down, so that the cohort size of the baby boomers is considerably larger than that of all later generations. The baby boomers played a vital role in driving the high growth of the economy in postwar Japan. Today the cohort is around sixty years old 430 yoshitaka ishikawa and about to retire. According to mass media reports3 and academic research (e.g., Kamo 1999; Tahara, Nagata and Arai 2000; Tanigawa 2004; Takeshita 2006), many middle-aged persons (including the baby boomers) have already migrated from the three large metropolitan areas to peripheral regions, a number that today continues to increase. In addition to the number of persons who, upon retirement, have taken the opportunity to make a ‘U-turn’ back to their hometowns in peripheral regions, there are also an increasing number of people who make what is called an ‘I-turn’ in Japan, to peripheral regions blessed with a superior natural environment, regions other than their original hometowns. The May 2005 issue of the magazine Nōrin Tōkei Chōsa [Monthly bulletin of agricultural statistics and research] ran a special issue on the topic of ‘Problems in agriculture in 2010,’ featuring the baby boomers and their strong interest in agriculture. Although key words such as ‘return to agriculture after retirement’ (teinengo nōgyō kaiki) and ‘living in the country’ (inaka gurashi) often appear in this context (e.g., Iizaka 2009), concrete data indicating the total number of retired baby boomers who become agricultural workers in peripheral regions is difficult to find. Therefore, Table 2 from Imai’s (2005) article, which appeared in the special issue cited above, will be reproduced here to indicate how strongly persons nearing retirement age desire to work in agriculture. According to this table, which gives data until 2002 – that is, before Japan’s total population began to decline – some 78,000 persons changed jobs to work in agriculture, or retired and went to work in agriculture in 2002. Most were 40 years of age or older, and their number had been increasing sharply since the 1990s. Also noteworthy is that, as shown in the right hand column of the table, the number of people who are not actually working in agriculture, but who have consulted about the possibility, had also been rapidly rising. Since a proportion of agricultural land and houses in peripheral regions had been abandoned due to population decline, many municipalities greatly welcomed the inflow of middle-aged people, mainly from the baby boomer generation. These new community members not only have rich life experiences, they may also help alleviate some of the problems these communities are facing due to population decline.

3 see, for example, TV Asahi Group’s programme Life Paradise (http://www .tv-asahi.co.jp/rakuen/). domestic migration and population decline 431

Table 2 new entry to agriculture (‘000s of people).

New entry to agriculture Total of Persons Total Entry of Entry to Persons new entry who school- agriculture 40 years of young consulted leavers to after change old or adults to about agriculture: of job or older out agriculture: entry to ① retirement: ② of ②: ③ ①+②−③ agriculture 1985 93.9 4.8 89.1 73.2 20.5 - 1990 15.7 1.8 13.9 11.4 4.3 0.8 1995 48.0 1.8 46.2 40.4 7.6 2.5 2000 77.1 2.1 75.0 65.5 11.6 8.9 2002 79.8 2.2 77.6 67.9 11.9 11.5

Source: Imai (2005).

Today, attracting middle-aged people through dedicated web sites4 and various events has become an important policy issue for many local municipalities in peripheral regions. The migration of baby boomers to peripheral regions is still going on, and although it is difficult to state exact figures, it is possible to give an estimate for 2010. Table 3 is based on data from the 2000 population census and a projection of the recently-retired 60–64 age cohort; and gives a summary of net migration by prefecture. A notable tendency is the net outflow from the three largest metropolitan areas and the net inflow into peripheral regions. The 36 prefectures that constitute the peripheral regions had a total net inflow of 37,000 persons. It should be noted that because in 2000 the baby boomers were ten years younger than today, they appear in the table in the 50–54 age group, which at that time was 1.35 times larger than that of the 60–64 age group. In other words, if one assumes that the baby boomers follow the same migration pattern as the 60–64 age group did in the 2000 census, then the net inflow into peripheral regions would be around 50,000 persons – a significant number.

4.2 Significances and Contributions From the many international comparisons of population migrations, including the studies conducted by Rogers and Castro (1986) and

4 see, for example, the web site of the NPO certified Hometown Return Support Center (http://www.furusatokaiki.net/). 432 yoshitaka ishikawa

Table 3 net migration of age cohort 60–64 by prefecture, 2000

In- Out- Net Prefecture migration migration migration

Hokkaidō 4,535 2,794 1,741 Aomori 1,590 1,327 263 Iwate 1,729 1,014 715 Miyagi 3,097 1,980 1,117 Akita 1,341 839 502 Yamagata 1,149 631 518 Fukushima 2,800 1,211 1,589 Ibaraki 5,233 2,794 2,439 Tochigi 2,958 1,565 1,393 Gunma 2,470 1,167 1,303 Saitama 12,147 11,837 310 Chiba 12,213 11,201 1,012 Tokyo 17,079 35,952 −18,873 Kanagawa 12,337 18,892 −6,555 Niigata 2,032 1,201 831 Toyama 1,038 589 449 Ishikawa 1,087 790 297 Fukui 718 510 208 Yamanashi 1,586 678 908 Nagano 3,323 1,148 2,175 Gifu 2,141 1,611 530 Shizuoka 4,521 3,211 1,310 Aichi 5,029 7,175 −2,146 Mie 2,982 1,478 1,504 Shiga 2,718 1,437 1,281 Kyoto 3,602 3,814 −212 Osaka 8,114 21,379 −13,265 Hyōgo 8,763 8,340 423 Nara 3,176 2,553 623 Wakayama 1,666 953 713 Tottori 963 386 577 Shimane 1,232 473 759 Okayama 2,724 1,640 1,084 Hiroshima 2,989 3,257 −268 Yamaguchi 2,626 1,471 1,155 Tokushima 910 462 448 Kagawa 1,413 968 445 Ehime 1,924 963 961 (Continued) domestic migration and population decline 433

Table 3 net migration of age cohort 60–64 by prefecture, 2000 (Contd.)

In- Out- Net Prefecture migration migration migration Kōchi 1,244 437 807 Fukuoka 6,912 4,883 2,029 Saga 1,249 777 472 Nagasaki 2,137 1,405 732 Kumamoto 3,077 1,228 1,849 Ōita 2,338 1,020 1,318 Miyazaki 2,185 899 1,286 Kagoshima 4,088 1,136 2,952 Okinawa 724 433 291

Source: MIAC, 2000 Population Census of Japan.

Kubo and Ishikawa (2004), and in particular from results of comparing migrations in Japan with those of the advanced nations, one point has become clear: significant migration of retired people 60 years of age or older can be definitively demonstrated in the United States and in Europe (including Germany), whereas in Japan it cannot. In Europe, retirement migration often becomes international migration, and in Germany retirement migration to the warm Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands of Spain has been thriving. In contrast, such retirement migration in Japan has been rare, at least until 2000. Figure 5, which is based on data from the 2000 census, gives the migration schedule or the migration rate by age class derived from outflows from each municipality. Whereas the migration rate shows a peak for the 25–29 age group and then uniformly decreases with age, it increases again for the age groups 75–79 and older. In other words, in 2000, for the age cohort around 60 years old there was no local peak that would indicate retirement migration had occurred. Tahara (2007) has made some fascinating observations on why one does not find retirement migration in Japan. However, it is likely that the rising trend of baby boomers migrating to peripheral regions observed in recent years will be reflected in the results of the 2010 census, marking the emergence of European-American-style retirement migration in Japan. Much of the post-second world war research on migration to peripheral regions has focused on return migration or ‘U-turn’ migration, and particularly so since the ‘migration turnaround’ of the 1970s, when 434 yoshitaka ishikawa

Source: MIAC, 2000 Population Census of Japan. Figure 5 Migration rate by age groups in terms of out-migration from municipalities the three large metropolitan areas experienced a drastic reduction in net migration inflows. Local municipalities, on the other hand, welcomed the increase in U-turn migration, hoping that it would help them stabilize their declining population figures. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive official data onU -turn migration, making survey research necessary. For instance, in one of a series of detailed studies, Esaki, Yamaguchi and Matsuyama (2007) have noted the recently declining rate of U-turn migration, based on their case study of the Shōnai region in Yamagata Prefecture. Today, the U-turn or I-turn migration of middle-aged people (including baby boomers) receives greater attention than the U-turn migration of young people, who have been in the labour market for only a few years. However, as with figures for U-turn migration of the young population, there is no comprehensive data source for this trend, making it difficult to understand precisely the real situation. Nevertheless, the frequent appearance of this topic in the media in recent years suggests that U-turn and I-turn migration by middle-aged persons (including baby boomers) has been increasing, even though the reason behind this new and hitherto unseen movement is probably a different one, because – unlike younger migrants – older migrants do not seek guarantees of employment opportunities in the regions. domestic migration and population decline 435

The baby boomer generation is such a large cohort that its members are likely to contribute to the revival of destination areas because of the various life and work experiences they acquired in the large metropolitan areas. However, it should be remembered that most of these people are retirees, so even if they realize their ambition of working in the agricultural sector, their contribution to the revival of local economies will be limited. Again, one can ask: why did the return migration of young people from the 1970s onwards, to which so much attention has been paid, not contribute to the development of peripheral regions? Was their number simply too small? According to the results of the 2000 census, there was also a trend of later-stage elderly people (age 75 or older) moving to the three largest metropolitan areas, contrasting with early-stage elderly people (age group 65–74) who were oriented towards peripheral regions (Hirai 2007). These findings suggest that even if, for the time being, peripheral regions have succeeded in attracting middle-aged people (beginning with retired baby boomers), these people may find it difficult to put down roots, a circumstance that possibly results in them migrating back to metropolitan areas. Thus, the migration of middle-aged persons to peripheral regions has to be examined in more detail hereafter. Furthermore, these inflows of middle-aged persons have not yet solved the problem of how, in the long run, peripheral regions are going to secure human capital in an era of population decline. Until now, peripheral municipalities have tended to lose their young people to the three largest metropolitan areas, but whether they will be successful in attracting both young and middle-aged people to come back has become an urgent problem.

5. the Inflows of Foreign Women Marrying Japanese Men

5.1 Recent Trends The migration of middle-aged people (including baby boomers) to peripheral regions has been a matter of major concern in both media reports and academic research. The inflow of foreign women marrying Japanese men in peripheral regions, however, has received little attention. Similarly, although peripheral regions are fully aware of the discussion concerning the migration of middle-aged people, they have tended to be unaware of the discussion concerning the inflow of foreigners, with the exception of the period of concern about 436 yoshitaka ishikawa agricultural village wives in Yamagata Prefecture in the second half of the 1980s. Figure 6 summarizes trends in the number of international marriages since 1970, as recorded in the Vital Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). International marriages in Japan began to increase in the second half of the 1980s, a time that saw a rising shortage of workers due to the booming economy, and a large influx of foreign workers to make up for it. The recent increase in marriages of Japanese men to foreign women has been notable. In three-quarters of the cases the spouses came from China, the Philippines and South Korea. Another trend evident in the data by prefecture recorded in the Vital Statistics of Japan is that most international marriages were registered in the three largest metropolitan areas, and especially in the Tokyo area. In peripheral regions, on the other hand, the number of international marriages is small. Takeshita (2000) lists four factors that promote international marriages: (1) the weakening of the norm of endogamy; (2) an imbalance in the ratio of men and women; (3) the attraction of different races and ethnicities; and (4) physical and social proximity. The following will focus on the second factor, the problem of the sex ratio imbalance, which has been a major reason behind Japan’s lowering fertility and population decline since the 1970s. Against this background, the rapid

Source: MHLW, Vital Statistics of Japan (various years).

Figure 6 International marriage trends in Japan domestic migration and population decline 437 increase in international marriages is the result of a situation in which men, who wish to get married, are confronted with a marriage squeeze and thus choose a foreign spouse.

5.2 Regional Features Looking specifically at regional differences,F igure 7 shows the statistical relationship between the rate of international marriages and the sex ratio for unmarried persons aged 25–39 by prefecture (Ishikawa 2007b). According to the scatter diagram, the sex ratio is much higher than 100 for all prefectures, and the imbalance is quite marked. The 47 points representing the prefectures are distributed in a curve slop- ing upward and to the right, suggesting that the sex ratio imbalance is a significant factor behind international marriages. The coefficient of determination for this regression equation (y = −5.9351 + 0.0643x) is 0.39, that is, 39 per cent of the interprefectural variation shown by the international marriage rate is due to the interprefectural variation of the sex ratio. The coefficient itself is not particularly high.S o, for Japan as a whole, it is not necessarily clear whether there is a causal relationship between the rate of international marriages and the sex ratio of the unmarried among the young population. Nevertheless, it indicates that there are regional differences among the following three groups.

Source: Ishikawa (2007b). Figure 7 The relationship between the sex ratio of unmarried persons and the rate of international marriages 438 yoshitaka ishikawa

The first group comprises prefectures belonging to the three largest metropolitan areas. Almost all of them are located above the regression line in the scatter diagram, suggesting not only that the incidence of international marriages is above the level predicted by just the sex ratio imbalance for the unmarried, but that there are additional causes for the observed rate of international marriages. Tokyo Prefecture has a particularly high rate of such marriages, which sets it apart from other prefectures and suggests that various reasons lie behind it. The second group, which comprises all prefectures in peripheral regions of eastern and central Japan, shows a sex ratio of more than 145, except for Hokkaidō, and prefectures are scattered on both sides of the regression line. A comparatively clear attribution of a causal relationship in which the sex ratio imbalance of unmarried persons promotes international marriages, can be made for all of the 17 prefectures in this group, because they show a linear distribution in Figure 7 with a slope that is steeper than the regression line. The third group comprises prefectures in western Japan, including the regions of Kyūshū, Shikoku, and Chūgoku. They are concentrated in the lower left of the scatter diagram.F or these prefectures, a sex ratio imbalance is clearly recognizable, but because the imbalance is not large, it is not a strong factor inducing international marriages there. These three groups can be regarded as the three regional types in terms of the relationship between international marriages and the sex ratio imbalance in contemporary Japan, with the second and the third group being classified as peripheral regions. With this in mind, it is likely that the sex ratio imbalance can be emphasized as a cause of the inflow of foreigners marrying Japanese nationals in the second group of prefectures, i.e., in eastern Japan. Moreover, the rapid increase in the number of international marriages in recent decades can also be attributed to the work of matchmaking agencies (MAs). According to my own calculation (Ishikawa 2010), at least one third of the approximately 45,000 international marriages recorded in 2006 were arranged through MAs, and most of the foreign wives were new immigrants from China and the Philippines. It is difficult to point to specific data, but it seems that while many of the international marriages in the three largest metropolitan areas are so- called love marriages, many of the international marriages in peripheral regions are MA-based. Some of these international marriages are merely a cover to allow non-Japanese to immigrate and work in Japan (Piper 2003). domestic migration and population decline 439

Ishikawa (2010) also shows that at the end of 2007 there were about 300 MAs. As for the distribution of these 300 agencies, many of them were based in the three largest metropolitan areas, mainly in Tokyo; moreover, most were in eastern Japan, with relatively few in western Japan. The skewed distribution is a subject for further study, but it seems to reflect the difficulty men in eastern Japan have in getting -mar ried. Common to all Japanese men who use MAs is that they are single and at least 40 years old, and that because of their age they have difficulties in finding a Japanese wife and thus decide to marry a foreign woman. Most of the MAs they use are small and only marginally profitable, and a part of them even engage in illegal business practices. However, when one considers that without MAs at least one in three international marriages would not have taken place, their role in affecting the inflow of foreign women into Japan should be evaluated favourably.

5.3 Significances and Contributions The number of registered foreigners in Japan has increased since the middle of the 1980s. And although there are many international marriages in the three largest metropolitan areas and only relatively few in peripheral regions, these marriages are clearly increasing in peripheral regions too (Kamiya and Lee 2009). Figure 8 shows how international marriages contribute to the increased number of registered foreigners.

Source: Japan Immigration Association, Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan, and MHLW, Vital Statistics of Japan (various years). Figure 8 contribution of international marriages to the increase of registered foreigners, 2001–2006 440 yoshitaka ishikawa

The two bars for each year inF igure 8 show the increase in the num ber of registered foreigners on the left (data taken from Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan) and the number of international marriages on the right (data recorded in Vital Statistics of Japan). The figure shows that the increase in the number of registered foreigners does not form any clear trend. Furthermore, one has to consider that since the number of international marriages includes those between Japanese and foreigners in peripheral regions, the actual immigration by foreigners to Japan due to marriage is less than that indicated by the right bar in the figure.H owever, for peripheral regions that have suffered an outflow of young people, it is notable that this inflow of foreign spouses was entirely unexpected. The number of international marriages in the peripheral regions has been rising steadily, and in just five years, from 2001 to 2006, increased about 1.5 times, reaching about 15,000 in both 2005 and 2006, a level almost equal to that of the increase in the number of registered foreigners. Since the number of foreigners in peripheral regions is comparatively small, and relatively few international marriages based on love relationships, it is probable that most of these foreign spouses are new immigrants from overseas. As for prospects of how the inflow of foreign wives contributes to peripheral regions, it has to be noted that there are few foreign residents in farming and mountainous areas, which in general have a strongly conservative atmosphere. The influx of foreigners due to international marriages is an opportunity to create a more open atmosphere. It is also necessary to bear in mind that with the inflow of foreigners, fertility will increase and more children be born, both valuable contributions in an era of population decline. However, due to different cultural backgrounds, there might also be stress in such marriages, stress that could lead to family disharmony or even divorce. There is also a chance that these immigrants, after settling into local life, assim- ilating and adapting to Japanese values, will migrate to the three large metropolitan areas due to lack of employment opportunities and/or other reasons (cf., for example, Satake and Da-anoy 2006). A further point is that, until the birth of a first child, foreign women who come to Japan for MA-based marriages have a tendency to rely on the agency when any kind of trouble arises (Ishikawa 2010). However, if these immigrant women are considered a valuable human resource – especially in peripheral regions where the problem of population decline continues to worsen – such problems should not be left to the agencies domestic migration and population decline 441 to resolve. Rather, local governments and local communities need to provide the necessary support for these women.

6. concluding Remarks

Japan is facing incipient population decline, and it is in peripheral regions where this problem is most serious. Against this background, this chapter looked at two cases of notable population inflows to peripheral regions, inflows that are comparatively recent and which can be summarized as follows. First, there is (1) the inflow of an ethnic majority, composed of middle-aged people including baby boomers, and (2) the inflow of an ethnic minority consisting of foreign wives. Unfortunately, at this stage, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which these inflows will contribute to municipalities in peripheral regions in terms of future population development, simply because there are no comprehensive data sources available. The slogan ‘Balanced Development ofN ational Land’ (Kokudo no kinkō aru hatten) which was prominent some time ago, has all but disappeared since Japan entered the era of population decline. However, having stressed the importance of a regional perspective in this chapter, it is paramount that peripheral regions do not remain complacent about their position as a one-way supply area of young people to the three largest metropolitan areas. Rather, based on recent population inflow trends, peripheral regions should take active measures for the future. Even if their populations are in seemingly inevitable overall decline, they should try to limit the extent of this trend and aim to build communities in which people want to live. As Matsutani (2009) has pointed out, these new population movements provide an important key for peripheral revitalization. Second, the main cause of population decline in contemporary Japan has been the reduced fertility of the ethnic Japanese majority. In spite of various attempts through policy to change this trend, a reversal has proved difficult to achieve, leaving little hope for a recovery.H ence, the strong interest expressed in this chapter in the possibility of ethnic minority foreigners contributing to a solution to or alleviation of problems related to population decline. This view is similar to the ideas on replacement migration expounded by the United Nations (2001). However, with respect to the ongoing discussion on replacement migration, there is a strong tendency to think of foreigners solely as 442 yoshitaka ishikawa additions to the labour force. But what needs to be emphasized is that foreigners are people who will settle down in host countries. The foreign wives discussed in this chapter have migrated to Japan for the purposes of marriage. Many will become permanent residents of Japan, and their children will contribute to some degree to a recovery in Japan’s lowered birth rate. Third, it is predicted that Japan’s population decline will proceed from now on at a rapid pace. Many other countries are predicted to follow the same path, including European countries, many of which have already seen a weakening of their population increases, and some of which have already started to experience population decline. Against this background, international marriages, and the associated inflow of population, are highly significant. In devising future policies and seeking to understand Japan’s current situation, comparative case studies with countries such as South Korea and Taiwan should also be referred to, countries that have seen similar rapid increases in international marriages. In Europe as well, many countries have seen weakening population increases, and in some countries, the population has begun to decline. We must definitely refer to case studies of such countries in devising future policies and seeking to understand Japan’s current situation (Ishikawa 2007a: 6–8). Rural Depopulation and Economic Shrinkage in Japan: What Can Affected Municipalities Do About It?

Volker Elis

1. Demography and Rural Areas in Japan

Regional decline in Japan’s countryside is generally considered a phenomenon closely linked to demographic change. Population ageing, outmigration of the young and rapid population decline can be observed in many towns, villages and hamlets in the non-metropolitan areas, and lead to secondary effects like rising costs for public infrastructure, dwindling local tax revenues, and general economic decline. While the extent of demographic and economic shrinkage in the rural parts of Japan differs considerably depending on whether the area being examined is situated in the periphery or not, the majority of rural areas are affected in one way or another. The problem of shrinking processes and economic stagnation is likely to become an increasingly important field for both regional policy and spatial planning in Japan. Against this backdrop, research on rural decline can make a significant contribution in assessing the scope of its development and creating a realistic future vision for the Japanese countryside. However, until now not much attention has been paid to the causal factors that have triggered this drastic demographic development. Instead of taking demographic change as an exogenous factor, what seems to be the prevailing view among many decision-makers, the media and researchers alike, a promising research approach is to include the historical and socio-economic determinants in the analysis of current rural change. In order to assess the ongoing processes in rural areas properly, it is crucial to avoid unduly over-emphasizing the explanatory power of demographic variables. The reason is that such a one-sided way of per- ceiving and explaining the current changes in the countryside – that is, what has been termed ‘demographization’ – fails to grasp the complex background of current rural developments and yields a distorted 444 volker elis

overall picture that could give rise to misleading evaluations (Beetz 2007: 238–240) which in turn could easily be used as a pretext for political steps to abandon rural areas that show unfavourable demographic conditions. Accordingly, it is necessary to re-examine, rather more critically, the popular notion that demographic change, as an exogenous factor coming ‘out of the blue’, so to speak, is the principal cause of each and every problem in the countryside. This chapter is based on the findings from case study research conducted in three rural towns in which rural decline has appeared in particularly extreme forms. The aim was to collect hints in order to formulate working hypotheses about the causal factors behind rural shrinkage and thus to advance towards a general explanation for the observed phenomena on the basis of similarities between the cases. Extreme cases were used based on the consideration that causal mechanisms would appear in the purest form, so that they could be analysed to the best effect. Unlike in other countries affected by the impact of demographic change, depopulation and economic decline in Japan’s peripheral areas are phenomena that have neither been ignored by the general public nor excessively hushed up by lawmakers and the authorities. Extensive media coverage in television programmes and in the newspapers has contributed to the dissemination of the information that shrinking processes have begun to negatively affect the quality of life in many rural areas. Particularly well-known is the case of the city of Yūbari – a bankrupt former mining town in Hokkaidō that was hit by dramatic population decline – which often serves as an exemplary case of a shrinking municipality and has received considerable media attention for being put under forced administration by the central government (Flüchter 2008: 85–86; Seaton 2010: 2). While media depictions of how people live in rural parts of the country are in general strongly biased and far from showing a balanced picture of life in the countryside, it cannot be denied that media coverage has helped to raise awareness of the current difficulties of rural areas (Elis and Lützeler 2008: 15–16). The comparatively strong attention that has been paid to the issue of rural shrinkage is possibly attributable to the particularly high speed of demographic change and ageing in Japan, a factor that makes it nearly impossible to ignore the development altogether. Therefore, the severe problems of remote areas are commonly seen as one of the various – and not the least important – aspects of the substantial change that the country is undergoing in general. rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 445

2. problem Description

Demographic change in the countryside manifests itself by population decrease, demographic ageing, and outmigration. The effects of these developments can be further subdivided into direct and indirect effects. The direct effects are related to demographic change like the closure of schools caused by the drop in the number of school children, or the weakening of local community activities due to highly unbalanced age structures. The indirect effects, on the other hand, are caused by the lower level of supply and demand in economic terms, caused by population decline (Taira 2005: 72). The various effects ofdemographic change can be depicted as a complicated web of interwoven cause-effect relations. When analysing these processes it becomes apparent that there are several negative feedback loops between the single phenomena that create an overall situation that could be characterized as a vicious circle leading to more and more outmigration (Fujita 1981: 247; Taira 2005: 72; Elis 2008: 868–870). Since the negative effects of population decrease tend to be mutually reinforcing, the choice of adequate policy measures by the local decision-makers is of critical importance. Depopulation in rural areas has been intensifying since the 1990s, and thus the fact that rural areas are losing population is hardly a new phenomenon. During the period of high-speed economic growth (1956–1973) people moved from rural areas to the major conurbations to find work in the rapidly expanding industrial sector and the rural population thinned out as a consequence, eventually leading to a regionally unbalanced population distribution (Flüchter 1998 [1995]: 42; Esaki 2002: 2–4, 7–8). Although the situation eased somewhat in the 1970s due to a moderate trend towards return migration (Lützeler 2004: 42), population decline continued (Flüchter 1998 [1995]: 44). In the 1990s then, disadvantaged areas like underpopulated areas (kaso chiiki) and mountain villages (sanson) showed a strong population loss again, due to and accompanied by rapid demographic ageing, a late effect of the outmigration of many young people in the era of high- speed economic growth (Okahashi 2004: 237). A symptom of this is that depopulation and desertion of settlements is already widespread. Speaking of a total depopulation of whole regions or towns in Japan might still be an exaggeration, but many rural municipalities have to deal with the appearance of hamlets and villages in which the majority of the population is 65 years or older and in which community life cannot be sustained any more. For such settlements on the verge of 446 volker elis becoming deserted, the catchword genkai shūraku was coined, which – despite the shortcomings of its definition – is oftentimes used in newspaper articles and can be found in publications by government agencies and local authorities. In 7,878 (12.7%) of the 62,273 existing settlements in underpopulated areas more than half of the population is 65 years or older and 2,643 (4.2%) settlements are estimated to be in danger of becoming extinct (SJGKT 2009: 12). While the direct effects of demographic change on areas in the rural periphery are severe, the indirect effects that have an impact on the local economies add to the problems of shrinking towns and villages as well. Effects differ according to the economic sector being examined, but they all have in common the fact that they can lead to further outmigration and loss of local vitality, as well as to lower tax revenues for local governments. In agriculture, over-ageing of farmers and declining productivity are serious issues, and fallow fields have been on the rise since the end of the 1990s due to the retirement of farmers and a lack of successors for farm businesses (Sakuno 2006: 53). The manufacturing sector in rural towns and villages is usually characterized by a handful of labour-intensive businesses and plants remaining from a moderate location boom that occurred at the end of the period of high economic growth in Japan. It is not to be expected that they act as catalysts for employment in the local economy. As there is less demand for goods and services in shrinking municipalities, the retail sector suffers as well. When local shops close and the local shopping streets lose what is left of their vitality, the supply of goods and services deteriorates, which in turn contributes to diminishing the attractiveness of the town. In municipalities with declining local economies and population, the local governments have to reckon with higher expenditures. Not only do they have to provide welfare and other services for the rising number of elderly people, they also have to take into account higher costs for keeping up a public infrastructure that is not used to its full capacity (Gürtler 2004: 19–22). While the level of per capita costs for the provision of public services is already high due to low population density and numerous small and scattered settlements, it rises even more with population decrease. Moreover, it gets increasingly difficult to maintain schools, hospitals, bus services, snow and ice control and other parts of local infrastructure and services. In this critical situation, in which many municipalities are facing enormous challenges, the overall course that regional policy is taking rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 447 at the national level is working against the rural periphery (Elis 2008: 869–871). Since the regional policy reforms implemented by the Koizumi government, transfers to financially weak municipalities from the central government have tended to decrease. This is particularly true in the case of underpopulated areas, which used to be eligible for special subsidies and a substantial amount of funds. With the help of these transfers, shrinking rural municipalities were able to guarantee a comparatively high level of public services. For quite a few rural municipalities, the revenue from these transfers, which were originally designed to mitigate regional disparities, was their most important source of income. Since the amount of transfers has been reduced, rural municipalities have to adjust their policies, or otherwise risk going bankrupt in the long run.

3. policy Options

Action against shrinking processes in the countryside can take different forms and can be supported by various local actors. However, decision-makers in local government should be considered the most influential group that shapes responses to this critical situation. In the following pages, a number of measures will be introduced and outlined that have been formulated to improve the situation of rural municipalities. They can be subdivided into measures that tackle the demographic problem directly and measures that aim at revitalizing rural areas through other means. One policy option to tackle the demographic problems in a proactive way is to promote migration back to the countryside. Currently quite a few municipalities are competing with each other to attract younger residents. Since this is a competition in which the big conurbations definitely have an edge – because they can offer better opportunities for work, study and finding a life partner – some cities located farther away from the big metropolises and in rural areas take up strategies to attract retirees instead. Particularly welcome are affluent members of the baby boomer generation, born between 1947 and 1949. Some members of this generation have already retired by now and are looking for a ‘second life’, possibly in the countryside, after having spent the longest part of their lives in an urban environment (Wakabayashi 2009: 125). As municipalities count on their new citizens to increase the local demand by spending their retirement bonuses 448 volker elis and savings, it is not uncommon that substantial subsidies are offered, particularly for real estate purchases (Asahi Shimbun 26 November 2006: 9). However, this approach also has its drawbacks, specifically that escalating costs of providing care for ageing baby boomers could soon overstretch the capacities of local public finance (Hara 2007: 202). As a lack of children seems to lie at the heart of the problem, fertility- oriented or pro-natalist measures for local development might spring to mind as a viable policy option. As a matter of fact, pro-natalist policies are evident in underpopulated areas in the form of encouragement of marriage and childbirth by granting awards and marriage brokerage offered by municipal governments (Knight 2003: 113–114). There are also a few examples of villages that succeeded in raising their birth rate and boosting their population like Shimojō in Nagano Prefecture that managed to attract young families by offering them cheap housing and providing family-friendly services (Tanaka 22 May 2006: 30; The Nikkei Weekly 8 February 2010: 25). However, the reason why this mixed migration- and fertility-oriented approach has worked in this case is that Shimojō is a village close to a city that offers jobs and employment opportunities. This policy would not be a promising policy option for municipalities in the rural periphery, where attractive jobs for younger people are in short supply, not only in the municipality itself but in the whole region. While the case of Shimojō Village sounds encouraging, it must also be mentioned that in a situation in which all municipalities – be they urban, suburban or rural – compete to attract a steadily declining number of younger people, the successes of the winners in the competition are matched by a large number of losers that are left empty-handed. Top-down measures for regional revitalization include a conventional industry attraction policy. Although there are some municipalities affected by depopulation and economic decline in Japan that continue their efforts to attract mobile businesses, the chances are generally considered fairly low that an underpopulated area manages to attract a larger firm which can provide employment, particularly in the peripheral and mountainous parts of the country. During the latter half of the period of high economic growth, some rural areas benefited from a boom in industrial relocation, centred on labour intensive industries. While some enterprises from this period still remain in the countryside now, companies that are currently active in labour intensive production would rather choose a location abroad in a country rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 449 which offers considerably lower labour costs. The dilemma of rural areas is aggravated by the fact that the desirable shift from labour intensive to R&D intensive branches of the economy, including the IT sector and related services, is complicated by these being branches that prefer locations in urban areas (Yoshida 2005: 136–137). While the promotion of the manufacturing sector seems problematic, the promotion of the tourism industry can be seen as another viable option to create jobs and employment opportunities in rural areas. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the so-called resort-oriented development policy (rizōto kaihatsu) experienced a boom in Japan that resulted in a considerable number of ski resorts, golf courses and multi- purpose complexes being created in areas that were not known as tourist destinations before. During this time, the government considered this to be its principal strategy against rural depopulation and a means to provide the local population with an additional income source. On the other hand, localities that were thought to be lacking the requirements for resort-oriented development opted for marketing those aspects of their area that could be considered characteristic and unique. This led to a commodification of various assets of rural communities including local products and trades, the natural environment, and cultural and historical heritage. Due to declining demand, large- scale resorts experienced a crisis after the end of the bubble economy in the beginning of the 1990s and slipped into financial difficulties. Concerns about the drawbacks of this approach, such as dependency from non-local business interests and environmental destruction, led to the rise of alternative tourist models like green tourism emphasizing rural-urban exchange (Moon 2002: 228–232). While tourism is expected to play a key role in revitalizing shrinking towns and villages, it has to be taken into account that the provision of services in the tourism sector is threatened by the ageing process as it restricts the locally available manpower and resources (Funck 2008: 593–596). In addition to the approaches outlined above, bottom-up approaches for rural revitalization that stress endogenous development have been successfully applied in some rural areas in Japan. Most influential in determining the targets and aims of this approach was the ‘one village, one product movement’ (isson ippin undō) that was established in Ōita Prefecture and has spread from there all over the country since 1979. The idea was to propagate specialization in one single local product and empowerment of local actors. Today, the term mura okoshi [village revitalization] is more often used, since a nationwide boom ensued 450 volker elis after the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency began to promote projects for regional revitalization in 1984 (cf. Nishino 2004: 121–123). While in the early stages of this revitalization movement, villages concentrated on mostly agrarian products, the term mura okoshi began to take on a broader meaning and today encompasses revitalization efforts through local festivals, the strengthening of local identity by all kinds of events, and activities to promote local culture and folklore. Recently, the focus has shifted towards efforts to create brands for different kinds of commodities and to market them on a nationwide scale. Another typical way to cope with the demographic challenge was to take part in the so-called Great Heisei Merger wave (Heisei no dai- gappei). In that way, the number of municipalities in Japan was nearly halved in the period from 1999 to 2006. For small towns and villages it was attractive to participate in the merger, as the newly created municipality could benefit from a number of substantial financial conces- sions and subsidies as well as make use of special merger bonds (gappei tokurei-sai) (Machida 2006: 27–30). However, smaller towns and villages had to bear the risk of being treated as mere appendages of the bigger towns or cities. The typical course of action after the merger was to pursue a ‘small government’ strategy. To make use of synergy effects, local administration staff was cut and infrastructure concentrated in the central settlement, where the town hall of the newly created municipality was located. Cutbacks in public infrastructure were used as a common tool to reduce costs. Elementary and middle schools were closed or merged, while hospitals were downsized. In some cases, there are plans being put into place to shut down bus services or railway lines that are operating in the red. Finally, another strategy that will probably be applied more often by rural municipalities in the future is the devolution of responsibilities to non-government institutions on the sub-municipal level. As local government staff are cut and municipalities have to get by with smaller revenue, the local authorities in some towns simply can no longer provide the necessary services. Maintaining public services is particularly difficult in towns and villages with many scattered settlements in which population ageing is already advanced. In this case, one solution is to empower representatives at a local level, who are working as volunteers and playing a leading role at the level of districts below the municipal level. They receive lump-sum payments from the local government and can use the money as they see fit. This strategy is only one example rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 451 of the rising importance of the local governance approach in Japan, including enhanced participation by local groups, associations and NPOs in decision-making at a local level. While local governance in a bottom-up style offers some chances as well as new opportunities, it has to be emphasized that it is borne out of simple necessity. The challenge for municipalities that were dependent on guidance from central authorities for a long time should not be underestimated, since they now have to independently come up with concepts and ideas for revitalizing town life and the local economy.

4. case Studies

Following the intention of this study, three areas were selected as case study sites on the municipal scale.1 The selection criteria were a high population decrease over the last forty years, a tendency towards a highly unbalanced age structure2 and a location inside an area particularly affected by the impact of demographic ageing. Finally chosen were the three (former) towns of Ani (Akita Prefecture), Koza (Waka yama Prefecture) and Ōya (Hyōgo Prefecture) (cf. Figure 1). Ani and Koza are situated in prefectures in which the pertinent projections forecast population decline and ageing in an extent that lies markedly above the average. Ōya, on the other hand, is located in a prefecture that shows relatively favourable population trends as a whole owing to the urbanized regions along the Inland Sea coast, but also includes subregions like the Tajima region in the Northern part (where Ōya is located), where the impact of demographic change is pronounced. Each of the three towns that I chose for my study belong to the group of underpopulated areas and were highly dependent on transfers from national and prefectural governments.

1 i have referred to the administrative division as of 1998 (i.e., prior to the Great Heisei Merger wave). This has the advantage that local developments can be observed and analysed on a smaller scale than what would have been possible if post-merger administrative units were used. By doing so, the distortions that would have resulted from lumping together towns with different local histories and characteristics could be avoided. In all three cases the towns were formerly independent administrative bodies. 2 to measure changes in the age structure a slightly modified form of the Billeter Index was used, in which the age of 65 served as the threshold age for the elderly population (cf. Lützeler in this volume for calculation details). 452 volker elis

Source: Design by the author; cartographic base by Ralph Lützeler. Figure 1 location of case study towns

4.1 Ani Ani is a sparsely populated mountain town with a population of 3,893 in Akita Prefecture in Northeast Japan. It once was a town thriving on the wealth of its mines that produced copper, silver, and gold, while agriculture, forestry, and bear hunting served as auxiliary income sources. However, the last mine had to close down in 1976, partly due rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 453 to declining prices of copper (Yamaguchi 1981: 62). Ani has now developed into an area based on economic activities like small-scale agriculture, forestry and tourism. Even for a town in the northern Tōhoku region – a part of Japan that is particularly affected by the impact of demographic change – the population decline is precipitous. In the forty years from 1965 to 2005 the town lost more than 60 per cent of its population (cf. Figure 2). The ageing process is already well advanced and 42 per cent of the population is 65 years of age or older. Concerns about the continued shrinking processes in Ani led to a situation in which the local government supported the plan to amalga- mate Ani and three larger municipalities. Consequently, Ani became a part of the newly created city of Kitaakita in 2005. As Ani is now part of a city with an overall population of 40,000, the power to influence the course of its local policy has somewhat decreased. However, its participation in municipal amalgamation opened the way for implementing policies aimed at generating synergy effects by pursuing a ‘small government’ strategy and downsizing and rearranging public infrastructure. As a result the former town hospital has already lost two-thirds of its beds and was turned into a clinic (Yamamoto 8 October 2004: 29). The merger is not popular with the average town resident, but from the

Source: Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku, Kokusei chōsa hōkoku (various years); IPSS (2004). Figure 2 population decline in Ani, Koza and Ōya from 1965 to 2005 and projected further population losses 454 volker elis viewpoint of local government finance it can be considered a necessary step to avoid getting into difficulties with regard to the bleak future outlook for the local economy and the population development. As agriculture, forestry, industry and retail show no upward trend and have no promising future prospects, the promotion of tourism can be considered the only sensible way to make an attempt to revitalize the town. However, the ski resort in Ani fails to attract enough customers (Asahi Shimbun 25 April 2008: 31) and is in danger of becoming a burden for the local government (Asahi Shimbun 13 May 2008: 27). In addition, there is a spa in Ani and some attempts are being made to use the cultural heritage of the local bear hunter minority (matagi) as a means to promote tourism.

4.2 Koza Koza is a small coastal town in central Japan, situated near the south- ernmost point of Japan’s main island of Honshū. In the past, it served as a trade centre for the lumber and charcoal produced in its hinter- land upstream, the Koza River and its tributaries, and as a location of a number of sawmills financed by wealthy local wholesale merchants. Furthermore, it was a regional port town for trade, fisheries and whaling (Higaki 1993: 1, 11). However, Koza has lost its status as a trade centre and the industries that supported the local economy in the past have not much relevance for the town today. Except for the remaining two sawmills there is not much left of the industries that used to provide jobs. There are only a handful of professional fishermen left and fishing has become more like a leisure time activity. Wholesale trade is no longer a typical economic activity in Koza and retail also has its problems. The traditional shopping street inK oza is rapidly deteriorating and has lost its customers to large retail stores. Although the coastline of Koza is part of the Yoshino-Kumano National Park, Koza cannot be considered a major tourist destination. And as there are no jobs available in the other sectors of the local economy as well, younger people tend to turn their back on their home town to find employment elsewhere. Koza experienced a steep population decline by 41 per cent in the period from 1965 to 2005 (cf. Figure 2) and the ratio of people 65 years of age or older has reached 36 per cent as of 2005. Despite its relatively advantageous location on the coastline of Wakayama Prefecture, Koza is severely affected by demographic change, a fate that it shares with rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 455 the neighbouring town of Kushimoto. The two towns merged in 2005 and Koza became a part of Kushimoto, now with a population of 14,644. At first sight, the development in Koza after the merger seems quite similar to the developments observed in my first case study town of Ani. Municipal amalgamation was chosen and local government staff were subsequently reduced to consolidate the fiscal situation of the enlarged town and to realize synergy effects. Subsidies for local associations and events were curtailed and some public facilities privatized. The strategy of concentrating infrastructure was restricted to the merger or closure of schools, while the two existing hospitals in Kushimoto and Koza are to be maintained. A problem that has not been solved, however, by the municipal merger is deindustrialization and the lack of new industries that could serve as a starting point for a revitalization of the town. Moreover, the promotion of tourism – although it might have some potential in cooperation with other towns in the region – suffers from the tendency that Koza is being bypassed by visitors. Until now, there are no convincing concepts to revitalize the local economy, but Koza might benefit from a generally more favourable location and better traffic connections in comparison to other rural towns.

4.3 Ōya Ōya is a mountain town situated in Hyōgo Prefecture that shares many features of the town of Ani from the first case study. In the past, its main income sources were mining, sericulture, forestry and small- scale agriculture. However, the Akenobe copper and tin mine had to close down in 1987 and sericulture is now extinct. What remains of the old economic structure is some agriculture. In addition, there are a handful of manufacturing plants and a ski resort. However, as in many other rural towns, the retail sector is declining. Ōya is experiencing a precipitous population decline and is affected by a characteristic change in population structure. In the period from 1965 to 2005 its population declined from 9,313 to 4,397 (cf. Figure 2) and a further decline to 3,197 by 2030 is projected. In 2005, already 37 per cent of the population were 65 years of age or older. The concerns connected with demographic change and the negative overall perspectives of local government finance were among the factors that led to the municipal merger with three other towns in 2004 (Yabu-gun 456 volker elis

Gappei Kyōgikai 2002: 7), two with a larger and one with a smaller population. Particularly alarming was the high ratio of dependency (73%) on fiscal transfers from the prefectural and central government for the four towns altogether. The new municipality was given the name of Yabu – that is, the name of the district (gun) that the participating towns belonged to – and turned into a city with a population of 27,000 as of today. After the merger, the city hall of Yōka, the largest town participating, became the city hall of the new municipality, while the former city hall of Ōya was turned into a branch office. Like the cities of Kitaakita and Kushimoto, the city of Yabu pursues a small-government strategy. Schools are closed or amalgamated, while the only hospital in Yōka was maintained. The focus of local government policy lies on fiscal consolidation to avoid getting into distress after the moratorium period following the merger (cf. below) ends. High costs in maintaining public infrastructure and services of general interest restrict the municipality’s fiscal leeway while it has to reckon with rising costs when providing services for the elderly. As the local authorities assess it as difficult to sustain the level of social and welfare services with a smaller staff in the near future, steps are being taken to seek the cooperation of volunteers and to build a structure of sub-municipal community committees organized on the basis of elementary school districts. These community committees are provided with funds and staff to organize and supervise the maintenance of minor roads, flood control and various other tasks on the settlement level. This can be considered as a measure to introduce local governance elements into local administration – albeit in a top-down fashion – and a step to transfer tasks to smaller spatial units. In addition to these policies which are now being taken within the scope of a larger municipality, there are some policies for local revitalization that are being continued in the former town of Ōya, including attempts to market the town’s historical heritage (Akenobe mine, silk- worm tradition) and promote local artists.

4.4 Findings from the Case Studies When comparing the findings from the three case studies it becomes apparent that the localities in each case share quite a few similar features, both from the viewpoint of their overall socio-economic situation and the problems they have to deal with, as well as from the rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 457 viewpoint of the policies they opted for to adjust the locality to the direct and indirect impacts of demographic change. All three towns suffer from a lack of economic perspective that has its roots in long- term structural change. While branches that once supported the local economy and provided jobs in the past (agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishery, whaling, mining, wholesale trade) became obsolete or experienced a substantial decline, there were no new key industries that could replace them. Particularly striking is the impact of a general decline of the primary sector that can be observed in all three case study towns. In addition, in two of the three towns mining was an important economic sector in the past, an economic activity that has been discontin- ued in both of them, which partly explains the rapidness and intensity of demographic change. All three municipalities succeeded in finding partners to take part in the Great Heisei Merger wave and thereby managed to pool the fiscal risks involved in adjusting to a declining and ageing population. After the merger, the local governments of all three larger municipalities that evolved pursued a remarkably similar strategy, aiming at a reduction in local government staff, small government and the concentration and downsizing of infrastructure to cut costs. Dissimilarities between the policies taken in the towns can be found when looking at the consist- ency with which this approach was applied. While closure and amalgamation of schools occurred in all three municipalities, the extent to which this happened differed. The hospital in Ani was downsized, the hospital in Koza was maintained, and Ōya had no municipal hospital in the first place. Considerable variations existed between the case study towns regarding the policies for local revitalization, probably due to different perceptions and assessments of the problems connected with demographic change. Furthermore, the choice of policy measures and the extent to which they have been applied might also have depended on the restraints dictated by the severity of the respective fiscal situation of the local government. Merging with other municipalities that partly had a larger pop ulation but were sharing basically the same problems, enabled the three case study towns to obtain a moratorium period of ten years, after which the preferential treatment for municipalities that have taken part in the merger, in particular in the intergovernmental finance system, will gradually run out. Furthermore, the newly created municipalities were able to use special merger bonds to fill financial gaps and to finance infrastructure projects related to the merger. 458 volker elis

By concentrating their infrastructures they were able to benefit from synergy effects. On the other hand, the case study municipalities had to part with the option to take independent action on a smaller administrative scale. Moreover, they also run the risk of weakening their local identity which could have repercussions on the cohesion of local communities. There can be no doubt that the altered landscape of regional policy at a national level contributes to the critical situation of rural municipalities. All in all, the participation in the Great Heisei Merger wave was the consequence of political decisions made by actors at the national level. Municipalities with a small population were hit particularly hard by the lower level of local allocation tax grants (chihō kōfuzei kōfukin) and were thereby driven to take part in the merger wave, wherein they lost their status as independent municipalities (Kajita 2008: 72).

5. conclusion

What can be learnt from the findings of my three case studies is that participation in municipal mergers and the subsequent consolidation of municipal finances by a cutback of infrastructure and downsizing of local government staff was seen as the fundamental strategy when reacting to the shrinking processes that the towns studied experienced. While at first sight it seemed like a rational strategy to adjust the supply of infrastructure for a declining population and avoid bank- ruptcy, a lack of convincing concepts for an economic renaissance and visions for tackling the weakening of local communities is apparent. However, the basically defensive and reactive stance that can currently be observed in Japan’s rural periphery and which focuses on trouble- shooting and crisis management is hard to criticize due to three reasons. First, it should be taken into account that the towns in each case apparently managed to judge their fairly critical situation in a realistic way. Therefore, the local decision-makers succeeded in avoiding the trap of continuing with policies based on the assumption of a growing, or at least stagnating, population and thus a growing demand for public services. In the past, mayors of small towns had too many overam- bitious and optimistic policy stances that were received favourably by local voters but have led to now nearly insurmountable difficulties in local public finance. In this way, the political course of the towns in this study can be assessed as an appropriate response to the impact of rural depopulation and economic shrinkage in japan 459 demographic change leaving a chance to recover after the adjustment process is accomplished. Second, it also has to be taken into account that the local decision- makers only followed a course that was predetermined by the incentives set by regional policy reforms at a national level. Confronted by a situation in which they had to reckon with a considerably lower level of transfers from the central government, they were driven to participate in the merger wave that at least promised a moratorium period and a chance to pool the risks with municipalities sharing similar problems. Third, it has to be stressed that most of the causal factors behind rural shrinkage are beyond the scope of what can be influenced by local actors in rural towns. For example, I could prove in all three cases that long-term structural change was one of the fundamental causes for economic decline in each of the localities examined, which in turn was partly due to the effects of globalization and trade liberalization caused by pressure from the WTO. While rural municipalities experience long recessions in the agricultural or the forestry sectors, there is no way to tackle the real causes. In addition, regions, villages, towns and cities in the Japanese countryside are unable to make full use of the chances that the ongoing global processes offer for the more dynamic cities located in the larger conurbations. The dilemma that Japanese rural municipalities are facing today is caused by a process of peripherization that leads to the following consequences: (1) a cutback and subsequent hollowing-out of public services; (2) distance from power and dependency on policy decisions taken elsewhere, prohibiting countermeasures against a deterioration of living conditions; and (3) only marginal welfare gains from globalization and industries characterized by low value added. It is striking that each of these three aspects identified in this chapter in the case of three rural areas in Japan has also been identified in the case of northeastern Germany (cf. Beetz in this volume). The findings of both chapters are mutually affirmative. Demographic decline is rather the outcome than the initial cause of the many structural problems rural areas are facing today. Although it is still too early to generalize on the basis of observed phenomena in only two countries, the approach of linking processes in the countryside with the process of globalization on the one hand, and with changes in national policies on the other hand deserves further attention, not only in Germany and Japan, but also in other countries that experience shrinking processes in rural areas. 460 volker elis

In light of the effects and daunting consequences of peripheraliza- tion in rural Japan it is not surprising and quite rational that local actors continue lobbying for subsidies rather than opting for the local development strategies mentioned in the third section of this chapter, that is, enhancing endogenous potentials. In view of the competition of the two biggest parties for the rural vote, cries for more support of rural areas are likely to fall on sympathetic ears. However, whether financial transfers can substantially improve the situation in rural areas in the long run remains an open question; for the difficulties in peripheral areas have structural and historical roots. However, viewed from a nationwide or regional perspective, endogenous revitalization strategies aiming at attracting migrants also have their drawbacks. In-migration to a successful municipality is always matched by population loss in other municipalities and hence a zero-sum game. Since there is no dominant strategy that could solve the current problems of Japan’s countryside, it remains to be seen what local and non-local actors will make of the challenge. Demographic, Economic and Institutional Shrinkage – From the Perspective of Rural Areas in Germany

Stephan Beetz

1. introduction: Demography and Rural Areas in Germany

European research on regional development in the last two decades has emphasized the decrease in spatial disparities between states, but attention has also been drawn to the increase in disparities at the intra- state regional level (Mau 2004). Also discussed intensively for many years have been the consequences of demographic change at the regional level, where it is possible to observe a close relationship between demographic change and spatial disparities. On the one hand, spatial disparities affect the paths of migration, particularly young people migrating to regions that offer better living and working conditions, as well as life expectancy levels. On the other hand, demographic change reinforces spatial disparities in infrastructure, community capacity and economic development. The entireG erman post-war period has seen and was influenced by different patterns of regional migration. During and directly after the Second World War the population in German cities decreased. The 1950/1960s saw a huge number of people migrating to strong industrial districts, a period of growth that was based on the “use up” of traditional sectors in the economy and society through capitalism (Lutz 1984). In the 1970/1980s period of high-level welfare, homeown- ership and suburbanization were promoted – alongside automobiliza- tion and the functional change of city centres. And since the beginning of the 1990s, new patterns of mobility have emerged, based on international migration, net internal migration between eastern and western Germany, as well as globalization and specific consumption habits (like different youth cultures and ecological lifestyles). These migration patterns correspond strongly to the situation within the labour markets of the different regions and, until today, have decisively effected spatial developments more than any other factor of demographic change (including lower fertility rates and increased life expectancy). Intensified net outmigration from what was formerly East Germany 462 stephan beetz has long concealed the decrease in birth rates in western Germany, whereas in reality the number of immigrants is falling in many regions. In 2005, only 14 per cent of counties and 10 per cent of urban districts recorded more births than deaths, while 39 per cent of counties and 34 per cent of urban districts recorded inmigration exceeding outmigration by 3 per cent or more, compared to 84 per cent of counties and 31 per cent of urban districts in 1995 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Responsible for this development are the decrease in international immigration, the decline in the number of cohorts with high birth rates in East Germany and the so-called “urban renaissance” (Läpple 2004). The number of regions that face demographic shrinkage will rise in the near future, and it is probable that this phenomenon will not be restricted to so-called weak regions only. Actually, severe demographic competition concerning the most attractive living and working conditions can be observed already today. Spatial differences in demographic ageing are comparatively small in Germany, when compared to Japan for example. In a regional focus, however, we can discern large ‘older’ areas, such as the Ruhrgebiet, Saarland, Eifel, Südniedersachsen, Harzvorland, Lausitz, Erzgebirge and Frankenwald, and even between communities or neighbourhoods large variations in the demographic age structure and the process of ageing do occur. The demographic development ofG erman rural areas can be subdivided into the following categories or phases: (1) The demography of modernization was accompanied by the growth of urban agglomerations in the period of industrialization and centralization, as well as the decrease in birth rates and the increase in life expectancy. The rural-urban relationship was strongly affected by urbanization. (2) The demography of ruralization has accompanied the change from an agricultural to a rural society with a new understanding of living and working conditions in rural areas. The population and employment rates in rural areas increased, while the rural-urban relationship was shaped by sub- and counterurbanization. (3) The demography of transformation refers to the specific change in eastern Germany after the collapse of the political, institutional and economic systems of the former GDR; that is, the adaptation to the systems of western Germany. This process entailed a sharp decline in birth rates paired with high outmigration rates in urban and rural areas. demographic, economic and institutional shrinkage 463

(4) The demography of peripherization is so far only a tendency. Newly emerging spatial patterns of liberalization and globalization suggest a division between ‘lagging’ and ‘leading’ areas (or ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ areas), including the participation of regions in the international division of labour. The consequences are new shrinking (i.e., high outmigration of young people) and rapid demographic ageing in both rural and urban areas. Population shrinkage has occurred in all four phases. A new discourse, which has developed in the last two decades, is perhaps that on the amalgamation of occupational, infrastructural, institutional and demographic shrinkage. These phenomena, however, are not restricted to rural areas; such processes can also be found in certain parts of metropolitan areas and in old industrial areas (cf. Table 1). Demographic changes have proceeded very differently in German regions and communities. However, these spatial differences in demographic development do not correspond clearly with the scheme of urban and rural relationships. Table 1 shows that, in the totality of rural

Table 1 Demographic indicators for different spatial types in East and West Germany

Source: BBR (2008), own calculations. 464 stephan beetz areas, there are no remarkable differences in the demographic indicators to other spatial types. Rural areas in East Germany – in contrast to areas in West Germany – had suffered some loss of population already for four decades; but after 1990 population decline started to constitute the general trend in East Germany. Yet again, unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, some dominant centres in East Germany have recently started to register an increase in the number of inhabitants. The differences in the economic performance between rural and urban areas in both East and West Germany are shown in Table 2, in which the commuter rates are listed as an indicator of high everyday regional mobility. On the surface, many aspects of demographic change in rural areas and, in particular, the political and public discourses, look similar in Japan and Germany (Elis and Lützeler 2008). However, it becomes clear from the data that in Germany the metropolitan-rural differences are not so significant due to both geographical and institutional reasons: (a) in Germany extreme forms of underpopulation are not existent: Although in the Northeast the population density in some communities is less than 40 inhabitants per square kilometre, most rural areas in Germany as a whole show higher densities. Germany is comparatively well balanced in terms of population density – only a few rural areas suffer from disadvantageous

Table 2 economic indicators for different spatial types in East and West Germany

Source: BBR (2008), own calculations. demographic, economic and institutional shrinkage 465

climatic, morphologic and/or traffic-related conditions. In general, distances to urban areas and agglomerations are not far and medium-sized cities are also within reach. (b) The political system of Germany is federal and the economic system is not centralized, a result of, among other things, the historical legacy of numerous small states in Germany. Therefore there is no single dominant urban centre, but several agglomerations. In addition, communities at the local level play an important role in the organisation of public services, housing politics, economic development and financial distribution. The interest groups of towns, districts and communities are influential in the political system, and some economic pressure groups have regional organisation networks.

2. the ‘Demographization’ of the Discourse on Rural Areas

Considering these facts it is interesting to analyse why the discourse of ‘empty land’, ‘depopulation in rural areas’ and ‘Landflucht’ (lit. ‘flight from the countryside’, a tendentious term for migration to the cities in Germany) is so powerful – both in Germany and in Japan. However, two aspects have to be noted. First, the (German) discourse on the future of rural areas often focuses on traditional attributions that do not offer much value for analysis. There are at least three characteriza- tions of the countryside as either the ‘retarded or non-modernized’ society, the ‘natural alternative’ to the capitalistic or modern society, or the ‘endangered or dependent’ society. Therefore, instead of resorting to these attributions, it would be better to analyse the new forms of rurality and the complexity of urban-rural relationships based on empirical findings. And second, the discourse of ‘empty land’ is an element of a new spatial orientation in high-industrialized countries. In the so-called ‘international competition’ of the regions, the state and federal governments stake everything on the metropolitan areas as global players. This does not take into account, however, that small regions and decentralized local networks can be very powerful as well. The debates on the high importance of global cities do not reflect adequately the patterns of new regional or national competition (Streeck 2004, 2005). The rise of these global cities as political, 466 stephan beetz

economic, cultural and infrastructural centres is not only a result of their magnitude and inherent dynamics, but a consequence of national and EU actions to promote their competitive position. This process is influenced in both Japan and Germany by governmental programmes. From a German perspective, however, it is questionable whether it is only metropolitan centres that are competitive (due to their function as centres of business, transportation networks and creative activities). Although not empirically evident, this argument is used to influence state and suprastate political programmes. In my view, the argument reflects both intense regional rivalry and continuous political conflict. Although the interrelationship between demographic, economic and political developments is multifarious and highly complex, political and medial discourse offer only a very narrow perspective. It is a perspective orientated towards ‘depopulation’ in rural areas as part of the demographic change, or, more generally, a demographic perspective. This means that other aspects of development are subordinated to demographic aspects, a way of discourse that we have called ‘demographization’. There is currently a demographization of political, social, infrastructural and economic problems. But why is this discourse a problem? It is a problem, first, because it is necessary to also discuss other aspects of changes. For example, the reorganization of the infrastructure in public services constitutes the predominant challenge in rural areas today, compared to which the adaptation to demographic shrinkage and ageing is a minor problem. In the current demographic discourse there is a certain danger (or risk) involved in not changing but conserving old structures. Second, the demographic discourse introduced a new ‘determinism of the number’ with regard to the development of modern society. It is consistent with traditional ideas such as Tragfähigkeit, which can be translated as ‘sustainability’ or the population carrying capacity of an area. However, history shows that the development of modern society is not determined by demographic change, but instead contains a wide variability in political and social strategies. Third, the discourse suggests a direct link between the mathematical exactness of population projections and the scenarios of regional development. But in between these aspects lies the contingence of political action, because projections always face the uncertainty of the future. My criticism is that this uncertainty in the spatial effects demographic, economic and institutional shrinkage 467 of demographic change has to be recognized as an important element of regional planning (concerning, for example, diversification, reflex- ivity and follow-up costs of decisions). Otherwise, frankly speaking, one is simulating pseudo-exactness in order to stabilize old ideas of planning. A new political and academic debate has emerged about how much effort and subsidies should reasonably be invested into so-called ‘emp- tying areas’. Article 72 (2) of the German Basic Constitutional Law, which also constitutes a guideline of the German Federal Planning Law (Bundesraumordnungsgesetz), develops the notion of ‘equivalent living conditions’ in all parts of Germany, and has been considered by many as the main reference for current debates. After ‘equivalent’ has been interpreted as ‘equal’ for most of the second half of the 20th century (Barlösius 2006), the decline of many rural regions has now led to reconsideration. Many politicians and planners claim that the equality ideal will have to be replaced by a definition of a minimum standard of living. Until today, debates on actual coping strategies and future visions for shrinking rural regions have focused primarily on technical innovations and/or the redefinition of the standards of land use planning and central place theory (Pütz and Spangenberg 2006; Beetz and Neu 2006). Although new instruments for integrated rural development have been applied on a more or less exemplary basis, structural innovations are still lacking. It is not helpful to discuss demographic change within the limits of the old classifications of ‘urban’ and ‘rural’.O ne argument against using these classifications is that the empirical findings do not justify this spatial opposition. It is necessary to create other terms of divided developments. The other, more theoretical argument is that this classification is strongly tied to a territorial understanding of space.R egions are treated as manifest territories with specific characteristics such as ‘low population density’, ‘far from centres’ and ‘dominated by the agricultural sector’. But a more interesting question is what ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ really means for policy-making and everyday life. And, in particular, how are territorial characteristics produced in modern society? To answer this question not only requires a new spatial classification, it also means analysing the production of space in the sense of Henri Lefebvre (1991). The research topic under discussion is not only the territory, but the very processes themselves that form the territory in the framework of the national and global division of labour, state governance, and so forth. 468 stephan beetz

3. ‘Peripherization’ instead of ‘Demographic Decline’: The Case of Northeastern Germany

Many research studies that focus on structurally weak areas paired with demographic, economic and political problems, have explored new forms of spatial disparities (Beetz, Barlösius and Neu 2008). A considerable part of rural regions in northeastern Germany suffers from processes of peripherization. The term ‘peripherization’ is introduced here as a category to underline the spatial aspect of regional socio-economic decline and demographic shrinking, as well as to emphasize the process character and the close linkage with centralization procedures. Peripherization is different from specific geographical descriptions of peripheries; that is, it can emerge in both urban and rural environments and at the scale of both regions and neighbourhoods. The situation of the northeastern German countryside high- lights the following three aspects of peripherization: (1) There is debate about the cutback of important services of public interest (Daseinsvorsorge). Resources for the maintenance of essential functions in the regions run shorter and shorter, and the political will to invest in these already weak regions declines. Consequently, substantial fields of public services are foregone (Neu 2006). Social disparities increase as substantial parts of society become dependent on welfare state instruments. With decreasing tax revenues and increasing transfer payment obligations, local administrations become ever less effective, and public service capability deteriorates further. Many municipalities are unable to maintain public services, which results in a serious lack of services and employment, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, as well as in subsequent social exclusion (Keim 2007). (2) peripherization expresses a unilateral dependence on political and economic decisions taken in the centres of power. Peripheral regions are hardly in the position to participate in decision- making processes; they are shaped by distance from power, as well as by splintering of local actors and competition with other peripheries (Kreckel 1992). Due to this mismatch of power, peripheries are unable to place their interests in the public sphere and at the same time are heavily dependent on political decisions taken elsewhere, while civil society in such peripheries demographic, economic and institutional shrinkage 469

experiences worsening living conditions: “Periphery means not being able to resist disadvantages” (Neu 2006: 13; own translation). (3) peripherization does not necessarily prevent the integration of peripheral regions into supraregional and global economic cycles; however, peripheral regions usually realize only marginal welfare gains from this fact (Beetz 2007; Woods 2007). Other authors have interpreted peripherization as a disconnec- tion of economic and social processes, as areas becoming “idle” or “forgotten” by society (Nolte and Baehre 2002). In such a perspective, centres have no need for ‘internal colonies’ any more, because the former functions of these ‘colonies’ have now been distributed globally. But peripheral regions in northeastern Germany do not become wastelands either. The crucial point is that they do not succeed in obtaining a higher added- value. The production of food, renewable primary products, recreation services, second homes, and the quality of life in rural areas demand specific forms of land use, but these are often associated with comparatively small remuneration. Far from an alleged emptiness, the peripheral countryside is shaped by land use competition and conflicts, and questions about future advantages and benefits from land use are constantly to the fore. Currently there are at least four diverging positions about shrinking of rural areas in northeastern Germany (cf. Beetz, Huning and Plieninger 2008): (1) The first position defends the welfare system as an indispensable good, which should not been given up rashly. Strong and weak regions need to be mutually supportive, according to this argument, to reduce inequalities in terms of economic exchange and participatory conditions. The decision on one of these options fundamentally impacts the framework for planning and political actors and institutions in the region. (2) a second position claims that in poor regions a mix of (decreasing) welfare payments, more subsistence economic activities, and a readiness to accept a lower quality of life opens up space for alternative lifestyles. As many services cannot be commodi- fied and transfer payments are insufficient, social networks 470 stephan beetz

may be able to fulfil an important support function. Locally adapted economic cycles will then prevent losses in the creation of value. (3) critics of the second position emphasize the disadvantages of regional closure and vote for the improvement of competitiveness, in particular by the integration into supraregional and global economic activities. They claim that it is important to realize product specialization, low workforce costs and deregulated work conditions. Regional closure, this position holds, would lead to political stagnation and would bring innovation to a halt. (4) Finally, the fourth position – commonly referred to as ‘passive restructuring’ – assumes that people will continue to leave shrinking regions in any case, because they can considerably improve their life conditions in other regions. Therefore it is argued that individual mobility should be promoted, whereas government aids would only slow down an inevitable development caused by (global) economic and demographic changes that lead to the ‘depopulation’ of peripheral regions. New planning challenges result from the specifics of rural shrinkage. The population decrease in rural regions isjust one symptom of an overall process of peripherization, which needs to be addressed more in general terms and not only in terms of demographic change. I argue that peripherization challenges traditional post-war ideas and conceptions of spatial planning in Germany. While urban planning has undergone significant restructuring over the last decade, especially with regard to procedural and governance innovations in urban renewal strategies, regional planning for rural areas still seems to be based on pre-defined development standards and endowment norms with a relatively high distance between decision-making institutions and concerned citizens. While debates on coping strategies still focus on technical innovations and the redefinition of planning standards, it is necessary to create more flexible planning frameworks which leave space for place-adequate, adaptive and participatory solutions. A very difficult question is to what extent the capacities and competencies of local governance and local civil society are sufficient for these challenges. The conditions are different in each community, but it can be said that, in general, state support is necessary to maintain community work. Studies investigating infrastructure development show that landscapes in northeastern Germany are in a process of fundamental demographic, economic and institutional shrinkage 471 transformation (Beetz, Barlösius and Neu 2008). The fact that infrastructure facilities are being shut down is commonly justified with reference to the shrinking population in that region. Demographic change is used in various ways to legitimize all kinds of political and planning measures, while any other causal relationships or explanations are ignored. As a consequence, it is argued that today’s standard of social and technical infrastructure is no longer affordable. However, the cuts in infrastructure seen over the last decades have been much more a result of rationalization, technical innovation and changes in demand, than of declining population numbers (Machold and Tamme 2005). The contemporary change in rural areas also brings about new challenges for regional and local governance, as is reflected in public debates about the following three topics: (a) After the Fordistic modernization of infrastructure, multifunctional and flexible forms of public services are required; (b) in recent decades, the possibilities of land use have been decreasing, while natural resources arouse new interest; and (c) the efficiency of governmental centralization is ambiguous, because citizenship and neighbourhood in rural communities are playing an increasingly important role. Crucial points in these debates are the public valorization and the enhanced value of natural and social resources in rural areas in an economic sense. Analyses show that, similar to other rural regions, processes of infrastructure concentration in northeastern German regions too result from the enforcement of uniform technical standards, as well as from the increasing competition between service providers and from efficiency orientation. Positive effects due to increasing effectiveness, supply variety, specialization and quality are contrasted by opposite negative consequences such as rising mobility and transport costs, as well as decreasing consumer proximity. The liberalization of public services in the European Union likewise strengthens this process. In a specific way, northeastern German rural regions are reacting to the challenges of economic, social and demographic change requiring new structures of supply and support.

4. conclusions

The demographic challenges are linked with the totality of rural development. What does the future hold for the countryside? It is often said in current public discourse that agriculture and old industries no longer provide sufficient employment opportunities in northeastern 472 stephan beetz

Germany, while no new means of income generation are in sight. Many young and well-educated residents leave the areas. But the so-called ‘empty land’ is attractive for many forms of land use by groups such as rural pioneers and big energy investors – not merely neo-Nazi groups who are attracting much attention by the German mass media. The intensification of land use in recent years reflects not only the productive but also the consumptive function of land use. In this sense, factors such as ‘quality of life’, ecosystem services, health services and aesthetic landscapes offer chances to develop economic potentials (Shucksmith, Cameron and Merridew 2006). But this ‘new’ rurality shows conflicts with other conceptions of land use such as intensive biomass production or industrial animal breeding (Siebert and Knierim 1999). The question is whether we will see a new boom or further shrinkage. The answer to this is difficult, because both sustainability and the value-added effect produced by these developments are not yet clear. Economic and demographic shrinkage and economically active land use in the region exist side by side (Plieninger and Bens 2007). However, despite all the differences in the development of rural regions, the same stereotypes of the ‘loss of villages and rural neighbourhoods’ continue to dominate public discourse. Therefore, new phenomena in regional shrinkage and growth are not easy to discern in both urban and rural areas. Left Behind in the Global City: Spaces and Places of Ageing and Shrinking in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area

Ralph Lützeler

1. introduction

For the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (TMA), and in contrast to almost all other regions of Japan, population ageing and decline are not yet considered major problems. As latest projection figures prepared by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research show (KSJK 2007b), the population of Tokyo Prefecture is expected to continue to rise until 2020 and then to decrease gently, in 2035 still showing a higher level than in 2005. For the rest of the agglomeration, a more significant population decline has been calculated, which in relative terms, however, will still be below the national average. With regard to ageing, the suburban prefectures of Saitama and Chiba are likely to approach the national average by 2030 (then 31.8 per cent), while the metropolitan core prefectures of Tokyo and Kanagawa are predicted to remain well below that level (28.0 per cent and 29.1 per cent, respectively). Thus, according to this projection, the dichotomous contrast between a thriving capital region and a stagnating or declining rest of Japan is expected to stay or even widen further for some decades to come. This chapter will show, however, that demographic decline is already occurring in a large number of areas in the TMA as well. Arguing that contemporary urban politics are an important factor behind the emergence of extreme population ageing and decline amidst ongoing urban growth, this contribution will, first, identify both location and characteristics of municipalities in the whole Southern Kantō Region (Section 2) and in the Tokyo core city area or, more precisely, in specific neighbourhoods affected by demographic hyper-ageing and population shrinkage in the Tokyo special ward area (Tōkyō tokubetsu kubu) (Section 3). The results were obtained by using census data and other official statistics. The situation in local government housing estates (kōei jūtaku danchi; in Tokyo: toei jūtaku danchi) will be given 474 ralph lützeler special attention. Second, probable causes that brought about these spatial patterns in population ageing and shrinking are discussed, relying heavily upon the concept of ‘entrepreneurial city politics’ formulated by David Harvey in 1989. Third, strategies and policies currently carried out by the Tokyo prefectural government to cope with the manifold problems existing in its housing estates are critically examined (Section 4).

2. ageing and Population Decline in the Southern Kantō Region

In order to examine the location and characteristics of areas affected by ageing and/or population decline at the inter-municipal level, the statistical procedure of hierarchical cluster analysis was applied to all municipalities in the Southern Kantō Region – comprising the pre fectures of Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo and Kanagawa – which is roughly equivalent to the TMA. This means that areal units (in this case, municipalities including the 23 special wards of Tokyo proper) are classified into internally homogeneous groups (clusters) according to selected structural variables or indicators (cf. Table 1).1 In addition to demographic indicators (Var. 1 to 3), social and economic indicators (Var. 4 to 8) were included to create groups that also allow assumptions to be made on development potentials of its member units. Both the method used and the selection of variables lean upon a research project on the classification of German municipalities according to their demographic structure, a project that was commissioned by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006). The results are shown in Table 1, which reveals the main characteristics of the seven clusters created. Along with the simple means of the variables included in the procedure, eta squared values are given for each variable, describing the proportion of variance that is statistically explained by the classification result. In other words, the regional pattern of variables displaying high eta squared values is better represented by the clusters than variables with low values. In the present case, for instance, the rate of employment change from 2000 to 2005,

1 as linkage rule, the Ward method was used (with squared Euclidean distance as the distance measure). The original results were then slightly revised after applying discriminant analysis. left behind in the global city 475 2 eta 0.577 0.494 0.384 0.842 0.564 0.586 0.608 0.706 emper 1993: emper 7.5 vg. egion: simple simple egion: 99 16.0 25.5 94 −0.37 A R 147 101 antō antō 7 7.6 K 94 88 13.2 25.4 72 −0.59 113 6 9.8 99 90 13.6 26.1 88 −0.42 130 ecember 2009). 5 7.3 88 13.5 29.2 93 −0.36 (2000, Japan of census Population ōkeikyoku, 132 101 Clusters 6.9 4 93 15.7 28.7 −0.27 149 106 116 3 7.3 86 19.5 23.3 −0.28 149 100 101 2 6.5 93 22.8 14.3 96 −0.27 246 144 1 4.8 27.2 13.8 −0.22 499 101 732 122 ndex measures the generative potential of a population and is calculated by dividing the difference of the of difference the dividing by calculated is and population a of potential generative the measures ndex ratio (2005) ratio tion ndex*, 2030) ndex*, n the case, present the index was modifiedbyusing the 0–14,age groups 65+and 15–64,respectivelyitto a into measure transform I T Sōmushō (7) on (3) to K (2007b); Var. based K SJ on (2) are (1) and Var. wn calculations. Clusters based on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, municipalities of the Southern of municipalities characteristics, socio-economic and based demographic on Clusters I Billeter- the form, original its n I aytime-night time popula aytime-night rojected population change change population rojected structure age rojected er cent of managerial and professional workers workers professional and managerial of er cent er cent of family households with minor minor with households family of er cent Municipal tax revenue per tax revenue Municipal in ¥1000 (2005) capita Unemployment rate in per cent (2005) in per cent rate Unemployment (2005) children (2005) children (2000–2030; 2000 = 100) I (Billeter- ote: * ote: able 1 able (8) (7) mployment change (2000–2005; 2000 = 100) change (6) e mployment (5) d (4) p (3) p Variable T (1) p (2) p means and eta squared and means 122–123). number the and the lower ofelderly people number the higherthe value, the negative more The children. of the number by relativized ageing of age. employable of the population to relative children of O Source: accessed (last 29 D http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Xlsdl.do?sinfid=000002902968 (8) on Var. 2005); and population under 15 years and the population from 50 years of age onward by the number of people aged between 15 and 49 years ( K years 49 and 15 between aged people of number the by onward age of years 50 from population the and years 15 under population N 476 ralph lützeler as an indicator for the economic performance of a municipality, is represented by less than half by the clustering compared to the daytime- night time population ratio indicating the level of employment centrality (38.4 per cent and 84.2 per cent, respectively). In general, however, the obtained eta squared values are high, showing that the clusters created can indeed be interpreted as groups of municipalities that share demographic and socio-economic features. Clusters 1 to 4 do not reveal major signs of demographic decline and can thus be dealt with briefly. Cluster 1 is made up of the three inner Tokyo wards of Chiyoda, Chūō and Minato, and may thus be termed the ‘city centre group’. This group is characterized by high levels of employment centrality, projected population increase, occupational skills among its resident employees (indicated by variable 4) and municipal tax revenues (indicating sufficient room for fiscal manoeu- vring), as well as by comparatively low levels of unemployment or population ageing. To the west and south, this group is adjoined by cluster 2, which comprises densely built-up communities such as Shinjuku Ward or Ōta Ward. These wards show sound social and economic conditions despite a lesser degree of demographic vitality, as compared to the city centre area. Cluster 3 comprises suburban areas in close proximity to the Tokyo city centre, areas that display stable demographic and economic conditions and to which belong well- known cities of one million inhabitants or more such as Yokohama, Kawasaki and Chiba, as well as many smaller cities located directly to the west and east of Tokyo proper. Finally, the major characteristics of cluster 4 are high projected population increases, a high share of family households and an excellent economic performance during the first half of the 2000s. Represented, among others, by the cities of Saitama (Saitama Prefecture), Narita (Chiba Prefecture) and Hachiōji (Tokyo Prefecture), this cluster comprises suburban areas that are still growing, in part due to thriving industries such as those related to Narita International Airport. Clusters 5 to 7 are characterized by a much more unstable demographic situation. Cluster 5 (cf. Figure 1) shows a concentration at the fringes of the Tokyo commuter belt. The northern part of Saitama Prefecture in particular is included here, comprising cities such as Kumagaya or Fukaya along the border to Gunma Prefecture. A high proportion of households with minors, on the one hand, and a comparatively old age structure expected for the future, on the other, left behind in the global city 477

Source: cf. Table 1. Figure 1 distribution of municipalities classified into cluster 5 suggest that these areas had recorded large migration surpluses of young families until only a few years ago, but then ceased to do so. Projections assume that population figures will decrease markedly in the future. These municipalities were popular new residential areas during the era of soaring land prices until the early 1990s. It was only there that middle-class families could still realize their dream of becoming owner-occupiers of detached homes. Today, in view of markedly reduced land prices in more central locations, neighbourhoods in these areas, especially when they are more than one kilometre away from a railway station, suffer from a shortage of new residents and an outflow of children leaving the area, suggesting that ageing will soon become a manifest problem (Esaki 2006: 128). Cluster 6 (cf. Figure 2) shows a multiple nuclei distribution pattern. It is characterized by areas of high unemployment and rather low proportions of workers in high-skill occupations. To this group belong 478 ralph lützeler

Source: cf. Table 1. Figure 2 distribution of municipalities classified into cluster 6 municipalities such as the industrial city of Satte in Saitama Prefec ture or the cities of Kisarazu and Sodegaura in Chiba Prefecture, which are part of the industrial belt surrounding Tokyo Bay. These areas are already highly affected by ageing and will have lost more than 10 per cent of their present population size by 2030. Most municipalities in this cluster suffered from employment losses in the manufacturing sector during the economic crisis of the 1990s. As a consequence, younger workers left these areas, leaving behind elderly and unskilled workers. It should be emphasized that even the northeastern sector of Tokyo proper is included in this cluster, represented by the wards of Arakawa, Kita, Adachi and Katsushika (cf. Lützeler 2008: 272, 274). Cluster 7 (cf. Figure 3), finally, reflects the situation in the outermost parts of Southern Kantō, such as the southern half of Bōsō Peninsula or the mountainous areas around Chichibu City in western Saitama Prefecture. Here, ageing and shrinking assume alarming proportions left behind in the global city 479

Source: cf. Table 1. Figure 3 distribution of municipalities classified into cluster 7 and tax revenues are the lowest. Obviously, these communities are not part of the TMA in functional terms but have much more in common with depopulated rural areas of the Japanese periphery (cf. Elis in this volume). As a whole, the classification results have revealed that, apart from rural communities at the periphery of the Southern Kantō Region, areas most affected by demographic decline or the prospect of it are: (1) municipalities that are located at the outer margin of the suburban belt and have become relatively inconvenient for residents commuting to the city centre of Tokyo, and (2) communities that have recently suffered heavy losses of jobs in the manufacturing sector. This finding corresponds well with the argument that there are growing disparities between ‘hotspot’ and ‘coldspot’ areas in Tokyo, an argument that has been put forward by the well-known urban housing researcher Hirayama Yōsuke (2006: 79–85, 129–144) in his book Tōkyō no hate ni 480 ralph lützeler

Source: Own calculations based on Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku (1995, 2005). Figure 4 population change (per cent) during the period 1995–2005, Tokyo ward area

[Tokyo at the bounds]. As coldspots, he, too, identifies the partly de- industrialized blue-collar districts of northeastern Tokyo as well as suburban areas farther away from major commuter traffic routes, both of which have become deeply unattractive for real estate developers to invest in; while hotspot areas are located in the city centre and along the waterfront, where new stylish high-rise building clusters, including expensive condominiums for the upper-middle class, herald huge profits for the construction industry and other businesses. The overall population trend by wards during the period from 1995 to 2005 is prob ably the best indicator to show both the location and the sharpening left behind in the global city 481 contrast between hotspot and coldspot areas in the Tokyo core city region (cf. Figure 4). It becomes evident that population numbers have grown substantially in the city centre area (comprising the wards of Chiyoda, Chūō and Minato) and along the waterfront, while the northern and northeastern wards, which are traditionally dominated by blue-collar workers, are stagnating. Apparently, demographic shrinkage at the level of whole municipalities in the TMA is largely the outcome of economic decline amidst growth, be it collapsed real estate markets or de-industrialization.

3. demographic Decline in the Tokyo Core City Area: Patterns and Explanations

At the neighbourhood level in Tokyo proper, population decrease is often the outcome of residential use being replaced by commercial functions, and thus a sign of economic vitality rather than decline. For this reason, only those neighbourhoods that are showing high rates of demographic ageing are considered in the following. In Figure 5, the locations of the 50 most aged neighbourhoods or districts (chōchō) out of almost 3,000 are indicated by circles.2 The figure also reveals that except for a few special cases – such as the day-labourer district of San’ya (Kiyokawa 2-chōme) situated in the northeastern corner of Taitō Ward, or areas dominated by homes for the elderly (indicated in the figure by circles with dashed edges) – highly aged neighbourhoods can be classified into one of two types. One type includes inner area districts, often adjacent to noisy railway lines and built up with many old wooden houses inhabited by elderly owner-occupiers. Since all these areas are centrally located, it might be only a matter of time until urban redevelopment will bring young people back (or wipe out residential use altogether) and thus solve the ageing ‘problem’ in its own particular manner. More numerous – and presumably more permanent – are neighbourhoods dominated by public rental housing estates. Interestingly, nine of these districts (indicated in the figure by arrows) are also in the top fifty neighbourhoods marked by

2 The number of residents in most neighbourhoods, orchōchō – the smallest administrative units in Japanese cities, ranges between 500 and 6,000 people. To keep the effect of random biases to a minimum, neighbourhoods with less than 500 residents were merged with other, adjacent neighbourhoods of larger size. 482 ralph lützeler high unemployment rates (as a proxy variable for poverty). This fact is in line with the message of several recent Japanese publications – newspaper articles and academic books alike – arguing that many Japanese rental housing estates or jūtaku danchi, once regarded as symbolic places of post-war social equality (cf. AERA 23 July 2007: 46–50), have turned into social problem areas, which will be considered in more detail below. When analyzing temporal changes in poverty and ageing of Tokyo residents by tenure of dwelling, it becomes apparent that the current extent of the problems found in public rental housing districts is indeed

Source: Own calculations based on Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku (2005). Figure 5 neighbourhoods with the highest rates of elderly people (rank 1 to 50), Tokyo ward area, 2005 left behind in the global city 483 a rather new phenomenon. Poverty as defined by the share of households belonging to the lowest income quintile has always been substantial among local government housing residents, but the additional increase from 37.8 per cent in 1988 to 53.0 per cent in 20033 is remarkable nonetheless. During the same time, by contrast, income poverty declined in the private rental sector with its mass of tiny low-quality apartments (from 37.0 per cent to 31.0 per cent), probably due to the new construction of pricey rental flats in the city centre, while poverty levels did not change much (and are still below the prefectural average) in public corporation rental housing estates aimed at middle-class families. Population ageing, on the other hand, is proceeding fast in both types of public housing (cf. Figure 6). During the short time span from 1995 to 2005, the percentage of residents who were at least 65 years old jumped from 18.6 to 32.2 per cent among tenants of local government housing, and doubled from 10.1 to 20.3 per cent in the public corporation housing sector. Unlike many European estate areas (except for those of Southern Europe; cf. Dekker and Van Kempen 2005), however, housing estates in Tokyo do not house high proportions of foreign nationals, nor are they blighted by vandalism or low levels of public safety. Non-Japanese citizens can apply for public housing in Japan, but due to their comparatively low numbers, and since they do not belong to a specially targeted group, they form a significant proportion of residents only in some provincial towns where competition for public housing admission is more relaxed and the number of foreign workers is high (such as in cities dominated by the car industry; cf. Shūkan Daiyamondo 5 September 2009: 45). TheK irigaoka local government housing estate, situated in the north of Tokyo close to Akabane station, is a typical case of a large estate area that shows all the problems mentioned so far.4 In 2005, about 7,200 people lived in this neighbourhood that was constructed piecemeal between 1957 and 1975 on a plateau with a good panoramic view of the alluvial lowlands lying to the northeast. Although the estate area itself is quite appealing with many trees and large park areas, housing

3 figures were obtained by own calculations (method: proportional allocation) based on data taken from Jūtaku, tochi tōkei chōsa (Housing and Land Survey of Japan), published by Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku (1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003). For details on the calculation method, cf. Toyoda (1999: 238–240). 4 all figures listed in this paragraph were taken from the result sheets of the Japanese population census (Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 1995, 2005). 484 ralph lützeler

Source: Own calculations based on Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku (1995, 2005). Figure 6 elderly people 65 years of age and over (per cent) by tenure of dwelling, Tokyo ward area, 1995–2005 standards are rather low. Since two-thirds of the original dwellings had not been equipped with bathrooms, let alone devices for physically disabled people, some housing units were torn down and rebuilt, while others were renovated recently. Unemployment is high (13.9 per cent in 2005 compared to 5.6 per cent in the whole Tokyo ward area), although there are other estates with even higher rates. Due to the large decrease in the number of children (only 5 per cent of all residents were below 15 years of age in 2005), no less than three elementary schools were closed down in the vicinity in the last four to five years. Instead, demographic ageing is proceeding fast: While in 1995, 26.7 per cent of all residents were 65 years of age or older, this figure rose sharply to 46.7 per cent in 2005, thereby almost meeting the criteria of a marginal settlement (genkai shūraku) on the verge of desertion due to the share of elderly people exceeding 50 per cent. Until a few years ago, this term had only been in use for rural hamlets but is now applied by the media to urban neighbourhoods such as Kirigaoka as well (e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun 17 February 2009: 31; Asahi Shimbun 1 May 2009: 29; Shūkan Daiyamondo 5 September 2009: 30–69). This high proportion of elderly people becomes a problem insofar as more and left behind in the global city 485 more of them are living alone. In Kirigaoka, the share of one-person households among all households with elderly members rose from 37.0 per cent in 1995 to 44.3 per cent in 2005. One result of this has been an increase in cases of solitary deaths (kodokushi) reported; that is, deaths which are discovered only after some time has passed. Furthermore, estate areas inhabited by single elderly people such as Kirigaoka have become a prime target area for dubious door-to-door sales people (Shūkan Daiyamondo 5 September 2009: 40, 42–43). Finally, elderly people tend to not leave their dwelling except when absolutely necessary, making many estate areas look uninhabited (Ōyama 2008: 23). The main shopping district ofK irigaoka, an almost deserted rectangular courtyard, conveyed a surreal atmosphere when I visited the area in August 2008. About half of the shops appeared to have been shut down, while others offered durable products such as toys, which seemed totally out of place here, given the low percentage of resident children noted above. Without doubt, the bleak situation in the estates is not least the result of growing socio-economic inequality and rising shares of the elderly due to demographic change seen all over Japan during the last ten to fifteen years. Ageing in place is widespread since many elderly have lived in the estates from the time they were first occupied (Ōyama 2008: 20, 25–26). An even more significant factor, however, is a recent paradigm shift in housing policies, put into effect by several amendments to the Local Government Housing Law (Kōei jūtaku-hō). In quantitative terms, the scope of public rental housing (including public corporation rental housing) as a housing provider has always been rather limited, since post-war Japanese housing politics have constantly emphasized the creation of ownership as an instrument to build a solid middle-class society. Highly subsidized local government rental housing – in 2003 accounting for no more than 5.2 per cent of the housing stock in the Tokyo ward area (own calculations based on Sōmushō Tōkeikyoku 2003) – was originally meant for young middle- class-to-be families who stood on the bottom rung of the so-called housing-career ladder, since due to Japan’s seniority wage system they had not yet secured enough financial resources to buy their own home (Hirayama 2006: 158). But the role assigned to the estates has changed completely. Proceeding on the idea that, in principle, housing provision as well as building loan agreements should be left to the private sector, local government housing is now defined as a safety net or last- resort reception area for those who are too weak economically or 486 ralph lützeler socially to find adequate housing on the market.T o guarantee that only the neediest get a dwelling, access to local government housing has become more and more restricted. In order to gain admission, one has to at least fall below a certain income threshold. Until 1996, one had to belong to the lowest third of income earners; since then it is the lowest quarter. Successful applicants are then determined by drawing lots (Hirayama 2006: 225–237; 2009: 245–250). On average, only one applicant in 40 or 50 draws a winning number in Tokyo. This is because Tokyo Prefecture, due to the ‘last resort’ line of thinking and in ready acceptance of central state policy lines, refuses to increase the stock (TJSK 2006: 22–23). The chances of being selected rise, however, when one is officially acknowledged as heading a household for which the market is unable to deliver decent housing. Such categorization of the needy started with households of elderly people in 1980 and subsequently has been extended to households with physically or mentally disabled members, leprosy patients, single-mother households, victims of violence or natural disasters, and people receiving welfare benefits. Such households may draw five to seven lots at a time, and income qualifications are more relaxed (Hirayama 2009: 250–255).5 Since other needy groups such as younger ‘working poor’ households are not included (as long as they are not receiving welfare benefits, the granting of which is no less restricted), it has been criticized that the decision of whom to grant preferential access is less grounded on objective measurement of need- iness but more on arbitrary political agreement on who deserves to be supported (TJSK 2006: 42–48; Hirayama 2009: 259–264).

Is there a theoretical framework that can be used to put all these various manifestations of demographic decline amidst growth, both at the municipal and neighbourhood level, into a larger context? Since Tokyo is usually referred to as a first-grade global city along with London, New York or other large Asian metropolises such as Shanghai or Singapore (cf., e.g., Sonobe 2001; Sassen 20012; Shindō and Goishi 2006), global city theory might hold the key for understanding why the demographic structure of adjacent urban areas develops in completely

5 More detailed information is available on the webpage of the Bureau of Urban Development, Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Tōkyō-to Toshi Seibikyoku), http://www.toshiseibi.metro.tokyo.jp/juutaku_keiei/261toei2.htm (last accessed 29 December 2009). left behind in the global city 487 opposite directions. In contending that the dynamism of global cities is more strongly related to the global than the national economy (Sassen 20012: 8–9), this theory might be used to answer the question of why the TMA continues to grow while other parts of Japan, at best, stagnate. Overall increasing socio-economic polarization can also be explained by referring to this theory insofar as it holds that new jobs in global cities are mainly created at the higher or lower end of the service sector while typical (lower) middle-class employment in clerical or production occupations is being reduced (Sassen 20012: 201–204, 284– 288). In its turn, this is supposed to lead to a growing gap between the city centre, where the new service class elite tends to concentrate in increasingly gentrified districts, and the rest of the urban agglomeration, blue-collar areas in particular (Sassen 20012: 260–262). Such a trend can indeed be observed in Tokyo as well, as has been noted in Section 2 above. However, global city theory does not pay much attention to the role of politics, nor does it take the mechanisms of the housing market into account. Due to these shortcomings, the theory inter alia lacks sufficient starting points to explain the increase in small- scale residential segregation at the neighbourhood level (White 1998: 456–459; Lützeler 2008: 30–33, 59–60). To overcome this lack, a somewhat different theoretical approach is needed. It is my hypothesis that so-called entrepreneurial city politics as defined by David Harvey (1989), finally established in Japan by the start of this century, do heavily contribute to current residential enclave formation in Tokyo. Entrepreneurial city politics mean a shift away from the long-standing managerial role of local governments to provide services, facilities and benefits to urban citizens, and towards an economic growth strategy which focuses on the attraction of “external sources of funding, new direct investment, or new employment sources” (Harvey 1989: 7). De-industrialization, fiscal constraints as well as a supposed threat of being surpassed by other cities in the race for new employment bases form the background of this paradigm shift in urban politics, which started in the US during the 1970s. Crucial for the formation of small- scale residential enclaves is the fact that the upgrading of the city image to draw in capital and/or wealthy residents mainly rests on practicable small-scale redevelopment projects – often designed by internationally renowned architects – rather than tedious improvement schemes targeting whole city districts. The lack of resources to realize economic restructuring on their own account usually induces city administrations to form ‘public-private partnerships’ with the private sector, the 488 ralph lützeler latter being rewarded through incentives such as the abolition or weakening of city planning standards, tax exemptions or the bargain sale of public space including public housing. In Japan, city politics have eventually turned in the same direction, in effect challenging the popular image of Japan as being a “developmental state” (cf. Johnson 1995) in which the government bureaucracy guides the private economic sector (as well as the political class). Already in the late 1980s and ending a sustained period of half-hearted efforts at regional decentralization, Japanese urban renewal activities became more and more re-focused on Tokyo to support the city in its competition race with other global cities, proceeding on the assumption that a strong Tokyo would eventually invigorate the whole Japanese economy (Hirayama 2006: 16–23). These state-promoted activities already centred on the location of service sector industries combined with housing and facilities for the better-off, but still the less privileged were not forgotten. Thus, all major city centre renewal projects of the 1990s included some public housing blocks for the lower and lower- middle classes (cf. Hohn 2000: 333–339, 534–536). Following Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s election as Japanese prime minister in 2001, however, things became more market-driven: Based on the national Urban Revitalization Law (Toshi saisei-hō) of 2002, and with the unanimous approval of the prefectural government led by the conservative mayor Ishihara Shintarō, city planning rules such as upper floor-space limits were partly suspended in specially designated areas of the city centre, while the financing as well as the central handling of urban restructuring projects was left to large private consortia. The result was an even faster pace of new construction of isolated high-rise building clusters in the city centre at the relative expense of more peripheral locations (Hirayama 2006: 25–32). Obviously, it is these changes in the concep- tion of what city politics should be concerned with that also provide the backdrop for the aforementioned retreat of the state from an active role in most housing policy fields and the growing residualism in the provision of affordable housing.

4. restructuring the Danchi: Political Priorities and Disregards

It is true that the prefectural government of Tokyo has taken an active role in the neo-liberal turn in city and housing politics, but it is hard to imagine that the current state of their housing estates as outlined above left behind in the global city 489 finds the undivided approval of the responsible actors in the Tokyo administration. It has thus to be asked whether the prefectural authorities have any strategies at hand to mitigate the deteriorating state of the local government estates. In fact, several countermeasures have already been carried out or were endorsed. The types of measures that have been selected, however, reveals a problem consciousness that is markedly different to what would be expected from a European perspective. The currentT okyo Prefectural Housing Masterplan, effective for the period 2006–2015 (Tōkyō-to 2007), explicitly states that all dwellings built up until 1965 are to be replaced by state-of-the-art high-rise dwellings, and those built between 1965 and 1970 have to be refur- bished and renovated in order to meet the requirements of an aged society (TJSK 2006: 26; Tōkyō-to 2007: 51). In particular, this refers to the installation of elevators, bathrooms and other devices that provide for barrier-free living. In the case of rebuilding, all former tenants still eligible for local government housing at the time of demolition have the right to return. Rent increases do occur, but they are usually moderate and even waived if a household is not able to pay the increase. This means that housing standards are improved without displacing poor households. However, since the right to return applies only to those households that still meet the allocation criteria, every rebuilding activity further intensifies social and demographic segregation (Ōyama 2008: 52–53). Further more, the high rate of single elderly households in such estates is the reason for equipping the new blocks with a high share of very small units (Tokyo being at the bottom with 32 sqm; cf. Asahi Shimbun 1 May 2009: 29). Since people forming a single household are usually only admitted when they are 60 years or older, this construction policy is very likely to perpetuate a high percentage of elderly residents. Finally, social relations between households that had lived next door in the old buildings might break up because former tenants are located in the new housing blocks by drawing lots (Ōyama 2008: 54). Human relations could become more anonymous, which could add to the number of solitary deaths. In order to change back the estates into more lively communities less isolated from surrounding neighbourhoods, the prefectural housing administration follows two principles. First, it promotes the integration of rebuilding activities into larger urban renewal projects wherever applicable. A typical way to do this is to sell parts of the estate area to private developers who will build rented apartments or condominiums for middle- and higher-income groups. The prefecture 490 ralph lützeler then uses the profits realized from the sale to finance the construction of new estate buildings – usually high-rise blocks to make good the loss in building area (Tōkyō-to 2007: 53–54). In this way, a more socially balanced population might be achieved for the area as a whole. At the building block level, however, segregation remains high, meaning that the chance of direct social contacts between the different groups of residents is rather low. Second, the prefecture, by implementing regulations that were part of the 2005 amendment of the Local Government Housing Law, has further enlarged the list of specially targeted households by including families with at least two children under the age of 18. And if the children are below the age of six, preferential treatment is granted even when the household income exceeds the set threshold. This measure has been adopted not only to create more lively areas, but even more to act as an element in the more extensive efforts to raise Japan’s birth rate (Tōkyō-to 2007: 72; Hirayama 2009: 253–254). This sounds reasonable, but without increasing the housing stock, it also adds to the tendency of virtually excluding needy households who are not defined as a special target group. A closer look at what is not mentioned in the official prefectural statements reveals a different aspect as to the intentions underlying these policies: That is, there are no remarks whatsoever indicating that the strategy to mix housing tenure types and population groups adopted for Tokyo estates is motivated by the attempt to enhance social interactions of the residents with mainstream society and, as a result, to increase their social opportunities – as is, by contrast, the case with many European projects to improve the structure of social housing estates (cf. Andersson and Musterd 2005: 128–130). There is obviously no predilection for area-based social integration policies among prefectural politicians and other actors. It rather seems that all these measures are conceived more to improve the outward appearances of the area and, by this, of the city as a whole. Japanese city planners regularly stress the need for neighbourhoods to be lively (Lützeler 2008: 308). In the present case, this means that a situation is to be avoided where, due to the frailty, immobility or apathy of a mainly aged resident population, or an increase in vacant units, estate areas attract burglars or fraudsters, or become blighted with garbage – a situation that might even spread to neighbouring districts. There are already many estates where, due to a decline in participation, neighbourhood associations have become defunct or have been left behind in the global city 491 dissolved (TJSK 2006: 33–34). Adding to this concept, Japanese urban planners have recently taken up the compact city paradigm from Europe. Hence they aim at a cityscape that is compact (thus the preference for high-rise buildings), ecologically sound, functionally mixed and orderly designed. Again, this planning ideal is part of the efforts to help Tokyo in attracting foreign investors and expatriates and thus to successfully compete with other global cities (Saito and Thornley 2003: 676–677). Obviously, the integration of estate rebuilding activities into larger urban renewal projects mentioned above is in line with this paradigm. Seen from this viewpoint, the estate renewal projects, including the social mix strategy, are part of the entrepreneurial turn in Japanese urban politics rather than policies meant as a social corrective.

5. Conclusions

To sum up the major findings of this chapter, the following remarks can be made: (1) At the municipal level, remotely-located commuter towns and cities suffering from de-industrialization are the areas most affected by population ageing and decline in theT MA. (2) At the level of neighbourhoods in the Tokyo ward area, ageing has assumed the highest proportions in some inner city districts not yet touched by urban redevelopment and in local government housing estates. (3) So-called entrepreneurial city politics have a boosting effect on the spatial concentration of demographic ageing in the TMA. First, state- supervised private urban redevelopment mega-projects, meant to keep or raise the status of Tokyo as a global city, are exclusively located in the city centre where profit returns are highest, leading to a relative status loss and even disregard of more peripheral areas. Second – and in line with the gradual retreat of local governments from their managerial function as service providers – admission to public housing has become more and more restricted, targeting the very poor, the disabled and the aged. (4) The actors responsible for the management of local government housing are aware of problems in their estates. However, their counter-strategies are embedded in the overall effort to create an orderly designed city rather than being part of social integration policies. What is intended for the estates is to generate a lively, safe atmosphere in order to dilute existing social problems and maintain the global attractiveness of Tokyo. Here again, policies are in line with the entrepreneurial city paradigm.

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Abe, Atsuko 344 Berger, Suzanne 69, 71 Abegglen, James 269 Billari, Francesco C. 21, 151 Adachi, Kiyoshi 314 Birg, Herwig 57 Adserà, Alice 6 Bleses, Peter 176, 177, 178, Ahn, Namkee 82 188, 191 Alders, Maartens 20 Blossfeld, Hans-Peter 302 Alic, Safet 250 Bödeker, Wolfgang 301 Alley, Dawn 295 Börsch-Supan, Axel H. 300 Amabile, Teresa M. 298 Boling, Patricia 206, 215, 220, 232 Amrhein, Ludwig 144, 145, 148 Boltanski, Luc 79 Andersson, Gunar 167 Bonoli, Giuliano 179, 182 Andersson, Rodger 490 Borman, Walter C. 295, 296 Ando, Junko 30 Brandt, Martina 145 Andō, Hidehiro 125 Brettell, Caroline 326–327, 345 Anheier, Helmut 312 Brewster, Karin L. 166 Arai, Makoto 30, 373, 387, 395 Bronfenbrenner, Urie 251 Arai, Noboyuki 314 Brown, Penelope 367 Arai, Yoshio 430 Bucher, Hansjörg 400 Argote, Linda 302 Buchholz, Sandra 302 Armstrong-Strassen, Marjorie 305 Buck, Hartmut 302, 305 Arthur, Michael B. 295 Bullinger, Hand-Jörg 302 Asahi Shimbun 162, 195, 342, 343, 374, Buzar, Stefan 409 379, 448, 454, 484, 489 Atoh, Makoto 4, 27, 40, 98, 102, 151, Caldwell, John C. 151 152, 154, 155, 156, 158, 167, 170, Caldwell, Pat 151 171, 232, 233 Cameron, Stuart 472 Avolio, Bruce J. 297 Campbell, John C. 3, 311, 327 Campbell, Mary 175, 179 Backes, Gertrud M. 27, 141, 142, 143, Campbell, Ruth 334 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, Cascio, Wayne F. 297 Backhaus, Peter 30, 363, 367 Cassens, Insa 401 Bade, Klaus J. 59 Castles, Francis 182 Baehre, Klaas 469 Castles, Stephen 326 Ballescas, Maria Rosario Piquero 344 Castro, Luis J. 431 Baltes, Paul B. 297 Chang, Chingching 290 Bandō, Kumiko 230 Chiapello, Eve 79 Barlösius, Eva 467, 468, 471 Chiavacci, David 324 Barry, Thomas E. 290 Clasen, Jochen 66 Basso, Sara 21 Coale, Ansley J. 35 Bechtold, Sonja 214 Cohen Gene D. 297 Beck, Robert 233, 235 Coleman, David A. 35, 43 Beckert, Jens 94 Coleman Liv 229 Beetz, Stephan 31 Conrad, Harald 1, 270, 272, 274, 276, Bell, Wendell 249 277, 285, 288, 291 Bens, Oliver 472 Cornelius, Wayne A. 329 Beneker, Hanna 350 Coulmas, Florian 4, 144–145, 269, 277, Beppu, Motomi 35 291, 334 530 index of authors cited

Crimmins, Eileen 295 Funck, Caolin 449 Crystal, Stephen 116 Fukushima, Yutaka 230 Furdell, Kimberley 411 D’Addio, Anna Cristina 50 Furukawa, Kojun 233 D’Ercole, Marco Mira 50 Dalla Zuanna, Gianpiero 44 Gambles, Richenda 180 Daly, Mary 180, 183 Gans, Paul 408 Date, Yusukue 209, 232 Gassmann, Oliver 275 Deci, Edward L. 234, 235 Gauthier, Anne H. 152 Dekker, Karien 483 Gerhards, Jürgen 177 Del Boca, Daniela 209 Gerling, Vera 291 Deller, Jürgen 301 Germer, Andrea 205, 206, 213 Da-anoy, Mary Angeline 440 Gibb, Heather 364 Demeny, Paul 51 Giddens, Anthony 182 Dollinger, Stephen J. 300 Gillis, John 5 Dollinger, Stephanie M. Clany 300 Gills, Dong-Sook S. 327 Dombrowski, Rosine 175, 176 Göschel, Albrecht 410 Dorbritz, Jürgen 401 Goishi, Norimichi 486 Drucker, Peter F. 5, 269 Goldstein, Joshua R. 6, 52 Dychtwald, Ken 269, 293 Goldstone, Jack 56 Golini, Antonio 21 Ebersole, Priscilla 356, 358 Goodman, Roger 175 Eichhorst, Werner 68 Goody, Jack 5 Eisenmenger, Matthias 399 Gottschalk, Georg 311 Elder, Glen 116 Grainger, Karen 364 Elis, Volker 31, 444–45, 447, 464, 479 Grolnick, Wendy S. 234 Ellison, Glen 305 Grünhage-Monetti, Matilde 356, 358 Engelbrech, Gerhard 192 Gruescu, Sandra 192 Erickson, Tamara 293 Gudorf, Pascal 269, 270, 278, 280–84 Ericsson, Karl Anders 299 Gürtler, Martin 446 Esaki, Yūji 434, 445, 477 Güttel, Wolfgang H. 287 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 80, 175, Guzzo, Karen B. 45 179, 181 Häußermann, Hartmut 402, 409 Fagnani, Jeanne 167 Hagstrom, Cynthia 369 Fillmore, Charles 363 Hall, Douglas T. 295 Flaste, Richard 234 Hank, Karsten 192, 205, 209, Fleckenstein, Timo 175, 181, 193 210, 223 Flöthmann, E.-Jürgen 57 Hara, Toshihiko 448 Flower, Joe 269 Harvey, David 474, 487 Flüchter, Winfried 444–45 Hashimoto, Ryūtarō 237 Fokkema, Tina 46 Haub, Carl 5 Folts, W. Edwards 296 Hedge, Jerry W. 295, 296 Fougère, Maxime 295 Heindorf, Viktoria 270 Frejka, Thomas 37 Henninger, Annette 175, 176, 188 Freund, Alexander M. 297 Henseke, Golo 297 Friebe, Jens 30 Herstatt, Cornelius 269–70, 275, 278, Friedrich, Klaus 412 280–84 Friedrichs, Jürgen 402, 409 Hertog, Ekaterina 185, 205 Fudenberg, Drew 305 Hess, Patricia 356, 358 Fujimoto, Makoto 286 Hesse, Markus 408 Fujimura, Masayuki 117 Hetze, Pascal 301 Fujita, Yoshihisa 445 Hewitt, Paul S. 142 Fukawa, Hisashi 277, 294 Hideg, Andrea 269, 291 Fukuda, Nobutaka 165 Higaki, Takumi 454 index of authors cited 531

Higo, Masa 273–74, 279, 285, 287 Kegel, Sandra 206 Hill, Edward W. 411 Kemper, Franz-Josef 31, 406, 408, 475 Hinneberg, Sabrina 354 Kerr, William R. 1 Hipp, Christiane 28, 29, 297 Keupp, Marcus M. 275 Hirai, Makoto 435 Kim, Bum Jung 24 Hirayama, Yōsuke 479, 485–86, 488, 490 Kim, Nora Hui-Jung 24 Hiroi, Yoshinori 322 Kingma, Mireille 326, 332, 351 Hochschild, Arlie Russell 86, 183 Kinoshita, Reiko 221 Hofäcker, Dirk 302 Kiriku, Takashi 198 Hohn, Uta 488 Kistler, Ernst 305 Hoisl, Karin 297 Kitamoto, Keiko 361 Holthus, Barbara 28, 204, 205, 206, 211, Klein, Axel 28, 231 212, 213 Klingholz, Reiner 22, 26, 55, 57, 80, 399 Hoßmann, Iris 22, 55, 80 Knapp, James 295 Hrebenar, Ronald J. 230 Knight, John 448 Huber, Evelyn 175, 180 Knierim, Andrea 472 Hummert, Mary L. 362 Kobayashi, Atsuko 332, 344 Hurd, Michael D. 116 Köhler, Götz 250 Köppen, Bernhard 408 Ichijo, Kazuo 289 Kohlbacher, Florian 28, 29, 270, Ide, Sachiko 370 272–73, 275, 278, 280–84, 288, Idei, Yasuhiro 328 289, 291, 294 Iguchi, Yasushi 324, 328 Kohler, Hans-Peter 151 Iizaka, Masahiro 430 Komatsu, Mitsuyo 361 Ikegami, Naoki 1, 327 Kono, Shigemi 2, 4, 8, 26, 35, 44 Imai, Ken 430–31 Kramer, Ina 301 Inaba, Keiko 324, 328, 330, 332 Kreckel, Reinhard 468 Ingram, Paul 302 Kreyenfeld, Michaela 192, 205, 209, Ishii, Daiichirō 317–18, 322 210, 223 Ishikawa, Yoshitaka 31, 428, 433, Kröhnert Steffen 22, 55, 57, 80, 399 437–40, 442 Krüger, Thomas 265 Ishizuka, Masahiko 324 Kubo, Tomohiro 433 Iversen, Thorben 175 Kuroki, Yasuhiro 361 Iwai, Nobuaki 389 Kyōgoku, Takanobu 115 Izuhara, Misa 321 Laaser, Ulrich 250, 263 Jansen, Marius B. 323 Läpple, Dieter 409, 462 Janssen, Onne 297 Laming, Donald 233 Jasilioniene, Aiva 6, 52 Lammlein, Steven E. 295 Jenson, Jane 182 Leach, Desmond J. 298 Johnson, Chalmers 488 Lee, Chul Woo 439 Judt, Tony 72 Lee, Joseph S. 25 Jugaku, Akiko 367 Lee, Sang-Hyop 232 Lee, Wonjae 18 Kajita, Shin 458 Lefebvre, Henri 467 Kamikawa, Yōko 240 Leibold, Marius 295, 296 Kamiya, Hiroo 439 Lens, Willy 234 Kamiyama, Yasushi 375, 393, 396 Lesthaeghe, John C. 5, 6, 45 Kammerman, S.B. 165 Levine, John M. 5 Kamo, Hiroyasu 430 Lewis, Jane 175, 179 Kaneko, Ryuichi 4, 102, 105, 110, Lewis, Suzan 180 153, 421 Liaw, Kao Lee 427 Katō, Shinji 361 Liefbroer, Aart C. 46 Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 247 Lin, Wan-I 14, 15, 16 Kawaguchi, Yoshichika 336–39, 341 Long, Susan O. 310, 327 532 index of authors cited

Lützeler, Ralph 32, 250, 319, 444, 445, Neu, Claudia 467–69, 471 451, 452, 464, 478, 487, 490 Neurath, Oskar 8 Luhmann, Niklas 264 Nihon Fujin Dantai Rengōkai 207 Lutz, Wolfgang 6 Nishino, Toshiaki 450 Lutz, Burkart 461 Nishimura, Shūzō 115 Nishizaki, Fumihira 125 Maas, Utz 353 Noda, Seiko 237 Machida, Toshihiko 450 Nolte, Hans-Heinrich 469 Machold, Ingrid 471 Nonaka, Ikujiro 272 Maeda, Daisaku 310 Maeda, Minoru 395 Obayashi, M. 3 Meadows, Donella 35 Ōbuchi, Hiroshi 233 Magnus, George 269 Ochiai, Emiko 119 Mai, Ralf 316, 399, 406, 408, 412 Ogawa, Naohiro 232, 342 Maier, Heiner 402 Ogawa, Reiko 323, 328, 345 Manning, Roger 362, 369 Ohtake, Fumio 116, 294 Masuda, Masanobu 233 Oishi, Akiko S. 210 Matsukura, Rikiya 232 Oishi, Nana 210, 325, 326, 343 Matsutani, Akihiko 287, 288 Okahashi, Hidenori 445 Mau, Steffen 461 Okamura, Shigeo 313 Merridew, Tanya 472 Okayama, Yasuko 215, 361 McCormick, Kay M. 366 Onoda, Takao 361 McCreery, John 269, 275 Ōnuki, Masao 374, 379 McDonald, Peter 6, 44, 106, 151, O’Rand, Angela M. 117 152, 232 Orloff, Ann Shola 175 McEvoy, Glenn M. 297 Ortego, J. A. 151 Meadows, Donella 35 Ōsawa, Mari 175, 180, 194 Mendius, Franziska 305 Ōumi, Kazuo 310 Mérette, Marcel 295 Ōyama, Mahito 485, 489 Merkle, Tanja 89 Ozawa, Machiko 195, 196, 198 Mertens, Peter 272, 285, 286 Merton, Robert K. 116 Palomba, Rossella 17, 21 Meyer, Jenny 297 Pampel, Fred C. 116 Meyer, Traute 188 Papadopoulos, Irena 355 Meyer-Ohle, Hendrik 274, 288 Parker, Martin 239 Micheli, Giuseppe A. 44 Pekkala Kerr, Sari 1 Micheel, Frank 399 Peng, Ito 175, 193, 194 Mira, Pedro 82 Piore, Michael 69, 71 Mitani, Naoki 285, 293 Piper, Nicola 327, 344, 438 Miyajima, Hiroshi 115 Pirkl, James J. 292 Miyazawa, Kiichi 237 Plieninger, Tobias 469, 472 Mörk, Eva 209 Polanyi, Karl 72, 78 Moerke, Andreas 291 Pomerantz, Eva M. 234 Mohr, Henrike 301 Population Reference Bureau 55 Moon, Okpyo 449 Potter, David M. 343 Morgan, S. Philip 45 Price, Carrie E. 234 Morikawa, Hiroshi 426 Prieler, Michael 290 Morison, Bob 293 Psathas, George 371 Moschis, George P. 290 Pütz, Thomas 467 Muenz, Rainer 22 Murata, Hiroyuki 287 Quine, Maria Sophia 16 Musterd, Sako 490 Rake, Katherine 180, 183 Nakata, Kiyoshi 316 Rapoport, Rhona 180 Nayer, Gerda 167 Rathunde, Kevin 300 index of authors cited 533

Rebick, Marcus 191 Sjögren, Anna 209 Reher, David Sven 44 Skirbekk, Vegard 6 Reimann, Anna 214 Smeeding, Timothy 120 Reiter, Iris 57 Smith, Jacqui 299 Reynaud, Cecilia 21 Snyder, Robert E. 292 Rindfuss, Roland R. 45, 166 Sobotka, Tomáš 6 Ristau, Malte 192 Sockoll, Ina 301 Roberts, Glenda S. 1, 24, 190, 195, 232 Sonobe, Masahisa 486 Rogers, Andrei 431 Spieß, Katharina 192, 301 Rosenbluth, Frances McCall 1 Stegmaier, Ralph 301 Rouvinen, Petri 297 Steinke, Ines 272, 285, 286 Rürup, Bernd 192 Stephens John D. 175, 180 Russell, Steve 272, 285, 286 Streeck, Wolfgang 6, 26, 27, 65, 71, Ryan, Ellen B. 362 73, 87 Ryan, Richard M. 234, 235 Stroud, Dick 292 Steinke 272, 285, 286 Sachweh, Svenja 362, 364, 366, 369 Stride, Christopher B. 298 Sainsbury, Diane 180 Strohmeier, Klaus Peter 28, 250, 263 Saint-Martin, Denis 182 Sugii, Junko 328 Saito, Asato 491 Surak, Kristin 344 Saitō, Makoto 116 Surkyn, Johan 6 Sakuno, Hirokazu, 426, 446 Suzuki, Kenji 232, 236 Salamon, Lester M. 312 Suzuki, Toru 13–16, 25, 46 Salsberg, Brian 290 Suzuki, Nobue 328, 332 Sarangi, Srikant 362 Suzuki, Seiko 361 Sardon, Jean-Paul 37 Switalla, Bernd 353 Sassen, Saskia 486, 487 Svaleryd, Helena 209 Satake, Masaaki 440 Szulanski, Gabriel 302 Satō, Asanobu 332, 344 Satō, Hiroki 195, 196, 198 Tachibanaki, Toshiaki 116 Satō, Shigeru 388 Tagsold, Christian 145 Saunders, Peter 120 Tahara, Yūko 430, 433 Scharein, Manfred 406 Taira, Nobuhisa 445 Schlömer, Claus 400, 406, 408 Takahashi, Hiroshi 311 Scholz, Rembrandt D. 401, 402 Takahashi Shigesato 26, 27, 40, Schoppa, Leonard J. 194, 200, 231–33 98, 102 Schütz, Alfred 264 Takeda, Hiroko 232 Schwartz, Friedrich Wilhelm 348 Takeda, Yūko 221, 232 Seaton, Philip 444 Takegawa, Shōgo 119 Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin 8, 27, 175, 176, Takeishi, Emiko 195, 196, 198 177, 178, 181, 188, 189, 191, 193 Takeshita, Shūko 430, 436 Sekizawa, Hidehiko 275 Takeuchi, Hirotaka 272 Shea, Dennis 116 Tamme, Oliver 471 Shevky, Eshref 249 Tanaka, Akihiro 448 Shibata, Masato 205 Tanaka, Hiroshi 328 Shimada, Shingo 145 Tanaka-Naji, Hiromi 241, 323 Shimizutani, Satoshi 209, 232 Tanigawa, Norihiro 430 Shindō, Muneyuki 486 Taylor-Gooby, Peter 179 Shirahase, Sawako 27, 118, 119, 125, Teitelbaum, Michael S. 37 136, 138, 232, 294 Terpoorten, Tobias 255, 256 Shoven, John B. 116 Testa, Maria Rita 6 Shuey, Kim M. 117 Tews, Hans Peter 306 Shucksmith, Mark 472 Thevenon, Olivier 167 Siebel, Walter 402, 407 Thang, Leng Leng 316 Siebert, Rosemarie 472 Thode, Eric 68 534 index of authors cited

Tilly, Louise 5 Wilke, Christian B. 300 Tivig, Thusnelda 297, 301 Williams, Marilyn 249 Todd, Emannuel 44, 49 Williamson, John B. 273, 274, 279, Toivonen, Tuukka 8, 27, 175, 190 285, 287 Toyoda, Tetsuya 483 Willson, Andrea E. 117 Tsuda, Takeyuki 329 Wimbauer, Christine 175, 176 Tsutomu Tomioka 240 Winter, Frank 68 Torres-Gil, Fernando 24 Winter, Jay M. 37 Tsuya, Noriko 167 Wippermann, Carsten 89 Woellert, Franziska 59 Uchida, Takashi 392 Wolfe, David B. 292 Ueda, Akemi 210 Wolff, Heimfrid 301 Uno, Kathleen 211 Wolfinger, Martina 148 Wolman, Harold 411 Van Auken, Stuart 290 Wood, Stephen J. 298 Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 5, 45 Woods, Michael 469 Van Kempen, Ronald 483 Vaubel, James W. 11 Yamada, Masahiro 119, 194, 241 Verworn, Birgit 28, 29, 297 Yamada, Yoshiko 287 Viebrock, Elke 66 Yamada, Yutaka 125 Voelpel, Sven C. 295, 296 Yamaguchi, Kazuo 18, 453 Vogt, Gabriele 24, 29 Yamaguchi, Toshiko 363 Yamaguchi, Yasufumi 434 Wadensten, Barbro 364 Yamane, Mari 328 Wagnild, Gail 362, 369 Yamamoto, Masuo 453 Weihrauch, Andrea 269, 294 Yang, Shin-Yi 14, 15, 16 Weinhold, Christine 369 Yeatts, Dale E. 295 Wakabayashi, Keiko 447 Yonekura, Akira 391 Waldenberger, Franz 270 Yoshida, Akemi, 327 Waldman, David A. 297 Yoshida, Megumi 370 White, James W. 487 Yoshida, Yoshio 449 White, Robert W. 235 Wilderom, Celeste 311 Zhou, Yanfei 210 Index of Subjects

(Note: Page numbers in bold indicate illustrations.)

1.57 shock 154, 157, 172, 190, 194, rate 7, 9, 315 203n2 of society 117, 230, 360 as a societal problem 141–4, 146 abortion 3, 75, 81 workforce (see workforce: ageing) active ageing 144, 348 ageism 144–5, 157, 256, 286–7, 302, adult guardianship 30, 373–6, 377–8, 304, 306–7 379–96 age-neutral marketing 292 advisership 385, 389, 391–2, agriculture 430, 431, 446, 452–5, 394–396 457, 471 adulthood 16, 300 Angel Plans 157, 172, 190, 203n3 adults: Austria 22, 38, 44, 50, 51–2, 151, young 9, 412, 431 164, 166 younger 412 Australia 19, 36, 38, 163 age: average 1, 272, 278, 298, 364, 401 babies 88, 183, 197, 370, 429 cohort 298–9, 347, 428, 431, 432–3 baby boom 3, 31, 40, 53, 56, 58, 61, 72, distribution 97–9, 118, 205, 216, 334 101–2, 272–3, 275, 285, 287, 292–3, group 6, 13, 60, 62, 98, 100, 103–4, 295, 302, 374, 429–31, 433–5, 441, 108, 109, 117, 119, 135, 137–8, 141, 447–8 143–5, 189, 214, 249, 273, 275, baby boomer 40, 56, 61, 101–2, 272–3, 276–7, 279, 284, 291, 301, 399–400, 275, 285, 287, 292–3, 295, 302, 374, 406–8, 413, 431, 433, 435, 475 429–31, 433–5, 441, 447–8 as growth market 270, 275 babysitter 210, 216, 224, 225–6, 228 mean 365 “barrier-free” 314, 317, 319, 489 median age 3, 10, 58 Belgium 38, 44, 50, 163 structure 9, 27, 40, 271, 298, 303, Billeter Index 451n2, 475 305–6, 403, 412, 445, 451, 462, birth: 475, 476 annual number of 153 aged society 3, 374, 489 cohort 41, 216 ageing 1, 3–4, 8, 11, 21–2, 24–32, 35, control 3, 47, 49, 52, 152, 238 48, 58, 60, 78, 100, 113, 115–9, 139, outside marriage 45, 74, 91, 93, 185, 145–8, 182, 194, 203, 213, 274, 282–3, 205, 401 287, 311, 313, 321–2, 324–5, 333–4, birth rate 3, 16, 91, 262 346–8, 366, 372, 379, 395, 399–400, below replacement 4, 7 412, 414, 425, 443–6, 448–51, 453, crude (CBR) 39 457, 462–3, 466, 473–8, 481–2, declining 1, 17, 36, 41, 57, 78–9, 89, 484–5, 491 117, 139, 142, 183, 191, 203, 247, hyper- 7, 102, 112, 473 428, 462 indicators of 413 high 58, 86, 91, 203, 462 market 270 increase/stabilize/boost 16–8, 80–1, political philosophy of 141, 147 88, 93, 182, 194, 199–200, 216, 230, population 3, 7, 9, 11, 21, 24, 27, 32, 242, 442, 448, 490 39–41, 48–9, 97, 100–2, 112, 115–6, low 11, 16, 22, 38, 45, 47, 49, 56, 92, 138, 213, 269, 277, 295, 324–5, 333, 117, 177, 179, 196, 204, 214, 243, 346, 373, 400, 412, 425, 443, 450, 271, 347, 374 457, 473–4, 476, 483, 491 Brazil 328–9 536 index of subjects breadwinner 25, 77–8, 118, 129, 130, arrangement 223 133, 135, 138, 156–8, 166, 171, 175, centre 81, 316 183, 186, 188, 193, 199, 206, 207, 327 facility 11, 50, 58, 90n 13, 156, 161, “bubble” economy 110, 324, 449 165, 169, 171, 172, 188, 189, Bulgaria 9, 10, 13, 15, 22 193, 226 full-time 87, 211 Canada 36, 50, 163, 184–7, 332, 336, grandparental 220–3 337, 427 institutionalized 204, 209–10, 210–1, capitalism 22, 63–4, 72, 89–90, 93–5, 213, 216, 223, 226 233, 327, 461, 465 leave 15, 110, 157, 159n5, 160–1, care: 164–5, 169, 172–3, 190, 197, 225 facilities 11, 50, 58, 90n13, 156, 161, modes of 210 165, 169, 171, 172, 188, 189, 193, part-time 211 212, 214–5, 218, 225–6, 228, 247, private 86, 225 310–2, 315–7, 330, 336, 337, 359, public 11, 16, 50, 81, 87, 89 361, 363–4 service 156–61, 181, 190–1, 204, 209 geriatric 310n1, 347, 351, 354–7, 360, support 51 362–3 childless 93, 143, 206, 220, 221, 237, giving 29–30, 144, 183, 188, 193, 241, 251 213–4, 221, 222–4, 225–6, 309, 330, childrearing 111, 192 324–5, 327–8, 330, 331–5, 344–6, children 1, 5–6, 113, 18, 21, 28–29, 36, 340, 342–5 43–52, 55–63, 64, 72, 74–5, 78–95, in-home 311–3, 350 102, 105, 106, 110–13, 117, 120–1, institutional 311, 321, 361 132–5, 139, 143, 152–62, 165–73, insurance 18, 112, 143, 145, 230, 180–6, 187, 188–94, 203–16, 217, 311–2, 314–5, 318, 320–1, 334, 343, 218, 220, 221, 222–6, 228, 230n4, 351, 361, 373, 378, 390–1, 393 236–43, 247–8, 250–7, 258–9, 260, resident 30, 32, 312–21, 323, 348–9, 261–3, 264–6, 290, 309, 315, 334, 361–4, 365–6, 367, 368, 369, 370, 347, 349, 374, 379, 401, 428, 440, 371–2, 390 442, 445, 448, 475, 477, 484–5, 490 social 175, 179 China 14, 21, 47, 271, 436, 438 socialization of 325–6, 333, 343, Christian Democratic 64, 87, 89–90, 345–6 93n16, 191, 193 system 7, 58, 89, 97, 203n3, 212, 216, cities 15, 21, 28, 32, 158, 215, 247–8, 309, 334, 348, 350, 360 249, 250–2, 253–4, 256, 257, 258, 259, career 11, 18, 81, 116, 180, 195, 206, 260, 264–6, 313, 349, 379–80, 386, 240, 255, 263, 279–80, 292, 303, 388, 394, 399–401, 403, 404, 405, 406, 295, 485 407, 408–11, 413, 414, 427, 429, 436, child: 444, 447–8, 450, 453, 456, 459, 461, allowance 14, 16, 93, 156, 158–9, 165, 465, 470, 473–4, 476, 478–83, 486–91 169, 172–3, 236 cohabitation 29, 43–5, 52, 74–5, 171n13 mortality 3 cohort 41, 142–3, 146–7, 153, 155, poverty (see poverty: among children) 273–4, 290 welfare 156 age 298–9, 347, 403, 428, 429, 431, childbearing 3, 16, 27, 36, 76, 153–4, 432–3, 435, 462 156, 172 birth 41, 216 postponement of 27, 52, 153, 241 communication 30, 145, 272, 284, 305, childbirth 15, 45, 52–3, 90–1, 93, 338–9, 340, 351–7, 360, 362, 366, 105–6, 110, 159–60, 165, 170, 184, 369, 372 205–7, 448 patronizing 362, 366, 371n3, 372 child care 15, 50, 51, 110, 152, 154, (see also ageism) 164–8, 173, 175, 181, 189, 195, 197–1, community-based: 206–7, 210, 212, 216, 218, 221–2, voluntary care 334 224, 242, 300, 304 facilities 316, 321 index of subjects 537

service 313, 318, 410 decline 2, 4, 24–5, 31, 178, 459, 468, support centre 312, 317–8 473, 476, 479, 481, 486 consumer 5, 29, 278, 290, 401, 414, 471 -economic paradox 57 behaviour 275, 289–90 equation 422 older consumer 7, 28, 283–4, 290–1 factor 7, 47, 97 society 29 history 101 contraceptive 49, 53, 152 indicators 10, 463 corporate social responsibility 294 imbalance 2 corporations 195, 220, 270, 286, 288, shift 269 312–3, 331, 395–6, 410, 483, 485 structure 116, 271, 292–3, 312, 409, countryside 248, 360, 430, 443–5, 474, 486 447–60, 465, 468–71 transformation 115 couples 74, 81, 86, 88, 102–3, 105–6, transition (1st and 2nd) 5–6, 9, 16, 125–8, 152–3, 190, 195–6, 225, 36–7, 45, 47, 52, 295 242, 317 trend 5, 12, 27, 55, 57, 60, 176, 194, elderly 118, 121, 128, 136, 138, 310, 409, 463 319, 374 demography 81, 176, 287, 293, 443, married 45, 74, 102, 105–6, 110, 112, 461–3 152–3, 190, 195, 225 Denmark 22, 38, 44, 50, 57, 66–7, 69, -only household 125–8, 374 163, 184–7, 337 reproductive behaviour of 17, 106, dependency ratio 5, 43, 449, 456, 459 110, 112 depopulation 1–2, 5–7, 9, 26, 29–31, 35, unmarried 45, 74, 409 48, 397, 443–5, 448–9, 465–6, 470 two-income 86–7, 196 deregulation 26, 70, 76 young couples 11, 16–7, 27–8 Diet 235, 237n11, 242 Czech Republic 22, 50, 351 disability 255, 273, 291, 296, 319, 348, 375, 378, 385–94, 484, 486, 491 daughter-in-law 309, 326, 335 disease 348, 354, 357 day care 17, 28, 87, 161, 172, 188, divorce 45, 52, 73, 75, 79n5, 81, 90–1, 203–4, 209–10, 211, 212–16, 218–21, 95, 109, 135, 171n13, 428, 440 222–3, 224–6, 227–8, 247–8, 249, 250, dual-earner 86–7, 156–8, 171, 196, 206, 263, 311–3, 316–8, 361 207, 209, 211, 212, 224 service 203, 213, 215, 247, 250, 313n5, 316 economic: Zero Waiting List for 161, 172, 212 boom 59 death 3, 39, 40, 45, 47, 55, 56, 97, 98, decline 443–4, 448, 459, 468, 481 190n3, 391, 424, 462, 485, 489 development 1, 32, 44, 409, 461, 465 dementia 313n3, 315n9, 354, 364, growth 77, 97, 106–8, 115, 152, 194, 366, 368, 373–4, 378, 386, 389, 445–6, 448, 487 390, 392 independence 196–7 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 13, 87, indicators 464, 474 89, 169, 193–4, 199, 340 inequality/disparity 7, 27, 86, 115–9, demographic: 121, 123, 124, 125–6, 127, 128, ageing 141–2, 347, 445, 451, 462–3, 137–8, 141, 147, 294, 369, 485 481, 484, 491 liberalization 24–5, 31, 63, 71, 76, 85, behaviour 8, 16, 25 459, 463, 471 challenge 176, 290, 450, 471 productivity 59 change 2, 14, 19, 26–7, 31, 48, 62, prosperity 49, 406 98–9, 112, 141–2, 144, 269–70, 275, restructuring 31, 326, 487 278, 280, 282, 283, 285, 288, 292–3, security 119–20, 130–3, 138 303–4, 305, 306, 324–5, 347–9, 360, education 4, 6, 31, 47–8, 50, 57–8, 60, 399, 409, 412, 414, 443–6, 451, 88, 95, 108, 142, 152, 156, 165, 453–5, 457, 459, 461, 463–4, 169–70, 183, 192, 205–6, 210, 211, 466–7, 470–1, 485 212, 219, 230, 241, 249, 251–2, 253–4, 538 index of subjects

256–7, 263–4, 286, 291, 302, 304, 340, stability 68 342, 349, 354, 356, 359–60, 385, 392, structure 26, 106–7 406–7, 417 temporary 69, 111, 218 elderly: status 111, 206, 218 Act on Social Welfare Service for system 46, 69, 71, 198, 273, 285, the 386, 389 288, 344 benefits 160 (see also job, occupation, care 11, 25, 30, 130, 134–5, 196, 290, unemployment) 310–2, 314, 317, 320–1, 334, 335, ethnicity 142, 147, 326, 344–5 343, 347–57, 358, 359–63, 365–6, 368, 370, 372, 413, 448 familialism 87, 90, 92, 182, 185 citizen (senior) 27, 29, 101, 180, 203, family: 214, 236, 304, 314, 343 allowance 17 employee 279, 285–7, 292 benefits 52, 156, 160, 165, 166, 191 household income 136 care 190–1, 336 living alone 27, 121–2, 126, 309, 310, formation 26, 76, 97, 110, 154, 317–8, 374, 485, 489 167–8, 241 welfare 310n1, 312 -friendly 52, 85, 265, 448 employee 15, 85, 111, 112, 138, 141, income/wage 1, 13, 72, 77–8, 155–6, 160, 169, 171–2, 181, 187, 80–1, 175 192, 196, 204n4, 206–7, 225, 272–3, life 16, 18, 47, 58, 152, 154, 158–9, 278–81, 285–9, 292–5, 296, 297–9, 167–8, 192, 206, 251, 264 300, 301–2, 305, 307, 324, 336, nuclear 72, 220–1, 409 411–2, 476 patriarchal 77 non-regular 294 planning 3, 47, 49, 52, 152, 238 regular 187, 196, 273, 280, 294 policy 15, 27–8, 48–9, 51, 84, 85, employer 23, 65–6, 68–9, 71, 76–9, 87, 88–9, 91, 93n16, 95, 151–2, 164, 94, 188, 192–4, 196, 198, 200, 274, 166, 175–6, 177, 178–83, 185–94, 286, 324, 327, 331, 342, 344 198–201, 236, 247, 248, 251 employment: register 375–6 continuous 20, 273, 274, 279, size 6, 51, 105 285–7, 293 state expenditure for 248 of elderly/older people 136, 139, 273, structure 5, 27, 44, 64, 72, 80, 274, 280, 285, 288, 295, 306 91–2, 409 flexible 63, 65 support centre 210, 224 full-time 206, 211, 213–4 urban 251, 264 by industry 107 father 15, 28, 81, 87–8, 95, 129, 188, insecurity of 6 206–7, 208, 209n8, 216, 217, 218–9, lifetime 156, 273, 288 221, 222, 223–4, 225–6, 241, 262 M-shaped curve of women’s 108 female workforce/labour force non-regular 108, 112 participation 1, 18, 44, 47, 57, 62, 70, opportunities 26, 51, 108, 157, 204, 77, 80, 82, 83, 90, 106, 108, 109–11, 375, 429, 434, 440, 448–9, 471 156–7, 166–7, 168, 176, 178, 181–3, part-time 14, 50, 51, 71, 78, 111, 112, 184, 185–6, 191, 193, 197, 204, 206–7, 170n11, 189–91, 197, 201n9, 204, 209, 223, 247, 371 206, 218, 293 feminism 16, 77–8, 87, 91, 155, 175 permanent 111 fertility: protection 66–7, 69, 90 age-specific, rate 103 rate 21, 60, 61, 62, 181, 183, 185, back to replacement 42 192–3, 198, 204, 206, 209, 213, 217, Basic Law on 155 300, 305, 309, 462, 464, 475 behaviour 401 re- 188, 204, 285, 287–8 below/sub-replacement 3–7, 36–9, security 67–8, 78, 84 45, 49, 51, 151, 156, 176, 182 self- 131, 136, 218 control 3, 5 index of subjects 539

decline 1, 3, 5–6, 15, 19, 21, 26–7, equity/equality 6, 16, 27, 62, 158, 166, 38, 53, 82–3, 91, 92, 149, 153–5, 171–2, 175–6, 178, 180–2, 185, 192, 166–7, 172, 203, 216, 237n11, 247, 194–6, 199–200, 230 295, 406 roles 107–8, 156, 171, 225, 231 high fertility (countries) 57, 83, 152 generation 11, 58, 78, 89n 12, 74, 115, higher 248 117, 131–3, 135, 155, 172–3, 287, 309 level 6, 18, 56–7, 153, 162–3, 182–3 generational: low 1, 3–6, 9, 11, 16, 18, 23, 25–7, balance 293 35–6, 39–40, 45, 47–8, 51–3, 56–8, justice 16 84, 86–7, 99, 101, 112, 151–2, 153, relations 139 154–5, 163, 168, 171–3, 176, 190, solidarity 145 199, 203–5, 229–43, 295, 324, 412 geront(echn)ology 142, 144, 291, 297 marital 6, 205, 216, 241 Gini coefficient 71, 118 policy 155, 163–4, 171–2, 230–2, globalization 6, 26, 31–2, 97, 107, 119, 235–7, 239–40, 242–4 142, 170, 459, 461, 463 rate 8–9, 20, 36–53, 57–8, 62, 85, 90, Gold Plan 310 99–102, 103, 106–7, 110, 112–3, grandparents 207, 209, 220, 221–4, 151, 163, 173, 176, 182, 185, 190, 226, 292 192–3, 198, 203–5, 209, 212–3, Great Heisei Merger 450–9 216, 231, 247, 249, 295, 324, Greece 22, 43–4, 46, 50, 56–7, 59, 164 401–2, 461 gross domestic product (GDP) 17, 18, rate total (TFR) 3, 10, 36, 47, 52, 55, 48–9, 68, 83, 84, 165, 166, 464 75, 83, 85, 91–2, 98, 117, 151–2, 153, 166, 168, 177, 203, 241, 347, health: 401, 403 care 4, 7, 18, 25, 58, 97, 230, 278, 283, recovery 42, 154, 167 291, 310n1, 323–5, 327, 331–6, 337, replacement 153 340, 348–51, 359–60, 363–4, 472 transition 153 management 286, 301, 303, 307 trends 177 home care/help 17, 304, 310–3, 318, ultra-low 45, 47, 52, 101 320, 336, 334, 335, 350–1, 361 very low 6, 97, 151–2, 153, 154, 164 homes for the elderly 312, 315n8, 316, Finland 44, 50, 57, 60, 163, 184–7 342, 347–8, 350, 352, 481 flexicurity 66–8 homemaker 156–8, 166, 171 foreigners 24, 304, 328, 356, 435, 438, homogamy 86 439, 440–2 hospital 72, 310n1, 330, 331, 333, 336, France 8–9, 10, 12–5, 17, 18, 21–2, 38, 337–9, 340, 341, 342, 344, 349, 369, 39, 43–4, 46, 48, 50, 51, 56–60, 69, 377, 392, 446, 450, 453, 455–7 73–5, 82, 83–4, 86, 91, 113, 151, 163, household 46–7, 51, 78, 87n9, 88n11, 166, 167, 168, 184–7, 203, 209n8, 247, 108, 119, 156, 187, 206, 207, 217, 271, 337 248–50, 252–3, 262, 275, 317, 327, freeter 169–70 351, 375, 406, 409, 414, 475, 476, 483 full-time: average monthly consumption 276 housewife 156, 158, 206, 211, 242 couple-only 120, 123, 126, 127, mother 51 128, 374 parents working 206, 212–4, 218 with children 475 seniors working 273, 279 with elderly members 115–19, 120, wife working 175, 201n9 121, 122–4, 125, 126, 127–30, 131, women working 207 133, 137–9, 221, 485–6 elderly-only 118, 121, 135, 136, gender 5–6, 44, 46, 72, 77, 111, 141–7, 137–8, 309, 489 158, 170–2, 178, 196–7, 199–201, head 118–9, 129–30, 131, 132, 133, 326–7, 344–6, 361, 365–6, 370–2, 186, 276–7 379, 426–9 income 88n11, 119, 131, 132, 133–4, -based division of labour 175, 196 136, 137, 190, 213, 252, 464, 490 540 index of subjects

nuclear 120, 123, 127 of household (see household: income) one-person 118, 120, 121–2, 123, level 118, 134 125, 127, 128, 136, 186, 195, 221, low 14, 25, 27, 87–8, 90, 135, 158, 485–6, 489 170, 236, 414 savings 277 net 87 single elderly female 122, 126 security 68, 127, 133 structure 120 transfers 248 three-generation 27, 29, 120, 122, individualization 79, 119, 142 123, 124–6, 127, 128, 129–30, 130, individualism 5, 29, 44, 78–9, 81, 93 131–2, 133, 134, 135, 138–9, 206–7, Indonesia 24, 29, 324, 330, 331–2, 336, 208, 220, 221, 309, 374 342–3, 345–6 housing 11, 29, 32, 43, 49, 127, 152n2, industries: 248–51, 264–6, 309–11, 401, 406, 410, automobile 291, 483 448, 473–4, 479, 481–91 construction 480 alternative 320, 322 manufacturing 24–5, 106, 181, 284, commercial 313, 319–20, 322 288, 297, 410–1, 412, 446, 449, for elderly 310–17, 319–22, 484 455, 478 and group living 320–2 tourism industry 449 market 248–50, 266, 401, 487 industrialization 38, 47, 462 policy 31, 51, 250, 414, 465, 485, 488 de- 32, 455, 480–1, 487, 491 public 310n1, 482, 483, 488, 491 inequality: social 319, 490 in access to information 369 housewife 156, 157, 158, 170, 189, 206, economic 27, 86, 115–8, 121, 124, 211, 242, 262 126, 128, 137–8, 294, 485 housework 49, 197, 209 intra-household 126 human: service 412 capital/resource 88, 175, 178–9, social 7, 115, 141, 147 181–2, 191, 199–200, 231, 251, 327, (see also income: disparity) 435, 440 infrastructure 81, 147–8, 190, 240n15, resource 60, 63, 301 256, 394, 401, 443, 446, 450, 453, resource management 29, 170, 195, 455–8, 461, 466, 470–1 269–71, 274, 285, 288, 292, 295, innovation 143, 269, 275, 285, 287, 289, 301, 307 292, 297–8, 467, 470–1 Hungary 19 institutionalization 64, 71, 75, 91–2, husbands 72, 77, 93–4, 108, 157, 170, 143, 146, 203–4, 209–11, 213, 216, 190n3, 194, 344, 436 220, 223, 225–6, 311, 334–6, 343 investments 1, 29, 32, 48, 56, 58, 60, 62, Iceland 44, 57, 59, 163 181, 185, 209, 231, 266, 275, 301, 317, immigrant 7–9, 10, 17–23, 25, 29, 30, 467–8, 472, 480, 487, 491 37, 39, 48–9, 52, 55–6, 58–60, 86, Ireland 13, 22, 36, 50, 57–9, 163 88–90, 190, 248, 250, 252–4, 255, 305, Italy 7, 10, 13, 15–6, 17, 18–9, 21–2, 26, 327–8, 347–9, 330, 347, 349–50, 352, 38, 39, 43–5, 46, 48, 50, 52, 56–9, 62, 360, 404, 438, 440, 462 64, 69, 73–5, 76, 82, 83–4, 91, 93, 151, income: 164, 168, 185, 209, 271 annual 111 disparity/inequality 27, 115–6, 118, Japan Business Federation (Nippon 121, 123, 124, 125–6, 127, 128, Keidanren) 170n12, 196, 198, 333 137–9 job 49–51, 56–8, 61–2, 65, 87, 90n13, disposable 119, 121n2, 125, 134, 136 93, 117, 134, 137–8, 156, 159–61, distribution 111 170–1, 186, 191, 206–7, 251, 254, 262, double- 206, 212, 224 (see also 265, 286, 301–2, 303, 305, 326, 351, dual-earner) 369, 406–8, 410, 412, 418, 430, 431, elderly household 136 448–9, 454, 457, 479, 487 of family (see family: income) non-standard 134, 137 index of subjects 541

rotation 301, 303, 359 Next Generation Nurturing Support protection 14, 18, 67–8, 85–6, 295 Measures Promotion Law 155, temporary 70, 197 172–3 training, on-the-job 273, 331, 359 NPO Law 314, 343 Overall Strictness of Employment kindergarten 156, 165, 210, 211 Protection 66 knowledge: Urban Revitalization Law 488 loss 270, 278, 292, 295, 296 Liberal Democratic Party management 278, 285, 288, 295, 302, (LDP) 169n10, 193–4, 199, 229–30, 303, 306 232–3, 236–7, 240, 242, 245, 340n19 transfer 281, 289, 299–301, 302, liberalization 24–5, 63, 71, 76, 85, 94, 303–4, 306 459, 463, 471 Kōmeitō 229–30, 236–7, 245 life course 27, 116, 118, 141–3, 145–7, Korea 6, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 19, 25–6, 160, 205, 327, 332, 414 50, 55, 164, 168, 170, 184–5, 271, life expectancy 1, 3, 6–7, 9, 10, 11, 27, 436, 442 29, 39, 58, 61, 97, 99, 142, 229, 288, 293, 295, 347–8, 402–3, 412, 461–2 labour: lifelong learning 62, 295, 301, 307 cost 293, 296, 301, 449 lifestyle 1, 260, 309, 353, 355, 469 division of 46, 77, 141, 143, 145–7, living: 175, 196, 380, 463, 467 arrangements 7, 29, 126, 207, 309, migration 29–30, 323–8, 336, 340, 310, 311, 374 345–6 alone 27, 122, 126, 309, 317–8, productivity 197, 287, 305 374, 485 force, shrinking 23, 271–2, 293, assisted 396 301, 442 conditions 4, 119, 146, 252, 265, 459, shortage 22, 24–5, 77, 139, 181, 189, 467, 469 270, 272, 275, 278, 325, 350 standard of 7, 72, 78, 467 labour market: 6, 8, 16, 18, 24–5, 29, with children 130, 132–3, 139 31, 60, 67–9, 71, 75–95, 113, 134–5, with parents 16, 46, 134 137–9, 142, 166–7, 179–82, 188–9, longevity 3, 5, 7, 98, 101, 112, 141, 146–7 197–8, 205–6, 209, 274, 293, 324–7, long-term care insurance (LTCI) 18–9, 329, 344–6, 405, 407, 410, 414, 143, 145, 230, 311–2, 315, 318, 320–1, 434, 461 334, 336, 343, 351, 373, 378 policy 64–6, 68, 80, 83n7, 84, 87, 94 Luxembourg 59, 163 Laws: Adult Guardianship Law 30, 374–5, male breadwinner 77, 175, 183, 186, 380, 383–91 188, 193, 199, 207 Child Care Leave Law 157, 160–1, marital: 172, 190 behaviour 5 Elderly Residence Law 314n6 fertility 6, 205, 216, 241 Equal Employment Opportunity Law status 108, 109, 208 (EEOL) 157, 204 marketing 29, 269–71, 282–4, 289, Eugenics Protection Law 3 292, 449 Law concerning Stabilization of marriage 5–6, 16, 26–7, 36, 43–7, 52–3, Employment of Older People 273, 73–6, 91, 93, 103, 104, 106, 108, 112, 274, 285, 288 153, 156, 161, 170, 185, 194, 203, 205, Law to Promote Specified Non-profit 207n6, 231, 240, 375, 401, 427–9, Activities 343 436–7, 438, 439, 440, 442, 448 Law for the Welfare of the maternal: Elderly 310n1 care 210, 221, 223, 225 Local Government Housing Law employment 185, 186, 193 (see also 485, 490 mothers: working) Long-term Care Insurance Law 321 leave 12, 14–5, 46, 85–6, 159n5, 180 542 index of subjects mean log deviation 121, 123, 125, 126–7 NEET 169–70 Meiji period 232 neighbourhood 28, 36, 142, 249, 250, men living with parents 46 251–2, 255, 260–1, 262–3, 264–5, metropolitan areas/regions 31–2, 232, 313n5, 315, 317, 321–2, 406–10, 462, 215, 250n2, 255, 309, 316, 363, 408, 468, 471–3, 477, 481, 482, 483–4, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429–31, 486–7, 489–91 434–8, 439, 440–1, 443, 447, 463–6, association 313n5, 319, 490 473, 486 net café refugees 115 migration: Netherlands 8, 12, 14, 20, 22, 44, 46, 50, domestic/internal 7, 399, 403–4, 66, 68, 69, 163, 167, 247 405, 406, 407, 408, 416, 419, New Zealand 36, 38, 163 421, 426, 461 non-profit organization (NPO) 240, education-oriented 419 318–22, 343, 379, 431n4, 451 gains 399, 400, 404, 408 Nordic countries 8, 18, 43–4, 51–2, 60, gender differences in 427 74, 84, 87, 165, 179, 182, 185, 247 “I-turn” 430, 434 Norway 38, 44, 56–7, 59, 62, 151, 163, in- 262, 404, 414, 421, 460, 462 184–5, 187, 209n8 international 1, 97–9, 144, 326, 328, nurse 24, 240, 252, 258, 262, 324n2, 344, 401, 403–4, 405, 409, 433, 330, 331–3, 336, 337–9, 340, 341, 342, 461–2, 463 347–9, 350, 351, 352, 353–60, 362, job-oriented 418 369–70, 371 net 8–9, 263, 404, 405, 406, 407, nursery (school) 158–9, 161, 162, 165, 423–4, 427, 431, 432–3, 434, 463 171n13, 249, 258, 262, 316n11 out- 19, 31 262, 404–6, 410, 412, 414, nursing 41, 97, 112, 291, 320, 326, 333, 434, 443, 445–6, 461–3 338–9, 341, 347–8, 350–60, 369, 385, policy 323–6, 329–30, 340n19, 345–6 390–3, 396 rate 263, 404–6, 408, 416, 424, 427, home 310n1, 311–3, 315–8, 322, 331, 433, 434, 462 340, 342, 344, 348–9, 362, 380 replacement 441 return 433, 435, 445 occupation 24, 79, 88, 154, 217–8, 249, surplus 477 324, 463, 476–7, 487 (see also job, “U-turn” 430, 433–4 employment) Ministry of Economy, Trade and OECD countries 17, 22, 26–7, 68, 69, Industry 331, 333 73–5, 83–4, 91–2, 166, 168, 182, 184, Ministry of Education 156, 211, 212 185, 186–7 Ministry of Finance 156 oil shock 106 Ministry of Health, Labour and old age 27, 43, 116–7, 136, 138, 143–7, Welfare 4, 48, 119, 155–6, 172, 210, 165, 334, 451n2, 476 211, 212, 230, 273, 286, 312–4, 333–4, overpopulation 2–3, 47 361, 374, 396, 436 overtime 28, 169, 204, 218, 219, 223, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 225 Communications 426 Ministry of Justice 328, 380 “parasite single” (see single: “parasite”) Ministry of Labour 156, 195 parent 11, 13–5, 25, 28, 44–5, 46, 51, 55, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 58, 74, 81, 87–90, 95, 99, 102, 108, Transport and Tourism 312, 314 130, 134–5, 157, 160, 182, 186, 188, mortality 3–4, 6, 37, 39, 41, 42, 98, 99, 191–4, 201, 206–7, 208, 209, 211, 100, 101, 263, 295, 399, 401–2 212–20, 221–4, 225–6, 234, 241–3, mothers: 252, 253–4, 260, 262, 284, 301, 334–5, age distribution of 205, 216 374, 394, 409, 427 (see also single: working 14–5, 95, 111, 171n13, parent) 180–1, 186, 188–93, 201n9, 206–7, parental: 208, 217, 218–9, 220, 223, 247, 248 age distribution 216 (see also maternal: employment) allowance 14 motherhood 18, 88, 91, 93, 203, 205 benefit 178, 188, 191, 193 index of subjects 543

care 204, 209, 210, 220–1, 223 trends 97, 155, 451, 480 education 253–4 working-age 21, 58, 97, 99, 100, employment 208, 218 116–7, 271, 295, 292 income 13, 213, 215n13 253–4 Portugal 43–4, 50, 59, 62, 164 leave 14–6, 17, 50, 175–6, 177, 180, poverty 7, 16, 59, 71, 78, 83n7, 86, 188, 190–1, 193, 200, 225 89–90, 95, 115, 118, 121–2, 124, 139, support 86 186, 192, 250–1, 256, 258, 260, 264, working hours 219, 225 482–3 paternalism 44, 49, 321, 384–5 among children 89, 181–2, pension 17–8, 20, 41, 51, 58, 61, 97, 116, 185–6, 187 118, 126, 128, 131–2, 133, 134, 135–8, among the elderly 124, 294 156, 159n6, 165, 188, 194, 230, 232, rate 118, 121, 122–3, 124, 126, 128, 240, 274, 300, 343, 371 129–30, 131, 186, 253 Philippines 21, 24, 29, 170, 324, 330, prefectures 423–5, 432–3 331–2, 336, 342–4, 346, 349, 436, 438 pregnancy 110, 160, 237 Poland 38, 39, 56, 58, 350–1 pre-school 157, 172, 210 political economy 142, 144, 323, pro-natalism 42, 47, 51, 79–80, 152, 325–8 154n3, 155, 164, 448 population: census 97–8, 101, 109, 250, 428, 431, quality of life 146–7, 386, 444, 433–4, 435, 473, 483n4 469, 472 change 9, 10, 32, 39, 40, 99, 399, 410, 421, 422, 423–4, 475, 480 refugees 115, 328, 404 decline 1–4, 7–9, 17, 22, 25–6, 28–29, regional disparities 7, 141, 143, 251, 31, 33, 37–43, 48, 55, 57, 60, 105, 401–2, 405–7, 412–4, 447, 461, 112–3, 141–2, 247–8, 250, 271–2, 468, 479 274, 399, 400, 410–4, 421–2, 425–6, replacement: 428–30, 434–6, 440–5, 451, 453, below 3–7, 36–9, 45, 49, 51, 151, 156 454–5, 458, 464, 471–4 levels 8, 11, 13, 18, 42, 48, 52–3, 63, density 262, 401, 408, 411, 446, 464, 68, 82, 85, 89, 97, 117, 152–3, 163, 467 166, 176, 182, 203, 205, 428 development 2, 4, 12, 16, 56, 399, migration 441 400, 403, 409–11, 412, 415, reproduction 38, 63–4, 79–82, 85, 441, 454 93–4, 247 dynamics 1–2, 5, 27, 32 reproductive: elderly 41, 100, 101–2, 311, 413, age 36, 51, 153 420, 451n2 behaviour 5, 17, 64, 79, 103–6, 110, explosion 2, 35 113, 179, 241 foreign 19–1, 24, 328, 329, 344, 440, labour 325–7, 336, 343, 345 442 463, 483 rights 152, 155n3, 164 growth 2–4, 6,9, 14, 17, 19, 22, 28, Retire Moratorium 287 35–7, 56, 247, 409–11, 414 retirement 7, 29, 60–1, 70, 79n5, hyper-aged 7, 151 110, 272–5, 277, 279–80, 287–91, loss 4, 25, 56, 445, 453, 460 302, 313, 348, 408, 430, 431, policy 8, 11, 17, 22, 25, 49, 247 435, 446–7 projection 3–4, 35, 42, 56, 98, 99, age: 60, 145, 159n6, 273, 274, 279, 100, 101–2, 153, 155, 399, 408–9, 285, 287–9, 293, 295, 300, 413, 466, 475, 476–7 304, 430 pyramid 58 early 61, 70, 300, 306 replacement 3, 97, 117 migration 406, 408, 412, 422, 430, structure 4, 39, 41, 139, 347, 406, 455 433, 447 total 20, 23–4, 38, 40, 41, 56, 58, rural: 97–9, 101–2, 104, 112, 272, areas/regions 1, 7, 15, 30–2, 56, 190, 328, 334, 361, 377, 399, 421, 212, 215, 248, 309, 315–6, 400–2, 428, 430 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 410–1, 544 index of subjects

413, 443–51, 455, 458–62, 463–4, social policy 25, 27–8, 71, 83, 87, 89, 93, 465–72, 479, 484 95, 119, 139, 180, 183, 204, 209, 229, depopulation 31, 443, 445, 449, 459, 232, 237, 243 467, 470–1 social: Russia 38, 39, 59, 263, 271, 350 security 4, 7, 18, 66–7, 77, 97, 112, 137–9, 143, 156, 158–9, 172–3, 294, salary 14–5, 172, 287, 301 (see also 334, 411, 412, 473 income, wage) expenditure 68, 160, 165 Scandinavia (see Nordic countries) system 67, 95, 117, 119, 126, 169, 173 school 24, 43, 58, 60, 86, 89, 95, 156–8, social structure 49, 64–5, 72, 92, 95, 165, 172–3, 210, 212, 216, 222, 228, 136, 147–8, 322 230n4, 232, 234, 252–5, 256–8, 260, social welfare 1, 44, 112, 233, 312–3, 262, 263–5, 302, 317–8, 324, 331, 318, 380n6, 386, 389, 393–4, 396 342, 410–1, 412, 431, 445–6, 450, sons 44, 129–30, 335, 429 455–7, 484 Spain 19, 21, 43–5, 46, 50, 52, 56–7, 59, segregation 28, 86, 89n12, 156, 247–49, 151 164, 185 250, 251–3, 257, 264, 266, 344, 487, spouse 119, 242, 309, 335, 379, 436–7, 489–90 440 seniority system 156, 273–4, 287–8, standard of living 7, 72, 78, 467 298, 485 stratification 215n13, 294 sex ratio 427–9, 436, 437, 438 suburban 215, 248, 251, 400–2, 403, silver: 404, 405, 407, 408–10, 413, 448, customer (silver/senior) 29, 275, 461–2, 473, 476, 479–80 283–4, 290–3 Sweden 9, 10, 17, 22, 38, 44, 48–9, 50, employment 295, 306 (see also 57, 60, 62, 64, 69, 73–5, 79, 81–2, employment: of elderly) 83–4, 85–6, 90, 91, 93n16, 151, 163, housing 310–17, 319–22 167, 168, 170, 184–7, 203, 209, 336, market 29, 141, 269–70, 275–7, 282, 337 283–4, 285–6, 289–91, 293–4 Switzerland 22, 38, 44, 59–60, 62, 164, Singapore 164, 486 166, 184–7 single: elderly (see elderly: living alone) taboo 80, 334, 336 father 221 Taiwan 6, 14–6, 24–5, 47, 120, 442 household (see household: one- tax 11, 16, 49–50, 84, 95, 119, 156, 158, person) 165, 190, 206, 379, 443, 446, 458, 468, mother 70, 78, 89, 91, 93, 156, 165, 475, 476, 479, 488 221, 248, 262, 319, 486 tax revenue 443, 446, 468, 475, 476, 479 “parasite” 194, 241 teachers 95, 234, 342, 363 parent 25, 74, 90, 95, 186, 208, 221, technology 53, 60, 86, 278, 291, 302, 305 262, 409 terms of address 361–3, 365–6, 367, women 104, 122, 126, 167 368, 370, 369, 372 social class: 27, 142, 144, 146 Tokyo Metropolitan Area 32, 212, 422, bourgeois 93n16, 264 473–4, 479, 481, 487, 491 lower 89n12, 91–2, 488 total fertility rate (TFR) 3, 10, 36, 47, lower middle 487–8 52, 55, 75, 83, 85, 91–2, 98, 117, middle 28, 81, 86, 88–90, 92, 95, 158, 151–2, 153, 166, 168, 177, 203, 241, 248, 251–3, 255, 260, 477, 480, 483, 347, 401, 403 485, 487–8 tourism 351, 405, 411, 412, 449, 453–5 upper 86, 253, 260 transculturalism 355 upper-middle 480 Social Democratic 64, 79, 81, 87, 90, 95, underpopulation 445–8, 451, 464 175, 180, 191, 193, 199 unemployment 8, 16, 32, 43, 61–2, social exclusion 43, 254, 264, 468 67–71, 78, 87, 112, 117, 135, 138–9, social inequality 7, 115, 141, 147 169, 208, 218, 253, 255, 262–3, 264, social networks 148, 209, 342, 469 405, 412, 476–7, 482, 484 index of subjects 545

rate 21, 62, 305, 406, 410–1, 412, 464, state, German 86–7 475, 482 (see also social welfare) United Kingdom (UK) 2, 8–9, 10, 12, well-being 3, 11, 118–9, 125–7, 137, 14, 17, 20, 37, 38, 39, 43–4, 48–9, 152, 196, 309, 357, 362, 376 50, 56–7, 59, 68, 69, 73–5, 76, 82, wives 93–4, 110, 157, 170, 242, 436, 83–4, 85, 91, 151 163, 170, 179, 438–42 184–7, 337 women 46, 57, 60, 104, 184, 213 United States (US) 8, 19, 36–8, 48–9, women’s groups/movements 175–6, 50, 52, 64–5, 68, 69, 73–5, 76, 82, 199–200 83–4, 85–6, 89–90, 92, 115, 151, worker 60, 65, 67–8, 71, 77–9, 85–6, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 180, 88, 94, 106–7, 111, 156, 159–60, 184–7, 209n8, 230n3, 263, 271, 181, 195, 197–9, 214, 217, 218, 323, 332, 376, 433, 487 279, 298, 302, 325, 330, 347, 475, unmarried: 477–8, 481 children 208, 309, 374 elderly in agriculture 430 couples 45, 74, 409 care 24, 331–3, 338, 345, 361–2, 364, parent 74 367–9, 371–2 persons 112, 243, 428, 437, 438 female 156–7, 176, 178, 191, 197, 207, women 108, 122, 241 223, 371 (see also female workforce urban: participation) areas 7, 30, 87, 89n12, 212, 215, migrant 20, 24–5, 324–7, 342–4, 349, 247–49, 251–2, 260, 264, 256, 315, 351, 404, 483 380, 405, 409–10, 426, 428, 447–9, non-regular 112, 169–70 451, 462, 463–4, 465, 467–8, 472, older 28–9, 285, 296, 299, 302 484, 486–7 shortage in 324, 436 planning/renewal 265, 322, 470, 481, social 379, 395 488–9, 491 unskilled 20, 25 rural and intra-urban work-family balance 18, 28, 167, 178, relationship 212, 254, 264, 266, 180, 185, 251 405, 411, 462, 465 workforce 1, 23, 51, 58, 60, 70, 136, 271, -ization 47, 309, 462 278, 286–7, 298, 325, 329, 344, 346, 360, 470 values 106, 166, 171, 177, 198, 201, 225, ageing 28, 272, 274–5, 280, 292–3, 288, 291, 298, 299–300, 305, 355, 357, 295, 296, 297, 300, 301, 303–4, 440, 459, 465, 469, 470–2 305–7 volunteer 146, 148, 314, 317–8, 320–1, working: 395, 450, 456 hours 18, 65, 70, 86, 170, 181, 186, 187, 195, 198, 209, 216, 218, 219, wage 1, 24, 43, 71–2, 77–8, 80–1, 86, 225, 273, 301, 409 89–90, 95, 111, 116, 118, 136, 156–7, “poor” 115, 486 165, 175, 191, 325, 329, 332, 351, work-life balance 11, 27, 48, 170, 180–1, 410–1, 412, 485 191, 193, 195–6, 198–200, 203–4, welfare 1, 29, 44, 89, 97, 112, 128, 216–7, 225, 230n4, 242 138–9, 152, 156, 158–9, 172, 193, 233, Charter for 170, 196, 198–9, 204 237, 310, 312–4, 318, 321–2, 331, workplace 28, 65, 155, 187, 225, 272, 373–4, 383–7, 389–94, 396, 446, 456, 285–7, 301, 356, 359 459, 461, 468–9, 486 Japanese-type 131 Year 2007 problem 272, 279 state 20, 72, 80, 86–7, 95, 119, 131, youth 88, 190, 214, 250, 255, 269, 275, 139, 175, 177, 180, 210, 468 302, 305, 461