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Afghanistan - Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Tuesday 20 June 2017

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Afghanistan - Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Tuesday 20 June 2017 Afghanistan - Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Tuesday 20 June 2017 Information on ISIS/ISIL/Daesh taking over the village of Chaparhar in the Nangarhar province; Information on events in early/mid 2016 in the same area of conflict between ISIS and Taliban; & Information on Americans bombing the area In May 2017 the Afghanistan Analysts Network states that “At the same time as coming under increased pressure in Achin and Kot, however, ISKP has made considerable advances into another district, Chaparhar, which is adjacent to Jalalabad and has long been contested. The group captured almost half of Chaparhar in a sudden and coordinated attack against the Taleban on 2 and 3 April 2017. ISKP claimed to have killed 30 Taleban in the fighting, although Taleban sources speaking to AAN only admitted to losing a dozen fighters. With the district centre having always remained under the government’s control, the rest of the district has changed hands between ISKP and Taleban several times over the past two years. It had the highest density of pro-ISKP Salafi fighters which made it difficult for the Taleban to establish solid control, as reported earlier by AAN. It was also one of the districts that saw the earliest defections of Taleban fighters to ISKP, in late 2014 and early 2015” (Afghanistan Analysts Network (23 May 2017) The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated). A publication issued in February 2017 commenting on events of 2016 by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan points out that: “On 20 October, Afghan and international military forces conducted a partnered search operation Chaparhar district, Nangarhar province that resulted in the injury of two children during a firefight with Anti-Government Elements” (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (February 2017) Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2016, p.90). A report released in January 2017 by Landinfo points out that “According to analyst Borhan Osman from Afghanistan Analysts Network, Daesh expanded relatively quickly in the first months of 2015, before the Taliban took up resistance. Daesh grew mainly in areas under Taliban control, where the authorities only had a symbolic presence in the district centres. During the second half of 2015 Osman claims that there was positional warfare between Daesh and Taliban in parts of the districts of Pachieragam, Chaparhar, Bati Kot and Deh Balah. Throughout the period, Daesh and Taliban repeatedly exchanged control of different geographical areas. In the struggle for territorial control brutal methods have been used against civilians by both sides. In January 2016 the Taliban declared jihad against Daesh. After sending in its «elite forces» – reportedly over 3,000 cadres from other provinces – to Nangarhar, the Taliban was able to drive out Daesh cadres from the districts of Chaparhar and Bati Kot” (Landinfo (30 January 2017) Report: Afghanistan: The security situation in Nangarhar province). In November 2016 a document published by the European Asylum Support Office notes: “In January 2015, IS officially announced its presence in Afghanistan. It grew from Pakistani militants who had settled since 2010 in the southeastern districts of the province of Nangarhar and their ranks include other Pakistani militants who arrived during 2014 and former Taliban members…The district of Achin…in Nangarhar was chosen as the group’s headquarters for various reasons, including proximity to the Pakistani border, easy access to weapons and logistical supply routes…Its presence was limited to the districts of Achin, Deh Bala and Chaparhar of Nangarhar…” (European Asylum Support Office (November 2016) EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Afghanistan: Security Situation, p.113). A publication issued in November 2016 by the Centre for Security Studies states: “From December 2015 through the end of February 2016, the combination of large- scale Taliban offensives, ad hoc community uprisings, the selective engagement of Afghan security forces and pro-government militias, and what locals described as “very effective” U.S. drone strikes, IS-K’s territorial expansion was halted and it abandoned the districts of Chaparhar and Kot to the Taliban and Afghan government” (Centre for Security Studies (9 November 2016) The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan). In September 2016 a report issued by the European Asylum Support Office points out that: “ISK retained limited presence in the Achin, Deh Bala and Chaparhar districts of Nangarhar province, and recent operations by the ANSF, supported by international military air strikes, as well as attacks from the Taliban, led to the removal of ISK to remote locations near the border with Pakistan…” (European Asylum Support Office (19 September 2016) EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Recruitment by armed groups). A document issued in July 2016 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan “On 16 April, ISIL/Daesh shot and killed two civilian men while the men worked on their farm in Chaparhar district, Nangarhar province. ISIL/Daesh reportedly accused the men of providing intelligence to Taliban” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (25 July 2016) Afghanistan: Midyear Report 2016: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict). A document published by the Middle East Institute in May 2016 states: “Islamic State fighters continued to seize villages, clash with the Taliban, and push out hundreds of Taliban fighters and their families families into refugee camps around Jalalabad…Fighters aligned with IS were able to hold villages in districts like Achin, Naziyan, Bati Kot, Shinwar, as well as some territory in Deh Bala, Rodat, and Chaparhar districts in Nangarhar province” (Middle East Institute (May 2016) The Islamic State in Afghanistan, p.6). A document issued by Khaama Press in April 2016 notes: “At least 57 anti-government armed militants were killed in separate airstrikes and infighting among the rival militant groups in eastern Nangarhar province. According to the local government officials, the militants were killed during the past 24 hours in different parts of Nangarhar. Provincial governor's spokesman Ataullah Khogyani said at least 23 militants were killed in an airstrike in Chaparhar district” (Khaama Press (30 April 2016) Drone strikes, infighting and AAF raids kill over 50 militants in Nangarhar). Khaama Press in April 2016 states: “At least four militants affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist group were killed in a drone strike in eastern Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan. According to local government officials, the militants were targeted in a drone strike in Achin District earlier today. Provincial governor's spokesman Ataullah Khogyani confirmed the airstrike and said at least three Taleban insurgents were also targeted in a separate drone strike. He said the raid was conducted in Chaparhar District of Nangarhar Province, leaving three militants dead, including a commander of the militant group” (Khaama Press (8 April 2016) Afghanistan: ISIS, Taliban militants killed in Nangarhar drone strikes). References Afghanistan Analysts Network (23 May 2017) The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/341732/472354_en.html Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 Centre for Security Studies (9 November 2016) The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/0dc0f56f- 94cf-428e-998e-5c52bf3a4842 Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 European Asylum Support Office (November 2016) EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Afghanistan: Security Situation http://www.refworld.org/docid/584ec81e4.html Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 European Asylum Support Office (19 September 2016) EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Recruitment by armed groups http://www.ein.org.uk/members/country-report/easo-country-origin-information- report-afghanistan-recruitment-armed-groups This is a subscription database Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 Khaama Press (30 April 2016) Drone strikes, infighting and AAF raids kill over 50 militants in Nangarhar http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb =21_T26140150756&format=GNBFULL&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=201&results UrlKey=29_T26140150760&cisb=22_T26140150759&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&c si=382497&docNo=282 This is a subscription database Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 Khaama Press (8 April 2016) Afghanistan: ISIS, Taliban militants killed in Nangarhar drone strikes http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb =21_T26140028668&format=GNBFULL&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=201&results UrlKey=29_T26140028672&cisb=22_T26140028671&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&c si=10962&docNo=280 This is a subscription database Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 Landinfo (30 January 2017) Report: Afghanistan: The security situation in Nangarhar province http://www.ein.org.uk/members/country-report/report-afghanistan-security-situation- nangarhar-province This is a subscription database Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017 Middle East Institute (May 2016) The Islamic State in Afghanistan http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_ web.pdf Accessed Tuesday 20 June 2017
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