Establishing an Open Source Agency for Increasing Resources and Expertise in Analysis of OSINT Information by Irena Stevens University of Georgia [email protected] Special Thanks to Dr. Loch Johnson ABSRACT As technology of information and communication continues to improve, Open Source intelligence (OSINT) is the fastest spreading and most abundant source of information. It is also the most underutilized form of information by intelligence operatives. The collection and processing of OSINT will become an insurmountable problem for the Intelligence Community (IC) without a venue for accessing the expertise of the academic, corporate, and research institutions on a need or demand basis. Since most of the information available to the analyst dealing with foreign events is open source, further development of an effective method of analysis can help fill in gaps and create links between information sources. Effective analysis of OSINT can move the IC toward a greater understanding of other countries, their cultures, and their leaders for creating more effective foreign and domestic policy. This framework provides coherence to a fragmented information database; individual agencies can supplement it with other forms of intelligence, such as those collected by clandestine or satellite methods, to be used for their specific purpose. Since the internet is the main source of the expanding supply of information, it can also be used to organize and funnel ideas between outside parties and the intelligence community through a database of personnel and relevant research. The willingness to process and share information is rewarded with a system of incentives designed to benefit the analyst through monetary, professional, intellectual, and psychological rewards. Establishing an independent Open Source Agency can dramatically improve the framework of fragmented intelligence by expert personnel and enable the intelligence community and other research institutions to gain mutual benefit in processing open source information through the sharing of ideas.
ESSAY The Intelligence Community (IC) is composed of 16 agencies designed to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information which provides timely and relevant intelligence for decision makers and reduces uncertainty in conflict. Some collection methods of intelligence are considered secret, classified, or closed information. These secret methods consist of HUMINT, clandestine espionage agents, SIGINT, signals intelligence, IMINT, photography and satellite intelligence,
MASINT, energy emissions, and others. Other information is sensitive or confidential, but typically not secret. The majority of this information is OSINT, open source intelligence that can be legally obtained from public information sources such as newspapers, websites, and books. This type of information is different from classified intelligence obtained by the IC through clandestine operations. It is the most widespread source of information, and often the cheapest. However it continues to be an undervalued source of information compared to secret sources. The problems of meeting the intelligence needs of the 21st century include improving informational collection and processing, expanding the scope of analysis, and increasing communication within and outside of the agencies in the community. These problems are prevalent in the IC and can be greatly ameliorated by establishing an independent Open
Source Agency under the Director of National Intelligence.
Open Source intelligence (OSINT) is collected from publicly available information that can be lawfully obtained. There are generally 4 types of OSINT information. The first is widely available data from sources like newspapers, magazines, library records, books, community records, scientific journals, textbooks, broadcasts, videos, movies, documentaries, and user driven internet databases like forums, blogs, and message-boards. The second category includes targeted commercial data like annual budget reports, acquisitions, ongoing research, and business patterns. The private sector has been coming out with many innovative ways to analyze patters in the global economy with information sources like Factiva.com, which hosts articles for business news from around the world, as well as various scientific, engineering, agricultural, and other such purpose driven databases. The third source of open source information is within individual experts, who have the knowledge of sources harder to locate, like professional books and years of expertise within a certain area. The final source of information is called gray information, which is limited in availability either because few copies are distributed or access is constrained. (p. 65 (3)) Distinguishing between openly available open source information and secret information helps isolate gray information, which helps identify areas of interest for the Intelligence Community.
Establishing an independent Open Source Agency under the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) will help increase processing of open source information by increasing communication within and outside of the Intelligence Community and expanding analysis of intelligence. Creating this agency will help reorganize the IC in a more efficient manner as open source information will be processed to provide contextual background for further investigation by supplementary sources. Its manner of function will help solve important problems facing the IC. Firstly, establishing an OSINT agency will place more importance on the exploration of open source information. Such a change in the culture of the Intelligence Community is necessary for it to adjust to the changing nature of information.
Secondly, it allows the IC to build a stable venue to collect and process publicly available information while avoiding duplicate costs. Finally, it provides a communication framework for connecting information using open sources to present in comparison to secret information, effectively isolating information that is truly secret and helping to identify points of interest for the intelligence community.
To clarify, this agency is not supposed to procure finished intelligence or replace other sources of information. Rather, its advantage is greatest when it is compared and supplemented with other sources of information to create an all-source complete intelligence product.
Creating an independent Open Source Agency will help restore the original mission of the
Central Intelligence Agency as it was founded after World War II. The 1949 Dulles report, which was the first major effort to evaluate and shape the community after its establishment following the
National Security Act of 1947, stipulated:
“The Central Intelligence Agency should not be merely another intelligence agency
duplicating and rivaling the existing agencies of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force. It
should not be a competitor of these agencies, but a contributor to them and should help
to coordinate their intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of
existing agencies; it must not duplicate their work but help to put an end to existing
duplication by seeing to it that the best qualified agency in each phase of the
intelligence field should assume and carry out its particular responsibility.” (p. 16 (10))
The Dulles Report intended for the responsibilities of the CIA to be separate from those of other agencies in order to maximize use of existing resources. However, the end of the Cold War, the beginning of new international security threats like terrorism, and the subsequent need to keep up with the growth of information, prompted efforts at reform of the Intelligence Community. Investigative bodies like the Aspin-Brown Commission, the 9/11 Commission, and the WMD Commission recommended making greater use of open sources to improve intelligence products. As a result, open source departments have proliferated throughout the agencies of IC. One Coast Guard report states that
“although there are interim measures that may be taken to leverage existing technology and better exploit open sources, it is unlikely that the benefits of a robust OSINT program will be fully realized.
Why? The absence of an overarching domestic OSINT program has effectively shifted the burden of developing and executing policy, strategy and tactics to this field level organization.” (p. 34 (28))
Currently, the main OSINT department is the Open Source Center (OSC) in the office of the Director of National Intelligence, headquartered at the CIA building in 2005. It was built upon the former department Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which has existed since World War 2 to translate foreign broadcasts and documents. Its main priorities are to mine and sift for valuable open source information on a computer, maintain a collection of published online material, purchase information from commercial and academic databases, and process material from a large number of other agencies that produce controlled unclassified, or sensitive, reports. The Open Source Center has proven to be successful in conglomerating expertise across many spectra, in student training programs and in producing intelligence related content. Its services have expanded to a wider range of customers at all levels of the government. One operative stipulates: “All told, more than 98 percent of the center’s products are unclassified...The less than two percent that are classified usually are in response to classified requirements. Classification also may be applied when the OSC must protect a classified source.”(9) This agency is a good foundation on which to build an independent Open Source Agency and help solve the problems increasingly affecting the Intelligence Community.
Journalist Robert Ackerman reported in 2008 that national security threats in such areas as cyber warfare, maritime issues, drug trafficking, the War on Terrorism, research on certain countries like Korea or Iran, and the proliferation of weapons are beginning to consolidate throughout the intelligence community. The current structure of the intelligence community, shaped through competitive stovepipes, is going to weaken potential prospects for multilaterally analyzing issues that are relevant to many agencies. (11) To maximize efficiency, the intelligence field of open source should be conglomerated in the best qualified OSINT agency to avoid duplication and redundancy. Reportedly, some costs have been duplicated because different OSINT departments within agencies are buying the same information. The former Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes is quoted as saying, "if we walked down [to the State Department's new media-monitoring unit], you'll see live what's happening on Arab TV. We have a young man who's watching the blogs, the Web chats.... That unit publishes a daily rapid-response report. It goes to all the Cabinet secretaries and all our ambassadors." (12) These types of operations are increasingly necessary, but are needlessly repeated throughout the community. Open Source resources and personnel from agencies such as Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State (DOS), National Intelligence Council (NIC), Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of State’s Bureau of
Intelligence Research, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), National Security Agency (NSA),
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and several others should be put into the new Open Source
Agency. This agency will serve as a low level security analytical agency through which controlled unclassified, sensitive, or confidential OSINT information will be routed. This process would aid in forming a useful database of personnel who can be quickly located and accessed in most situations. The creation of this agency would regain the spirit of the Dulles Report’s vision of the CIA’s information gathering role, and fix redundancy, duplication, and costs by combining resources from fragmented open source departments.
The first major reform effort to the Intelligence Community was the 2004 Homeland Security
Act, which split the responsibility of the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) into two positions: Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(DCIA). The creation of the office of the DCIA drastically narrowed the scope of responsibilities of the DNI. The office of the DNI would be effective in running an independent Open Source Agency which would deliver necessary reports and help coordinate information with all the intelligence agencies. Rather than hosting it within the CIA or the state and Defense Departments, as some proponents have suggested (p.145 (1)), which could breed further competition between the agencies, a separate agency can help build communication, cooperation, and synchronization of the whole community. It would have its own divisions of human resources, multimedia facilities, legal services, security, background checks for low security clearance, student opportunities, and other administrative offices. The independent agency will push open source information reports onto the agencies which are already conducting this open source research, and they will also be able to ask the agency to conduct further research in relevant areas of interest. This will help conglomerate the sources that the agency is utilizing, and eliminate falsities and discrepancies in the information they are analyzing. This information is further supplemented by the specific function of the agencies, and analyzed by the CIA as it would have been done. It would work closely with the CIA personnel, but maintain a distance in their levels of clearance. This would create a new bureaucratic structure for open source research outside the individual agencies, but it would help decrease duplicate costs of gaining the same information and help consolidate information between the agencies. Furthermore, this agency can potentially have a beneficial role in domestic law enforcement or provide knowledge to congressional committees, an ability currently hampered by provisions of the National Security Act banning the CIA from those types of activities. The open source information this agency gathers could help support multilateral operations with other open source establishments such as those of the United Nations, foreign intelligence services, diplomatic institutions, law enforcement agencies, and other public and private information gathering institutions.
An independent agency would solve the problem of inadequate attention paid to open sources in entering the information age of the 21st century. Open source information is generally considered supplementary to secret sources, rather than used as preliminary background information. Secretly acquired information, such as that gathered by espionage, stealing documents, consulting with internal spies, or data from satellites, is considered more valuable, though it oftentimes proves not to be any more insightful than information attained by open sources (4). Many intelligence analysts and officers such as Sherman Kent, LT. Gen. Samuel Wilson, and Arthur Hulnick (5) have estimated that during peacetime, 80-95% of information policymakers need to make decisions is publicly available. (6) One reason for this neglect of open sources is the psychological benefits of having inside information on a
“need to know” basis. (p. 65 (3)). An Open Source Agency seeks to replace the “need to know” system with “responsibility to provide” ideal when it comes to information already publically available.
Building a stable venue for collection and analysis of OSINT will have the advantage of a lasting framework for large scale OSINT operations. Currently, OSINT intelligence operatives are subject to change their research focus based on their agency's current priorities or to accommodate the information they have readily available. Because of the duplication of open source research, operatives are not being used to their maximum capacity because they often work on similar projects as other departments without a stable venue for collecting and analyzing OSINT information relevant to all.
This problem can be lessened once OSINT increases in importance and yields important insight and background into global events for use in all relevant agencies.
Another reason for the slow establishment of a comprehensive method to deal with open sources relates to the challenge of adjusting from a Cold War intelligence ideology to one increasingly shaped by the fall of many closed societies and pervasive forces of globalization (p. 66 (3)).
Stevyn Gibson comments that it is significant that the fall of the Soviet Union happened around the same time as the proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ITCs) because it created a dramatic change in the nature of information (7). The availability of useful information reversed from an estimated 80% largely secret and unavailable information to 80% ubiquitous and easily accessible information at the present age (8). Open source is becoming increasingly as useful as secret information used to be. Along with media sources, one advocate says: “OSINT is expanding into the areas of HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT...OSINT now pervades all of the collection disciplines." (6)
OSINT is very useful in providing the framework to understand the political ramifications of an event or a historical pattern. (3) Sometimes, analysts and policymakers have little option but to trust OSINT in basing their judgments, especially in countries like North Korea, that does not have an embassy and social networking is largely controlled.
The second major problem in the community is analyzing the large amount of rapidly expanding information. Expansion of communication and information databases in the last two decades can be directly attributed to improving networking technologies, particularly the internet. It is the gateway that made open source dissemination possible on a mass, collective scale. It is the reason information will exponentially expand in conjunction with the locations in the world to which it spreads. And it is one of the fastest, most widespread, low-cost, and most convenient forms of communication. Therefore, it is one of the most useful sources in collecting, analyzing, and deducting intelligence. One intelligence officer has said: “whereas the 20th century was the century of secrets, the 21st century may well prove to be the century of global information.” (14). The force of an expanding globalized world, while allowing for greater opportunities, also creates new challenges and costs of monitoring more events from around the world. This vigilance is also necessary because enemies are using it as a cheap effective source of communication. For example, Al-Qaeda has been using the As-Sahab Institute, a database of information and propaganda, as well as a communication and planning venue to organize with other organization members. (15) However, based on a 2003 estimate, analysts used only 3-5% of information from internet sources. Another estimate specifies,
“we collect, at best, 20% of what we need to collect, at 99% of the cost, and we spill most of that for lack of processing capabilities” (p. 141 (1)). Another CIA agent has suggested: “With greater resources, perhaps a doubling of OSINT spending to roughly 2 percent of the intelligence budget, we would see an impressive increase in intelligence available to all in government. It would even permit covert collectors to focus with greater precision on areas truly beyond the reach of open sources.” (16)
Robert Steele, the founder of OSS.net, a website dedicated to compiling open source knowledge for public utility, has actually proposed making OSINT 80% of the budget according to his perception of its priority in intelligence operations. (17) Some of the reasons for the low budget allocation include not having effective acquisition and research technologies, a proper procedure for conducting operations on a need basis, nor a simple way to sort open from closed information to isolate gray intelligence. All of these integration problems can be solved with the establishment of an independent agency by providing better technology, compiling the resources of all the existing OSINT departments, defining an open mission statement, developing an effective structure, and providing a venue for expanded information sharing, processing, and analysis. As a result, it would create a non-redundant system and reliable databases of liaisons, professionals, collected data, consumers of data, and comprehensive reports such as terrorist watch lists.
In addition, the availability of an effective open source apparatus can greatly aid in better identifying areas of concern for other types of collection activities such as clandestine operations by isolating the intersection of open source and secret information called gray intelligence. According to one intelligence officer, Gregory Treverton, “Assessing the value of secrets requires knowing what is already available publicly” (p.32) The goal of this network is to isolate gray intelligence and separate it from classified intelligence and what is clearly available as open source. One operative attests to
OSINT’s value in that: “We couldn’t claim to do all-source analysis without it. And it’s a baseline that helps us define what is truly secret, allowing us to better focus our clandestine capabilities.”(18) This isolation can help identify clues. Classified information is estimated at approximately 4%, and gray intelligence is around 6%. (19) The development of a multilateral all-source product requires combining black, white, and gray intelligence with little speculative or assumptions opinions. Though open source comparison with secret information can reveal useful gray information, some open source information is classified to protect IC's interest in the subject. The information gathered by this agency will be compared to secret information of other agencies to identify areas of interest.
The third major problem of the IC is communication within and outside its agencies.
Communication within and outside of the IC is difficult because of inadequate clearance procedures, no thorough database of expert personnel, and willingness to cooperate by outside parties. Garicano and
Posner find that secrecy and centralization contribute to a "herding problem," i.e., intelligence analysts tend to focus on the same limited information when drawing conclusions. The herding problem gets
"locked in" because the large investments made in intelligence systems prevent information outside that system from entering the analytical process. (20) The OSINT Agency is type of organization that would serve to encourage competitive analysis because of its unique openness, ability to hire and consult with outside sources and task force structure. However, one of the main problems of liaison continues to be the time consuming clearance processes for approving new personnel. The effectiveness of these programs depends on structure of the open source agency which is supposed to be the common denominator of information that all of the other agencies need.
The open source agency would help regulate clearance across the IC because it is the most appropriate for a faster low-level clearance process. Current clearance levels are not ubiquitous and lack in clarity (12). A proper structure of formalizing low level classification is easiest with an agency designed with the lowest levels of clearance because OSINT is typically unclassified, but controlled information. Eliot Jardines, the founder of the National Open Source Enterprise, notes “The bottom line is that because it is unclassified, there is far more collaboration and facilitation than you might find on the classified side.” (9) One source estimates: “OSINT will substantially reduce the cost of secrecy, estimated by the Moynihan commission as being on the order of 6 billion a year (probably closer to 15 billion today) and will also eliminate perhaps 70% of the costs associated with establishing the trustworthiness of individuals being considered for clearances. (p. 146) (1) Only the top personnel of the agency would have access to secret information. They read the reports on requests for information, distribute the tasks, and report to the DNI. This requirement would have the effect of forging more and easier links with outside sources. Personnel to be considered for low level sensitive clearance should be vetted at the open source office, so they can develop a database of potential contacts at an emergency situation. In order to incorporate greater access to academics, the Agency can conduct a model of the Brief background check, called NDI's (NO Derogatory Information) (22). If they are to be transferred to work at higher clearance at another agency, the specialized thorough background check would be completed based on the needs of each agency.
The OSINT agency can provide the structure to focus information based on a pull basis. One source describes a common criticism: “It is, indeed, a fundamental failing of the American intelligence services that, in general, they are not advised of the current needs of policy-makers. Unfortunately, continuing effort is rarely made by intelligence consumers to guide intelligence activities toward the most meaningful targets. (18 (10)) Submissions for research would be presented to the Board of
Directors for planning and direction of assembling a task force of people who have expertise on a certain region or issue. These analysts will provide reports for case officers, as well as build communication with OSINT operatives from many different regions based on necessity. Establishing regional focus centers around the expertise of the individual OSINT operative would allow specialized expertise to be brought into these assembled task forces. It would also build communication openness with other agencies and with specialized outside personnel. Open source agency's personnel would be drafting the basic available information for every other agency, which would promote inter-agency information sharing and cooperation. Furthermore, requests for information based on a regional or specialty basis would allow agents to identify which departments have worked on similar projects and encourage their mutual cooperation on working on that issue. Each center will be responsible for compiling a list of potential experts who can be contacted to do further work.
Michael Hayden, the CIA director, noted “the fact that international relations in the 21st century will be shaped by a greater number and more diverse set of actors than in the 20th century. The overriding challenge this presents to those of us responsible for our nation’s security is that we must do a better job of understanding cultures, histories, religions, and traditions that are not our own.” (18)
Cultural knowledge can help avoid a mistake of mirror imaging, an assumption that other individuals in other countries will act the same way as themselves. (p. 7 (2)) Professors, educators, and experts can help fill some of the lack of analysis for the wide breadth of information available. Professors have spent long years studying specific areas of the world. As a result, data collection and processing will occur to produce information on things like violence, organized crime, war, genocide, and human rights abuses in other countries, as well as information on problems within countries like political instability, terrorist cells, state collapse, drug flow and production, verification of proper use of foreign aid, counter-proliferation, famine, refugee flows, and others. Even common scientific and environmental issues like ecological patters, environmental degradation, famines, floods, and many other issues can be processed thoroughly.
Liaison with outside experts is increasingly necessary because there is a significant lack of language translators, cultural experts, and analysts. Analysts assigned to a certain area are much more effective if they can read their newspaper, be able to correctly interpret digital satellite images of their specialized area, understand how the local people live and treat each other, and consult with other experts in the field. The sheer volume of information poses a problem for limited time resources.
Expanding the network of external liaison is an essential component of faster and more efficient information management. Many agencies like the NIC and DHS have already contracted academic or business experts to gain the skill sets that are underrepresented in the community. Private sector open source companies have proven to be a readily accessible resource for the IC. Furthermore, there are private intelligence agencies, foreign policy think tanks, and publishing companies who can provide insight into specific areas of global problems, earth intelligence, commercial intelligence, and cultural intelligence. The network of communication can extend to academics, experts, computer scientists business leaders, and strong researchers on various levels of the local, state, and national government.
All of these actors have a common incentive to share and do research. Joint ventures develop mutual benefits; trade of information makes everyone better off. This principle can be demonstrated with the pharmaceutical industry growth in the United States. Rather than growing by traditional means, many
American companies came to dominate the world drug market through a system of mergers and acquisitions leading to concentration. (25) The same principle can be applied to conglomerating individual OSINT resources into one agency.
Businesses are often concerned with international and domestic economic information and can provide for the IC commercial and competitor intelligence, and can have success finding American financial institutions targeted by al Qaeda. (27) Because the Intelligence Community has generally
“failed to keep up with private sector advances in data visualization and organizational memory systems or in advances in collaborative work tools, information communication, and automated monitoring of online and internal information,” such liaison is exceedingly useful for the development of new technologies. (p. 71 (24)) For example, In-Q-Tel is a CIA link to the business community involving small contracts used mainly for developing technologies (4). OSINT collection and analysis can be made much more effective with new technologies and analytic tools. Most estimates rate the intelligence technological system as inadequate and outdated. Translation software, search tools, data mining, predictive analysis, tagging, and indexing should be updated to be more efficient and specified for the use of the OSINT agency. These technologies can help: measure chatter volume, identify links, rate pages based on relevance, and filter blogs and forums. These improvements can greatly aid in precision and focus when conducting OSINT operations. For example, the Department of Defense invested a $48 million grant in Johns Hopkins University to develop a complicated translating and speech analysis technology that could be useful across the entire IC (4). Ideally, the Agency should have a reservoir of audio/video conferencing technology like white boards or webcams, and other remote communication technologies. New technologies would not only help the open source intelligence do its job, but the agency's research and personnel can aid in developing new technologies in return.
Establishing an Open Source Agency will also help alleviate some of the problems the IC has faced in recruiting academics. As a result of IC scandals, academics have faced in stigmatization conducting research for the CIA because of the agency's reputation. Some universities do not even allow such work for their employees. The Open Source Agency would allow a new reputation to be developed for communicating with outside experts. Expanding incentives like contracts or grants, establishing some forms of recognition or award, expanding promotion opportunities, offering tax breaks, or reputation incentives could aid in initially encouraging participation. Scholars who are currently hired by individual agencies to participate in research, training programs, conferences set up by the CIA or other entity, and reports on attended conferences would be hired through the OSINT agency and included in a database for further contact. These people can get access to the field and other experts in the field, as well as gain educational and psychological internal rewards.
Training programs are essential to fully exploiting the value of open source information.
A CIA unclassified report made the recommendation of promoting communication between agencies and collaboration with collectors by establishing a "community-wide training program to educate analysts on collection management and systems.” (21) This program could be ideally housed in the
OSINT Agency because it would provide the scope of research relevant to introductory training programs. Its low level of clearance can attract many young newcomers to gain experience, learn how to conduct research, and train in specialized knowledge before assuming greater responsibilities within a higher level agency. These programs can serve as a venue for career development to place more experienced operatives in specialized areas. This pathway would be particularly useful because the IC lost many veteran specialized staff after the end of the Cold War, and needs a new, stable generation of analysts.
Promoting methods of communication within the community can also be greatly aided by further development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). These technologies are particularly advantageous to an OSINT agency because of its role as a venue for other agencies use of open source information. One of the most successful efforts has proven to be Intellipedia, a wiki of puzzles and mysteries created as a model for promoting communicating and information sharing within the intelligence community. It allows all 16 agencies as well as cleared outside contacts to communicate with each other through the interlink social networking. It is useful for linking various pieces of evidence in dealing with common problems like terrorism, climate change, drug trafficking, or disease control. Doctors Dixon and McNamara conducted a small scale evaluation of Intellipedia.
They reported that there isn't much of a recognizable age gap, younger and older people had their own reasons for posting their expertise on Intellipedia. They found that that the presence of such a venue for communicating was exciting, and people were willing to do it if given the opportunity. The monitoring of entries works best with many users, and the fact that the entries cannot be anonymous motivates the individuals to avoid vandalism and share their expertise. People are actually excited about the opportunity to publicize their work and get recognition. Intellipedia entries and interlink blogs can provide a professional identity that is clear across all the agencies. Some people post on it with guidance from managers and others post on their own. Managers can encourage Intellipedia entries, but are also distrustful of it as a worthwhile time effort to fit in doing that along with all the other work of the agencies (26). Intellipedia is a step in the right direction for sharing information.
Overall, the system has run into several problems because it is based on the effort of some enthusiastic individuals, rather than an effort of the whole community. Furthermore, many people from individual agencies are hesitant to contribute information that might only be important to their department or they feel is likely to compromise security. Because of these problems, many agencies have found it useful to build their own networking databases. For example, the State department has established Diplopedia and the FBI, Bureaupedia. Perhaps this fulfills the need to focus on relevant information within the agency. Not every fact applies to every agency, but if every agency was to put up their facts, not only would it compromise information, but further put irrelevant information into the database. While there might be a legitimate need for within-agency networking, Intellipedia has the property of reaching across all of the agencies. Its databank of information could be greatly expanded with a coordinated open source effort mandated by the agency. Open source information can usually be readily shared throughout the community without great compromise to sources and methods. An OSINT Agency can be mandated to make contributions of new and relevant open source information to guide these information sharing technological networks within the IC.
This database would have levels of permissions set off by firewalls so that some information could be posted on the lowest level by citizens. This level would have unclassified, nonsensitive information like primary sources and a venue for reporting events that might be pertinent to national security. Currently 119 and 114 numbers made for this purpose are being set up for this purpose of reporting information around the country (7). Handheld devices, widespread internet availability, and growing communication can stimulate and untapped citizen resources. This is a way to incorporate citizens into protecting their own country and feel like they can be part of the democratic process.
Information is valuable, to the U.S. and to other countries. Information sharing treaties are a good way to reward allies and gain some valuable information in return. Sharing of information can build greater trust, diplomacy, and peacekeeping with other parts of the world. Foreign policy is not a product of opportunistic and exploitative policies, rather it is supposed to aim at improving social and economic relations. Exposure to the ideas of other countries will only further to develop the trust within the international community. The Middle East provides one of the most useful examples of cooperative security models. Rather than cooperating within the country, they are working on cooperating in between countries on issues of common concern. The traditional model of violence is slowly replaced by cooperation on common security issues like terrorism or drug trafficking. This cooperation allows them to develop confidence building measures (CBMs) on a range of cultural, educational, and religious issues, which build greater trust and cooperation. (8) Countries can now act as partners rather than enemies. Another example is the Association of South East Asian nations
(ASEAN) which has proposed a regional information and resource center to collect information on regional developments and to disseminate data on defense expenditures and arms proliferation. The key to these is multilateralism, which allows greater results with cooperation with other parties, rather than solitary efforts. To prevent breach of security, and possibly undermine national security, the data available should be mainly open source. There is possibility of joint collection and response strategies in cooperation with other countries through research and development institutions (R&D) to develop early warning systems that have proactive evidence based decision making, systematic reviews and expert analysis, and a watch list of priority targets.
The amount of sensitive information is expanding, while the amount of information that can be considered truly secret is shrinking. Entering the age of information, especially with the growing prominence of the internet, necessitates a coordinated OSINT effort. An Open Source Agency directly under the Director of National Intelligence could solve the problem of underprocessing open source information by increasing the value placed on it, installing a bureaucratic mechanism to handle the large amount of OSINT information, and promote communication between the other Intelligence
Community agencies and outside resources. Though there might be political difficulties in convincing military bodies like the Department of Defense or the CIA to give up some of its resources and autonomy in administrating its own OSINT units, all of them can ultimately benefit from the process.
Potential benefits that can be perceived from this collection of data is the aggregation of similar research into one concrete area, the elimination of duplicate costs, and expert focus areas for well trained personnel who can readily help participate in a task force for any of the agencies. This process will allow for more insight into problems in understanding cultural, and possibly economical, motivations of intentions of other countries. Open source information is unique in that it is not threatening to the agencies security concern over sources and methods. It can be collected by ethical means without danger to human agents. It can provide reasons for advocating policy, and warning/informing the public of threats without compromising any classified information. Furthermore, it can be a means in itself of foiling illegal or undesirable activity merely because of the merit of its availability. OSINT is also shareable, can be disseminated fast, and with little cost. These measures would promote multilateralism within the intelligence process of planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Bibliography
(1) Johnson, Loch K., and James J. Wirtz. Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies. 2nd. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
(2) Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 4th. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2009. Print.
(3) Sands, Amy (2005) Transforming U.S. Intelligence pp. 63–78. Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC
(4) Richard A. Best, Jr. and Alfred Cumming, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 5 December 2007, p. CRS-1, available at
(5) Hulnick, Arthur. "OSINT: Is It Really Intelligence?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008
(6)Mercado, Stephen C. "Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age: A Venerable Source in a New Era." csi-publications 48.3 (2007): n. pag. Web.
(7)Robert Steele intelligence and national security: the secret world of spies. 2nd edition. Loch Johnson, James Wirtz. Oxford university press. New York 2008. (137-149)
(8) Rathmell, Andrew. "Building Confidence in the Middle East: Exploiting the Information Age." Journal of Palestine Studies. 29.2 (2000): 5-19.
(9)Ackerman, Robert K. "Intelligence Center Mines Open Sources." Signal Online (2006): n. pag. Web.
(10)Warner, Michael. McDonald, J. Kenneth. Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.) US intelligence community reform studies since 1947 [electronic resource] / Prepared by Dr. Michael Warner and Dr. J. Kenneth McDonald U.S. Center for the Study of Intelligence, [Washington, DC.] : 2005
(11) http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1557&zoneid=23 1
(12) "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT." Federation of American Scientists. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence Associate Director of National Intelligence and Chief Information Officer, 01 2008. Web.
(14)Richard A. Best, Jr. and Alfred Cumming, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 5 December 2007, p. CRS-1, available at
(15)Arnaud de, Borchgrave. "Networked and lethal." Washington Times, The (DC) n.d.: Newspaper Source. EBSCO. Web. 23 Mar. 2010.
(16)Mercado, Stephen C. "Reexamining the Distinction Between Open Information and Secrets." csi- publications 49.2 (2007): n. pag. Web.
(17) http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/090708/1c328931a2d334553f20312187f95aa1/IJIC%20SU MMER%202007%20BEAN%20DNI%20OSC.pdf
(18) Hayden, Michael . "Director's Remarks at the DNI Open Source Conference 2008: Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden at the DNI Open Source Conference 2008." CIA. Historical Document, 12 Sep 2008. Web.
(19) Crowe, June. Davidson II, Thomas S. gray Journal (TGJ); Fall 2009, Vol. 5 Issue 3, p123-133, 11p, 2 charts, 1 diagram, 1 map
(20)Bean, Hamilton. "The DNI's Open Source Center: An Organizational Communication Perspective." International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence. 20.2 (2007): 240-257. Print.
(21)https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/unclass_sip/chapter-6-interacting-with- collectors.html
(22) Johnson, Loch. America's Secret Power. Oxford. New York. Oxford University Press 1989.
(23) http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/voelz.pdf
(24) "MANAGING THE PRIVATE SPIES: THE USE OF COMMERCIAL AUGMENTATION FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS." Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. JMIC Press, Jun 2006. Web.
(25) Beena, S. ICFAI Journal of Mergers & Acquisitions; Dec2008, Vol. 5 Issue 4, p51-70, 20p, 11 charts, 1 graph. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=13&hid=15&sid=ebc99a87-f524-4620-a8de- dae7fba1b59e%40sessionmgr13
(26) Our Experience with Intellipedia: An Ethnographic Study at the Defense Intelligence Agency Nancy M. Dixon, PhD, Common Knowledge Associates Laura A. McNamara, PhD, Sandia National Laboratories February 5, 2008
(27)http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/08/23/379380/index.htm
(28) http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2006/Sep/06Sep_Leary.pdf