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2012 Examining the relevance of the theories of guerrilla warfare in explaining the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in Northern Uganda Herman Rujumba Butime University of Wollongong
Recommended Citation Butime, Herman Rujumba, Examining the relevance of the theories of guerrilla warfare in explaining the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in Northern Uganda, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, 2012. http://ro.uow.edu.au/ theses/3631
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EXAMINING THE RELEVANCE OF THE THEORIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN EXPLAINING THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN UGANDA
A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
From
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
By
Herman Rujumba Butime Bachelor of Arts in Social Sciences (Makerere University Kampala) Master of Arts in International Relations (University of Nottingham)
CENTRE FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION
FACULTY OF LAW
2012
1
THESIS CERTIFICATION
CERTIFICATION
I, Herman Rujumba Butime, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Law, University of
Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.
……………………………………..
Herman Rujumba Butime
02nd March, 2012
2 EXAMINING THE RELEVANCE OF THE THEORIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN EXPLAINING THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN UGANDA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………..7 Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………….8 Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..10 Chapter 1 : BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………….12 1.1 Roots of Conflict in Northern Uganda…………………………………12 1.1.1: Introduction…………………………………………………………….12 1.1.2: Colonial Roots of Conflict in Northern Uganda……………………….14 1.1.3: Post-Colonial Roots of Conflict in Northern Uganda………………….15 1.2 Evolution of Insurgency in Northern Uganda………………………….18 1.2.1: The Uganda People’s Democratic Army Rebellion (1986-1988)……...19 1.2.2: The Holy Spirit Movement I Rebellion (1986-1988)…………………..20 1.2.3: The Holy Spirit Movement II Rebellion (1988-1989).………………....21 1.3 : Evolution of the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgency (1987-todate)...... 21 1.3.1: Emergence (1987-1990)………………………………………………...22 1.3.2: Countering the Emergence of LRA: Operation North (1991-1992)……23 1.3.3: The Bigombe Peace Initiative (1993)…………………………………...24 1.3.4: Securing External Support (1994)………………………………………25 1.3.5: Loss of External Support (1999-2002)………………………………….26 1.3.6: The Juba Peace Process (2005-2008)…………………………………...27 1. 4 : Research Problem and Research Methodology…………………………28 1.4.1: Problem Statement………………………………………………………28 1.4.2: Primary/Broad Research Question………………………………………29 1.4.3: Secondary/Specific Research Questions……………………………...... 29 1.4.4: Research Hypotheses……………………………………………………29 1.4.5: Scope of the Study………………………………………………………31 1.4.6: Significance of the Study………………………………………………..31 1.4.7: Research Methodology………………………………………………….32 End Notes………………………………………………………………..36
Chapter 2 : THEORETICAL REVIEW I…………………………………………43 2.1 : Defining and Operationalizing Guerrilla Warfare……………………43 2.2 : Constructing an Insurgent Identity………………………………...... 47 2.2.1 : Ideology………………………………………………………………48 2.2.2 : Popular Support and Propaganda…………………………………….50 2.2.2.1: Popular Support………………………………………………………50 2.2.2.2: Propaganda…………………………………………………………...54 2.2.3 : Motivation and Esprit de Corps……………………………………....59 2.2.4 : Recruitment………………………………………………………...... 63 3 End Notes…………………………………………………………..68
Chapter 3: THEORETICAL REVIEW II……………………………………………75 Operationalizing Insurgent Activity…………………………………...... 75 3.1: Training………………………………………………………………...75 3.2: Organizational Structure………………………………………………..79 3.3: Guerrilla Bases…………..……………………………………………...84 3.4: Funding and External Support………………………………………….87 3.5: Guerrilla Strategy……………………………………………………….91 3.5.1: Combatant-to-Combatant Engagements……………………………...92 3.5.2: Combatant-to-Non Combatant Engagements (Terrorism)……………96 3.6: Guerrilla Tactics………………………………………………………...98 3.7: Weapons and Weapons Acquisition…………………………………...104 End Notes………………………………………………………………..109
Chapter 4 : TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: IDENTITY…………………………………………………………...119 4.1 : Ideology……………………………………………………………...119 4.1.1: Grievances/Aims……………………………………………………..120 4.1.2: Ideology……………………………………………………………...124 4.2 : Popular Support and Propaganda…………………………………….127 4.2.1: Popular Support……………………………………………………... 127 4.2.2: Propaganda…………………………………………………………...131 4.3 : Motivation and Esprit de Corps……………………………………...135 4.4 : Recruitment…………………………………………………………..141 End Notes…………………………………………………………….150
Chapter 5 : TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: OPERATIONAL………………………………………………….156 5.1 : Training…………………………………………………………...156 5.1.1 : Induction and Training……………………………………………156 5.1.2 : Career Progression………………………………………………..160 5.2 : Organizational Structure………………………………………….163 5.2.1 : Composition………………………………………………………164 5.2.1.1: Ethnicity…………………………………………………………..164 5.2.1.2: Gender…………………………………………………………….165 5.2.1.3: Age………………………………………………………………..165 5.2.2 : Troop Strength……………………………………………………166 5.2.3 : Structure…………………………………………………………..169 5.2.4 : Leadership and Intra-organizational Schisms…………………….179 5.3 : Guerrilla Bases …………………………………………………...184 5.4 : Funding and External Support……………………………………188 5.5 : Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics…………………………………….193 5.5.1 : Rationalization of Strategy and Tactics…………………………...194 5.5.2 : Operationalization of Strategy and Tactics……………………….197 5.6 : Weapons and Weapons Acquisition………………………………204 4 End Notes…………………………………………………………209
Chapter 6 : CONCLUSION…………………………………………………...219 6.1 : LRA INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES: IDENTITY………………...223 6.1.1 : Ideology…………………………………………………………...223 6.1.2 : Popular Support…………………………………………………...224 6.1.3 : Propaganda………………………………………………………..225 6.1.4 : Motivation………………………………………………………...226 6.1.5 : Recruitment……………………………………………………….227 6.2 : LRA INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES: OPERATIONAL………….229 6.2.1 : Training…………………………………………………………...229 6.2.2 : Career Progression………………………………………………..230 6.2.3 : Organizational Structure………………………………………….231 6.2.4 : Guerrilla Bases……………………………………………………233 6.2.5 : Funding and External Support……………………………………234 6.2.6 : Strategy and Tactics………………………………………………235 6.2.7 : Weapons and Weapons Acquisition……………………………...238 6.3 : Research Questions Revisited…………………………………….239 6.3.1 : Attacking the Support Base……………………………………….239 6.3.2 : Evolution of Military Strategy……………………………………240 : End Notes…………………………………………………………242
Chapter 7 : IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY. …………………………………………………………………….246 7.1 : TARGETING LRA ATTRIBUTES: IDENTITY………………..246 7.1.1 : Targeting Ideology……………………………………………….246 7.1.2 : Targeting Propaganda……………………………………………247 7.1.3 : Targeting Popular Support……………………………………….248 7.1.4 : Targeting Motivation…………………………………………….249 7.1.5 : Targeting Recruitment…………………………………………...250 7.2 : TARGETING LRA ATTRIBUTES: OPERATIONAL…………252 7.2.1 : Targeting Training……………………………………………….252 7.2.2 : Targeting Organizational Structure……………………………...253 7.2.3 : Targeting Guerrilla Bases………………………………………..254 7.2.4 : Targeting Funding and External Support………………………...254 7.2.5 : Targeting Strategy and Tactics…………………………………..256 7.2.6 : Targeting Weapons and Weapons Acquisition…………………..258 7.3 : Recent Developments and Prospects for a Resurgence of the LRA Threat…………………………………………………………….259 7.4 : How the LRA Insurgency might End……………………………263 7.5 : The Transition from Insurgency to Post-Insurgency…………….266 7.6 : Significance of the Research Findings…………………………...267 7.7 : Areas for Further Research………………………………………270 End Notes………………………………………………………...272
5 : FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 1: Evolution of the Ideology of LRA……………………120 Figure 2: Troop Strength of LRA……………………………….167 Figure 3: Centralized Command Structure of LRA……………..177 Appendix 1: Testing the Insurgent Attributes of LRA: Identity.. 277 Appendix 2: Testing the Insurgent Attributes of LRA: Operational .. …………………………………………………………………283 Appendix 3: Field Research Contacts…………………………....289 Appendix 4: Interview Schedule (Experts)………………………291 Appendix 5: Interview Schedule (Ex-LRA Combatants)………..293 Bibliography……………………………………………………..295
6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This research would never have been accomplished without a support network. I wish to thank the Almighty God for giving me the wisdom to undertake and complete my doctoral studies. I am grateful to Professor Adam Dolnik and Dr Sam Mullins for supervising my thesis. I wish to express my gratitude to Yee Sin Ang, a PhD Physics Candidate at the University of Wollongong for assisting me in digitizing some of the diagrams in my thesis. Without the dedicated support of staff at Campus East (where I have lived for three years), the University of Wollongong Library, University of Wollongong Medical Centre and National Australia Bank (University of Wollongong Branch), it would have been extremely difficult for me to fulfil my academic obligations.
In conducting my field research in Uganda, I had to rely on the critical support of a number of people: Honourable Tom Butime (Member of Parliament of Mwenge North in Uganda) and Mr Charles Mpagi (Political Editor of the Daily Monitor of Uganda), thank you so much for acting as my principle snowball contacts. I want to thank all the interviewees who spared their valuable time to talk to me. I am indebted to Mr Mubiru who safely drove me to and from Gulu, the original theatre of the LRA insurgency.
Over the three years I have spent studying at the University of Wollongong, my family has been very supportive. I wish to express gratitude to my parents Mr John Butime and Mrs Grace Butime and my brothers Ted Butime and Mike Butime for supporting me. I am grateful to Mrs Beatrice Butime, my auntie and Dr Julius Butime, my cousin for the numerous times they drove me to and from Entebbe International Airport.
I am highly indebted to everyone that supported me while I pursued my doctoral studies. Without your moral, financial, administrative and academic input, this thesis would never have come to fruition.
God Bless Herman Butime 3rd March, 2012.
7 ACRONYMS
AACPC All Africa Committee for Political Coordination AAPRA All African People’s Revolutionary Army AAPRP All African People’s Revolutionary Party ADF Allied Democratic Front AIAI Al Ittihad Al Islammiyya APC Armoured Personnel Carrier AU African Union BBC British Broadcasting Corporation Brig Brigadier Capt Captain CAR Central African Republic CCO Chief of Combat Operations CMS Church Missionary Society CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People Col Colonel CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DDR Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration DP Democratic Party DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Agonos ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna FAL Fusil Automatique Leger FAR Former Army of Rwanda FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda FEDEMU Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda FLEC Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda FRELIMO Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique FRONASA Front for National Salvation GoDRC Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo GoS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan GoU Government of Uganda GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat HRW Human Rights Watch HSM I Holy Spirit Movement I HSM II Holy Spirit Movement II HSMF Holy Spirit Mobile Forces ICC International Criminal Court ICU Islamic Courts Union IDP Internally Displaced People’s Camp IED Improvised Explosive Device IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies INA Industria National de Armas
8 IRA Irish Republican Army IPS Inter Press Service KAR King’s African Rifles LRA Lord’s Resistance Army LRM Lord’s Resistance Movement Lt Col Lieutenant Colonel Lt Gen Lieutenant General LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealan Maj Major Maj Gen Major General MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta NGO Non Governmental Organization NRA National Resistance Army NRM National Resistance Movement NSAG Non-State Armed Group PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army PRDP Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda RC Resistance Council RDC Resident District Commissioner RENAMO Mozambique National Resistance RGS Royal Geographical Society RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade RUF Revolutionary United Front SAF Sudanese Armed Forces SAM Surface to Air Missile SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organization TFG Transitional Federal Government TNT Tri Nitro Toluene TPDF Tanzania People’s Defence Force UA Uganda Army UFM Uganda Freedom Movement UK United Kingdom UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independecia Total de Angola UNLA Uganda National Liberation Army UPC Uganda People’s Congress UPDA Uganda People’s Democratic Army UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces UPM Uganda Patriotic Movement USA United States of America WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WNBF West Nile Bank Front
9 ABSTRACT
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency is arguably one of the longest civil conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Triggered off by shifts in the regional balance of power in Uganda, it emerges at the tail end of a series of rebellions that gripped the Acholi sub- region of Northern Uganda following guerrillas of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seizing state power in 1986. Up until this point in the post-colonial era, the political and military structures of the state were controlled by Ugandans hailing from the Northern part of the country. For the first time in the country’s history, the NRM takeover handed control of the state to Southern Ugandans. Over the course of 25 years, the armed conflict has spread from its original theatre in Northern Uganda to Eastern Uganda, Southern Sudan, North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Eastern Central African Republic (CAR).
The LRA rebellion unsettles the theories of guerrilla warfare in a number of ways: LRA’s military strategy is based on conducting excessive attacks on the population that should otherwise have been rendering popular support to its activities; the group is predominantly populated with abductees who are not ideologically committed to its armed struggle; LRA has not only lacked a coherent ideology but also (for the better part of its life cycle) a political wing to articulate it; the group has failed to systematically graduate from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phase of its insurgent campaign. And yet for all its apparent skewed approach to armed conflict, the group has managed to stay in operation for more than two decades.
This qualitative study attempts to unlock the logic behind the above discrepancies. The central question in this thesis is whether the theories of guerrilla warfare are useful in explaining the activities of LRA. In order to address this question, a theoretical blueprint for insurgency was developed. This was in turn tested on the insurgent attributes of LRA. The process of gathering data for this study was undertaken at two levels: First, an extensive review of literature on the principles of insurgency, the life cycle and organization of the LRA rebellion was undertaken. Second, interviews were conducted in
10 Kampala, the capital city of Uganda and Gulu, the original theatre of the LRA rebellion. In Kampala, interviewees included lecturers, journalists, military officers and politicians with in-depth knowledge on the group. In Gulu, Northern Uganda, ex-combatants of LRA furnished this study with an insider account of the group’s modus operandi.
It can be asserted that the theories of guerrilla warfare are helpful in providing a benchmark for understanding the insurgent activities of LRA. With respect to ideology, propaganda, motivation, training and bases, the group conforms to the principles of insurgency. In terms of popular support, recruitment, funding and external support, strategy and tactics, weapons and weapons acquisition, LRA is partially at odds with the principles of insurgency. To this end, ethnicity has not been an enduring basis for popular support as it has been undermined by LRA attacks on the Acholi population; In the post-formative phase, LRA has forcefully recruited members who are not ideologically committed to its campaign;
The group has not depended on popular support-driven funding; Despite its longevity, the military strategy of the group has not followed a systematic evolutionary trajectory; And there was no evidence to prove that LRA acquires some of its arms through theft. The evolution of the group’s organizational structures is also at marked variance with the theories of guerrilla warfare. LRA neither separates its military from its non-military wings nor subordinates its military wing to a non-military one. While largely conforming to the tenets of insurgency, overall, the LRA case is useful in pinpointing the logic that might sustain a rebel group whose modus operandi is partially at odds with the theories of guerrilla warfare.
This thesis concludes with an assessment of recent developments in the LRA insurgent campaign and the dynamics underpinning the regional initiative aimed at ending it. Finally, there is a brief discussion on whether this transnational conflict is coming to an end and if it is, the challenges inherent in the transition from the phase of insurgency to that of post- insurgency.
11 CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.1: ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA 1.1.1: INTRODUCTION. In the post-colonial era, the use of violence has emerged as the principle means by which political actors contest domestic political dispensations in most African states. Up until the return to civilian-led governance in 1999, regime change in the Federal Republic of Nigeria was mainly achieved through military coups. 1 In Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 2 Congo, Rwanda 3 and the Central African Republic (CAR), Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs) contesting the authority of seating governments have adopted guerrilla warfare as a strategy. In Somalia, rebel groups have relied on the conventional military capability of neighbouring countries to seize state power. 4
The evolution of regime change strategy in Africa has largely been underpinned by rational calculations. NSAGs on the domestic political scene have adopted approaches commensurate with their start up insurrectional capacities. Where the balance in military capabilities has been tilted in favour of the state military apparatus, sub-national groups have opted to employ irregular warfare.
This strategy has allowed them to build and conserve their insurrectional capabilities while selectively engaging stronger state military apparatuses. In cases where cracks have emerged within the political and military establishments of the state, sub-national groups have opted to engineer military coups d’etat. This approach has attempted to turn the military capability of the state against itself. Where some neighbouring countries have demonstrated the capability and propensity to support external subversive activity, some rebel organizations have relied on the conventional armies of these states to change governments.
12 The post-colonial political development of Uganda throws up a classical case in the evolution of insurrectional strategy in Africa. Over the years, insurgent groups have constituted the country into a laboratory for testing the efficacy of contending regime change strategies. In 1971, 5 1980 and 1985, 6 military coups facilitated regime change in Uganda. In 1979, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), Tanzania’s national army, backed the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) rebels in invading Uganda and deposing President Idi Amin. 7 Between 1981 and 1986, guerrillas of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) waged an agrarian insurgent campaign that resulted in the collapse of the second Milton Obote regime.
In more recent times, guerrilla organizations have employed terrorism to contest the authority of the Ugandan state. Between 1996 and 2002, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) conducted an Islamist terrorist campaign in Western Uganda and Kampala, the Ugandan capital. 8 Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has violently challenged the National Resistance Movement government. Originally situating the thrust of its activities in the Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda, LRA has since graduated into a transnational non-state armed group. At different stages of its life cycle, the group has expanded its theatre of insurgent activity into the Lango region of Northern Uganda, the Teso region of Eastern Uganda, 9 Southern Sudan, 10 North Eastern DRC 11 and South Eastern CAR. 12 Led by Joseph Kony, a mystic figure ostensibly commanding spiritual powers, LRA aims to unseat the NRM government and replace it with one based on the Ten Commandments of the Christian faith.
The LRA insurgency unsettles conventional analysis of conflict in a number of ways: Among other discrepancies, LRA has excessively based its campaign on mounting attacks on the population on which it should otherwise have relied for popular support; 13 For the better part of its life cycle, the group has relied on a conscripted fighting force which is not ideologically committed to its armed struggle; 14 It has largely operated without a political wing and lacked a coherent ideology. 15 Yet for all its apparent skewed approach to conflict, the group has managed to operate for 25 years. This thesis attempts to unlock the logic underpinning the organization of the LRA rebellion. First, it sets the background to
13 the conflict in Northern Uganda. Second, it unveils a theoretical framework for studying the LRA case. Third, the attributes of the group are tested against the theoretical framework in order to generate a better understanding of the rationale behind its activities.
1.1.2: COLONIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA. Conflict in Uganda is rooted in its colonial past. In seeking to consolidate colonial rule in the country, the British authorities created multiple polarities. Paul Jackson asserts that the British government generated an economic divide in Uganda by constituting the South into a hub for agricultural and industrial development whilst turning the North into a reservoir for cheap labour. Consequently, by the time Uganda secured political independence from Britain, the North was lagging behind the South in economic development terms. 16 This colonial arrangement would have implications for the stability of the country. First, the North would potentially agitate for a redistribution of the national wealth. Second, in the event of a future outbreak of conflict in Uganda, British colonial policy had furnished the South with a start up resource edge over the North.
In assembling the Ugandan colonial state, British authorities also generated a labour market divide that constituted the security services into a domain dominated by the North while turning the civil service into one predominantly populated by Ugandans hailing from the South. 17 Kristen E Cheney pinpoints some disparities in the constitution of the King’s African Rifles (KAR), the British colonial army in Uganda: While the Acholi and Langi from Northern Uganda constituted only 6% of the Ugandan population, they made up 61% of KAR. 18 As a result, Colonel Walter Ochora, Resident District Commissioner (RDC) Gulu notes that “The Acholi saw the army as an industry.” 19 Jeroen Adam et al observe that this professional calling caused the evolution of an Acholi “military ethnocracy.” 20
In evaluating the implications of British labour market policy in Uganda, Cheney points out that “Northerners were thus economically disadvantaged but controlled the instruments of violence.” 21 In the event a conflict unfolded, British colonial policy had equipped the North with a start up compensatory military edge over the South.
14 In designing the above colonial strategy, Britain was guided by a strategic calculation: With the South initially emerging as the bedrock for anti-colonial activity, the imperial government thought it prudent vesting the instruments of coercion in the hands of the hitherto less politically agitative Northern region. In case the South spearheaded an uprising against the colonial authorities, the British would potentially draw on support from the North to crush it.
It is worth noting that British colonial policy in Uganda was not solely premised on the creation and sustenance of a North-South regional divide. Alongside this strategy, London cultivated highly divisive Catholic—Protestant22 and Buganda—rest-of-Uganda23 polarities in the country.
In building the Ugandan colonial state, British authorities worked in close partnership with a number of non-state actors. While the explorers of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) furnished the British colonial office with information on the geographical characteristics of territories in Uganda, missionaries assembled a pool of Christian converts who aligned themselves with churches mainly originating from Europe. When in 1888, Protestants and Catholics clashed over control of the kingdom of Buganda, the British colonial authorities sided with the Protestants. The subsequent defeat and marginalization of the Catholics introduced a religious dimension to the politics of Uganda. In 1954, the Catholic-dominated Democratic Party (DP) emerged to redress the under representation of Catholics within the political structures of the Ugandan polity. 24
1.1.3: POST-COLONIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA While expanding and consolidating the Ugandan colonial state, Britain heavily relied on the support of the highly organized and centralized kingdom of Buganda. To reciprocate Buganda’s support, Britain bequeathed the newly independent Ugandan state a post- colonial constitutional arrangement that guaranteed the region a special federalist status. In the immediate post-independence era, Buganda’s attempt to maintain her special position within Uganda precipitated a clash between Milton Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda and Kabaka (King) Muteesa II of Buganda who was doubling as Non Executive President
15 of Uganda. Consequently, Obote, a politician hailing from the Lango sub-region of Northern Uganda capitalized on the North’s dominant position in the Ugandan army to depose Muteesa II and declare Uganda a republic in 1967. 25
The Catholic—Protestant and Buganda—rest-of-Uganda polarities were significant. In case the labour market polarities ceased to be useful, the British would potentially exploit the religious and federalist polarities to divide Ugandans. Equally significant, Uganda’s immediate post-independence leadership inherited the above array of polarities that it would potentially use to maintain a stranglehold on state power. However, with the army having played an instrumental role in settling the Buganda—rest-of-Uganda question, control of the military emerged as the key element in the evolving battle for the control of the Ugandan political dispensation.
In this discourse, the termination of the second post-colonial administration is significant in two ways: First, the military coup that Idi Amin staged against Obote (in 1971) introduced a sub-regional polarity within an already existing North-South regional divide. The coup was precipitated by underlying concerns over the constitution of the Ugandan military. While Obote was intent on staffing the Uganda Army (UA) with Acholis and Langis from the North, Amin, the Army Commander at that time, favoured recruiting soldiers from the North West. 26 Second, the disintegration of the first Obote regime constituted the state military apparatus into a prospective theatre for insurrections in Uganda. In future, subnational groups were potentially more likely to favour military coups as a regime change strategy.
The end of the Amin regime (in 1979) showcased the underlying underdevelopment of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda at that time. Ugandan exiles in Tanzania needed the outright support of the Tanzanian army to depose Amin.27 Between 1971 and 1977, attempts at assassinating Amin 28 and conducting insurgent activity inside the country were foiled by Ugandan security forces. In a sense, the capacity for rebel groups to independently change government in Uganda remained largely ineffective.
16 However, the collapse of the Amin regime laid the foundation for a reconfiguration of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. The role of the Northern dominated Uganda National Liberation Army (the post-Amin national army) in intervening and sustaining the second Obote administration precipitated a push for the reversal of the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the North. In 1980, Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party defeated DP in highly disputed general elections. 29 The significance of the 1980 polls was two fold: First, the poor performance of UPC in the South underscored the endurance of the North-South divide in the politics of Uganda. Second, the intervention of UNLA on Obote’s side underlined the critical role of ethnicity in shaping the allegiance of the Ugandan military. Being a Northern dominated military institution, UNLA backed Obote because he hailed from the North. In this connection, the South then needed its own military organization and capability to wrest the reigns of state power from the North.
Consequently, Yoweri Museveni, a political and military leader from South Western Uganda whose Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) party had emerged second runners up in the 1980 polls, formed the National Resistance Movement (NRM) armed group and launched a five year guerrilla campaign against the second Obote regime. 30
At this juncture, it is worth observing that the NRM insurgency (1981-1986) was perhaps the single most critical development that transformed the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. For the first time in the post-colonial history of the country, a rebel group managed to wage a popular protracted armed struggle against a seating government, inside the country without significant external support. In future, some subnational groups would potentially be tempted to adopt this approach as a means of changing government in the country.
Second, the NRM insurgency radically changed the territorial and ethnic bases for the development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. NRM’s ascent to state power in 1986 tilted the regional balance of power in favour of the South. For the first time in the post-colonial history of the country, the South controlled the instruments of coercion. 31 In this connection, the future germination of conflict in Uganda was going to depend on the
17 manner in which the South dispensed its newly acquired military power and how the North reacted to the loss of its position of influence.
Significantly, the North’s response to changes on the Ugandan geo-political landscape would potentially facilitate a shift in the theatre of insurrection from the South to the North. However, there was a challenge with the North evolving as a new arena for the development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda: In July 1985, Gen Tito Okello Lutwa, the Ugandan Army Commander hailing from Acholi had overthrown President Obote from Lango. 32 Consequently, rivalry between the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups was introduced in the Northern camp. Thus, the North faced a Herculean task in seeking to marshal ethnic unity to prosecute an armed struggle against the South.
Third, the nature of combatant-non-combatant relations in Ugandan guerrilla wars was shaped by the manner in which the NRM insurgency and the UNLA-led counterinsurgency campaign were conducted in the Luwero Triangle. NRM guerrillas strived to link UNLA troops to atrocities committed in the theatre of the insurgency. The propaganda strategy of the rebels was aided by the bareknuckled strategy adopted by the government forces. Tomas Ofcansky observes that “In January, 1983, Obote launched Operation Bonanza in this area during which UNLA troops destroyed small towns, villages and farms and killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians.” 33
Given the fact that the Acholi (Northerners) were the predominant ethnic group in the army and the Baganda (Southerners) suffered the brunt of counterinsurgency operations, the war in Luwero appeared to be a regional conflict. 34 In the event of future changes in the regional balance of power, relations between the North and South would significantly be affected by events in Luwero. If the South seized power, then it would potentially seek to exact revenge against the North for the atrocities allegedly committed by UNLA.
1.2: EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN UGANDA. The collapse of the Northern hegemony in 1986 presented opportunities and constraints for the future development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. In terms of opportunities,
18 shifts in the regional balance of power constituted the North into fertile ground for the evolution of a new theatre for armed rebellion. However, the collapsing Northern establishment faced an uphill task in seeking to adapt the remnants of its conventionally constituted political and military institutions to the challenges that come with conducting irregular conflict.
1.2.1: THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC ARMY REBELLION (1986- 1988). The onset of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) rebellion in 1986 unveiled Northern Uganda as a new theatre for armed insurrection. This insurgency was significant in the following ways:
First, it defined the ideological basis for armed conflict in Northern Uganda. Led by Brigadier Justin Odong Latek, a senior UNLA military officer from Acholi, UPDA advanced grievances that highlighted the enduring centrality of the North-South divide to the evolution of conflict in Uganda. The group decried the bareknuckled tactics NRM used in consolidating its authority in Northern Uganda. In August 1986, the 35th Battalion of the National Resistance Army (NRA), the armed wing of NRM killed 40 civilians in Namakora, Kitgum district, the birth place of Gen Lutwa. 35
According to Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi, Political Editor of The Daily Monitor newspaper, these tactics reinforced speculation that in the wake of the disintegration of the Northern hegemony, the South was intent on avenging atrocities committed by the Northern dominated UNLA in the Luwero Triangle. 36 In this connection, UPDA adduced the need for the ethnic survival of the Acholi in particular and people of Northern Uganda in general as a legitimate reason for contesting the authority of NRM.
Second, the collapse of the UPDA rebellion exposed the pitfalls of using conventional military tactics in asymmetric duels. In August, 1987, the then conventionally attuned UPDA forces suffered military defeat at the Battle of Kilak Corner. 37 Consequently, on 3rd June, 1988, a faction of the rebel group concluded the Pece Peace Accord with the NRM
19 government. 38 In order to avoid the fate that had militarily befallen UPDA, rebel groups emerging in future had to adopt an unconventional approach to armed conflict.
1.2.2: THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT (HSM) I REBELLION (1986-1988) Whereas UPDA laid the foundation for insurrection in Northern Uganda, the Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) not only re-defined the ideological basis for the conflict but also revolutionized the military strategy underpinning it. Led by Alice Auma also known as Lakwena, HSM I partially traced the roots of conflict in this part of the country back to contradictions within the Acholi social cosmos. 39 Lakwena argued that the prevalence of witchcraft in the Acholi sub-region had generated a social crisis. 40 In order to redress this problem, she asserted that there was a need to cleanse Acholi society of its sins. 41
In this respect, it can be argued that HSM I introduced auto-criticism to the body of grievances advanced by insurgent groups in Northern Uganda. The group percieved the misdeeds of Acholis as much a basis for conflict in this part of the country as those of non- Acholis. 42 This ideological re-orientation potentially watered down the North-South divide as the principle cause of armed conflict in the North. With auto-criticism gaining ideological prominence over the regional divide, in future, insurgent groups in this part of the country were more likely to constitute Acholi society into a canvass for the violent resolution of the Northern political question.
It is also worth observing that the disintegration of HSM I exposed the shortcomings of a faith-based military strategy. Prior to militarily engaging government forces, Holy Spirit Mobile Force (HSMF) fighters were sprinkled with ‘holy water’ and shea butter oil to insulate them against bullets. 43 Although this battlefield preparatory strategy yielded a fearless rebel force, the adoption of bold combat tactics (like open charging) unduly exposed HSM fighters to enemy gunfire. In 1986, at the Battle of Magamaga in Jinja, Eastern Uganda, Lakwena’s fearlessly charging and hymn-singing forces were decisively defeated by NRA. 44
20 1.2.3: THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT (HSM) II REBELLION (1988-1989) Although the collapse of HSM I called into question the effectiveness of a faith-based military strategy, insurgent groups in Northern Uganda did not drop this approach altogether. In the aftermath of the Battle of Magamaga, Severino Lukoya Kiberu, Lakwena’s father, established the Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) rebel group which did not significantly differ from HSM I in terms of organization. 45
While largely maintaining the HSM I faith-based combat approach, Lukoya made some doctrinal adjustments that aimed at enhancing esprit de corps. Acknowledging the appeal of the spiritual model of HSM I, he aimed to enhance morale within HSM II by opening up access to the pool of spirits in his organization. Unlike in HSM I where spiritual powers were only vested in the leader of the organization, Lukoya democratized the spiritual landscape in HSM II by permitting any of his fighters to take up roles as spirit mediums. Although doctrinally ground breaking, his strategy presented with one cardinal shortcoming: Whichever HSM II fighter chose to become a spirit medium increasingly put himself directly in the line of fire. 46 As a result, fewer members of the group were willing to embrace this career.
Organizationally fragile, under military pressure from government forces and engaged in a bitter turf war with LRA 47 (an emerging force on the Northern Uganda conflict circuit), HSM II imploded. Lukoya was captured and tortured by LRA, rescued from LRA captivity and jailed by government forces before being released in 1992. 48
1.3: EVOLUTION OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) INSURGENCY (1987-TO DATE) In the aftermath of the disintegration of HSM II, LRA emerged as the most critical security threat to the authority of the NRM government. However, LRA’s contribution to the long term development of the insurrectional landscape in Northern Uganda was largely going to depend on whether it would rectify the strategic and tactical errors that had caused the demise of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. In the event LRA surmounted this challenge, then it would have created a blueprint for a durable rebellion in the country.
21 1.3.1: EMERGENCE (1987-1990) At this juncture, it is worth noting that in order to precipitate an effective doctrinal redirection of the conflict in Northern Uganda, LRA had not only to drop or modify existing insurgent warfare models but also neutralize the groups that would potentially have re-popularized these strategies. In this direction, the emergence of LRA heavily depended on the simultaneous disintegration of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. 49
In seeking to facilitate the demise of the then evolving Holy Spirit Movement, Joseph Kony, the leader of LRA pursued a two-pronged approach: Like Lakwena and Lukoya, he sought to position himself as the only authentic practitioner of spiritual warfare. This strategy would potentially eliminate all his competitors. Brigadier Michael Acellam, a former LRA commander reveals that in 1987, Kony presented himself to his followers as “Mani Polo, a soldier from heaven.” 50 However, the authenticity of Kony’s claims largely depended on the status of his competitors. If Lukoya still commanded his spiritual credentials, then Kony’s position was in jeopardy. According to Peter Eichstaedt, Kony neutralized the doctrinal threat posed by HSM II by capturing Lukoya “…reportedly tying his uncle to a tree and beat(ing) him severely with a cane pole, shouting that he would not tolerate any more Lakwenas.” 51
Whereas the Holy Spirit Movement presented a fundamental doctrinal challenge to the emergence of LRA, the continued existence of UPDA threw up a legitimacy crisis for Kony. Most pioneering members of the UPDA officer corps were Acholis who had previously served in UNLA. In this sense, UPDA boasted not only ethnic ties to the Acholi population but also military experience needed to fight NRA. Although Kony had mainly recruited among Acholis (which put LRA at a level of parity with UPDA in terms of ethnic connections with the Acholi people), he lacked the requisite military expertise to match that of UPDA. Thus, in order to shore up its legitimacy, LRA needed to undermine the position of UPDA.
In seeking to address this challenge, LRA adopted a two-pronged approach: It attacked UPDA. Describing the intensity of the turf war between the two groups, Billie
22 O’Kadamerie observes that “(Kony) attacked UPDA with surprising ferocity that even surpassed NRA’s offensive then.” 52 By 1988, the viciousness of the clashes between LRA and UPDA had pushed UPDA to conclude a peace agreement with the NRM government. 53 This would relieve UPDA of the burden of having to engage two enemies—NRA and LRA.
However, acknowledging the wealth of military experience accumulated by the pioneering officer corps of UPDA, Kony sought to incorporate some of the high ranking officers of this group into the structures of his emerging organization. To this end, former UPDA commanders, Brig Justin Odong Latek, Lt Col Basilio Opwonya, Lt Col Dr James Kweya, Lt Col Terensio Okullo, Lt Col Athocon, Lt Col Mazoldi Lubangakene, Col Joseph Obonyo, Maj Kenneth Banya, Major Stephen Moyi, Maj Benjamin Apia and Lt Col Kaggwa assumed leadership positions in LRA.54
1.3.2: COUNTERING THE EMERGENCE OF LRA: OPERATION NORTH (1991- 1992) Thus far, this discussion has addressed the role played by different non-state armed groups in shaping the development of the insurrectional landscape in Northern Uganda. It is worth observing that the development of insurrectional landscapes ultimately depends on the confrontational interaction between insurgents and counterinsurgents. While insurgent activity cultivates the foundation for asymmetric duels, counterinsurgent activity seeks to dismantle these conflict settings. In this connection, the evolution of Northern Uganda as a theatre for insurrection not only hinged on the insurgent activities of UPDA, HSM I, HSM II and LRA but also on counterinsurgency campaigns mounted by the Ugandan state military apparatus.
Operation North 55 presented the Ugandan state with the first comprehensive opportunity to influence the development of the insurrectional landscape in Northern Uganda. This counterinsurgency campaign not only set the geographical parameters of the emerging conflict but also defined the future shape of the battle for the hearts and minds of the Acholi people.
23 According to Lt Gen Ivan Koreta, Deputy Chief of Defence Forces of UPDF, Operation North aimed at cordoning off an area covering Karuma, Lake Kyoga and the Eastern bank of River Nile—in essence, large parts of the Acholi and Lango sub-regions of Northern Uganda. 56 In this connection, it can be argued that ideological differences among the different rebel groups affected neither the ethnic basis nor the geographical setting of the armed conflict. Like UPDA, HSM I and HSM II, the theatre of the LRA rebellion was in Northern Uganda 57 and the grievances underpinning this rebellion related to the North- South regional divide.
Operation North was also instrumental in shaping combatant-civilian relations in the conflict in Northern Uganda. In order to deny LRA popular support, the Ugandan state relocated large sections of the Acholi population in protected camps. 58 With civilians restricted to designated areas, Koreta argues that the Ugandan military then had a better opportunity to “…chase legitimate targets.” 59 As part of the counterinsurgency campaign, Betty Bigombe, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office Resident in Northern Uganda, spearheaded the creation of civil defence groups known as the Arrow Boys. In reacting to this strategy, LRA designated Acholi civilians government collaborators and started attacking them. 60 At this stage in the campaign, the population was at crossroads: It had to choose between supporting a rebel group that was fighting to liberate it (while attacking it) and a government that had dispossessed it of its political power (but was protecting it against rebel attacks).
1.3.3: THE BIGOMBE PEACE INITIATIVE (1993) Although by 1992, Operation North had significantly weakened LRA’s capacity to wage war inside Uganda, 61 the NRM government opted to change its counterinsurgency strategy. In 1993, Bigombe initiated peace talks with LRA geared towards realizing a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Northern Uganda. 62 This peace process was significant in two ways:
First, it underscored the centrality of the battle for hearts and minds to the execution of asymmetric duels in Uganda. Although by 1992, LRA had relocated to the Otto hills,
24 Lubangatek and Jabulein in Southern Sudan after incurring heavy losses at the hands of NRA, 63 the establishment of protected villages in Northern Uganda had severed relations between the Acholi population and the NRM government. Apart from uprooting it from its natural habitat, the above policy 64 did not effectively insulate the Acholi people against LRA attacks. Thus, the 1993 peace process did not only present the NRM Government with the opportunity of peacefully ending the LRA insurgency but also that of repairing its relations with the Acholi population
Second, the collapse of the Bigombe initiative underlined the critical role of peace processes in facilitating transitions between different phases of insurgencies in Uganda. The 1993 peace process ended because of a break down in trust between the negotiating parties over suspicions that LRA was using the negotiations period to regroup. 65 The activities of LRA during the 1993 peace process mirrored insurgent practice in previous conflict eras. In 1985, guerrillas of NRM used the Nairobi peace negotiations to prepare for a final military onslaught on Kampala, the Ugandan capital. 66
1.3.4: SECURING EXTERNAL SUPPORT (1994) The role of Tanzania in deposing President Idi Amin introduced an external support dimension to civil conflicts in Uganda. Although Ugandan exiles had formed the UNLF rebel group to fight Amin, the bulk of the force that toppled him was marshalled by the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF). 67 The commencement of Sudanese support for LRA was significant. In the long term, it would show the extent to which proxy conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa had changed since the collapse of the Amin regime. 68
Sudan’s involvement in the conflict in Uganda underlined the connection between foreign policy and domestic politics. According to Angelo Izama of the Daily Monitor newspaper, Sudan backed LRA and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in retaliation for suspected Ugandan support for the Sudanese rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). 69 However, Lt Col Felix Kulayigye, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and Ministry of Defence Spokesman contests the notion that Uganda’s foreign policy fuelled the conflict in the North. He contends that by the time Uganda started extending
25 support to SPLA, the rebel group was already receiving military aid from Ethiopia. According to Kulayigye, Sudan backed LRA because it was uneasy about the emergence of what it perceived as a progressive regime in Uganda. 70
In discussing the Uganda-Sudan proxy war, the nature of the LRA-Government of Sudan (GoS) alliance generates conflicting perspectives. Whereas Izama asserts that Sudanese support for LRA was contingent on the rebel group operating along what was known as the Southern flank, 71 Ray Apiire, former Chaplain of LRA downplays the influence the Khartoum establishment commanded over Kony’s forces. Despite Sudan pursuing Islamist foreign policy objectives, Apiire reveals that it did not force Islam down the throat of LRA. 72
1.3.5: LOSS OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT (1999-2002) The nature of relations between LRA and the GoS would subsequently shape the next phase in the evolution of the insurgency in Northern Uganda. Given the loose control that Khartoum had over LRA, the conclusion of the Nairobi Peace Accord in 1999 (that normalized Uganda-Sudan relations) 73 and the commencement of the UPDF-led counterinsurgency Operation Iron Fist in Southern Sudan in 2002 74 did not rein in Kony’s fighting group. Capitalizing on the measure of autonomy it enjoyed in its relations with the GoS, LRA was able to disengage from the alliance and embark on the next phase in its campaign.
Under pressure from UPDF counterinsurgency units in Southern Sudan, LRA split up into two forces: In 2003, the first flooded back into Uganda causing terror in Acholiland, Lango and the Teso sub-region of Eastern Uganda. 75 In 2005, the second, commanded by Maj Gen Vincent Otti, Kony’s deputy, relocated to Garamba forest in North Eastern DRC. 76 The relocation to Garamba showed that the group could establish a sanctuary in a neighbouring country without the consent of its government. Unlike in Sudan, in the DRC, LRA relatively improved prospects for holding on to its base. It was not only difficult for the GoDRC to access this part of the country (due to rough terrain) but also in light of the
26 fact that LRA had set up base in the country illegally, it had not entered into a formal alliance with the DRC that would have constrained it.
The incursions into Eastern Uganda offer insights into the strategic calculations of the group in the wake of the official withdrawal of Sudanese support for its activities. The International Crisis Group identifies three objectives underpinning LRA’s Eastern Campaign in 2003: To disrupt the Eastern trade route that passes through the Eastern town of Mbale; “giving the insurgency a national character” and “replenishing logistics.” 77 The defeat of LRA forces in this part of the country exposed the futility of following insurrectional routes used by other rebel groups to ease transnational counterinsurgency pressure. In 2003, Eastern Uganda emerged as a perennial stumbling block to the southward exportation of insurrections originating from Northern Uganda. Like HSM I forces which were mowed down by NRA machine gunfire at Magamaga in Eastern Uganda, 78 LRA suffered perhaps one of its worst defeats in Teso, Eastern Uganda. Brigadier Tabuleh, one of the group’s top commanders was killed during clashes with government forces and civil defence groups in the sub-region. Although a setback, the Eastern debacle presented LRA and future rebel groups with the opportunity of reassessing and identifying alternative insurrectional routes.
1.3.6: THE JUBA PEACE PROCESS (2005-2008) Just like the 1993 peace talks, the Juba peace process showcased the critical role of diplomacy in facilitating transition between different phases of insurgencies in Uganda. Mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan, 79 the Juba peace process (perhaps the best opportunity to peacefully end the conflict in Northern Uganda) was held hostage by two sticking issues: Whereas LRA premised the conclusion of a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) on the Government of Uganda (GoU) influencing the revocation of International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments targeting its leadership 80 (which the GoU tried to do but failed), the Ugandan state insisted that meaningful peace in Northern Uganda was unattainable as long as LRA used the negotiations to regroup. 81 The sticking issues in the negotiations furnished the two sides with the excuses and space to pursue the military option. The Juba peace process accorded the GoU the opportunity to ‘exhaust’ all
27 diplomatic channels before dealing with the LRA problem militarily. Having taken a beating during Operation Iron Fist, LRA needed a cessation of hostilities to reorganize its forces.
With both sides becoming increasingly belligerent, the Juba peace process turned out to be a pause in hostilities. On 14th December, 2008, the armies of Uganda, DRC and Southern Sudan with logistical support by the United States launched Operation Lightening Thunder that targeted LRA bases deep in North Eastern DRC. 82 Although this campaign significantly crippled the group’s capacity to wage war, it exported LRA terror to hitherto unaffected territories in the Central African Republic.
1. 4: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.4.1: PROBLEM STATEMENT The background to this study unveils shifts in the development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. In the pre-LRA era, groups contesting the authority of the state mainly targeted the capability of the national army. By staging coups, they aimed at turning the capability of the state military apparatus against itself; By relying on the support of conventional armies of neighbouring states, these groups aimed to raise their military capabilities to the same level as those of the governments whose authority they were contesting; By adopting insurgency as a strategy, they aimed to selectively engage government forces. In all the above cases, insurrections in Uganda were duels between combatants.
In the LRA era, insurrectional culture has radically changed. Non military infrastructure has evolved into a target for the violent resolution of political disputes in the country. Rebel groups in Uganda now target civilians, homes, gardens and schools with the aim of indirectly undercutting the confrontational edge commanded by the state military apparatus. This shift potentially upsets existing paradigms underpinning the organization and execution of irregular conflict. For example, LRA’s sustained attacks on civilians 83 undermine its capacity to marshal popular support needed for prosecuting its insurgent
28 campaign. Despite receiving substantial military support from the Government of Sudan (GoS), 84 LRA’s apparent failure to systematically graduate from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phase of its campaign runs contrary to existing theories of guerrilla warfare.
The apparent discrepancy between the modus operandi of LRA and the principles of insurgency points to an emerging gap in knowledge on irregular conflict in Africa. In order to bridge it, this thesis compares and contrasts the activities of LRA with a theoretical model of guerrilla warfare. Any conformities and disconformities emerging in this case study will contribute towards a better understanding of asymmetric warfare in the modern era.
1.4.2: BROAD/PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION Are existing theories of guerrilla warfare useful in explaining the insurgent activities of LRA?
1.4.3: SPECIFIC/SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. How does LRA reconcile the need for popular support with its sustained attacks on civilians? 2. Why has LRA not systematically graduated from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phase of its insurgent campaign?
1.4.4: HYPOTHESES The hypotheses in this study were generated from an in-depth discussion of the principles of guerrilla warfare (Chapters 2 and 3). IDEOLOGY LRA will have adopted an ideology that is either an original synthesis of its ideals or an adaptation of existing ideologies in order to articulate political contradictions in the Ugandan polity and justify its recourse to violence to resolve these contradictions
29 PROPAGANDA 1. LRA will have used a communicational campaign espousing the idea of an independent existence for its targeted audience, pin-pointing political contradictions within the Ugandan polity and rationalizing its recourse to violence. 2. LRA will have used overt propaganda techniques in territories where it commands greater control over the population and covert ones where it has less control. MOTIVATION & ESPRIT DE CORPS LRA fighters will have been motivated by idealistic and social considerations POPULAR SUPPORT LRA will have enjoyed popular support because it can easily access civilians, its membership is ethnically connected with the population in Northern Uganda and civilians in this part of the country believe that LRA will unseat the National Resistance Movement government. RECRUITMENT LRA will have selectively recruited its members from civic groups and constituencies that are either conscious and/or targets of marginalization perpetrated by the National Resistance Movement government. TRAINING LRA will either have designed or adopted a training model commensurate with its military strategy and tactics and one that imparts both combat and non combat skills. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE LRA will have evolved as a politico-military organization characterized by a structural separation of functions, with its armed wing subordinated to its political wing. GUERRILLA BASES 1. LRA will have located its bases in topographically inaccessible areas in order to limit attacks on them. 2. The LRA insurgency will have been located in an area with a history of armed insurrection and susceptibility to weak central government control.
30 FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT LRA will have relied on popular support and criminal activity domestically and exploited existing geo-political contradictions regionally to mobilize resources for prosecuting a relatively cheap insurgent campaign. GUERRILLA STRATEGY 1. LRA will have prosecuted an unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign and selectively targeted loop-holes in the capability of the state military apparatus while adapting to its own condition of relative military weakness. 2. LRA will have selectively attacked civilians to expose the Ugandan state as incapable of protecting its citizens. In turn, this will have pushed the government to adopt a heavy handed approach to tracking down the rebels. GUERRILLA TACTICS 1. LRA will have attacked weak points in the military capability of the Ugandan state and avoided outright confrontation with government forces. 2. LRA will have used terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive movements in its theatres of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy. WEAPONS & WEAPONS ACQUISITION LRA will have used a wide range of weapons according to availability and will have purchased and stolen its arms and ammunition from a variety of domestic and foreign sources.
1.4.5: SCOPE OF THE STUDY This study tests twelve variables underpinning the organization of the LRA insurgency against a theoretical model of guerrilla warfare developed in Chapters 2 and 3.
1.4.6: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY This study will enhance our understanding of LRA and add to what is already known about guerrilla warfare and conflict in Africa.
31 1.4.7: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Within the domain of research, there are two diametrically opposing paradigms: On one hand, the positivist school of thought is premised on the assumption that objective truth exists and employing the tools for systematic, value-free investigation, it can be unlocked. On the other, the post-positivist or interpretivist school of thought contends that ‘truth’ is a subjective construction. It is a product of a value-laden investigative process. 85
The emergence of divergent research paradigms has yielded competing methods for knowledge production. Whereas the positivist approach seeks objective truth through statistical quantification, the post-positivist approach seeks subjective truth through holistic interpretation. 86 This thesis has adopted a post-positivist/interpretivist approach because the process of studying the activities of LRA is not value-free. This research is significantly informed by multiple theoretical perspectives.
1.4.7.1: Developing a Theoretical Framework In seeking to construct a pool of values to shape this investigative process, a critical review of some of the theoretical perspectives underpinning the organization of insurgency was done. Emphasis was placed on the following variables: organizational structure, the evolution of strategy and tactics, mode of recruitment, induction and training, resource mobilization strategy, weapons acquisition and use, motivation, propaganda, ideology and popular support. In this direction, the research objective was to assemble a benchmark on the basis of which the insurgent credentials of LRA would be tested.
1.4.7.2: Selecting LRA In the field of Terrorism Studies, Africa is one of the more understudied regions in the world. An attempt was made to extend the frontiers of this field by conducting an extensive study on one terrorist campaign in the region. In 2009, I conducted an extensive review of literature on seven terrorist campaigns in Africa: The LRA and Allied Democratic Front (ADF) insurgencies in Uganda; the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency in Sierra Leone; the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) insurgency in Algeria; the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) insurgency in Rwanda; Al Ittihad Al Islammiyya (AIAI) and Al Shabaab insurgencies in Somalia. In all these cases, the objective was to unlock the
32 logic behind insurgent activity. To this end, an attempt was made to establish the relationship between the life cycle of each group and the organization of its insurgent activities.
Although conforming to some of the attributes of insurgent groups in Africa, LRA exhibited certain tendencies that put it at odds with the theories of guerrilla warfare. It does not seek to control territory and resources; The group’s organizational structures do not reflect its ambition to capture and dispense political power; 87 Despite strengthening its military capability over the years, LRA does not seem to have systematically graduated from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare stage of its insurgent campaign.
1.4.7.3: Generating Field Research Questions The extensive review of literature yielded gaps in existing knowledge on LRA. These missing links were used to formulate open-ended field research questions.
1.4.7.4: Research Design The choice of a research design was dictated by two factors: The need to adopt a framework consistent with the interpretivist paradigm and the need to conduct an in-depth study of a single case. In seeking to accommodate the above research considerations, a single case study design was adopted. With this approach, it was possible to study multiple features of LRA in-depth, spread over multiple periods of time. 88
1.4.7.5: Gaining Access to the Field Research Settings Given the interpretivist dimension to the study, a non-random sampling technique was selected. 89 To this end, snowball sampling was used to contact key persons who in turn identified potential interviewees. The sampling frame for this study was partitioned into five categories: Ex-combatants, Ugandan military, Media, Academic and Political. For each category, one principal snowball contact was used to identify potential interviewees.
33 1.4.7.6: Data Collection, Sorting and Analysis Interviews were conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Wollongong. Given the post-positivist dimension to this study, qualitative research instruments were used. Unstructured interview schedules with open-ended questions were used to elicit responses from interviewees. These research tools allowed interviewees to elaborate their responses. In order to allow for research triangulation, secondary sources were used as a counterweight to the interviews. 90
The thematic codes 91 for this study were derived from the different variables of the theoretical framework. In this connection, all generated data was grouped under: strategy, tactics, organizational structure, funding, recruitment, induction, training, weapons and weapons acquisition, external support among other categories. In order to answer the questions in this study, the organization of the LRA insurgency was compared and contrasted with a theoretical model for guerrilla warfare.
1.4.7.7: Challenges encountered in conducting the study. Interviewing ex-combatants is an enormous challenge. While most of the ex-LRA combatants were willing to share their insurgent experiences, I had to tread a fine line between generating as much data as I could and guarding against pushing the interviewees to a point where probing brought back traumatizing memories of their careers. Most of the LRA commanders I interviewed were brutally conscripted into Kony’s guerrilla army at a very tender age.
I was able to overcome the above challenge. Prior to embarking on my field research, my principle supervisor (with vast experience in conducting terrorism and counter-terrorism research) taught me the fundamental techniques for interviewing insurgents. Other challenges related to harmonizing the time-boundedness of my field research with the need to generate enough data. In light of the busy work schedules of some of the interviewees, I had to cancel and reschedule some of the interviews.
34 20 interviews were successfully conducted in Kampala, the Ugandan capital and Gulu, the original theatre of the LRA insurgency. The next chapter is a critical review of the theories of guerrilla warfare.
35 END NOTES
ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA
1.1: INTRODUCTION 1 Klay Kieh, George, ‘Military Engagement in Politics in Africa,’ in Klay Kieh George and Agbese Ogaba Pita (eds) 2004, The Military and Politics in Africa. From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control. Ashgate Publishing Limited. England pp 37-56 Luckham, Robin, ‘Military withdrawal from Politics in Africa revisited’ in Klay Kieh George and Agbese Ogaba Pita (eds) 2004. Op cit. pp 91-107 2Salehyan, Idean 2010, Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle, PA. pp 35 of 74. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515804&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. Accessed on 21/02/2011. 3Waugh M Colin 2004, Paul Kagame and Rwanda. Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. McFarland & Company, Inc., North Carolina. pp 63-84 4International Crisis Group 2007, Central African Republic. Anatomy of a Phantom State. Africa Report No 136. 13 December 2007. pp 19 of 48. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central- african-republic/Central%20African%20Republic%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Phantom%20State.ashx. Accessed on 21/02/2011 BBC 2012, Somalia Profile. BBC News. 25th January, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 14094503. Accessed on 30/01/2012 5 Kasozi, A B K 1994, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda. 1964-1985. McGill Queen’s University Press. pp 88-103. 6 Mutengesa, Sabiiti 2006, From Pearl to Pariah: The Origin, Unfolding and Termination of State- Inspired Genocidal Persecution in Uganda, 1980-85. Social Science Research. 21st December, 2006 Council. http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/Mutengesa/. Accessed on 22/02/2011. 7 Murphy D Sean 1996, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an evolving World Order. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. pp 105-107 8Rake, Alan ‘Recent History’ in Murison, Catherine (ed) 2004, Africa South of the Sahara 2004. 33rd Edition. Europa Publications. England. pp 1167-1168 9 Naulele, Simon 2010, Defence Minister apologises for LRA atrocities in Teso. The New Vision. Monday, 18th January, 2010. http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/17/707473. Accessed on 22/02/2011. 10Ruati, Richard 2011, LRA rebels kill two, abduct one in Southern Sudan’s Western Equatoria province. Sudan Tribune. 28th January, 2011. http://www.sudantribune.com/LRA-rebels-kill-two-abduct-one-in,37794. Accessed on 22/02/2011 11Rice, Xan 2010, ‘Stench of Death’ in Congo confirms resurgence of Lord’s Resistance Army. The Guardian. Sunday, 28th March, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/28/lra-congo-uganda-un. Accessed on 22/02/2011 12Hsiao, Amanda 2010, 12,000 people in Central African Republic flee LRA attacks. Enough. Centre for American Progress. 28th May, 2010. http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/12000-people-car-flee-lra-attacks. Accessed on 22/02/2011 13Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, ‘Profiles of the Parties to the Conflict’ in Lucima, Okello (ed) 2002, Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda. Accord Northern Uganda Project. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/profiles.php. Accessed on 29/10/2011 14Hennessy Selah 2010, Report: LRA Recruiting Child Soldiers in DRC, CAR. Voice of America. 12th August, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Ugandan-Rebel-Group-Accused-of-Mass-Abductions-Killings- 100535724.html. Accessed on 26/06/2011 15IRIN 2004, Uganda: Nature, Structure and Ideology of LRA. 1st January, 2004. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=23&ReportId=65772. Accessed on 22/06/2011
36 1.2: COLONIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA 16Jackson, Paul 2002, ‘The March of the Lord’s Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, 13: 3. Routledge pp 35-37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310208559196. Accessed on 22/12/2009. Adam, Jeroen, De Cordier, Bruno, Titeca, Kristof and Vlassenroot, Koen 2007, ‘In the Name of the Father? Christian Militantism in Tripura, Northern Uganda, and Ambon’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30: 11. pp 963-972. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701611288. Accessed on 22/12/ 2009. 17Apuuli, Phillip Kasaija, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgency in Northern Uganda’ in Nhema, Alfred and Tiyambeleza, Paul (eds) 2008, The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. James Currey Limited. Chapter 4 18Cheney, Kristen E 2005, ‘our children have only known war’: children’s experiences and the use of childhood in northern Uganda’, Children’s Geopgraphies, 3: 1. pp 25-26 http: dx.doi.org/10.1080/14733280500037133. Accessed on 22/12/ 2009. 19Ochora, Walter 2010, Interview. 27th January, 2010. Gulu, Uganda. 20 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-972 21 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 22BBC 2009, Timeline: Uganda: A Chronology of Key Events. 9th April 2009. http: //newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/country-profiles/1069181.stm. Waliggo, Mary John, ‘The Bugandan Christian Revolution: The Catholic Church in Buddu, 1879-1896’ in Maxwell, David and Lawrie, Ingrid (eds) 2002, Christianity & The African Imagination: Essays in Honour of Adrian Hastings. Koninkljyke Brill NV. Netherlands pp 64-66 23Mutibwa, Phares 1992, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes. Africa World Press Inc. Trenton N J pp 42-58 Shillington, Kevin (ed) 2005, Encyclopaedia of African History. Volume 1. A-G.. Fitzroy Dearborn Taylor and Francis Group. New York. pp 1624 24Otunnu, Ogenga 2002, ‘Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland’. Conciliation Resources. ACCORD. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/causes-dynamics.php Accessed on 24/07/2010. Kassimir, Ronald, ‘The Catholic Church in Uganda’ in Young, Tom (ed) 2003, Readings in African Politics. The International African Institute, School of Oriental & African Studies. London. pp 151-157
1.3: POST-COLONIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA 25Mutiibwa, Phares 1992, Op cit pp 59 Mulira, Peter 2006, Four factors led to the 1966 Buganda Crisis. The New Vision. Monday, 23rd October, 2006. http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/20/528137. Accessed on 24/07/2010. Mubangizi, Michael 2009, Uganda’s 60 Year Conflict (Part 1): Obote to Museveni: One Game Different Players. The Observer. Thursday, 17th December, 2009. http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6494&Itemid=69. Accessed on 24/07/2010 26Rowe A John 2009, ‘Independence: The Early Years’, in A Country Study: Uganda. Country Studies. Federal Research Division. Library of Congress. May 7th 2009 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+ug0020%29. Accessed on 24/07/2010 Horowitz A Donald 1985, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press. California. pp 489 Byrnes M Rita (ed) 1990, Uganda: A Country Study. Washington. GPO for the Library of Congress. http://countrystudies.us/uganda/10.htm. Accessed on 24/07/2010 27Jorgensen, Jelmert 1981, Uganda: A Modern History. Taylor and Francis. London. pp 331-336 28Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin 2003, Why I am glad they didn’t assassinate Idi Amin. The Independent. Monday, 18th August 2003. http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/yasmin-alibhai-brown/why-im-glad- they-didnt-assassinate-idi-amin-536230.html. Accessed on 23/02/2011. 29 Mutiibwa, Phares 1992, Op cit pp 148-165
37 30Kanyongonya, Elizabeth, ‘Profile of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’ in Museveni K Yoweri 2000. What is Africa’s Problem? University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. xxv-xxvi Weinstein M Jeremy 2006, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. pp 62-70 31Otunnu, Ogenga ‘Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland’ in Lucima, Okello (ed) 2002, Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda. Accord Northern Uganda Project. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/causes- dynamics.php Accessed on 23/02/2011 Kulayigye, Felix 2010, Interview. Tuesday, 19th January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda 32Mutengesa, Sabiiti 2006, Op. cit Jackson, Paul 2002, Op. cit pp 35-37 33 Gersony, Robert 1997, The Anguish of Northern Uganda. Results of a Field Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda. United States Embassy Kampala. pp 17 of 135 http://www.internal- displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/3FF99DEEED86A1D3802570B7005A5558/ $file/The+anguish+of+northern+Uganda.pdf. Accessed on 24/07/2010. Mulindwa, Rogers 1998, ‘Obote soldiers sold women at shs 1,000’ says report. The Monitor. Monday, 9th November, 1998. pp 32. Kasozi, A.B.K 1994, Op cit. pp 180-185 The Luwero Triangle was situated North West of Kampala, the Ugandan capital, within the central region of Buganda. Two of the longer sides of the Triangle were 160 kilometres each. One was marked by a road running “North from Kampala to Gulu.” The other, “North West from Kampala to Hoima.” The shorter Northern one was “marked by Kafu River.” See: Ngoga Pascal, ‘The National Resistance Army’ in Clapham, Christopher (ed) 1998. African Guerrillas. Fountain Publishers. Kampala. pp 96-98 34 Gersony, Robert 1997, Op cit pp 17-19 of 135
1.4: EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN UGANDA. 1.4.1: THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC ARMY REBELLION (1986- 1988).
35International Crisis Group 2004, Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict. 14th April 2004. International Crisis Group. pp 8 of 47 http://www.up.ligi.ubc.ca/ICGreport.pdf. Accessed on 23/02/2011. Ochora, Walter 2010, Interview. Op cit Bevan, James 2007, ‘The Myth of Madness: Cold Rationality and ‘Resource’ Plunder by the Lord’s Resistance Army’. Civil Wars. 9: 4. pp 347-348. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240701699433. Accessed on 22/12/2009 Kasaija, Phillip, Apuuli 2006, Civil Society and Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in the Northern Uganda Conflict. 9-12th July, 2006. 7th Annual Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR), Bangkok, Thailand. http://www.istr.org/conferences/bangkok/WPVolume/Kasaija.ApuuliPhillip.pdf. pp 2 of 12. Accessed on 24/07/2010. 36Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Interview. Monday, 18th January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda Jackson, Paul 2009, “Negotiating with Ghosts’: Religion, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda”, The Round Table. 98: 402. pp 323-325. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358530902895402. Accessed on 22/12/2009. Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, ‘Uganda’s roadmap to the end of the northern region insurgency’. Daily Monitor. Tuesday, 18th July, 2006. pp 4-5 37Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, ‘Profiles of the Parties to the Conflict’ in Lucima, Okello (ed) 2002, Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda. Accord Northern Uganda Project. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/profiles.php. Accessed on 29/10/2011 38Lamwaka, Caroline, ‘The Peace Process in Northern Uganda 1986-1990’, in Lucima, Okello (ed) 2002 Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda. Accord Northern
38 Uganda Project. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/peace- process-1986-90.php. Accessed on 29/10/2011 Ochora, Walter 2010, Interview. Op cit Among other terms, the Pece Peace Agreement set out to end hostilities between UPDA and NRA; Facilitate the integration of UPDA into NRA; Arrange for the release of Prisoners Of War held by both sides; Organize the resettlement of displaced people and the rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructure. See: Lamwaka, Caroline 2002. Op cit
1.4.2: THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT (HSM) I REBELLION (1986-1988)
39Behrand, Heike 1999, Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda. 1986-97. James Currey Ltd. Oxford. pp 22-36 40 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit Cline, Lawrence E 2000, ‘Spirits and the cross: religiously based violent movements in Uganda’. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 14: 2. pp 115-118. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310412331300706. Accessed on 22/12/2009. 41Borzello, Anna 2007, ‘The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army’. Conflict, Security & Development. 7: 3. pp 389-393 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800701556537. Accessed on 22/12/2009 42 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 43 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit pp 115-118 Behrand, Heike 1999 Op cit pp 56-64 44Kasaija, Phillip 2005, Amnesty and International Law : The Case of the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgents in Northern Uganda. African Journal of Conflict Resolution. 5 : 2 2005. pp 38 of 155. http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_2005_2.pdf. Accessed on 29/10/2011
1.4.3: THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT (HSM) II REBELLION (1988-1989)
45O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, ‘Bigombe—Kony Talks: Has Total Peace Come To Northern Uganda? The New Vision. Monday, December 13, 1993. pps 14-15. 46Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118 47Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit pp 115-118 48Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit pp 115-118 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 389-393 The New Vision 1989, ‘Lakwena’s father gives up’. The New Vision. Vol 4. No 164. Saturday, July 29, 1989. pps 1&12
1.5: EVOLUTION OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) INSURGENCY (1987-TO DATE) 1.5.1: EMERGENCE (1987-1990)
49Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 50Acellam, Michael 2010, Interview. Tuesday, 26th January, 2010. Gulu, Uganda 51Eichstaedt, Peter 2009, First Kill Your Family. Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Illinois. Lawrence Hill Books. pp 17 52O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 53Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit. 54O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15
39 1.5.2: COUNTERING THE EMERGENCE OF LRA: OPERATION NORTH (1991- 1992)
55 Dolan, Chris 2009, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda 1986-2006. Berghahn Books. pp 45-46 Gersony, Robert 1997, Op cit pp 37-38 56 Koreta, Ivan 2010, Interview. Thursday, 21st January 2010. Kampala 57The theatre of the LRA insurgency has since largely remained Northern Uganda. See: UN Mission in Sudan 2006, LRA Incidents VISTA (January – May 2006). Reported incidents by location. June 14th 2006. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_af.nsf/luFullMap/E2A859799EA073728525718E0055C22C/$File/usdo s_SEC2_sdn140606.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed on 24/02/2011. 58 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 59Koreta, Ivan 2010, Op cit 60 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello Op cit Green, Mathew 2008, The Wizard of the Nile. The Hunt for Africa’s Most Wanted. Portobello Books Ltd. London
1.5.3: THE BIGOMBE PEACE INITIATIVE (1993)
61Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Uganda 2010, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda. 15th March, 2010. 62 O’kadamerie Billie ‘LRA/Government Negotiations 1993-94’ in Lucima, Okello (ed) 2002, Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda. Accord Northern Uganda Project. Conciliation Resources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/negotiations-1993- 94. php. Accessed on 24/02/2011. 63 Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Uganda 2010, Op cit 64 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 65 O’kadamerie Billie 2002, Op cit O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, ‘Kony warned again’. The New Vision. Vol 9. No 38. Tuesday, 15th February, 1994. pps 1& 2 66Kiplagat, Bethuel 2002, Reaching the 1985 Nairobi Agreement. Conciliation Resources. ACCORD. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/reaching-nairobi-agreement.php. Accessed on 24/02/2011
1.5.4: SECURING EXTERNAL SUPPORT (1994)
67The Library of Congress 2010, Military Rule Under Amin. A Country Study: Uganda. Federal Research Division. 27th July, 2010. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+ug0021%29. Accessed on 24/02/2011. 68 O’kadamerie Billie, 2002 Op cit The Great Lakes Region of Africa is a geographical area incorporating countries in East and Central Africa whose water masses are directly or indirectly connected to Lake Victoria, River Nile and River Congo. Victoria is arguably the largest fresh water lake while the Nile and the Congo some of the longest rivers on the continent. 69 Izama, Angelo 2010, Interview. Friday, 22nd January, 2010. Kampala Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 70 Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit. 71 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit 72Apiire, Ray 2010, Interview. Monday, 25th January, 2010. Gulu, Uganda
40 1.5.5: LOSS OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT (1999-2002)
73Neu, Joyce 2002, Restoring Relations between Uganda and Sudan: The Carter Centre Process. Conciliation Resources. ACCORD. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/carter-center.php. Accessed on 07/09/2010 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 The Carter Centre 2001, The Nairobi Agreement: Agreement between the Governments of Sudan and Uganda. December 8th 1999. http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/nairobi%20agreement%201999.htm. Accessed on 09/09/2010 74Kulayigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Kasaija, Phillip 2010, Interview. Thursday, 21st January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda 75 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Lapoti, Lucy 2002, ‘Kony rebels free 78’. The Monitor. Friday, 9th August, 2002. pp 2 Mulumba D Badru 2002, ‘Rebel hostages living in fear’. The Monitor. Saturday, 10th August, 2002. pp 1-2 Nyakairu, Frank 2002, ‘Kony can’t capture Gulu—LC V boss’. The Monitor. Saturday, 10th August, 2002. pp 1-2 76IRIN 2009, DRC-UGANDA 2005: Disarm LRA Rebels, Museveni tells Kinshasa and MONUC. 30th September 2005. IRIN. A project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=56540. Accessed 25/02/2011. 77International Crisis Group, Op cit. pp 9-14 of 47 78 Kasaija, Phillip 2005, Op cit. pp 38 of 155 Bevan, James 2007, Op. cit pp 344-346
1.5.6: THE JUBA PEACE PROCESS (2005-2008)
79 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Matsiko, Grace 2006, ‘Talks resume tommorrow’. Sunday Monitor. No 218. Sunday, 6th August, 2006. pps 1-2 There were a number of regional and international developments that led to the Juba peace process. LRA found itself under increasing pressure in the aftermath of the signing of the Nairobi Accord between Uganda and Sudan (1999) and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (2005). Counterinsurgency Operations Iron Fist I and II dislodged the rebel group from Southern Sudan. Weary of LRA becoming a security threat within its backyard, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) gave the group three options: Withdraw from Sudan; Engage in negotiations with the Government of Uganda; Prepare for war against the GoSS. See: Schomerus, Mareike 2007. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International Studies. http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:0uw19qxWgP4J:www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/suda n/Sudan_pdf/SWP%25208%2520LRA.pdf+lord%27s+resistance+army&cd=26&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk. Accessed on 15/04/2009
When Jan Egeland, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator visited the war ravaged areas of Northern Uganda, the LRA insurgency was cast in the international spotlight. He commented that the conflict was the “most under-reported story in the world” and the “worst humanitarian crisis.” With Uganda having failed to militarily defeat LRA, international pressure started mounting against the government to re-consider negotiating with the rebels. See: Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393
In December, 2003, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda invited the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate atrocities committed by LRA. According to Paul Jackson, it was “…first major case taken up by the court and so became a critical test case.” The ICC indictments were unsealed in October, 2005. The then
41 top five commanders of the group, Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen were indicted on 33 counts. According to Frank Nyakairu, these included “…12 counts of crimes against humanity for rape and sexual enslavement. The other 21 counts cover war crimes, including attacks against civilians and the murder and forced enlistment in the army of children.” See: Borzello, Anna 2007. Op cit. pp 389-393 Jackson, Paul 2009. Op cit. pp 320-323 Borzello, Anna 2007. Op cit. pp 389-393 Nicolli Alexander and Johnstone Sarah Johnstone (eds) 2008 Uganda’s Elusive Peace Deal. IISS Strategic Comments. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1080/13567880802565229. Accessed on 22/12/2009 Nyakairu, Frank 2006 Rugunda off to Juba Kony round one. Daily Monitor. Monday, 3rd July, 2006. pps 1-2
80 The Hague Justice Portal. Situation in Uganda. http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/6/175.html. Accessed on 11/09/2010 81Oryem, Okello Henry 2010, Interview. Wednesday, 20th January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda 82Atkinson, Ronald 2009, Revisiting ‘Operation Lightening Thunder’. The Independent. Tuesday, 9th June, 2009. http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/insight/67-insight/1039-revisiting-operation- lightning-thunder-. Accessed on 25/02/2011.
1.6: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
83Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit 84 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit 85McNeil, Patrick and Chapman, Steve 2005, Research Methods. Third Edition. Routledge. New York, NY. pp 174-179 86Punch, Keith 2005, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Research Approaches. Sage Publications. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif. pp. 234-240 87Bevan, James 2006, ‘The Myth of Madness: The Organisation of the Lord’s Resistance Army’. March 22nd 2006. All Academic Research .Small Arms Survey Geneva. International Studies Association. San Diego; California. pp 1-19
88 Burns, Robert B 2000, Introduction to Research Methods. Pearson Education. Frenchs Forest. pp 460 Neuman, Lawrence W 2006, Social Research Methods. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 6th Edition. Pearson Education Inc. pp 40-41 89 Maxwell, Joseph Alex 2005, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Second Edition. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, Calif. pp 87-91 90 Maxwell, Joseph Alex 2005, Op cit 93-94 91 Neuman, Lawrence W 2006, Op cit. pp 320-324
42 CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL REVIEW I
2.1: DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING GUERRILLA WARFARE Human history is replete with peaceful and violent contestations of domestic political dispensations. Typically, the violent dimension to domestic politics or civil strife pits seating governments commanding conventional military apparatuses against opposing Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs). In such duels, states initially command a conventional military edge over these rebel organizations. Seeking to reverse this imbalance in military capabilities, the NSAGs adopt strategies and tactics commensurate with their initial condition of relative military weakness.92
Over the course of time, guerrilla warfare has emerged as a widely favoured strategy for the reversal of imbalances in military capabilities inherent in asymmetric duels. Guerrilla warfare is based on the execution of “guerra” which in Spanish translates as “small war.”93 Given the start up resources at the disposal of the state military establishment, NSAGs can only take part in serialized duels. This approach allows them to gradually weaken the strength of the state military establishment while patiently building their own.
But the serialization of confrontational contact with government forces makes it difficult for guerrillas to seize state power. In order to occupy territory, buttress the population and control key government installations, they would need to establish a fixed presence which would potentially attract a conventional military response from government forces. This state of affairs would end up negating the essence behind adopting guerrilla warfare as a strategy. However, Che Guevara contends that guerrilla warfare is merely “a phase that does not offer in itself opportunities to arrive at complete victory.” He argues that “…as its steady growth acquires the characteristics of a regular army…,” guerrilla warfare ultimately provides a mechanism for a head-on confrontation with the enemy. 94 In this respect, Che Guevara appreciates the limitations of guerrilla warfare and the inherent need to adopt a different strategy at the penultimate stage of an insurgent campaign in order to facilitate the seizure of state power.
43 The climax to an asymmetric duel (capturing the reigns of power) underlines the connection between war and politics. In defining the nexus between the two variables, Mao Tse Tung argues that “war is politics with bloodshed” and conversely “politics is war without bloodshed.” 95 In similar vein, Carl von Clausewitz defines war as the “continuation of politics by other means.” 96 The Maoist and Clausewitzist dicta suggest that armed confrontation is a violent extension of politics. Deriving from this position, T E Lawrence asserts that guerrilla warfare emerges as a means for furthering a political movement through the use of unorthodox tactics. 97
Situating guerrilla warfare within the domain of politics, Robert Asprey asserts that traditionally, this mode of conducting armed conflict “…is a weapon of protest employed to rectify real or imagined wrongs levied on a people either by a foreign invader or by the ruling government.” 98 However, he observes that guerrilla warfare strategists have had to choose between using this military strategy singly and using it in conjunction with others.
In addressing this dilemma, Mao concurs with Che Guevara in asserting that “Guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war.” 99 The limitations of guerrilla warfare would suggest that in order to capture state power, NSAGs should transit from using guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. This approach would allow them to defend their battlefield gains. The views of Mao and Che Guevara posit a trajectory in the evolution of armed conflict replete with phases preceding and succeeding guerrilla warfare. To this end, Frank Kitson (citing the works of Sun Tzu) observes that “…conventional war should only be used if the enemy cannot be overthrown by the activities of spies and agents sowing dissension and nurturing subversion.” 100
Guerrilla warfare then emerges as a viable option only in situations where the phases preceding it have been exhausted. The drive to exhaust each phase in the evolution of insurrection underscores the need to attain the objectives of armed conflict with minimal costs incurred.
44 In pursuing a cost-sensitive military strategy, Huntington observes that NSAGs seek to reverse the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military apparatus by assuming “…the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places.” 101 In this regard, an NSAG can gain the strategic initiative by selectively choosing when, where and how to engage the state military apparatus.
One of the avenues for minimizing the cost of conducting asymmetric conflicts is the location of a theatre of an insurgency in agrarian settings. Essentially, guerrilla war theatres are situated in rural parts of the country, preferably detached from effective government control. 102 The inaccessibility of these sanctuaries allows guerrillas the time and space to organize insurgent activities undeterred by the state military apparatus. It is then ironic that in certain situations, urban settings have been constituted into guerrilla war theatres. Cities, towns and trading centres constitute the more highly developed and better policed parts of any polity. Under normal circumstances, the state military apparatus would find it easier disrupting the activities of insurgents in urban than it would in rural settings. Yet for all its apparent shortcomings, urban guerrilla warfare has been given both scholarly and practical consideration.
In seeking to understand the essence behind asymmetric duels in urban settings, Carlos Marighella defines the urban guerrilla as “….a person who uses other than conventional means for fighting against the military dictatorship. As a political revolutionary and also a convinced patriot, he is struggling to set his country free and is thus a friend of its people and their liberty. His battlefield consists of the major cities of our country.” 103 Like the rural-based insurgent, the urban guerrilla employs unorthodox methods to contest the authority of a seating government. What separates the two types of insurgents is the nature of the theatre they operate in. The urban guerrilla operates in a more developed theatre than the agrarian insurgent. But as already noted, the urban environment unduly exposes urban guerrillas to attack by government forces. Why then would they adopt this rather risky strategy?
45 Marighella observes that “The primary task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear down, to demoralize the military regime and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the foreign managers and the Brazilian upper class.” 104 In this respect, the function of urban guerrilla warfare is to speed up the armed struggle. It takes the conflict to the door step of the enemy and eases counterinsurgency pressure that the state might be mounting on rural-based insurgent groups. In this connection, the government would have to split up its forces to deal with the rural and urban security threats. This approach would potentially not yield the desired counterinsurgency effect.
It is important to note that the targeting of civilians and non-military infrastructure (as part of urban guerrilla warfare) 105 raises a critical question about the essence of warfare: Should NSAGs attack populations which are naturally supposed to render popular support to their activities? According to Walter Laqueur, “Terror is used as a deliberate strategy to demoralize the government by disrupting its control, to demonstrate one’s own strength and to frighten collaborators.” 106 Rex Hudson asserts that in order to psychologically wrong- foot governments in asymmetric duels, rebel groups attack civilians. 107
It is plausible to make two deductions from the postulations of Laqueur and Hudson: In rebellions, guerrilla groups can either target military, non military or military and non- military infrastructure. By hinging their campaigns on striking at non military infrastructure, insurgent organizations indirectly demonstrate a measure of incapacity in taking on the state military establishment. Non military infrastructure then emerges as a canvass on which they can disorientate the state in situations where a similar feat would be unattainable on a battlefield.
The adoption of terrorism as a strategy redefines the essence of asymmetric warfare. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman observe that “…the direct targets of (terrorist) violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators.” 108 Terrorists emerge as strategists who employ psychological warfare to upset the social contract between the citizen and the state.
46 Mindful of the state’s duty to protect its citizens, they target civilians in order to undermine confidence in their government and provoke the state into using ruthless counterinsurgency measures.
From the above discussion, it can be asserted that guerrilla warfare is a means by which rebel groups gradually reverse an imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military establishment. Essentially, this strategy allows them to selectively engage government forces while conserving their resources and building their own military capability. In its classical form, guerrilla warfare is a military contest between combatants. However, in practice, most insurgent groups also attack civilians as part of their wider campaigns.
2.2: CONSTRUCTING AN INSURGENT IDENTITY In seeking to initiate and sustain an insurgency, a guerrilla organization has to grapple with two principle challenges: First, it has to design an identity that is appealing to the population in order to attract and retain its membership. To this end, an insurgent group needs an ideology to explain its grievances and propaganda techniques to influence the emotions of the population. The realization of popular support not only pushes civilians to enlist but also motivates them to stay in an insurgent organization. In the long run, the organizational image that a guerrilla group cultivates and projects in its interaction with the population constitutes its insurgent identity.
Second, it needs to undertake certain tasks to prepare and confront the enemy. In this connection, a rebel group needs to assemble its organizational structures, set up its bases, secure weapons and other forms of external support, design its military strategy and tactics and train its fighters. The second set of tasks allows it to operationalize its insurgent activities in its confrontational interaction with government forces. In seeking to understand the evolution of an insurgent identity, this chapter assesses the significance of ideology, propaganda, popular support, recruitment and motivation in guerrilla warfare.
47 2.2.1: IDEOLOGY Christopher Harmon notes that “For an organization to grow and become a serious movement, it must elaborate its views. These views may be limited to the desire for certain changes…More often, guerrilla groups have ‘unlimited war’ objectives and a desire to take power themselves. They elaborate their view of the world, either by wholesale adaptation from ideological predecessors or by an original synthesis of their own.” 109 Harmon emphasizes that an insurgent group needs an explanatory framework in order to market itself among civilians. In this sense, the manner in which it packages its ideals influences the population into choosing to embrace or reject its agenda.
Ideology then emerges as highly indispensable to the execution of guerrilla warfare. But at this stage, while acknowledging its significance, the actual place of ideology in an insurgency is not clear. For example, thus far, the extent to which ideology shapes the overall course of a guerrilla war remains unaddressed. Charles Maechling Junior observes that “There is no secret about the ingredients of guerrilla warfare. At the purely tactical level, it so closely resembles its parent, irregular or partisan warfare that to the uninstructed there seems to be no distinction between them. It is the injection of ideology into guerrilla operations that transforms partisan warfare 110 into revolutionary warfare.” 111 In this regard, ideology presents insurgents with a conceptual mechanism for articulating political contradictions in a given polity and justifying the recourse to violence.
While Maechling underscores the inherent connection between ideology and the use of violence by insurgent groups, he does not categorically state whether in the interaction between these two variables, ideology becomes part and parcel of guerrilla strategy. In seeking to demarcate the parameters of ideology, Peter Paret argues that ideology can actually be used as an operational weapon in psychological warfare: “First, to demoralize the enemy, that is, to destroy his faith in his own side; second, to exdoctrinate him, if I may coin a word—to eradicate the doctrines in which he has been taught to believe by his side; and third, if possible to indoctrinate him with positive doctrines which we wish him to possess.” 112 In this respect, ideology is an effective tool in insurgencies only if it assumes both indoctrinational and counter indoctrinational dimensions.
48 The duality in the nature of ideology then accords insurgents and counterinsurgents the opportunity of using it as a tool for ‘purifying’ the enemy. In discussing the connection between ideology and psychological warfare, Michael McClintock observes that for French counterinsurgency strategists, “Enemy ideology was a disease or an infestation; the cure was to be found in re-education camps, where prisoners were to be ‘disinfected’ by being educated clearly and objectively in the French ideology.” 113
Since ideology plays a quasi purificational role in asymmetric duels, the manner in which insurgents and counterinsurgents apply it raises a critical question: To what extent is a coercive approach used in indoctrination in asymmetric conflicts? Insurgents use persuasive and coercive tactics to advance their respective ideological positions. In seeking to persuade the population to support its cause, an insurgent group articulates its ideology in simple language that is widely understandable and addresses the immediate concerns of the population. However, it makes very little mention of its long term objective. 114 The purificational dimension to ideology points to the uncertainty underpinning the evolution of insurgent-civilian relations. From the perspective of the rebels and depending on how they package their ideology, civilians may embrace or resist an insurgency.
In this context, an insurgent group may not rule out applying coercive techniques to market its ideals. McClintock argues that “A people can be converted from one faith to the other if given a choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted out. To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of the new faith must be required. Sustained counterintelligence must remain on the alert against backsliders, but formal acceptance will become genuine acceptance if all public media or expression are denied the vanquished faith.” 115 In this respect, there are rewards and sanctions inherent in the enemy adopting or rejecting the ideology of an insurgent organization.
It can be asserted that ideology plays a dual role in guerrilla warfare. It not only acts as a medium through which insurgents and counterinsurgents articulate their respective ideals
49 and cultivate popular support but it also rationalizes and manages the violence directed towards settling an asymmetric conflict.
2.2.2: POPULAR SUPPORT AND PROPAGANDA
2.2.2.1: POPULAR SUPPORT In underscoring the critical importance of popular support in revolutionary struggles, Mao asserts that “the populace is for revolutionaries what water is for fish.” 116 The very survival of an insurgent movement is heavily dependent on the support it draws from civilians. In an insurgency, a population acts as a source of recruits, food and intelligence for a guerrilla organization. Without popular support, Fairburn argues that an insurgent group would be isolated. 117 Stressing the strategic importance of cordial insurgent-civilian relations, Museveni (who between 1981 and 1985 successfully spearheaded the National Resistance Movement’s five year guerrilla campaign in Uganda) notes that “The population is the one that gives us food, shelter and intelligence information about the movements of the enemy troops. We are educating our soldiers in practical and everyday examples that it is the people that matter in this exercise.” 118
It does then appear that a population supports a guerrilla movement because the guerrilla group has taken practical steps to foster cordial insurgent-civilian relations. 119 In this regard, civil-insurgent relations are reciprocal. However, while acknowledging this assumption, Fairburn notes that the level of development of a society also plays an important part in shaping the nature of ties between civilians and guerrillas. He advances a hypothesis to the effect that “….the more primitive…(…the more traditional)….the society afflicted by guerrilla war, the more difficult it is for a foreign overlord to detach local people as puppets or even influence locals to the extent of getting them to supply information against their blood fellows.” 120 In this direction, Fairburn suggests that ethnic ties also play an important role in shaping civil-insurgent relations.
In Uganda, cordial insurgent-civilian relations are rooted in reciprocity and ethnicity. An insurgent organization not only seeks to cultivate good ties with the population but also
50 ensures that it operates among people sharing ethnic ties with it. In prosecuting urban guerrilla campaigns in the 1980s, the Ganda dominated Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) not only operated in the Buganda region of Uganda, 121 but also desisted from mounting attacks on the Baganda people. In northern Uganda, the Acholi dominated Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) 122 and Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) 123 operated in the Acholi sub-region and strived to cultivate and maintain cordial relations with the Acholi people. On the other hand, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) experienced frosty relations with the population in its theatre of insurgent activity. Whereas the membership of ADF was largely drawn from the Western, Central and Eastern parts of Uganda, its Islamist connections 124 in a largely Christian backyard may have limited the evolution of cordial insurgent-civilian relations in its areas of operation. As a result, the group adopted terrorism as a means of forcing civilians to cooperate with its fighters.
While acknowledging the critical role of reciprocity and ethnicity in the evolution of civil- insurgent relations, Fairburn contends that popular support may merely be the product of terrorism or apoliticism. 125 Either an insurgent organization intimidates civilians into supporting it or by virtue of being apolitical, the population neither backs the rebels nor the government.
The notion that guerrillas can use terrorism to tilt popular support in their favour raises an intriguing question: Why would civilians succumb to the terror threats of the insurgents and not those of the state? The relevance of this question springs from the assumption that civilians are rational and are in a position to understand that the state commands better means to dispense terror than the insurgents. In this case, the population would be expected to yield to the state’s terror threats and not those of the insurgents.
In seeking to unlock the above paradox, 126 Fairburn reasons that “It only requires the existence of a small communist cell to remind a large village, if necessary through exemplary acts of terrorism, that the parallel hierarchies still exist and one day will come into their own again.” 127 It would then be plausible to assert that the population does not yield to the side with the better capacity for dispensing violence. Rather, while
51 acknowledging the state’s capacity to dispense terror in the short and long term, the population is uncertain of its (the state’s) propensity to institute rewards in return for popular support. On the other hand, while demonstrating the capacity to impose hardship on civilians in the short term, insurgents promise to institute improvements in the welfare of the population.
Thus far, emphasis has been placed upon the dynamics that would underpin the shifting loyalties of populations in asymmetric conflict. However, it is imperative to note that in order for either side to win the battle for hearts and minds, popular support needs to reach a certain threshold.
Whereas garnering majority support would be the ideal objective of any party to an asymmetric conflict, David Galula contends that a more realistic strategy would involve securing the support of the critical minority and using this nucleus as a springboard for tapping the support of the majority. In stipulating the laws of counterinsurgency, Galula observes that the above strategy is ideal for situations where the population is swayed by the winning side. 128
His postulations suggest that the population shifts its loyalty in an opportunistic manner. What would be the roots of this behaviour? Like Galula, James Eliot Cross dispels the notion that popular support in an insurgency amounts to “….the enthusiastic, voluntary backing of the large majority of the population.” He argues that in developing countries, the majority of the population hardly understands the issues surrounding conflicts and usually prefers “…to be left alone.” 129
It would then appear that in conflict and non conflict situations, the population prioritizes certain issues over higher politics. Cross asserts that the population expects its government to “…provide the means for improving the standard of living; secondly, it should not force changes and innovations at a pace or in forms which are not acceptable; and third, it should provide military and economic protection for all concerned in this evolutionary process and do it without heavy financial demands on the beneficiaries of its strength.” 130 Thus, while
52 acknowledging the role of the state in improving the economic situation, the citizen prefers limited interaction with the state.
The apolitical and apathetic behaviour of the population points to the relative insignificance of majority support in guerrilla warfare. Cross asserts that “The active participation of a small number of people and the general apathy of the majority often provides all the popular support necessary to make a successful revolution.” 131 The start up minority becomes a nucleus around which an insurgent organization mobilizes the majority to execute a guerrilla campaign.
Another important point relates to the calculations of the population in times of asymmetric conflict: How actively or passively should it participate in an insurgency? Which side is likely to succeed in the long run? Are the insurgents able to violently impose their will on the population? While grappling with these critical questions and mindful of the dangers of ending up on the losing side, Cross points out that the population tends to “…defer judgement initially and then jump on the right band wagon at the appropriate time…” He dispels the notion that popular support genuinely amounts to the population’s voluntary support for the activities of an insurgent group. Cross asserts that “A better way of putting it is usually that the guerrillas have free access to the population and are therefore in a position to exert control.” 132
While acknowledging that the population is likely to “…move with the prevailing winds,” Timothy Lomperis argues that some actors within a given polity could “calculate that real advantages can be had by actively joining one side or the other, whether for the opportunity of command and influence with the insurgents or for riches and prestige with the incumbent regime. Calculation at this level requires an active commitment to the side of choice…” At a higher level where the ideology of an insurgent group appeals to some actors in a population, he argues that a “…transcending of calculations, individual interests and opportunity” yields a cadreship that is dedicated to the guerrilla organization’s cause. 133 Thus, Lomperis’ three tiered working minority or “steel frame” for executing an insurgency
53 consists of the following elements: The masses that move with the prevailing winds, the opportunists and the idealists.
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that popular support in guerrilla warfare could spring from different premises. It could be driven by reciprocity. In this case, civilians would support guerrillas because they treat them well. Alternatively or in combination with reciprocity, civilians would support a guerrilla group because they share ethnic ties with its members. However, in most cases, popular support is a product of the population’s calculations in an insurgency and the combatants’ propensity to violently access civilians and civilian infrastructure. The population will either support a side that appears to be winning an asymmetric duel or one that demonstrates the capacity to attack it.
2.2.2.2: PROPAGANDA While it is important to cultivate esprit de corps within a guerrilla army, it is equally crucial to generate the population’s interest in the armed struggle. Guerrillas depend on civilians for recruits, food and intelligence. In modern conflicts, propaganda emerges as one of the essential tools for maintaining this support. In this connection, T E Lawrence observes that the printing press is perhaps “the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.” 134 He suggests that modern conflict is inherently more psychological than physical. In other words, military victories and losses are not always determined on the battlefront. The selective dissemination of information could mask the actual outcome of a military duel.
Given the significance of propaganda in asymmetric conflicts, how does an insurgent organization or a state military apparatus use it? What dimensions does it assume? What sections of the population does it target? In offering insights into the nature of communicational warfare, Fairburn asserts that “Propaganda consists of the planned use of any forms of public or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific purpose whether military, economic or political.” 135 The use of propaganda as a tactic opens up a communicational war front between the
54 insurgent and the counterinsurgent. In this case, the side with the most effective tools for communication wins the support of civilians.
However, Fairburn hastens to point out that from a communist perspective, propaganda constitutes the totality of political warfare. He defines political warfare as “all types of agitation, propaganda, subversion, economic manipulation, rioting, terror, diversionary diplomacy, guerrilla and para-military actions etc: everything, in sum, short of the employment of the main formal armed forces.” 136 Given his proposition that propaganda incorporates all forms of political warfare (of which propaganda itself is a constituent part), then it can assume violent and non violent dimensions. From Fairburn’s definition, propaganda has got a violent side to it in light of the fact that it incorporates “guerrilla and paramilitary actions.” Both phenomena are coercive in nature.
However, the intriguing dimension to Fairburn’s definition is the notion that propaganda should aim at psychologically wrong-footing the enemy without provoking them into military confrontation. In this context, M Jules Monnerot asserts that “Totalitarian diplomacy and propaganda frequently test the psychological resistance of the opponents they tend to disintegrate by suddenly switching from war talk to peace talk, in the hope of obtaining from “cowardly relief,” what they were unable to achieve through menaces.” 137 Propaganda then plays an instrumental role in watering down the belligerence of an enemy. This tool seeks to cunningly test the enemy’s propensity to walk the path of peace at a time of war.
It is also worth observing that whereas the insurgent has to direct propaganda at the state and its citizens, the population constitutes the most critical battleground in communicational warfare. Unlike the state that is stoically committed to resisting the insurgency, the population’s position on the insurgency usually takes time to emerge. It is therefore incumbent upon a guerrilla group to devise an elaborate propaganda strategy that seeks to swing popular support in its favour while the population is still undecided.
55 In discussing the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah prescribes a four point blueprint for “accelerating the political awakening” of the population: An effective propaganda campaign has to espouse “the idea of an independent existence (anti- colonialism, nationalism);” “the idea that ‘something is rotten’ (the awakening to neo- colonialist exploitation);” “the idea that the situation can change (that is a conscious anti- neo-colonialist exploitation);” “the idea that victory can be achieved only by action (the need to use force; the will to fight).” 138 He basically suggests that an effective insurgent communicational campaign should not only conscientize the population about political contradictions within the body politic, but an effort should also be made to market armed struggle as the more viable means for changing the status quo.
There is another important point to note about Nkrumah’s propaganda framework. As the insurgency evolves, the population exhibits differing levels of commitment to the armed struggle. Different sections of the population base would require different levels of conscientization. He argues that a distinction should be made among: “a liberated territory where the people’s power must be consolidated;” “a contested territory where the liberation movement must be supported, where popular consensus must be achieved, and where the enemy must be demoralised;” and “an enemy-held territory where it is essential: to analyse and denounce enemy action; to show the breaks in his armour; to show why and how the people’s forces must be organized and led to victory.” 139
The existence of liberated 140 contested 141 and unliberated areas would then demand differentiation in the conscientization of the population and in the choice of propaganda tactics. Whereas conferences, seminars and exhibitions would be ideal propaganda tools in liberated areas, clandestine publications would be more suitable for contested and unliberated areas. 142 The guiding principle in the adoption of a set of propaganda tools would then be: The greater an insurgent organization’s control over a territory, the more overt the propaganda tools employed.
However, it is worth noting that the psychological basis of propaganda generates lingering concerns about its long term efficacy. While in the short term, it might be possible to
56 manipulate the dissemination of information in a way that masks the capability and vulnerability of an insurgent organization, in the long term, it would be challenging to ascertain the extent to which this psychological warfare would stave off a sustained onslaught by an enemy determined to settle a given conflict on the battlefront.
While acknowledging that “In most recent guerrilla wars, political propaganda has been of equal or greater importance than military operations,” Laqueur argues that “Elsewhere, propaganda has played a subordinate role; this is especially true for guerrilla wars waged by secessionist movements. These had the support of the people any way.” 143 He stresses that “The apathy of the majority usually favours the guerrillas more than their enemies.” 144 While this calculation seems to give insurgents a propaganda advantage over the state, it raises an intriguing issue. Normally, the colossal resources at the disposal of a state should allow it ample communicational leverage over a guerrilla organization. Where then are the openings in the government’s propaganda machinery that the guerrilla organization exploits to reverse this initial imbalance in communicational capabilities?
It would appear that the government’s control of the reigns of state power constitute it into an ideal target for insurgent propaganda. In discussing the challenges of conducting counterinsurgency campaigns, Hilsman points out that while a state has to strike a balance between fighting an insurgent organization and reconstructing the country, a guerrilla organization would only be preoccupied with fighting the state. 145 The dual accountability of the state to its citizens implies that while the guerrillas can pinpoint its failings in the area of governance, in situations where a guerrilla organization does not control territory and little is known about its organizational activities, a state would be hard pressed to expose the contradictions within the insurgent movement. Thus, in swing populations, the duality in the state’s accountability to its citizens accords an insurgent movement an edge over a seating government in terms of start-up propaganda capital.
Thus far, this discussion has focussed on the efficacy of non-armed propaganda. It is important to note that insurgents may use violence to publicize their cause. Also known as armed propaganda, the use of violence as a means of communication assumes critical
57 relevance to the prosecution of the revolutionary struggle. In taking the fight to the doorstep of the enemy, the insurgent would need to use communicational manipulation to convince the population that the guerrilla organization is registering an upper hand in the conflict. Laqueur points out that by opening up a front in the urban areas, “Urban guerrillas will get far more publicity than rural because there are more newspapermen and cine cameras in town.” 146
However, while acknowledging the importance of urban guerrilla warfare, Marighella identifies a critical inhibition to the adoption of this strategy: The urban guerrilla shares the terrain with the urban criminal and the counterrevolutionary. All these three actors attack civilian targets. The challenge for the urban guerrilla is to distance their activities from those of the urban criminal and counterrevolutionary. In this regard, Marighella advocates the use of leaflets to make clarifications on the authors and intentions of the different urban attacks. 147
Uganda’s conflict ridden history offers some useful insights into the nature of armed propaganda. One of the most divisive debates on Uganda’s turbulent past relates to the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Luwero Triangle. Between 1981 and 1985, NRM managed to win popular support in Luwero by linking government forces to atrocities committed in this part of the country. 148 However, high ranking officers who served in the Obote administration have persistently argued that human rights violations in Luwero were committed by NRA guerrillas disguised as government forces. In the event this allegation holds true, then NRM demonstrated the capacity to effectively employ armed propaganda tactics. Its fighters were able to covertly attack civilians whilst successfully linking the atrocities to the enemy.
Whereas armed propaganda was beneficial to the anti-Obote movement in the rural areas, in the urban areas, the situation was more fluid. It is worth noting that while NRM was engaged in agrarian guerrilla warfare in the countryside, two guerrilla groups turned Kampala, the Ugandan capital into an urban guerrilla war theatre. Between 1981 and 1985, the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) 149 and the Federal Democratic Movement of
58 Uganda (FEDEMU) 150 mounted sustained urban guerrilla campaigns in the city. 151 Whereas the activities of UFM and FEDEMU may have complimented those of NRM by mounting pressure on the Obote regime, the prevailing insecurity in Kampala was a double- edged sword that could as well have alienated the anti-Obote movement from the population. It may have been difficult for civilians in Kampala to distinguish between attacks mounted by UFM, FEDEMU, urban criminals and covert government operatives. This scenario could have accorded the Obote administration the opportunity of alienating the guerrillas from the population by linking the upsurge in insecurity in the Ugandan capital to the activities of NRM’s allies—UFM and FEDEMU.
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be asserted that propaganda plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of an asymmetric duel. Predominantly targeting a swing population and depending on the extent of control exercised over contested territory, insurgents and counterinsurgents either use overt or covert or both techniques to mask their military capabilities and vulnerabilities.
2.2.3: MOTIVATION AND ESPRIT DE CORPS This theoretical review has underscored the inextricable connection between politics and armed conflict. Mao and Clausewitz maintain that armed conflict is a mechanism for violently resolving political disputes that political actors have otherwise failed to resolve diplomatically. However, in advancing the theories of guerrilla warfare, Mao and Clausewitz operate at different wave lengths. Whereas Mao stresses the centrality of ideology to guerrilla warfare, 152 Clausewitz merely emphasizes the combat aspect of asymmetric duels. 153 Maechling captures the contrasts between the Maoist and Clausewitzist theoretical positions. He argues that it is the “injection of ideology into guerrilla operations” 154 that transforms irregular warfare (as advanced by Clausewitz) into revolutionary warfare (as advanced by Mao).
As already noted, an insurgent organization would strive to propagate an ideology that sells its agenda to the population, attracts and retains recruits within its ranks. In this sense, ideology plays enlistment and motivational roles. However, the motivational function of
59 ideology throws up some challenges: Members of an insurgent organization would not only need to interpret its ideology but also be in a position to draw inspiration from it to keep fighting while the rebel group is militarily on the back-foot. Normally, it would be difficult to fulfil this condition because not every member of a guerrilla group would demonstrate the same propensity to understand the political contradictions underpinning a given insurgency and exhibit the same levels of motivation during leaner times. In this connection, cultivating and sustaining high levels of motivation in insurgent organizations emerges as one of the more critical challenges in prosecuting guerrilla wars. 155
Given the above constraints, what would be the source of motivation in a guerrilla group? Geoffrey Fairburn contends that “It is not true that the majority of those who take part in a revolutionary insurgency are particularly ‘well motivated’ in the sense that they are idealists who have made a personal commitment to a great cause. They are for the most part involved rather than committed.” 156 If this proposition were adopted, how would one explain situations where fighters who are merely ‘involved’ and not ‘committed’ demonstrate the propensity to fight courageously?
Fairburn identifies six factors that delink commitment to a political cause from esprit de corps in guerrilla warfare: “Involvement in a movement the leadership of which has, at a time of its own choosing, put them beyond the law;” guerrillas derive pride from serving in their respective units; the perceived inevitability of victory; the negative repercussions of desertion; a sense of belonging to the new community created by the insurgents; and detachment from mainstream society. 157 His views suggest that a fighter’s selfish evaluation of their position in an insurgency is paramount in boosting their morale. Operating outside the jurisdiction of the state implies that a fighter can get away with illegal conduct; Prospects for upward movement within the hierarchical structures of the guerrilla movement offer the insurgent a vested stake in the armed struggle. In a nutshell, an insurgency offers an individual fighter something tangible to fight for while cushioned from the long arm of the law.
60 But in as much as the selfish calculations of individual fighters can guarantee a guerrilla organization a measure of esprit de corps, in light of the imbalance in military capabilities that is initially tilted in favour of the state military apparatus, the leadership of an insurgent movement would still need to consider the notion that higher levels of morale would be difficult to sustain throughout the life cycle of a rebel group.
In discussing motivation in guerrilla warfare, the recruitment 158 and subversive 159 stages are critical. Whereas recruitment constitutes the membership of a rebel organization, subversion allows it to clandestinely assemble its structures and prepare for the guerrilla phase of its insurgent campaign. In situations where a rebel group depends on voluntary enlistment, motivation to join and serve in the insurgent army will highly depend on the manner in which the recruiter packages the prospects inherent in an individual pursuing an insurgent career. In the event the recruiter heightens the risks, then the insurgent organization is bound to realize low recruitment and morale levels. The subversive stage of an insurgency is equally critical for motivation because at this level, a guerrilla group is organizationally and militarily fragile and potentially vulnerable to enemy annihilation. At this stage, the architects of an insurgency work towards preventing the state from dealing severe blows to the guerrilla organization in a way that would lower morale among its fighters.
The motivation strategist in an insurgent organization experiences fewer challenges when an insurgency evolves from the subversive to the guerrilla phase. At this point, the individual fighter’s motivational calculations are overridden by those of the fighting group. Fairburn argues that “As the struggle gathers intensity, the ebb and flow of it imposes its own pressures which virtually obliterate the possibility of individual choices being made on the basis of interior ‘motivation.’ 160
In discussing the sources of motivation in an insurgent organization, Laqueur concurs with Fairburn in arguing that guerrillas are never overly motivated by the ideals underpinning the conflict. Attempting a typology of insurgent motivations, Laqueur points out that personal and idealistic considerations could sustain an individual’s continued interest and
61 participation in an armed struggle. An individual might be susceptible to the lure of guerrilla adventure or the future prospects for an upward movement within the political structures of the state. Alternatively, he argues that “guerrilla warfare is an excellent outlet for personal aggression; it provides opportunity for settling account with one’s enemies.” 161 In this respect, the motivational lure for continued participation in an armed struggle mainly lies in the potential career prospects and power it offers and bestows upon individual insurgents respectively.
Laqueur also acknowledges that “The dynamic character of guerrilla movements has always exerted a powerful attraction for young idealists—the prospect of activity, of responsibility for one’s fellows, of fighting with equally enthusiastic comrades for the national and social liberation of the homeland.” However, he hastens to de-emphasize the centrality of political idealism to motivation in insurgent organizations. Lacqueur maintains that “What induces guerrillas to stay on above all is esprit de corps, loyalty to his commander and fellow soldiers. The feeling of togetherness and team spirit seems to be more important than ideological indoctrination.” 162
While a guerrilla organization needs to harness an individual fighter’s interest in insurgent activity, it is also imperative that it sustains his/her participation in concert with that of other rebels. This proposition underscores the centrality of group dynamics to the evolution of motivation in an insurgent movement.
Harry Holloway and Ann Norwood argue that the individual fighter’s connection to an insurgent organization is the product of the interaction between “the psychological structure of the terrorist’s personality and the ideological factors, group process, structural organization of the terrorist group and cell and the socio-cultural milieu of the group.”Citing Jeanne Knutson, Ehud Sprinzak argues that as the ideological component of this set of variables takes root through the process of radicalization, the group’s identity subsumes that of the individual insurgent. Jerrold Post asserts that the identity transformation yields a “group mind” or “group moral code.” 163
62 Martha Crenshaw notes that the group then becomes the selector and interpreter of ideology. This phase also realizes three other critical developments: the terrorist group evolves into a family that accords the individual terrorist a sense of belonging; counterterrorist activity constitutes a threat to this new community of belonging; and the terrorist group institutes tight measures to mitigate dissent. For example in 1970, 30 members of Rengo Sekogun which later became the Japanese Red Army were “…tied to stakes in the northern mountains of Japan, whipped with wires and left to die of exposure” for objecting to the group’s strategy. 164
Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that while individuals may join an insurgent organization because of idealistic considerations, in most cases, they derive the motivation to keep fighting from loyalty to their colleagues-in-arms, prospects for career advancement within the structures of the rebel group, the risks that come with attempted desertion and the sense of belonging that the guerrilla movement gives them.
2.2.4: RECRUITMENT In this thesis, we have stressed the need for a guerrilla group to construct an insurgent identity. Among other elements, it needs an ideology to articulate its grievances, motivation to retain its members, propaganda techniques to manipulate the emotions of the populace and popular support to cushion its insurgent activities. At this juncture, it is important to observe that the identity of a rebel group ultimately springs out of the interaction between the skills, characters and personalities that new members import into the structures of the group and the organizational attributes (ideology, esprits de corps etc) that the group imposes on its members.
Thus, the identification and recruitment of new members of a guerrilla group emerges as one of the more tedious challenges in conducting an insurgency. 165 In this regard, an insurgent group is faced with a number of hard questions: How can it identify, contact and recruit new members against the backdrop of stringent enemy surveillance? What calibre of recruits would fit into its organizational structures and adapt to its modus operandi?
63 In seeking to assemble the manpower base of a guerrilla group, Nkrumah prescribes a selective enlistment strategy. He asserts that the Africa-wide guerrilla movement should recruit from peasants’ organizations, trade unions, progressive students’ organizations, cooperative movements, youth and women’s organizations. His recruitment strategy is underpinned by three factors: The need to co-opt organized civic groups or use their structures to identify potential enlistees; Targeting constituencies that are potentially on the receiving end of the enemy’s policies; Enlisting from groups that are potentially conscious of the contradictions within the body politic of a given society. 166
In this context, an insurgent movement would recruit among peasant farmers and industrial workers in times of agrarian riots and industrial unrest. These marginalized groups would percieve the insurgent movement as a vehicle for the redressment of unpopular policies in the country. While sometimes not directly affected by the state’s exploitative machinations, progressive students’ groups are a critical arm of the intelligentsia that studies, interprets the contradictions within the body politic and stokes the flames of insurrection in a given society. A rebel organization would find it helpful recruiting from this constituency.
While segmentation of the population allows a rebel group to recruit insurrectionally attuned individuals, this approach cannot fully insulate it against enemy infiltration. The state could plant moles in any of the recruitment constituencies enumerated above. To mitigate fifth columnism in an insurgent movement, Nkrumah proposes the creation of a Guerrilla Commission of Control and Recruitment charged with the responsibility of scrutinizing the social origins, qualities and ideological orientation of enlistees. 167 In a sense, it can be asserted that an effective insurgent enlistment strategy is premised on three interrelated principles: The segmentation of the population in a way that pinpoints insurgency savvy civic and social groups; the identification of potential enlistees; and the verification of their credentials.
The nucleus of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group of Uganda trained with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique and fought within the ranks of the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in the liberation
64 struggle that deposed Idi Amin. FRONASA and NRM were headed by Museveni. 168 The evolution of the NRM manpower base shows that the nucleus of an insurgent movement may be populated by long time associates and loyalists of the leader of the group. This initially safeguards the then infant organization against enemy infiltration.
Beyond the formative stage, an insurgent group expands to incorporate more individuals with minimal or no acquaintance with their leader. According to Ngoga, NRM recruited peasants, students, professionals, orphans and Rwandese refugees. The peasants, orphans and Rwandese refugees were victims of the state’s counterinsurgency campaigns in the Luwero Triangle. 169 The orphans had lost their parents. The peasants had either been displaced or lost their beloved ones. The Rwandese refugees had been harassed by government forces because the state suspected them of supporting NRM. All these three groups saw the NRM insurgency as an avenue for escaping state-instigated harassment.
In a way, it can be deduced that recruitment for insurgency depends on the emergence of political contradictions within a country. Segaller explains the kind of political factors that would push elements within the population to join an insurgent movement. A controversial foreign or defence policy or provocative acts of injustice visited on the population would push elements within the population to join an insurgent group. However, like Nkrumah, he emphasizes that by the time of recruitment, some of the potential enlistees would already be “active in marginal, extra-parliamentary political circles.” 170
According to Segaller, foreign occupation could also push individuals to participate in liberation struggles. 171 For example the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) attracted recruits committed to contesting seven centuries of British occupation of Northern Ireland. 172 Similarly, Basque people opposed to decades of Spanish presence in the Basque region voluntarily joined Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 173
It can then be argued that while the insurgent organization is initiating its recruitment contacts, certain unpopular political developments could simultaneously push elements within the population to seek an organizational framework for addressing their pressing concerns. Against this backdrop, voluntary recruitment manifests at that point where the 65 recruitment initiative of an insurgent organization intersects with the population’s active drive to contest a prevailing political dispensation.
At this point, it is worth noting that whereas certain political developments could constitute a given population into a potential recruiting ground for an insurgent group, the decision to participate in an insurgency presents the individual recruit with some hard choices: Joining a guerrilla army entails committing illegal acts for which the state imposes severe penalties. How then does the potential enlistee cope with such a dilemma? The management of individual recruitment dilemmas appears to be the job of the rebel group. In this respect, a guerrilla organization may gradualize the process of enlistment to make an insurgent career more ‘palatable’ for the recruits.
Segaller illustrates the approach ETA uses to address the above dilemma. After potential enlistees have been contacted and recruited, their trainers initially assign them simple tasks like delivering propaganda material and “spraying ETA slogans on walls.” 174 These preliminary assignments test the recruits’ readiness for more rigorous missions. Those who excel in performing the simple tasks are then assigned more complex ones like conducting surveillance and delivering weapons to ETA members. 175 By the time recruits end their induction programmes, they have systematically engaged in a chain of illegal activities that would potentially attract judicial retribution in case they chickened out of the rebel group and returned to their communities. In this case, staying with the guerrilla organization emerges as a better option.
As already noted, the management of enlistment dilemmas is not always addressed by the insurgent organization. By the time a rebel group contacts them, prospective enlistees may already have been radicalized by the institutions to which they belong. Institutions of higher learning could act as grounds for breeding dissidence. For example many members of the Japanese Red Army were drawn from the universities of Tokyo, Rikkjo and Kyoto. In Spain, the universities of Madrid and Barcelona acted as breeding grounds for Spanish dissidents. In Italy, terrorist groups recruited their members from the universities of Rome,
66 Turin and Bologna. 176 In Uganda, the leadership corps of NRM was staffed with graduates of Makerere University. 177
On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that prevailing political contradictions within a given polity present an insurgent organization with marginalized sections of the population which can be targeted for recruitment purposes. Although a selective enlistment strategy would allow a guerrilla group the opportunity of achieving the above objective, the state could undermine its insurgent activities by planting moles within the recruitment savvy constituencies. In order to mitigate fifth columnism within its structures, an insurgent organization would need to thoroughly screen its recruits.
67 END NOTES
2.1: DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING INSURGENCY
92Grange, L David 2000, Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern. National Strategy Forum Review. Winter 2000. http://blackboard.jfsc.ndu.edu/html/jfscpublications/assets/docs/cam_grange.pdf. Accessed on 27/02/2011. J Anker III, Clinton and Burke D, Michael 2003, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare. Military Review. July- August 2003. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/ancker.pdf. Accessed on 27/02/2011 Thornton, Rod 2007, Asymmetric Warfare. Polity Press. Cambridge. pp 1-21 Norton-Taylor, Richard 2001, Asymmetric Warfare. The Guardian. Wednesday, 3rd October, 2001. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/03/afghanistan.socialsciences. Accessed on 27/02/2011. Laqueur, Walter 1977, Guerrilla. A Historical and Critical Study. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. pp 382-409 93Che Guevara 1985, Guerrilla Warfare, University of Nebraska Press. Lincoln and London. pp 1-10 94 Che Guevara 1985, Ibid 95Zedong, Mao 1963, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung. 1893-1976. Foreign Languages Press. Peking .pp 230 96 Clausewitz, Carl von 1976, On War. Princeton University Press. Princeton. pp 127 97 Che Guevara 1985, Op cit pp 1-10 98Kitson, Frank 1992, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peace-Keeping. Dehra Dun Natraj Publishers. pp 13-29 99 Ibid 100Ibid 101Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp382-409 For a discussion on selective confrontational engagement in insurgency see: Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, ‘The Art of Insurrection’ in Pomeroy, William J (ed) 1968, Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism. International Publishers Co., Inc. Tanham, George K 1961, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indo China. Frederick A Praeger. New York 102 Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp 382-409 103Marighella, Carlos 1971, For the Liberation of Brazil. Penguin Books. pp 61-63 Marighella, Carlos 1969, The Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. June 1963. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch01.htm. Accessed on 28/02/2011. On the nature of urban terrorism, see: Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp382-409 Bakier, Hameed Abdul 2008, Jihadi Tutorial in Urban Terrorism and the Kidnapping of Americans. Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Focus. 5: 27. 23rd July, 2008. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5070. Accessed on 28/02/2011 104Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op. cit 105Merari, Ariel, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency’ in Chaliand, Gerald and Blin Arnaud (eds) 2007, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda. California Press. Berkeley. pp 12-48 106Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit 382-409 107Hudson, A Rex 1999, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes a Terrorist and Why. Federal Research Division. Library of Congress. September 1999. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf- files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf. Accessed on 28/02/2011. 108Arena, Michael P and Arrigo, Bruce A 2006, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat. New York University Press. New York. pp 77-78
68 2.2: CONSTRUCTING AN INSURGENT IDENTITY
2.2.1: IDEOLOGY 109Christopher C Harmon, ‘Fanaticism and Guerrilla Warfare in the Late Twentieth Century’, in Mathew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson. (eds) Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age. Routledge. 2005. pp 107-108 In Colombia, the ideology of both FARC and ELN evolved out of an attempt at emulating the Cuban communist revolution. See: Hanson, Stephanie 2009, FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left Wing Guerrillas. Backgrounder. 19th August, 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272. Accessed on 08/06/2011 In South East Asia, Jemaah Islamiya looks up to Al Qaeda for ideological direction. See: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2004, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia. Australian Government. http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/is4.html. Accessed on 08/06/2011 110 Marquis de Feuquieres defines a partisan as “a person who is very dexterous in commanding a party, and knows the country very well; he is employed in surprising the enemy convoys or in getting intelligence”. See: Ewald Johann 1991, Treatise on Partisan Warfare. Contributions in Military Studies. Number 116. pp 13 of 179. http://www.jaegerkorps.org/reference/Treatise%20on%20Partisan%20Warfare%20by%20Ewald.pdf 111McClintock, Michael 2002, Instruments of Statecaft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism 1940-1990. http://www.statecraft.org/chapter12.html. Accessed on 08/06/2011 112McClintock, Michael 2002, Op cit Michael A Aquino defines psychological warfare (PSYWAR) as “the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives” Aquino A Michael 1987, Psychological Operations: The Ethical Dimension. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defence University, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. pp 7 of 27 http://www.xeper.org/maquino/nm/PSYOPEthics.pdf.. Accessed on 09/06/2011. 113McClintock, Michael 2002, Op cit
SGT Christopher Alexander, CPT Charles Kyle and Maj William S McCallister contend that the key to defeating the Iraqi insurgency lies not in neutralizing the ideology underpinning it but in understanding the cultural environment in which it is anchored. Alexander, Christopher SGT, Kyle Charles CPT and McCallister S William 2003, The Iraqi Insurgent Movement. 14th November, 2003. http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/03alexander.pdf. Accessed on 09/06/2011. 114McClintock, Michael 2002, Op cit In certain situations, the open propagation of the ideology of an insurgent group is dictated by existing circumstances. In discussing the ideological crisis facing Hamas, Levitt Mathew argues that “In the West Bank, Hamas faces a severe security crack down that has driven the movement underground. And in Gaza, Hamas has been forced to choose between engaging in acts of violence or attempting to effectively govern the territory it took over by force of arms. The result is an acute ideological tension within Hamas….For some, the cessation of violence, however temporary, is a sign of moderation within Hamas. For others, Hamas’ actions including continuing radicalization and weapons smuggling into Gaza, better denote the movement’s true intentions and trajectory”. See: Levitt, Mathew 2009, Hamas’ Ideological Crisis. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Vol 9. Friday, 06th November, 2009. Hudson Institute. http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/hamass-ideological-crisis. Accessed on 09/06/2011 115McClintock, Michael 2002, Op cit
2.2.2: POPULAR SUPPORT AND PROPAGANDA
2.2.2.1: POPULAR SUPPORT On Mao Zedong’s postulations on popular support see: 116Zedong Mao 1963, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung. 1893-1976. Peking. Foreign Languages Press. pp 259-261
69 Zedong Mao 1992, On Guerrilla Warfare. Second Edition. Baltimore. Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co Desai, Raj and Eckstein, Harry 1990, ‘Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion’. World Politics. XLII/4. Princeton University Press. Princeton. pp 443 117 Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version. Penguin Books. pp 302-305 118 Ngoga, Pascal, ‘The National Resistance Army’, in Clapham Christopher (ed) 1998. African Guerrillas. Kampala. Fountain Publishers. pp 98-100 119 On the theory of insurgent behaviour see: Metelits, Claire 2009, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians and Revolutionary Group Behaviour. NYU Press. New York. pp 26-28 120Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 121 Kasozi, A.B.K 1994, Op cit. pp 166-168 122International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9 of 47 123Behrand, Heike 1999, Op cit. pp 22-36; 56-64 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118 124 On the origins of the ADF insurgency in Uganda see: Refworld 2002, Uganda: The Allied Democratic Front. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 25th January, 2002. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,UGA,456d621e2,3df4bebb14,0.html. Accessed on 10/03/2011. Sekatawa, Muhammad, Reflections on the Situation of Muslims in Uganda, 1986-2003. Faculty of Arts, Islamic University in Uganda. http://www.mubarak-inst.org/stud_reas/research_view.php?id=312. Accessed on 10/03/2011 IRIN 2010, Who’s who among armed groups in Eastern DR Congo. Tuesday, 15th June 2010. Rwanda News Agency. http://www.rnanews.com/regional/3587-whos-who-among-armed-groups-in-the-eastern-dr- congo. Accessed on 10/03/2011. 125Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 126 On the nature of state terrorism, see: Arbuthnot, Felicity 2010, State Terrorism and the New World Order: ‘Man’s Stupidity has no Bounds’. Global Research. 11th June, 2010. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19663. Accessed on 10/03/2011. Stohl, Michael 2008, The Global War on Terror and State Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism. 2:9 http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/48/html. Accessed on 04/11/2011 Blakeley, Ruth 2009, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South. New York. Routledge. pp 25-50 127Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 128Galula, David 2006, Pacification in Algeria. 1956-1958. Santa Monica, California. RAND Corporation. pp 243-246 129Cross, Elliot James 1962, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War. Westport, Connecticut. pp 22-39 On the factors that affect the battle for hearts and minds, see: De Wijk, Rob, ‘The Limits of Military Power’, in Lennon, T.J Alexander (ed) 2003, The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Washington. pp 3-26 130Cross, Elliot James 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 131Cross, Elliot James 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 On the dynamics underpinning the manifestation of active and passive civilian support for insurgency see: Sepp I Kalev, ‘The US Army and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’ in Mahnken G Thomas and Keaney A Thomas (eds) 2007, War in Iraq: Planning and Execution. Routledge. New York. pp 208-210 Bennet, James 2005, The Mystery of the Insurgency. The New York Times. 15th May 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/weekinreview/15bennet.html?pagewanted=print. Accessed on 10/03/2011 132Cross, Elliot James 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39
70 133Lomperis, Timothy J 1996, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill. pp 49-67
2.2.2.2: PROPAGANDA 134Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 284-293 For more insights into the evolution of informational warfare see: Lawrence, T E 1997, Seven Pillars of Wisdom.. Wordsworth Editions. Hertfordshire. pp 183-185 Ali Tariq 2002, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity. Verso. London. pp 97- 98 135Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 284-293 136Ibid On the use of armed propaganda during the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa see: O’Malley, Padraig, ‘Armed Propaganda and Non-Collaboration: Rationalizing Weakness, August 1979- December 1980’. O’Malley: The Heart of Hope. Chapter 5. http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02712/05lv02713/06lv02723.htm Accessed on 08/03/2011 On the use of armed propaganda in Vietnam see: Brocheux, Pierre 2007, Ho Chi Minh: A Biography. Cambridge University Press. pp 83-86 Porch, Douglas, ‘Giap, Vo Nguyen: Vietnamese Military Leader, 1912-’ in Cowley, Robert and Parker, Geoffrey (eds) 2001, The Reader’s Companion to Military History. Houghton Mifflin. New York. pp 185 137Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 284-293 138Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution. International Publishers. New York. pp 56-102 On the place of propaganda in conflicts in the developing world see: Derrick, Jonathan 2008, Africa’s ‘Agitators’: Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West. 1918-1939. Columbia University Press. New York. pp 225-226 On the relationship between propaganda and psychological warfare see:
Jowett, S Garth, O’Donnell, Victoria 2006, Propaganda and Persuasion. Sage Publications Inc. California. Chapter 5 139Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 On conditions in liberated zones and the place of propaganda in guerrilla settings see: 140Guevara, Ernesto 1985, Op cit. pp 118-121 Shy, John and Collier, W Thomas, ‘Revolutionary War’ in Paret, Peter (ed) 1986, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Oxford University Press. Oxford. pp 846-849 On propaganda in contested guerrilla settings see: 141Fichtl, Eric 2005, Contested Country: An Examination of Current Propaganda Techniques in the Colombian Civil War. Colombia Journal. 1st August, 2005. http://colombiajournal.org/contested-country.htm. Accessed on 08/03/2011 142Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 143Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp 382-409 144Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp 382-409. 145Ahmad, Eqbal, ‘Revolutionary Warfare and Counter Insurgency’ in Gerard Chaliand (ed) 1982, Guerrilla Strategies. An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. University of California Press. Berkeley. pp 241-262 In liberal democracies, the state’s obligations to its citizens stem from the social contract. For insights into social contract theory, see: Rousseau, Jacques Jean 2004, The Social Contract Or Principles of Political Right. Kessinger Publishing. Azam, Jean-Paul and Mesnard, Alice 2001, Civil War and the Social Contract. Royal Economic Society Conference. 9th-11th April, 2001. Durham. http://www.polarizationandconflict.org/Papers/azam.pdf. Accessed on 09/03/2011 146Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp 382-409
71 147Marighella, Carlos 1969, The Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. June 1963. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch01.htm. Accessed on 28/02/2011 Marighella, Carlos 1971, For the Liberation of Brazil. Penguin Books. 148 Gersony, Robert 1997, Op cit. pp 17-19 of 135 Mulindwa, Rogers 1998, Op cit. pp 32. Kasozi, A.B.K 1994, Op cit. pp 180-185 149 Kasozi, A.B.K 1994, Op cit. pp 166-168 150 Mutengesa, Sabiiti 2006, Op. cit 151 Mutengesa, Sabiiti 2006, Op. cit
2.2.3: MOTIVATION AND ESPRIT DE CORPS 152Tse-Tung, Mao 1976, On Guerrilla Warfare. Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co of America Inc. pp 32- 36 153Clausewitz, Carl von 1976, On War. Princeton University Press. pp 480-482 154McClintock, Michael 2002, Op cit 155On the relationship between motivation and popular support see: Nichols, Bruce 2004, Guerrilla Warfare in Civil War Missouri, 1862. McFarland & Company Inc. North Carolina. pp 39-45 Mackey R Robert 2004, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. University of Oklahoma Press. Oklahoma. pp 14-15 Jalali, Ahmad Ali and Grau W Lester 2002, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters. Zenith Press. pp 324-325 Zedong, Mao 1963, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung. 1893-1976. Op cit. pp 230 Clausewitz, Carl von 1976, Op cit. pp 127 Viterna S Jocelyn 2006, Pulled, Pushed and Persuaded: Explaining Women’s Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army. AJS 112:1. July 2006. The University of Chicago. http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/soc/faculty/viterna/AJS2006.pdf. Accessed on 03/03/2011 Wirtz J James 1991, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Cornell University Press. New York. pp 75-76 156 Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 294-302 157Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 294-302 For a discussion on esprit de corps in guerrilla warfare see: Maurer, Kevin 2009, Afghan commandos’ esprit de corps transcends tribe. The Seattle Times. Saturday, 12th September, 2009. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009854105_apasafghancommandos.html. Accessed on 06/03/2011 158 For an analysis on enlistment in guerrilla warfare see: Young, Tom and Hall Margaret, ‘Mozambique at War with Itself’, in Young, Tom (ed) 2003, Readings in African Politics.The International African Institute. London. pp 59-60 159 For a general discussion on the factors underpinning the onset of subversion see: Mallin, Jay 1994, Covering Castro. US Cuba Institute Press. Washington DC. pp 119-120 Schrader R Charles 2008, History of Operations Research in the United States Army. Volume II. Government Printing Office. pp 255-258 On the relationship between enlistment in guerrilla warfare and subversion see: Joes, James Anthony 2000, America and Guerrilla Warfare. The University Press of Kentucky. Kentucky. pp 170-173 160Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974. Op cit. pp 294-302 On reasons that motivate individuals to enlist in insurgent armies see: Buijtenhuijs, Rob 1996, The Rational Rebel: How Rational, How Rebellious? Some African Examples. Afrika Focus. 12:1-2-3. 1996. Afrika-Studiecentrum. pp 5-8 of 23. http://www.gap.ugent.be/africafocus/pdf/96-12-13-Buijtenhuijs.pdf. Accessed on 07/11/2011
72 Connable, Ben 2010, The End of an Insurgency: What President Obama can learn from Peru, Angola and Colombia. Council on Foreign Relations. 20th September, 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66749/ben-connable/the-end-of-an-insurgency. Accessed on 07/03/2011 Paley R Amit 2007, Iraqis Joining Insurgency Less For Cause Than Cash. The Washington Post. Tuesday, 20th November, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2007/11/19/AR2007111902022.html 161Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. 382-409 162Ibid On other factors underpinning enlistment in insurgent organisations see: Acharya, Avidit 2009, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence. October, 2009. Woodrow Wilson Centre for Public Affairs and International Affairs. Robertson Hall, Princeton University. pp 8-9 of 31. http://www.princeton.edu/~aacharya/maoist.pdf. Accessed on 07/03/2011 Khalil, Lydia 2007, New Sufi Group joins the Iraqi Insurgency. 21st February 2007. Terrorism Focus. 4:2. The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1021. Accessed on 07/03/2011. Ferguson, Neil and Burgess, Mark, ‘The Road to Insurgency: Drawing Ordinary Civilians into the Cycle of Military Intervention and Violent Resistance’, in Ulusoy Demet M 2008, Political Violence, Organized Crime, Terrorism and Youth. Vol 46. IOS Press. pp 85-88 Cordesman, H Anthony and Davies, R Emma 2008. Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp 215-216 163Hudson, A Rex 1999, Op cit On group dynamics in terrorist organizations see: Stern, Jessica 2011, What motivates Terrorists? 21st January, 2011. Defining Ideas. Hoover Institution. Stanford University. http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/58841. Accessed on 07/03/2011 Atran, Scott 2008, “Band of Brothers”: Civil Society and the Making of a Terrorist. The International Journal for Not-for-Profit-Law. 10:4. August 2008. http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol10iss4/art_3.htm. Accessed on 07/03/2011 Ozer, M, ‘The Impact of Group Dynamics on Terrorist Decision Making’, in Ozeren Suleyman, Gunes, Dincer Ismail and Al-Badayneh M Diab (eds) 2007, Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects. IOS Press. pp 63-75. Kershaw, Sarah 2010, The Terrorist Mind: An Update. The New York Times. 9th January, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/weekinreview/10kershaw.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed on 07/03/2011 164Hudson, A Rex 1999, Op cit On the trail of terror engineered by the Japanese Red Army see: Steinhoff, G Patricia, ‘Death by Defeatism and other Fables: The Social Dynamics of the Rengo Sekigun Purge’ Lebra Sugiyama Takie (ed) 1992, Japanese Social Organization. University of Hawaii Press. Hawaii. pp 195-198. Gallagher, Aileen 2003, The Japanese Red Army: Inside the world’s most infamous terrorist organizations.. The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc. New York. pp 22-30 BBC 2006, Japanese Red Army Leader Jailed. Thursday, 23rd February, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4742028.stm. Accessed on 07/03/2011
2.2.4: RECRUITMENT 165 Anti-colonial insurgent recruitment in Zimbabwe targeted “unemployed school leavers” and the Zimbabwean migrant community in Zambia. See: Okoth Assa 2006, A History of Africa. 1915-1995. Vol 2. East African Educational Publishers Ltd. Nairobi, Kenya. pp 136-137 For some global insurgent networks like Al Qaeda, recruitment is conducted by its affiliates. See: Byman L Daniel 2010, Al Qaeda’s M&A Strategy. 7th December, 2010. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1207_al_qaeda_byman.aspx. Accessed on 16/03/2011
73 Where a rebel group can not use persuasion to recruit an individual with a unique skill, payment-based enlistment could be considered as an option. See Lichbach, Irving Mark 1995, The Rebel’s Dilemma: Economics, Cognition and Society. University of Michigan Press. Michigan. pp 230-231 166Nkrumah, Kwame 1968. Op cit. pp 56-102 Fuller, Thomas 2009, Thai Rebels recruiting in Schools. The New York Times. 21st June, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/asia/22thai.html. Accessed on 16/03/2011 In the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq by the United States of America boosted Al Qaeda’s recruitment drive. See: Karon, Tony 2004, Why Al Qaeda Thrives. Time. 26th May, 2004. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,642825,00.html. Accessed on 16/03/2011 In the Niger Delta in Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) recruits locally from unemployed youth: See: Refworld 2009, Nigeria: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. 16th June, 2009. UNHCR. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,NGA,,4b20f032a,0.html. Accessed on 16/03/2011 167Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 168Ngoga, Pascal, 1998 Op cit.pp 92-100 Leggett, Ian 2001, Uganda: The Background, The Issues, The People. Fountain Publishers Ltd. Kampala, Uganda. pp 73-74 169Ngoga, Pascal, Op cit.92-100 Pottier, Johan 2002, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. pp 23-24 Otunnu, Ogenga, ‘Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda’, in Adelman Howard and Suhrke Astri (eds) 1999, The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire.. Transaction Publishers. New Brunswick, New Jersey .pp 14-20 170Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 290-292. 171 Israel’s continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip pushed Palestinians to join Hamas. See: Council on Foreign Relations 2009, Hamas. Backgrounder. 27th August, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968. Accessed on 17/03/2011 172Gregory, Catherine 2010, Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Backgrounder. 16th March, 2010. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/provisional-irish-republican-army- ira-aka-pira-provos-glaigh-na-hireann-uk-separatists/p9240. Accessed on 17/03/2011 173Bhattacharji Preeti 2008, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. 17th November 2008 http://www.cfr.org/france/basque-fatherland-liberty-eta-spain-separatists- euskadi-ta-askatasuna/p9271. Accessed on 17/03/2011 Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 290-292. 174 Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 290-292 Chaffee G Lyman 1993, Political Protest and Street Art. Popular Tools for Democratisation in Hispanic Countries.. Greenwood Press. Westport Connecticut .pp 84-85 175Segaller, Stephen 1986. Op cit. pp 290-292. 176 Hudson A Rex 1999, Op cit 177Ngoga, Pascal 1998, Op cit.92-100
74 CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL REVIEW II
OPERATIONALIZING INSURGENT ACTIVITY In chapter 2, we observed that an insurgent group needs to assemble an organizational image that attracts popular support and motivates its fighters. Principally, the construction of an insurgent identity allows a guerrilla group to interface with and draw civilians away from supporting the state military establishment. While the battle for the hearts and minds of the population is a critical consideration in guerrilla warfare, an asymmetric duel is inherently an armed contest between combatants. In this regard, a guerrilla group ultimately needs to operationalize its insurgent activity by preparing and confronting the enemy. To this end, it needs to train its fighters, assemble its organizational structures, secure guerrilla bases, weapons, funding and other forms of external support and design a military strategy and tactics for taking on government soldiers. This chapter examines how each of the above variables facilitates guerrilla warfare.
3.1: TRAINING As already noted, a guerrilla group needs to undertake a given set of tasks in order to assemble its identity, prepare and confront the enemy. These range from simple to complex activities that require expertise. For example, a guerrilla organization needs cadres with knowledge on mass communication to organize its propaganda campaigns and those with basic and specialized information on weapons use to conduct military operations.
The need for expertise constitutes training into an indispensable requirement for conducting guerrilla warfare. 178 Under training, our interest not only centres on the kind of skills that insurgent organizations impart but also the extent to which capacity building in rebel groups is related to guerrilla strategy and tactics. This analytical approach is helpful in establishing whether a common logic underpins all the features of guerrilla warfare.
75 In light of the start up numerical strength commanded by government forces, training is an important means for redressing the imbalance in military capabilities disfavouring insurgents. Where the state is able to deploy well equipped brigades in the battlefield, a guerrilla organization should be in a position to field battalions of specialized fighters with the capacity to engage a large enemy force. Thus, it is incumbent upon the training unit of a guerrilla organization to impart highly specialized skills and institute higher levels of morale among its fighters.
In the above context, our attention is drawn to two questions: What kind of training would insurgents need? 179 Is there a relationship between the training approach of a guerrilla group and the organization of its insurgent activities? According to Nkrumah, guerrillas require skills for “marching under duress,” “camping in difficult terrain,” “subsisting on short rations for limited periods,” “enduring isolation in small groups cut off from the base” and “rigorous individual initiative.” 180 His model suggests a nexus between the organization of guerrilla activity and the training approach of an insurgent group. Principally, insurgent groups aim to selectively engage a superior enemy. In pursuing this objective, they maintain a high level of mobility and operate in small groups. In this direction, guerrillas need to be trained to improve their physical capacity to walk and run for long distances and also to develop the requisite interpersonal skills for fighting alongside a few combatants.
The above training only constitutes a fraction of capacity building in guerrilla warfare. Nkrumah emphasizes the need for insurgents to muster the art of attacking, dispersing, regrouping, encircling, retreating, close combat, commando-type manoeuvres and sabotage. Training in the above areas equips insurgents with the skills to selectively exploit emerging loopholes in the enemy’s military capability.
Nkrumah breaks down the above aspects of combat into more specific training objectives. To this end, insurgents need to muster marksmanship. He reasons that “In this field, the guerrilla-fighter must be skilled for it is necessary to use a minimum of ammunition.” 181 In this connection, training aims to economize the resources of an insurgent organization. In
76 terms of weapons use, guerrillas not only need to learn how to use different weapons in their possession but also familiarize themselves with those possessed by the enemy. A guerrilla should then not only learn how to accurately shoot at fixed and moving targets but also know the different kinds of aircraft used by the state military apparatus. 182
Although combat is a critical consideration in guerrilla warfare, an insurgency does not entirely depend on this variable. Rebel organizations need to engage in a range of other activities. For example, it has been observed that among others, the cultivation of popular support, enlistment and information dissemination are indispensable to the effective execution of an insurgent campaign.
In seeking to marshal self sufficiency in its armed struggle, a guerrilla organization needs to equip its recruits with skills for resource generation. Depending on the context, enlistees should learn the principles and practice of plantation farming, cattle rearing, handicraft and basic industrial manufacturing. 183 With this expertise, an insurgent group would presumably not suffer shortages in food, clothing and military hardware. Shifts in external support would not significantly affect the resource base of a self sufficient insurgent organization. 184
It is also imperative to observe that guerrillas are not tailored to operate like mercenaries or robots. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare theorists like Mao, Che Guevara and Nguyen assert that the propagation of ideology should be at the heart of any insurgent campaign. In this sense, there is a need for fighters to comprehend the ideological basis of the armed struggle .185 This mentally strengthens and prepares them to endure any operational and tactical setbacks that the organization might suffer along the way. Political indoctrination then emerges as an important area of training for recruits. Nkrumah stresses the need for guerrilla recruits to learn the colonial and neo-colonial history of Africa. 186 This indoctrination equips them with basic recruitment skills and the burning desire to contest the prevailing political order.
77 From the foregoing, it is evident that guerrilla groups seek to constitute training into a theatre for the reversal of the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military establishment. Where the enemy boasts superior armaments, the insurgent should make up this shortfall by mustering the art of asymmetric combat. Where a superior conventional military capability eases the operational tasks of government forces, insurgents need to marshal a greater investment in individual initiative and skill. 187 For example, while the availability of tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) eases the movement of government forces, insurgents need to learn to effectively cover long distances on foot to elude and take on the enemy.
Deriving from the above exposition, insurgents need to be Jacks of all trades. They need to perfect all the skills that the conventional soldier commands. According to Nkrumah, insurgents need to learn how to shoot with rifles, revolvers and machine guns; manufacture and detonate bombs; study and interpret maps; and “send and receive messages in Morse code.” 188 This training approach theoretically positions them at a level of parity with conventional government soldiers.
In a bid to establish an edge over the enemy, insurgents also need to acquire extra skills in areas conventional soldiers are least expected to prioritize. With naval frigates, tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers, government soldiers do not need to overly muster the basic skills for facilitating rudimentary movement. On the other hand, the unavailability of state- of-the-art movement aids pushes insurgents to learn to rudimentarily facilitate movements in theatres of guerrilla activity. According to Nkrumah, they then need to learn how to “ride bicycles, paddle canoes, row boats, climb walls, surmount obstacles with ropes, change and mend wheels on bicycles and cars” and conduct elementary repairs. 189 In this discourse, it is evident that there are marked differences between the training needs of insurgents and those of conventional soldiers.
In chapter 2, it was observed that asymmetric warfare could manifest as agrarian guerrilla warfare, urban guerrilla warfare, terrorism or a combination of some or all of these strands. Given these variations, an intriguing question arises: Do the training needs of insurgents
78 differ from genre to genre? For example, does an urban guerrilla require more specialized training than an agrarian guerrilla?
The technical training for an urban guerrilla showcases some of the fundamental similarities and differences in training approach among the different genres of asymmetric warfare. In terms of similarities, agrarian and urban guerrillas use similar techniques for movement, communication, subsistence and reconnaissance. However, operation in urban settings and differences in target definition and selection warrant some fundamental differences in training approach. In the discussion on the nature of urban guerrilla warfare, it was observed that an urban guerrilla shares a terrain with the urban criminal. In order to adapt to a crime-laden environment, urban guerrillas have to adopt some of the tactics employed by urban criminals. According to Nkrumah, an urban guerrilla has to learn how to “make rubber stamps, imitate hand writings and forge documents.” 190 This allows them to blend in the crime-laden environment in urban settings. In a way, training aims at assisting insurgents adapt to their operational environment. In this direction, differences in operational circumstances may call for the adoption of different training approaches among different strands of asymmetric warfare.
With training, it can then be concluded that a guerrilla organization is in a position to transform a raw recruit into an actively skilled member. It accords a rebel group the opportunity of assembling a knowledge base of insurgent practice. Through the repetitive conduct of guerrilla training sessions, training instructors of an insurgent group are in a position to develop and refine training strategy and tactics. Over time, the training approach of an insurgent organization evolves into a fully fledged body of knowledge on capacity building in an insurgency.
3.2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE We have argued that a guerrilla group needs to recruit and train new members to construct its identity and operationalize its insurgent activities. It is important to observe that the above key objectives are unattainable without an organizational framework that manages the manpower of an insurgent group. In this sense, a guerrilla organization requires
79 structures that organize and define the different tiers of its leadership. These facilitate command, control and cohesion within an insurgent movement. 191 Under organizational structure, this thesis focuses on the manner in which the different organs of an insurgent movement relate to each other and how the overall structural organization of a guerrilla group meets the purpose of an insurgency.
In light of the fact that the ultimate aim of an insurgent movement is to capture state power, its structures should not only mirror the organs needed to violently pursue this mission but also those needed for managing the post-conflict situation. In this connection, an insurgent movement should be a politico-military institution.
In discussing the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, Nkrumah proposes the establishment of two organs: the All African People’s Revolutionary Party (AAPRP) that would coordinate the policies and direct the actions of an anti-colonial African guerrilla movement and the All African People’s Revolutionary Army (AAPRA) that would unify all of Africa’s liberation forces and effect an armed struggle against the colonial establishment. 192
Alongside these two organs, he proposes the formation of the All Africa Committee for Political Coordination (AACPC) which would act as the political arm of the AAPRA. The AACPC would coordinate the political initiatives of the African guerrilla movement and foster anti-colonial alliances among Africa, Asia and Latin America. The supreme organ in the AAPRA would be the High Command which in terms of organizational hierarchy would operate under the AACPC. In stressing the supremacy of the AACPC over the AAPRA, Nkrumah notes that the African guerrilla movement’s strategy would be designed by the AACPC. This strategy would encompass all the political, military and economic aspects of the African guerrilla movement in contested and enemy zones. 193
Nkrumah’s organizational model attempts a separation of functions in insurgent movements. One organ manages people in conflict and post-conflict situations. The other prosecutes the armed conflict. In acknowledging the pre-eminence of politics over combat in an insurgency, his model subordinates the armed wing, AAPRA to the political wing,
80 AACPC. The logic behind this organizational structuring is that the successful prosecution of the armed struggle depends on the interpretation of political contradictions within the body politic. The AAPRA cannot swing into armed action unless the AACPC has interpreted and articulated the basis of the armed conflict.
With the political wing of a rebel group taking precedence over the military wing, how does an insurgency unfold into contested and unliberated zones? Nkrumah points out that “…AAPRA forces will act in support of the people’s struggle and not precede it…” 194 He adds that the political committees 195 and guerrilla units should always operate ahead of the frontline manned by AAPRA. Here, Nkrumah shows the relationship among the organs of a rebel group and the order in which they engage the enemy. This illustration also probably shows the order of significance of different aspects of guerrilla strategy. The political committees operate ahead of the conventional forces (and guerrilla units) because of the primacy of popular support in a rebellion. Essentially, rebel groups pursue two broad objectives: In the immediate term, they aim to defeat government forces. In the long term, they seek to govern the population. In order to attain both objectives, a guerrilla group needs to interact with the population. Through its political committees, a rebel organization articulates its ideology and uses propaganda to cultivate popular support. The primacy of the above task gives the political wing (the organ that executes it) added significance hence its supremacy within the structures of an insurgent organization and the vanguard role it plays in an insurgent campaign.
The guerrilla units and the conventional forces play sub-vanguard roles. They swing into action to reinforce the work of the political committees. Guerrilla units operate ahead of the conventional forces of an insurgent group because of the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of government forces. A rebel group will seek to reverse this state of affairs by using its guerrilla units to selectively erode the capability of the state military apparatus. Once the balance in military capabilities is relatively even, then the conventional forces of the guerrilla group can start taking on government forces.
81
The separation of functions and the manner in which an insurgency unfolds into contested and unliberated zones presents enormous command and control challenges for the leadership of an insurgent organization. In this sense, what chain of command would a rebel group employ in such circumstances? Nkrumah proposes a triple chain of command that attempts a separation of command and control in a guerrilla movement: The political executive would have its chain of command that runs from the national right down the village level (in rural areas) and ward level (in urban areas); the partisan or guerrilla wing of the movement would have a dual chain of command consisting of the political and military executives; and the military executive would also have its own parallel chain of command.
In this set up, the partisan executive would only swing into action after the political and military executives have initiated action. The triple chain of command insulates both the political and military wings of a guerrilla movement. Within its structures, these organs are fused and separated. While the partisan command incorporates political and military elements, his proposed movement also has separate political and military executives. This structural arrangement plays an important function. In the event the partisan chain of command were successfully targeted by the enemy, the pillars of the political executive would remain intact, relocate underground and continue with the armed struggle. 196
Like Nkrumah, Laqueur acknowledges the importance of a political wing in an insurgency. According to him, “Organization implies the existence of a political party or movement or at least a non-combatant fringe, semi-legal or underground party providing assistance to the guerrillas—money, intelligence and special services.” He observes that “In some instances, the guerrilla movement has been more or less identical with the party (Cuba, Uruguay, Algeria); elsewhere it has acted as the armed instrument of the party. Wherever guerrillas had no such connection with a political party (EOKA, the Stern Gang, many African and Latin American guerrilla movements) they could at least rely on a periphery of sympathizers, which albeit unorganized, provided support.” 197 Laqueur introduces an interesting dimension to this debate. Those who populate the political wing may be situated
82 in the same place (theatre of the insurgency) as those of the military wing or they may constitute what is known as the external wing. In the latter case, they would be resident in a foreign country far detached from the military wing and for that matter, the theatre of the insurgency. The cohesion of the guerrilla movement would depend on how well the two organs interact against the backdrop of geographical distance separating them.
The pre-eminence of the political wing over the military wing in guerrilla groups underscores the centrality of politics to the organization and execution of an insurgency. 198 In order to attain its political objectives, a guerrilla movement then needs to interface with the population. To this effect, its political wing has to constitute a nucleus of mid-level cadres by indoctrinating trade unionists, semi intellectuals, marginalized and rebellious youths and the unemployed. 199 The selective approach to enlistment not only ensures that an insurgent group recruits potential loyalists but it also minimizes the chances of the state disrupting the formative development of its structures.
Thus far, this discussion has stressed the theoretical supremacy of the political wing over the military wing of a guerrilla movement. 200 However, it is imperative to reiterate that although subordinated to the political wing, the military wing is an indispensable part of an insurgent movement. In this study, the organization of the military wing is particularly important because it offers insights into the military priorities of an insurgent group.
Guerrilla organizations attach importance to espionage. 201 As such, they require an Information Section that gathers intelligence in a number of areas: On inhabitants in a theatre of insurgent activity; insurgents would be interested in distinguishing among supporters and opponents as well as people who are indifferent to the armed struggle; They would also need information on the ideal places for situating bases. In this case, the suitability of rivers, forests, mountains and valleys for the establishment of guerrilla sanctuaries would be assessed.
Insurgent groups would need information on the strategic relevance of different geographical positions to the conduct of military engagements. For example, the Information Section would be interested in assessing the importance of overrunning, 83 occupying and holding towns, airfields and bridges among other vantage points; Equally, information on the attitude of its fighters and those of the enemy would be of critical interest to an insurgent organization. 202 The collection of accurate information about the enemy would allow rebels to target the weak spots in the state’s military capability.
In terms of preparation for combat, an insurgent organization needs among others: an Instruction Section that trains its fighters and sensitizes the masses; an Armament Section that purchases, stores and distributes weapons; a Provisions Section that provides insurgents with food, uniforms and supplies; a Health Section that mitigates the outbreak and spread of disease among the insurgents; a Communications Section schooled in radio telegraphy and whose mandate is to organize and supervise communications networking. In order to take on the enemy, it would need an Operations Section that spearheads combat operations and a Sabotage Section that among other things identifies the enemy’s vulnerabilities and deploys operatives to aggravate these points of weakness. 203
From the above discussion, it is evident that a guerrilla organization requires units within its structures that accord its fighters holistic preparation and support. In this respect, its organizational setup is designed to recruit, train, sensitize, equip, feed, clothe and treat its fighters. In seeking to meet the above objectives, a rebel group structurally separates those organs that articulate its political mission from those that facilitate the violent pursuit of this goal.
3.3: GUERRILLA BASES In defining and operationalizing guerrilla warfare, we noted that at the start of an asymmetric duel, the state military apparatus usually has a conventional military edge over an insurgent organization. In order to gradually reverse this imbalance in military capabilities in its favour, a guerrilla group needs to selectively engage government forces.
In seeking to attain the above objective, guerrilla groups adopt the principle of mobility. 204 However, mobility in perpetuity is unsustainable in light of the fact that guerrillas need a sanctuary to recuperate and prepare for fresh insurgent campaigns. 205 What kind of sanctuary or base would meet this need? Ideally, guerrilla bases should be situated in 84 inaccessible regions that the enemy would find difficult to attack in full strength. 206 Mountains, forests and swamps would be ideal locations for guerrilla bases.
In the mid 1990s, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), a Ugandan Islamist guerrilla group situated its bases in the rugged Rwenzori mountain ranges along the Uganda-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border. 207 During its five year guerrilla campaign against the Obote regime in the 1980s, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group operated in what was known as the Luwero Triangle. According to Pascal Ngoga “this area was hilly and densely populated at its southern end, fading out towards the drier and less densely inhabited Singo plains in the north.” 208
In Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) guerrillas operated within the Virunga volcanic ranges where the weather was hostile to the extent that some of the insurgents died due to exposure. 209 In all these three cases, the rugged terrain was an inhibition to regular forces accessing the guerrilla sanctuaries. 210 An even better approach for insulating guerrilla bases against enemy attack would involve setting them up on foreign territory. In seeking to attack these bases, a state would risk a war with the country hosting the guerrillas.
It is important to note that the establishment of guerrilla bases is not without drawbacks: As areas of fixed insurgent activity, sanctuaries offer government forces the opportunity of engaging guerrillas in set-piece battles. In the mid-1990s, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) had a false start to its campaign when Ugandan government forces overrun its bases in Buseruka, Hoima district; Locating bases in very remote areas detaches guerrillas from the population. This disconnect denies the insurgents food, recruits and intelligence; In situations where a country is undergoing rapid urbanization, locating a guerrilla base in a remote area would be counterproductive. Laqueur reasons that “The village cannot encircle the city if the majority of the population resides in urban areas.” 211
The debate on the establishment of guerrilla bases points to the notion that guerrilla warfare will only thrive in areas with favourable conditions. Would it then follow that different
85 insurgencies occurring at different times in a given country would always spring up in the same places? Laqueur asserts that guerrilla wars are more likely to occur in specific parts of the country that favour this military strategy. However, whilst geographical factors are an important consideration in guerrilla warfare, weak central government control and a culture of political violence are indispensable to the evolution of a theatre of insurgency (guerrilla bases). Whereas weak state control over a country allows a guerrilla movement to germinate unchecked, 212 a cultural predisposition to political violence encourages an unwavering long term popular commitment to the violent resolution of political disputes.
In post-independence Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the eastern part of the country has evolved into a perennial hot-bed for insurgency. This region is home to some of Africa’s densest tropical forests. The inability of the Government of the DRC (GoDRC) to extend firm control over this area has allowed different insurgent groups to contest its authority. 213 For example the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) have been active in eastern DRC. 214
Whereas a culture of political violence is indispensable to the evolution of a theatre of insurgent activity, its impact depends on the population’s predisposition to organized armed resistance and a guerrilla group’s capacity to cultivate popular support. In this regard, Chaliand identifies four characteristics of guerrilla savvy societies: “profound nationalism,” “village level solidarity and communal institutions,” “thousand year old habits of collective work and patient and precise labour of a rice-growing peasantry with intense ties to the soil,” and a capacity to keep secrets and cultural traditions favouring adaptation. These characteristics foster “National cohesion…” and “…a capacity for prolonged resistance.” 215
The discussion on guerrilla bases throws up some of the critical dilemmas that insurgents encounter. In order to avoid being obliterated by better equipped government forces, guerrillas have to maintain mobility. Yet mobility in perpetuity undermines their capacity to effectively recuperate and prepare for fresh insurgent campaigns. In this case, rebels need sanctuaries that government forces cannot easily access, preferably on foreign
86 territory or on topographically rugged terrain. However, the establishment of bases negates the guerrilla principle of mobility and accords government forces the opportunity of attacking a fixed area of insurgent activity.
3.4: FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT Whereas a state can legally generate revenue domestically and internationally and allocate substantial chunks of its annual budget to the defence sector, an insurgent group does not enjoy a similar luxury. Yet, like all organizations, it needs funds to purchase arms and ammunition, medicine and clothing among other things for its fighters
In chapter 2, we observed that an insurgent group may either cultivate cordial relations or severe its ties with the population. Popular support allows rebels to raise funds and other forms of aid domestically. However, reliance on this approach presents them with some stiff challenges: How can people regularly supply insurgents with food, clothing and money against the backdrop of stringent surveillance mounted by the state’s counterinsurgency units? In urban areas, the environment is murkier. The urban guerrilla shares the terrain with urban criminals and counter revolutionaries. How would an insurgent group mobilize resources in such an environment? 216
The challenges in mobilizing resources domestically push guerrillas to explore criminal activity and external support as alternative avenues for funding insurgent campaigns. In this connection, insurgent operatives engage in theft, extortion, blackmail and burglary to finance their activities. 217 However, in light of the state’s propensity to limit the levels of criminal activity in a given country, how much funds are terrorists able to mobilize locally? The state cannot completely eliminate domestic funding for an insurgency. Rebellions are relatively cheap. One Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign in different English cities only cost £ 25,000 and yet caused infrastructural damage to the tune of £ 10,000,000. In this sense, there is one cardinal loophole in countering insurgent financing: Insurgents only need a minute slice of unaddressed criminal space to generate minimal funds to finance their activities. 218
87 However, in discussing the amount of funding needed for insurgent campaigns, it is important to note that insurgencies may expand to a point beyond which pockets of funding would be inadequate. When a rebel group is constrained in mobilizing funds domestically, it may solicit for external support. This option introduces an important feature of modern rebellions—the role of foreign countries in fuelling civil conflicts. In the ensuing paragraphs, we examine the nature of support that foreign states offer Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs).
According to Byman, states extend monetary, logistical, military, operational, organizational, ideological and diplomatic support to insurgent organizations. In terms of capacity building, insurgents are trained to use explosives, small arms and conduct surveillance and counter surveillance. A state may directly train an insurgent group or use another as a proxy for training it. For example, Iran extends military training to Hezbollah which in turn trains Palestinian militant groups. Operationally, states may assist terrorist organizations in improving their precision in attack. In this respect, the Iranian intelligence is known to have worked closely with Hezbollah in the assassination of Iranian dissidents in Europe. 219
In addition to training and operational assistance, insurgent organizations need monetary, organizational, logistical, ideological and diplomatic support to effectively conduct their campaigns. In relation to monetary assistance, they need funds to purchase equipment and run operations. In the 1970s, Libya extended military aid to the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the tune of $ 3,500,000. Insurgent funding may be earmarked for specific tasks. For example, Iran and Pakistan extend funding to the Lebanese Hezbollah and Kashmiri Hizb-ul Mujahideen specifically for training purposes and supporting the families of fighters. 220
In terms of logistics, states may assist rebel groups in securing real or forged travel documents and establishing companies and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as fronts for employing insurgents. In extending organizational support, a state may push for the unification of all the insurgent groups it supports. For example, in rendering
88 organizational support to insurgent groups in 1988, Iran united eight small Afghan Shi’a groups into a bigger organization known as Hezb-i- Wahadat (The Unity Party). 221 Once integrated into a wider insurgent circuit, a guerrilla group would cut down on costs by sharing tasks and resources with sister organizations.
External support can have a lasting impact on a group’s capacity to conduct an insurgent campaign. Training is particularly beneficial in the sense that once it is delivered, in case of a deterioration in relations between the foreign state and the proxy rebel group, the state cannot ‘withdraw’ it. The pioneering set of trainees can constitute the group’s Military Instruction Unit and train future recruits. On the other hand, monetary support makes a rebel group dependent on its foreign sponsor. Unless the group devises a capacity for self- sufficiency, the withdrawal of external funding would badly affect it. External support then emerges as a double edged sword in insurgent campaigns. While it may assist a group in building its capacity to execute an insurgency it may at the same time make it overly dependent on its foreign backer.
Thus far, this discussion has only focussed on a proxy conflict involving three actors—a rebel group, a state opposed to it and a foreign state supporting it. At this stage, a question arises: Are the activities of an insurgent group only affected by the behaviour of these two states? Since the support of one external actor within the international system may affect the outcome of an insurgent campaign, the behaviour of the international community as a whole could have a more profound impact. Thus, as part of an external support package, insurgent groups need diplomatic cover to engage the international community. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Arab world was known to provide this assistance to Arab militant groups. 222
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that external support is pivotal in shaping the outcome of an insurgent campaign. How different is it from domestically sourced support? Whereas the surveillance system of the state could restrict the scope of domestic funding, a non-restrictive external support environment could allow a rebel group an unrestrictive assistance package. For example, while it might be difficult for an insurgent group to train
89 its fighters in its theatre of insurgent activity, this objective would be attainable on the territory of a foreign state backing its activities.
It is imperative to note that not all insurgent groups are predisposed to benefit from external support. In order for external insurgent assistance to flourish, the right kind of geopolitical dynamics need to prevail. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, Somali and Ethiopian rebel groups exploited poor relations between the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia to secure external support. While the Somali government of General Siad Barre backed Ethiopian guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow the Ethiopian government led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Mengistu regime reciprocated by aiding anti-Barre Somali groups. In more recent times, Al Shabaab, a Somali insurgent group has benefited from Eritrean support due to poor Ethiopia-Eritrea relations. 223 In the case of the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), 224 there were no geopolitical contradictions that it may have significantly exploited to secure external support. While the UFM insurgency was ensuing, Uganda was relatively at peace with her neighbours.
It can then be argued that insurgent groups cannot totally escape the need to solicit funding domestically. Even groups that are beneficiaries of external support need a measure of locally generated funds to push their campaigns forward. Since an insurgent group would not be in control of the state apparatus, it would require time and elaborate organization to smuggle weapons and other provisions into the theatre of insurgent activity. In this case, while awaiting the external support network to elude the state’s security system, it would have to generate funds for the campaign domestically.
What tactics would insurgents then use to generate funds locally? Rebel groups use bank hold-ups, kidnappings and the institution of a revolutionary tax as means of domestic resource mobilization. For example Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a Basque separatist movement in Spain, dispatches letters to specific individuals and institutions demanding money. These messages are usually laced with threats. In these letters, ETA states that it would visit terror on whoever fails to meet its demands. In this respect, we deduce that domestic insurgent resource mobilization can be threat driven. The victims are coerced into
90 mobilizing funds without coming into contact with the insurgents. In other situations, terrorists could choose to issue threats while in confrontational contact with their victims. For example in January 1981, ETA kidnapped and held hostage Jose Lipperheide, a German-born Spanish industrialist until a ransom fee of $ 1,600,000 was paid. 225
In diversifying their tactics for domestic resource mobilization, insurgents can also use methods that not only bring them into contact with their victims but also allow them to directly generate funds. In this respect, they may engage in theft and illicit trade which allows them direct involvement in the collection of proceeds. For example between September 1963 and April 1964, Front de la Liberation Quebecois, a French Canadian terrorist group stole cash to the tune of $ 40,000 and military equipment valued at $ 55,000. In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is known to generate its funds through drug trafficking. 226
This discussion has pinpointed some of the choices insurgents make in mobilizing resources to finance their campaigns. 227 They not only have to choose between generating funds externally and internally but also between getting and not getting into direct contact with their resource mobilization canvasses. Like other variables underpinning insurgency, funding in guerrilla warfare is deeply rooted in the insurgents’ drive to reverse the imbalance in confrontational capabilities favouring the counterinsurgent. In this respect, the population emerges as a principle arena for the redistribution of resource mobilizational capabilities in asymmetric duels. It could voluntarily avail funds to either of the parties engaged in an asymmetric duel or evolve into a canvass on which the insurgent or counterinsurgent or both forcefully extract resources for prosecuting the conflict.
3.5: GUERRILLA STRATEGY Thus far, this study has dwelt on the non-military variables that shape rebellions. Ultimately, a guerrilla organization needs an approach that allows it to confrontationally interface with the enemy. 228 Guerrilla strategy emerges as one of a number of broad frameworks that insurgents use to attain the above objective. It lays the foundation for the tactics that dictate the nature and scope of operations conducted by rebels.
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3.5.1: Combatant-to-Combatant Engagements Given the start-up conventional military edge that government forces command over insurgents, a guerrilla group faces a critical challenge in prioritizing its military objectives. For example, it has to choose between reducing the troop numbers of the enemy and destroying their resource base. In this case, the challenge in designing guerrilla strategy lies in identifying and crippling the enemy’s cardinal area of strength. In “Seven Pillars of Wisdom,” his treatise on insurgency, T.E. Lawrence argues that “In the Turkish army, materials were scarce and precious, men more plentiful than equipment…the aim should be to destroy not the army but the materials.” 229
Lawrence’s views suggest that pockets of weakness exist within the enemy’s broader domain of strength. In this case, insurgents should desist from conducting a blanket attack on the pillars of the enemy’s capability. Instead, they should concentrate on targeting specific loop-holes within this capability. In this respect, guerrilla strategy should seek to surgically disable the enemy’s capacity to wage war.
In discussing the nature of guerrilla warfare, we noted the inextricable connection between contradictions in the body politic and the manifestation of armed conflict. To what extent then would the ideals of politics inform military strategy? For example, would it be plausible to maintain that the political ideology of an insurgent organization significantly shapes its military strategy?
In examining the relationship between Marxism and unconventional warfare (of which guerrilla warfare is a part) Vladimir Lenin reasons that “Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method. It recognizes the possibility that the struggle may assume the most variegated forms. For that matter, Marxism does not ‘invent’ those forms of struggle. It merely organizes the tactics of strife and renders them suitable for general use….Marxism never will reject any particular combat method.” 230 Thus, while defining the purpose for which the military should be used, the politics around which an insurgency evolves do not shape the methods that a rebel group employs. However, given
92 the supremacy of the political over the military organs, the military strategy of a guerrilla organization will not develop autonomously beyond a point where it completely negates the political purpose of an insurgency.
The inextricable connection between politics and armed confrontation also raises another pertinent issue: When defining and operationalizing its political aims and objectives, does an insurgent group set a time frame within which to accomplish its tasks? Are the political and military time frames of an insurgent organization in tandem with each other?
It is important to note that different insurgent organizations project the end of their respective campaigns differently. Whatever the political basis of these calculations, the sustainability of an insurgent campaign greatly hinges on shifts in the military strength of the enemy. Guerrillas require time to erode the military capability of government forces. They seek to adopt a strategy that serializes the armed campaign against the enemy. In this regard, a guerrilla war should not be characterized by the onset of one major military confrontation conducted in a short period of time in a small area. 231 These battlefield circumstances are ideal for government forces to use their superior conventional military capability (higher troop numbers, modern equipment, etc) to obliterate the ill equipped, under-staffed and comparatively inexperienced guerrillas.
Instead, guerrilla wars should be characterized by a “series of a few big battles separated by comparatively long intervals.” During the intervening periods, an insurgent group ought to conduct a “large number of small engagements.” 232 Shedding light on the protracted character of guerrilla warfare, General Giap argues that “The general law of a long revolutionary war is usually to go through three stages: defensive, equilibrium and offensive. Fundamentally, in the main directions, our resistance war (in Vietnam) followed this general rule. Of course, the reality on the battlefields unfolded in a more lively and complicated manner.” 233 His postulations point to the notion that military capability in guerrilla warfare is built over time. Until they assemble sufficient capacity to conduct offensive campaigns, guerrillas should only confront government forces selectively. From this discussion, it can be deduced that the protracted nature of guerrilla warfare gives time
93 supreme significance in an insurgency. It evolves into a resource that the insurgent uses to wear down a conventionally superior enemy.
It is also important to note that the superiority of the state military apparatus presents an insurgent organization with some critical dilemmas: How should it confront the state military apparatus? Should emphasis be placed on attack or defence? Would too many attacks unduly expose an insurgent organization? Would too many defensive battles stall an insurgent campaign? An effective guerrilla strategy attempts to address all the above concerns. In this respect, insurgent groups adopt a military strategy premised on alertness, mobility and attack. 234 Alertness and attack allow them to identify and strike at ideal targets of opportunity while mobility facilitates the institution and shifting of battlefronts. Unpredictability in the emergence and disappearance of frontlines unsettles conventionally attuned government forces that are used to conducting military operations along fixed battlefronts.
Guerrilla strategy is essentially premised on dual adaptation. An insurgent group simultaneously adapts to its own condition of relative military weakness and the enemy’s position of relative military strength. Dual adaptation in guerrilla warfare relates to the Yin Yang concept. Otherwise known as the ‘unity of opposites,’ this philosophy acknowledges the potential manifestation of strength within the domain of weakness and weakness within that of strength. For example, while a small band of fighters is susceptible to annihilation at the hands of a large enemy force, its unit size facilitates rapid deployment and retreat. Yin Yang also explains the dynamics under which insurgents may prioritize resource use. While territory and time are of equal importance in an insurgency, a guerrilla group can forfeit one in order to hold onto another. In this regard, a guerrilla group could relinquish territory in order to allow itself time to build or rebuild its capability. At a later stage, it could de- prioritize time as a resource and opt to regain lost territory. 235
In 2006, faced with a formidable onslaught mounted by Ethiopian forces, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) opted to surrender control of Mogadishu, the Somali capital (territory) to allow itself time to rebuild its capability. When the Islamist forces marshalled sufficient
94 capability to take on the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), they launched a sustained attack to recapture Mogadishu (territory). 236 In similar vein, following the success of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) counterinsurgency Operation Bonanza (in 1983), guerrillas of the National Resistance Army (NRA) gradually surrendered their original sanctuary in Luwero Triangle in Uganda to government forces (territory). After marshalling sufficient capability to square off against Ugandan government forces, in 1986, NRA guerrillas swept across the country recapturing the Luwero Triangle and previously unoccupied parts of this East African country. 237
We have observed that an insurgent group has to adapt to its own condition of relative military strength. Given this necessity, to what extent should it rely on its own resources to conduct operations? Cross argues that “Rebels who cannot count on more conventional forces moving up to relieve or support them must win their own fights as best as they can.” 238 In this case, individual insurgent units should not overly depend on sister units for support. The challenge for an insurgent organization then lies in according its individual units the capacity to hold their own in combat duels with enemy forces.
We have noted that insurgents use time as a means of recovering from battles with government forces and building their military capability ahead of the next campaign. In a sense, they inadvertently seek to utilize time to test the enemy’s capacity to engage in a prolonged armed conflict: At this stage, an intriguing question arises: To what extent would the state apparatus permit ‘psychological pressures’ to dictate the nature of its response to an emerging insurgency? Cross argues that “When disciplined troops are available in sufficient numbers; when their equipment is suited to the task; and when the government cares nothing for popular opinion and support, an insurrection can often be stamped out by ruthless slaughter and subsequent terror.” 239 His views suggest that a rebel group does not have control over the behaviour of government forces in a protracted insurgency. It would appear that the success of protracted guerrilla warfare depends on the counterinsurgency calculations of the enemy.
95 3.5.2: Combatant-to-Non Combatant Engagements (Terrorism) Given the imbalance in military capabilities favouring government forces, a classical rebel group will initially maintain a strategic defensive posture, conducting a limited series of attacks on isolated, under-strength enemy units. In large measure, this will be a confrontation between combatants. In the modern era, the growing importance of popular support in asymmetric warfare has constituted the population into a critical battleground. Insurgents and counterinsurgents not only battle to win the support of civilians but also attack them as part of a wider campaign.
However, the adoption of terrorism as a strategy does not directly weaken the state’s capacity to wage war. A rebel attack on civilians does not reduce the manpower of government forces. The challenge for an insurgent group then lies in attacking the population in a way that will indirectly affect enemy soldiers. 240 An intriguing issue in this debate is the contrast between the target selection of insurgents and that of counterinsurgents and its impact on the outcome of an asymmetric conflict. Whereas guerrillas may seek to attack civilians whilst avoiding regular confrontational contact with government forces, government soldiers may find themselves struggling to locate and fight the highly elusive insurgents.
Terrorism then emerges as a psychological contest between insurgents and the state military apparatus. It shifts the war from the actual theatre of skirmishes onto a psychological front. In the unfolding war of nerves, the civilian population is constituted into a theatre of indirect confrontational contact between insurgents and the state. 241 Whereas the insurgents demonstrate their military potency by attacking civilians, the state is unable to demonstrate its own conventional military might since the insurgents are not intent on engaging in head- on duels with government soldiers. Yet the state cannot ignore the attacks on the population by the insurgents. The duty of the state is to protect its citizens. If the state fails to halt the terrorist attacks, the insurgents will have scored psychological victories.
In seeking to direct violence at the population, a rebel group has to grapple with some critical choices: Would it demonstrate its terrorist potency by killing or maiming en masse?
96 In this case, genocide or ethnic cleansing would be a suitable approach. Would it pursue a selective demonstration of its terrorist capability? Since the population only serves as a canvass on which the group can showcase its potency, then the use of indiscriminate terrorism 242 would be counterproductive. The non-selective targeting of civilians would constitute the population into the ultimate target of the insurgents. In order to survive, the population could be pushed to side with the state.
Because of the above reason, insurgents generally employ terrorism selectively. This strategy sends out a simple message to civilians: If you do not cooperate with the state, you will not be targeted. Selective terrorism targets state officials, civilians collaborating with the state in counterinsurgency campaigns and neutral citizens. In pursuing a selective terrorist strategy, insurgents use assassinations, maimings and kidnappings as tactics. These methods allow them to strike at specific individuals who represent the enemy’s interests. As part of its armed struggle against South Africa’s occupation of present day Namibia, guerrillas of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) not only attacked isolated military outposts and police stations but also Namibians who were collaborating with the occupation forces. 243
Since an insurgent organization would seek to avoid confronting government forces while conducting its terrorist campaign, in the long run, the state would grow frustrated at its inability to corner and engage the insurgents in a fight. Under such circumstances, Marighella argues that the state would be compelled to take drastic measures to identify and take on the guerrillas. To this effect, it would step up cordon and search operations and arbitrarily arrest civilians. This counterinsurgency approach would make life unbearable for the citizens who would start perceiving the state as overly repressive. Consequently, the population would throw its weight behind the guerrilla movement. 244
Based on the above analysis, it can be deduced that guerrilla strategy essentially rests on two premises: In fighting government forces, insurgents will seek to prosecute an unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign, selectively targeting loop-holes in the capability of the enemy. The rebels will also strive to adapt to their own condition of
97 relative military weakness. Alongside combatant-to-combatant engagements, guerrillas will also seek to selectively attack civilians to expose the state as incapable of protecting its citizens. This approach will aim to push the government to adopt a heavy handed response to the mushrooming insurgency.
3.6: GUERRILLA TACTICS Guerrilla strategy accords an insurgent group a set of tenets that broadly determine the shape of its confrontational interaction with government forces. For example, the launch of a strategic offensive by a rebel group is subject to the delay or inability in the state launching a new strategic offensive. 245 It is worth noting that this broad principle does not prescribe specific steps that guerrillas should take in order to exploit the vulnerability of the state military apparatus in transition between two strategic offensives. For instance, it does not concisely show how guerrilla units should conduct movements relative to the enemy during this phase.
Thus, for a better understanding of insurgent practice, it is imperative that we identify and study the specific dimensions that strategy assumes in a given theatre of insurgent activity. Otherwise known as tactics, these minute manifestations of strategy constitute the basic mode of confrontation between guerrillas and government forces in an active theatre of combat. Tactics derive from strategy and shape the nature of operations that a military organization conducts. 246 In this section, we set out to answer the following questions: What tactics do guerrillas use? What is the rationale behind the tactics they adopt? How do shifts in guerrilla strategy affect the evolution of tactics?
When an asymmetric conflict breaks out, government forces initially command a conventional military edge over guerrillas. At this stage, the principle challenge for an insurgent army lies in determining the optimal allocation of its limited capabilities. For example, in terms of deployment, an insurgent army has to make decisions on the kind of fighting units that would suit a given set of military confrontational circumstances. The diversity in the composition of a guerrilla group potentially gives its military wing individuals with extensive fighting experience, those with limited fighting experience and
98 those without. With a thin and diverse manpower base, how would an insurgent group allocate its human resources?
Clausewitz asserts that the militia and civilian units of a guerrilla army should not be deployed against the core force of the enemy. These relatively inexperienced units should operate along the outer reaches of the main body of the enemy army. Otherwise known as “surfaces” or “edges,” these points constitute the thinnest areas of enemy deployment and concentration. 247 Guerrillas should strike at these points while heading towards the rear of the enemy force. In this respect, the objective of an insurgent army should be to draw areas outside the main theatre of war from the enemy’s grasp.
From the above analysis, it is evident that two considerations underpin the allocation of fighting capabilities in an insurgent organization. First, the fighting strength of the enemy: A guerrilla organization will seek to deploy those units with the requisite capability to engage a given set of enemy units. Second, attainable short term objectives: A guerrilla organization will conduct attacks that can yield victory in the short run. The vulnerability of the enemy’s flanks and isolated military outposts accord a guerrilla group the opportunity of using its inexperienced units to dominate these areas and wrest them from the enemy’s control. 248 This feat allows the rebel group to register some pockets of progress within a wider domain of initial strategic military setbacks. Tactical progress in this direction is potentially attainable in light of the fact that at these spots, the state military apparatus exhibits a relatively lighter concentration of its fighting capability.
It is equally important to observe that in other theatres of asymmetric confrontation, government forces manifest in strength. Guerrillas cannot perpetually harass the enemy’s flanks. Ultimately, they have to square off against the main body of the enemy force. With a relatively limited capability, how would insurgent units cope with this challenge? Guerrilla movements should be deceptive. Insurgent units intent on attacking government forces from the west should deceptively appear to be approaching enemy positions from the east. Rebels should conduct attacks when there are lulls in the manifestation of enemy
99 strength. To this end, insurgents should mount attacks when government forces halt an offensive or commence a troop withdrawal. 249
This study has mainly attempted to prescribe the specific steps that guerrillas should take in reaction to temporary lapses in the manifestation of the enemy’s strength. This tactical approach is dictated by the enemy’s modus operandi. In this respect, an insurgent force has little control over the evolution of the enemy’s tactical vulnerability. If the enemy drastically minimized the loopholes in their capability, then an insurgent army would have limited opportunities of winning an asymmetric duel. Under such circumstances, insurgents would need a reservoir of their own advantages they would independently exploit to tactically out-manoeuvre the enemy. Cross asserts that insurgents should draw their advantage from two areas: The capacity to marshal “greater mobility than conventional forces” and “detailed and intimate knowledge of the countryside.” 250
In relation to mobility, some puzzling issues arise: Given the resources at their disposal, government forces are in a better position to marshal machines and equipment to facilitate quicker movement of troops than guerrillas. In the Niger Delta, the Nigerian army would be expected to use its modern ships to transport troops faster than guerrillas of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). 251 Similarly, the lavishly equipped Angolan army would be expected to use its Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and battle wagons to crisscross the tiny Cabinda enclave faster than separatist guerrillas of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). 252
In this sense, at a technological level, conventional forces are better predisposed to marshal mobility than insurgents. An insurgent army would then only be left with the option of enhancing the mobility of its individual fighter vis-à-vis that of a government foot soldier. However, the challenge in adopting this tactical approach is that the state military apparatus could reorientate its own foot soldier to match the mobility of the individual guerrilla. In this case, insurgents would then find it difficult to constitute troop movement into a critical area for the reversal of the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military apparatus.
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Given the above challenge, how can guerrillas marshal mobility? Cross points out that greater insurgent mobility does not denote greater absolute speed. In other words, the mobility of units of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Sudanese region of Darfur should not be measured in terms of the kilometres they are capable of covering in an hour. Rather, their mobility should broadly be quantified in terms of their capacity to conduct movements throughout the theatre of insurgency on “short notice with greater ease and less fanfare.” 253 In this direction, insurgents seek to marshal a relative and not an absolute mobility edge over government forces.
It is also worth noting that in order to effectively marshal mobility, insurgents need to muster terrain intelligence. Cross points out that guerrillas should demonstrate superior knowledge on “trails and short cuts,” “remote hiding places,” “promising spots for ambushes” and the “surest escape routes.” 254 It could be argued that a given guerrilla unit is mobile not because it has the means to quickly move from one part of a theatre of insurgency to another but because it knows and uses routes that present the least obstacle to faster troop movement.
In this analysis, it has been argued that guerrillas need to adopt mobility to maintain a tactical edge over government forces. Thus far, the specific tactical posture that mobility assumes in guerrilla operations has not been addressed. In seeking to address this need, insurgents should spend minimal time accessing, operating in and withdrawing from a battlefield. They should vacate a battlefield in minutes and a region of confrontational interaction with the enemy in days. 255 This approach denies the enemy the time and space to effectively respond to insurgent activity. For instance, when a guerrilla unit mounts a tactical offensive, government forces immediately assume a tactical defensive posture. But because the guerrilla attack lasts for a very short period, by the time government forces switch from a defensive to an offensive posture, the insurgents have vacated the battlefield. This state of battlefield affairs prevents government forces from directly exerting their offensive momentum against retreating guerrillas.
101 Thus, in engaging with the principle of mobility, insurgents have to make optimal use of time. However, it is important to note that they cannot monopolize this resource. The state military apparatus could alter its own management of time. Guerrillas would then have to introduce a new dimension to their wellspring of tactical potency. To this effect, they would need to mount ambushes against the enemy. 256 The element of surprise renders the enemy’s time management strategy obsolete. Where insurgents ambush government forces, the state military apparatus would be unsettled by the lack of time for taking on rebels appearing in both expected and least expected places.
This thesis has dwelt on the dynamics underpinning the manifestation of insurgent mobility in the theatre of skirmishes. It is important to note that this domain constitutes the highest area of confrontational interaction between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. In order to access it, insurgents need to conduct movements in its environs. Given the fact that the environs lie outside the theatre of combat, the intensity of confrontational interaction in these areas is expected to be less than that in the theatre of skirmishes. Does it then follow that there are differences in the way insurgent mobility manifests inside and outside the theatre of combat?
Whereas speed underpins insurgent mobility inside the combat theatre, clandestinity characterizes that outside the theatre of skirmishes. While operating in the environs of the theatre of combat, insurgents are least preoccupied with conducting fast movements and more concerned with making undetectable movements. To this end, they seek to cover all their tracks and desist from generating noise that would arouse the enemy’s suspicion.
In addition, they conduct different mobility-related activities at different times of the day. They march at night and conduct mobility-support activities during the day. At night, insurgents desist from holding conversations and smoking. While marching, they adopt an unusual pattern of movement: In order to avoid tripping over stones, branches and other obstacles, they walk with their feet high up. 257 Whilst realizing undetectability in mobility, the adoption of an unusual pattern of marching tends to slow down their movement. However, it is imperative to remember that in the areas outside the theatre of skirmishes,
102 insurgents could afford to forego speed for undetectability-in-mobility since the degree of confrontational interaction with the enemy is expected to be at its lowest. In this case, the chances of government forces quickly locating and taking them out are expected to be relatively minimal.
With the hours of the night dedicated to marching, what activities does a field operational unit conduct during the day? In what ways do these activities support their movements in the areas outside the theatre of combat? During the day, guerrillas engaged in field operations take turns to sleep and study maps. 258 Rest accords them collective reinvigoration ahead of the commencement of the next phase of their field operations. In discussing the nature of mobility, we argued that geographical knowledge on the theatre of skirmishes is essential in marshalling insurgent mobility. In this connection, map reading emerges as one of the critical avenues for determining routes that present the least obstacles to insurgent mobility.
This research has stressed the significance of mobility in facilitating limited and selective confrontational interaction between guerrillas and government forces. With initial minimal interaction between the two sides, insurgents are allowed the time and space to assemble their capability. However, it is important to note that guerrillas cannot cripple the enemy’s capacity to wage war by perpetually avoiding confrontation with government forces. Ultimately, the strength of government forces will only decline if guerrillas can impose costly battles on them. Mindful of its fragile capability and the inescapable need to engage the enemy, what would constitute ideal targets for an insurgent attack? 259
Nkrumah identifies the communication sector as one of the more vulnerable elements in the enemy’s capability. Guerrillas should not only seek to attack communication infrastructure but also enemy forces in transit. Whilst seeking to disable roads, railway lines and airfields, they should also strike at enemy military convoys. 260 The key question at this stage: Why would mobility evolve into a critical area of vulnerability for government forces?
It is imperative to observe that in seeking to disrupt the enemy’s mobility, insurgents attack government forces heading to an area that is expected to evolve into a theatre of skirmishes.
103 In this sense, guerrillas ambush government forces while they are outside the theatre of combat. In discussing insurgent mobility, we noted that guerrilla movements are at their slowest outside the theatre of skirmishes. We also observed that while insurgents are at their most vulnerable in this domain, the low degree of confrontational interaction with the enemy permits them to trade speed for undetectable movements. Similarly, we note that in terms of movement, government forces would also be at their slowest outside the theatre of combat. If insurgents constituted this area into a domain for confrontation, then government forces would struggle to adapt to these unexpected circumstances.
Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that there are two key elements in a guerrilla tactical framework: First, insurgents will seek to attack weak points within the capability of the state and avoid outright confrontation with its armed forces. Second, they will seek to use terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive movements within the theatre of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy.
3.7: WEAPONS AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION We have noted that armed confrontation is the usual means by which guerrillas and government forces seek to settle an asymmetric duel. With arms, Segaller argues that combatants command the strength to “enforce” and “enable activity” and precipitate “action” that results into “death, injury and damage.” Without these instruments of coercion, he asserts that an insurgent is a “powerless radical.” 261
Given the imbalance in confrontational capabilities that is initially tilted in favour of the state military apparatus, insurgents face an uphill task in assembling their arsenals. Marighella enumerates some of these challenges: They have to capture and divert arms from the enemy. This is a Herculean task in light of the fact that government forces initially command greater firepower than them; and whilst insurgents can manage to source for different weapons in different places, it is always difficult securing ammunition that suits these arms. 262
104 In light of the above constraints, how would an insurgent organization assemble its arsenal? What kind of weapons would it use and why? Che Guevara asserts that “The arms preferable for this kind of warfare are long range weapons requiring small expenditure of bullets, supported by a group of automatic and semi-automatic arms.” 263 Whilst concurring with Che Guevara, Marighella stresses the need for guerrillas to use light, short barrelled weapons. 264
Broadly, Che Guevara and Marighella propagate a weapons-use strategy that suits asymmetric warfare. Minimizing the expenditure of ammunitions allows a guerrilla army to conserve its meagre resources while the use of light weapons facilitates mobility in theatres of insurgent activity.
Specifically, eight considerations underpin the choice and use of weapons in guerrilla warfare: portability, availability, usability, firepower, range, accuracy, economy and concealability. Guerrillas use automatic and semi-automatic weapons because of the above advantages. While Che Guevara recommends “…the more modern Belgian FAL and M-14 automatic rifles,” 265 Marighella specifically recommends the Brazilian made INA model 953 sub machine gun which is an effective weapon in combat, easy to conceal and respected by the enemy. 266
Although the sub machine gun is one of the more ideal weapon for guerrilla warfare, the Kalashnikov is perhaps the most widely used gun in asymmetric conflicts across the globe. Segaller observes that it is “simple to use,” “dramatic in firepower,” “easily broken down into four pieces fitting into a brief case or bulky jacket” and it counts perhaps as “the ultimate weapon in a terrorist’s arsenal of unsophisticated and manual weapons.” 267
Whilst adding firepower to the military capability of insurgents, automatic and semi- automatic weapons are occasionally inaccurate and waste ammunition that is not readily available. In this connection, while recommending the M-1 rifle or the Garand that is readily available in the United States of America, Che Guevara cautions that “…this should
105 be used only by people with experience since it has the disadvantage of expending too much ammunition.” 268
In Chapter 2, we observed that guerrilla warfare is merely a phase in an insurgent campaign. In order to seize state installations, occupy enemy territory and control the population, an insurgent organization should transit from using guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. At this stage in a campaign, a guerrilla army scales down on the mobility of its fighting units and starts establishing a fixed insurgent presence which makes it more vulnerable to conventional military attacks mounted by government forces. With changes in the confrontational circumstances (especially the potential onset of set-piece battles along fixed frontlines), insurgents are pushed to upgrade their arsenals to match the firepower of the enemy. During this phase, a guerrilla army seeks to acquire medium and heavier weapons to bolster its existing arsenal of light arms. 269
What kind of medium and heavy weapons would insurgents then need at the conventional warfare stage of an insurgency? Che Guevara asserts that “Medium and heavy arms such as tripod machine guns can be used on favourable ground, affording a greater margin of security for the weapon and its personnel, they always ought to be means of repelling the enemy and not for attack.” 270 In this case, ease of use and the balance in confrontational capabilities are critical considerations in insurgents selecting medium and heavy weapons for use.
Discussing the use of medium and heavy weapons, Marighella concurs with Che Guevara in stressing that arms like bazookas and mortars should be entrusted with highly experienced fighters. Although readily available in the arms market, longer barrelled heavy weapons like the FAL, Mausers, Shotguns and Winchesters present insurgents with transportation and concealment challenges. 271
Their shortcomings notwithstanding, heavy weapons present insurgents with the firepower to conduct targeted attacks. For example, the hand-held Soviet-made Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) 7 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) is a highly effective weapon with a
106 capacity to penetrate 320 millimetres of armour. However, this weapon has got drawbacks: Richard Clutterbuck observes that “It is ….thrown off course by cross winds and defeated by wire mesh protection outside buildings (as at police stations in Northern Ireland), because the hollow charge relies for its penetration on detonating at right angles and the right distance from its target. It is also unsafe to fire it in confined spaces or with a wall within two metres of the back of the launch tube.” 272
Thus far, this discussion has centred on the use of guns in guerrilla warfare. Although they allow combatants to directly target the enemy, the need to have the enemy within shooting range and the propensity for the enemy to strike back exposes gunners to higher casualties. In order to limit confrontational contact with the enemy, insurgents may resort to using explosives. They can either lob these devices at government forces from a safe distance or prepare and clandestinely plant them behind enemy lines.
Essentially, explosives range from simple home made to industrially manufactured incendiary devices and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Insurgents could assemble Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by filling metal tubes or fire extinguishers with Tri Nitro Toluene (TNT) or a mixture of sugar and weedex. Alternatively, they could assemble these explosive devices by adding fuel to ammonium nitrate fertilizer to make the resultant product (Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil) combustible. 273
In the modern era, insurgents have not only used highly explosive industrially manufactured dynamite but also explored prospects of using atomic, biological and chemical weapons. However, in seeking to use WMDs, Segaller observes that insurgents exercise caution given the fact that they prefer to cause “tactical and not strategic ‘scorched earth’ destruction.” 274 In light of the indispensability of popular support to the execution of an insurgency, the adoption of a military strategy based on mass destruction would grossly alienate guerrillas.
While insurgents have to grapple with selecting and using weapons, the procurement of these instruments of coercion presents them with an even stiffer challenge. They have to
107 rely on a thin resource base to procure arms and ammunition against the backdrop of stringent enemy surveillance. Principally, insurgents use four avenues to source for weapons: They either make them, steal or capture them from the enemy, purchase them in the underworld or according to Segaller, smuggle them by “abusing diplomatic bag rules.” 275
By making their own arms, insurgents develop their own internal capacity for innovation and reduce dependence on external sources. However, by itself, this approach does not accord them a weapons technological edge over the enemy. The state military establishment could either manufacture or purchase more superior arms and ammunition; Reliance on arms and ammunition stolen or captured from government forces allows insurgents to remain at a level of weapons technological parity as the enemy. An upgrade or downgrade in the arsenal of government forces would precipitate no long term technological shock among insurgents as both parties to the asymmetric duel would be using the same calibre of weapons; Purchasing arms accords insurgents the opportunity of either getting to a level of weapons technological parity as the enemy or even surpassing it.
Given the imbalance in military capabilities that initially favours government forces, it can be concluded that guerrillas face an uphill task in seeking to procure and use weapons. In order to address this challenge, an insurgent organization will adopt a weapons acquisition- and-use strategy that takes the following factors into consideration: availability, usability, portability, concealability, firepower, range, accuracy and economy. Having looked at the different variables that shape the organization of insurgent activity, we now seek to test the above theoretical model on the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda.
108 END NOTES
OPERATIONALIZING INSURGENT ACTIVITY
3.1: TRAINING 178 Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri contends that in the insurgent training sector, the critical issue to address is securing training sites and not improving training quality. See: Lia, Brynjah 2007, Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training—Part II. Terrorism Monitor. 5:2. 21st February, 2007. The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1005. Accessed on 18/03/2011 In seeking to train personnel, insurgent groups tend to adopt models that have already been tested. Owing to the success of the Cuban revolution and the Soviets’ familiarity with insurgency doctrine, Mkonto we Sizwe (MK) the armed of ANC sent its cadres for training in the Soviet Union. See: Ndlovu, Mxolisi Sifiso, ‘The ANC in Exile, 1960-1970’, in South African Democracy Education Trust 2004, The Road to Democracy in South Africa. Volume I (1960-1970). Zebra Press. pp 457-459. Like Al Qaeda, in Somalia, Al Shabaab uses training videos to disseminate training instructions. See: 179Allbritton, Christopher 2009, Somalia’s Al Shabaab Releases Extensive Training Video. Insurgency Watch. 21st September, 2009. http://www.insurgencywatch.com/2009/09/21/somalia%E2%80%99s-al- shabaab-releases-extensive-training-video/. Accessed on 18/03/2011 Al Shabaab conducts both ideological and military training. See: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed 2009, The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s Al Shabaab: Dimensions of Jihad. Middle East Quarterly. Fall 2009. pp 25-26. http://www.meforum.org/2486/somalia-al-shabaab-strategic- challenge. Accessed on 18/03/2011 180Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 181Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 In Afghanistan, poor marksmanship exhibited by the Taliban could be attributed to: Limited knowledge on marksmanship; reliance on automatic fire; poor condition of rifles; poor vision; and lack of quality training. See: Chivers, C.J 2010, The Weakness of Taliban Marksmanship. At War. The New York Times. 2nd April, 2010. http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/the-weakness-of-taliban-marksmanship/. Accessed on 18/03/2011 Training also serves as a tool for psychological warfare. Insurgent groups record training sessions to depict sharpness in war preparation. This undertaking is partly aimed at instilling fear in the enemy. See: Cole, Matthew, Ross, Brian and Ata Nasser 2010, Underwear Bomber: New Video of Training, Martyrdom Statements. ABC News. 26th April, 2010. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/underwear-bomber-video-training- martyrdom-statements/story?id=10479470. Accessed on 18/03/2011. 182Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 183Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 184Citing the works of Mao, Meisner observes that self sufficiency in guerrilla warfare is attainable in “strategically defensible and economically self-sufficient base areas”. See: Meisner, Maurice 2007, Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait. Polity. pp 60-62 185In the Philippines, guerrillas of the Communist Party of Philippines used indoctrination as a tool for determining career advancement. For example recruits who performed well in the “Special Mass Course” rose through the ranks and went on to undertake more advanced indoctrination courses like: “Five Golden Rays” and “Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform”. See: Marks A Thomas 1996, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam. Routledge. pp 98-101 186Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 187On the nature of asymmetric warfare, see: Corbin, Marcus 2001, Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare. Terrorism Project. Centre for Defence Information 5th October, 2001.. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/asymmetric.cfm. Accessed on 18/03/2011
109 It takes conventional military establishments a great deal of time to adapt to the culture of asymmetric warfare. Insurgents may exploit these circumstances to gain ground in irregular conflict. See: Kiszely, John 2007, Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors. The Shrivenham Papers. Number 5. The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. December 2007. pp 8-14 of 32. http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0712kiszely.pdf. Accessed on 19/03/2011 The nature of external state support significantly shapes the fortunes of a proxy non-state armed group. See: Irani, Emile George 2007, Irregular Warfare and Non State Combatants: Israel and Hezbollah. Project on Defence Alternatives. http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0710irani.pdf. Accessed on 19/03/2011. 188Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122 189In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen used donkeys and mules to conduct movements. See: Jalali, Ahmad Ali and Grau, W Lester 2001, Op cit. pp 403-404 Marighella establishes a nexus between types of weapons and modes of transport used by insurgents. See: Marighella, Carlos 1969, Op cit. pp 5-7 of 31 190Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit Marighella, Carlos 1969, Op cit
3.2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 191On the logic behind insurgent organizational structuring see: Pavlova, Elena, ‘Jemaah Islamiah According to PUPJI in Tan T.H Andrew (ed) 2007, A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in South East Asia. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Cheltenham. pp 92-96 McAdam, Doug 1982, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago. pp 53-56 Hashim, S Ahmed 2006, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Cornell University Press. New York. pp 152-160 Bruno, Greg and Kaplan, Eben 2009, The Taliban in Afghanistan. Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551. Accessed on 10/03/2011 192Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 193 Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 On the place of political and military wings in the organizational structures of insurgent groups, see: Ross-Harrington, Jonathan, ‘Separatist Insurgency in Southern Thailand: An Approach to Peacemaking’ in Eichensehr, Kristen and Reisman, Michael W (ed) 2009, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp 161-162 194Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 195Discussing the relationship between the political and military wing of the African National Congress, O’Malley cites a source that asserts: “Our movement has brooked no ambiguity concerning this. The primacy of the political leadership is unchallenged and supreme and all revolutionary formation and levels (whether armed or not) are subordinate to this leadership. See: O’Malley, Padraig, The ANC: Stages of Struggle and Policy Foundations, 1960-1994. O’Malley: The Heart of Hope. http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02303/06lv02304/07lv02 305/08lv02311.htm. Accessed on 11/03/2011 Ngculu observes: “People had to internalise that the military line was derived from the political line, which came from the highest body of the ANC, the NEC”. See: Ngculu, James, The role of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the creation of a democratic civil-military relations tradition. pp 7 of 12. http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Ngculu2.pdf. Accessed on 11/03/2011 196Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 197Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. 382-409 198 On the place of the vanguard party in revolutionary struggles see: Cleaver, Kathleen and Kastiaficas N George 2001, Liberation, Imagination and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and their Legacy. Routledge. New York. pp 28-30 Hanlon, Joseph 1991, Mozambique: Who calls the shots? James Currey Ltd. London. pp 278
110 199Chaliand, Gerard, ‘Introduction’ in Chaliand, Gerard (ed) 1982, Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. University of California Press. Los Angeles, California. pp 1- 32 200On the pre-eminence of the political over the military wing in revolutionary struggles, see: Ross-Harrington, Jonathan, ‘2009, Op cit. pp 161-162 Hanlon, Joseph 1991, Op cit. pp 278 Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 Across the world, command and control assumes varied dimensions. In Afghanistan, Mujahideen units were controlled by local tribal leaders. See: Schultz Jr, H Richard & Dew J Andrea 2006, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. Columbia University Press. pp 262-263 201Information gathering in guerrilla warfare assumes two forms: Intelligence which furnishes the guerrilla with information about the enemy and Counterintelligence which denies the enemy information about the guerrilla. See: Daugherty, Michealin 2006, Guerrilla Warfare. Ireland’s OWN: History. http://irelandsown.net/guerrilla.html. Accessed on 11/03/2011 202Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122 203Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122 In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealan (LTTE) attempted organizational structuring that mirrored that of the Sri Lankan armed forces. See: Steven C.S Graeme and Gunaratna, Rohan 2004, Counterterrorism: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. pp 200-201
3.3: GUERRILLA BASES 204Mao, Tse-Tung 1961, On Guerrilla Warfare. University of Illinois Press. Illinois. pp 46-49 Luttwak, N Edward 1987, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press. Massachusetts. pp 151-155
Minter, William 1994, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. Witwatersrand University Press. Johannesburg. pp 71-73 205Laqueuer Walter, 1977, Op cit 382-409 Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122 206Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit 382-409 207Tindifa, Samuel B 2001, Peace, Conflict and Sustainable Development: The Experience in Uganda. A conference on sustainable development, governance and globalization. 17th-20th September 2001. pp 15 of 27. http://www.worldsummit2002.org/texts/SamTindifa.pdf. Accessed on 01/03/2011 IRIN 2010, Who’s who among armed groups in the eastern DR Congo. Rwanda News Agency Tuesday, 15th June 2010.. http://www.rnanews.com/regional/3587-whos-who-among-armed-groups-in-the-eastern-dr- congo. Accessed on 01/03/2011 208Ngoga, Pascal 1998, Op cit. pp 96-98 Briggs, Phillip 2008, Uganda. Bradt Travel Guides Ltd. England. pp 23-24 209Prunier, Gerard, ‘The Rwandan Patriotic Front’, in Clapham Christopher (ed) 1998 Op cit. pp 130-133 210Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp 382-409 211Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit. pp 382-409 212Jones, G Seth 2008, ‘The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency’. International Security. 32:4. pp 9-20 of 35. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.7. Accessed on 01/03/2011 213Orievulu, Kingsley 2010, Security Situation in the DRC: A Case of a Weak State Leaning on the UN. Consultancy Africa Intelligence. Thursday, 16th September, 2010. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=542:security-situation- in-the-drc-a-case-of-a-weak-state-leaning-on-the-un&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion- papers&Itemid=265. Accessed on 01/03/2011
111 214International Crisis Group 2010, DR Congo Conflict History. February 2010. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/dr-congo.aspx. Accessed on 01/03/2011 International Crisis Group 1999, How Kabila Lost His Way: The Performance Of Laurent Desire Kabila’s Government. Africa Report No 3. 21st May 1999. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central- africa/dr-congo/003-how-kabila-lost-his-way-the-performance-of-laurent-desire-kabilas-government.aspx. Accessed on 01/03/2011. International Crisis Group 2009, Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR. Africa Report No 151. 9th July 2009. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151-congo-a- comprehensive-strategy-to-disarm-the-fdlr.aspx. Accessed on 01/03/2011 Terrie, Jim 2005, DRC Update: Building Security for the Elections. African Security Review 14 (1). International Crisis Group. 30th March, 2005. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr- congo/drc-update-building-security-for-the-elections.aspx. Accessed on 01/03/2011 215Chaliand, Gerard 1982. Op cit. pp 1-32
3.4: FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT 216On the role of crimal activity in the funding of insurgencies see: Starkey, Jerome 2008, Drugs for guns: how the Afghan heroin trade is fuelling the Afghan insurgency. The Independent. Tuesday, 29th April, 2008. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/drugs-for-guns-how- the-afghan-heroin-trade-is-fuelling-the-taliban-insurgency-817230.html. Accessed on 13/03/2011 Miller, Greg 2009, Taliban drug proceeds lower than thought, U.S report says. Los Angeles Times. 12th August, 2009. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/12/world/fg-afghan-drugs12. Accessed on 13/03/2011 Risen, James 2009, U.S to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban. The New York Times. 9th August 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10afghan.html. Accessed on 13/03/2011 217Segaller, Stephen 1986, Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s. Joseph. London. pp 268-269 In Colombia, the trade in narcotics finances the insurgent activities of FARC. See: Farah, Douglas and Simpson, R Glenn 2010, Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerrillas and the Citizens’ Revolution. 24th January, 2010. International Assessment and Strategy Centre. http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.221/pub_detail.asp. Accessed on 13/03/2011 Hanson, Stephanie 2009, FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerrillas. Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. 19th August, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing- guerrillas/p9272. Accessed on 13/03/2011 218Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 268-269; 275-280. 219Byman, Daniel 1967, Deadly Connections: States that sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. pp 53-78 The US Department of Defense estimates Iranian military support for Hezbollah at between $ 100 and 200 million. On the nature of Iranian support for Hizballah, see: Bruno, Greg 2010, State Sponsors: Iran. Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. 7th October, 2010. http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362. Accessed on 13/03/2011 Whittington, James 2006, ‘Iran sending funds to Hezbollah’. BBC News. Thursday, 2nd November, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6112036.stm. Accessed on 13/03/2011. Fuller, E Graham 2006, The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance. The Washington Quarterly. Winter 2006-07. 30:1. pp 139-150. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies. http://www.twq.com/07winter/docs/07winter_fuller.pdf. Accessed on 13/03/2011. 220Byman, Daniel 1967, Op cit. pp 53-78 Simons, Geoff 1993, Libya: The Struggle For Survival. St Martin’s Press. New York. pp 302-303 Burgess, Mark 2002, Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection. Terrorism Project. 5th June, 2002. Centre for Defence Information. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/farc-ira-pr.cfm. Accessed on 14/03/2011 Kelsey, Tim and Koenig, Peter 1994, Libya will not arm IRA again, Gaddafi aide says. The Independent. Wednesday, 20th July, 1994. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/libya-will-not-arm-ira-again-gaddafi- aide-says-1414984.html. Accessed on 14/03/2011 221Byman, Daniel 1967, Op cit. pp 53-78 Goodson, P Larry 2001, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press. pp 75-77
112 222On the relationship between diplomacy and terrorist activity see: Byman, Daniel 1967, Op cit. pp 53-78 Ghosh, SK 2000, Pakistan’s ISI: Network of Terror in India. A.P.H Publishing Corporation. New Delhi. pp 133-134 Daniel Byman et al examine the different forms of external support. See: Byman Daniel, Chalk Peter, Hoffman Bruce, Rosenau William and Brannan David 2001, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Rand Corporation. 223Adow, Mohammed 2006, Why Ethiopia is on war footing. BBC News. Friday, 21st July, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5201470.stm. Accessed on 14/03/2011 Bloom, Rebecca and Eben Kaplan 2007, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Backgrounder. 1st November, 2007. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/ethiopia/ogaden-national-liberation-front- onlf/p13208. Accessed on 14/03/2011 224 Kasozi, A.B.K 1994, Op cit. pp 166-168 225 Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 275-280. SBS 2011, ETA extortion ‘has halted’. World News Australia. 28th January, 2011. http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1474342/headline. Accessed on 15/03/2011. Keeley, Graham 2006, Police arrest 12 ETA extortion suspects. The Times. 20th June, 2006. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article676787.ece. Accessed on 15/03/2011. BBC News 2006, Spain tells ETA to stop extortion. Tuesday, 4th April, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4877556.stm. Accessed on 15/03/2011 Tremlett, Giles 2004, Celebrity chefs face ETA extortion claims. The Guardian. Friday, 15th October, 2004. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/15/spain.gilestremlett. Accessed on 15/03/2011. Nash, Elizabeth 2008, Bank accounts linked to ETA are frozen in Liechtenstein. The Independent. Monday, 31st March, 2008. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bank-accounts-linked-to-eta-are-frozen- in-liechtenstein-802730.html. Accessed on 15/03/2011 226 Hanson, Stephanie 2009, Op cit 227Mark Pieth and Rohan Gunaratna offer useful insights into the intricate web of activity underpinning insurgent financing. See: Pieth, Mark, ‘Financing of Terrorism: Following the Money’, in Pieth, Mark (ed) 2002, Financing Terrorism. Kluer Academic. London. pp 115-126 Gunaratna, Rohan 2002, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. C Hurst. London. pp 60-69
3.5: STRATEGY
3.5.1: COMBATANT-TO-COMBATANT ENGAGEMENTS 228In unveiling a framework for understanding military strategy, John M Collins stresses the need for “strategic starting points”. He lists these as: Strategic building blocks, Strategic schools of thought, Elemental alternatives, Political military assumptions and strategic paths and pitfalls. See: Collins M John 2002, Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives.. Brassey, Inc. Dulles, Virginia. pp 59-67 In discussing US military strategy in 2011, David Alexander notes “The strategy is a broad statement on how the military intends to use its forces and prioritize aid and training to help achieve US security goals”. See: Alexander, David 2011, New Military Strategy looks beyond Afghan War. Reuters. Wednesday, 9th February, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/09/us-usa-military-strategy- idUSTRE71803H20110209. Accessed on 20/03/2011 229Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 In seeking to limit confrontational interaction with the enemy, T E Lawrence recommends insurgent strategy premised on the conduct of “wars of detachment”. See Rice E Edward 1988, Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries. University of California Press. London. pp 93 General Giap contends that insurgents should move beyond conceptualizing armed deeds as the only mission of armed forces. See: Tanham, George K 1961, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina.. Frederick A Praeger. New York. pp 73 113 230Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 With ever changing confrontational circumstances, it is imprudent to tie asymmetric conflict to a rigid approach. In this respect, Mao notes: “…choosing the right moment to begin our preparation becomes an important problem. The right moment should be determined according to both the enemy’s situation and ours and the relation between the two”. See: Tse-Tung Mao 1954, Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War. Foreign Languages Press. Peking. pp 59-63. Describing the fluidity of asymmetric conflict, Giap observes: “There is no fixed line of demarcation, the front being wherever the enemy is found”. See: Alexander, Bevin 1995, The Future of War. W W Norton & Company. pp 160-175 The inherent fluidity of asymmetric warfare allows it to assume different dimensions. Equating it to political warfare, Michael McClintock notes that asymmetric conflict can assume one of the following forms: strikes, riots, economic sanctions, proxy warfare, kidnapping, targeted assassinations…See: McClintock, Michael 1992, Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism. 1940-1990. Pantheon Books. pp 230-234 231Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 On the protracted nature of guerrilla warfare, Giap points out three defining phases: “defensive, equilibrium and offensive”. See: Fairburn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 335-348 Mao Tse Tung partitions guerrilla phases into strategic defensive and strategic offensive. See: Tse-Tung Mao 1954, Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War. Foreign Languages Press. Peking. pp 47-55 232Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 233 On the protracted nature of guerrilla warfare see: Mao Tse Tung 1938, On Protracted War. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Yenan Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected- works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm. Accessed on 01/03/2011. Mao Tse Tung, ‘Problems Of Strategy In Guerrilla War Against Japan’ in Mao Tse Tung 1967, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung. Foreign Languages Press. Peking. http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PSGW38.html. Accessed on 01/03/2011. Asprey B Robert 1994, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Volume 1. iUniverse Inc. Lincoln NE. pp 38 Ostelhammel, Jurgen 1997, Colonialism. Markus Weiner Publishers. pp 43 Fairburn, Geoffrey 1974, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version. Penguin Books pp 335-348 234 Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, ‘The Art of Insurrection’, in Pomeroy, William J (ed) 1968. Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism. International Publishers Co Inc. pp 53 Rice E Edward 1988, Op cit. pp 92-93 Tanham George K 1961, Op cit. pp 74-78 Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit. pp 73-95 Marighella, Carlos 1969, Op cit pp 64-65 235 Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 Tse-Tung, Mao 1961, On Guerrilla Warfare. Illinois University Press. Illinois. pp 25-26 The Yin-Yang philosophy is also applicable in counterinsurgency situations. See: Millen A Raymond, The Yin and Yang of Counterinsurgency in Urban Terrain. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute. http://www.usma1982.org/Submissions/Millen/Counter%20Insurgency%20in%20Urban%20Terrain.pdf. Accessed on 20/03/2011 236 Spencer, Robert 2007, Somalia: Rise and Fall of an Islamist Regime. The Journal of International Security Affairs. No 13. Fall 2007. http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/13/spencer.php. Accessed on 20/03/2011. National Counterterrorism Centre 2011, Al Shabaab. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html. Accessed on 20/03/2011
114 International Crisis Group 2010, Somalia’s Divided Islamists. Africa Briefing No 74. 18th May, 2010. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B074-somalias-divided-islamists.aspx. Accessed on 20/03/2011. 237Ngoga, Pascal, 1998 Op cit. pp 103-104 238Cross, James Elliot 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 239Ibid
3.5.2: COMBATANT-TO-NON COMBATANT ENGAGEMENTS (TERRORISM) 240On the organizational prerequisites for conducting terrorism see: Segaller, Stephen 1986, Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s. Joseph. London. pp 267-304 Gunaratna, Rohan 2002, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. C Hurst. London. pp 54-85 Hoffman, Bruce 2006, Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. New York. pp 132-137 241On the psychological nature of terrorism see: McClintock, Michael 1992, Op cit. pp 230-258 242For a discussion on selective and non-selective terrorism see: Tranquier, Roger 1964, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Pall Mall Press. London and Dunmow. pp 19-21 243For insights into the SWAPO armed struggle see: Brown Susan, ‘Diplomacy by other means: SWAPO’s Liberation War’ in Colin Leys and John S Paul (eds) 1995, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle. The Two Edged Sword. James Curry. London. pp 19-39 Dobell, Lauren 1998, SWAPO’s struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by other Means. Basel Namibia Studies Series 3. P Schlettwein Publishing. Basel, Switzerland. 244Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit pp 79-80 Marighella, Carlos 1969, Op cit For a discussion on the global transition to urban guerrilla warfare as a strategy see: Beckett, FW Ian 2001, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750. Routledge. London. pp 151-181
3.6: TACTICS 245Tse-Tung Mao 1954, Op cit. pp 53-55 246Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 Cross, James Elliot 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122 Alexander, Bevin 1995, Op cit. pp 160-175 247Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 Clausewitz, Carl von 1976, Op cit. pp 479-482 Sarkesian, Charles Sam 1975, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. Transaction Publishers. Chicago, Illinois. pp 160-161 Franklin D William, Clausewitz On Limited War. pp 1-7. http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/eng_mr/txts/VOL47/00000006/art3.pdf. Accessed on 21/03/2011 248 Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 In Palestine, Fatah’s Tanzim graduated from random strikes to coordinated attacks on isolated Israeli military outposts. See: Usher, Graham, Fatah’s Tanzim. MER217. Middle East Research and Information Project. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/fatahs-tanzim. Accessed on 21/03/2011 In China, Maoist guerrillas “could attack isolated outposts and reduce Japanese forces piecemeal”. See: Cassidy M Robert 2003, Renaissance of The Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight. The US Army Professional Writing Collection. http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume1/september_2003/9_03_8.html. Accessed on 21/03/2011 As part of its strategy, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb targets isolated military outposts. See:
115 Filiu, Jean-Pierre 2009, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge of Global Threat? Carnegie Papers. Middle East Program. Number 104. October, 2009. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/al-qaeda_islamic_maghreb.pdf. Accessed on 21/03/2011 249Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 250Cross, James Elliot 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 On the role of terrain in insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns, see: Harkavy, E Robert and Neuman, G Stephanie 2001, Warfare And The Third World. Palgrave. New York. Chapter 3 Luza V Radomir 1984, The Resistance in Austria, 1938-1945. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis, Minnesota. pp 193-195 Trinquier, Roger 1964, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Pall Mall Press Ltd. London, England. pp 90-92 251Using its naval frigates, the Nigerian navy is unable to keep pace with the highly mobile speed boats used by MEND. See: Daly C K John 2008, Nigeria’s Navy Struggles with Attacks on Offshore Oil Facilities. Terrorism Monitor. 6:14. 10th July, 2008. The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5044&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_cac he=1. Accessed on 21/03/2011. 252In 2002, the Angolan Armed Forces was equipped with 400 main battle tanks, 7 naval vessels, 104 combat aircraft and 40 armed helicopters. See: Encyclopaedia of the Nations, Angola: Armed Forces. Encyclopaedia of the Nations. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Angola-ARMED-FORCES.html. Accessed on 22/03/2011 On the background to insurgency in Cabinda, Angola, See: IRIN 2003, Angola: Cabinda, one of Africa’s longest, least reported conflicts. 6th October, 2003. http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?InDepthID=25&ReportID=66282. Accessed on 22/03/2011 253Cross, James Elliot 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 254Cross, James Elliot 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 Unlike insurgent groups, conventional armies rely on high tech to muster terrain intelligence. See: Whitemore Jr, C Frank 1960, Terrain Intelligence and Current Military Concepts. American Journal of Science. Bradely Volume. Vol 258-A. 1960. pp 1-13. http://earth.geology.yale.edu/~ajs/1960/ajs_258A_11.pdf/375.pdf. Accessed on 22/03/2011 255Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122 256In Africa, insurgent groups use ambush as a principle means of conducting attacks. See: Simpson, Chris 2001, Ambush in Casamance. BBC News Africa. Tuesday, 13th March, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1217705.stm. Accessed on 22/03/2011 ADL 2011, Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). International Terrorist Symbols Database. http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/salafist.asp. Accessed on 22/03/2011. Aljazeera 2010, Niger Delta rebel camp busted. 20th November 2010. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/11/2010112014743415757.html. Accessed on 22/03/2010 Charbonneau Louis 2010, U.N peacekeeping boss orders probe of Darfur ambush. Reuters. Thursday, 25th March, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/25/us-sudan-darfur-un-idUSTRE62O4SM20100325. Accessed on 22/03/2011. 257Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. 103-122 Offering insights into patterns of marching in guerrilla warfare, Che Guevara notes: “If the guerrilla band is marching through unknown places, breaking a road or being led by a guide, the vanguard will be approximately one hundred or two hundred meters or even more in front…” See: Guevara, Ernesto, Loveman, Brian and Davies M Thomas 1985, Guerrilla Warfare. Scholarly Resources, Inc. Nebraska. pp 87 In seeking to sniff out William Quantrill (a United States Confederate guerrilla), in Little Santa Fe in Kansas in 1862, United States Federal forces used marching patterns similar to those proposed by Nkrumah. See: Goodrich, Thomas 1995, Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-1865. Indiana University Press. Indiana. pp 30-33 258Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122
116 259In Iraq, insurgents conduct both random and selective attacks on hard targets like the Coalition Provision Authority, Green Zone and military convoys as well as softer targets like police stations, government officials and offices, NGO buildings and private security convoys. See: Lonsdale V Mark 2007, Security Operations in a Semi-Permissive War Zone and Protective Security Details in Iraq. Part 1 of 3. Operational Studies. pp 4 of 5. http://www.operationalstudies.com/psc-psd- operations/PSD_Iraq_Part1.pdf. Accessed on 22/03/2011 The other dimension to target selection relates to decision making. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has adopted a decentralized approach to target selection. Decision making is conducted at the cellular level. See: Bunker, J Robert 2005, Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency. Routledge. Abingdon, Oxon. pp 154- 156 260Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 103-122
3.7: WEAPONS AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION 261 Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 299-301. 262Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit pp 68-70 263 Che Guevara, Ernesto 1985, Op cit pp 27-28 264Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit pp 68-70 265Che Guevara, Ernesto, Op cit. pp 27-28 266Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit pp 68-70 Machine guns are commonly used by insurgents operating in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. See: Reuters Africa 2010, Nigerian militants deny army raid in oil delta. Monday, 22nd November, 2010. http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6AL0D520101122?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0. Accessed on 09/06/2010. Daily Champion 2009, Nigeria: Weapons in the Niger Delta. 20th October, 2009. AllAfrica.com. http://allafrica.com/stories/200910201192.html. Accessed on 09/06/2011. Wellington, Bestman 2007, Weapons of War in the Niger Delta. Terrorism Monitor. 5: 10. Jamestown Foundation. 25th May, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4190 Accessed on 09/06/2007 267Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 299-301. The AK 47 is used by Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and rebels of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). See: Baldauf, Scot and Khan Asraf 2005, New Guns, New Drive for Taliban. The Christian Science Monitor. 26th September, 2005. http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0926/p01s03-wosc.html. Accessed on 09/06/2011 Reuters Africa 2010, Op cit Daily Champion 2009, Op cit Wellington, Bestman 2007, Op cit International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) 2010, ICPVTR Profiles (Group): Al Shabaab. 18th March 2010. pp 16 of 35 http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab- 18March10.pdf. . Accessed on 10/06/2011. 268Che Guevara, Ernesto, Op cit. pp 27-28. 269 When the Sri Lankan army overran the military bases of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi, it was amazed by the assortment of weapons that the rebel group had. Among other heavy weapons, LTTE had amoured vehicles and a tank. Over the course of its life cycle, LTTE did graduate to a level where it could engage Sri Lankan government forces in conventional warfare. See: Voice of America 2009, Sri Lanka Army Amazed by Size of Captured Rebel Arsenal. VOA News. 6th May 2009. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-06-voa12-68786647.html. Accessed on 14/11/2011. BBC 2009. Tigers finished as military force. BBC News. Monday 18th May, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8055138.stm. Accessed on 14/11/2011 270Che Guevara, Ernesto, Op cit. pp 27-28 271Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit. pp 68-70 272Clutterbuck L Richard 1990, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies. Routledge. pp 41-51.
117 273Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 269-275 In the Niger Delta, dynamite is an important weapon in the explosives arsenal of MEND. See: Daily Champion 2009, Op cit 274Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 269-275 Over the course of its life cycle, Al Qaeda has been seeking to assemble a WMD military capability. See: Lumpkin J John 2009, Al Qaeda’s Bio Weapons. CBS News 11th February, 2009. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/31/terror/main684449.shtml. Accessed on 09/06/2011 275Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 299-301 Other sources of arms for insurgent activity include: states that sponsor terrorism and lax gun acquisition regimens. See: Beck Catie 2011, Al Qaeda encourages would-be-terrorists to shop at gun shows in Virginia, other states. CBS 6. 9th June, 2011. http://www.wtvr.com/news/wtvr-al-qaeda-gun-shows-video-background- debate,0,4978927.story . Accessed on 09/06/2011 Albone Tim 2007, Iran gives Taliban hi-tech weapons to fight British. The Sunday Times. 5th August, 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article2199281.ece. Accessed on 09/06/2011 Sahak, Abdul Latif 2010, Taliban buying guns from former warlords. Asia Times. 26th January, 2010. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA26Df04.html BBC News 2011, Hague fury as ‘Iranian arms’ bound for Taliban seized. BBC News. 9th March 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12694266. Accessed on 09/06/2011. In the Republic of Congo, Sypros Demetriou, Robert Muggah and Ian Biddle observe that “During the conflicts of the 1990s, militia combatants acquired their weapons from two principal sources: the looting of military and police depots, and weapons purchased on their behalf from outside the country. Additional, albeit negligible, sources include weapons taken from enemy units—ie who had either been killed or fled—and those distributed to civilian militias in the 1960s and 1970s and still in circulation—e.g rifles and MAS-38 sub machine guns” Demetriou, Sypros, Muggah, Robert and Biddle, Ian 2002, Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo. Small Arms Survey Special Report. 30th April, 2002. pp 21 of 76 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-107007.pdf. . Accessed on 10/06/2011
118 CHAPTER 4
TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: IDENTITY
4.1: IDEOLOGY As discussed in the foregoing theoretical review, political contradictions in a given polity accord a guerrilla group a range of grievances out of which it can formulate its ideology. The doctrine of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is of critical importance in this discourse given the overlapping nature of insurgent activity in Northern Uganda. Since the LRA rebellion emerges at the tail end of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) insurgencies, 276 the task in this section is to establish whether LRA inherited and has continued to nurture the body of ideals advanced by insurgent movements preceding it. This exercise will offer insights into the factors that shape the evolution of ideology in overlapping insurgencies.
In this section we specifically test the hypothesis that LRA will have adopted an ideology that is either an original synthesis of its ideals or an adaptation of existing ideologies in order to articulate political contradictions in the Ugandan polity and justify its recourse to violence to resolve these contradictions. Since the grievances/aims of a guerrilla group are the building blocks out of which its ideology evolves, we shall first examine these before analyzing how the ideology of LRA subsequently crystallizes out of its objectives.
119 4.1.1: GRIEVANCES/AIMS
Evolution of the Ideology of LRA
GRIEVANCES AIMS IDEOLOGY UPDA -Collapse of Northern -Unseat NRM -Secular hegemony government -Ethnic survivalist -Human Rights violations -Effect equitable in Northern Uganda distribution of power -Moderate -Inequitable distribution -Protect Acholi population of power
HSM I -Collapse of Northern -Unseat NRM -Faith-based / Secular hegemony government -Ethnic survivalist -Human Rights violations -Effect equitable in Northern Uganda distribution of power -Moderately radical -Inequitable distribution -Protect Acholi population -Utopian of power -Socially cleanse Acholi -Moral degeneration society
HSM II -Collapse of Northern -Unseat NRM -Faith-based / Secular hegemony government -Ethnic survivalist -Human Rights violations -Effect equitable in Northern Uganda distribution of power -Radical -Inequitable distribution -Protect Acholi population -Utopian of power -Socially cleanse Acholi -Moral degeneration society
LRA -Collapse of Northern -Unseat NRM -Faith-based / Secular hegemony government -Ethnic survivalist -Human Rights violations -Effect equitable in Northern Uganda distribution of power -Excessively Radical -Inequitable distribution -Protect Acholi population -Ultra-Utopian of power -Violently cleanse Acholi -Moral degeneration society -Percieved Acholi-NRM -Assemble new Acholi polity collaboration
Figure 1
The start up mission of LRA broadly reinforced the body of aims that had underpinned the onset of the UPDA, HSM I and HSM II rebellions (Figure 1). LRA rooted its grievances in the conflict discourse that evolved in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Northern hegemony in Uganda. 277 Stating its reasons for waging war against the Government of
120 Uganda (GoU), LRA decried “the lack of Northerners in government” and “violations of human rights” in Northern Uganda. 278 This set of grievances was not different from that propagated by other Northern-based rebel groups. For example, there was a human rights dimension to the grievances underpinning the onset of the UPDA rebellion.
Following the collapse of the Okello Lutwa military junta in 1986, Cline notes that demobilised soldiers of the defunct Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) from Acholiland were sent to “politicisation camps” where they “…performed manual labour.” 279 Acholi people drew parallels between the National Resistance Movement government’s announcement in 1986 instructing all ex-UNLA soldiers to “report to army headquarters” to a similar one by Amin in 1971 that resulted in the death of many Acholi soldiers. 280 Consequently, in justifying why members of the Acholi ethnic group joined UPDA, a human rights activist in Northern Uganda notes that “The Acholi boys said to each other, ‘This time we are not going to die like chicken. Let us go to Sudan and join our brothers and fight to save Acholi.” 281
Like the UPDA rebellion, the LRA insurgency was partially triggered off by economic factors. In stating what it termed ‘Causes of Our War,’ LRA decried NRM’s poor management of the Ugandan economy. Economic factors were similarly at the heart of the UPDA rebellion. Following the collapse of the Northern hegemony in 1986, Ballentine observes that ex-UNLA officers from Acholi experienced “descent from military authority to civilian obscurity”. He deduces that “The economic impact of these factors would almost certainly have shifted the opportunity cost in favour of involvement in rebellion.” 282
The proposals that LRA advanced to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda were consistent with the ideals that underpinned the UPDA rebellion. LRA proposed the creation of an ethnically balanced Ugandan army and the relocation of the Ugandan capital from Kampala to Kigumba, Masindi district, in Bunyoro, Mid Western Uganda. 283 The first proposal underlined the critical centrality of the military to the control of the state machinery in Uganda. During the Pece peace negotiations between UPDA and the NRM government, UPDA clamoured for its fighters to be integrated into NRA (the national
121 army). 284 The proposals of LRA and the negotiation position of UPDA underlined one important cause of conflict in Uganda—imbalances in ethnic representation within the military.
The second proposal showcased the place of symbolism in the North-South regional duel in Uganda. Kampala, the Ugandan capital is situated in Buganda in the South. Although geographically located in the Mid West, Kigumba is politically designated as an integral part of the political South. LRA’s choice of Kigumba may have been based on three considerations:
First, the need to check Buganda’s epicentrality to the collapse of the Northern hegemony. NRM waged its campaign in the Luwero Triangle in Buganda 285 and the 35th Battalion of NRA that committed atrocities in Northern Uganda was mainly staffed with Baganda. 286 Second, the need to locate the Ugandan capital in an area not dominated by the South. Kigumba is inhabited by Northerners and Southerners. Third, the need to revive fifth columnism in the North-South duel. The proposed relocation of the capital from Buganda to Bunyoro would potentially revive rivalry between these two Southern regions and secure an ally for the North in an otherwise hostile South. 287
Like UPDA, LRA formulated objectives aimed at attaining international crossover appeal. Mindful of the international context within which the NRM government operated at that time, LRA sought to cultivate external support through the exploitation of Cold War divisions. Citing the leftist democratic attributes of the Resistance Council (RC) 288 system and the centralized approach to the economic organization of the Ugandan state at that time, the group attempted to link the NRM government to the communist bloc. UPDA pursued a similar approach. In outlining its grievances in 1987, it labelled NRM a “communist dictatorship.”289 In both cases, this strategy aimed to attract support for the rebels from the capitalist bloc. However, the end of the Cold War and the liberalisation of the Ugandan economy in 1990 combined to distance NRM from its original leftist ideological inclinations thereby 290 rendering the above doctrinal strategy obsolete.
122 LRA gleaned autocriticism from the ideology of HSM I. In articulating her reasons for fighting the GoU, Lakwena, the leader of HSM I attributed the political crisis in Northern Uganda to an upsurge in witchcraft in Acholiland. Consequently, she undertook to resolve this crisis by attempting to eliminate sorcery in this part of the country. Pursuing a similar objective, LRA proposed the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs aimed at upholding the Ten Commandments of the Christian faith and specifically ending witchcraft in Uganda. By acknowledging the emergence of negative social practices in Acholiland, 291 both groups indirectly designated the Acholi people as partially responsible for the onset of the crisis in Northern Uganda. The partial culpability of the Acholi positioned them as potential targets of rebel attacks in future.
The theocratic dimension to the aims advanced by HSM I and LRA is also significant in other ways. Given the dominance of monotheism in Uganda, the move to eradicate witchcraft may have been calculated to endear Northern-based guerrilla movements to Southern Christian and Muslim constituencies. Like the 1966 crisis, the pursuit of theocratic objectives potentially accorded HSM I and LRA the opportunity of changing the dynamics of the North-South regional duel. Henceforth, theism would become an important factor in the evolution of regional relations in the country.
In discussing the evolution of its aims, it can be deduced that LRA largely sought to maintain the thrust of the grievances advanced by UPDA, HSM I and HSM II (Figure 1). This strategy allowed it to maintain a measure of popular support links among the Acholi people whose control of the Ugandan state had ended with the collapse of the Northern hegemony in 1986. LRA did not have to formulate aims different from those advanced by the other insurgent movements. All four rebellions targeted the same local constituency and sought to exploit similar political circumstances.
It is also important to note that since LRA was not seeking a secessionist solution to the Northern political question, there was a need to formulate a set of aims geared towards cultivating both national and international crossover appeal. Like UPDA, LRA attempted to engineer cracks within the South by fuelling historical intra-Southern regional rivalries. At
123 the international level, NRM’s initial leftist policies accorded both UPDA and LRA the opportunity of positioning themselves as rightist leaning rebel groups aiming at overthrowing a communist regime. By pursuing this strategy during the Cold War era, both guerrilla organizations were potential beneficiaries of military support from the Capitalist bloc.
Having concluded that LRA largely gleaned its aims from those propagated by UPDA, HSM I and HSM II, the next task in this discussion is to establish how its objectives crystallized into ideology. This exercise is important because it allows us to assess how the organization of an insurgent campaign shapes the set of aims it has adopted.
4.1.2: IDEOLOGY One of the perennially touted reasons for the collapse of negotiations between LRA and the GoU is that the rebel group lacks a harmonised set of aims and values that would allow its adversaries to make compromises needed for peacefully resolving the conflict in Northern Uganda. 292 Apparently, there is one key area of incongruence in the ideals of the group. The realm of religion has either subordinated or remained at a level of parity with that of the politics shaping its ideology. This state of affairs has thrown up a challenge for LRA watchers. While some have categorized the group as a political movement others have designated it as a religious cult.
The dual ideological outlook of LRA is a product of the contrasting doctrines it has adopted from other insurgent movements. Whereas UPDA attributed the conflict in Acholiland to shifts in the regional balance of power in Uganda, HSM I and HSM II mainly stressed the role of moral degeneration in fuelling the crisis in this part of the country. While being committed to reincarnating the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics (like UPDA), LRA (like HSM I and HSM II) also undertook to socially reorganize Acholi society. In explaining the social roots of the LRA insurgency, Achama, the Personal Secretary of Joseph Kony argues that “The Acholi are being punished because of their own sins they have committed. Kony is the agent of God because he is bringing about the suffering that will purify the Acholi.” 293
124
The divergence in the doctrines advanced by UPDA on one hand and HSM I, HSM II and LRA on the other generates conflicting culpability for the conflict in Northern Uganda. Whereas UPDA blamed Southerners, HSM I, HSM II and LRA partly blamed Northerners for the crisis in this part of the country. The ideological position of the latter three introduced autocriticism into the body of grievances touted by rebel groups in Northern Uganda.
While HSM I and HSM II prescribed spiritual cleansing of the Acholi to resolve the crisis in the North, LRA advocates a radical overhaul of the Acholi society and pushes for the construction of a new polity. Jackson observes that the ideology of LRA hinges on “…an apocalyptic vision that the Acholi are on the brink of extinction” and the only solution to this crisis lies in undertaking “…a radical transformation of the Acholi from within—a moral crusade.” 294
In seeking to construct a new Acholi polity, the architects of the ideology of LRA face some challenges: What is going to be the fate of members of the old order? Are citizens of the old polity beyond spiritual rehabilitation? Who will inhabit the new LRA polity? In articulating the doctrine of LRA in relation to the drive to assemble an Acholi utopia, Kony often informs young LRA recruits that he will send soldiers to wipe out Acholis inhabiting Acholiland in order to facilitate the evolution of a new Acholi polity where “…the children form the seed of a new ‘pure’ generation of Acholis.” 295 The drive to construct an Acholi utopia allows the ideology of LRA to evolve into a domain for the operationalization of its strategy. The lure to belong to a “pure generation of Acholis” 296 dissuades young LRA recruits from escaping back to their communities.
Unlike UPDA that maintained a uni-faceted ideological outlook, LRA assumes a more multi-faceted doctrinal posture. UPDA adopted a secular ideology centred around the drive to protect the Acholi population against potential extermination at the hands of Southerners. On the other hand, Lt Col Charles Otim, a former commander of LRA notes that it is difficult to put a finger on the actual doctrinal disposition of LRA. He reveals that on
125 Fridays, LRA comes across as an Islamist organization while on Sundays as a Christian one. 297 According to Jackson, despite heading a quasi-Christian fundamentalist group, at spiritual functions, Kony dons a Kanzu, a white tunic otherwise synonymous with Islamist religious practice. 298
The amalgamation of traditional Acholi religious practices with Christianity and Islam makes the ideology of the group more complex. Based on the idea that spirits (Joks) are omnipotent, traditional Acholi religion plays a central role in shaping the doctrine of LRA. In order to strengthen the potency of the group’s ideology, Kony advocates the combination of Jok with Allah (God as professed by Muslims) hence the hybrid deity/spirit Jok Allah. 299 The expansion of the domain of spirits in Acholi tradition dates back to the evolution of the ideology of HSM I. At that time, Acholi spiritual revivalists argued that in light of the crisis that was gripping the North, there was a need to co-opt new spirits to cope with the challenges of the modern age. To this effect, HSM undertook to create new spirits like Jok Jesus (an amalgamation of an Acholi spirit and the Messiah as professed by Christians). 300
However, the incorporation of Jok Allah into the group’s cosmos of spirits points to possible strategic calculations aimed at sustaining external support links with the Islamist regime in Sudan. Adam Jeroen et al observe that from 1994, LRA prohibited work on Fridays, extended the fasting period in a manner akin to the Islamic Holy month of Ramadan and introduced bowing of heads during prayer. 301 Curiously, the above revolution in doctrinal affairs coincides with the commencement of Sudanese support for LRA
Like HSM I and HSM II, LRA uses ideology to operationalize its military strategy. The Holy Spirit Safety Precautions, the battlefield manual for HSM fighters attempted to link the belief system of HSM with its combat practice. Given the perceived immunity it enjoyed against enemy fire, HSM encouraged its fighters to engage in combat without taking cover. LRA has adopted a similar model to marshal invincibility in combat. Kony positions himself as the fulcrum of multiple spirits that guide the activities of his foot soldiers. He claims to be possessed by Silli Sillindi, a spirit that designs the group’s military
126 strategy, Ing Chu, a spirit that ostensibly turns enemy tanks into toys and a Korean spirit that deflects enemy bullets in combat. 302
From the above analysis, we accept the hypothesis in this section. It can be asserted that LRA largely gleans its ideology from those of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. All four rebel groups formulated their ideologies around a conflict orchestrated by changes in the regional balance of power that favored the Southern over the Northern part of Uganda. However, unlike UPDA that purely rooted its grievances in the politics surrounding the North-South divide, HSM I, HSM II and LRA partly attributed the crisis in the North to an upsurge in negative social practices in Acholiland. By making the Acholi people partially culpable for the conflict in Northern Uganda, LRA furnished its ideology with a rationale for using force to enlist the support of the population.
4.2: POPULAR SUPPORT AND PROPAGANDA
4.2.1: POPULAR SUPPORT In conventional guerrilla warfare, insurgents depend on the population for recruits, food and intelligence among other forms of support. In the problem statement, we observed a peculiarity in the modus operandi of LRA. Over the course of its insurgent campaign, the group has concentrated its military attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure and yet managed to remain in operation for 25 years.
Its propensity to operate contrary to the laws of insurgency raises some critical issues about popular support and propaganda in asymmetric conflict. Given the fact that the original long term goal of LRA was to unseat the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government and manage the Ugandan state, the group not only needed instruments of coercion to fight the Ugandan army but also a set of non-confrontational techniques to engage the Ugandan population at large. But the adoption of a terrorist strategy potentially alienated the population that would otherwise have supported its insurgent and post- insurgency activities. Having adopted this approach, LRA would also not have needed a
127 communicational strategy to sway the support of a population that it would otherwise have been in a position to access violently.
This section deals with the uneasy place of popular support and propaganda in the LRA insurgent campaign. We test the following hypotheses:
1. LRA will have enjoyed popular support because it can easily access civilians, its membership is ethnically connected with the population in Northern Uganda and civilians in this part of the country believe that the group will unseat the National Resistance Movement government. 2. LRA will have used a communicational campaign espousing the idea of an independent existence for its targeted audience, pin-pointing political contradictions within the Ugandan polity and rationalizing its recourse to violence. 3. LRA will have used overt propaganda techniques in territories where it commands greater control over the population and covert techniques where it has less control.
LRA was popular at the formative stage of its insurgent campaign because it positioned itself as a guerrilla movement seeking to liberate the people of Northern Uganda from perceived subjugation at the hands of Southerners. Stating its reasons for waging war against the GoU, the LRA peace team at the Juba peace talks noted that “…as soon as NRM came into power, it became obvious that its target was not to integrate, but to finish off members of the former armies…Scores of young men, both former soldiers and even those who had not been in the army, were arrested, tortured and either killed or damped in prison cells without trial, under the most squalid conditions….Our mothers, sisters and wives were raped in front of us and in some extreme cases, men were sodomised in public and in front of their family members. This became infamously known as ‘Tek Gungu’…NRM soldiers went to the extent of cutting men’s anuses with razor blades and pouring paraffin therein to enlarge them to fit their sex organs.” 303
Support for armed rebellion in Northern Uganda was not only fuelled by atrocities committed by NRA. In the aftermath of the NRM takeover, Jackson points out that the
128 people of Northern Uganda were also apprehensive about Southerners taking control of their economic resources. For example, the Acholi people harboured concerns to the effect that President Museveni of Uganda intended to settle Rwandese refugees (who had fought within the ranks of the National Resistance Army) in Northern Uganda. The depletion of the Acholi cattle population was another area of concern. Between 1986 and 1987, the cattle population in Kitgum went down from 156,667 to 3,239. 304
In attempting an explanation for the dwindling cattle population in the sub-region, the LRA peace team reasoned that “When the NRM came to power, their soldiers raided our livestock in broad daylight and took them away. The government has tried to explain it away by blaming it on the Karimojong…. But the Karimojong have never owned nor operated a helicopter. But helicopters were used to identify our animals hidden in the deepest of forests…The Karimojong never had army uniforms. But most of our animals were taken by men in NRM uniforms.” 305
Given the manner in which NRM had consolidated its authority in Acholiland, any armed group that emerged to reverse this trend of events was potentially going to enjoy popular support. However, it is important to note that while the people of Acholiland initially supported insurgent activity, all four rebel groups that operated in this part of the country did not enjoy the same levels of popular support. Borzello observes that unlike UPDA and HSM I, LRA has enjoyed limited popular support among civilians in its theatres of insurgent activity. 306 In its formative stages, the group was popular among civilians in the North because it was seen as a counterweight to the looting, rape and general harassment of civilians orchestrated by government forces. However, when its brutal reaction to the emergence of civil defence groups in Acholiland started outweighing that of the Ugandan military, its popular support declined. 307
One of the more intriguing developments in the conflict in Northern Uganda is that the decline in popular support for LRA did not trigger off an upsurge in support for the GoU. In seeking to explain this paradox, Andrew Mwenda argues that the Acholi population is caught between a rock and a hard place. Although LRA conducts terror in Acholiland, he
129 observes that “it is ethnically connected” to the population in this part of the country. In addition, Mwenda reasons that counterinsurgency measures that led to the creation of Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps (which he equates to concentration camps) position the GoU as an enemy of the Acholi people and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) as an “occupation force.” 308
From the above discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. In its formative phase, LRA enjoyed popular support because it was not only ethnically connected to the Acholi but also strived to liberate them from perceived subjugation at the hands of Southern Ugandans. However, we reject the notion that ethnic connections sustained popular support throughout the life cycle of the group. In the 1990s, while still ethnically connected to the Acholi people, LRA lost popular support for its insurgent activities. However, this development neither precipitated an upsurge in popular support for the GoU nor stopped LRA from using violence to access civilians and civilian infrastructure.
The creation of poorly managed protected villages (that increased Acholi resentment towards the GoU) and civil defence groups that triggered off LRA retaliatory attacks on civilians combined to make the Acholi population passive participants in the conflict in Northern Uganda. The Acholi people started resenting LRA and the GoU. We accept the notion that popular support in Northern Uganda is partly contingent on the anticipated outcome of the conflict in this part of the country. The Acholi joined civil defence groups probably because they believed that in the long run, the GoU would win the war. However, the GoU did not reap popular support from counter LRA measures for two reasons:
First, its counterinsurgency strategy only aimed at preventing LRA from accessing the Acholi population. It did not specifically seek to cultivate support for the NRM government. Thus, even in situations where units of the Ugandan army succeeded in preventing LRA attacks on civilians, Acholi people living under squalid conditions in Internally Displaced People’s camps resented the NRM government as much as they did LRA. Second, despite the establishment of strategic hamlets in Acholiland, on a number of
130 occasions, LRA managed to mount attacks on civilians. These breaches in security undermined the Acholi people’s confidence in the GoU. However, in recent years, as part of a concerted hearts and minds strategy aimed at winning the support of the Acholi population, the NRM government has instituted a number of development programmes geared towards resuscitating the economy of Northern Uganda. These programmes have included among others the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). 309
4.2.2: PROPAGANDA Given the fluid state of popular support underpinning the insurgency in Northern Uganda, what propaganda strategy and tactics does LRA use to maintain a non-confrontational connection with the population? In its communicational campaign against the Government of Uganda (GoU), the group stresses the special position that Acholiland occupies in the Ugandan polity. It markets its armed struggle among Acholi civilians by pinpointing factors that have facilitated the decline in Acholi political power and proposing a set of measures to reverse this trend. Although this strategy serves to arouse the consciousness of the Acholi, its positive impact is potentially negated by attacks that the group mounts against civilians in its theatres of insurgent activity.
LRA uses a communicational approach that attempts to rationalize the use of terrorism as a prerequisite to the realization of an Acholi utopia. John an ex-LRA abductee reminisces that “There was a kind of propaganda where Kony himself would talk to the children, captives—that the Acholi are no more, they are not there, they are already killed, that Joseph Kony will send out some soldiers to wipe out the whole community of Acholi because they are not supporting him so he will continue sending his soldiers to kill them, So for those captives who were there in Sudan, they will give birth in order to begin another generation of Acholi because those that are there will all be killed.” 310
Although LRA has formulated a set of narratives (like the above) to communicate its mission, a state of belligerence with the GoU constrains it in effectively using propaganda to swing popular support in its favour. Because of the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, the group employs a terrorist
131 strategy to psychologically disorientate the Ugandan state. However, this military approach strains its relations with the population and constrains it in using non confrontational means to market its agenda. On the other hand, periods of peace negotiations with the GoU present the group with perhaps the best opportunity for marshalling propaganda.
Over the course of peace negotiations between the two sides, LRA has systematically employed a propaganda strategy aimed at projecting itself as an honest peace-seeker whilst portraying the GoU as a war-monger. Disagreements over security arrangements at venues for peace talks allow the group to improve its image in the public through a calculated extension of benevolence to GoU peace delegations. In 1993, LRA precipitated a stand off with the GoU over security arrangements at the venue for peace negotiations. In the lead up to the second round of meetings, Kony insisted that the government delegation should arrive at the venue unescorted. 311
When the GoU delegation agreed to let Bigombe, the chief government negotiator meet the LRA peace team, it was already dark and negotiations between the two parties could not take place. Apparently, apprehensive of ‘enemies of peace’ scuttling the talks, George Omona, LRA Field Commander dispatched 30 escorts to accompany Bigombe back to Ugandan government controlled territory. 312 When a delegation of Ugandan leaders visited the LRA base in Garamba Forest in North Eastern DRC in 2007, Kony noted that “I am deeply concerned about your movements. I was worried because there are very many reckless people who would like to destroy this chance. But by God’s grace, I am glad you are here.” 313
On the surface, the goodwill gestures of Omona and Kony were confidence building measures aimed at pushing peace processes forward. However, on closer inspection, these may well have been propaganda techniques aimed at parading an alternate side to the group’s modus operandi. Potentially, LRA marketed itself as capable of acting in the interest of peace. In both cases, the group used word of mouth as an overt communicational approach in areas it controlled to appear to be extending benevolence to its adversary.
132 In communicating its negotiation positions at peace talks with the GoU, LRA positions itself as selfless. This propaganda technique unsettles the government and puts it awkwardly on the defensive. At a meeting between Kony and Bigombe on 11th January, 1994, at Pagik in Gulu, Kony stated that LRA was setting no pre-conditions for the negotiations in light of the fact that “…the children in the bush are not my children but Acholi children” and appealed to the GoU to genuinely commit itself to the peace process requesting for time to regroup his forces. 314 By expressing readiness to release “Acholi children” (LRA soldiers) back into their communities, LRA was ostensibly demonstrating the willingness to sacrifice anything for the sake of peace in Northern Uganda. But by tactfully tying demobilization to prior regrouping, the GoU was being pushed into a situation where it would scuttle the peace talks on grounds that LRA intended to use the negotiations period to prepare for a resumption in hostilities.
LRA equally exploits stand-offs over ceasefire agreements to parade its ostensible selflessness. During the Juba peace talks, it took the first step in declaring a cessation of hostilities between LRA and UPDF. Speaking on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 4th August, 2006, Otti pronounced: “I, Lt Gen Vincent Otti, second-in-command of the LRA High Command, do hereby declare a unilateral cessation of hostilities. I order all our field commanders to, with immediate effect; cease all forms of hostilities against the Uganda People’s Defence Forces positions.” 315
The unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by LRA put the GoU in an awkward position in which it had to cautiously welcome a development that could either have pushed the Juba peace talks forward or presented LRA with the opportunity of clandestinely using the negotiations period to regroup. In cautiously reacting to Otti’s pronouncement, Ruhakana Rugunda, the Minister for Internal Affairs and leader of the GoU peace delegation observed that “We will wait and see what it means on the ground because previous ceasefires have been abused.” 316
LRA appears to use overt propaganda techniques in enemy territory when three things occur: Peace negotiations between the two sides collapse; Counterinsurgency operations
133 resume; and its military capability increases. In April 1996, Lt Col Beba Beba Oola addressed rallies in Aswa and Kilak counties of Acholiland in which he mooted LRA’s conditional willingness to resume negotiations with the GoU. 317 This development unfolded two years after the collapse of the Bigombe diplomatic initiative, LRA starting to receive military support from Sudan and the Ugandan army resuming counterinsurgency operations against the group. By expressing willingness to re-negotiate with the GoU, LRA used propaganda to achieve three objectives: First, to demonstrate that it was not a war- monger. Second, to ease counterinsurgency pressure on it by luring the GoU into peace- seeking reciprocity. Third, by attaching conditions to the resumption of peace talks, it demonstrated its enhanced military capability and preparedness to follow the war path should the GoU have rejected its peace overtures.
When negotiations take place in its backyard, LRA stage manages the treatment accorded peace delegates and takes full advantage of the media presence to repair its organizational image. For example, while hosting a delegation of Ugandan government leaders at the LRA base in Garamba, North Eastern DRC in 2006 and conscious of the negative image that had been constructed around the activities of his organization, Kony observed that “Now that you have come here and seen that I am not a monster with huge eyes and a tail, you must have confirmed that I am a human being. Go back and tell the people of northern Uganda that I want nothing but peace.” 318
Whilst able to use a more open approach to communicating its position at its bases, in the enemy’s backyard (areas under the control of the GoU), LRA employs more covert methods. For example, in attempting to market LRA as a genuine peace-seeking party to the Juba talks, in August 2006, Kony wrote letters to the Kings of Bunyoro and Toro in which he appealed to these cultural institutions to “…make your contribution to peace building in northern Uganda” and sought to “…reaffirm and reassure you of my total commitment to the current peace talks in Juba. I hope the government in Kampala will do the same.” 319
134 Against this backdrop, we accept both the second and third hypotheses in this section. The propaganda campaign of LRA is based on a drive to pinpoint political contradictions in the Ugandan polity, arouse the consciousness of the Acholi people and rationalize the use of violence as a means of recapturing their glorious place in Ugandan politics. In areas it controls, LRA uses overt communicational techniques (rallies, stage managed meetings and antics) to mask its capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. In territories under government control, the group employs covert methods to communicate its agenda.
Grace Matsiko, Managing Editor of the Kampala Dispatch news magazine reveals that at its base in North Eastern DRC, the group had access to internet. The connection was unstable. The rebels could not hang up an antenna due to the rainy weather conditions in this area. It was not possible to establish the extent to which LRA used this technological facility to wage communicational warfare against the GoU.
4.3: MOTIVATION AND ESPRIT DE CORPS Section 4.1.2 unveiled the contrasting doctrines that Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) bequeathed LRA. Given the centrality of the North-South divide to the evolution of armed conflict in Northern Uganda, the re-definition of the Northern Question by HSM I and HSM II tested the endurance of the original conflict discourse that had triggered off the UPDA rebellion. Shifts in the development of ideology among Northern rebel groups would also potentially affect their motivation. In this section, we test the hypothesis that LRA fighters will have been motivated by idealistic and social considerations.
In its formative phase, LRA was motivated by idealistic considerations. Bevan observes that “…there are powerful reasons for attributing the onset of the conflict to grievances that permeated the Northern Ugandan population following the defeat of the UNLA in 1986.” 320 When guerrillas of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized the reigns of state power in 1986, the North lost control of the military for the first time in the post- independence history of Uganda. 321
135 The way in which NRM consolidated its authority in the North motivated civilians in this part of Uganda to violently resist the newly reconstituted Ugandan state. Colonel Ochora observes that the activities of the 35th Battalion of NRA undermined the government’s chances of winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the Acholi people. 322 Also known as Gungu and predominantly staffed with former members of the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) and Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU) guerrilla groups, the 35th Battalion of the National Resistance Army (NRA) killed 35 civilians in Namakora village, Kitgum district in 1986. In its actions, Gungu battalion (mainy staffed by ethnic Baganda) was apparently motivated by the drive to revenge atrocities committed in Luwero Triangle by the Acholi dominated Uganda National Liberation Army. 323 According to Jackson, NRA engaged in “…systematic rape of both men and women, usually in the presence of their families, the murder of civilians and the burying alive of civilians by soldiers.” 324
Given the above developments, Bevan observes that “The North was fertile ground for anyone recruiting resistance fighters for defence against Southern occupation.” 325 Jackson asserts that the bare knuckled tactics employed by the 35th Battalion of NRA “…fed the paranoia already rampant among the Acholi………….People became susceptible to the belief that the end was near for the Acholi.” 326
It can be deduced that at its formative stage, the motivation of LRA was closely linked to that of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. All four groups were motivated by the drive to protect the people of the North against potential extermination at the hands of Southern forces. This survivalist motivation in turn fed into a nostalgic desire to reincarnate the Northern hegemony in the politics of Uganda. In this context, after protecting the people of the North against ethnic cleansing, LRA would have moved to seize back the reigns of state power from the South.
Given the fact that the above motivation was tied to the ethnic survival of the people of the North, severance in relations between LRA and the population in this part of the country would potentially have undermined the levels of motivation in this guerrilla organization.
136
Critical developments at its formative stage and changes in its military strategy upset the original idealistic basis for motivation in LRA. The turf war between UPDA and LRA, 327 the conclusion of the Pece Peace Accord that ended the UPDA rebellion 328 and the creation of counter LRA civil defence groups in Acholiland 329 punctured the North-South divide as a basis for motivation in LRA. With some sections of the Acholi population throwing in their lot behind the government side, LRA was no longer in a position to realize voluntary enlistment let alone motivation purely based on the drive to reverse the collapse of the Northern hegemony. While the pioneering officer corps of the group was still committed to contesting the emerging political and military dominance of the South, some of the freshly recruited members had been abducted from communities that had already reconciled themselves to the reconstituted political order in the country. At this stage of development, LRA was faced with the enormous task of having to harmonize sharply contrasting motivational tendencies within its ranks.
Most of the ex LRA combatants interviewed revealed that at the time of abduction, they were more preoccupied with the desire to escape back into their communities than participate in a violent campaign against the Government of Uganda. Brig Acellam reveals that on several occasions, he unsuccessfully attempted to escape from LRA captivity. 330 After being caught for the third time trying to escape, Col Otim decided to stay in LRA for fear of being killed on a fourth attempt. 331 Capt Sande Otto decided to postpone his escape attempts until circumstances were conducive. 332
It is worth noting that the first shifts in the motivation of LRA occured when Sudan started extending external support to it. Bevan examines the relationship between LRA receiving military support from Sudan and adopting a terrorist strategy: “…exploitation of the population can be characterized as rent-seeking on two accounts….First, the LRA abducts recruits from the population to sustain what has, in the past, proved a ‘marketable’ insurgency. Sudan provided military materiel and logistical support because the LRA was a viable proxy force. The group’s leadership did not have to make a substantial bid for control of the Ugandan state or any territory therein. There only requirement was to remain
137 a thorn in the side of the Ugandan government and its SPLA allies.....Second, the LRA’s use of the population as the target of its aggression generates the leadership’s only source of political capital. The LRA has clearly orchestrated extreme acts of violence to afford its leadership the maximum visibility…” 333
The strategic calculations of Khartoum partially influenced changes in the motivation of LRA. By not supplying the rebel group with sufficient capability to overthrow the NRM government, Sudan pushed LRA to adjust its motivation. Since its chances of seizing state power were minimal, the drive to reverse the regional balance of power was no longer feasible. The most vital necessity for the group then was maintaining its links with its backer (Khartoum). LRA could please Sudan by destabilizing Uganda. The group could achieve this objective at a relatively cheap cost. It could avoid the well armed Ugandan military and instead attack unarmed civilians. LRA did not have to care about losing popular support for two reasons: First, the Acholi people were increasingly turning their backs on the group. So from LRA’s perspective, they deserved to be punished. Second, the chances of the group capturing state power were diminishing. LRA did not have to worry about its image as it did not envisage a situation where it would have to govern the country. With survival the remaining plausible vocation, the group had to maintain its relations with Sudan by destabilizing Uganda.
Since LRA was fast losing popular support among the Acholi people, it could no longer count on voluntary financial contributions towards its insurgent campaign domestically. Sudan itself was strategic in extending support to the group. It only supplied LRA with enough materiel for destabilizing Uganda. In this regard, the motivation and calculations of the rebel group had to change. LRA had to prioritize its survival as an organization. It had to start looking beyond its alliance with the Government of Sudan (GoS). Given the conditional manner in which the GoS rendered support, LRA could not rule out a situation in future where Khartoum withdrew its assistance. In order to secure its survival, the group had to try and assemble its own independent financial base. But domestically, LRA faced a critical challenge: It had severed relations with the population. How was it going to build its financial base? The group had two options: Either coerce the population into supplying it
138 with funds or clandestinely conduct legal or illegal business to finance its insurgent activities. LRA chose to pursue both options which precipitated an increase in attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure and a corresponding reduction in attacks targeting government soldiers. There was one rationale underlying this approach: Unlike attacks on infrastructure guarded by government soldiers, attacks on defenceless civilians presented LRA with a cheaper option for coercively raising funds for its campaign. Citing examples of the profit-driven activities of the group, Billie O’Kadamerie reports that “A wife of a senior rebel commander is said to be running an eating house in Kitgum town and at Atanga. The money is received from her husband…..In Gulu town, a kiosk is said to be run by a relative of a senior rebel who even named the kiosk in honour of the rebel.” 334
From other dispatches by O’Kadamerie, it is evident that the conflict in Northern Uganda was a much bigger profiteering venture for LRA that went beyond small scale businesses. He points out that “An NRA officer who did not want to be named said NRA recently tracked down former Uganda Democratic Christian Army (the forerunner to LRA) rebel army commander Obitre Gama alias Atanasio Obite on the shores of Lake Kyoga. He had started a thriving covert business after escaping with several tolas of gold and 30,000 dollars that was entrusted to him by Kony. While attempting to escape arrest, Obitre-Gama was shot dead by NRA intelligence men.” 335
While the above examples point to a profiteering motivation, Bevan contends that “… it is unclear what financial means Kony enjoys, but the fact that the LRA is not resource- extractive or commerce controlling, suggests he is unlikely to have financially profited from the conflict substantially.” 336
If we accepted the propositions that LRA is motivated neither by the desire to re-establish the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics nor profiteering, what new set of factors are then fuelling the LRA insurgency?
One of the principle obstacles to ending the conflict in Northern Uganda is the direct benefits the leaders of the group derive from the rebellion. An ex-LRA combatant notes
139 that “All the good food such as chicken, meat, goats, cows and groundnuts are given to rebel commanders.” When abduction parties return from their expeditions, LRA rebel commanders are at liberty to select female abductees of their choice. 337
According to Feldman, “It is doubtful that Kony, the son of peasant farmers and a school drop out, could attain what he has outside of LRA. Indeed, for many of the rebel commanders, the LRA has enabled them to acquire by force what they never would have been able to earn through work.” However, a former LRA commander contends that the “…material condition of LRA commanders has deteriorated 100%. They have lost a lot. Most commanders are willing to negotiate because of this. If the government can give the LRA a quarter or half of what it wants, we may as well take it.” 338
The loss of its guerrilla bases in Sudan and the DRC may have significantly denied LRA sanctuaries for its leaders to enjoy the trappings of insurgent power. It then follows that a completely different set of factors must be motivating the group. Angelo Izama argues that the current motivation of the group is constructed around a survivalist strategy that seeks to “keep” it “alive as long as possible,” “create a tribe of new believers” and settle in a new haven. 339
Against this backdrop, we accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA has largely been motivated by idealistic considerations. When it launched its insurgent campaign, it derived its motivation from the conflict discourse that had precipitated the UPDA, HSM I and HSM II rebellions (Figure 1). All four guerrilla groups were motivated by idealistic considerations geared towards reversing the collapse of the Northern political hegemony in Uganda. The sustenance of this motivation was contingent on the above rebel groups cultivating and maintaining cordial relations with the population. The reincarnation of the Northern hegemony would not only protect the people of Acholiland against potential extermination at the hands of Southern forces but also reinstate the North as the dominant region in Ugandan politics.
140 We accept the section of the hypothesis that partly attributes the motivation of LRA to social considerations. Shifts in popular support, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations and the geo-political calculations of Sudan significantly altered the motivation of LRA. Sudan extended limited and conditional material support to LRA. With this assistance, the group lacked the capability to change government. As a result, the group could not sustain its motivation based on the drive to reverse changes in the regional balance of power. The emergence of self defence groups in Acholiland denoted dwindling popular support for insurgent activities in this part of the country. With this development, LRA could not bank on the population for voluntary support. In order to secure its survival, the group then had to do two things: First, maintain its relations with Sudan by destabilizing Uganda. Second, build an autonomous financial base to support the group just in case its relations with Khartoum deteriorated. The above circumstances paved way for profiteering to emerge as a motivation for LRA. The group needed funds to keep going as long as it could.
The above changes in the motivation of LRA depended on Sudan continuing to offer the group a sanctuary. When Uganda-Sudan relations improved, LRA lost its rear bases which acted as sanctuaries for it to organize its profiteering enterprise. With the North-South divide and profiteering (as motivational factors) rendered obsolete, the leadership of the group is now left with two motivations—enjoy whatever remains of its trappings of insurgent power and survive for as long as is possible. On the other hand, the rank-and-file (mainly abductees) are motivated by the desire to survive until an opportunity for escape arises. Both sets of motivation are not idealistic (and do not demonstrate ‘selflessness’ on the part of LRA members). They border more on the social side of things and bring out the ‘selfish’ dimension to the motivation of the group’s members.
4.4: RECRUITMENT As part of the drive to assemble its identity, an insurgent group needs to recruit members. Mode of recruitment is an important barometric measure of the levels of popular support that a guerrilla movement enjoys and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns mounted by the state military apparatus. Higher levels of voluntary enlistment would
141 normally point to popular support for a rebel group while low numbers would either be an indication of low levels of popular support for its activities or effective counterinsurgency measures mounted against it.
Section 4.2.1 discusses shifts in popular support for LRA insurgent activities. We observed that the creation of self defence groups and protected villages by the Ugandan state and the adoption of a terrorist strategy by LRA have combined to deny the group popular support. The central question in this section then is: How does LRA recruit its members without the backing of civilians? In seeking to resolve this puzzle, we test the hypothesis that LRA will have selectively recruited its members from civic groups and constituencies that are either conscious and or targets of marginalization ostensibly perpetrated by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government.
At the stage of formation, LRA predominantly recruited its members from among military officers who had served in the Obote and Okello regimes in Uganda. The collapse of the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics rendered most politicians and soldiers from the North jobless and made rebellion against the reconstituted Ugandan state an attractive vocation for some.
However, doctrinal differences among rebel groups fighting the NRM government pushed LRA to adopt persuasive and coercive approaches to constituting its membership. After reportedly praying for two weeks on Mount Odek in Gulu, Northern Uganda, in 1987, Kony persuaded six boys and one girl to participate in an armed struggle against the GoU. 340 If this account hold true, then Kony used persuasion to constitute the nucleus of his group. Although UPDA and LRA were committed to reversing changes in the regional balance of power in Uganda, UPDA pursued a secular ideological position that run into conflict with the faith-based approach adopted by LRA.
In order to consolidate its position as the strongest rebel group in the North, LRA not only engaged in bitter turf wars with UPDA and HSM II, but also forcefully recruited members from these organizations. For example, following the signing of the UPDA-NRM Accord,
142 Kony attacked the 100 remaining fighters of UPDA killing some and incorporating the rest into his fighting group. The members of UPDA who were integrated into LRA were graduates of prestigious universities and military academies like Sand Hurst in the United Kingdom (UK). This group included among others Brig Justine Odong Latek, Lt Col Basilio Opwonya, Lt Col Dr James Kweya, Lt Col Terensio Okullo, Lt Col Athocon, Lt Col Mazoldi Lubangakene, Col Joseph Obonyo, Maj Kenneth Banya, Maj Stephen Moyi, Maj Benjamin Apia and Lt Col Kaggwa. 341
By recruiting top calibre personnel, Kony potentially set the stage for a clash of egos within LRA. While the above ex-commanders of UPDA boasted illustrious military careers, Kony was merely a former altar boy who had had short stints as a Spiritual Advisor and Ritual Assistant in UPDA 342 and HSM I 343 respectively. The differences in academic and military background between the pioneering officer corps and those who joined LRA at a later stage were potentially a recipe for schisms within the group.
However, in constituting the leadership of LRA, Kony ensured that former senior officers of UPDA remained hierarchically peripheral to the structures of his movement. For example Brig Latek was appointed to the ceremonial post of Chairman, Military Advisory Board while other ex-UPDA officers took up sinecure responsibilities: Lt Col Okullo was appointed Chief of Logistics and Engineering, Lt Col Athocon, Chief of Artillery and Air Defence while Lt Col Dr Kweya assumed the position of Chief of Medical Services. 344
The above officers occupied positions more suited for a conventional military institution. LRA was an unconventional armed group. At its stage of formation, it had neither the military capability nor institutional capacity to warrant the appointment of Heads of Artillery and Air Defence. O’Kadamerie provides a probable logic behind the organizational structure of LRA: “….he (Kony) needed those who would not doubt his mystic powers and preferred to use men without military experience or officer life…..” 345 Thus, while seeking to appoint inexperienced and loyal cadres to sensitive positions in his organization, Kony at the same time ensured that he depleted rival groups of their highly
143 trained officer corps. It can be deduced that LRA first used coercive enlistment as a method for consolidating its position on the conflict scene in Northern Uganda.
It is worth noting that although Kony used a coercive approach to conduct enlistment at the stage of formation, all the target groups of LRA at that time were committed to armed insurrection against the Government of Uganda. Ex-UPDA military officers had served in the Uganda National Liberation Army (Uganda’s defunct national army). The collapse of the NRM regime would potentially have paved way for them to regain their positions within the structures of the Ugandan military establishment. Thus, although coerced into joining LRA, ex-UPDA commanders were presented with an opportunity to fight to reclaim their status.
However, a downswing in popular support presented the group with a recruitment dilemma: Unlike the phase of formation where it had used persuasive and coercive methods to recruit members from constituencies that resented the NRM government, beyond this stage, LRA could only use a coercive approach to constitute its membership from communities exhibiting divided loyalty. The conclusion of the Pece peace agreement between UPDA and NRM in 1988 346 meant that some sections of the Acholi population had started disfavouring the prolongation of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Naturally, this segment of Acholi society would not voluntarily join the group.
Consequently, in order to cope with negative shifts in popular support for its insurgent activities, LRA adopted a recruitment model premised on the abduction of civilians, most especially children. 347 Whereas young boys were forced to take up roles as fighters, young girls were coerced into becoming “rebel wives” or “Ting Ting” (domestic servants). 348 The enlistment of children by LRA raises a critical question: Why would it prefer recruiting children to adults?
Borzello cites an ex-LRA commander who reveals that children are “nimble, easy to train and quick to forget home.” 349 Recounting his abduction experience, a former child soldier reinforces the above revelation: “…One of the rebels looked at me and said, ‘This boy,
144 should we take him or leave him?’ They said, ‘Let’s go with him’. And they took me. My brothers were not taken; they are older than me. So the rebels claim if they take someone who is mature—who has got all the tactics of knowing their movements—he can plan and easily escape. So with a child like me, they move with him in the bush and he gets confused and lost. So it is better to take children.” 350
The observations of the ex-LRA commander and the experiences of the child soldier mentioned above point to certain strategic calculations in the recruitment approach that LRA employs: It recruits those who are “nimble” and “easy to train” 351 because they potentially fit into the LRA organizational model. Since the group operates highly centralized structures, the recruitment of manipulable individuals eases the task of indoctrination which in turn facilitates effective command and control within the guerrilla organization.
It is also important to note that in the long term, young recruits present Kony with a more reliable alternative to existing leadership dispositions within the structures of LRA. Whereas at the stage of formation, he had to strike a balance between recruiting adult officers with questionable credentials and those boasting illustrious military careers, 352 young abductees who have matured over the years have in recent times presented him with a pool of loyal, highly indoctrinated and potentially appointable members.
Kony has fast tracked the career progression of a number of former child soldiers probably as a way of limiting the influence of members of LRA who joined the organization as adults. For example, Maj Gen Dominic Ongwen, a member of Control Alter, the supreme military organ of LRA, is a former child soldier. Lt Col Otim, 353 Brigadier Acellam 354 and Capt Sande Otto 355 were all conscripted into the LRA fighting force at a tender age.
Given the strategic advantage in enlisting young children to beef up the troop strength of LRA, what theatres of abduction would present the rebel group with the best opportunity for recruiting a high number of children? LRA has predominantly constituted homes, schools and gardens into theatres for conducting abductions. Victor, a former LRA fighter
145 recounts his abduction experiences: “They came during night time while I was asleep with my brothers,” while Peter, another ex LRA combatant reminisces: “So I had gone to the fields to cultivate and I was abducted there.” 356 Homes and schools are strategic sanctuaries for children. At homes, children are a constituent part of families. Targeting homes allows LRA to recruit from primary sources (the families into which children are born). However, unlike in families, at schools recruits (children) are regimented according to age sets (classes). This regimentation allows rebel units to target specific age sets for enlistment.
It is also important to note that while homes and schools are ideal recruitment targets for LRA, the state could deploy forces at these places and limit the group in conducting its enlistment. With the state demonstrating the capacity to block recruitment at primary sources, LRA would then only target civilians roaming the areas lying between the primary sources. In this case, it would have to waylay children on their way to or from homes or schools or gardens. Capt Sande Otto of LRA was abducted while on his way to school. 357 Although not a very effective approach, recruitment from secondary sources (along roads, in gardens) accords LRA two tactical advantages:
First, the rebels can employ the principle of ambush to waylay and abduct unsuspecting children. Second, at secondary sources (unless in situations where civilians are escorted by military convoys), LRA units require minimal force to conduct forced recruitment. Unlike schools and Internally Displaced People’s (IDPs) camps where LRA units could encounter resistance mounted by Home Guards or UPDF units, along highways, foot-paths and in farming fields, LRA would abduct civilians without engaging in gun battles. This approach allows the group to conserve its ammunition and save it for fire fights with the Ugandan military.
We have mainly discussed the modalities that facilitate the random recruitment of civilians into LRA. Our analysis has mainly focussed on situations where LRA units target primary and secondary recruitment sources without knowing the identities of those who will end up being recruited. At this juncture, a question arises: Does random forced recruitment meet all of the manpower needs of LRA?
146 In situations where the group is unable to attract specialized personnel through voluntary enlistment or forced random recruitment, a manpower gap may emerge within its organizational structures. The group has plugged such gaps by conducting selective forced enlistment. While on work leave in Kiryandongo, in Masindi district, in Western Uganda and on the instigation of his relatives in LRA, Lt Col Francis Okwangalero, who had served as a Training Instructor in UNLA and NRA, was specifically abducted in 1996 to strengthen the training capability of LRA. 358 On other occasions, elements within the LRA leadership corps have conducted selective forced recruitment for personal reasons. For instance, on the orders of Otti Lagony, the then Deputy Leader of LRA, Capt Otto Sande was abducted because he was in a position to provide Lagony with information about his sister, Amela. Amela was Capt Otto Sande’s teacher. 359
As noted in the introduction to this section, negative shifts in popular support have affected the manner in which LRA conducts its recruitment. This state of affairs means that LRA is potentially unable to sustain its recruitment drives. However, a closer examination of the enlistment and attendant manpower statistics of LRA upsets the above assumption. The group has consistently demonstrated the propensity to replenish its manpower base with civilian (especially child) abductees. Borzello notes that by 1989, LRA had abducted 30,000 civilians of whom 20,000 were children under the age of 18. Bearing in mind that Operation North had significantly dented its capacity to wage war, in the aftermath of this counterinsurgency campaign, LRA was expected to experience a serious manpower shortage.
However, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimates that between 1990 and 2001, the group abducted 28,902 civilians from the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac and Lira. Of these abductees, 10,000 were children. Operations Iron Fist I and II did not prevent LRA from conducting abductions either. Between 2002 and 2004, the group abducted 10,000 more children. 360
In explaining the mode of recruitment adopted by LRA in the pre-terrorist phase of its campaign, we accept the hypothesis in this section. At the stage of formation, LRA
147 recruited its members from among ex-soldiers of the defunct UNLA who had lost their jobs in the aftermath of the NRM takeover in 1986. The emergence of LRA as the most powerful rebel group violently championing the reincarnation of the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics made voluntary and quasi-voluntary (as in the case of ex-UPDA officers who were conscripted into LRA) enlistment into the group an attractive vocation. In this connection, the realization of higher recruitment numbers depended on the continued relevance of the North-South divide to the armed conflict in Northern Uganda.
In this analysis, it can also be asserted that there is a link between the onset of counterinsurgency operations and the decline in LRA recruitment numbers. In a period of two years, between 1987 and 1989 (before the onset of Operation North), LRA abducted 30,000 civilians. In a period of 11 years, between 1990 and 2001 (interspersed with a series of effective counter LRA campaigns), LRA abducted 28,902 civilians (nearly the number abducted in two years prior to the onset of Operation North). The above statistics indicate that on average, LRA recruited fewer members annually between 1990 and 2001 than it did between 1987 and 1989.
From the foregoing discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. Originally, while it enjoyed cordial relations with the population, LRA predominantly recruited its members from among Northerners who had either lost their positions in the Ugandan governmental setup, been or expected to be victims of the South’s drive to consolidate its position of power in the North. However, contrary to the theories of guerrilla warfare, recruiting from an insurgency savvy constituency did not guarantee LRA voluntary enlistment. Due to ideological differences in its targeted recruitment constituencies, LRA had to employ persuasive and coercive means to populate its structures. We partially rejected the hypothesis on grounds that in subsequent phases of its insurgent campaign, LRA did not recruit from insurgency savvy constituencies. The group has been enlisting members lacking ideological commitment to its cause. Although its conscripted recruits lack commitment to its armed struggle, the use of indoctrination based on terror mitigates mass defections from LRA.
148 Having examined the pillars supporting the identity of LRA, in the next chapter, this thesis turns to the dynamics that facilitate the operationalization of its insurgent activities.
149 END NOTES
TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: IDENTITY
4.1: IDEOLOGY
4.1.1: GRIEVANCES / AIMS 276 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit pp 115-118 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 277International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 6-9 of 47 Mwanguhya Charles 2010, Op cit. Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 Kasaija, Phillip 2006, Op cit. pp 1-2 of 12 Vinci, Anthony 2007, ‘Existential Motivations in the Lord’s Resistance Army’s Continuing Conflict’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. pp 338-339 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701200173. . Accessed on 22/11/2009 Vinci, Anthony 2005 ‘The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord’s Resistance Army’, Small Wars & Insurgencies. pp 364-367http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500221336. Accessed on 22/11/2009 278Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002, Op cit. 279 Cline, Lawrence E 2000. Op cit. 115-118 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, ‘Profiles of the Parties to the Conflict’ 2002, Op cit On the nature of NRM’s ‘political re-education’ campaign also known as ‘Mchakamchaka’ see: Bouckaert, Peter, Human Rights Watch 1999. Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda: Human Rights Watch. New York. pp 65-69 Lubega, Henry 2010. NRM Historicals: We became too greedy too fast. The Observer. Sunday, 7th February, 2010. http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7139&Itemid=59. Accessed on 24/07/2010 280 International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47 Kasozi A.B.K 1994. pp 110-112 281Cline, Lawrence E 2000. Op cit 115-118 282Bevan, James 2007 Op cit. pp 347-348 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002, Op cit 283Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit 284Okuku, Juma 2002, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda: University Printers.18-22 Kasozi, A B K, 1994: The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda. 1964-1985. McGill Queen’s University Press. Uppsala. pp 88-103 Lamwaka, Caroline 2002. Op cit 285Gersony, Robert 1997, Op cit. pp 17 of 135. Accessed on 24/07/2010. Mulindwa, Rogers 1998, Op cit. pp 32. 286 Liu Institute, Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), Makerere University. War in Acholiland and its Ramification for Peace and Security in Uganda. pp 34-51 http://www.up.ligi.ubc.ca/_assets/031106uganda_fullreport.pdf. Accessed 14/10/2009 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 37-40 International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47
150 287Sserumaga, Kalundi 2009, What eats Buganda, eats Bunyoro too. The Independent. Tuesday, 03rd November, 2009. http://www.independent.co.ug/column/comment/2058-what-eats-buganda-eats-bunyoro- too. Accessed on 21/06/2011. Mulira, Peter 2006, Four factors led to the 1966 Buganda crisis. The New Vision. Monday, 23rd October, 2006. http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/20/528137. Accessed on 21/06/2011 288 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit Ngoga, Pascal 1998, Op cit. pp 96-98 289Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit 290Dicklitch, Susan, ‘The Incomplete Democratic Transition in Uganda’, in Kleinberg, Remonda and Clark, Janine (eds) 2000, Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World. Palgrave Macmillan. pp 116-118 291Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002. Op cit
4.1.2: IDEOLOGY 292Ugandan army spokesman, Shaban Bantariza observes that “You can’t tell whether they want political power. Its only aim is to terrorise and brutalise the civilian population and to loot their homes…What was originally a rebellion has turned into terrorism. If they had a political problem, we would have solved it long time ago”. See: IRIN 2004, Uganda: Nature, Structure and Ideology of LRA. 1st January, 2004. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=23&ReportId=65772. Accessed on 22/06/2011 LRA exhibits a multifaceted ideological outlook. There are both faith-based and secular elements in its doctrine. See: Leonard, Emma 2010, The Lord’s Resistance Army: An African Terrorist Group? Perspectives on Terrorism. 4:6. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/129/html. Accessed on 22/06/2010 Andre Lotz observes that “The LRA is now seen by many as having no central vision or goal other than negotiating favourable terms for peace” Lotz, Andre, Cornering Kony: An update on the Lord’s Resistance Army. Consultancy Africa Intelligence. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=260&Itemid=179. Accessed on 22/06/2011 Anneke van Woudenberg, Senior Africa Researcher at Human Rights Watch points out that “This is no longer a group with an ideology. This is a group that survives on sheer brutality” BBC 2010, Uganda LRA rebels ‘on massive forced recruitment drive’. BBC News Africa 12th August, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10947791. Accessed on 22/06/2011 According to David L McCoy, “While their articulated mission has been to “install the Ten Commandments in Uganda…from its inception until the present, the LRA has had no coherent ideology, rational political agenda or popular support” which makes brokering a peace agreement problematic”. See: McCoy David 2008, Fostering Peace and Ending Impunity: The International Criminal Court, Human Rights and the LRA. International Affairs Review. Wednesday, 13th August, 2008. http://www.iar- gwu.org/node/18. Accessed on 22/06/2011 Ledio Cakaj of the Enough Project points to a growing disconnect in the recent evolution of the ideology of LRA. Although LRA initially sought to fight for the emancipation of the Acholi people, Cakaj observes that “Alot of fighters said that they found themselves so far from Northern Uganda that it was impossible to maintain the same ideology”. See: DeCapua Joe 2011, Former Ugandan LRA Rebels Fear Going Home. VOA News. 14th February, 2011. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/decapua-lra-demobilization-14feb11-116164939.html. Accessed on 22/06/2011 However, in an interview with Sam Farmar, Foreign Correspondent for ABC, Kony attempts to offer insights into the aims and ideology of LRA: “I am a freedom fighter who is fighting for freedom in Uganda…..We should be free to elect our leader…But not a movement like the one of Museveni” Farmar Sam 2006, Uganda—Joseph Kony LRA. 4th July 2006. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2006/s1680601.htm. Accessed on 22/06/2011
151 293Borzello, Anna 2007, ‘The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army’, Conflict, Security & Development, 7: 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800701556537. 393-395 Accessed on 22/12/2009 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007. Op cit. pp 963-974 294Jackson, Paul 2002, ‘The March of the Lord’s Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, 13: 3. pp 40-44 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310208559196. Accessed on 22/12/2009. Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, ‘Former Lord’s Resistance Army Child Soldier Abductees: Explorations of Identity in Reintegration and Reconciliation’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 13: 3. pp 282-283. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10781910701471306. Accessed on 22/12/2009 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 Adam, Jeroen, et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-972 295Ibid Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit. pp 282-283 296Adam, et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-972 297Otim, Charles 2010, Interview. January, 2010. Gulu, Uganda Nicolli, Alexander and Johnstone Sarah Johnstone (eds) 2008, Uganda’s Elusive Peace Deal. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Comments. 14: 8, pp 1-2. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1080/13567880802565229. Accessed on 22/12/2009. Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118. 298Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 299Ibid 300For a discourse on the interaction between traditional Acholi spiritualism and western religion see: Manca Terra 2008, Innocent Murderers? Abducted Children in the Lord’s Resistance Army. Cultic Studies Review. 7: 2. 20th August 2008. pp 129-166 http://www.icsahome.com/logon/elibdocview_newa.asp?Subject=Innocent+Murderers%3F+Abducted+Childr en+in+the+Lord%92s+Resistance+Army+. Accessed on 30/07/2010 Wiredu, Kwasi 1998, Toward Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion. African Studies Quarterly. 1: 4 1998. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:F8CciBNHfesJ:web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/4/3.pdf+Jo k+Jogi+Acholi&cd=38&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk. Accessed on 30/07/2010. 301Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 972-974 On the multi-faceted ideological outlook of LRA, see: Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 302Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-972
4.2: PROPAGANDA AND POPULAR SUPPORT 4.2.1: POPULAR SUPPORT
303Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 304Jackson, Paul 2009, Op cit. pp 323-325 Branch, Adam 2005, Neither Peace Nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998. Spring 2005. African Studies Quarterly, 8: 2. http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i2a1.htm. Accessed on 24/07/2010. 305Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 For a discourse on the interaction between armed conflict and cattle rustling in Northern Uganda see:
152 Lucy, Ben 2000, The EU, Northern Uganda and the Prevention of Violent Conflict. African Security Review 9: 5:6. http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9No5And6/Lucy.html. Accessed on 24/07/2010. Muhereza, Frank Emmanuel 1998, Violence and the State in Karamoja: Causes of Conflict, Initiative for Peace. CSQ Issue: 22.4 Winter 1998. Uprooted: Dispossession in Africa. Cultural Survival. http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/violence-and-state-karamoja-causes-conflict- initiative-peace. Accessed on 24/07/2010. IRIN 2010, Uganda: Cattle rustling compounds returnees’ woes. Thursday, 22nd July, 2010. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=84675. Accessed on 24/07/2010. 306Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 388-389 307Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 308 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 309United States Virtual Presence Post 2011. Northern Uganda: What a Difference Two Years Makes. http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/nu_whatadifference.html. Accessed on 04/10/2011
4.2.2: PROPAGANDA 310Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit. pp 282-283 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 311O’kadamerie Billie, 2002, Op cit 312Ibid 313Nyakairu, Frank and Gyezaho, Emmanuel 2006, ‘Kony very sick, coughing blood’. Daily Monitor. No 214. Wednesday, August 2, 2006. pps 1-2 314O’kadamerie Billie, 2002. Op cit. 315Matsiko, Grace 2006, ‘Talks resume tommorrow’. Sunday Monitor. No 218. Sunday, August 6, 2006. pps 1-2 316Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit. pp 1-2 317O’kadamerie Billie 2002. Op cit 318Nyakairu, Frank and Gyezaho, Emmanuel 2006, Op cit. pps 1-2 319Nyakairu, Frank & Gyezaho, Emmanuel 2006, ‘S Africa considers joining Kony talks’. Daily Monitor. No 230. Friday, August 18, 2006. pps 1-2
4.3: MOTIVATION 320Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 321 On the factors that shaped the evolution of insurgency in Northern Uganda, see: Otunnu, Ogenga 2002, Op cit. McCauley Ann Carol 2008, Lord’s Resistance Army. The Seraph: Vol 1—Spring 2009. St Bonventure University. http://www.sbu.edu/studentresearch.aspx?id=25414 Accessed on 27/06/2011 Lamwaka, Caroline 2002, Op cit. Human Rights & Peace Centre (HURIPEC) and Liu Institute for Global Issues 2003, The Hidden War: The Forgotten People. War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda. October, 30th 2003. pp 36-38 of 142. http://www.huripec.mak.ac.ug/Hidden_War.pdf. Accessed on 25/07/2010 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002. Op cit. International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47 322Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit 323International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47 324Jackson, Paul 2009, Op cit. pp 323-325 325Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 326Jackson, Paul 2009, Op cit. pp 323-325 327O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 328Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 37-40
153 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002, Op cit 329Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 330Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 331Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 332Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit 333Bevan, James 2010, Op cit pp 351-352 334Okadamerie, B 1994, ‘Rebels captured’. The New Vision. Vol 9 No 115. Tuesday, May 17, 1994. pps 1-2 335Ibid 336Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 337Feldman Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 139-140 338 Ibid 339Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit “The LRA has abandoned any real political agenda and does not seek to rally popular support. On the contrary, the LRA’s primary motivation is survival of the organisation, which it accomplishes through terrorizing and pillaging civilians”. See: Hammond Guy 2011, Eliminating the Lord’s Resistance Army Once and For All. 11th October 2011. Stimson. http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/eliminating-the-lords-resistance-army-once-and-for-all/ . Accessed on 16/12/2011.
4.4: RECRUITMENT 340Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-972 341O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pps 14-15 342Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002, Op cit 343Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-27. 344O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 345Ibid 346Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit. Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 347Hennessy Selah 2010, Report: LRA Recruiting Child Soldiers in DRC, CAR. Voice of America. 12th August, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Ugandan-Rebel-Group-Accused-of-Mass-Abductions- Killings-100535724.html. Accessed on 26/06/2011 Mugarura, Mutana 2011, LRA condemned for continued forced recruitment of children. Uganda Radio Network. 21st March, 2011. http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=32312&PHPSESSID=a8954283d6b0d6afef8c57f047bb9931. Accessed on 26/06/2011 Refworld 2011, Armed groups in Central African Republic continue to recruit children—UN report. UNHCR. 25th April, 2011. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db661dfc.html. Accessed on 26/06/2011 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 2006, UN Special Representative calls for an immediate release of children. 21st November, 2006. http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/pr/2006-11-26132.html. Accessed on 26/06/2011. The Lincoln Tribune 2011, UN says armed groups in Central African Republic continue recruiting children. The Lincoln Tribune. 25th April, 2011. http://lincolntribune.com/?p=10202. Accessed on 26/06/2011 Kavanagh J Michael 2011, Lord’s Resistance Army steps up Congo attacks; More than 30 dead. Bloomberg Business Week. 18th March, 2011. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-18/lord-s- resistance-army-steps-up-congo-attacks-more-than-30-dead.html. Accessed on 26/06/2011 348Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 396-398 Feldman L Robert 2008, ‘Why Uganda has failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army’ Defense & Security Studies Analysis. 24: 1, pp 45-46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790801903210. Accessed on 22/12/2009 154 Feldman, Major Robert 2007 ‘A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 18: 1, pp 134-136 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310601173279. Accessed on 22/12/2009. Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 274-275 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007. Op cit. pp 963-972 349Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 350Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 29-31 351Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 352 O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 353Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 354Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 355Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit. 356Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 278-280 357Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit. 358Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 359Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit. 360Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 396-398
155 CHAPTER 5
TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: OPERATIONAL
5.1: TRAINING
5.1.1: INDUCTION AND TRAINING The foregoing chapter looked at the key insurgent attributes of LRA that shape its identity. The group’s ideology, motivation and esprit de corps, propaganda and popular support and mode of recruitment were examined. Over the course of the armed conflict in Northern Uganda, the evolution of the identity of LRA has generated an insurgent culture replete with unique ideals, values and norms notwithstanding similarities to previous insurgencies in terms of grievances and aims. LRA has to transmit this organizational culture among its fresh recruits predominantly coming from a non-insurgent background. In this context, the adoption of an effective induction and training regimen has become indispensable to the operationalization of the group’s activities.
This section tests the hypothesis that LRA will either have designed or adopted a training model commensurate with its military strategy and tactics and one that imparts combat and non-combat skills. The objective will be to test this hypothesis on the mode of induction and training used by the group before assessing how the group manages the career progression of its new members. This approach will furnish the study with insights into the strategy and tactics that LRA uses to integrate its initiates and maintain cohesion within its structures.
The imbalance in military capabilities favouring the Ugandan state military apparatus pushes LRA to amalgamate the basic training and military operational components of its insurgent activity. Cheney cites the example of a female LRA abductee: “Chancy was not taken to Sudan right away, but she was trained to shoot a weapon over the course of one month and was forced to loot villages and homesteads as they made their way through Gulu and Kitgum districts.” 361
156 The above training approach accords LRA three advantages: First, it saves it time. Instead of waiting to get back to bases outside Uganda to train its recruits, LRA units can undertake field operations and capacity building simultaneously. Second, this training approach gives fresh LRA recruits first hand practical combat experience. Third, field-based training and induction increases the troop strength of field operational units of the group. Recruits who learn the art of insurgency immediately after being abducted are rapidly transformed into quasi-fighters who can take on government forces before even reaching the guerrilla bases. However, this approach is not without disadvantages: LRA operational units will potentially be placed in danger given the lack of fighting ability among fresh recruits and the lack of time to weed out those who are unsuited to insurgent activity.
Given the centrality of ideology to the execution of insurgencies, LRA attaches importance to indoctrination as an integral part of its training regimen. 362 Capt Sande Otto’s induction programme commenced with a trip to the ‘Yard’ or church where he was given a white stone and had ‘Moo Yaa’ shea butter oil smeared on his body. He was subsequently forbidden from drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes and eating mutton or pork. 363
Offering further insights into the shape of indoctrination in the group, a former LRA fighter notes that “If they’ve just abducted you, they smear you with oil in the sign of the cross, on your forehead and on your chest…After we had been with them for three weeks, they drew a picture of a large heart in the ground, and divided it into thirty squares. They told us to bathe and remove our blouses and remain bare-chested. They told each of us to stand in one of the squares. They dipped an egg in a mixture of white powder and water, and drew a heart on our chests and backs. They also made a sign of the cross on our foreheads and…across our lips. Then they poured water on us. [A leader] said what they were doing was written in the Bible. Another man told us they were doing this for our protection.” 364 Francis, another ex-LRA combatant reminisces that “There was a lot of killing of children. Whoever tries to escape will be killed. For walking straight ahead, you will be killed and even for a minor mistake children will be severely tortured.” 365
157 The above initiation experiences point to some of the more strategic functions of training in LRA. The paramountcy of religious indoctrination over military training nurtures LRA recruits into becoming fearless fighters. LRA recruits are predisposed to fighting fearlessly because they believe that God is on their side.
The amalgamation of orthodox Christian and traditional Acholi religious practices brings forth a bizarrely unique doctrine that LRA recruits cannot intellectually challenge. While they may be knowledgeable on the workings of Christianity or traditional Acholi religion, a combination of the two religious practices makes it difficult for recruits to interpret the group’s doctrine. With the leadership corps of the group acting as the intellectual custodians of the hybrid doctrine, recruits into LRA are highly susceptible to manipulation.
The execution of would-be LRA escapees acts as a contingency measure. An abductee unconvinced about the validity of the group’s doctrine would not easily escape back into their community given the harsh penalties that LRA has instituted to mitigate attempted defections.
However, whilst constituting an important part of the training regimen of the group, it is worth noting that religious indoctrination does not equip LRA recruits with the skills for physically fighting government forces. Ultimately, the recruits require training in combat tactics and weapons use. In light of the imbalance in training capabilities disfavouring LRA, what are its capacity building priorities?
The group subjects the bulk of its recruits to basic military training commensurate with its drive to selectively engage the national army. After completing a three month religious induction course, Brig Acellam was subjected to basic military training that equipped him with knowledge on the principles of attack and military drills. 366 Capt Sande Otto was taught how to use a gun and participate in military parades. 367 While strategically and tactically operating differently from conventional armies, as a guerrilla group, LRA largely remains a military institution.
158 In this sense, like combatants serving in conventional armies, recruits of the group need to learn how to load and use guns, match into and retreat from a theatre of combat. At this stage, it is worth observing that while basic military training accords the group the essential expertise needed for insurgent operations, over the years, the expansion in the scope of its strategic objectives has pushed it to seek expertise in specialized areas. Its relocation to Southern Sudan not only accorded it territory and the opportunity to assemble para- state structures but also exposed it to potential enemy attack. In a bid to prepare for future set piece battles with Ugandan government forces, LRA sought to enhance its conventional military capability by sending its officers to Khartoum, Sudan for specialized training. For example Lt Col Okwangalero undertook specialized training in the use of landmines and time bombs 368 while Brig Acellam acquired the expertise needed to operate SPG9 anti-tank missiles. 369
Based on information provided by former commanders of LRA, the following deductions can be made in relation to capacity building in the group: Training in LRA is an ongoing process that starts immediately after one has been abducted and continues while one serves in the rebel force; Induction for freshly recruited members follows a systematic pattern: Recruits first learn to accommodate the idea of death and dread that of defection and thereafter, acquire the basic and specialized skills for fighting. Whereas basic military training is mandatory for all recruits, Lt Col Okwangalero, the former Head of Training of LRA reveals that only those with exceptional talent go on to pursue specialized training. 370
On the basis of the above analysis, we accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA has adopted a mode of training that is in tandem with its condition of relative military weakness vis-à-vis the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. In this respect, training in the group aims to mould fighters that are capable of engaging in serialized campaigns against the Ugandan military. The non-combat training model of LRA is geared towards achieving three objectives: First, it inculcates the ideals and values of the group among its recruits. Second, it psychologically prepares new members for the rigours of combat. Third, it emotionally detaches fresh recruits from their old communities, minimizes defections and facilitates integration and cohesion within the organizational structures of the group.
159 5.1.2: CAREER PROGRESSION Since LRA mainly conscripts children who lack ideological commitment to its struggle, the group potentially faces challenges in integrating them into its structures. In this direction, this section seeks to address some key questions: How well do new members of LRA embrace its insurgent culture? At what point do freshly recruited members start consciously participating in the insurgent activities of the group? What organizational and career progression incentives does LRA use to facilitate the full integration of its members? Answers to the above questions will show whether the training model adopted by LRA provides a foundation for the effective integration of its newly recruited members.
While LRA is in a position to conduct abductions and allocate abductees to its fighting units, preliminary indoctrination notwithstanding, its recruits psychologically struggle to embrace its insurgent culture. Discussing the dynamics underpinning recruitment and integration into LRA, Angela Veale and Aki Stavrou identify two phases in the emotional transition of the group’s initiates:
During the first phase, abductees are still emotionally attached to the old order (the normal lives they led in their communities) and resist emotional integration into the structure and workings of the new order (the abnormal lives they are beginning to lead while in LRA captivity). At this stage, Veale and Stavrou observe that “…there is still the existence of ‘us,’ the abducted children and of ‘them,’ the rebel commanders.” 371 Although allocated to different LRA fighting units, freshly recruited members nostalgically harbour defection plans. However, the twin fear of having no family to return to and the prospects of being tried for atrocities they were forced to commit by LRA operational units is one of two factors that mitigates against defections from the rebel force.
The other relates to LRA inhibiting negative shifts in its manpower levels by preventing the collective crystallization of abductee nostalgia. Veale and Stavrou argue that “any solidarity children may feel because they share the same plight or are from the same village was systematically and brutally broken down as children were forced into positions of extreme
160 isolation. All former abductees interviewed said they felt they could not trust anyone while in the LRA.” 372
During the second phase, LRA institutes its preliminary career progression incentives that facilitate the start of emotional transition among its freshly recruited members. Veale and Stavrou observe that “The military uniform served as a powerful external symbol that also created internal conflict for abductees. This is captured in the way the youth struggled to express the identity transition they had experienced: ‘I didn’t want to be a soldier’ is followed by ‘but when I became a soldier.’ There are rewards to this identity transition: Beatings and violence became less and having a gun conferred power, in contrast to the complete powerlessness of the new abductee.” 373
It is worth observing that assenting to initial career progression in LRA does not necessarily denote a genuine embrace of the insurgent culture and practice of the group. Veale and Stavrou note that in certain situations, “Resistance to this identity is conveyed through their perception that their identity is imposed. It is likely that some abductees adopt a survival strategy within the LRA of identification with the aggressor and move to a position of fuller participation.” 374
It can be deduced that quasi-integration into the organizational structures of LRA manifests at that point where freshly recruited members are accorded the first set of career progression incentives. However, at that material stage, the survivalist strategy adopted by some of the new members potentially exposes the group to defections in future. In this case, the manner in which LRA institutes additional career progression incentives (as well as disincentives for leaving) determines the extent to which its manpower levels will be affected by defections.
How then does LRA dispense additional career progression incentives? The group subjects all its freshly recruited members to the same promotional benchmark. Career progression for a new member of LRA is characterized by a gradual shift from handling less sensitive to critically sensitive affairs. For example, Brig Acellam graduated from serving as a Security
161 Officer in LRA for four years to heading the Operations Room at the LRA headquarters (in his capacity as Chief of Staff). 375 Lt Col Okwangalero went from acting as a training instructor for Kony’s body guards to commanding the LRA supremo’s protection unit. 376
The apparent existence of universal opportunities for advancement for those who can demonstrate their worth mitigates mass defections from LRA and accords members of the rebel group the opportunity of pursuing a career within its structures. Capt Apiire’s rise to the helm of the LRA chaplaincy is attributed to the stellar performances he posted at the group’s prayer functions while he was still a freshly recruited member. 377
Given the high risks inherent in an insurgent career, members of LRA are constantly exposed to death and fatal injury. The onset of physical injury to a serving officer of the group raises a pertinent question: As a guerrilla organization, LRA operates on a thin resource base. Normally, the group would be hard pressed spending its scarce resources maintaining a fatally injured or terminally ill rebel officer or fighter.
However, in seeking to institute career security within its structures, LRA does not alter the career progression of its injured members. Although he had been interned among women and children after sustaining injuries in combat, Brig Acellam was appointed to the LRA team that engaged the Government of Uganda in peace negotiations held at Palabek in Kitgum in Northern Uganda in 1994. 378 It is also imperative to observe that security in career progression is not only a preserve of the officer corps of LRA. As part of its terms for participating in the 1993 peace talks, LRA demanded that the Government of Uganda treats all its injured fighters. 379 Recovery from injury presented LRA fighters with the opportunity of reactivating their insurgent careers or embarking on post-insurgency activities. Subsequently, they would be in a good position to seek promotion within the organizational structures of the group or the Ugandan state (in the aftermath of a negotiated settlement to the conflict).
The theoretical review in Chapter 2 underscores the connection between politics and war. In this regard, the ultimate objective of insurgents is to overthrow seating governments. The
162 future control of the reigns of state power demands prior organizational preparation. In seeking to meet this requirement, insurgent groups organizationally try to mirror the groups they intend to replace and the institutions they intend to seize. In this context, Lt Col Kulaigye observes that general promotions in LRA occur immediately after those in the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF). 380 By building and maintaining a promotional model similarly parallel to that of UPDF, LRA psychologically positions itself at a level of parity with Ugandan government forces. This career progression disposition accords promoted members of the LRA officer corps inflated seniority status and an attendant vested stake in the organization.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that LRA uses its career progression model to mitigate the challenges it faces in integrating freshly recruited members into its structures. Although the use of fear helps in the allocation of recruits to different fighting units of LRA, initially, the new members struggle to embrace the insurgent culture of the group. This potentially exposes LRA to future defections. In order to prevent negative shifts in its manpower levels, the group systematically introduces promotional incentives at different stages in the careers of its freshly recruited members. In the long term, members of LRA who commence their careers as insurgent misfits, embrace its culture and end up becoming dyed-in-the-wool adherents.
5.2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Sections 4.4, 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 examine the mode of recruitment, induction, training and career progression of LRA members respectively. Like all armed groups, LRA cannot effectively attain the above objectives without an organizational framework. The structures of an insurgent group define its tiers of leadership and map the paths for the career progression of its members. Since an insurgent group draws personnel to populate its structures from its pool of recruits, in this section, an assessment of the composition and troop strength of LRA is useful in determining the wealth of manpower resources at its disposal.
163 5.2.1: COMPOSITION
5.2.1.1: Ethnicity The composition of an insurgent group not only reflects the ethnic, religious and political constituencies that support its activities but also the place of gender in the prosecution of its armed struggle. The ethnic composition of LRA reflects the enduring centrality of the North-South divide 381 to the manifestation of armed conflict in Northern Uganda and the transnational nature of the group’s insurgent activities. Until the start of counterinsurgency Operations Iron Fist and Lightening Thunder, LRA was predominantly staffed with Acholis and Langis from the North and Itesots from the East. 382 Although inhabiting Eastern Uganda, politically (especially during the first and second Obote regimes), the Itesots were in alliance with the Acholis and Langis. All these three tribes (Acholis, Langis and Itesots) are united by a common Nilotic ancestry as opposed to the Bantu ancestry that characterizes some of the tribes in Eastern Uganda and all those in the South. 383
However, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations inside Uganda has grossly limited LRA’s capacity to conduct recruitment in the above tribal areas. Left with no other option for replenishing its manpower levels, the group has had to conduct forced enlistment in Southern Sudan, North Eastern DRC and South Eastern CAR. In terms of composition, Lt Gen Koreta of Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) observes that LRA has since ceased being a Ugandan and graduated into a “regional group.” 384
Changes in the ethnic composition of LRA potentially expose Kony to an internal coup. Most of the group’s recent recruits do not speak Acholi and as a result, a communicational gap may emerge between Acholi speaking LRA officers and non-Acholi speaking LRA fighters. Whereas Acholis still dominate the top echelons of the group, the increasing depletion of the officer corps of LRA (through death and defections) leaves Kony with the tricky option of having to promote non-Acholis to top positions within his organization. With a gap in ethnic connections emerging between Kony and the reconstituted officer corps, he can no longer count on loyalty to him based on ethnicity.
164 5.2.1.2: Gender While largely seeking to restrict female abductees to non-combat activities, LRA has left the doors open for talented and skilled female members of the rebel group to assume roles as fighters. Brig Acellam reveals that while most LRA units are staffed with males, there are some mixed units with female fighters. He cites the example of an exceptional female fighter who rose to the rank of Captain in LRA. 385 By allowing women to participate in combat operations, LRA is in a position to harness all its human resources to push its violent campaign forward.
5.2.1.3: Age In the discussion on recruitment, we noted some of the strategic advantages inherent in LRA targeting children for enlistment. An ex-LRA commander observes that children are “nimble, easy to train and quick to forget home.” 386 His position is validated by the account of Capt Apiire who underscores Kony’s uneasiness in working with adult members of the group. On one occasion, for questioning the brutal tactics employed by LRA, Apiire (who was conscripted into LRA as an adult) was lashed three hundred times with a whip. 387 Whereas there is broad empirical consensus on LRA choosing to predominantly use child soldiers, a debate on the exact number of young abductees within its ranks generates conflicting figures. While Veale and Stavrou observe that children constitute 90% of the fighting force of the group, 388 Jackson Achama, Kony’s former Personal Secretary maintains that only 10 to 15% of child abductees are still in LRA captivity. 389
There is one probable explanation for the above conflicting statistics. There may be a fluid interface between recruitment and defection in LRA. The group realizes high child enlistment numbers as it does defections and rescues. The composition of LRA can be attributed to two factors: First, the interaction between the strategic recruitment objectives of the group and the political contradictions fuelling the insurgency in Northern Uganda. This interface yields the ethnic, gender and age-based elements in its composition. Second, the transnationalization of the insurgent activities of LRA which has recently widened the base of its ethnic composition. Ultimately, however, LRA constitutes its membership by recruiting wherever and whomever they can limited only by constraints placed upon them.
165 5.2.2: TROOP STRENGTH The foregoing section throws up some of the challenges in examining the organization of insurgent campaigns. In the case of LRA, scholars and counterinsurgency officers not only struggle to estimate its ethnic, gender and age-based composition, but also the actual size of its fighting force. In relation to troop strength, the divergence in opinion arises from two premises:
First, there is a thin line separating fully fledged fighters from those undertaking non- combat duty. In LRA, every recruit is potentially in a position to assume a fighting role. Yet, not every member of the group regularly fights. 390
Second, as discussed in the previous section, the composition of LRA may be shaped by simultaneous forced mass enlistment and mass defections and rescues. 391 In this context, it is a challenging task determining how many freshly recruited members go on to assume fighting roles and how many recruits-cum-fighters LRA loses in defections and abductee rescue missions conducted by UPDF.
Borzello asserts that LRA is generally a small insurgent organization. Whereas the Ugandan military establishment estimates the troop strength of the group never to have exceeded 5,000 fighters, LRA puts its troop strength at a figure closer to 10,000 fighters. 392 Robert L Feldman points out that Kony commands “a few hundreds to several thousands” of fighters. 393 Jeroen Adam et al estimate LRA’s troop strength at between 500 and 5,000 fighters. 394 At its formative stage, O’Kadamerie notes that Kony commanded a staggering 10,000 fighters. 395 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that by 1990, the troop strength of LRA had dwindled to between 3,000 and 4,000 fighters. 396 By 1997, James Bevan notes that the size of LRA had swelled to 5,000 fighters. 397
When he surrendered to government forces in 2005, Brig Sam Kolo, the former Spokesman for LRA estimated the size of LRA at between 400 and 500 rebels (fighters, women and children inclusive). 398 At the time of the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between LRA and the Government of Uganda (GoU) in 2006, LRA asked the Government
166 of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to supply it with food for feeding 5,000 fighters. According to Borzello, diplomats who visited the LRA base in Garamba forest in DRC during the Juba peace talks in 2007 observed that Kony probably commanded a force of “...about 5,000 rebels, perhaps half of whom are women and children.” 399 Although Kony is currently estimated to command a force of between less than 500 and 700 fighters, the group insists its troop strength stands at 1,000. 400
Figure 2
Although the debate on the troop strength of the group generates divergent opinions, we can attempt an interpretation of the statistics. We analyze the first set of figures quoted by O’Kadamerie, LRA and the Ugandan military together because they relate to the same phase of the group’s campaign. According to O’Kadamerie, (at the formative stage of LRA) Kony commanded 10,000 troops. The Ugandan military asserts that (at its peak) LRA was a 5,000 man force. At its peak, the group insists it had 10,000 fighters. In terms of size, LRA is likely to have been at its largest (peak) at the formative stage. The group enjoyed popular support and the government had not yet launched Operation North that significantly depleted its manpower base. 401 Given the role of propaganda in asymmetric conflicts, the government and the rebels may have understated and overstated the troop
167 strength of LRA respectively. In constructing Figure 2, we have quoted 10,000 because this figure is adduced by two sources. In this sense, we have been swayed by the need to triangulate evidence.
We have not used the statistics adduced by Feldman (“a few hundreds to several thousands”) and Adam et al (500 to 5,000) to construct Figure 2 because these figures relate to the whole life cycle of LRA. With these numbers, it is difficult to determine the specific size of the rebel army at the different stages of its campaign. The IISS provides a figure for 1990 (3,000). With this, we can attempt an explanation for the decline in the troop strength of LRA [Figure 2]. The effectiveness of counterinsurgency Operation North may have undermined the group’s capacity to wage war and recruit inside Uganda. 402 By 1997, the size of LRA had shot up to 5,000 fighters (from 3,000) [Figure 2] With Sudan supporting LRA, the group enhanced its military capability 403 and capacity to conduct abductions inside the country.
The dwindling of the troop strength of LRA in 2005 (from 5,000 to 400 fighters) [Figure 2] may be attributed to the effectiveness of Operations Iron Fist I and II that dislodged the group from Southern Sudan, 404 precipitated its relocation to North Eastern DRC and curtailed its capacity to recruit and train fighters inside Uganda and Southern Sudan. The upswing in the troop strength of the group in 2007 (from 400 to 5,000 fighters) [Figure 2] may be attributed to one of two reasons: LRA may have used the lull in fighting occasioned by the onset of the Juba peace process to beef up its troop numbers. In the event this figure is inaccurate, then the group inflated its troop strength to secure and stock food (supplied by the GoSS) ahead of a planned resumption of hostilities with Ugandan government forces. 405
In the aftermath of Operation Lightening Thunder, estimates of the group’s troop strength range between less than 500 and 1,000. IISS estimates the size of LRA at between less than 500 and 700 fighters. This figure appears to exclude non-fighting members of the group. Although for propaganda reasons, LRA may have overstated its strength (1,000), we adopt this figure because it appears to accommodate the fighting and non-fighting members of
168 LRA. In other words, the group may have had about 700 fighters (assuming the IISS figure is accurate) and approximately 300 non-fighters (assuming the LRA figure is accurate). The decline in the troop strength of LRA (from 5,000 to 1,000 fighters) [Figure 2] may be attributed to the effectiveness of Operation Lightening Thunder that destroyed most of its insurgent infrastructure and undermined its capacity to recruit and train fighters inside Uganda, Southern Sudan and North Eastern DRC. 406
The above analysis points to regular shifts in the manpower levels of LRA. Whereas counterinsurgency operations have significantly affected its troop strength, an attempt at figuring out the actual number of LRA fighters demobilized by these campaigns generates conflicting outcomes. The International Crisis Group attributes this problem to the different approaches used in determining its troop strength. Whereas some figures incorporate women and children into the estimated size of LRA, others only reflect the number of men under arms. 407
5.2.3: STRUCTURE Based on the analysis in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, it can be asserted that LRA assembles its structures from a pool of predominantly male recruits drawn from the Northern and Eastern parts of Uganda. The number of members that populate the organizational structures of the group depends on the effectiveness of prevailing counterinsurgency operations, LRA’s own popularity and its use of terrorism against its own people. This section tests the hypothesis that LRA will have evolved as a politico-military organization characterized by a structural separation of functions, with its armed wing subordinated to its political wing.
Up until the commencement of the Juba peace process, LRA lacked established tiers of leadership devoted to articulating its political objectives. Although in the formative phase of the LRA insurgency, there was an attempt to create a political/external wing of LRA, Kony resisted this move. O’Kadamerie observes that exiled politicians hailing from Acholiland such as Otema Allimadi, Dr Benjamin Obonyo, Prof O Bwangamoi, and Col Owiny Omoya “…wanted to be recognised as Kony’s political chiefs but insisted that Kony
169 changes the name of the rebel group ‘to something else more acceptable, not Holy…’” The LRA head rejected the idea preferring to maintain total control over his forces. 408
By the onset of the Juba peace process, LRA lacked a coherent political cadreship to negotiate with the Ugandan government. Consequently, it had to constitute sections of the Acholi community in exile into the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM) (its political/ external wing) to take part in the talks.
However, this move was not without drawbacks: The political and military wings of the group operated at variance with each other. This significantly affected the progress of the Juba peace process. Jackson cites two factors that drove a wedge between the two organs: “…the old rift of 1993 between those who are in the Acholi diaspora and those led by Kony…;” the fact that there is “…little agreement between them (the two LRA camps) as to the aims of the negotiations and more specifically, what Kony wants out of any peace agreement, particularly given the existence of warrants from the International Criminal Court on him and his associates.” 409 Matsiko shows the extent of the disconnect between the political and military wings of LRA. He observes that “Several members of the 15- member LRA delegation are viewed by some elements in Kampala and Juba as not being truly representative of Kony and his fighters. A number of the delegation members flew into Juba either from London or Nairobi where they live.” 410
Despite the rather late evolution of a political wing (LRM), the military wing played a more decisive role in asserting the position of LRA at the Juba peace talks. According to Henry Okello Oryem, Uganda’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and a member of the Uganda Government peace delegation, LRA (the military wing) maintained its position of pre- eminence because Kony could not rule out some members of LRM (the political/external wing) colluding with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to have him tried for allegedly committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. 411
In order to audit the activities of LRM, LRA named two guerrilla commanders, Col Leonard Bwone Lubwa and Lt Col Santos Alit as part of its twelve man delegation to the
170 Juba peace talks. 412 While the unstated mandate of the political wing was to rationalize the negotiation positions of the group, the military wing seating at the LRA headquarters in Garamba forest made the final decisions. The disharmony in the relationship between LRA and LRM ultimately manifested when Kony and his commanders (military wing) rejected the Final Peace Agreement that the LRA peace team (largely made up of members of LRM) was about to reach with the Government of Uganda peace delegation. 413
Over the years, while stifling the evolution of a political wing, LRA has demonstrated an appreciation for military and non-military organs within its structures. However, unlike in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group where there was a separation of powers, LRA exhibits a fusion of functions. As Head of LRA, Kony is the spiritual and military leader of his armed group. While he delegates some of his military functions to the LRA Army Commander, as a member of Control Alter, the division that superintends over LRA’s four divisions, 414 he is still in a position to monitor and audit all military activities of the group.
The organizational structure of LRA is not only shaped by Kony’s personal security concerns and his apparent drive to remain firmly in charge of his group. The prevailing military capability of LRA may also dictate its structural posture. According to Brigadier James Mugira, the Chief of Military Intelligence of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) LRA came across as a conventional fighting force while it benefited from Sudanese military support. 415. In this respect, the group exhibited centralized command and control. It is important to note that while there is a measure of consensus on the broad outlook of the centralized command structures of LRA, there is a divergence in opinion on the specific features of these leadership tiers. At the heart of the contention is the challenge in reconciling the hierarchical attributes of LRA with traces of shared decision-making within its structures.
From literature reviewed and interviews conducted, the ‘source’ of LRA commands is not in dispute. Apparently, the ‘Holy Spirit’ issues spiritual edicts to Kony who in turn acts as the Laor or Spiritual Medium/Interpreter. 416 Below Kony, there are two contending
171 positions on the manner in which the spiritual instructions crystallize into military commands. The first perspective posits LRA as a hierarchical organization. To this effect, commands flow from Kony (the Head of LRA) to the Deputy Head of LRA (the Holy Chief), the LRA High Command, divisions, brigades and battalions in that order. 417 At and below the High Command level, there are conflicting positions on how the group’s structures are organized. Whereas one perspective points to divisions, 418 the other points to brigades 419 as the largest units of the LRA fighting force.
From a conventional military perspective, the existence of divisions would point to a sizable LRA army. In explaining the organization of the British army, Mark Oliver observes that “The composition of each brigade will differ depending on its responsibility but could often contain 5,000 soldiers…A division would traditionally be made up of three or four brigades depending on the specific role it is to undertake…” 420 With four divisions (ofcourse depending on the size of each), LRA’s troop strength would be somewhere close to an astronomical 60,000. On the other hand, an army made up of four brigades (and depending on the size of each) would put the LRA troop strength at approximately 20,000. Whichever position one adopts (the differences between the sizes of conventional and unconventional units notwithstanding), there is a broad consensus that there are five large units of LRA. Control Alter (division or brigade) superintends over four divisions or brigades, namely: Sinia, Gilva, Stocree and Trinkle.421
Borzello attempts a breakdown of the LRA organizational structure below the High Command (presumably Control Alter) level. Commensurate with conventional military institutions, each of the divisions is sub-divided into brigades, battalions, companies and platoons (assuming that a division is the largest unit of the rebel group). However, a principle point of departure in structuring emerges at the basic unit level. Unlike conventional armies where all fighting units are staffed with fully fledged combatants, the Rebel Family, the basic unit of the LRA fighting force is made up of combatants and non- combatants. According to Borzello, a typical LRA Rebel Family is staffed with a rebel commander, his wife, children, escorts and helpers. 422
172 The composition of the Rebel Family presents the group with some critical dilemmas: How does it harness the non-combatant resources within its basic units? Would the wives, children and helpers of the LRA commanders constitute a combat liability in skirmishes with the enemy? Would the total militarization of the Rebel Family (training the wives, children and helpers) compromise the group’s quality and ethics of combat? Confrontation between UPDF and Rebel Families points to the underlying liability inherent in staffing the basic units of an insurgent force with non-combatants. The wives, children and helpers of LRA commanders are always unable to cope with fire fights and often end up surrendering to government forces. 423 These surrendering personnel may often end up furnishing government forces with intelligence on the activities of the group.
The first perspective is significant in other ways. Besides emphasizing a hierarchical chain of command, it draws a distinction between strategy formulation and strategy implementation within the structures of LRA. In the formative phase of the LRA campaign, there was no interaction between Control Alter and the brigades it superintended. O’Kadamerie observes that in 1993, Kony’s “…early ‘division’ (or brigade) commanders like Ben Opiro (Gilva), Otto-Otti (Condum), Obitre-Gama (Stocree) and Oyet-Waliki (Sinia) were a collection of fanatical followers and he kept shuffling them around.” O’Kadamerie separates the above officer corps from the “….hardliners at his (Kony’s) headquarters such as the late Bosco Oyuk, the late Dominic Dulmony, Otti-Lagony and Obong Kijura who ensured all his commands were followed.” 424
Under the above structural arrangement, it would appear that one set of officers constituted a kind of military bureaucracy that sat at the LRA headquarters and probably drew the group’s war plans while the other was in the field implementing them. On the basis of this point, two deductions are noteworthy: First, there was a separation of powers and functions within the structures of LRA. To this effect, the commanders of the divisions/brigades (units for strategy implementation) were not members of Control Alter (the organ for strategy formulation). Second, in light of the hierarchical chain of command, there was no collegial decision-making within the leadership structures of the group.
173 The second perspective springs from the notion that there is interaction between Control Alter and the units it controls. We can test the validity of this perspective by answering three questions: Who populates Control Alter? What is the nature of decision-making in this organ? Do members of Control Alter engage in strategy formulation and strategy implementation?
Under pressure from counterinsurgency Operations Iron Fist I and II, LRA split up into two forces: One, commanded by the late Vincent Otti (the then Deputy Head of LRA) relocated the LRA headquarters from Southern Sudan to North Eastern DRC; 425 The other, commanded by the late Tabuleh (the then third-in-command) re-entered Uganda and conducted attacks in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country. 426 While the Juba peace talks were under way, Ugandan military intelligence suspected that Dominic Ongwen (one of the top five LRA commanders indicted by the ICC) and units under his command were trapped somewhere in Northern Uganda and needed a ceasefire to link up with the main LRA force in North Eastern DRC. 427 From the above accounts, Otti and Ongwen at one time physically commanded LRA troops. Under the first perspective, they would have been involved in strategy implementation and would therefore not be members of Control Alter. A closer inspection of the group’s tiers of leadership upsets this assumption.
In indicting Joseph Kony, the late Vincent Otti, the late Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC was guided by the assumption that these were the top most leaders of LRA who in their power had consciously plotted the group’s terrorist strategy. 428 If the ICC assumption is accurate, then presumably, there is a platform of some description within LRA where the group’s strategy is debated. The culpability of the above five commanders stems from the leverage each one of them ostensibly enjoys within the highest decision-making organ in choosing to endorse or reject the group’s modus operandi. It is therefore plausible to assert that Control Alter exists and Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, Odhiambo and Ongwen were/are members of this supreme decision-making organ of LRA
There is further evidence to support the existence of Control Alter and the idea that the Head, Deputy Head and other top commanders of LRA constitute a high decision-making
174 organ of some sort. In 1993, Kony (the Head), Otti-Lagony (his Deputy), Oyuk, Dulmony and Kijura were based at the LRA headquarters. The job of Lagony, Oyuk, Dulmony and Kijura was to enforce Kony’s will. 429 Given the proximity (based in the same place) these five commanders had to each other, their propensity to interact and the strategic nature of their functions (transmitting commands to the lower tiers of the group’s leadership), the group presumably has a top-level forum of sorts in which it collectively maps its strategy.
Having adopted the position that Otti and Ongwen are/were members of Control Alter, we can deduce that there is interaction between the highest decision-making organ of LRA and the units it controls. In this sense, members of Control Alter not only formulate strategy but (like Otti and Ongwen) they also implement it by physically commanding troops. To emphasize this point in Figure 3, the commanders of the LRA brigades appear in the same box as the Head and Deputy Head of the group because all of them presumably belong to Control Alter. At the same time, there are arrows showing the connection between the brigade commanders and lower tiers of military leadership. This is intended to illustrate the other function of these leaders—the implementation of the group’s strategy. Brigade commanders fulfil this duty by coordinating the activities of battalions, companies, platoons and rebel families.
It is plausible to place the Director of Religious Affairs in Control Alter as well. Since there is a Chaplain attached to each battalion, 430 then the overall head of the Battalion Chaplains (presumably the Director of Religious Affairs) is hierarchically positioned somewhere above the battalion level but below the Deputy Head of LRA. This logic positions him in Control Alter at the same level as the brigade commanders of Gilva, Sinia, Trinkle and Stocree (but of course with different responsibilities).
While in Control Alter, the Director of Religious Affairs is presumed to be hierarchically at par with the brigade commanders, the hierarchical relationship between a Battalion Commander and a Battalion Chaplain is unclear. In Figure 3, dotted lines support the assumption that parallel hierarchies exist at this tier of leadership. In this sense, while a Battalion Commander reports to a Brigade Commander, a Battalion Chaplain presumably
175 reports to the Director of Religious Affairs. Under this arrangement, the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Chaplain are hierarchically at par.
176
Figure 3: Centralized Command Structure of LRA
177 Thus far, this section has examined the structure of LRA in times of enhanced military capability and notes its akinness to conventional military institutions. There is a need to establish whether the group is in a position to maintain its centralized organizational posture in leaner times. Brig Mugira and Lt Col Kulayigye of UPDF and Lt Col Otim formerly of LRA concur that a decline in military capability precipitates changes in the structure of the group. LRA adopts a flexible, informal centralized command structure. 431 Assessing the impact of UPDF counterinsurgency campaigns against the group, the International Crisis Group notes that “LRA has further subdivided into smaller units to avoid detection by the army….While command and control is still intact, there is no longer a fixed headquarters such as existed for years in Southern Sudan, nor is there any longer external support.” 432
Figure 3 largely depicts the centralized command structure of the group. As is the case with any organization, there are informal channels of communication, rivalries and fluctuations that affect command and control. However, emerging information on LRA notwithstanding, it shows the stable, formal organizational structure of the group. It is also important to stress that while LRA might be strategically centralized and hierarchical, at the tactical and operational level, individual units are able to act with considerable autonomy. LRM is not included in the illustration because it has never been fully integrated into the structures of LRA.
Given the above analysis, we reject the hypothesis in this section. Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has not evolved as a politico-military organization. While assembling a structure with military organs, up until the onset of the Juba peace process, it lacked a fully fledged tier of leadership dedicated to articulating its political agenda. The hypothesis is also rejected on grounds that LRA does not separate its military from non-military organs. Kony is the military and spiritual leader of the group.
178 5.2.4: LEADERSHIP AND INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL SCHISMS In the previous section, we attempted to understand the rationale behind shifts in the organizational structure of LRA. It is imperative to observe that the calibre of personnel deployed in the structures of a rebel group may affect the way it functions. For example, the skills and character traits that individuals (especially those who go on to become leaders) import into the structures of an organization may shape its leadership. In order to push this debate forward, it is important to assess the calibre of leaders who have staffed the structures of LRA. This exercise will help us understand the relationship between leadership style and the structure and working of the group.
Since its inception, LRA has been headed by Joseph Kony. This would imply that for over 25 years, Kony has devised an effective leadership style that has kept the insurgency in Northern Uganda alive. If this assumption holds true, it is important that we do two things: First, examine the kind of attributes Kony has brought to the leadership of LRA. Second, assess the impact of his leadership style on the structure and working of the group.
As supreme head of his organization, Kony exudes a leadership style shrouded in mysticism, invincibility, unpredictability and charisma. His fighters and individuals external to LRA struggle to put a finger on his true character traits. According to Lt Col Otim, Kony is a unique human being. His behaviour oscillates between that of a child and an adult. 433 He exhibits unpredictable mood swings. Within a short spate of time, he can switch from being temperamental and rude to being highly jovial and friendly. 434
Whereas the above conduct could be a reflection of his natural character and personality, one cannot entirely rule out Kony exploiting this behaviour to consolidate his control over LRA. According to Jackson, Kony commands “personal charisma” and engages in “theatrical gestures” intended to mesmerize his audience. He hypnotizes his followers by donning aviator spectacles, long hair, women’s clothes and laughing in a “mesmeric voice.” 435 If we accepted the notion that the character traits of Kony are underpinned by strategic calculations, then we should be in a position to show the specific role that his conduct plays in directing the LRA insurgency.
179 Among former commanders of the group interviewed, Kony’s behaviour has yielded a leadership style that is an asset and a liability to the movement. They affirm that his leadership style has been key to the longevity of the LRA insurgency. According to Capt Ray Apiire, the former Chaplain of LRA, the LRA leader behaves like a chameleon. 436 In interacting with members of the LRA officer corps, Kony rarely sticks to already agreed positions. The unpredictable behaviour that governs the interaction between the rebels and government forces appears to equally characterize that between Kony and his commanders. In the armed confrontation between LRA and UPDF, the rebels maintain a measure of unpredictability in their activities in order to avoid being wiped out by government forces.
Among the LRA officer corps (High Command/Control Alter), Kony demonstrates unpredictability in decision-making because of either of two reasons: His character is predisposed to inconsistency or he acts the way he does because he envisages individual or collective threats to his position of power potentially coming from his commanders. If the second explanation is true, then the leadership style of Kony has turned Control Alter into a theatre for latent leadership contests. Since Kony does not fully trust his commanders, he has to do everything within his means to secure his life. He may not only need to increase the rate of his unpredictable conduct but also commit most of the resources and efforts of the group towards his personal security. The above state of affairs potentially elevates Kony’s personal security to the same level as that of the group. The survival of Kony then potentially becomes synonymous with the survival of LRA. This in turn makes him the centre of gravity of the group. If Kony is eliminated, LRA would potentially be thrown off- balance. In the post-Kony era, the LRA officer corps would grapple with some critical choices: What kind of leader would replace Kony? Would his persona fit into the structure and working of LRA as assembled by Kony?
The leadership style of Kony affects LRA in other ways. According to Brigadier Michael Acellam and Lt Col Okwangalero, the frequent alteration of the group’s war plans stifles the progress of the insurgent campaign in Northern Uganda. Anticipating regular changes, Kony’s juniors usually adopt a measured approach in implementing his instructions. 437
180 The pitfalls of his leadership style notwithstanding, Kony commands an aura of invincibility in LRA. The rank and file of the group believe he is possessed by powerful spirits. 438 Equipped with these supernatural powers, Kony is ostensibly in a position to foresee the future course of the LRA insurgency and second guess the enemies of his movement. Lt Col Okwangalero cites an incident where a hitherto non-Arabic speaking Kony spoke fluently in this language with members of a Libyan delegation visiting the LRA base in Southern Sudan. 439
If Kony manipulates his persona to maintain a firm hold over LRA, then he requires a pool of credentials and experience to authenticate his position. Prior to establishing LRA, Kony assembled his wealth of insurgent credibility by first serving as a Spiritual Mobilizer attached to the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) Black Battalion commanded by Major Apia 440 and later as a Ritual Assistant to Lakwena, the leader of the Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I). Given the centrality of ‘spiritual’ warfare to the evolution of the HSM I and HSM II rebellions, Kony’s qualifications accorded him much needed start-up credibility.
In light of the perceived, potential threat that his commanders pose against him and his modest educational and military background, what kind of leaders does Kony appoint in LRA? Over the years, he has pursued a disuniform approach in deploying personnel within the structures of his organization. At the stage of formation, the group was staffed with personnel with patchy credentials. Beyond this phase, Kony attempted to populate his structures with a better trained and more refined officer corps.
In accounting for the presence of personnel with questionable records within the structures of LRA, a former member of the group reveals that “…by 1988 when we negotiated with the NRM government, Kony had already broken away from UPDA. When we came out, we had already disagreed with Kony and he took the most deadly and primitive officers with him. There were also indications that the fighters who had committed atrocities during the fighting were willing to join Kony since they had no place else to go.” 441
181 However, while preferring to appoint personnel with patchy credentials, Kony beefed up the structures of LRA with some refined individuals boasting illustrious careers. While engaged in a bitter turf war with UPDA, he integrated some seasoned military officers formerly of UPDA into the structures of his group. For example Brig Justine Odong Latek, Lt Col Basilio Opwonya, Lt Col Dr James Kweya, Lt Col Terensio Okullo, Lt Col Athocon, Lt Col Mazoldi Lubangakene, Col Joseph Obonyo, Maj Kenneth Banya, Maj Stephen Moyi, Maj Benjamin Apia and Lt Col Kaggwa assumed leadership positions within Kony’s organization. 442
Despite their higher military and administrative expertise, the above crop of officers was subordinated to LRA officers with less distinguished records. O’Kadamerie reasons that while seeking to exploit the expertise of the ex-UPDA officer corps, ultimately Kony sought to work with a crop of commanders “…who would not doubt his mystic powers…” 443 In stark contrast with the highly trained ex-UPDA officers, recruits with questionable records were more susceptible to indoctrination.
In a sense, it can be argued that Kony is weary of better trained officers overshadowing him. Yet the rise of Maj Gen Vincent Otti to the position of Deputy Head of LRA debunks this notion. Although not in the same mould as the highly trained ex-UPDA military officers mentioned above, Otti came from a conventional military background and had undertaken more formal education than Kony. 444 Until his execution on Kony’s orders, Otti was Kony’s right hand man. 445 During the Juba peace talks, Kony hardly spoke a word. Otti always articulated the negotiation positions of the group. 446 What factors could have contributed to the rise of Otti? Since he was one of the pioneering members of the group, over the years, Kony may have grown to trust him. While weary of being overshadowed, Kony may have needed trained officers to execute some important tasks. For example, he needed someone with some formal education to convey his position. With Otti occupying an important position in the group, what could have caused the rift between him and Kony?
182 Lt Col Okwangalero traces the Kony-Otti rift back to the Juba peace talks. The two disagreed over the strategic relevance of the Juba negotiations to the LRA insurgency. Whereas Otti wanted LRA to use the negotiations to secure a dignified exit from its insurgent activities, Kony preferred the group using this period to regroup. 447
By adopting a pacifist position, Otti won acceptability within Ugandan and American intelligence circles much to the chagrin of Kony. 448 Consequently, in a bid to stave off a potential challenge to his leadership, Kony executed Otti. 449 The execution of Otti may have marked the end of disuniformity in the composition of the LRA leadership. Henceforth, Kony may have taken to appointing only individuals with patchy records and those exhibiting unquestionable loyalty to him. Maj Gen Okot Odhiambo, who replaced Otti, is known for being unquestionably loyal to Kony and notorious for leading some of the most brutal LRA attacks in Northern Uganda.
On the basis of the above analysis, we can make the following deductions: By adopting an unpredictable mode of interaction with members of the LRA officer corps, Kony elevates the threat to his position as leader of LRA to the same level as that of the group. While the group has to act in a deceptive manner to avoid being obliterated by Ugandan government forces, Kony has to constantly change his commands to mitigate a coup against him. The similarity in the behaviour of Kony and LRA makes the Head of LRA the centre of gravity of the group. In the event Kony was killed, captured by government forces or overthrown by his commanders, LRA would be thrown off-balance. The group would struggle to identify a leader to replicate the leadership style of Kony. In the event the new leader of LRA interacted with his commanders in a predictable fashion, then he would cease being the centre of gravity of the group. Predictable interaction within Control Alter would restore a measure of trust between the leader of the group and his lieutenants. This would probably de-prioritize his security vis-à-vis that of the group. With other members of Control Alter comfortable in their interaction with the Head of LRA, their confidence as leaders would start growing. In case the government eliminated Kony, the group would not be short of replacements.
183 The Kony-Otti rift shows the fragility in disuniform insurgent leadership models. While largely staffing his inner circle with individuals with questionable records, Kony was off mark in thinking that a modestly better trained officer than him (Otti) surrounded by officers with patchy credentials would not pose a future threat to his position as leader of LRA. Significantly, it can be noted that when lower levels of leadership present a threat to Kony, his reaction upsets the organizational foundation of the group’s structures.
5.3: GUERRILLA BASES Since the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) command a conventional military edge over LRA, the group strives to maintain mobility to survive. Outside theatres of military engagement, LRA needs safe bases to train its fighters, allow them recuperation after field operations and nurture para-state structures that would prepare it to seize the reigns of state power. 450 However, as discussed in the theoretical review, guerrilla bases accord government forces the opportunity of attacking fixed areas of insurgent activity. Against this backdrop, we test the following hypotheses: 1. LRA will have located its bases in topographically inaccessible areas to limit attacks on them. 2. The LRA insurgency will have been located in an area with a history of armed insurrection and susceptibility to weak central government control.
Henry Mukasa offers insights into the topographical challenges that faced regional forces participating in counter LRA Operation Lightening Thunder in 2008:
“The forested Garamba National Park where the UPDF, SPLA and Congolese army are hunting for LRA rebels has a difficult terrain. The park is dense with outlandish trees that are strongly buttressed with umbrella-like canopies. The undergrowth of climbing plants and thickets make movement within the park almost impossible. Dwellers depend on footpaths. Obstacles also include impassable rivers that dissect the grasslands, hills, rocky areas and wild animals. There is no infrastructure to talk about. In these circumstances, the fastest means of transport would be air transport” 451
184 Reinforcing Mukasa’s position, Lt Gen Koreta 452 and Scott Johnson pinpoint poor meteorological conditions and rough terrain as the principle challenges that hampered UPDF operations in North Eastern DRC. According to Johnson, “Shortly after dawn last December 14 (2008), four Ugandan Mi-24 helicopters banked low over the thick forest canopy of Congo’s Garamba National Park. A dense fog had rolled in overnight, and the weather had turned nasty….Descending through the fog bank and hovering just above the tree line, the pilots spotted what looked like a rebel council meeting in the largest cluster of shelters, code named Camp K. The gun ships immediately unleashed a barrage of rockets and chain gunfire.” 453
Because of rough terrain, there was a 48 hour time lag between the aerial strike and ground forces arriving at Camp Swahili (the main LRA base in Garamba). Johnson notes that “Two days after Operation Lightening Thunder begun, Ugandan commandos finally reached Camp K. They found bloody trails heading into the jungle in all directions. Hastily dug graves dotted the site’s periphery.” 454
In the theoretical review, we observed that the location of guerrilla bases is not only dictated by the terrain of an area but also by its predisposition to political violence and susceptibility to weak central government control. In choosing to locate its bases in Southern Sudan, LRA did not exploit weak central government control in that part of the country. Rather, there was a confluence between its calculations and those of the Sudanese government. Operation North had dislodged it from Northern Uganda. The group needed a sanctuary in a neighbouring country. Sudan was facing a rebellion mounted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the Southern part of the country. It needed a proxy group to help in stabilizing the area. In enlisting the services of LRA, the Government of Sudan (GoS) allowed the Ugandan group to operate in the highly unstable Magwi, Parajok, Imatong, Torit and Owiny Kibul areas in Southern Sudan.455 On the other hand, when it relocated to North Eastern DRC, 456 LRA exploited weak central government control to establish its presence in that part of the country. 457 In the post-colonial era, Eastern and North Eastern DRC have been hotbeds for insurrections against successive governments
185 seating in Kinshasa. Over the years, rough terrain and ineffective government control have hampered efforts geared towards putting down rebellions in that part of the country. 458
The organization of LRA bases offers insights into some of the enduring priorities underpinning its campaign. In designing its sanctuaries, the group showcases the centrality of ideology to its activities. At the height of the LRA campaign, Patrick Nyakahuma Kamara, a Ugandan radio and television journalist had the rare opportunity of visiting a deserted LRA camp in the company of David Ongiya, a former LRA rebel who had surrendered to Ugandan government forces in Kitgum district in Northern Uganda. According to Kamara, the ideological beliefs of LRA were vividly reflected in the physical architecture of its guerrilla base in Kit Valley, situated 120 kilometres inside Southern Sudan. Ongiya revealed to Kamara that it was ritualistic for Kony to kneel outside his huts and pray in an area where he had used stones to design replicas of the rosary. 459 In this sense, LRA marshals ideological consistency in two related ways: It embeds its faith-based beliefs in the physical architecture of its sanctuaries. The same set of beliefs is partially reflected in the group’s faith-based doctrine and military strategy.
In light of the imbalance in resource capabilities favouring the Ugandan state military apparatus, LRA seeks to establish guerrilla bases that limit the costs of executing its campaigns. For example, in order to mitigate the outbreak of disease, LRA enforces orderliness and high hygienic standards. At Kit Valley, once home to 3,000 LRA fighters, Kamara recalls seeing exceptionally neat, clean, well built huts. 460 At Camp Swahili, an LRA guerrilla base situated in the middle of Garamba forest in North Eastern DRC, Grace Matsiko notes that insurgents were well supplied with fresh and clean water flowing in a stream. 461
Whereas mitigation of epidemics is a critical priority, marshalling food security is a short, medium and long term concern for the group. LRA bases are organized to reflect the drive to marshal food security for its fighters. To this end, the group extensively cultivates cereals. At Kit Valley, LRA had extensively cultivated sorghum and maize. 462 At LRA bases in Bin Rwot, Lubanga-Tek and Acholi hills in Southern Sudan, Lt Col Kulaigye
186 notes that LRA had cultivated 10 square miles of food. 463 At Camp Swahili in North Eastern DRC, Scott Johnson observes that “Kony had been on the run for two decades, but this place had the look of a settled homestead. Acres had been cultivated with sorghum, cassava and maize. Stashes of sugar, rice and water in large plastic containers were buried all around.” 464
According to Brig Mugira, LRA had cultivated about 13 kilometres of food crops in Garamba forest in North Eastern DRC. However, with Ugandan government forces overrunning this base, the group has now resorted to looting and raiding in its theatres of insurgent activity. 465 The production of cereals gave LRA food that it could easily preserve. As observed by Johnson, the group buried its food stocks to meet this objective.466 LRA bases reflect its levels of technological advancement. While on a guided tour of Kit Valley, Kamara recalls seeing a vehicle, generator and camcorders. 467 Although an agrarian Non-State Armed Group (NSAG), the discovery of modern equipment at one of its bases showcases the importance LRA attaches to the acquisition of modern technology to execute its campaign.
The sanctuaries of LRA are also organized to cultivate and reflect the group’s capacity to manage the affairs of state in the post-insurgency era. It erects structures tailored to accommodate para-state institutions that attempt to reflect its ostensible knowledge on the structure and working of Ugandan state institutions. According to Frank Nyakairu and Emmanuel Gyezaho, “The warlord (Kony) has built a makeshift camp in Garamba he calls ‘The LRA Parliament’ made up of four grass thatched neatly built houses in a triangular shape.” 468 By naming one of its makeshift camps “LRA Parliament,” the group may have attempted to acknowledge the need for a legislative dimension to political organization. Ultimately, the above symbolic organizational paraphernalia may have been intended to showcase its preparedness to run the Ugandan state on the basis of an established constitutional framework. In concluding, we accept the hypotheses in this section. LRA largely locates its guerrilla bases in topographically inaccessible areas, characterized by weak central government control and in countries neighbouring and hostile to the Ugandan government.
187 5.4: FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has operated in different parts of the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Between 1987 and 1993, it was active in the Acholi region of Northern Uganda. Between 1994 and 2002, LRA was based in Southern Sudan, 469 fought alongside the Sudanese military 470 and conducted raids into Northern Uganda. When the Government of Sudan officially withdrew support for the group, 471 Kony relocated his forces to North Eastern DRC 472 where they were dislodged in 2008 by Operation Lightening Thunder mounted by Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudanese forces. 473 Currently, units of LRA are constantly on the move, attacking civilians in Southern Sudan, North Eastern DRC and the Central African Republic. 474
It is worth noting that shifts in the LRA theatres of insurgent activity have not only shaped the evolution of its military strategy and tactics but also the organization of its funding and external support activities. Whereas relocation to sanctuaries in Southern Sudan and North Eastern DRC accorded the group space to mobilize and manage external support, the official loss of aid and sanctuaries have pushed the group to frugally manage its resources and seek alternative sources of funding. This section seeks to establish how the group has assembled its domestic and international support networks, managed its resources, prepared for and made the transition between receiving and being denied external support. We test the hypothesis that LRA will have relied on popular support and criminal activity domestically and exploited geo-political contradictions regionally to mobilize resources for prosecuting a relatively cheap insurgent campaign.
In waging its armed campaign against the Ugandan government, LRA has exploited poor relations between Uganda and Sudan to assemble its resource base. From literature reviewed and interviews conducted, there is a strongly emerging consensus that points to the pivotal role that Sudanese support played in sustaining the LRA insurgency between 1994 and 2002. As discussed in Chapter 1, Sudan supported LRA because Uganda was extending military aid to rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). 475
188 Although the conclusion of the Nairobi Accord of 1999 was supposed to have ended the Uganda-Sudan proxy war, 476 intelligence and media reports indicate that the Government of Sudan (GoS) may as well have continued covertly rendering external support to LRA beyond 2002. 477 The enduring ties between LRA and the GoS show the weak link between improved Uganda-Sudan relations and the state of the LRA-GoS alliance. While the Nairobi Accord had significantly reduced hostility between the two neighbouring states, Khartoum still had to contend with SPLA. In seeking to deal with this problem, Sudan would have needed the support of LRA.
Given the significance of LRA as an actor on the Sudanese conflict scene, a number of questions arise: How did the LRA-GoS alliance evolve? What was the nature of this alliance? The initial contacts between LRA and the GoS were made by Dr Riek Machar, the leader of SPLA United and Nyuon Bany who doubled as a leader in SPLA United and the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). SPLA United was a breakaway faction of SPLA. 478 The LRA-GoS alliance was feasible because of the following reasons: In SPLA (and her external backer, Uganda), Sudan, LRA, EDF and SPLA United had common enemies. EDF and SPLA United were weary of SPLA (with the backing of Uganda) establishing itself as the dominant rebel group in Southern Sudan; The GoS had an interest in crashing SPLA and destabilizing its external backer (Uganda).
In entering an alliance with the above actors, LRA may have been swayed by the following considerations: It had taken a beating during Operation North and was in need of external support to reinvigorate its campaign; 479 SPLA was not only a threat to the GoS but also LRA. In 1986 (on the instigation of the NRM government), SPLA attacked remnants of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) who had taken refuge in Southern Sudan. This attack is cited as one of the reasons behind the onset of armed conflict in Northern Uganda. 480 It can be asserted that external support for LRA evolved at three mutually reinforcing levels: LRA exploited divisions within SPLA and poor Uganda-Sudan relations to secure external support to fight the GoU; SPLA United and EDF exploited poor Uganda-Sudan relations to link LRA to the GoS to fight SPLA; Sudan exploited divisions within SPLA to extend external support to LRA to fight SPLA and Uganda. With the above alliance
189 configuration, LRA evolved into a destabilizing and stabilizing force. Regionally, Sudan would use the group to destabilize Uganda (the principle backer of SPLA). Domestically, Khartoum would deploy LRA to stabilize Southern Sudan by attacking SPLA.
With contact between LRA and the GoS initiated, there were a number of challenges to contend with: How were the two sides going to operationalize their alliance? How would LRA relate to the Sudanese military? Would it remain an autonomous force or would it be integrated into the structures of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)? According to Izama, Sudanese support for LRA was contingent on the Ugandan group operating as part of a wider counter SPLA military alliance along what was known as the “Southern flank.” 481 Santos Ocaka, who claims to have served in the Gilva brigade of LRA, reveals that while at his base at Palataka trading centre in Southern Sudan, Sudanese military officials flanked by SPLA United officers led by Martin Kenyi, informed his unit that it had to take part in military operations against the John Garang-led SPLA. 482
It is important to note that by operating along the “Southern flank,” LRA was not in any way subverting the strategic course of its own campaign. In 1995, ’97 and ’98, a joint UPDF-SPLA force had attacked its units. 483 Thus, whilst appearing to meet a conditionality set by Khartoum, LRA was in effect fighting its own war. Pursuing a similar position that understates the control the GoS had over LRA, Capt Ray Apiire, the former Chaplain of LRA, observes that despite pursuing Islamist foreign policy objectives at that time, the Khartoum establishment did not force Islam down the throat of LRA. 484
Despite receiving military support and being given an external sanctuary, LRA diversified its mobilization of resources possibly because of two reasons: First, probably due to logistical challenges in the GoS supporting it, sometimes the group found itself with insufficient materiel. It had to devise means of surviving during times of scarcity. Second, LRA and the GoS were in an alliance of convenience. In case Uganda-Sudan relations improved, it would be difficult to determine how Khartoum would behave. LRA needed to build self-reliance beyond its alliance with the GoS. These two factors may have pushed the
190 group to adopt criminal activity as a way of independently mobilizing funds for its campaign.
Upon relocating to Southern Sudan, LRA faced critical shortages of food, clothing, arms and ammunition. The group had to devise means of meeting these key necessities in the short and medium term. According to O’Kadamerie, “…the food shortages had continued to worsen and a Sudanese army column had recently come to bring them arms…Because of food shortages, they had begun raiding Dinka villages for food, usually maize, cassava, chickens and goats.” 485
However, the adoption of the above strategy was not without drawbacks: According to Ocaka, a former LRA rebel, “…the problem is that the Dinka villagers are armed. Sometimes we had to fight them. Sometimes, Garang’s SPLA would come and chase us out.” Equally, attempts at conducting raids inside Uganda presented LRA with challenges. Maj Charles Angina, 4th Division Intelligence Officer in the Ugandan army, notes that at one point in its life cycle, LRA contemplated dispatching a contingent to loot clothing in Uganda but backed down for fear of getting caught up in ambushes mounted by units of SPLA that had cut off all major routes to Uganda. 486
In discussing the diversified approach to resource mobilization adopted by LRA, each theatre of insurgent activity presents the group with opportunities for receiving and independently mobilizing resources to prosecute its armed campaign. While in Southern Sudan, LRA received aid from the GoS and was at the same time at liberty to conduct looting raids in this part of the country. While operating in Uganda, LRA not only mobilized its resources through plunder 487 but was also a beneficiary of funding organized by Northern Ugandans in the diaspora. 488 The above strategy gave the group multiple resource mobilization contingencies: Successful counterinsurgency campaigns inside Uganda would not completely cripple its capacity to mobilize funds. The group would still be in a position to receive aid from the GoS, the Northern Ugandan community in exile and it would also conduct raids inside Southern Sudan. Equally, deterioration in LRA-GoS relations would not totally curtail its resource mobilization activities. Kony would still be
191 able to rely on external support rendered by the Northern Ugandan community in exile and conduct raids in Southern Sudan and possibly inside Uganda.
Given its reliance on plunder, some sources assert that the group has metamorphosed into a criminal organization. Feldman observes that “Though ostensibly the money is to finance its attempted overthrow of the government, the actions and structure of the LRA in some ways appear to be more representative of a criminal enterprise than a revolutionary one.” He adds that in seeking to assemble its financial structures, LRA engages in a wide array of criminal activity: For example, it engages in human trafficking. Some of its abductees are sold off to willing buyers. Kony’s forces also peddle illicit drugs, engage in armed robbery targeting individuals, stores, banks, taxis and buses and in the rural areas, raid villages and loot farms. 489
While criminal activity would undermine popular support for LRA, it would not negatively affect its strategic calculations. Poor LRA-Acholi relations fitted in with changes in the motivation of the group. Counterinsurgency operations weakened its capacity to overthrow the NRM government. Sudan was not providing the group with sufficient capability to cause regime change in the country. Sections of the Acholi population were collaborating with the state. Because of these three reasons, LRA could not fulfil its original mission— reversing changes in the regional balance of power in Uganda. Since the Acholi (whom the group was supposed to protect) were siding with the enemy, then there were some strategic benefits in the group attacking the population: First, the group would punish the population for ‘betraying’ the ‘Northern cause.’ Second, it would destabilize Uganda, the principle backer of SPLA. This would please Sudan which would reciprocate by providing more support to LRA. Third, LRA would assemble its resource capacity to cope with shifts in external support for its insurgent activities.
Thus far, this section has addressed the ways in which LRA mobilizes its resources during the course of armed confrontation with the GoU. From literature reviewed and interviews conducted, there is a strong indication that peace negotiations with the GoU also present the group with opportunities for replenishing its resource base. According to Lt Col Kulayigye,
192 during the Juba peace talks, LRA duped Caritas, an international humanitarian organisation into supplying it with more food than was commensurate with its actual troop numbers. Although the group’s estimated troop strength stood at less than 1,000 fighters, it benefited from food supplies for a fictitious fighting force of 10,000 soldiers. 490
As already observed in this section, Sudan may have been cautious (and strategic) in the amount of support it extended to LRA. Probably mindful of the possibility of LRA expanding into an uncontrollable threat to the security of Southern Sudan, Khartoum mainly equipped the rebel group with light weapons 491 to counteract SPLA and destabilize Northern Uganda. This capability was not sufficient for the group to overthrow the NRM government. The small arsenal of heavy weapons that LRA received from Sudan was mainly intended to give the rebels a defensive capability against potential joint UPDF- SPLA attacks on their bases in Southern Sudan. In the event the LRA-GoS alliance collapsed, Khartoum would probably have found it easier to neutralize a lightly rather than a heavily armed LRA.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA does not depend on popular support to fund its insurgent campaign. The adoption of a terrorist/criminal strategy by LRA and the creation of protected villages by the government have combined to limit the group’s domestic resource mobilization options. Without cordial insurgent-civilian interaction, the Acholi population cannot extend support to LRA. The notion that the group exploited political contradictions in the Great Lakes Region to cultivate external support is accepted. However, this development depended on the prevailing strategic calculations of LRA’s external backers. Where there was a confluence of interests (between LRA and the GoS), the group secured external support. In this study, it was not possible to determine actual expenses incurred by LRA in conducting its campaign.
5.5: STRATEGY AND TACTICS The problem statement pinpointed changes in the evolution of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. Unlike previous episodes of irregular armed conflict in the country, the LRA
193 insurgency has constituted the population into a military target. However, we observed that a terrorist strategy throws up a critical dilemma for the group: LRA would have needed the support of the population to redress the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). 492 In this respect, attacks on the Acholi population would potentially precipitate a withdrawal of this support.
We also observed that by itself, terrorism cannot deliver the control of the state to insurgents. In order to take effective control of the reigns of state power, insurgents need to occupy territory and seize key installations hitherto occupied and defended by government forces. 493 Thus, for guerrillas, direct confrontation with government forces is ultimately inescapable. At face-value, LRA appears to have operated in contradiction to the above laws of insurgency. This section examines the military approach used by the group. It specifically tests the following hypotheses:
1. The LRA military strategy will have been based on the prosecution of an unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign, selectively targeting loop-holes in the capability of the enemy while adapting to its own condition of relative military weakness. 2. LRA will have selectively attacked civilians to expose the Ugandan state as incapable of protecting its citizens. In turn, this will have pushed the government to adopt a heavy handed approach to tracking down the rebels. 3. LRA will have attacked weak points in the military capability of the Ugandan state and avoided outright confrontation with government forces. 4. LRA will have used terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive movements in its theatres of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy.
5.5.1: RATIONALIZATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS LRA uses terrorism to strip the Ugandan counterinsurgency campaign of its auxiliary forces. It attacks Acholi civilians to discourage them from enlisting in paramilitary groups and providing government forces with intelligence. Brig Acellam notes that sections of the population in Acholiland engaged in counter LRA military activity and espionage. Local
194 leaders armed civilians with bows and arrows while in one incident, hunters who stumbled on 800 boxes of LRA arms directed the authorities in Kitgum district to the location of these weapons. 494 During Operation North, Bigombe, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office in charge of Northern Uganda spearheaded the establishment of self defence groups aimed at augmenting counterinsurgency operations mounted by the Ugandan military. 495
As a reaction to these developments, LRA commenced gruesome attacks on civilians, cutting off the lips, ears and noses of its victims. 496 During the 1993 peace talks between between LRA and the GoU, Kony attempted a rationalization of this approach: “If you picked up an arrow against us and we ended up cutting off the hand you used, who is to blame? It is you. The Bible says that if your hand, eye or mouth is at fault, it should be cut off.” 497 In this context, the group raises the cost of using auxiliary forces in counterinsurgency campaigns in Northern Uganda. Civilians can only participate in counter LRA operations at a high cost—attracting increased attacks from the group. In turn, an upsurge in LRA terrorist attacks necessitates the Ugandan military establishment reassessing its deployment priorities. UPDF would have to choose between deploying fewer troops to chase LRA units and stationing more government soldiers at Internally Displaced People’s camps and villages to protect civilian life.
During the 1993 peace talks, LRA admitted and attempted to rationalize its terrorist strategy. During the Juba peace talks, the group admitted and deflected responsibility for atrocities committed in Northern Uganda. According to its peace team, “While the LRA does not deny that there were incidents of atrocities committed, it is not true that most of them were committed as a policy of the LRA and or with the approval of the high command….…because the enemy used the population as a human shield, whenever the LRA attacked the UPDF positions, death of civilians in crossfire was inevitable. Secondly, it became a UPDF policy to manipulate…… the population against LRA. The people who we expected to support the cause of LRA………became allies and spies of the UPDF against the LRA. Eventually, they were armed with spears and arrows to fight the LRA...... we know that many of the atrocities blamed on the LRA were committed by the
195 UPDF, a typical strategy they used in the Luwero triangle when they fought the Obote government.” 498
The position of the LRA peace team shows the potential interaction between military strategy and propaganda in asymmetric conflict. The group advanced three possible explanations for terrorist activity in Northern Uganda: The Acholi population was armed by the government. This constituted it into a legitimate target of LRA attacks; Not all LRA attacks were sanctioned by its leadership. Given organizational challenges in guerrilla warfare, at times, the group’s units operated with a high degree of autonomy; Some of the attacks attributed to LRA may have been false-flag attacks mounted by the Ugandan military. In order to occupy the moral high ground during the negotiations, the group had to rationalize its terrorist activity. To this effect, LRA only attacked civilians because it was left with no choice; Where the group was culpable, it had no control over its forces; In a bid to establish a balance of notoriety between the two sides, the group linked some of the terrorist attacks to covert operations mounted by the government.
Lt Col Okwangalero, an ex-commander of LRA offers further insights into the strategic use of terror in the conflict in Northern Uganda. He argues that it is a widely used method of conducting conflict and in the case of LRA, it draws the attention of the international community. 499 According to another former commander of the group, “They (LRA) want to prove the world wrong, that they are not finished. Atrocities speak louder than what the Ugandan government claims.” 500 By publicizing its potency, the group makes itself indispensable to the resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda. In the event the government failed to defeat LRA, then it would have no choice but negotiate with it.
Bevan pinpoints a link between the strategic calculations of Sudan and LRA adopting a terrorist strategy. Khartoum supported the rebel group because it was capable of destabilizing Uganda. Since LRA was not provided with sufficient capability to overthrow the government, it could only attack the population to meet the strategic objectives of its principle backer. In turn, the destabilization of the Ugandan state (through terrorist attacks) was the only way the group would maintain its relevance to the Northern question. 501
196 In conclusion, we partially accept the second hypothesis in this section. Mindful of the role of the Acholi population in counterinsurgency operations and the army’s incapacity to protect civilians while pursuing rebels, LRA has adopted a terrorist strategy that mainly targets civilians in Internally Displaced People’s camps. This military approach exposes the Ugandan state as incapable of protecting the population, makes participation in civil defence activities highly costly for Acholi civilians and demonstrates the rebel group’s disruptive capability.
If the creation of poorly managed protected villages were considered a heavy handed counterinsurgency measure, then the second hypothesis is partially rejected. LRA attacks on civilians commenced after the Ugandan government had established strategic hamlets in Northern Uganda. In this regard, the adoption of a terrorist strategy by LRA did not precipitate a harsh response to its activities by the Ugandan state. Rather, drastic counterinsurgency measures by the Ugandan government pushed the group to adopt a terrorist approach. Given the paradox underpinning the military strategy adopted by LRA, the longevity of the group can be attributed to its sheer use of force and circumstance occasioned by the external support it has received from Sudan and the topographical constraints inherent in trying to eradicate it.
5.5.2: OPERATIONALIZATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS Given the centrality of terrorism to the insurgent strategy adopted by LRA, over the years, the Ugandan military establishment has stepped up troop concentration in densely populated areas and enhanced the chances of a head-on confrontation with the rebels. The above shifts in counterinsurgency strategy have had a knock-on effect on the evolution of tactics that LRA employs in its operations. While mainly seeking to devise basic operational methods that would allow it to violently access the civilian population in Northern Uganda, for the group, the need to design a tactical framework for dealing with well armed government forces is increasingly inescapable.
Discussing the evolution of tactics employed by LRA, Brig Mugira observes that over its life cycle, the group has gone from employing conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare
197 and lately, to avoiding confrontation with UPDF. 502 Prior to 2003, Lt Col Kulaigye points out that LRA employed conventional military formations.503 However, due to counterinsurgency pressure (starting with Operation North in 1991), the group has since switched to conducting ambushes and outright targeting of civilians. 504
In light of the start-up strength commanded by government forces, LRA has to choose areas where it could establish an edge over the enemy. In pursuing this objective, the group pays special attention to the psychological preparation of its fighters. Before heading into the battle theatre, LRA soldiers receive blessings from their spiritual leaders and are promised immunity against enemy bullets. 505 This instils fearlessness among them and may make up for some of the battlefield disadvantages that the group shoulders in its confrontation with UPDF. Where UPDF boasts better equipped foot soldiers, LRA may make up for a shortfall in this area by deploying poorly equipped but fearless fighters.
The group could also register an edge over the state in the way it selects, accesses and withdraws from its targets. Given their lack of confrontational capability, civilians constitute the softer target of LRA attacks. On the other hand, the military capacity at its disposal makes the Ugandan military the harder target of rebel attacks. In seeking to exert its military strength, LRA selectively and randomly attacks civilian and military targets. Selective civilian targets include refugee camps, Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps and schools. Over the years, some of the more definitive attacks on civilian targets have included a raid on St Mary’s College, Aboke (a Catholic founded school for girls) in 1989 506 and an attack on Acholi Pii refugee camp in 2002. 507 In prosecuting its insurgent campaign, LRA has also demonstrated the propensity to attack specific military targets. At the height of its insurgent activity inside Uganda, the rebels mounted a daring attack on Gulu barracks where President Museveni was residing while on a visit to Northern Uganda. 508
Whereas selective targets accord the group already assembled canvasses on which to exercise its military potency, in their absence, random targets act as a backup operational platform. Acholi Pii had the hallmarks of an LRA selective target. It had a large
198 concentration of civilians and was lightly guarded. The group could attack it (as it did) and exercise its terrorist potency without expending much military effort. 509 Where the Ugandan military has beefed up security at IDP camps, LRA can conduct random attacks against civilians and soldiers along highways. In the long run, the intensification of ambushes pushes the Ugandan military to reassess its deployment priorities. More troops are released from guarding the protected villages and sent to man military patrols. This development then re-exposes the strategic hamlets to future rebel attacks.
According to Matsiko, the units that LRA deploys against civilians are stronger than those that it deploys against government forces.510 This deployment approach underlines the centrality of terrorism to the group’s insurgent campaign. LRA has deconventionalized its duel with Ugandan government forces by constituting the Acholi population into a primary target of its attacks. In order to reconventionalize the armed conflict in Northern Uganda, UPDF has had to beef up its deployments at civilian settlements. This counterinsurgency strategy aims at re-establishing a confrontation between combatants—that is LRA and UPDF. 511
We have observed that LRA attacks civilians in order to dissuade them from enlisting in self defence groups also known as Home Guards. 512 Despite adopting this approach, the group has not fully attained its objective. LRA attacks have neither stopped government creating militias nor discouraged civilians from joining them. However, Home Guards have since evolved into another target of LRA attacks. Self defence groups are neither soft targets as they are made up of civilians under arms nor hard targets as they have not undertaken rigorous military training and lack heavy weaponry. Their paramilitary credentials notwithstanding, they present the first line of resistance against LRA attacks on civilians. In order to attain its terrorist objectives, LRA has to neutralize these militias. According to Col Ochora, rebels attack Home Guards at bars on pay day. 513 In conducting these attacks, the rebels exploit the paramilitary (semi-civilian, semi-military) disposition of the self defence groups. Since they are semi-civilian, Home Guards are more susceptible to unregulated leisure activity during times of conflict than soldiers. When caught off-guard,
199 they are vulnerable to rebel attack. On the other hand, given their highly regimented lives, government soldiers would be less likely to suffer a similar fate.
Having examined the rationale behind LRA’s target selection, the next area of interest in its tactical framework is the mechanism it uses to insert fighters into the theatre of armed confrontation. Cline attempts a description of the group’s attack operandi: “Typically, the rebels appear to divide into small bands in order to lead raids into Uganda. Groups of five to twenty rebels wander through the bush, maintaining radio contact with their fellows.” 514 Brig Acellam reveals that for operational purposes, LRA units typically split up into groups of 10 to 11 fighters. 515 James Bevan maintains that this tactical approach is “…effective for attacking and abducting people from the local community, as well as for avoiding costly encounters with UPDF.” 516 However, Brig Acellam contends that this operational approach has since pushed UPDF to similarly split up its counterinsurgency units in order to tactically match LRA in this area. 517
Since attacks on civilians constitute the hallmark of the activities of LRA, a question arises: In situations where the group conducts random attacks, how do its units locate targets? Former abductees reveal the role of conscripted guides in pinpointing the location of civilians. According to Chancy, a former abductee, “We thought it was safe to sleep in the bush and wake up in the morning. But the rebels got a certain lady who knew where we were sleeping. So she led them to us…They asked ‘Are there government soldiers around?’ ‘Is there a trading centre around?” Richard, another former LRA abductee notes that “They wanted me to direct them where there are more children…” 518
The use of conscripted guides underscores the indispensability of locality intelligence to the execution of selective attacks in insurgencies. Guerrillas not only need to know the footpaths and roads leading to selected targets but also require accurate information on the identities and locations of inhabitants in these designated places. According to Brig Acellam and Capt Sande Otto, LRA usually deploys fighters in their respective areas of origin. 519 For example, the unit that abducted Capt Sande Otto in Koch Goma, Gulu district in 1994 was commanded by Otti Lagony who hails from this area. 520
200
While the mode of confrontation between LRA fighters and government forces is relatively predictable (fire fights), that between the rebels and civilians requires closer inspection. The population lacks the capacity to take on the insurgents. How much force then does LRA use when attacking civilians? Cline attempts a description of a typical confrontation between LRA operational units and the population in Northern Uganda: “In town, the rebels loot trading posts and steal medicines from small health clinics. In the bush, they loot compounds, beating and often killing the adults, and abducting many of the children. They burn huts when they leave, and steal everything edible or useful.”521
It can be deduced that LRA uses terror to acquire provisions, recruit members and demonstrate its capability. In interacting with civilians, the rebels demonstrate the amount of harm they can inflict. The minimum ill-treatment civilians can expect from the rebels is beatings and abduction. The maximum, death. This continuum fits in well with the group’s strategy. Those who are subjected to minimum ill-treatment count themselves lucky and will cooperate with the group to avoid being subjected to maximum ill-treatment. LRA needs this group of victims for two reasons: Those it captures will be least expected to defect. The prospect of being caught and summarily killed would loom in their minds; Those who escape back to government controlled areas will recount their horrible experiences thereby publicizing the lethality of the group.
Since there is an imbalance in confrontational capabilities between the rebels and civilians, what specific instruments does the group use to attain its terrorist objectives? Describing a raid mounted by the group on July 25th 2002 in Kitgum district, Northern Uganda, Feldman notes that “…the elderly were killed with machetes and spears. Babies were flung against trees.” 522 Chancy (an ex-LRA rebel) reminisces the killing of a rebel who was caught trying to escape: “They used clubs or big sticks and they beat and hit him. They always hit the back of the head.” 523 The group uses rudimentary instruments and objects in the environment to lower the cost of conducting its operations. Unlike guns, rebels do not need replenishable accessories (ammunition) to use matchetes, spears and clubs. Hard objects against which people can be flung readily exist in most of the places the group attacks. By
201 hitting the heads of their victims with blunt objects, rebel units probably aim to cause instant death thereby economizing the amount of time needed to attain operational objectives.
Having successfully conducted a raid, the next challenge for the insurgents is disengaging from the theatre of skirmishes. Unlike the stages at which LRA inserts its units and conducts its attacks, when it starts withdrawing from the scene of the attack, confrontation with government forces is more likely. UPDF units that may have failed to foil an insurgent raid usually await contact with the rebels as they retreat from the scene of the attack. The tactical posture of retreating LRA units is usually geared towards eluding contact with UPDF. In this direction, the group uses the following tactics:
When rebel units anticipate an ambush by government forces, they disperse. Richard, a former abductee reveals some of the tactics that LRA uses to camouflage its movements: “When we were moving in the bush, we reached an area which was not safe. The rebels were fearing the government troops. So they told us not to move in lines but to disperse and each one should move in the same direction but not following each other so that our routes cannot be traced.” 524 This tactic not only camouflages the field operational movements of rebel units but also where UPDF manages to establish confrontational contact with them, all of them would not be wiped out.
When rebels anticipate hot pursuit mounted by UPDF rapid response units, they retreat in circles. According to Feldman, LRA’s mastery of the terrain in Northern Uganda accords the rebels the luxury of taking “…the army in circles across the entire region with ease, much to the frustration of UPDF.” 525 Capt Otto reveals that the party that abducted him moved in circles never returning to the scene of his abduction. 526 This tactic not only covers the movements of the group’s units but also psychologically disorientates government forces.
In the event the rebels successfully eluded or fought off counterinsurgency units engaged in hot pursuit, the next phase in the operational cycle of an LRA attack is facilitating a safe
202 return to the guerrilla base. Whereas the group disperses its forces when inserting them in a theatre of combat, it concentrates them when preparing to return to its sanctuaries. According to Chancy, a former abductee, the LRA unit that abducted her “…joined up with the rest of the battalion and reported their new acquisitions. Chancy estimated there were around one hundred soldiers...” 527 Cline notes that “The small rebel bands then reunite, and march together back across the Sudanese border.” 528 Reassembling allows LRA units to take preliminary stock of the gains and losses registered in combat and facilitates an orderly return to the group’s bases.
In concluding this section, it can be asserted that the insurgent activities of LRA generally conform to guerrilla strategy and tactics. The first hypothesis is partially accepted. LRA wages an unpredictable campaign. In conducting random attacks along the busy highways in Northern Uganda and by retreating in circles, the group demonstrates a capacity for unpredictable activity. However, the notion that an insurgent campaign should be protracted does not hold entirely true for LRA. As noted by Uganda’s Chief of Military Intelligence and Army Spokesman, the strategic military disposition of LRA has always depended on its prevailing military capability.
When LRA was a recipient of Sudanese military aid, it engaged in conventional warfare. In this case, armed confrontation between LRA and UPDF units was mainly defined by a few big clashes along fixed frontlines. This was not a serialized mode of armed confrontation (protracted campaign). On the other hand, when the military capability of the group declined, it adopted a guerrilla posture, engaging Ugandan government forces in a series of skirmishes along shifting frontlines. We partially accept the third hypothesis. While predominantly seeking to attack soft targets (unarmed civilians and lightly armed self defence units), as evidenced by the daring raid on Gulu military barracks, on certain occasions, LRA has not hesitated to take on the Ugandan army. In this regard, LRA does not always avoid confrontation with the Ugandan military. However, it is important to note that this is more of an exception than a rule.
203 The fourth hypothesis is accepted. LRA’s tactics are principally hinged on deceptive movements that heavily rely on terrain intelligence and mobility. As Capt Sande Otto notes, knowledge on the physical and human geography of targeted areas allows LRA raiding parties to conduct retreat in circles, psychologically disorientating Ugandan government units that are engaged in hot pursuit.
5.6: WEAPONS AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION This thesis maintains that in asymmetric duels between the two sides engaged in the armed conflict in Northern Uganda, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) command a start up military edge over LRA. Principally, an imbalance in confrontational capabilities is measured in terms of the quantity and calibre of weapons at the disposal of the contending sides to a conflict and the ease with which they acquire and use these instruments of coercion. We set out to test the hypothesis that LRA will have used a wide range of weapons according to availability and will have purchased and stolen its arms and ammunition from a variety of domestic and foreign sources. The discussion in this section will be guided by the following specific questions: How does LRA acquire its weapons? What kind of weapons does it use? What is the relationship between the mode of acquisition, the quantity and calibre of weapons used and the strategic, tactical and operational calculations underpinning the insurgent activities of the group?
Over the course of its life cycle, LRA’s weapons acquisition campaign has significantly been shaped by shifts in the state of Uganda-Sudan relations. In Chapter 1, we noted that between 1994 and 2002, Sudan rendered external support to LRA in retaliation for Ugandan support for rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). 529 Ofwono Opondo notes that in 1994, “…the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) Brigadier Jerome Mugume also admitted that Kony had recently acquired landmines and other explosives from the Sudanese government.” 530
Although the Nairobi Accord of 1999 was expected to repair hitherto frosty Uganda-Sudan relations, 531 the extent of Sudanese support for LRA in the aftermath of the conclusion of this agreement remains a subject of intense debate. Borzello notes that “There have been
204 repeated and unconfirmed allegations by the Ugandan military that the Sudanese government has continued to supply the LRA through arms drops in Garamba national park. In 2006, when rebels moved towards assembly points as part of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, newspaper reports said onlookers were surprised at the number, quality and apparent newness of the weapons carried by the LRA.” 532 However, Brig Mugira stresses that “there is no evidence of fresh supplies of arms” for the group. The stocks that LRA is currently using were concealed before the start of Operation Iron Fist. According to Mugira, the group is currently avoiding contact with UPDF because it lacks an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. 533
The above contending perspectives suggest long term shifts in the weapons acquisition strategy employed by LRA. With the conclusion of the Nairobi Agreement, LRA may have gone on to use its old stocks of weapons or identified new weapons suppliers altogether. In discussing the first scenario, Feldman points out that LRA is a “self sustaining organization” with sufficient stockpiles of weapons. It needs only a few of these arms and ammunition for operational purposes. 534 In this sense, the strategy and tactics employed by the group determine its weapons acquisition approach. While attacking civilians in its theatres of insurgent activity, LRA rarely uses guns. Thus, deterioration in relations with its principle external supporters would neither push it to hurriedly seek an alternative weapons supplier nor affect its capacity to conduct operations in the short and medium term.
The second scenario is spurred by the argument that LRA may have been securing its weapons from the arms trade fuelling other conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The Inter Press Service (IPS) notes that “Zaire is an arms trafficker’s dream. With the help of corrupt military and civilian officials, arms merchants are funnelling weapons through the country to a plethora of conflicts in the area.” The IPS report names some of the beneficiaries of arms trafficking in the Great Lakes Region of Africa as Angola’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Hutu dominated Former Army of Rwanda (FAR), Hutu rebels fighting the Government of Burundi. 535
205 The IPS report adds that “Other customers for the arms may be the shadowy Ugandan rebel movement, the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Christian rebels in Southern Sudan who are wrapped in a conflict with the Muslim north.” IPS quotes a Human Rights Watch (HRW) Arms Project report released in 1995 that attempts to pinpoint states involved in arms trafficking in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The HRW report alleges that “France, Zaire (currently DRC) and South Africa were actively aiding the direct shipment of arms, facilitating such shipments from other sources, and providing other forms of military assistance including military training.” According to Gerald Owachi, former Soviet satellite republics particularly Bulgaria were also allegedly involved in arms trafficking in this part of Africa. 536
While offering insights into some of the probable alternative sources of weapons for the group, the IPS report does not specifically address LRA’s weapons acquisition strategy in the aftermath of the conclusion of the Nairobi Accord. The probable French and Zairean (Congolese) support for LRA may have been occasioned by Uganda’s military interventionism in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In the mid-1990s, Uganda was aiding guerrilla groups in Sudan, Rwanda and Zaire (currently DRC). Since Uganda is an Anglophone country, its interventionist designs in predominantly French speaking countries (with the exception of Sudan) of the Great Lakes Region of Africa were perceived by France as a geo-political affront on its sphere of influence on the continent. The alleged French support for Ugandan rebel groups may have been aimed at checking growing Anglophone influence in this part of Africa. However, it is worth noting that by 2005, Uganda had repaired relations with her principle adversaries in the Great Lakes Region thereby limiting the chances of LRA receiving military aid from the above Francophone states and Sudan. 537
Although the debate on the sources of weapons that LRA uses generates divergent perspectives, in all the interviews conducted and literature reviewed for this study, Sudan emerges as a principle source of external military aid to LRA. 538 The LRA-GoS alliance was underpinned by a confluence of calculations. The GoS supplied the group with weapons only sufficient to disrupt the Government of Uganda (the principle supporter of
206 SPLA). LRA did not mind receiving limited support from Khartoum as long as it maintained the capability to conduct attacks inside Uganda and remain a thorn in the flesh of the NRM government. 539
LRA is mainly equipped with small arms and ammunition. 540 Brig Mugira reveals that it uses Sub Machine Guns (SMGs), Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and land mines. 541 Brig Acellam reveals that the LRA arsenal consists of light weapons, mainly AK-47 rifles, light machine guns, G-2s and heavy weapons like the Russian-made SPG-9 and SA 7 Strella anti-aircraft missiles. 542 Given the fact that a significant number of LRA recruits do not come from a military background, there is always the need for the group to train its members in weapons use. As part of a capacity building programme, the GoS made arrangements for Lt Col Otim of LRA to undertake specialised training in the use of Strella anti-aircraft missiles. 543
With light weapons, the group is in a position to maintain mobility in its theatres of insurgent activity. This guarantees for the group selectively minimal contact with government forces while it assembles its military capability. On the other hand, the acquisition of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons gives LRA the capability to defend its bases against potential aerial assaults mounted by the Ugandan air force. In this sense, whilst unable to seize state power, with the array of weapons at its disposal, LRA was in a position to selectively exercise its military potency and destabilize Uganda—Sudan’s regional enemy.
It is probable that the group may currently be using arms and ammunition acquired while it enjoyed cordial relations with the Sudanese government. This would call for effective long term concealment and preservation of weapons caches. Borzello observes that in the mid- 1990s, LRA concealed its weapons in Northern Uganda. 544 Lt Col Kulayigye notes that the conclusion of the Nairobi Accord (which normalized Uganda-Sudan relations) pushed the group to conceal most of its arms and ammunition in Equatorial Province in Southern Sudan. 545
207 Based on the foregoing discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA uses a wide array of weapons. Its arsenal ranges from rudimentary instruments for subduing civilians, small arms for engaging the enemy in the field of combat to heavy Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) for defending its guerrilla bases. Over the course of its life cycle, the group has mainly received its arms and ammunition from Sudan which was engaged in a proxy war with Uganda. On the basis of the Inter Press Service and Human Rights Watch reports, LRA purchased arms from arms dealers supplying weapons to other rebel groups in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In this research, there was no evidence to suggest that the group acquires its weapons through theft.
208 END NOTES
TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: OPERATIONAL
5.1: TRAINING
5.1.1: INDUCTION AND TRAINING 361Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 362Wilkerson notes that “Few, if any, similar guerrilla or insurgent groups worldwide have been capturing, brainwashing and training children for as long as the LRA, and its leaders have refined their brutal techniques to an art form”. See: Storo Christine 2011, The Lord’s Resistance Army and their reign of Terror. Consultancy Africa Intelligence. Monday, 17th January, 2011. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=643:the-lords- resistance-army-and-their-reign-of-terror-&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265. Accessed on 26/06/2011. “It is safe to assume that the ranks of the non-Ugandan fighters have been replenished as LRA abductions in CAR, Congo and Sudan have continued unabated since December 2008. Abductees are quickly forced to fight alongside the LRA with little training”. See: Sudan Tribune 2010, The Lord’s Resistance Army remains Ugandan force. Sudan Tribune. 24th September, 2010. http://www.sudantribune.com/The-Lord-s-Resistance-Army-remains,36382. Accessed on 26/06/2011. “The captured civilians are being forced to undergo military training at the LRA’s base in the Garamba National Park in northeastern DRC, close to the Sudanese border and not far from the CAR”. See: Institute for War Peace Reporting 2008, LRA prepares for War not Peace. Institute for War Peace Reporting. ACR Issue 168. 1st May, 2008. http://iwpr.net/report-news/lra-prepares-war-not-peace. Accessed on 26/06/2011. 363Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit. 364 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 365Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit. pp 278-280 In an interview conducted by Mark Colvin of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Anneke van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher on Congo for Human Rights Watch discusses the experiences of an ex- LRA combatant: “He’d watched the LRA leaders kill his father in front of him and he then had to undergo military training of which one component was to kill unruly children or other children that didn’t obey the rules of the Lord’s Resistance Army” Colvin Mark 2010, Uganda’s brutal Lord’s Resistance Army now active in the Congo. PM with Mark Colvin. ABC News. Monday, 3rd May 2010. http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2010/s2889152.htm. Accessed on 26/06/2011 366Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 367Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit. 368Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 369 Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit “SAF directly supplied the group’s training camps in Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria state, which borders on Uganda”. See: Small Arms Survey, Lord’s Resistance Army. Sudan Human Security Basement Survey. pp 4 of 9http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/southern-sudan/HSBA-Armed- Groups-LRA.pdf . Accessed on 26/06/2011 370Okwangalero Francis 2010. Op cit
5.1.2: CAREER PROGRESSION 371Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 278-280 372Ibid 373Ibid
209 374Ibid 375Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 376Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 377Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit 378Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 379O’Kadamerie, Billie 2002, Op cit 380Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit
5.2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
5.2.1: COMPOSITION
5.2.1.1: Ethnicity 381Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 35-37 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007. Op cit. pp 963-972 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit 382Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit Operation Lightening Thunder commenced on 14th December, 2008 and ended on 15th March, 2009. The Ugandan military provided conflicting objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign: Col Moses Rwakitarate, Airforce Chief of Staff observed that “UPDF’s victory is not capturing Kony but failing the enemy’s normal operations.” According to Capt Chris Magezi, a UPDF Spokesman, “The operation is on until we achieve our objective to destroy and eliminate or capture rebel leader Joseph Kony.” Assessing the impact of the three-month operation, Lt Gen Aronda Nyakairima, UPDF Chief of Defence Forces noted that LRA was at its “weakest point we have ever seen.” See: Atkinson, Ronald 2009. Op cit 383Otunnu, Ogenga 2002, Op cit. 384Koreta, Ivan 2010, Op cit
5.2.1.2: Gender 385Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit
5.2.1.3: Youth 386Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 387Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit 388Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit. pp 274-275 389Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 396-398
5.2.2: TROOP STRENGTH 390 While abducted boys serve as soldiers, girls either become wives or helpers (Ting Ting) of LRA commanders. See: Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 396-398 391Operations North and Iron Fist significantly depleted the manpower of LRA. Koreta, Ivan 2010, Op cit 392Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 393Feldman L Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 45-46 394Jeroen Adam et al. Op cit pp 963-983 395O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 396Nicolli, Alexander and Johnstone Sarah Johnstone (eds) 2008. Op cit 397Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346
210 398Nyakairu, Frank 2005, ‘Kolo blames Kony over talks failure’. The Monitor. Thursday, 24th February, 2005. pp 4. 399Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 400Nicolli, Alexander and Johnstone Sarah Johnstone (eds) 2008, Op cit 401The poor conduct of Ugandan government forces caused popular support for LRA. See: Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-27 402O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Uganda 2010, Op cit 403Bevan, James 2007, Op cit pp 344-346 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit pp 40-44 404Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit pp 118-125 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit pp 29-31 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 389-393 Bevan, James 2007, Op cit pp 344-346 405Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 406Atkinson, Ronald 2009, Revisiting ‘Operation Lightening Thunder’. The Independent. Tuesday, 9th June, 2009. http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/insight/67-insight/1039-revisiting-operation- lightning-thunder-. Accessed on 25/02/2011. 407International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9-14 of 47
5.2.3: STRUCTURES 408O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 409Jackson, Paul 2009, “Negotiating with Ghosts’: Religion, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda”, The Round Table, 98: 402. pp 325-327 http: //dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358530902895402. Accessed on 22/12/2009 410Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit. pps 1-2 411Oryem, Okello Henry 2010, Op cit 412Nyakairu, Frank 2006, ‘Rugunda off to Juba Kony round one’. Daily Monitor. Monday, July 3, 2006. 413Obita, James 2011, Interview. Kampala, Uganda 2011. 414O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, ‘Kony chief killed’. The New Vision. Vol 9. No 67. Monday, March 21, 1994. pps 1-2. O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 Lt Col Charles Otim revealed “Everything you do, you report to central command”. Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit Paul Jackson observes that “…LRA has a rigidly hierarchical structure with Kony as its undisputed head”. See: Jackson, Paul 2009, Op cit. pp 325-327. Lt Col Kulaiyigye notes that while Kony is the overall head of LRA. An Army Commander presides over the military affairs of this Ugandan sub national group. Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Grace Matsiko points out that while Kony acted as a spiritual leader, his deputy, Vincent Otti was charged with the responsibility of designing LRA’s military strategy: Matsiko, Grace 2010, Interview. January, 2010. Kampala. When LRA secured a sanctuary in Southern Sudan, O’Kadamerie notes that Kony acted as Commander in Chief and “Head Teacher” of the group. See: O’Kadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit. pp 1-2 415Mugira, James 2010, Interview. January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda 416Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002. Op cit 417The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups. Legal and Policy Responses: Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=28. Accessed 21/10/2009 418The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Op cit 211 419Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002. Op cit 420Oliver, Mark. Focus: The British Army. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/army/ Accessed on 16/12/2011. 421International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9-14 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 395-396 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002. Op cit 422Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 423When UPDF attacked LRA bases in Southern Sudan, Lt Col Otim who was then injured together with some wives and children of LRA fighters were captured in the ensuing fire fights. Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 424O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 425IRIN 2009, Op cit 426International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9-14 427Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit. pp 1-2. 428International Criminal Court 2005. ICC-02/04-01/05. The Prosecutor vs Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. http://www.icc- cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/situation%20index?lan=en- GB. Accessed on 14/12/2011 429O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 430Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 431Mugira, James 2010, Op cit Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit LRA has adopted a “flexible structure of small brigades…based in remote areas well away from government control”. See: Nicolli, Alexander and Johnstone Sarah Johnstone (eds) 2008. Op cit. According to Lt Col Otim, LRA field commanders can make decisions without being sanctioned by the LRA High Command. For example the abduction of the Aboke Girls was not sanctioned by Kony. Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 432International Crisis Group 2005. Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda. Crisis Group. Africa Briefing No 27. 23rd June, 2005. pp 3 of 16 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of- africa/uganda/B027%20Building%20a%20Comprehensive%20Peace%20Strategy%20for%20Northern%20U ganda.pdf. Accessed on 18/12/2011
5.2.4: LEADERSHIP & INTRAORGANIZATIONAL SCHISMS 433Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 434Former LRA commanders Capt Ray Apiire and Brig Michael Acellam say that Kony is highly unpredictable. Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Angelo Izama says that whilst exhibiting susceptibility to pressure, sometimes Kony demonstrates the capacity to cope with it. Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit Grace Matsiko says that on certain occasions, Kony comes across as mentally stable and on others utters nonsense. Kony never entertains intrusive questions, delays answering questions and sometimes gets upset during the course of meetings. Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit 435Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 436Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit 437Okwangalero Francis, 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit
212 438Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 439Okwangalero, Francis 2010, Op cit 440Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002 Op cit. 441 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 442O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 443O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 444Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 445Mwanguhya notes that Otti was LRA’s “executioner of operations”: Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Interview. January 2010. Kampala Matsiko observes that as Chief Planner of LRA, Otti commanded loyalty among LRA fighters. Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit 446During the Juba peace talks, Otti gained wide acceptability among Ugandan and American intelligence circles: Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit 447Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 448Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit 449Izama, Angelo and Nyakairu, Frank 2007, ‘Kony replaces Otti’. Daily Monitor. No 311. Wednesday, November 7th , 2007. pps 1-2.
5.3: GUERRILLA BASES On the evolution of LRA bases, see: 450The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) offered LRA an operational base near Juba in South Sudan. In 2006, upon Uganda-Sudan relations improving, LRA relocated from Central Equatoria Province in South Sudan to Garamba National Park in Orientale Province in DRC. See: Cakaj, Ledio 2010, The Lord’s Resistance Army of Today. Enough. November, 2010. http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/lra_today.pdf. pp 3-4 of 25. Accessed on 24/06/2011 “SAF directly supplied the group’s training camps in Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria state, which borders on Uganda”. See: Small Arms Survey. Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA): Lord’s Resistance Army. pp 3 of 8 http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/southern-sudan/HSBA-Armed- Groups-LRA.pdf. . Accessed on 24/06/2011 “Though the rebel group ended attacks in Northern Uganda in 2006, it then moved its bases to the northern Democratic Republic of Congo…” See: Human Rights Watch 2010, US: Act to end Lord’s Resistance Army violence in Central Africa. Human Rights Watch. 24th May, 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/24/us-act-end-lord-s-resistance-army-violence- central-africa. Accessed on 24/06/2011. “Recent reports say he has set up six new bases in northern DR Congo and is running diamond mines in the Central African Republic”. See; BBC 2008, Uganda rebels in surprise attack. BBC News. Friday, 19th September, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7625515.stm. Accessed on 24/06/2011 “LRA fighters have used Bas Uele as an important base and transit point to CAR where the majority of LRA fighters and commanders have been based in recent months. LRA violence in Bas Uele is intended to depopulate the area north of Ango and south of CAR”. See: Cakaj, Ledio 2010, LRA building base in Congo’s Bas Uele. The Africa Report. Friday, 13th August, 2010. http://www.theafricareport.com/archives2/in-the-know/3294715-lra-building-base-in-congos-bas-uele.html. Accessed on 24/06/2010 On why on going counterinsurgency operations would not permanently force LRA to be mobile, Makassi, a former rebel commander says of Kony: “I know this man. He is looking for a place to stay and get strength. He is trying to rebuild”. See: Gettleman, Jeffrey 2010, Uganda Enlists Former Rebels to end a War. The New York Times. 10th April, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/world/africa/11lra.html. Accessed on 24/06/2011 451Mukasa, Henry 2008, Garamba Forest a Nightmare. The New Vision. Wednesday, 17th December 2008. http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/665158. Accessed on 15/08/2011
213 452Koreta, Ivan 2010. Op cit. 453Johnson, Scott 2009, ‘Inside the hunt for LRA’s Joseph Kony’. Daily Monitor. Friday, May 22, 2009. 454Ibid 455Schomerus, Mareike 2007, The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International Studies. Geneva Switzerland. September 2007. http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:0uw19qxWgP4J:www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/suda n/Sudan_pdf/SWP%25208%2520LRA.pdf+lord%27s+resistance+army&cd=26&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uko Accessed 15/04/2009. 456Allio, Emmy, 2002, Sudan Extends Kony Operation.. The New Vision. 23rd May 2002. http://www.newvision.co.ug/detail.php?mainNewsCategoryId=8&newsCategoryId=12&newsId=10258 457IRIN 2009, Disarm LRA Rebels, Museveni tells Kinshasa and MONUC. 30th of September 2005. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=56540 458Orievulu, Kingsley 2010, Security Situation in the DRC: A Case of a Weak State Leaning on the UN. Consultancy Africa Intelligence. Thursday, 16th September, 2010. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=542:security-situation- in-the-drc-a-case-of-a-weak-state-leaning-on-the-un&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion- papers&Itemid=265. Accessed on 01/03/2011 459Kamara Patrick 2010, Interview. January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda. 460Ibid. 461Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit. 462Kamara Patrick 2010, Op cit 463Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit 464Johnson, Scott 2009, Op cit 465Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 466Johnson, Scott 2009, Op cit 467Kamara Patrick 2010, Op cit 468Nyakairu, Frank and Gyezaho, Emmanuel 2006, Op cit. pps 1-2
5.4: FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT
469Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 470Koreta, Ivan 2010, Op cit 471Neu, Joyce 2002, Op cit 472IRIN 2009, Op cit 473 Gettleman, Jeffrey and Schmit, Eric 2009, US Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels. The New York Times. February 6th 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?hp. 474Medecins sans Frontieres 2009: Survivors of Horrific Attacks in North-East Congo (DRC) tell their Story http://www.msf.org.uk/articledetail.aspx?fId=drc_survivors_story_20090820. Radio France Internationale English 2008, 400 killed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, claims Charity. 30th December 2008. http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/108/article_2541.asp Accessed 08/09/2009 475Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 476Neu, Joyce 2002, Op cit. The Carter Centre 2001, Op cit 477Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 478Schomerus, Mareike 2007, Op cit 479O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Uganda 2010, Op cit.
214 480Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, Op cit Human Rights and Peace Centre and The Liu Institute for the Study of Global Issues 2003. Hidden War: The Forgotten People. War in Acholiland and its Ramification for Peace and Security in Uganda. pp 37 481Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit 482O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, ‘SPLA kills Kony rebels’. The New Vision. Vol 9 No 300. Monday, December 19, 1994. pps 1-2 483Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 484Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit. 485O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit. pps 1-2 486Ibid 487Feldman Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 47-48 488Vision Reporter 1996, The New Vision. Vol 11 No 99. Thursday, April 25, 1996. pps 1-2 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 489Feldman, Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 137-138 490Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 491Ibid
5.5: STRATEGY AND TACTICS
5.5.1: RATIONALIZATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS 492 On the need for popular support in insurgencies, See: Zedong Mao 1963, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung. 1893-1976. Foreign Languages Press. Peking. pp 259-261.
Zedong Mao 1992, On Guerrilla Warfare. Second Edition. Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. Baltimore. Desai, Raj and Eckstein, Harry 1990, ‘Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion’. World Politics. XLII: 4. Princeton University Press. Princeton. pp 443 Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 Ngoga, Pascal, 1998 Op cit.pp 98-100 493 Che Guevara argues that insurgency is merely a phase in the total war. See: Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10. 494Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Lt Col Otim says that LRA adopted a terrorist approach because the GoU had equipped civilians with guns and spears to fight the rebels. Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 495Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 496On LRA’s terrorist operandi see: Prendergast, John 2007, The Answer to the Lord’s Resistance Army (Strategy Paper). Enough. 1st June, 2007. http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/answer-lords-resistance-army. Accessed on 24/06/2011. Clark, Michael 2004, In the Spotlight: The Lord’s Resistance Army. Centre for Defence Information. 27th October, 2007. http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=2606&programID=39&from_page=./friendlyversion /pr. Accessed on 24/06/2011 Plaut, Martin 2009, Behind the LRA’s terror tactics. BBC News Africa. 17th February, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7885885.stm. Accessed on 24/06/2011 Boswell, Allan 2010. The Guerrilla Movement That Won’t Die. Time. Tuesday, 31st August, 2010. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2014431,00.html. Accessed on 24/06/2011 497Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 498Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, ‘Uganda’s roadmap to the end of the northern region insurgency’. Daily Monitor. Tuesday, July 18th , 2006. pps 4-5
215 499Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 500Feldman Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 134-136 501Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 351-352
5.5.2: OPERATIONALIZATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS 502Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 503Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit. 504 Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit. 505Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 506Businge, Canon 2009, Who are the Aboke Girls? The New Vision. Friday, 28th March, 2009. http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/30/676097. Accessed on 03/07/2011. 507Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 508News24 2002. Museveni safe after LRA attack. 08th August 2002. http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Museveni-safe-after-LRA-attack-20020808. Accessed on 13/10/2011. Agence France Presse 2002. LRA rebels attack northern Uganda army headquarters. Relief Web. 08th August 2002. http://reliefweb.int/node/106892. Accessed on 13/10/2011. 509 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 510Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit. 511Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit 512Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 389-393 513Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit 514Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 515Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit. 516Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 517Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit. 518Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 519Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 520Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit 521Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 522Feldman Robert 2007.Op cit. pp 137 523Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 524Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit.pp 29-31 525Feldman Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 47-48 526Otto Sande 2010, Op cit. 527Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 528 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125
5.6: WEAPONS AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION
529Bevan, James 2007, Op cit pp 344-346 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 530Opondo-Ofwono 1994, ‘Kony gets land mines’. The New Vision. Vol 9. No 194 Wednesday, August 17, 1994 pps 1-2 531The Carter Centre 2001, Op cit 532Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396
216 Even after the signing of the Nairobi Protocol in 1999, there were some indications that the GoS might still have been supplying LRA with weapons. David Oneka who defected from LRA said Sudan supplied LRA with anti-tank missiles. BBC 2003, Sudan ‘re-arming Uganda rebels’. BBC News. Tuesday, 26th August, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3182133.stm. Accessed on 23/06/2011 533Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 534Feldman Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 47-48 535Owachi, Gerald 1996, ‘Now Kony promoted to Maj Gen’. The Monitor. No 104. Friday August 1996 Some reports indicate that LRA acquired its weapons from both Sudan and Kenya. See: Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network 2010, Arms Exports and Transfers: From Sub Saharan Africa to Sub Saharan Africa. December 2010. pp 10 of 11 http://www.aefjn.org/tl_files/aefjn- files/arms/arms_material%20eng/1101AEFJNReportArmsAfrica_Africa_eng.pdf . Accessed on 23/06/2011. Over the years, LRA itself has become a source of weapons for armed groups engaged in interethnic conflict in the Great Lakes Region. See: Mkutu Agade Kennedy 2006, Small Arms and Light Weapons among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area. African Affairs. 106:422. pp 14 of 24. http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/106/422/47.full.pdf. Accessed on 23/06/2011 536Owachi, Gerald 1996, Op cit. 537Dobson, Sue 2009, Conflict in the Great Lakes Region. INTR3064. Africa on a Global Stage. pp 11 of 19 http://www.socsci.flinders.edu.au/global/africa/suedobson/conflict.pdf. Accessed on 05/07/2011. 538Col Makasi who defected from LRA revealed that Sudan had given LRA crates of AK 47s, mines, heavy machine guns and surface-to-air missiles which were buried in caches across Southern Sudan. See: Crilly, Rob 2008, Lord’s Resistance Army uses truce to rearm and spread fear in Uganda. The Times. 16th December, 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5348890.ece. Accessed on 23/06/2011 Confirming Sudanese support for LRA, former LRA Commander Brig Kenneth Banya says he oversaw the delivery of SAM surface-to-air missiles, 82 mm recoilless anti-tank weapons, heavy machine guns and AK 47 assault rifles. See: The Telegraph 2004, Sudan’s Islamist regime supplied LRA with arms. The Telegraph 06th October 2004. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/uganda/1473493/Sudans-Islamist-regime- supplied-LRA-with-arms.html. Accessed on 23/06/2011 Sudan supplied LRA with guns it had captured from SPLA. SPLA had in turn secured these weapons from Uganda. See: Vesely, Milan 1998, The AK 47: 50 years old and still going strong. African Business. June 1998. BNET. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5327/is_n233/ai_n28705609/. Accessed on 23/06/2011. 539Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 351-352 540On the types of weapons, stockpiles and the mode that LRA uses to acquire its weapons see: Schomerus, Mareike 2007, Op cit. pp 21-23 of 30. By 2007, LRA was estimated to have been in possession of 150,000 small arms. See: Imaka, Isaac and Ubwani Zephania 2010, East Africa Boosts Small Arms Control. The Monitor. 2nd December, 2010. AllAfrica.com. http://allafrica.com/stories/201012030211.html. Accessed on 23/06/2011 541Mugira, James 2010, Op cit Sudan supplied LRA with AK-47s, G-3 assault rifles, anti-tank weaponry (including B-10 recoilless guns), 81mm and 82mm mortars. See Hillier, Debbie and Wood, Brian 2003, Shattered Lives: The case for tough international arms control. Amnesty International and Oxfam International. pp 15 of 95. http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp- content/uploads/2011/02/Shattered-lives-the-case-for-tough-international-arms-control.pdf. Accessed on 23/06/2011 542Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Sudan supplies LRA with machine guns, mortars, grenades and ammunition. See: Brown Edward Michael 1996, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. MIT Press. pp 383-385 543 Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 544Borzello, Anna 2007. Op cit. pp 395-396
217 545Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit
218 CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the relevance of the theories of guerrilla warfare in explaining the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in Northern Uganda. Our task is twofold: First, to determine whether there has been a significant discrepancy between the hypotheses developed in the theoretical review and the organization of the LRA insurgency. Second, to establish whether the principles of insurgency have ultimately helped us answer the broad and specific research questions in this study.
Out of 16 hypotheses generated in the theoretical review, 5 were accepted, 10 partially accepted and 1 rejected (Appendices 1 and 2). The key features of LRA are as follows: Ideologically, the group seeks to construct a new Acholi polity. Its doctrine is an amalgamation of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) commitment to reincarnate the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics 546 and the Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) drive to socially cleanse Acholi society; 547 The group’s popular support has been shaped by its reaction to counterinsurgency operations. When the Government of Uganda (GoU) created protected villages and civil defence groups, LRA reacted by attacking civilians thereby undermining the popular support it enjoyed. 548 However, due to pathetic conditions in the protected villages and the group’s capacity to breach the security of the strategic hamlets, the decline in support for LRA did not lead to an increase in support for the GoU. 549
LRA uses overt propaganda techniques in areas it controls and covert ones in those it does not. The group’s communicational campaign pinpoints the failings of the GoU, markets the viability of an Acholi polity and justifies the recourse to violence as the best means for constructing the polity; 550 The motivation of the group has been shaped by shifts in domestic and external support for its insurgent activities and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. At the stage of formation, LRA was motivated by the drive
219 to protect the Acholi population against potential extermination at the hands of Southern Ugandans and reincarnate the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics. 551
Beyond this phase, its motivation was affected by two main factors: First, the GoU created protected villages to curtail insurgent-civilian interaction and civil defence groups to fight the group. LRA reacted to these developments by attacking the Acholi population. 552 Attacks on civilians undermined the group’s credentials as a protector of the Acholi people. In turn, LRA could no longer marshal motivation to protect people who were not supporting it. Second, the effectiveness of the GoU counterinsurgency campaign 553 and the end of Sudanese support 554 for the group’s activities diminished its chances of seizing state power. Unable to effect regime change, the group could no longer cultivate motivation based on the drive to reverse the NRM takeover.
LRA was not only unable to overthrow the NRM government but it could also not realize voluntary enlistment. The group then resorted to conducting abductions. 555 As a result of the above developments, there was a further change in the motivation of LRA. The officer corps of the group was motivated by two considerations: First, the drive to sustain its insurgent power as an alternative 556 to the Northern hegemonic power it had failed to achieve. In order to sustain the trappings of sub-national authority, the group had to engage in profiteering activity. 557 Second, given the horrendous atrocities commited by LRA, the officer corps was also motivated by the need to elude the long arm of retributive justice. 558 On the other hand, members of the group who had been coercively recruited and lacked ideological commitment to the LRA armed struggle were motivated by the need to survive while in captivity until an opportunity for escape presented itself. 559
In terms of capacity building, LRA recruits are subjected to military and religious training. Whereas all male recruits undergo basic military training, 560 only the talented go on to undertake specialized military training. 561 As part of their induction programme, recruits are introduced to a doctrine they can neither interpret nor challenge. While some of the recruits may separately understand the principles underpinning Christianity, Islam and
220 Animism, a combination of these doctrines introduced in an atmosphere of fear makes for difficult interpretation. 562
LRA is largely a hierarchical organization exhibiting centralized command and control. 563 However, at the strategic level, it showcases some traces of shared decision-making. To this effect, the Head of LRA, Deputy Head, Director of Religious Affairs and commanders of the four brigades of LRA are all members of Control Alter, the supreme decision-making organ of the group. 564 At the tactical and operational levels, the group’s units enjoy a measure of autonomy in executing assigned tasks. Thus far, in seeking to establish its bases, LRA has exploited two factors: In Southern Sudan, it capitalized on poor Uganda- Sudan relations to secure a sanctuary. 565 In North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, it exploited weak central government control to set up base in that part of the country. 566 In both cases, the group situated its sanctuaries in topographically inaccessible areas. 567 The group uses its bases to muster ideological consistency, food security and technological advancement. 568
LRA mobilizes resources for its campaign during the course of armed confrontation and peace talks with the Government of Uganda (GoU). While in a state of belligerence with the GoU (before Uganda-Sudan relations improved), the group relied on support from the Government of Sudan (GoS), Acholis in the diaspora and plunder by its units. 569 While engaged in peace negotiations, the GoU, Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and international aid agencies extended support to LRA to discourage it from preying on the population. 570 Some sources suggest that the group may also be engaged in illicit drug peddling. 571
Depending on its prevailing military capability, LRA has oscillated between using conventional and guerrilla warfare. In either case, consistent attacks on civilians have been an integral part of its modus operandi. 572 The group attacks the population in order to demonstrate its potency 573 and precipitate a troop deployment dilemma for the GoU. 574 In this regard, the Ugandan state has had to choose between protecting civilians and pursuing marauding units of the group; LRA uses an assortment of weapons ranging from
221 rudimentary tools it uses for subduing civilians 575 to light and heavy automatic weapons it uses in fire fights with government forces. 576 Whereas light weapons allow it mobility while conducting field operations, heavy ones give it the capability to defend its bases.
This study questions insurgency theory in four key areas: First, there is a discrepancy between the need for targeted recruits to demonstrate ideological commitment to a group’s armed struggle and its capacity to recruit and retain them. 577 The LRA case shows that a rebel group can conscript members without prior commitment to its cause and retain them for a long time. 578 Second, this research unsettles the place of popular support in an insurgency. Whereas guerrilla warfare theory accommodates scenarios where a rebel group may attack the population without triggering off corresponding popular support for the state, 579 the sheer extent to which LRA uses this approach without disintegrating questions the role of popular support in insurgencies.
Third, the highly peripheral place of the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM) within the structures of LRA questions the role of political wings in insurgencies. 580 Theoretically, a guerrilla group needs an organ to design and articulate its cause. This tier of leadership acts as the non-military interface between the insurgent organization and the population. 581 The LRA case shows that a rebel group can operate for 25 years without a clearly articulated ideology let alone an organ to articulate it. Fourth, the non-linear development of the military strategy of LRA unsettles existing principles of insurgency. In orthodox guerrilla warfare, the military strategy of durable insurgent groups evolves systematically. 582 In this respect, a rebellion will systematically graduate from the subversive through the guerrilla, mobile to the conventional warfare phase. LRA has oscillated between adopting guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare and outright avoidance of contact with government forces and yet managed to remain in existence for more than two decades. 583
In the ensuing sections, the insurgent attributes of LRA are evaluated against the 16 hypotheses developed in the theoretical review.
222 6.1: LRA INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES: IDENTITY 6.1.1: Ideology In their current form, guerrilla warfare theories 584can account for the following key characteristics of the LRA doctrine: Its similarity to that of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), 585 Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) 586 and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II); 587 The duality in the role that it plays in the LRA insurgency—it seeks to suppress the ideals of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government whilst simultaneously advancing those of LRA; 588 The use of rewards and sanctions to persuasively and coercively propagate the ideology of the group; The use of the ideology of LRA as a psychological weapon to operationalize its military strategy and tactics.589
In this study, we have come to empirical grips with the impact of the UPDA, HSM I and HSM II rebellions on the evolution of the ideology of LRA. In the conflict in Northern Uganda, the group that emerged at the tail end of the successive insurgencies exhibited a multiple ideological outlook. Its doctrinal disposition was a melting pot of the ideals espoused by insurgent groups preceding it. This finding adds to our understanding of how the ideology of insurgent organizations might develop.
It can be concluded that overlaps in the rebellions in Northern Uganda acted as a continuum for increasing extremity in ideology. The rebel group that set off the series of insurgencies was less radical in its ideological disposition than the one emerging at the tail end. In relation to this point, Kurth-Cronin observes that when an original group moves towards disarmament, smaller more radical factions break away. 590 Whereas UPDA (the first insurgent group in Northern Uganda) mainly blamed Southerners for the crisis in the North, 591 HSM I and HSM II (the second and third respectively) blamed Southerners and Northerners. 592 LRA that emerged at the tail end of the chain not only blamed these two peoples but also prescribed harsh ‘punishment’ for Northerners who should otherwise have been rendering support to its insurgent activities. 593
This study set out to test the hypothesis that LRA will have adopted an ideology that is either an original synthesis of its ideals or an adaptation of existing ideologies in order to
223 articulate political contradictions in the Ugandan polity and justify its recourse to violence to resolve these contradictions. The hypothesis was accepted. The ideology of the group is an amalgam of its doctrine and those of rebel groups preceding it. The LRA doctrine pinpoints contradictions in the Ugandan polity in general and Acholi society in particular and rationalizes the use of violence as the best means of addressing these problems.
6.1.2: Popular Support The case of LRA does not generate a significant discrepancy between the theories of guerrilla warfare and insurgent practice. The principles of insurgency largely explain shifts in the support the group has been enjoying over the course of its life cycle. 594 Civilians in Northern Uganda have supported LRA either because of their ethnic connections to its fighters, its commitment to liberating Northerners from perceived Southern domination or out of fear of being attacked by the group for cooperating with the NRM government. 595
Whereas ethnic connections and cordial relations between insurgents and civilians are theoretically considered twin prerequisites for realizing popular support for an insurgency, empirically, the treatment that LRA accorded the population was the more decisive factor. While still maintaining ethnic connections with the Acholi people, support for Kony dwindled when his rebel group started targeting civilians. 596 Contrary to the principles of insurgency, LRA has heavily relied on coercive tactics for support and yet managed to survive for a long time.
In seeking to explain the calculations of the population in an insurgency, guerrilla warfare theorists argue that civilians will initially defer support for either side to an asymmetric conflict and later, opportunistically, rally behind the emerging winner of the duel. 597 Theoretically, this means that when the outcome of an asymmetric conflict starts taking shape, one side will command higher levels of popular support at the expense of the other. However, the case of LRA shows that a decline in support for one side does not necessarily lead to an increase in support for the other. 598 In such a scenario, the population acts in a passive way. Thus, in order to marshal the full cooperation of civilians, either side should not only appear to be winning the duel but should also strive to endear itself to the
224 population. Unlike armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah that have taken the extra step to maintain social welfare programs, 599 LRA defies the theories of insurgency in the way it did not strive to sustain cordial links with the Acholi population while it enjoyed popular support.
Under this section, the objective was to test the hypothesis that LRA will have enjoyed popular support because it can easily access civilians, its membership is ethnically connected with the population in Northern Uganda and civilians in this part of the country believe that LRA will unseat the National Resistance Movement government. The hypothesis was partially accepted. Popular support for the group primarily derived from its original ideological commitment to liberate and its ethnic ties with the Acholi population. The hypothesis was partially rejected on grounds that ethnicity was not an enduring basis for popular support as it was undermined by LRA attacks targeting Acholi civilians.
6.1.3: Propaganda Guerrilla warfare theories can account for the nature, forms and tactics of propaganda 600 used in the conflict in Northern Uganda and the constraints that the Ugandan government faces in having to fight LRA while remaining accountable to the citizenry. The LRA case broadens our understanding of communicational warfare in insurgencies. Periods of peace negotiations present the group with opportunities for conducting propaganda wars. In times of war, it has not only to communicate to the population the shortcomings of the GoU but also strenuously explain the logic behind its attacks on civilians.
On the other hand, lulls in the fighting (to facilitate peace negotiations) suspend the actual need for a group to attack civilians and allows it to extend benevolence to selected constituencies and also pin the GoU on issues at the heart of the conflict. Monnerot attempts a theoretical explanation for this strategy: Where insurgents might be militarily on the backfoot, they will test the resistance of the enemy by switching between “war talk” and “peace talk.” 601 Empirically, it has been noted that whenever there are ceasefires to allow peace negotiations to end the conflict in Northern Uganda, LRA positions itself as a selfless peace-seeker whilst portraying the Government of Uganda (GoU) as a perennial war-
225 monger. The GoU finds it difficult to extricate itself from this propaganda trap because it always suspects LRA of using peace overtures to regroup. On most of the occasions, peace talks between the two parties have broken down because of this reason. 602
Under this section, the objective was to test two hypotheses: First, LRA will have used a communicational campaign espousing the idea of an independent existence for its targeted audience, pin-pointing political contradictions within the Ugandan polity and rationalizing its recourse to violence. Second, LRA will have used overt propaganda techniques in territories where it commands greater control over the population and covert techniques where it has less control. Both hypotheses were accepted. The communicational campaign of the group mainly addresses the idea of an Acholi polity. It justifies the need to dismantle the old and construct a new order. LRA uses overt, stage-managed communicational antics in its guerrilla bases and covert ones in areas controlled by the GoU.
6.1.4: Motivation The theories of guerrilla warfare explain motivations for individuals participating in a rebellion. Insurgents may be motivated by five factors: the drive to fight and die for their comrades-in-arms; the perceived inevitability of victory for their rebel movement; the harsh repercussions of attempting to defect from the guerrilla group; detachment from mainstream society; and the sense of community that the insurgent organization gives them. 603 Guerrilla warfare theorists also argue that over the course of their insurgent careers, members of rebel groups find it difficult to disengage from insurgent activity because their individual identities are subsumed by those of the rebel organizations.604
The LRA case shows the dynamics that may underpin shifts in motivation in overlapping insurgencies. Changes in the motivation of LRA were caused by the following factors: The motivational tendencies it inherited from other rebel movements; Changes in its life cycle and the organization of its insurgent activities. The group’s motivation has since changed from the drive to protect the Acholi people 605 to profiteering 606 and currently, to securing the survival of what remains of LRA. 607
226 This research also reinforces the notion that different generations and ranks within an insurgent organization may have different motivations and the overall motivation of the organization will change overtime. LRA has had to harmonize the interests of its pioneering officer corps who were motivated by the drive to reincarnate the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics with those of recently abducted members who are purely motivated by survival.
The hypothesis that LRA fighters will have been motivated by idealistic and social considerations was accepted. By seeking to emancipate the Acholi people, the pioneering officer corps of LRA was pursuing a ‘selfless’ cause dictated by idealistic considerations. By seeking to enjoy the trappings of insurgent power, the officer corps of the group are currently pursuing ‘selfish’ causes dictated by social considerations. Equally, the rank-and- file harbour ‘selfish’ motivations. They participate in the group’s activities as long as it takes them to escape from captivity.
6.1.5: Recruitment. There is a discrepancy between existing theories of guerrilla warfare and the way LRA recruits its members. In classical guerrilla warfare, rebel groups exploit prevailing contradictions within the body politic to recuit members from among conscious members of marginalized groups in society. Under this model, the insurgent organization has to segment the population in order to identify and verify the credentials of prospective members. 608 In addition, the integration of newly recruited members is gradualized in order to test their long term commitment to the armed struggle. 609
Empirically, it has been observed that the above model does not fully accommodate enlistment as practiced by LRA. Guerrilla warfare theories can explain the connection between the collapse of the Northern hegemony and LRA initially recruiting its members from soldiers of the defunct Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). However, given the presumed idealistic basis of the LRA rebellion, all members would presumably have enlisted in the group voluntarily.
227 In discussing recruitment in LRA, we have observed that this is not the case. While building its organizational structures, the group used persuasive and coercive approaches to recruit former members of the Ugandan armed forces hailing from the North. While broadly pursuing the same mission (resisting the rise of the South), LRA, 610 UPDA, 611 HSM I 612 and HSM II 613 adopted different approaches to the armed struggle. Because of these doctrinal differences, Kony had to use force to recruit personnel from rival organizations that otherwise subscribed to his worldview.
It has also been noted that shifts in popular support for its insurgent activities pushed LRA to drop the strategy of voluntary recruitment altogether. The group started abducting children to beef up its troop strength. 614 Theoretically, the evolution of a largely youthful fighting organization would present LRA with a critical challenge: Unlike adults who would have joined the rebel group on their own volition (mainly out of ideological conviction), children would lack the long term ideological commitment to participate in the armed struggle and would potentially be susceptible to defection. Empirically, it has been concluded that a rebel group can successfully indoctrinate members who are not ideologically committed to its cause and stop them from defecting. In the case of LRA, recruiters heighten the risks in children attempting to defect from the rebel group. 615 The above contrasting recruitment scenarios tie in with the preceding discussion on the motivation of the group. The older fighters are predominantly swayed by idealistic and social motivations while the younger ones, mainly social ones.
This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have selectively recruited its members from civic groups and constituencies that are either conscious and/or targets of marginalization ostensibly perpetrated by the National Resistance Movement government. It was partially accepted. Some pioneering members of LRA consciously joined the group after the Northern hegemony of which they had been a part disintegrated. The group presented them with an avenue for recapturing the positions they had lost. The hypothesis was partially rejected on two grounds: First, despite being consciously committed to the reincarnation of the Northern hegemony, some pioneering members of LRA were coerced into joining the
228 group. Second, in the post-formative phase of its campaign, LRA has coercively recruited and retained members who are/were not ideologically committed to its armed struggle.
6.2: LRA INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES: OPERATIONAL 6.2.1: Training. The mode of training and induction used by LRA largely reinforces the principles of insurgency. In consonance with guerrilla warfare theories, there is a relationship between the strategy employed by the group and the training model that it adopts. 616 Acknowledging the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of Ugandan government forces, LRA conducts training that adapts to its position of relative weakness. The group aims to achieve this objective through economizing scarce resources, marshalling self sufficiency and adapting to the military operational environment.
The LRA training model showcases some interesting features. In order to economize resources, the group amalgamates training for its freshly recruited members with military operations. 617 This approach yields three advantages: First, it saves LRA time. Recruits do not have to reach the group’s guerrilla bases before learning how to fight. Second, recruits gain first hand battlefield experience at an early stage in their careers. Third, the troop strength of LRA raiding parties is beefed up by the availability of fresh recruits who can participate in insurgent operations. In this context, the LRA case underlines the potential role of time and career fast tracking in the economization of scarce resources in an insurgency. However, it is important to note that recruits who are hurriedly trained may not make good fighters. They may compromise the fighting capability of the group’s operational units.
The LRA training model is also remarkable in other ways. It is merit-based. While all male recruits are subjected to basic training, only those who are exceptionally talented go on to undertake specialized training. On another score, the group uses a doctrine that its freshly recruited members cannot fully interpret and challenge. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the ideology of LRA is an amalgam of secular and faith-based explanations of the causes of conflict in Northern Uganda. 618 While some abductees may separately understand the
229 religious and secular elements, the amalgamation of these ideals with traditional Acholi religious practice makes the ideology of the group complex. This makes the group’s doctrine difficult to interpret let alone challenge. While guerrilla warfare theories stress the need for recruits to understand the ideology of an insurgent organization, the LRA case is interesting in the way it shows that recruits who are introduced to a set of ideals they do not fully comprehend will lack the capacity to challenge the basis for the armed struggle (even if they were allowed to) yet they will also, ironically, continue serving in the insurgent organization.
The hypothesis that LRA will either have designed or adopted a training model commensurate with its military strategy and tactics and one that imparts combat and non combat skills was accepted. Since it lacks the capacity to conventionally train its manpower, LRA economizes resources by combining training with field operations. We also accepted this hypothesis on grounds that LRA recruits are taught fighting skills (military training) and indoctrinated (non-military training).
6.2.2: Career Progression. Career progression in LRA is in tandem with the principles of insurgency. In order to earn promotion within the structures of the group, new members have to demonstrate their long term commitment to the armed struggle by graduating from handling simple to complex tasks. 619 However, the LRA case is remarkable in the way it shows the challenges in managing the career progression of conscripted members of an insurgent group. Recruits in LRA move from emotionally resisting the LRA insurgent lifestyle to fully accepting it or merely continuing to serve in the group just to survive. 620 The efficacy of this model highly depends on the gradual institution of promotional incentives, standardization, perceived equity and security in the career progression of members of the group. There was no specific hypothesis generated for this phenomenon. The discussion on career progression is intended to offer insights into the induction and integration of recruits into the structures of LRA.
230 6.2.3: Organizational Structure. In terms of organizational structure, LRA defies the principles of insurgency. Guerrilla warfare theories stress the need for a separation of the military and non-military and the subordination of the military to the non-military organs of an insurgent organization. 621 This approach positions politics at the heart of the armed struggle, maintains a healthy connection between a guerrilla group and the population 622 and prevents it from degenerating into a mercenary or criminal enterprise. The LRA case shows that a rebel group may fuse the organs of its leadership structures, sever its relations with the population and yet remain in operation for a long time. By extension, since it would lack leadership tiers that keep it politically connected (and preferably accountable) to the population, this kind of group could add a criminal dimension to its insurgent activities. 623
LRA upsets the principles of insurgency in other ways. Theoretically, a durable insurgency (one that lasts for a long time) evolves in a systematic manner. It develops from the subversive (formative) stage where its military capability is almost non-existent and its leadership channeled through highly autonomous and clandestine cells to the guerrilla phase where it’s military capability increases and a measure of centralized command and control is introduced in the group’s activities. When the group significantly strengthens its military capability, then the rebellion graduates from the phase of guerrilla warfare to that of conventional warfare where leadership becomes more centralized.
Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has exhibited a non-linear development of its organizational structures. At the formative stage, the group was structured like a guerrilla army. While retaining the attributes of a hierarchical organization, LRA gave its field operational units a measure of autonomy in executing assigned tasks. This was not in conformity with the principles of insurgency. By commencing its campaign with a guerrilla disposition, the group had ‘skipped’ the subversive phase. There was one potential problem with this development: The premature transition from one stage to another would make LRA underprepared to fight government forces. When it started receiving Sudanese military aid, LRA assumed a more formally centralized chain of command. The structural disposition of the group at this stage was equally at odds with the theories of insurgency.
231 This was essentially the second stage in the LRA campaign. The group should have been adopting guerrilla warfare. When external support for its activities ceased, LRA reverted to centralized command and control but with field operational units enjoying a greater degree of autonomy. 624 The fact that LRA failed to sustain centralized command and control beyond the phase of Sudanese support for its activities means it may have prematurely graduated from the stage of guerrilla warfare to that of conventional warfare.
Whilst the LRA model oscillates between formal and informal centralized command, as Head of LRA, Kony is perennially the centre of gravity and commands the levers of control in the rebel group. Although he delegates functions to his juniors, Kony wields immense power and influence deriving from the aura of invincibility he commands as Head of LRA. 625 In order to safeguard against internal coups, Kony is unpredictable in the way he makes his decisions. This keeps his juniors guessing as to what his next set of commands might be. 626 In the event Kony was either captured or killed by Ugandan security forces or overthrown by his lieutenants, LRA would have to grapple with the challenge of identifying a leader who would fit into the group’s existing leadership model. If Kony’s successor chose to introduce a new leadership style, it would be interesting to establish how this would improve or undermine the group’s fortunes.
This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have evolved as a politico-military organization characterized by a structural separation of functions, with its armed wing subordinated to its political wing. It was rejected. The group has largely not evolved as a politico-military organization. Save for the very brief period (the Juba peace talks) when it constituted the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), LRA has largely operated without a political wing. Defying the theories of insurgency, while it existed, LRM was subordinate to LRA. This hypothesis was also rejected on grounds that LRA does not exhibit a separation of powers and functions within its structures. For example as Head of LRA, Kony is a military and spiritual leader.
232 6.2.4: Guerrilla Bases. Theoretically, guerrillas grapple with the challenge of striking a balance between maintaining mobility and establishing a fixed insurgent presence. Whereas mobility allows them the opportunity of avoiding costly armed confrontations with the enemy along a fixed frontline, 627 the creation of safe sanctuaries gives insurgents space in which recuperation, training and the building of para-state structures can be realized. 628
However, on one hand, rebels cannot perpetually be mobile. At some point in an insurgent campaign, they have to engage the enemy, seize territory and assemble para-state institutions to buttress the population under their control. On the other, the evolution of guerrilla bases allows government forces to use their superior conventional military capability to attack areas of fixed insurgent activity. Guerrillas can minimize the chances of government forces destroying their bases by situating them in areas characterized by rugged terrain, preferably located in places with a history of insurgent activity or better still on foreign territory where a state would have to violate the territorial sovereignty of the host country to attack these sanctuaries. 629
LRA always locates its sanctuaries on foreign territory and in topographically inaccessible areas with a history of armed insurrection. In situating its bases on foreign territory, the group exploits weak state control of the host country to achieve either of two objectives: Establish a fixed insurgent presence without the consent of the host country 630 or with the consent of the host country, use its forces to assist the host country in strengthening its control in the area where the LRA bases are located. 631 This study also shows that a guerrilla organization can use its bases to reinforce its identity and operationalize its insurgent activities. In terms of reinforcing its identity, LRA marshals ideological consistency by artistically embedding its ideals in the physical infrastructure of its sanctuaries. 632 As theatres for operationalizing its insurgent activities, the group’s bases showcase its organizational priorities. To this effect, Kit Valley and Garamba Forest reflected the critical importance LRA attaches to the health of its fighters and the need to marshal technology and food security. 633
233 Under this section, the objective was to test two hypotheses: First, LRA will have located its bases in topographically inaccessible areas to limit attacks on them. Second, the LRA insurgency will have been located in an area with a history of armed insurrection and susceptibility to weak central government control. Both were accepted. LRA bases in the Imatong hills and Garamba forest were topographically inaccessible and in areas with a history of rebellions.
6.2.5: Funding and External Support Theoretically, relying on popular support and criminal activity and exploiting existing geo- political contradictions regionally, a guerrilla group can prosecute a relatively cheap insurgent campaign. 634 In the case of LRA, there is an interesting relationship between shifts in the group’s theatres of insurgent activities and the resource mobilization strategy that it employs. While the group was solely operating in Northern Uganda (at the stage of formation), it relied on its own initiatives to mobilize resources. It cultivated and sustained cordial relations with the population in Acholiland and the community of Acholis in the diaspora which reciprocated by funding its activities. 635
With the exception of parts of Southern Sudan inhabited by Acholi speaking people, 636 the relocation of its bases to a foreign country would largely have stripped LRA of its capacity for resource mobilization and handed this initiative to its host country. However, while accepting support from Khartoum, LRA sought to maintain a measure of self reliance by partly depending on its own initiatives to fund its activities. It plundered villages in Southern Sudan. 637 In this direction, it can be concluded that the viability of external support for LRA activities is contingent on the group maintaining self initiative in resource mobilization.
While guerrilla warfare theories hinge external support for an insurgent group on poor relations between its host state and country of origin, the LRA case defies this law. When there was a thawing in relations between Uganda and Sudan, the Khartoum establishment continued covertly funding LRA to specifically destabilize the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)-run Southern Sudan. 638
234 This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have relied on popular support and criminal activity domestically and exploited existing geo-political contradictions regionally to mobilize resources for prosecuting a relatively cheap insurgent campaign. It was partially accepted on two grounds. First, external support for LRA can be linked to deterioration in relations between Uganda and Sudan. Second, given its reliance on plunder, the notion that LRA will have relied on criminal activity to fund its campaign holds true. On the other hand, the idea that the group will have depended on popular support to fund its campaign was rejected. Three developments undermined popular support-driven funding for LRA activities: First, the Government of Uganda (GoU) curtailed LRA-Acholi interaction by creating protected villages. Second, the GoU created civil defence groups to fight LRA. Third, LRA reacted to the above developments by attacking Acholi civilians as a way of ‘punishing’ them for ‘collaborating’ with the GoU. The harsh reaction by LRA alienated it from the Acholi population and undermined its chances of continuing to receive popular support-driven funding for its insurgent activities.
6.2.6: Strategy and Tactics. Guerrilla warfare theories draw a distinction between combatant-to-combatant and combatant-to-civilian engagements in insurgencies. In combatant-to-combatant encounters, they generally prescribe a strategy centred around protracted, selective confrontational contact with, adaptation to the relative strength of the enemy, maintaining alertness, marshalling terrain and locality intelligence and mobility and attacks on soft enemy targets. In addition, they stress the need for the military doctrine of an insurgent group to evolve autonomous of but without negating its ideology and the deployment of the capabilities of a rebel army according to the manifesting strength of the enemy. 639
Empirically, LRA combatant-to-combatant strategy and tactics largely conform to the above theoretical blueprint. The group serializes its contact with the enemy, mainly splitting up and dispersing its units, avoiding armed confrontation with the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) that manifest in strength and only randomly ambushing them while in transit. 640 In seeking to marshal terrain and locality intelligence, LRA
235 deploys its fighters in their respective areas of origin and conscripts guides into its operational units. 641
In terms of combatant-to-civilian engagements, the modus operandi of LRA equally conforms to existing principles of insurgency. Theoretically, terrorism unsettles states. While guerrillas choose to elude government soldiers and attack civilians, government soldiers are not often in a position to establish confrontational contact with the insurgents in order to protect the population. As a result, the state military establishment overreacts by instituting harsh counterinsurgency measures which end up alienating the population. 642
In reinforcing the above theoretical perspectives, LRA conducts random and selective attacks on lightly guarded Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps and lightly armed self defence groups. 643 This strategy creates a troop deployment dilemma for Ugandan security forces. On one hand, beefing up forces at IDPs reduces the number of soldiers available to pursue highly elusive rebel units. On the other, prioritizing the pursuit of LRA rebels exposes civilians and non-military infrastructure to terrorist attack.
However, it is worth noting that in other respects, the LRA case is at variance with existing principles of insurgency. The establishment of IDPs in Northern Uganda was not a reaction to the terrorist activity of LRA. The group started employing terrorism after the Ugandan state had established IDPs and self defence groups. 644 In this context, it can be concluded that terrorist activity does not only manifest as a precipitant for the institution of harsh counterinsurgency measures. It can also unfold as a reaction to stringent counterinsurgency measures.
This study also showcases some of the approaches that a group may use to rationalize its use of terrorism. LRA exploits the interaction between its propaganda and military strategy to admit and deflect responsibility for terrorist activities in Northern Uganda. 645 This approach not only seeks to repair its image but also where the population remains unconvinced, it attempts to establish a balance of notoriety between the guerrilla organization and the government.
236 In discussing the terrorist strategy of LRA, it is important to specify two points: In terms of using this approach (qualitative extent), LRA is in conformity with the theories of insurgencies. Rebel groups may attack civilians to demonstrate their military capability, expose the state’s incapacity to protect its citizens and discourage civilians from collaborating with government forces in counterinsurgency operations. However, in terms of the extent to which it uses this strategy (quantitative extent), the modus operandi of LRA is in disconformity with guerrilla warfare theory. For nearly 25 years, the group has excessively concentrated on attacking civilians.
Under this section, four hypotheses were tested: First, LRA military strategy will have been based on the prosecution of an unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign, selectively targeting loop-holes in the capability of the enemy whilst allowing it to adapt to its own condition of relative military weakness. Second, LRA will have selectively attacked civilians to expose the Ugandan state as incapable of protecting its citizens. In turn, the government will have been pushed to adopt a heavy handed approach to tracking down the rebels.. Third, LRA will have attacked weak points in the military capability of the Ugandan state and avoided outright confrontation with government forces. Fourth, LRA will have used terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive movements in its theatres of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy.
The first hypothesis was accepted. LRA conducts some random attacks which make its campaign unpredictable. It has serialized its insurgent campaign over a period of 25 years. Although the group lacks the conventional military capability to take on the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, it is in a position to exploit UPDF’s incapacity to simultaneously protect civilians and pursue marauding rebel units.
The second was partially rejected. LRA attacks on civilians did not precede the GoU strategy of creating strategic hamlets and civil defence groups. The group adopted this strategy as a reaction to these two developments. The third was accepted. By attacking protected villages, LRA seeks to demonstrate that the strategy of curtailing insurgent- civilian contact is unachievable. It was also accepted on grounds that when it’s military
237 resource base narrowed (especially in the wake of Operation Lightening Thunder), LRA has avoided contact with government forces and concentrated on attacking civilians.
The fourth hypothesis was accepted. When retreating from theatres of combat, LRA field operational units use their knowledge of the operational environment to lure UPDF counterinsurgency units into circular movements. In order to marshal locality intelligence, the group deploys its fighters in their areas of origin.
6.2.7: Weapons and Weapons Acquisition. There is a confluence between the principles governing the acquisition and use of weapons in guerrilla warfare and the modus operandi of LRA. Theoretically, the type, acquisition and use of weapons in insurgencies are largely dictated by the prevailing balance in confrontational advantages between an insurgent organization and the state military establishment. When the scale is initially tilted in favour of government forces, guerrillas will seek to acquire and use weapons that are readily available and relatively cheap to avoid running short of coercive power, light to allow for mobility and concealability, usable to ease training and those with a good range and firepower to earn insurgents the respect of the enemy. 646
Empirically, the acquisition and use of weapons by LRA has been dictated by the confluence of its status as an insurgent group and the strategic calculations of its principle supplier. To this effect, the group predominantly acquired from Sudan and used weapons that are light, easy to use and conceal and with the range and firepower for LRA to destabilize Uganda. Sudan mainly supplied the group with light weapons 647 that would not make it difficult for Sudanese security forces to deal with a future LRA security threat.
This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have used a wide range of weapons according to availability and will have purchased and stolen its arms and ammunition from a variety of domestic and foreign sources. It was partially accepted on two grounds. The group uses a wide array of weapons. Its arms range from machetes and clubs to AK 47 assault rifles and Surface to Air Missiles (SAM). Before Uganda-Sudan relations improved,
238 Sudan (a foreign source) was the principle supplier of arms to LRA. The group may also have purchased weapons from arms dealers supplying different fighting groups in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. It was partially rejected because there was no evidence pointing to LRA acquiring some of its arms domestically through theft.
6.3: Research Questions Revisited. Through a systematic review of the principles of insurgency, a set of 16 hypotheses was generated and tested on the insurgent attributes of the group. As is evident in this study, the modus operandi of LRA largely conforms to the principles of insurgency. In areas where there is a discrepancy between theory and practice, guerrilla warfare theories still provide a benchmark on the basis of which the LRA insurgent model can be understood. In this context, it can be asserted that the theories of guerrilla warfare are useful in explaining the insurgent activities of LRA.
Deriving from the primary/broad research question, the task in this study was to answer two secondary/specific research questions: How does LRA reconcile the need for popular support with its sustained attacks on civilians? Why has LRA not systematically graduated from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phases of its insurgent campaign?
6.3.1: Attacking the Support Base Existing principles of insurgency accommodate scenarios where rebels may attack civilians and yet retain their support. Theoretically, under such circumstances, a guerrilla group would not be enjoying popular support per se. Rather, its ethnic connections with civilians in its theatres of insurgent activities, its capacity to violently access civilians and civilian infrastructure, the opportunistic calculations of the population and the ruthlessness of counterinsurgency operations mounted by the state military apparatus would combine to either make the population a passive or unwilling supporter of the group’s activities. 648
Empirically, it has been observed that the interaction between its military and propaganda strategies assists LRA in harmonizing the need for popular support with its sustained attacks on civilians. As discussed in Chapter 5, the LRA leadership explains the terrorist
239 dimension to the conflict in Northern Uganda from three perspectives: First, given the autonomy that its operational units enjoy, the top LRA leadership does not authorize all the terrorist attacks that its units carry out. Lt Col Otim reveals that the abduction of the students of Aboke Girls School was never sanctioned by the LRA top leadership. Second, where LRA conducts attacks on civilians, it has no choice in light of the fact that the Ugandan state pursues a policy of militarizing the population in order to fight LRA. In this case, civilians are a legitimate military target. Third, some of the terrorist attacks attributed to LRA are in fact false-flag operations mounted by Ugandan security forces aimed at discrediting the group. 649 While LRA seems to prioritize popular support only up to that point where it does not work against its military strategy, its brutal treatment of civilians points to a probable commitment to using excessive coercion. In this case, if it relaxed the use of violence, civilians would cease joining it and presumably, it would collapse.
6.3.2: Evolution of Military Strategy. Given the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of the state military establishment, most guerrilla warfare theorists prescribe a strategy based on a protracted insurgent campaign against government forces. To this end, Giap asserts that a guerrilla campaign should systematically graduate from a defensive through equilibrium and ultimately to a stage of offensive warfare. 650
In this connection, over the course of its life cycle, LRA should have systematically followed the above linear trajectory. Instead, it has been observed that the group has adopted a non-linear approach in developing its insurgent strategy largely dictated by the prevailing balance in military capabilities in the conflict in Northern Uganda. At the stage of formation, LRA employed guerrilla warfare. When it started receiving military support from Sudan, the group fought more like a conventional army. When Sudan withdrew support for its activities, LRA reverted to using guerrilla warfare. When faced with a full scale regional counterinsurgency campaign, the group is avoiding outright contact with government forces. 651
240 From the above exposition, it can be noted that although it has not systematically followed a linear trajectory, LRA has at one point in its life cycle graduated to a conventional warfare phase of its insurgent campaign. The fact that it has been able to shift back and forth between different stages in the development of its military strategy suggests that it operates highly flexible organizational structures. The organizational model of the group accommodates formal and informal centralized command structures. For example as Head of LRA, Kony epitomizes the fusion of military and spiritual powers. 652 Normally, this would mean that the group exhibits a highly centralized leadership hierarchy with absolute power vested in the leader of the group.
However, the supreme decision-making organ of the group is Control Alter of which the Head of LRA is a member. 653 This structural feature points to the propensity for Kony to democratize decision-making in his organization. Yet, the principle of shared decision- making in LRA is negated by the fact that before issues are tabled in Control Alter, Kony ostensibly has to be guided by the Holy Spirit. Given the faith-related foundation of LRA, members of Control Alter would find it difficult challenging commands tabled by Kony and ostensibly coming from The Holy Spirit.
The significance of the above model is that it does not allow LRA to stick to one military approach. When it experiences shifts in its military strength and external support for its insurgent activities, the group is in a position to flexibly switch back and forth between different phases in the evolution of its military strategy and organizational structures.
In wrapping up the discussion on the insurgent credentials of LRA, it can be asserted that on one hand, the group defies the theories of insurgency in that it favours coercion over persuasion and yet it continues to survive. On the other hand, it lends support to those theories in the sense that its preference for coercion is self-limiting. It cannot reach the requisite threshold of popular support which, coupled with enhanced military capability, are prerequisites for systematically pushing its campaign from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phase let alone presenting a formidable and legitimate challenge to the authority of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government.
241 END NOTES
546International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 6-9 of 47 547Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello, 2002, Op cit 548Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 549Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 550Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 200, Op cit. pp 282-283 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 551International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 6-9 of 47 552Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 553Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Uganda 2010, Op cit 554 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 555Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 274-275 556Feldman Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 139-140 557Feldman, Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 137-138 558The Hague Justice Portal, Op cit 559Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit 560Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 561Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 562 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 563Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 564International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9-14 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 395-396 565Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit. Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit 566IRIN 2009, Op cit 567Mukasa, Henry 2008, Op cit 568Kamara, Patrick 2010, Op cit 569O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit. pps 1-2 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 570Conciliation Resources, Op cit. International Crisis Group 2007, Op cit. pp 10 Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Mugira, James 2010, Op cit International Crisis Group 2007, Op cit. pp 10 571Feldman, Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 137-138 572 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 573Feldman Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 134-136 574Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 575Feldman Robert 2007,Op cit. pp 137 576Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 577Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 578Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 396-398 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 579Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 580Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit. pps 1-2 581Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102
242 582Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 335-348 583Mugira, James 2010, Op cit Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit 584Christopher C Harmon, Op cit. pp 107-108 585International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47 Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit. Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 586Behrand, Heike 1999, Op cit. pp 22-36 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 587Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118 588International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit pp 8-9 of 47 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 589Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-974 590Cronin, Audrey Kurth 1958. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns. Princeton University Press. Princeton, Oxford 591International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit Op cit pp 8-9 of 47 Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit. Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 592Behrand, Heike 1999, Op cit. pp 22-36 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 593Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 594Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 Cross, Elliot James 1962, Op cit 22-39 595Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 596Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 597Cross, Elliot James 1962, Op cit pp 22-39 598 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit. 599Council on Foreign Relations 2011, Hamas. Backgrounder. http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968. Accessed on 11/01/2012 USA Today 2006. Hezbollah promises to rebuild in Lebanon. 16th August, 2006. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-08-16-hezbollah-rebuilding_x.htm. Accessed on 11/01/2012 600Lawrence T E 1997, Op cit. pp 183-185 Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 284-293 Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 601Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 284-293 602O’kadamerie Billie 2002, Op cit. Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit. pp 1-2 603Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 294-302 604Hudson, A Rex 1999, Op cit 605Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 347-348 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47
243 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 37-40 Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit. Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit 606Okadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit. pps 1-2 607Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit 608Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 609Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 290-292. 610Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-972 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 282-283 611International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8-9 of 47 612Behrand, Heike 1999, Op cit. pp 22-36 613Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 115-118 614Hennessy Selah 2010, Op cit. Feldman L Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 45-46 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 615Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 278-280 616Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 617Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 618Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 393-395 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit. pp 963-974 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 282-283 619Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 290-292. 620Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 278-285 Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Okwangalero Francis 2010, Op cit 621Nkrumah, Kwame 1968, Op cit. pp 56-102 622Ibid 623Feldman, Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 137-138 624Nicolli, Alexander and Johnstone Sarah Johnstone (eds) 2008, Op cit. Mugira, James 2010, Op cit. O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit 625Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 626Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit Okwangalero, Francis 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 627Cross, James Elliot 1962, Op cit. pp 22-39 628 Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit pp 382-409 629Ibid 630IRIN 2009, Op cit. 631 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 632Kamara Patrick 2010, Op cit.
244 633Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit. Kamara Patrick 2010, Op cit Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Johnson, Scott 2009, Op cit Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 634Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 275-280. Byman, Daniel 1967, Op cit. pp 53-78 635Vision Reporter 1996, Op cit. pps 1-2 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 636Schomerus, Mareike 2007, Op cit 637O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit. pps 1-2 Feldman Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 47-48 638Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 639Che Guevara 1985, Op cit. pp 1-10 Mao Tse Tung 1938, Op cit. Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich 1968, Op cit. pp 53 Rice E Edward 1988, Op cit. pp 92-93 Tanham George K 1961, Op cit. pp 74-78 Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit. pp 73-95 640 International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9-14 of 47 Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit.pp 118-125 Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit. Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346 641 Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. 27-29 642 Marighella, Carlos 1969 Laqueur, Walter 1977, Op cit pp 382-409 Hudson, A Rex 1999, Op cit Arena, Michael P and Arrigo, Bruce A 2006, Op cit. pp 77-78 643Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 40-44 644Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 389-393 Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 645Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pps 4-5 646Segaller, Stephen 1986, Op cit. pp 299-301. Marighella, Carlos 1971, Op cit pp 68-70 Che Guevara, Ernesto, Op cit. pp 27-28 647Mugira, James 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit
Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit 648Fairbairn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 302-305 Galula, David 2006, Op cit pp 243-246 Cross, Elliot James 1962, Op cit pp 22-39 Lomperis, Timothy J 1996, Op cit. pp 49-67 649Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pps 4-5 650Fairburn, Geoffrey 1974, Op cit. pp 335-348 651Mugira, James 2010, Op cit Kulayigye Felix 2010, Op cit 652Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 653Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 O’kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15
245 CHAPTER 7
IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
7.1: TARGETING LRA ATTRIBUTES: IDENTITY 7.1.1: Targeting Ideology. Given resource and political constraints, targeting the ideology of an insurgent group should be based on a hierarchy of priorities. The state should decide on which set of grievances to address in the short (immediate), medium and long term. The rebellion in Northern Uganda has essentially been fuelled by the evolution of disparities in the distribution of political power and resources in the country. 654 At the outset of the conflict, the state could only target one element in the set of grievances advanced by rebel groups in Northern Uganda—human rights violations. In the wake of a public outcry over the atrocities committed by the 35th Battalion of the National Resistance Army (NRA), the Government of Uganda (GoU) instituted an immediate (short term) measure to disable the ideology of the rebel groups. It withdrew the military unit from Northern Uganda. 655
By itself, this measure was not sufficient to stop a series of rebellions from evolving in this part of the country. Disparities in the distribution of political power and resources still lingered. Yet measures aimed at addressing these grievances (like economic reconstruction programmes and levelling of the political playing field) would only yield concrete results in the medium and long term. The dilemma for Ugandan counterinsurgency strategists then lay in sustaining the military campaign against the insurgents in the short term without undermining the probable positive outcome of the hearts and minds programmes (economic reconstruction and political inclusiveness) in the medium and long term.
Given the relationship between the overlap in rebellions in Northern Uganda and the increase in ideological radicalization, the key to resolving the above dilemma lies in the state not negotiating with the group emerging at the tail end of the series of insurgencies. When the conflict in this part of the country got underway, the pioneering group (UPDA) pursued a relatively more moderate agenda which the state could accommodate (as it did)
246 through a negotiated settlement. Successive rebel groups (HSM I, HSM II and LRA) espoused more radical ideals that the state could not accommodate
When more radical groups emerge at a time the hearts and minds programmes have started coming to fruition, the state should close the door on negotiations for two reasons: First, the success of economic reconstruction and programmes aimed at instituting political inclusiveness would have provided a foundation for undermining popular support for the radical groups. Second, the radical agenda adopted by these groups would have narrowed the space needed for arriving at a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict. In this case, a full-blown military offensive that surgically targets the radical groups would not significantly alienate the population. The population would percieve the radical rebel groups as spoilers.
7.1.2: Targeting Propaganda. It has been argued that during periods of belligerence with the Ugandan government, LRA is constrained in using propaganda to execute its insurgent campaign. Because it attacks the Acholi population (which should have been its natural, ethnic popular support base), its propaganda campaign has not only to expose and exaggerate the failings of the NRM government but also strenously rationalize its terrorist approach. 656 On the other hand, peace talks shift the focus to the issues at the heart of the conflict (usually the failings of the state) and overly suspend the need for LRA to account for its terrorist attacks. In order to psychologically undermine the image of such a group in the public domain, the state should not conduct negotiations with it.
However, there are caveats to using this tactic: First, the group should have emerged at the tail end of a series of rebellions. Second, it should have adopted a radical ideology that narrows the scope for arriving at a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Third, its terrorist attacks should be targeting its natural, ethnic support constituency. Fourth, by the time the state shuts the door on peace talks, its medium and long term hearts and minds programmes should have started coming to fruition. In the case of Uganda, the Acholi population should
247 percieve LRA as a stumbling block to the reintegration of the North into the Ugandan political process.
7.1.3: Targeting Popular Support. Thus far, in targeting the popular support base of LRA, the calculations of the Ugandan state have been twofold: First, in light of the enduring North-South regional divide, the natural, ethnic support constituency for LRA would be the Acholi. In this case, the Ugandan state security apparatus would need to keep an eye on the activities of this population. However, this measure would not fully prevent LRA from interacting with civilians since the state would lack the manpower and resources to institute water-tight surveillance. Second, in order to try and cut any lingering links between LRA and the Acholi, the Ugandan state has had to quarantine the population in the theatre of the insurgency. 657
From the discussion on popular support for LRA activities (Chapter 4), it has been deduced that these tactics are based on shaky assumptions. Ethnicity as a basis for popular support is sustainable only in situations where the rebels and the population enjoy good relations. As is the case with LRA and the Acholi population, poor relations can evolve between a rebel group and its natural, ethnic support constituency. This means that the Ugandan state would only need to keep the Acholi population under surveillance not because it shares ethnic connections with LRA but because it enjoys cordial relations with the rebel group. Since, as discussed in Chapter 4, LRA is no longer popular in Acholiland, 658 the state would then need to shift from conducting blanket surveillance of the Acholi as a potential support base to targeted surveillance of specific elements within this constituency who might support the activities of the group
As observed in Chapter 4, deterioration in LRA-Acholi relations has not led to improvement in NRM-Acholi relations. Since the creation of protected villages has only achieved half its intended purpose (minimized LRA-Acholi interaction but not improved NRM-Acholi relations), then a counterinsurgency strategy based on the creation of strategic hamlets needs revisiting. NRM-Acholi relations have not significantly improved because of
248 the squalid conditions in the protected camps. 659 In order to improve state-population cooperation in counterinsurgency campaigns, the state would have to let civilians return to their natural habitats. However, this measure would potentially re-expose them to insurgent attacks as the state would not be able to concentrate a sufficient number of forces in all areas to protect them.
In order to mitigate the above risk, the state would count on two advantages: First, releasing the population from squalor in the protected camps and reintegrating the conflict affected region back into the national political process would reduce resentment towards the state. Second, deriving from the first advantage, the state would establish civil defence groups to bolster security in areas inhabited by civilians. With resentment towards the state receding, civilians in the theatre of insurgency would be motivated to actively participate in counterinsurgency campaigns.
7.1.4: Targeting Motivation. Over the course of the armed conflict in Northern Uganda, the motivation of LRA has been changing. At its formative stage (when its officer corps was dorminated by former fighters of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army), the group was motivated by the drive to protect the Acholi people against potential extermination and reclaim the political power the North had lost to the South. 660 When the chances of the group ever seizing state power diminished as a result of effective counterinsurgency campaigns, the strategic calculations of Sudan (its principle backer) and receding popular support, motivation in the group assumed different dimensions: The officer corps were motivated by two considerations: First, the need to elude the long arm of retributive justice in light of the atrocities allegedly committed by the group. 661 Second, the drive to sustain what remains of their trappings of insurgent power. 662 On the other hand, the conscripted rank-and-file were largely motivated by the desire to survive while awaiting the opportunity to escape from captivity. 663
Given the above dynamics, the state adopted a multi-pronged strategy to undercut the motivation of the rebel group. While LRA was being motivated by idealistic considerations,
249 the state undermined its popular support base by instituting a hearts and minds programme aimed at making the North feel like an integral part of Uganda. While curbing human rights violations in the short run would have reduced Acholi resentment towards the government, the effectiveness of the hearts and minds strategy highly depended on the long term success of economic rehabilitation programmes and the reintegration of the region into the Ugandan political process.
When the fear of retributive justice became a motivating factor, the Ugandan Parliament passed the Amnesty Act 2000 to instigate defections from and schisms within LRA. 664 This approach was highly selective. While it opened the door for the mid-level officer corps and the rank-and-file to abandon the armed struggle, it excluded the top leadership of LRA. In order to retain its manpower, the top commanders of the group would have to act in a more repressive manner towards their juniors. This would potentially cause infighting within the group.
During the Juba peace talks, some quarters pushed for a strategy that would specifically demotivate the top leadership of LRA. The International Crisis Group stressed the need for a peace deal that would specifically address the post-conflict security and livelihood concerns of Kony and his top lieutenants. 665 This arrangement would see the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees relocate to a country that is not signatory to the ICC Statute. 666 In this regard, the host country would not be obliged to hand the indictees to the Hague- based court for trial. The top leadership of the group would also be guaranteed a comfortable post-insurgency livelihood that would render the trappings of insurgent power unattractive.
7.1.5: Targeting Recruitment. LRA’s recruitment methods are dictated by the level of popular support it enjoys and its capacity to access the population. On the basis of this assertion, there are four potential recruitment scenarios for the group: In the first scenario, LRA enjoys popular support and can access the population. Civilians easily take the initiative or LRA persuades them to join the group; In the second, LRA enjoys popular support but cannot easily access the
250 population because it is interned in protected villages. Civilians try to sneak out or the LRA tries to sneak or force its way into the protected villages to recruit members; In the third, LRA does not enjoy popular support but can access the population. It needs minimal force to conscript civilians; In the fourth, LRA does not enjoy popular support and cannot easily access the population because it is interned in protected villages. It needs maximum force to overcome the units guarding the protected villages in order to recruit members.
At its formative stage, LRA faced a recruitment challenge. In seeking to constitute its membership, it had not only to interface with the population but also other groups fighting the NRM government. Whereas at this stage, the group did not have to conscript civilians into its ranks as it enjoyed popular support 667 and could easily access the population (first recruitment scenario), due to rivalry, it had to use a combination of persuasion and coercion to recruit members from armed groups that ironically shared a similar long term goal with it. 668
At this juncture, a three-way counter-recruitment strategy would have sufficed: First, the state would have improved the human rights record of the army thereby curtailing part of the popular support enjoyed by the insurgent group. In pursuing this approach, the NRM government withdrew the indisciplined 35th Battalion of NRA from the theatre of the insurgency. 669 However, this positive move was undermined by subsequent cases of human rights violations by other units of the Ugandan military. 670 Second, since this would be the pioneering group (with a moderate ideology) in what would be an evolving chain of insurgencies, the state would consider negotiating with this group (as NRM did with UPDA) 671 in order to further curtail popular support for those that would succeed it.
Third, in case the state concluded an agreement with the pioneering group, it would have to quickly attack any splinter factions that would have rejected the peace deal before they constituted the pioneering membership of a new insurgent group. In the aftermath of the signing of the Pece Peace Accord, Kony attacked and forcefully incorporated into his evolving guerrilla army all the splinter factions that had rejected this agreement. 672 The state should have mounted a concerted campaign to neutralize LRA at this stage.
251
Subsequent to the formative phase, LRA has been faced with the fourth recruitment scenario. It has been unpopular 673 and not able to easily access the population. 674 As a result, it has had to attack units guarding protected villages in order to recruit among civilians. 675 In this case, the state would have had two counter-recruitment options: The first would have entailed beefing up security at the protected camps in order to stave off potential LRA recruitment raids. However, this approach would not have been without drawbacks. As was the case with Acholi-Pii, 676 the group has demonstrated the capacity to breach the security of protected villages (strategic hamlets). Besides, the squalid conditions in the camps increased Acholi resentment towards the NRM government. The second would have involved releasing the population back into its natural habitat. Although this move would have re-exposed them to rebel attacks, the reduction in resentment towards the government would have boosted civil defence activity potentially curtailing LRA’s capacity to attack civilians in homes and farming fields.
However, it is important to note that children at schools would still constitute ideal recruitment targets of the group.677 Unlike situations where they would have to attack numerous homes scattered over a wide area, the high concentration of recruitable material in one place would tempt LRA raiding parties to square off against units guarding these institutions. Where the state has to prioritize its deployment, the protection of civilians especially children in schools should take precedence.
7.2: TARGETING LRA ATTRIBUTES: OPERATIONAL 7.2.1: Targeting Training. There are two cardinal features of the LRA training model: First, training is amalgamated with military operations. Abductees are taught how to fight while LRA units are still in the field. 678 This saves the group time, gives the recruits hands-on experience and in the immediate aftermath of abductions, increases the number of fighters available for insurgent activity. Second, recruits are subjected to a brand of indoctrination that is difficult to interpret and challenge. 679 While some abductees may be conversant with the principles of
252 Christianity, Islam, Acholi traditional religion and nationalism, a cocktail of these laced with extreme fear makes for difficult interpretation.
In order to target the first feature, government forces should allow the raiding parties no time to train the abductees. This calls for hot pursuit mounted by highly mobile, rapid response units. Faced with this challenge, LRA field units would most likely prioritize rapid retreat over the training of recruits. As a result, in terms of manpower, counterinsurgency units would not have to face an enhanced rebel capability. Since the group’s indoctrination is particularly tailored to psychologically manipulate children, survival-in-captivity and escape-from-captivity skills should be taught and integrated into the Ugandan school curricular. These courses would equip pupils with the skills to cope with emotional-transitional phases that are likely to be caused by LRA indoctrination (in case they are abducted).
7.2.2: Targeting Organizational Structure. LRA is a hierarchical organization. 680 Although counterinsurgency pressure may push it to change its structural posture, 681 it largely exhibits centralized command and control and a fusion of powers. The neutralization of Kony would have far reaching implications. In the event he surrendered, was captured or killed, LRA would struggle to identify another commander with the credentials to fit into his fused military and ‘spiritual’ roles. Within the structures of the group, Control Alter is the only tier where LRA appears to exhibit a measure of shared decision-making. Collegial (shared) leadership within the group allows leaders other than the Head to grow in confidence. In case the Head were eliminated, then the organization would not be short of personnel to step into his shoes. If government forces killed or captured all or most members of Control Alter (where effective leadership is nurtured), then LRA would disintegrate. There would be no other tier of leadership from which the group would produce leaders.
As stressed by the International Crisis Group and Enough, the Lord’s Resistance Movement (the political wing of LRA) is highly peripheral to its structures. During the Juba peace process, the Government of Uganda (GoU) should never have negotiated with an LRA
253 peace team predominantly made up of LRM members. It should have insisted on holding direct talks with Kony and Otti who wielded real power within the structures of the group. 682 This should be an emphasis for any future talks.
7.2.3: Targeting Guerrilla Bases. In setting up its bases, LRA is guided by two calculations: In Sudan, it exploited poor relations between Uganda and Sudan. 683 In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it exploited weak state control. 684 In both cases, the site of the bases was in an area that was not easily accessible.
In order to counteract the above calculations, Uganda improved her relations with Sudan 685 and DRC 686 respectively. While none of Uganda’s neighbours is officially offering the group a sanctuary, weak state control and large swathes of rugged terrain in the Great Lakes Region still give it multiple options for setting up new bases. Thus, it was not enough for Uganda to ask Sudan to expel LRA from Southern Sudan. Measures should have been taken to block its relocation to other favourable areas. After concluding the Nairobi Accord that repaired Uganda-Sudan relations, Ugandan, Sudanese, Congolese, United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) forces should have attempted to block the group’s relocation from Southern Sudan to the densely forested tri-border region of Central Africa.
7.2.4: Targeting Funding and External Support. Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has used three avenues to fund its insurgent campaign: It has recieved support from the Government of Sudan (GoS) 687 and some Acholis in the diaspora. 688 It has also preyed on the population in its theatres of insurgent activity. 689 Of all the three sources of funding, most analysts attribute the longevity of the group to the support it received from Sudan. 690 Beyond the signing of the Nairobi Accord that normalized Uganda-Sudan relations in 1999, 691 the GoS is suspected to have covertly continued aiding LRA. 692
254 Whereas financial support by Acholis in the diaspora was also instrumental in sustaining the group, that aid is likely to have ended in 2008 for two reasons: First, most exiled supporters of LRA from the North live in Western countries. 693 United States (US) support for counter LRA Operation Lightening Thunder (2008/2009) 694 would have had serious implications for individuals and groups supporting the group. With cooperation agreements between the US and most Western countries, Acholi financiers of LRA risked being tried for financing terrorism and having their assets frozen.
Second, the rift that emerged between LRA (the military wing) and LRM (the political wing) during the Juba peace talks may have triggered an end to Acholi diasporian support for the group. While Kony refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement, the LRA peace team largely made up of Acholis in the diaspora (LRM) favoured a negotiated end to the conflict in Northern Uganda. 695 It is also worth noting that during the Juba peace process (2005- 2008), the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), 696 Government of Uganda (GoU) 697 and international aid agencies supplied LRA with basic necessities to discourage it from preying on the population and encourage it to participate in the peace negotiations. 698
In future, the state may have to re-consider the policy of supplying rebels with essential needs during negotiations. Since LRA has always gone on to use these supplies to re-launch its campaign, then this approach might be worth abandoning. In order to assess the future prospects of LRA re-securing external support, we would need to consider a number of factors: The seccession of Southern Sudan from Sudan, relations between the newly created Government of South Sudan and Government of Sudan and the challenges of governance facing the two states. 699 These recent developments are discussed in detail in Section 7.3
If the start of Operation Lightening Thunder (2008/2009) marked the end of all external support for LRA, then for three years (2008-2011), the group has been able to sustain its activities by preying on the population. But as discussed in Chapter 5, LRA did not start preying on the population in 2008/2009. While operating in Northern Uganda (without external support) and Southern Sudan (with external support), the group preyed on the population. This makes plunder the most enduring source of funding for LRA. In this
255 respect, the long term key to crippling funding for the group lies not in the decapitation of its external support arms but in the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure.
7.2.5: Targeting Strategy and Tactics. Among other reasons, LRA attacks civilians in order to cause a troop deployment dilemma for the state. 700 The Ugandan military has to prioritize between pursuing LRA units and protecting civilians. On one hand, if it chooses to overly pursue rebel units, civilians are exposed to attacks. On the other, if it chooses to overly protect civilians, LRA units are able to retreat with minimal harassment by government forces. Given the critical role of terrorism in the LRA guerrilla campaign, the state should step up civilian protection. This approach denies the group a canvass (population) on which to exert the most critical aspect of its guerrilla strategy (terrorism).
In order to effectively marshall locality and terrain intelligence, LRA deploys its fighters in their areas of origin 701 and conscripts civilians to act as guides. 702 This set of tactics eases the task of locating, accessing and retreating from selective targets. In this direction, areas of frequent abductions are more likely to become areas of future LRA attacks. While the state should strive to spread out its troop deployments across all civilian inhabited areas, a relatively higher concentration of forces may be needed in areas most affected by abductions.
Whereas at the stage of troop insertion, LRA splits up its operational units, 703 at the final stage of troop withdrawal, it concentrates all of them at one spot, takes stock of its acquisitions (abductees and looted items) 704 and makes an orderly retreat from the theatre of insurgent activity. 705 Realizing that it cannot concentrate its conventional military power against insurgents operating in small units, the state has had to split up its counterinsurgency forces to pursue LRA raiding parties. 706 With accurate intelligence and enhanced troop mobility, the state can still use its conventional military capability. It can unleash its full conventional military power at those spots where LRA field units assemble before making an orderly match back to their bases.
256 However, there is a caveat to employing this tactic: In order not to disrupt the ‘normal’ LRA pattern of disengagement, counterinsurgency units should either forfeit or scale down hot pursuit in the immediate aftermath of a rebel attack. Sustained hot pursuit would keep the LRA raiding parties scattered all over the theatre of skirmishes, preventing them from assembling. This would deny government forces the opportunity of exerting its full conventional military capability against a concentrated manifestition of rebel activity.
This tactic is not without shortcomings: It would allow rebel units the time to train abductees and increase the number of fighters (trained insurgents and partially trained recruits) available for confrontation with government forces. If the state is sensitive to public revulsion over the slaughter of largely abductee rebels by government forces, then the army may maintain hot pursuit to minimize the chances of recruits being integrated into the rebel units and maximizing the chances of the abductees escaping during encounters between the two sides. However, if the state’s counterinsurgency strategy is not influenced by public opinion, it can allow the ‘normal’ LRA pattern of disengagement to take place so that government forces can strike at the rebels when they regroup before returning to their bases. The above counterinsurgency tactical framework cannot be based on a fixed formula and requires situation- and resource-dependent decision-making in the field.
In disengaging from combat theatres, we have noted that LRA operational units move in circles in order to disorientate government forces. 707 Circular movement can assume either of two dimensions: clockwise or anti-clockwise. In the event a rapid response unit knows the geography of an area under LRA attack, in conducting hot pursuit, it should split up its forces between those chasing the rebels in a clockwise (or anti-clockwise) direction and those waylaying them in the anti-clockwise (or clockwise) direction in which they are likely to emerge. There is one challenge with this approach. The LRA unit that abducted Capt Sande Otto moved in circles without returning to the scene of his abduction. In this case, the clockwise/anti-clockwise approach would not be helpful. Nonetheless, with intimate knowledge on the geography of an area, government forces would still be able to anticipate the likely directions the rebel circular movements might take.
257 7.2.6: Targeting Weapons and Weapons Acquisition. In seeking to target the ‘weapons’ element in the LRA insurgency, there are a couple of critical issues to consider: Who supplies LRA with arms and ammunition? How can this supply be cut off? What kind of weapons does the group use? What circumstances dictate usage of the different weapons in its arsenal? How can counterinsurgency operations alter these circumstances in a way that makes it difficult for LRA to acquire and use these weapons?
Before the sigining of the Nairobi Accord in 1999, most sources credited Sudan for overtly supplying LRA with weapons. 708 Some claim that even in the aftermath of the normalization of Uganda-Sudan relations, the Government of Sudan (GoS) may have given LRA a ‘send off’ consignment of arms or continued supplying it with weapons. 709 The normalization of Uganda-Sudan relations meant that if the GoS had to continue supplying the group with arms, it could only do this covertly. In order not to arouse suspicion, the GoS would have needed to regulate the quantity and period of weapons supply to LRA. Given the complexities that would have been involved in such a covert mission, we can assert that by and large, the thawing in Uganda-Sudan relations must significantly have undercut the supply of conventional weapons to LRA.
Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has used light, medium and heavy conventional weapons. 710 It has mainly used these in its military engagements with government forces. The group also uses an assortment of rudimentary (unconventional) weapons like matchetes and clubs. 711 Given the primacy of terrorism in its guerrilla campaign and the need to conserve its conventional weapons for firefights with government forces, LRA’s unconventional arms might afterall be the single most important element in its arsenal. It needs and mainly uses these sharp and blunt instruments to attack and subdue civilians. 712
In order to render the use of these unconventional weapons obsolete and push LRA to expend its limited conventional ammunition, potential civilian targets should be ‘hardened’. Villages, schools and other civilian inhabitated areas should be guarded by government soldiers and self defence groups armed with automatic and semi-automatic weapons. Faced
258 with well armed adversaries, LRA field operational units would be forced to use their conventional arms and ammunition without guaranteed replenishment.
Beyond this strategy, Uganda should be aiming to strengthen her relations with Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to prevent LRA from being re- supplied with conventional weapons. However, with the conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur 713 still unresolved and inter-ethnic clashes mushrooming in South Sudan, 714 it would be difficult to control the proliferation of small arms in this part of Africa and the chances of LRA exploiting these circumstances to re-equip its units with weapons cannot entirely be ruled out.
7.3: Recent Developments and Prospects for the Resurgence of the LRA Threat. Since the collapse of the Juba peace process in 2008, the response to the threat posed by LRA has become more concerted and assumed a multi-pronged dimension. Acknowledging the pitfalls of treating the LRA insurgency as a Ugandan problem and according this security challenge piece-meal attention, the international community has adopted a more coordinated approach incorporating military, economic and legal measures. The success of this latest regional initiative will largely depend on the sustained commitment of the actors involved.
With the end of the Juba peace talks, military action has emerged as the primary means of ending the LRA rebellion. Currently, the regional military initiative aims to kill or apprehend Kony and his top commanders. 715 This action would throw the group into disarray. LRA would presumably suffer defections and infighting which would in turn lead to the dismemberment of the group. But to achieve this objective, a number of modalities need to be in place:
First, all the countries affected by the transnational activities of LRA (Uganda, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic) need to militarily participate in the hunt for Kony. One of the shortcomings of Operation Lightening Thunder was the dismal participation of South Sudan and DRC in this campaign. Uganda with the
259 logistical support of the United States military shouldered the burden of mounting this operation. 716 The muted participation of DRC and South Sudan springs from the following premises: Both countries are distrustful of Uganda’s regional interventions. In the mid-90s, when Ugandan forces entered Eastern DRC to (among other reasons) pursue rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), they illegally exploited the natural resources of the country. 717 In similar vein, when the Ugandan military entered Southern Sudan to attack LRA bases, it engaged in illegal profiteering activity. 718 However, this mistrust in bilateral relations appears to have been diffused. In January, 2012, Central African countries affected by the LRA rebellion agreed to cooperate to end the conflict. The United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) reported that Uganda, DRC, South Sudan and CAR agreed to allow their troops to cross borders without any hinderance while pursuing LRA forces. 719
Second, aside from uneasy bilateral relations, unlike Uganda which has a relatively strong army with over 25 years of experience in conducting counterinsurgency operations, the Congolese, South Sudanese and Central African Republic (CAR) armies are relatively weak partners in the regional initiative. 720 In order to pursue a more effective counter LRA campaign, there is a need to strengthen the military capabilities of these three countries and improve that of Uganda. In 2011, the US government dispatched 100 troops to provide expertise in the hunt for LRA. 721 This initiative was executed under the auspices of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act that enjoins the American government to render military and economic assistance in the regional campaign against the group. 722
It is important to note that in the long term, the regional military initiative might be affected by faltering commitment on the part of some of the actors involved. With LRA no longer active in Northern Uganda, Kampala appears to be gradually treating it as a Congolese or CAR problem. Uganda has stepped up its troop deployments in Somalia at the expense of its counter LRA campaign in the tri-border region of Central Africa. 723 Her forces constitute the bulk of the African Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) stabilization force that is
260 protecting the African Union (AU)-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia against an Islamist insurgent campaign mounted by Al Shabaab. 724
Because of her involvement in the conflict in Somalia, Uganda has become a target of Al Shabaab attacks. In July, 2010, the Somali group conducted a double suicide attack in the heart of Kampala, the Ugandan capital. 725 Al Shabaab has threatened to mount more attacks as long as Uganda maintains her military presence in the Horn of Africa. Currently, unlike the LRA threat that is remote (in the tri-border region of Central Africa), the propensity for Al Shabaab to use its sleeper cells to strike at targets inside Uganda cannot be underestimated. In this direction, Uganda’s role in stabilizing the situation in Somalia appears to be more integral to marshalling security within her own borders than dealing with the ‘distant’ threat posed by LRA in Central Africa.
As part of an internationally supported hearts and minds initiative, the Government of Uganda (GoU) is also spearheading multiple programmes to foster the economic recovery of Northern Uganda. The conflict in this part of the country has partly been rooted in disparities in economic development between the North and the South. 726 It is thought that a redistribution of the national wealth would undermine the basis for people in this part of the country supporting LRA or any rebel group that may spring up in future. Through the GoU budget, donor assistance has gone to the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP), the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) and “…sector support for agriculture, education, health, water and environment, roads and other public works and strengthening local governments.” 727
On the legal front, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments of the top leaders of LRA was cited as one of the principle stumbling blocks to the conclusion of the Juba peace process. LRA conditioned ending its insurgent campaign on the revocation of these legal instruments. 728 This negotiation position raised some critical issues pertaining to conflict resolution: Should retributive justice be sacrificed at the alter of peace-making? 729
261
With the collapse of the Juba peace talks, the criminalization of the activities of LRA has since assumed more prominence. In this vein, the African Union (AU) has joined the ICC and the United States government in blacklisting the group. In pronouncing the AU position on the conflict in Northern Uganda, Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for the AU Peace and Security Council said that “The AU’s Peace and Security Council has decided to declare the LRA a terrorist group in line with the relevant AU instruments….The next step would be for all African countries to consider LRA as such and to enact regulations and legislation that would forbid the activities of LRA on their national territories and also make it punishable for any individual..(to) assist in any way the LRA to continue its criminal activities.” 730
The international criminalization of the activities of LRA grossly narrows its prospects for receiving external support. Sudan (which some sources suspect of covertly maintaining links with the group) 731 would risk being labelled a state sponsor of terrorism if its support for LRA was uncovered. Given previous efforts aimed at improving its international image, it is plausible to assume that Khartoum would not want to get caught up in such a situation. When Al Qeada masterminded the bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US accused Sudan of harbouring terrorists and retaliated by attacking the Al Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum (which the US insisted was a chemical weapons plant). 732 In 1999 (a year after the Al Shifa attack), Sudan concluded a Carter Centre-brokered peace deal that officially distanced it from LRA (one of several terrorist groups it had been linked to) and improved her relations with her southern neighbour, Uganda. 733
Tied in with the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Al Hasan El Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the Darfur region of Sudan by Sudanese security forces, 734 it is highly debatable that Khartoum would (for example) seek to fund and use LRA to destabilize the newly established South Sudan. There are some unresolved border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan (with implications for the exploitation of oil resources in the region) 735 and inter-ethnic clashes in
262 the Jonglei state of South Sudan736 that would give Khartoum (acting through LRA) opennings to destabilize its southern neighbour. However, Khartoum is unlikely to seize these opportunities for a number of reasons: The ICC indictments have made international travel for Bashir a nervy experience. Wherever Bashir has been on recent state visits, human rights groups have called on their governments to arrest him.737 Hot on the heels of the Arab Spring Revolution (of insurrections) that toppled Presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, 738 Hassan Al Turabi, a former ally of Bashir has pointed to the possibility that the Sudanese president may meet the same fate. 739 In this sense, the threat to his political power (potential insurrections) is a more immediate concern for Bashir than the need to revive the fortunes of a proxy group (LRA).
7.4: HOW THE LRA INSURGENCY MIGHT END Among experts interviewed, there is a relatively broad consensus that LRA is nearing the end of its life cycle. The group is fast running out of options for manoeuvre. However, those who disagree with this view argue that Sudan still holds the key to reviving LRA and the circumstances for pursuing this line still exist.
Grace Matsiko advances four factors to show that the LRA insurgency is receding: First, there is a huge geographical distance between the group’s current and original theatres of insurgent activities. LRA’s original base of operations was Northern Uganda (in East Africa). Currently, the group is active in the tri-border region of Central Africa. This geographical distance creates a disconnect between the stated mission of the group (overthrowing a government in East Africa) and the area where it is exerting itself militarily to achieve this goal (Central Africa).
Second, the bulk of the LRA fighting force is no more. Third, its leadership’s “biggest fear is the fear to communicate.” Kony has reportedly stopped using satellite phones to communicate with his troops for fear of American forces using their technology to track down his location. Angolan government forces were able to locate and kill Jonas Savimbi, the rebel leader of UNITA by tracking his satellite phone communication. Fourth, most members of the Acholi community in the diaspora that constituted LRA’s funding arm have
263 cut communication with the group and settled back in their jobs overseas. 740 This means that without adequate manpower, the capacity to effectively maintain communication with its field operational units and external funding for its activities (the second, third and fourth factors), LRA cannot effectively bridge the geographical gap that has evolved between its original and current theatres of insurgent activity (first factor).
Closely connected with the geographical disconnect, Col Tom Butime pinpoints discrepancies in the life cycle of the group. He argues that the success of a guerrilla group can be measured in terms of its capacity to expand in the different sectors of its insurgent campaign. To this effect, a rebel movement should expand the territory under its control, the size of its fighting force and its military capability. Butime asserts that for over 20 years, LRA has mainly posted “stunted growth” in these key areas. 741 It is then difficult to imagine that with its options for maneuvre narrowing, the group can intensify its activities at this stage.
Capt Ray Apiire, a former Chaplain of LRA reinforces the view that the group might be nearing its demise. Before surrendering to government forces, he reveals that Kony intimated to his top commanders that his spirits would leave him in the near future. 742 As discussed in the sections on ideology, leadership and intraorganizational schisms, Kony’s aura of invincibility ostensibly derives from his spiritual powers. Members of LRA believe that he can use his spiritual resources to secure the future of the group.743
What then would be the logic behind Kony divulging information on the imminent loss of an asset that has been at the heart of his position of invincibility in LRA? One thing seems to be clear though: His admission was a clear insider evaluation of the declining fortunes of the group. Now that Kony was about to cease being the spiritual insurance of the LRA insurgency, would members of the group start deserting it? Desertions instigated from within LRA would depend on two factors: First, members ceasing to believe in Kony’s spiritual invincibility. Second, the group losing its capacity to use force to retain its membership.
264 While pronouncing the impending decline in his spiritual powers (and the fortunes of LRA), Kony was not asking his followers to leave the group. Technically, any potential defections would still be dealt with using force and whatever iota of spiritual resources Kony would ostensibly still be commanding. Desertions from the group would also be mitigated by another factor: While pronouncing the imminent loss of his spiritual assets, Kony was simultaneously demonstrating the propensity to predict the future course of his movement. Potential deserters would be held back by the belief that Kony still commands the capacity to predict events and would know their defection plans well in advance.
There are experts who think that LRA is not a spent force. They largely argue that Sudan’s geopolitical calculations are key to reviving the fortunes of the rebel group. Phillip Kasaija pegs the end of the LRA insurgency to the amicable resolution of the South Sudanese question. Specifically, he cites the disputed, oil-rich border area of Abyei as a potential flash point in relations between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). Kasaija points out two credentials that would make LRA an important player in future armed conflict in Sudan:
First, the group was among 300 proxy militias that the GoS deployed against the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In this connection, LRA boasts the requisite fighting experience that would be needed to destabilize South Sudan. Second, it has got a significant South Sudanese contingent of fighters within its ranks. 744 This attribute potentially sets up the stage for non-Ugandan combatants in the group to militarily influence the politics of their countries of origin. This feature of insurgent campaigns is not new. Rebels of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) that seized state power in Rwanda in 1994 originally fought within the ranks of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group of Uganda. 745
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that LRA may either be re-hired by the GoS to destabilize South Sudan or it may disintegrate. The first scenario would presumably see the group retain its insurgent attributes (or modify them) as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The second scenario would see the group shedding off its guerrilla features. In this
265 direction, Matsiko, Mwanguhya Mpagi and Feldman concur that LRA would degenerate further into a bandit organization. 746
7.5: THE TRANSITION FROM INSURGENCY TO POST-INSURGENCY Assuming that LRA has commenced the transition from the phase of insurgency to that of post-insurgency, some critical questions emerge: How do members leave the group? What strategy does the Government of Uganda (GoU) use to facilitate their defection? Are there any arrangements in place to receive, disarm, debrief, rehabilitate and reintegrate former members of LRA back into Ugandan society?
In order to speed up the disintegration of the group, the GoU has instituted the Amnesty Act 2000 747 and put in place a comprehensive Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme. 748 The law pardons members of LRA of crimes committed while serving in the group. 749 This measure is significant in two ways: First, it targets the motivation of the group. Members who are motivated by the fear of facing retributive justice for having conducted terrorist attacks can contemplate defection since the state has pardoned them.
Second, it attempts to generate mistrust within the group. Under the Amnesty Act 2000, the five International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees are not entitled to amnesty. 750 Weary of mid-level commanders and the rank-and-file defecting from LRA, the top leadership corps could become more repressive to retain the group’s manpower. This measure could potentially set the stage for schisms within LRA. The DDR programme equally plays an important role in the post-insurgency phase. Where it is well implemented, ex-fighters of the group would presumably not swap their post-insurgent for renewed insurgent careers.
How then does the Ugandan state induce defections from LRA? According to Justice Onega, Chairman of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, the military working hand-in-hand with ex-insurgents and the United Nations use the media to contact active LRA combatants. To this end, ex-fighters of the group who are hosted on Ugandan radio stations and featured in newspapers urge active members to abandon the armed struggle. In areas where the
266 above media campaign might not reach LRA fighters, the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) drops leaflets encouraging combatants to defect. 751
The LRA top leadership has tried to counteract this measure. Commanders of the group sensitize the rank-and-file about the ostensible ulterior motive behind the GoU move. They argue that the state’s ultimate intention is to lure fighters out of the bush and try them for atrocities committed by LRA. 752 Although all ex-LRA fighters who were either captured or surrendered have been pardoned, the case of Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo is an intriguing one. Kwoyelo, who was captured by the Ugandan military in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is standing trial before the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the Ugandan High Court. 753
The trial of Kwoyelo showcases some of the challenges in the management of the post- insurgency phase of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Should ex-fighters of LRA be subjected to restorative or retributive justice? In seeking to dispense retributive justice, is the national judicial system competent enough to try suspects for war crimes and crimes against humanity? In 2002, the GoU created the 105th Battalion, a counterinsurgency unit made up of ex-LRA combatants. 754 Given the appalling human rights record of LRA, would this unit do a good hearts and minds job? Answers to these and other questions are key to accelerating the disintegration of LRA.
7.6: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS This case study offers insights into the organization of the LRA insurgency. It tests the extent to which theories of guerrilla warfare may uniformly explain rebel movements. These findings are useful in analyzing the development of insurgent ideology in overlapping rebellions. They show the dynamics that may facilitate an ideological switch from armed groups propagating outward-looking grievances (targeting constituencies external to their natural support bases) to those advancing inward-looking grievances (targeting their natural support bases). 755 The LRA case is also important in examining the nature of insurgent propaganda. It showcases the role of communicational warfare in
267 facilitating transitions between negotiations and armed clashes in an asymmetric conflict. 756
This research sheds light on the relationship between terrorism and popular support. In this study, the use of terrorism by one of the parties to the asymmetric conflict did not lead to an increase in popular support for the other. 757 It has also been noted that contrary to the laws of guerrilla warfare, terrorism may not act as the precipitant for harsh counterinsurgency measures. Instead, a drastic state response to an emerging rebellion may trigger off insurgent attacks on civilians. 758 This study is useful in assessing the evolution of motivation in overlapping rebellions. It shows the role of time, the narrowing of resource, popular and external support bases in the transformation of an insurgent group from one that is idealistically into one that is socially motivated. 759
In terms of insurgent recruitment, the significance of this research manifests in two ways: First, it discusses dynamics where competing Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) may recruit from each others ranks. It shows the significance in the transition between an armed group disintegrating and its competitor(s) persuasively and coercively enlisting some or all of its members. 760 Second, it shows the dispensability of ideological consciousness to recruitment. In this respect, an insurgent group can recruit and retain members who are not ideologically committed to its armed struggle. 761
This study is also important in analyzing the role of multi-tasking in the economization of time and resources in an insurgency. A guerrilla group may amalgamate the training of its recruits with its military operations. This measure would save it time, accord it’s freshly enlisted members hands-on experience and increase the manpower of field operational units before they return to their bases. 762 However, freshly trained recruits may not make good fighters thereby compromising the fighting of the rebel units. The LRA case is also significant in depicting the complex synthesization of insurgent ideology and the critical role it plays in the induction of recruits. Whereas some of the LRA abductees may separately understand the Christian, Islamic and Animist elements in the ideology of the
268 group, an amalgamation of these coupled with the terrifying manner in which indoctrination is conducted, 763 makes the doctrine difficult to interpret and challenge.
This case study offers insights into decision-making in insurgencies. The LRA leadership model showcases traces of shared decision-making within a largely centralized command and control structure. 764 Furthermore, this research looks at the role of guerrilla bases in the building of parastate insurgent institutions. It confirms the necessity of sanctuaries as theatres for marshalling insurgent ideological consistency, food security and technological advancement. 765
The LRA case examines the place of criminal activity and external support in funding an insurgent campaign. It shows that as long as an insurgent group is still able to prey on the population, 766 shifts in external support would not cripple its capacity to fund its activities. In this study, our attention is drawn to the interaction between military strategy and propaganda in insurgent campaigns. In seeking to rationalize its terrorist approach, an insurgent group may do three things: First, show justification why civilians may become legitimate military targets. Second, feign the nature of guerrilla warfare (loose command and control) in explaining ‘unauthorized’ attacks on the population. Third, deflect responsibility for some of the terrorist attacks by establishing a balance of notoriety between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. 767 In this connection, LRA links some of the reported terrorist attacks to false flag operations mounted by government forces.
Empirically, this study unveils the prospects for the non-linear development of strategy in guerrilla warfare. For example, shifts in domestic or external support may push a rebel group to adopt a fully fledged conventional military posture at its formative stage and guerrilla warfare at a later stage. 768 The LRA case is remarkable in two other ways: First, it establishes a link between theatres of recruitment and those of attack. In order to marshal locality and terrain intelligence, an insurgent group may deploy its fighters in their respective areas of origin (or more precisely, places where they were abducted). 769 In this direction, a future topic for research would be studying the geographical behaviour of LRA.
269 Second, it provides a clear understanding of some of the tactics that insurgents may use in disengaging from a theatre of combat. For example, the circular retreat of rebel units770 introduces the notion of troop insertion within the broader framework of troop withdrawal. By retreating while returning to the starting points of the troop withdrawal, an insurgent group is literally re-inserting its forces in the theatre of skirmishes whilst at the same time withdrawing them. Finally, this thesis establishes a nexus between guerrilla strategy and the choice and sustainable use of weapons in an insurgency. To this effect, a rebel group will strive to use arms that allow it to achieve its strategic military objectives. 771 However, these weapons should be replenishable.
While all the above findings are significant in reinforcing existing theoretical and empirical knowledge on insurgencies, the most striking are those that relate to the interaction between popular support and the use of terrorism in an insurgency. Theoretically, an insurgent group will attack civilians to lure the state into instituting harsh counterinsurgency measures. This reaction would presumably drive a wedge between the state and its citizens and increase support for the rebel group.772 In the case of LRA, the institution of ‘harsh’ counterinsurgency measures (the creation of poorly managed protected villages and self defence groups) predates the start of LRA attacks on the Acholi people. The Government of Uganda established strategic hamlets to curtail insurgent-civilian interaction. 773 In the post- formative phase of the LRA insurgency, the population neither supported LRA nor the Government of Uganda.
7.6: AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH This research has mainly focussed on the logic that underpins the organization of guerrilla activity. Insurgencies end in different ways: In Mozambique, rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) concluded a negotiated settlement with the state; 774 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealan (LTTE) rebellion was crushed by the Sri Lankan armed forces; 775 In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is fast transforming into a fully fledged criminal organization that kidnaps for ransom and peddles illicit drugs. 776 Since relocating to North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, LRA has gradually ceased manifesting as an armed group pursuing a political mission into one
270 merely surviving and systematically evolving into a criminal and potentially quasi- mercenary force.777
When a rebellion reaches this stage, what organizational transformation does an insurgent group undergo? How much of its guerrilla attributes does it retain? Which ones does it shed off? What dynamics would facilitate a future re-transformation from fully-fledged criminal enterprise back to fully-fledged guerrilla group? The way in which a rebel group metamorphoses beyond the stage of demise would make for useful research into asymmetric warfare in the modern age. Above all, insurgency is a dynamic phenomenon which will continue to change over time. Methodologically, we might continue to learn more about LRA through greater engagement with ex-members particularly those who occupied more senior positions in the group.
271 END NOTES
654International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 6-9 of 47 655Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC) 2003, Op cit. pp 37 of 142 656Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pp 4-5 657 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 658Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 389-393 Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-27 659 Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 660Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit pp 115-118 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002, Op cit 661International Criminal Court 2005, Op cit 662 Feldman Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 139-140 663Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit Otim, Charles 2010, Op cit Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit 664Veale, Angela and Stavrou, Aki 2007, Op cit pp 274-275 The Amnesty Commission 2009, An Act of Forgiveness: The Amnesty Act—Working for Peace and Reconciliation. The Amnesty Commission. pp 1-4 Onega, PKK 2010, Interview. Thursday, 21st January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda 665International Crisis Group 2007, Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace. Africa Report No 124. 26th April 2007. pp ii 666Prendergast, John 2007. Let’s Make a Deal: Leaverage needed in Northern Uganda Talks. Enough. Strategy Paper # 6. August 2007. pp 5 667Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 25-26 668 O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pp 14-15 669Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC) 2003, Op cit pp 37 of 142 670International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 8 of 47 671Ochora, Walter 2010, Op cit 672O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit 673Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 388-389. 674The Ugandan state created protected villages to curtail insurgent-population interaction. Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 675Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004. Uganda: Attacks on Internally Displaced Persons Camps Kill More than 125 in Past Month. United Nations. Press Release. AFR/968. IHA/918. 11th June 2004. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afr968.doc.htm. Accessed on 15/12/2011. 676IRIN 2002. Uganda: LRA attack forces refugee relocation. 6th August 2002. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=33418. Accessed on 15/12/2011 677 Eichstaedt H Peter 2009. First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Chicago Review Press. pp 62 678Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 679 Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 680Mugira, James 2010, Op cit. 681Kulaigye, Felix 2010, Op cit 682Assessing the progress of the Juba peace process, John Prendergast argued: “Deal with the key people on the core issues: Addressing the LRA military leadership’s security and livelihood is the neglected heart of this peace process and is best handled by directly engaging LRA leader Joseph Kony”. See: Prendergast, John 2007, Op cit. pp 1 683Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit
272 684IRIN 2009, Op cit 685Neu, Joyce 2002, Op cit. The Carter Centre 2001, Op cit 686In September, 2007 in Tanzania, Presidents Museveni and Kabila of Uganda and DRC respectively signed the Ngurdoto Agreement that pledged to eliminate all ‘negative forces’ operating in the two countries. See: Human Rights Watch 2009, The Christmas Massacres: LRA attacks on civilians in Congo. Human Rights Watch. pp 50. 687Bevan, James 2007, Op cit. pp 344-346. 688Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 689 O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit 690Bevan, James 2007 Op cit, pp 344-346 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 691Neu, Joyce 2002, Op cit. 692Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 693Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit. pp 1-2 694Atkinson R Ronald 2009. From Uganda to The Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord’s Resistance Army. International Peace Institute. December 2009. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4ADCC64D9D95A985852576790075389E- Full_Report.pdf. Accessed on 15/12/2011. 695Obita, James 2011, Interview. Kampala, Uganda 696 In May, 2006, Riek Machar, South Sudan Vice President was filmed handing Kony US $ 20,000 Conciliation Resources. Northern Uganda Update: Chronology. ACCORD. http://www.c-r.org/our- work/accord/northern-uganda-update/chronology.php. Accessed on 15/12/2011. 697International Crisis Group 2007, Op cit. pp 10 698Kulaiyigye, Felix 2010, Op cit Mugira, James 2010, Op cit International Crisis Group 2007, Op cit. pp 10 699Onyiego, Michael 2012, 22 killed in fresh South Sudan violence. Sydney Morning Herald. 10th January, 2012. http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/22-killed-in-fresh-south-sudan-violence-20120110- 1psyd.html. Accessed on 13/01/2012. Holland, Hereward 2012, South Sudan says Sudan blocking its oil exports. Reuters Africa. 11th January, 2012. http://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews/idAFL6E8CB59Y20120111. Accessed on 13/01/2012 Reuters 2012, Sudan will soon see revolution—Islamist leader Turabi. 5th January, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/05/sudan-opposition-idUSL6E8C52H020120105. Accessed on 13/01/2012 700Matsiko Grace 2010, Op cit. 701Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit 702Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 703Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit.pp 118-125 704Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 705Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit.pp 118-125 706Acellam, Michael 2010, Op cit. 707Feldman Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 47-48 708Bevan, James 2007, Op cit pp 344-346 Izama, Angelo 2010, Op cit Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit Opondo-Ofwono 1994, ‘Kony gets land mines’. The New Vision. Vol 9. No 194 Wednesday, August 17, 1994 pps 1-2 709Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396
273 BBC 2003, Op cit 710Schomerus, Mareike 2007, Op cit Imaka, Isaac and Ubwani Zephania 2010, Op cit Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 711Medecins Sans Frontiers 2004. Life in Northern Uganda: All Shades of Grief and Fear. December 2004. pp 13 of 16 http://www.msf.org.au/uploads/media/uganda04.pdf. . Accessed on 16/12/2011. 712Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 713Council on Foreign Relations 2009. Crisis Guide: Darfur. http://www.cfr.org/sudan/crisis-guide- darfur/p13129. Accessed on 13/01/2012. 714Onyiego, Michael 2012, Op cit 715 “Since March, 2009, Uganda’s determination to neutralize the LRA or atleast kill Kony and unstinting US financial and logistical support have caused Operation Lightening Thunder to grow in numbers, extend over a cross-border region bigger than originally expected or planned for and change from a targeted assault into a roaming hunt”. See: International Crisis Group 2010, LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony. Africa Report No 157. 28th April 2010. pp 5 716 “From incursions in February and March 2008, Kony knew that the CAR army was small and weak”. See: International Crisis Group 2010, Op cit pp 5 “As in the Congo, the Ugandans are doing the lion’s share of the hunting and fighting while the SPLA, lacking transport, communications equipment and expertise, has tended to remain in its bases”. See: International Crisis Group 2010, Op cit pp 8 717International Crisis Group 2010, Op cit pp 1 718Ibid In July 2006, locals of Eastern Equatoria presented their grievances to the leadership of LRA. They alleged that UPDF and LRA had committed atrocities in the area. UPDF had killed, raped and maimed people and burnt huts. In Acholi-inhabited parts of Southern Sudan, the Ugandan military was alleged to have engaged in illegal timber cutting. For example, when UPDF was withdrawing from Owiny Kibul under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement by the Government of Uganda and LRA, government forces allegedly cut down 200 trees outside Palataka and ferried them across the Uganda-Sudan border. See: Mareike Schomerus 2007. 719Hitchen Mike 2012. Lord’s Resistance Army: African States and UN agree to beef up measures against LRA. Mike Hitchen Online: I On Global Trends. Tuesday, 10th January, 2012. http://ionglobaltrends.blogspot.com/2012/01/lords-resistance-army-african- states.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+blogspot%2FzqKG+%2 8i+On+Global+Trends%29. Accessed on 19/01/2012. 720International Crisis Group 2010, Op cit pp 5 and 8 721Dalby, Ned 2012, Ending the LRA: Reason for optimism and political commitment. African Arguments. 10th January, 2012. http://africanarguments.org/2012/01/10/ending-the-lra-reason-for-optimism-and-political- commitment-%E2%80%93-by-ned-dalby-international-crisis-group/. Accessed on 19/01/2012. 722Resolve. LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. http://www.theresolve.org/lra- disarmament-and-northern-uganda-recovery-act-of-2009. Accessed on 19/01/2012 723Dalby, Ned 2012, Op cit 724BBC News Africa 2010. ‘Somali link’ as 74 World Cup fans die in Uganda blasts. 12th July, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10593771. Accessed on 19/01/2012 725Delany, Max and Straziuso Jason 2010. Uganda Bomb Attacks Kill World Cup Fans: Al Shabaab Suspected In Kampala Explosions. Huffington Post. 12th July, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/11/uganda-bomb-world-cup_n_642336.html. Accessed on 19/01/2012 726Jackson, Paul 2002, Op cit. pp 35-37 727United States Virtual Presence Post. Northern Uganda: What A Difference Two Years Can Make. http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/nu_whatadifference.html. Accessed on 19/01/2012
274 728Katherine, Southwick 2008. Uganda: Challenges of Peace and Justice. Refugees International. 19th February, 2008. http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/uganda-challenges-peace-and- justice. Accessed on 22/08/2010 729Kasaija, Phillip 2010, Op cit. Allen, Tim 2006. Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Zed Books. London pp 132-133 730Reuters Africa 2011, African Union declares Uganda’s LRA terror group. Tuesday, 22nd November, 2011. http://af.reuters.com/article/centralAfricanRepublicNews/idAFL5E7MM2FK20111122?pageNumber=2&virt ualBrandChannel=0. Accessed on 19/01/2012. 731Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 395-396 732Astill James 2001, Strike One. The Guardian. Tuesday, 2nd October, 2001. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/02/afghanistan.terrorism3. Accessed on 19/01/2012 733Neu, Joyce 2002, Op cit 734The International Criminal Court 2009. The Prosecutor vs Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. ICC-02/05- 01/09. http://www.icc- cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050 109/icc02050109. Accessed on 19/01/2012 735Kasaija, Phillip 2010, Op cit. 736Onyiego, Michael 2012, Op cit. 737Collins, Toby 2011. Advocacy Groups: Malawi should implement ICC’s Bashir arrest warrant. Sudan Tribune. 13th October, 2011. http://www.sudantribune.com/Advocacy-groups-Malawi-should,40421. Accessed on 19/01/2011 Onyiego, Michael 2010. Human Rights Groups call on Chad to arrest Sudan’s President Bashir. Voice of America. 22nd July, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Human-Rights-Groups-Call-on- Chad-to-Arrest-Sudans-President-Bashir--99039189.html. Accessed on 19/01/2012 738National Public Radio 2011. The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution. 17th December, 2011. http://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution. Accessed on 19/01/2012. 739Laessing Ulf 2012, Op cit 740Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit “…Jonas Savimbi was ultimately hunted down by elite government forces (apparently with Israeli technical assistance to pinpoint his location through the interception of a satellite phone call) in Eastern Moxico”. See Kevlihan, Rob, Angola in DeRouen Karl and Bellamy Paul (eds) 2008, International Security and the United States: An Encyclopaedia. Greenwood Publishing House. pp 51 741Butime, Tom 2010, Interview. January, 2010. Kampala, Uganda 742Apiire, Ray 2010, Op cit 743Okwangalero, Francis 2010, Op cit 744Kasaija, Phillip 2010, Op cit 745“By the time Museveni took Kampala by force in January 1986, a quarter of the soldiers in the 14,000 strong NRA were Rwandan, up to 2-3,000 Tutsi fighters, the sons of exiles…….On 1st October, 1990 Rwandan soldiers in the NRA invaded Rwanda taking their weapons and supplies”. See: Melvern Linda 2000, A people betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Zed Books. pp 27- 28 746Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit Mwanguhya Charles 2010, Op cit 747The Amnesty Commission 2009, An Act of Forgiveness: The Amnesty Act—Working for Peace and Reconciliation. The Amnesty Commission. August 2009. pp 1-4 Onega, PKK 2010, Interview. Thursday, 21st January, 2010. Kampala. Uganda. 748Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 398-400 749Ibid 750Onega, PKK 2010, Op cit
275 751Ibid 752Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 398-400 753Human Rights Watch 2012, Update on the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, former LRA combatant. 12th July, 2012. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/12/update-trial-thomas-kwoyelo-former-lra-combatant. Accessed on 02/02/2012. 754Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit. pp 400-406 755Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima 2002, Op cit Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 393-395 Adam, Jeroen et al 2007, Op cit pp 963-974 756O’kadamerie Billie 2002, Op cit. Matsiko, Grace 2006, Op cit pps 1-2 757Mwenda, Andrew 2010, Op cit 758International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 15-23 of 47 759Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima 2002, Op cit Feldman Robert 2007, Op cit. pp 139-140 760O’Kadamerie, Billie 1993, Op cit. pps 14-15 761The Lincoln Tribune 2011, Op cit 762Cheney, Kristen E 2005, Op cit. pp 27-29 763Cline, Lawrence E 2000, Op cit. pp 118-125 764International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 9-14 Borzello, Anna 2007, Op cit pp 395-396 Nyeko, Ballam and Lucima, Okello 2002, Op cit 765Kamara, Patrick 2010, Op cit 766O’kadamerie, Billie 1994, Op cit. pps 1-2 767Government / LRA Position Statement 2006, Op cit. pps 4-5 768 Mugira, James 2010, Op cit 769Otto, Sande 2010, Op cit 770Ibid 771Feldman Robert 2008, Op cit. pp 47-48 772Marighella, Carlos 1969, Op cit 773International Crisis Group 2004, Op cit. pp 15-23 of 47 774Conciliation Resources, General Peace Agreement for Mozambique. ACCORD. http://www.c-r.org/our- work/accord/mozambique/joint-declaration.php. Accessed on 02/02/2012 775BBC 2011, Sri Lanka: UN says army shelling killed civilians. 26th April, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13190576. Accessed on 02/02/2012 776BBC 2011, Colombians seize $ 2m FARC submarine. 26th September, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15069370. Accessed on 02/02/2012 777Mwanguhya, Charles 2010, Op cit Matsiko, Grace 2010, Op cit
276 Appendix 1: Testing the Insurgent Attributes of LRA: Identity
VARIABLE HYPOTHESIS LRA FEATURES STATUS OF HYPOTHESIS IDEOLOGY LRA will have adopted an ideology Partly gleans its ideology Accepted (The ideology of LRA that is either an original synthesis of from that of the Uganda is an amalgam of its ideals and the its ideals or an adaptation of existing People’s Democratic Army doctrines of UPDA, HSM I and ideologies in order to articulate (UPDA). LRA aims to HSM II. It pinpoints contradictions political contradictions in the reincarnate the Northern within the Ugandan polity, Ugandan polity and justify its hegemony in Ugandan specifying those in Acholi society recourse to violence to resolve these politics. and rationalizing the recourse to contradictions Partly gleans its ideology armed rebellion as the best means from those of the Holy to redress these crises.) Spirit Movements (HSM) I and HSM II. LRA aims to cleanse Acholi society of social evil. Partly advances an original doctrine. LRA aims to construct an Acholi utopia by ‘punishing’ and ‘weeding out’ all Acholi who belong to the old order. POPULAR SUPPORT LRA will have enjoyed popular At the stage of formation, Partially Accepted (Popular support because it can easily access LRA enjoyed popular Support for LRA primarily derived civilians, its membership is support because it sought to from its original ideological ethnically connected with the liberate, its structures were commitment to liberate and its population in Northern Uganda and predominantly populated ethnic ties with the Acholi civilians in this part of the country by and it could easily population) believe that LRA will unseat the access the Acholi National Resistance Movement population. government. In the post-formative phase Partially Rejected (Ethnicity
of its campaign, three was not an enduring basis for factors combined to deny popular support as it was LRA popular support: First, undermined by LRA attacks the Government of Uganda targeting the Acholi population) (GoU) created Protected Villages to curtail
277 insurgent-population interaction. Second, the GoU created Acholi Self Defence groups to fight LRA. Third, LRA reacted to the above developments by attacking the Acholi population. However, the decline in support for LRA did not lead to an upswing in support for the GoU. The conditions in the Protected Villages were pathetic and LRA was still able to attack Acholi people in these camps. PROPAGANDA LRA will have used a LRA uses its Accepted (The communicational communicational campaign communicational campaign campaign of LRA mainly addresses espousing the idea of an to cultivate Acholi the idea of an Acholi polity. It independent existence for nationalism. justifies the need to dismantle the its targeted audience, pin- It packages messages that old and construct a new order. LRA pointing political envisage the possibility of uses overt, stage-managed contradictions within the an Acholi utopian state communicational antics in areas it Ugandan polity and coming into existence. controls and covert ones in those it rationalizing its recourse to LRA messages underscore does not control) violence. the need to violently ‘purify’ Acholi society in LRA will have used overt order to realize the above propaganda techniques in polity. territories where it When LRA and the GoU commands greater control are in a state of over the population and belligerence, LRA is covert techniques where it constrained in pursuing its has less control propaganda campaign. It has to painstakingly rationalize its attacks on Acholi civilians. When LRA and the GoU are engaged in peace talks,
278 LRA is less constrained in advancing its communicational campaign. The cessation of hostilities between the two sides shifts focus away from the war front (where LRA may have committed atrocities) to the diplomatic front where the failings of the GoU take centre stage. Peace processes allow LRA to use overt and covert propaganda techniques. In a bid to undermine the view that it is a brutal rebel group, LRA extends benevolence to GoU peace teams visiting its bases [overt propaganda techniques in areas it controls] In order to position itself as a selfless peace-seeker, LRA clandestinely conveys peace overtures to the GoU through non-governmental actors (cultural institutions, religious organizations) [covert propaganda techniques in areas it does not control] MOTIVATION LRA fighters will have been Like UPDA, HSM I and Accepted (By seeking to motivated by idealistic and social HSM II, LRA was emancipate the Acholi people, the considerations. originally motivated by the pioneering officer corps of LRA drive to protect the Acholi were pursuing a ‘selfless’ cause population against potential dictated by idealistic extermination at the hands considerations. By seeking to enjoy of Southern Ugandans and the trappings of insurgent power, reincarnate the Northern the officer corps of LRA are
279 hegemony in Ugandan pursuing a ‘selfish’ cause dictated politics. by social considerations. The rank The effectiveness of and file of the group (who are counterinsurgency mainly abductees) are equally campaigns, the strategic motivated by social considerations. calculations of Sudan in They are spurred by the need to extending limited external survive while awaiting an support to the group and the opportunity to escape from loss of popular support in captivity. Acholiland had a far- reaching impact on LRA. The group found itself in a situation where it lacked the capacity to overthrow the NRM government. Since it could not achieve this objective, it could not sustain motivation based on the drive to reverse changes in the regional balance of power in the country. Since it was losing popularity among the Acholi people, it could also not sustain motivation based on the drive to protect people who were not supporting it. At this stage, the group’s motivation assumed multiple dimensions: The original officer corps who did not want to make peace with the GoU were motivated by two considerations: First, the drive to assemble and sustain parastate institutions that would accord them the trappings of insurgent power as an
280 alternative to those that the reincarnation of the Northern hegemony would have given them. In this connection, profiteering emerged as a motivational means of realizing this goal. Second, the drive to escape retributive justice for atrocities allegedly committed by the group. The loss of popular support curtailed voluntary enlistment into LRA. As a result, the group started conducting abductions to beef up its numbers. Recruits who had involuntarily joined the group were motivated by the drive to survive until a chance for escaping from captivity presented itself. RECRUITMENT LRA will have selectively recruited At the stage of formation, Partially Accepted (Some its members from civic groups and LRA used persuasive and pioneering members of LRA constituencies that are either coercive approaches to consciously joined the group after conscious and/or targets of recruit its members. the Northern hegemony [of which marginalization ostensibly Some of the pioneering they had been a part] collapsed) perpetrated by the National officer corps of LRA had Resistance Movement government. served in previous Northern-led governments Partially Rejected (Despite and voluntarily joined the being consciously committed to the group after the Southern- reincarnation of the Northern led rebels of the National hegemony in Ugandan politics, Resistance Movement some pioneering officers were (NRM) seized power in coerced into joining LRA from 1986. other rebel groups) Other pioneering officers had served in previous
281 Northern-led governments Partially Rejected (In the post- but were coerced into formative phase of its campaign, joining LRA from UPDA LRA has been able to coercively and HSM. recruit (abduct) and retain In the post-formative phase members (children) who are/were of its campaign, LRA not ideologically committed to its started using a coercive armed struggle. enlistment approach because the creation of protected villages by the GoU curtailed insurgent- population interaction and LRA’s adoption of a terrorist strategy alienated it from the Acholi population. Because it could not count on voluntary enlistment, LRA started abducting children who could easily be indoctrinated.
Appendix 2: Testing the Insurgent Attributes of LRA: Operational
TRAINING LRA will have designed or adopted LRA recruits undergo Accepted (LRA’s training model a training model commensurate military and non-military suits its military strategy. Because
282 with its military strategy and tactics training. it lacks the capability and time to and one that imparts combat and Whereas all male recruits conventionally train its manpower, non combat skills. undergo basic military the group economizes its resources training, only those with by combining training with special talents undertake recruitment) specialized training. Basic military training includes among others Accepted (LRA subjects its drills, fighting skills and recruits to military [fighting skills, weapons use. drills, weapons use] and non- Specialized military military [indoctrination] training). training includes among others advanced weapons use. Non-military training (indoctrination) introduces recruits to a doctrine that is a combination of principles they may separately understand (Christianity, Islam and Animism) but which makes for difficult interpretation when amalgamated. LRA combines recruitment (abduction) operations with training. Recruits are trained while LRA abduction parties are still in the field. ORGANIZATIONAL LRA will have evolved as a Strategically, LRA is a Rejected (LRA has not evolved STRUCTURE politico-military organization hierarchical organization as a politico-military organization. characterized by a structural exhibiting centralized Over the course of its campaign, separation of functions, with its command and control. the group has largely operated armed wing subordinated to its Tactically and without a political wing. The political wing. operationally, LRA units Lord’s Resistance Movement enjoy autonomy in [ostensibly its political wing] only executing assigned tasks. emerged during the Juba peace Although it is a hierarchical talks) organization, at the
283 strategic level, LRA Rejected (While it existed, LRM exhibits traces of shared [the political wing] was decision-making. The Head subordinate to LRA [the military and Deputy Head of LRA, wing]) Director of Religious Affairs and commanders of the four brigades of LRA are all members of Control Rejected (LRA exhibits a Alter, the supreme structural fusion of powers and decision-making organ of functions. For example: Kony is the group. the military and spiritual head of LRA does not exhibit a the group). structural separation of powers and functions. As Head of LRA, Kony occupies a position that fuses military and non- military powers and functions. As members of Control Alter, LRA brigade commanders are involved in strategy formulation and as field commanders, strategy implementation. GUERRILLA BASES LRA will have located its LRA locates its guerrilla Accepted (LRA situates its bases in topographically bases on foreign territory sanctuaries in insurgency savvy inaccessible areas in order (Southern Sudan and North areas characterized by rugged to limit attacks on them. Eastern Democratic terrain) Republic of Congo) The LRA insurgency will LRA locates its guerrilla have been located in an bases in topographically area with a history of inaccessible areas (Imatong armed insurrection and hills in Southern Sudan and susceptibility to weak Garamba forest in North central government Eastern DRC) control. In Sudan and DRC, LRA located its guerrilla bases in areas with a history of armed rebellion. Eastern
284 DRC is a hotbed for insurgent activity. Southern Sudan was a theatre of an insurgency pitting rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). LRA uses its guerrilla bases to showcase its mastery of ideological consistency, food security and technological advancement. FUNDING LRA will have relied on popular LRA has received financial Partially Accepted (LRA support and criminal activity support during the course of exploited poor Uganda-Sudan domestically and exploited existing war and peace talks with relations to secure external geo-political contradictions the Government of Uganda. financial support for its campaign) regionally to mobilize resources for During war time, support prosecuting a relatively cheap for its activities has mainly insurgent campaign. come from three sources: Partially Accepted The Government of Sudan (Domestically, LRA relied on (in retaliation for the plunder to fund its campaign) Government of Uganda
supporting SPLA); Acholis
in the diaspora; and plunder by LRA units. During peace talks, the Partially Rejected Government of Uganda, (Domestically, due to its adoption Government of South of a terrorist strategy, LRA no Sudan and international aid longer funds its campaign through agencies extended aid to popular support). LRA to encourage it to pursue diplomacy and discourage it from preying on the population. Plunder is the most enduring resource mobilization strategy used by LRA. While based in Uganda (without external
285 state support), LRA pillaged villages. While based in Sudan (with external state support), LRA still engaged in wanton plunder. STRATEGY AND TACTICS The LRA military strategy LRA conducts random and Partially Accepted (LRA will have been based on selective attacks on conducts some random attacks the prosecution of an civilians and government which make its campaign unpredictable, protracted forces. unpredictable) insurgent campaign, However, it concentrates selectively targeting loop- most of its attacks on holes in the capability of civilians in lightly guarded Partially Accepted (LRA has the enemy whilst allowing protected villages. serialized its insurgent campaign LRA to adapt to its own By attacking civilians, LRA over a period of 25 years) condition of relative aims to achieve two military weakness. objectives: First, to cause a troop deployment dilemma LRA will have selectively for the Ugandan state. Partially Accepted (Although attacked civilians to Government forces have to it lacks the conventional military expose the Ugandan state choose between protecting capability to take on the Uganda as incapable of protecting civilians and pursuing LRA People’s Defence Forces, LRA is in its citizens. In turn, the units. Second, to a position to exploit UPDF’s government will have demonstrate its military incapacity to simultaneously been pushed to adopt a capability. protect civilians and pursue rebel units) heavy handed approach to LRA military strategy is
tracking down the highly dictated by the prevailing
elusive rebels. balance in military capabilities. When it was a Partially Accepted (LRA LRA will have attacked recipient of Sudanese exploits its knowledge of targeted weak points in the military military support, the group areas to lure government forces capability of the Ugandan engaged in conventional into circular movements. state and avoided outright warfare. When it lost this confrontation with external support, it adopted Partially Rejected (The government forces. guerrilla warfare serialization of the LRA campaign LRA deploys its strongest has been at variance with the LRA will have used units against its weakest evolution of its military strategy. terrain intelligence to targets. LRA has not adopted conventional marshal mobility, conduct In order to marshal locality warfare in the later stages of its deceptive movements in intelligence, LRA deploys campaign [that is, after
286 its theatres of insurgent its fighters (abductees) in systematically building its activity and mount their areas of origin or capability from the subversive ambushes against the places where they were through the guerrilla to the enemy. abducted. conventional warfare stages of its A typical LRA attack campaign]). would assume the following sequence: At the stage of troop insertion, LRA splits Partially Rejected (LRA up its raiding parties into attacks on civilians did not precede small units; Former the Government of Uganda policy abductees and conscripted of creating protected villages and guides locate targets and self defence groups) provide intelligence on the movements of government forces respectively; Raiding parties kill, maim, abduct and loot; LRA units retreat from the scene of the attacks in circles; After disorientating government forces with their circular movements, the raiding units assemble at an agreed place and make an orderly march back to the LRA guerrilla base. WEAPONS AND LRA will have used a wide range In its confrontation with Partially Accepted (LRA uses WEAPONS ACQUISITION of weapons according to government forces, LRA a wide array of weapons. Its arms availability and will have purchased uses light and heavy range from machetes and clubs to and stolen its arms and ammunition automatic weapons. AK 47 assault rifles and Surface to from a variety of domestic and With light weapons, LRA Air Missiles) foreign sources. units can marshal mobility. Heavy weapons give LRA the capability to defend its Partially Accepted (LRA gets bases. its arms from foreign sources. LRA uses rudimentary tools Before Uganda-Sudan relations to subdue civilians and improved, Khartoum was the reserves automatic weapons principle arms supplier of LRA. ammunition for fire fights The group may also have with government forces. purchased some of its arms from
287 Most of the automatic foreign arms dealers) weapons in the LRA arsenal were supplied by Partially Rejected (Did not the Government of Sudan. find research evidence to show that When Uganda-Sudan LRA acquires some of its arms relations improved, Sudan through theft) is suspected to have given the group a ‘send off’ consignment of weapons to keep it going. LRA may have purchased some of its weapons from arms dealers supplying different fighting groups in the Great Lakes Region.
288 Appendix 3: Field Research Contacts
FIELD RESEARCH THEATRE: Kampala (Ugandan capital) & Gulu (Original theatre of the LRA insurgency)
FIELD RESEARCH CONTACTS:
Snowball Contact (Political & Military): Hon. (Col) Tom Butime Position: Member of Parliament of Uganda
Snowball Contact (Media): Mr Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi Position: Political Editor, The Daily Monitor
Snowball Contact (Military): Capt Ahabyona Position: Intelligence Officer, 4th Division UPDF
Interviewee (Military): Lt Gen Ivan Koreta Position: Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, Uganda People’s Defence Forces
Interviewee (Military): Brig James Mugira Position: Chief of Military Intelligence
Interviewee (Military): Lt Col Felix Kulayigye Position: UPDF & Ministry of Defence Spokesman
Interviewee (Media): Mr Grace Matsiko Position: Managing Editor, The Kampala Dispatch
Interviewee (Media): Mr Andrew Mwenda Position: Managing Editor, The Independent (Uganda)
Interviewee (Media): Mr Patrick Kamara Position: Senior Reporter, Nation Television
Interviewee (Media): Mr Angelo Izama Position: Senior Reporter, Daily Monitor
Interviewee (Political): Hon Okello Oryem Position: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Interviewee (Political): Hon Justice PKK Onega Position: Chairman, Amnesty Commission
Interviewee (Political): Col Walter Ochora Position: Resident District Commissioner, Gulu
289 Interviewee (Academic): Dr Phillip Kasaija Position: Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Diplomatic Studies, Makerere University Kampala
Interviewee (LRA): Dr James Obita Position: Member of LRA Peace Team (Juba Peace Talks)
Interviewee (LRA): Brig Michael Acellam Position: Senior Commander, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Lt Col Charles Otim Position: Senior Commander, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Lt Col Francis Okwangalero Position: Head of Training, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Capt Ray Apiire Position: Chaplain, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Capt Sande Otto Position: Commander, LRA
290 Appendix 4: Interview Schedule (Experts)
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (Experts) ------INTERVIEWER PARTICULARS: Interviewer Identification: Herman Butime Institution: University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia INTERVIEWEE PARTICULARS: Interviewee Identification (Optional): Interviewee Identification Number: Interviewee Occupation: INTERVIEW: Date: Time: Environment: ------INTERVIEW INTERVIEWER INTRODUCTION BUILDING RAPPORT . Question: Was your institution affected by the global economic meltdown? . Question: Is it recovering? SOLICITING INTERVIEW . Question: Sir/Madam, in this interview, do you prefer revealing or concealing your identity? . Question: How would you want me to address you? GENESIS: . Question: What are the root causes of the LRA insurgency in Uganda? . Question: What have been the defining phases in the evolution of the LRA insurgency? . Question: How different is the LRA insurgency from other insurgencies in the Great Lakes Region of Africa? ENLISTMENT . Question: What role has forcible enlistment of children played in sustaining the LRA insurgency? INDUCTION AND TRAINING . Question: Has the use of terror and indoctrination during induction and training turned LRA into a formidable fighting force? ORGANISATION OF GUERRILLA BASES . Question: To what extent do LRA bases evolve into para-states? IDEOLOGY . Question: To what extent does the discrepancy between LRA’s ideology and its strategy generate dissent within the organization? STRUCTURE & TROOP STRENGTH . Question: What role does the fusion of the political, military and ‘spiritual’ organs play in tightening LRA’s chain of command? . Question: What factors account for LRA’s varying troop levels? FINANCING . Question: What is the structure of financing in LRA?
291 TERRAIN . Question: What is the relationship between terrain and the establishment of temporary/permanent LRA para-state structures? WEAPONS & WEAPONS ACQUISITION . Question: To what extent is LRA’s supply of weapons dependent on illicit small arms trafficking in the Great Lakes Region? . Question: In seeking to secure weapons, does LRA collaborate with cattle rustlers in East Africa? STRATEGY & TACTICS . Question: How does LRA organize its theatres of combat? SCHISMS . Question: What impact did Joseph Kony’s feud with Otti Lagony have on cohesion in LRA? . Question: What impact did Joseph Kony’s feud with Vincent Otti have on cohesion in LRA? ENDING THE INSURGENCY . Question: What organizational vulnerabilities of LRA could be exploited to militarily end its activities? TERMINATING INTERVIEW ------ POST-INTERVIEW NOTES
292
Appendix 5: Interview Schedule (Ex-LRA Combatants)
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (Ex-LRA Combatants) ------INTERVIEWER PARTICULARS: Interviewer Identification: Herman Butime Institution: University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia INTERVIEWEE PARTICULARS: Interviewee Identification (Optional): Interviewee Identification Number: Interviewee Particulars [Age, Sex, Residence] INTERVIEW: Date: Time: Environment: ------INTERVIEW INTERVIEWER INTRODUCTION BUILDING RAPPORT . Question: Sir/Madam, lately, what has the weather been like in Gulu, Northern Uganda? . Question: Has it affected farming in this part of the country? SOLICITING INTERVIEW . Question: Sir/Madam, do you mind sharing with me certain aspects of your life experience? . Question: In this interview, do you prefer revealing or concealing your identity? . Question: How would you want me to address you? ENLISTMENT . Question: How long did you serve in the Lord’s Resistance Army? . Question: How were you recruited? . Question: What were your experiences between being recruited and starting training? INDUCTION AND TRAINING . Question: What kind of training did you undertake? ORGANISATION OF GUERRILLA BASES . Question: What was it like living in the place where you were taken? IDEOLOGY . Question: Were you told why it was important for you to belong to LRA? STRUCTURE & TROOP STRENGTH . Question: In your unit, who reported to whom? . Question: How many of you were serving in LRA? FINANCING . Question: From whom and where did you get food, medicine and clothing? TERRAIN . Question: Describe the place where you trained and lived prior to deployment? WEAPONS & WEAPONS ACQUISITION . Question: What weapons did you use? . Question: From where did you get your weapons?
293 STRATEGY & TACTICS . Question: How did you go about fighting? SCHISMS . Question: Did the junior commanders ever bitterly disagree with the senior commanders? ESCAPE/DEFECTION/SURRENDER . Question: How did you leave LRA? TERMINATING INTERVIEW ------ POST-INTERVIEW NOTES
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