The Round Tablette Founding Editor: James W. Gerber, MD (1951–2009)

Thursday, 8 September 2016 of Spain, with a chained brief case attached 30:01 Volume 30 Number 1 contain- ing plans for an invasion of Greece – Published by WW II History Round Table called Edited by Dr. Joe Fitzharris “Husky!” The Spanish forwarded copies of the documents to the Germans, who bought the story, www.mn-ww2roundtable.org hook, line, and sinker. Sir Michael Howard and Welcome to the September meeting of the Dr. other authorities consider MINCEMEAT “perhaps Harold C. Deutsch World War II History the most successful deception operation in the Round Table. Tonight’s speaker is Jonathan war.” Gawne, the author of Ghosts of the ETO: American Operation COCKADE (also 1943) included a Tactical Deceptions Units in the European Theater, series of sequential sub-operations, STARKEY, 1944-1945. WADHAM, and TINDALL, to alleviate pressure America’s overwhelming production strength and on Allied operations in Sicily and on the eastern logistics capabilities did not guarantee Allied victory front though feint attacks into Western Europe. in World War II; a two front war divided her re- Running in September, using double agents, decoy sources and manpower. Enemies also have something signals, fake troop concentrations, and increased air to say about victory conditions. Without indulging in reconnaissance and bombing in the Boulogne and hypotheticals, it is safe to say the Allies needed to Brest regions and in Norway, the three plans were use every weapon, every trick, and to cheat always implemented in short time lines, had bad back sto- and everywhere to ensure victory. Among these are ries, and took place outside the range of tactical air “deception” techniques and actions. support. STARKEY planners of British-Canadian Sun Tzu claimed that all “war is based on decep- landing at Boulogne wanted 2,300 heavy bomber tion.” Deception is a force multiplier shaping the sorties over 14 days. Gen. Ira Eaker’s 8Air Force battlefield by creating surprise and by providing had only flown 5,400 sorties in the previous 8 security for military operations and forces. months! The Royal Navy refused to place battle- The Allies – Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US ships at risk as bait for the Luftwaffe. WADHAM – all entered World War II with little if any capacity was an ostensible American invasion of Brest, for deceiving their opponents. All ended the war with many of the 13 divisions coming directly from the highly sophisticated programs for deception and US, following on the successes at Boulogne. TIN- “maskirovka.” The Russian concept differs somewhat DALL was a British-American attack to capture the from the Western notion of deception, and included airfield and town of Stavanger, Norway. The forces deception, concealment, camouflage, and secrecy, all to be used actually existed in Scotland. COCKADE intended to conceal large scale troop movements and failed because the Germans did not believe the concentrations preparatory to offensives, notably the Allies would invade western Europe in 1943, and highly successful operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, they refused to join in air battle as the Allies hoped. and in the White Russian offensive. The only success was in convincing the Germans there were 51 divisions in the British Isles; actually Success is measured by the enemy’s response. there were 17! When Gen. Galland of the Luftwaffe stated that the Operation BODYGUARD was the deception transfer of the fighter force from Pas de Calais to plan to support the OVERLORD invasion at Nor- Normandy was delayed because the OKW thought mandy in 1944. The objective was to induce “faulty Normandy was a feint, he confirmed the success of [German] strategic dispositions” of forces into Operation FORTITUDE. northern Italy, the Balkans, Greece, and Scandi- FORTITUDE, perhaps the most famous of the US- navia. Like Gaul, it had three parts: ZEPPELIN, UK World War II deception efforts, attempted to FORTITUDE NORTH and FORTITUDE SOUTH. deceive the Germans about the Allied landings on the ZEPPELIN was a sham British-American attack European continent. It included a horde of lesser into the Balkans from northern Africa. Decoy land- . known operations that are of interest ing craft in the eastern Med and selling the Ger- BARCLAY (1943) was sham attacks on southern mans 39 divisions when only 18 existed helped France and the Balkans. It helped safeguard HUSKY, make the threat posed by the fake “British Twelfth ensuring operational success in the invasion of Sicily Army” and the real US Seventh Army believable to by keeping the Italian fleet in the Adriatic near the Germans. Soviet cooperation – feints towards Greece, and influencing the Germans to misallocate Romania and Bulgaria - and double agents helped troop strength, leaving Sicily unreinforced. A sham make the ZEPPELIN story work. British Twelfth Army of 12 fictitious divisions was FORTITUDE NORTH was a sham attack on created in the eastern Mediterranean using double Norway and Denmark, using a fictional Fourth agents, false communications dummy encampments, Army of 250,000 men in Scotland – the British VII and so on. MINCEMEAT, in conjunction with BAR- taking Narvik and the Brit II corps and US XV CLAY, involved planting a dead courier off the coast Corps taking Stavanger. The story spread by double agents, false radio nets, and decoy camps, and So-

If you are a veteran, or know a veteran, of one of these campaigns – contact Don Patton at cell 612-867-5144 or [email protected] The Round Tablette 8 September 2016 — 2 viet fake preparations for an offensive agains Fin- Deceptions Units in the European Theater, 1944-1945 land and northern Norway. The diplomatic offensive (Oxford, U.K.: Casemate, 2014). - Operation GRAFFHAM - sought over-flight rights Philip Gerard, Secret Soldiers: The Story of World War and logistic support from Sweden, which in- formed II’s Heroic Army of Deception (New York: Dutton, the Germans, making OKW regard this threat as 2002). credible, they kept 12 divisions in Norway! Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (New FORTITUDE SOUTH was to convince the Ger- York: Oxford UP, 1980). mans that the main attack would be in the Pas de Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Decep- Calais area in late July, and that the June Normandy tion in the Second World War (New York: 2004). landings were a feint to draw German reserves out of Nicholas Rankin, A Genius for Deception: How Cunning the target area. The fictional First US Army Group Helped the British Win Two World Wars (New York: (FUSAG), commanded by Gen. George Patton, Oxford UP, 2009). whom the Germans regarded as our best combat Announcements: commander, had 150,000 US and Canadian troops in Twin Cities Civil War Round Table - eastern England. Pas de Calais was more heavily 20 Sept. 2016 – Civil War Made Modern Food - bombed than Normandy and reconnaissance flights www.tccwrt.com - [email protected] saturated the skies, with double agents, false radios, St Croix Valley Civil War Round Table - 26 Sept. 2016 – news reports, and decoy camps and equipment all Stonewall Jackson - 715-386-1268 - helping to sell this story, built on the geographic [email protected] logic of being the closest invasion point with good Cannon Valley CWRT - beaches. Several other smaller operations, including Fort Snelling Civil War Symposium - 8 April 2017 COPPERHEAD (a Montgomery double traveled to Minnesota Military Museum, Camp Ripley, 15000 Hwy Gibraltar the week prior to the Normandy invasion 115, Little Falls, MN 56345, 320-616-6050, http:// which he would not do if it were the real thing) rein- www.mnmilitarymuseum.org/ forced the Pas de Calais story. Honor Flight - Jerry Kyser - crazyjerry45@hotmail - 651-338-2717 BODYGUARD was highly successful, and the CAF - Commemorative Air Force - Germans were surprised by the landings at Nor- www.cafmn.org 651-455-6942 mandy on 6 June, and they continued to regard it as a Minnesota Air Guard Museum - www.mnangmuse- feint until July. ZEPPELIN AND FORTITUDE um.org 612-713-2523 NORTH were ambiguity deception operations, creat- Friends of Ft. Snelling, www.fortsnelling.org ing uncertainty and inhibiting accurate German intel- Fagen Fighters WWII Museum, Granite Falls, MN, ligence assessments, leading them to misallocate 320-564-6644, http://www.fagenfighterswwiimuseum.org. forces to south Europe and Norway. FORTITUDE World Without Genocide, 651-695-7621, http://www.- worldwithoutgenocide.org/ SOUTH was a misleading the opponent operation, Airshow - Eden Prairie - July 2017 reducing ambiguity by making the false alternative www.wotn.org 952-746-6100 so attractive. SOUTH worked so well that OKW, Military History Book Club, Har Mar Barnes & Noble: Rundstedt, Jodl, etc. were convinced the invasion 28 Sept., Corum, The Luftwaffe - point would be Pas de Calais in July. Only Rommel [email protected] dissented; the Luftwaffe had too easy a time flying reconnaissance over FUSAG areas, while air defens- We need volunteers to drive our veterans to and es over south England were nearly impenetrable. from meetings. Please contact Don Patton at cell Because the British controlled the German agents 612-867-5144 or [email protected] in England, they were able to send fake intelligence Round Table Schedule 2016-2017 reports back to Germany without fear of contradic- 2016 tion. To coordinate operations they formed the Lon- 8 Sept From Holocaust to US Soldier don Controlling Section (LCS), which tried to pre- 22 Sept 1930s Pacific Diplomacy vent conflicting deceptions and blown cover stories. 12 Oct 11th Airborne, PI to Occupation When the United States entered the war, they formed 27 Oct Germany in the 1930s their own committee, eventually known as Joint 10 Nov Deutsch Lecture - Sentencing at Nuremburg Security Control (JSC), that coordinated deceptions 8 Dec Countdown to Pearl Harbor (75th Anniv) in the Europeans and Pacific theaters, but the Ja- 2017 panese were a minor issue, their High Command did 12 Jan Battle of Koenigsburg not believe any intelligence that contradicted its 9 Feb Nazi Hunters presumptions about American/Allied capabilities. 9 Mar Arsenal for War The efforts of the Allies were generally successful 23 Mar Gen. Lesley McNair because they controlled access to information, had 13 Apr Last Mission of the 93rd Bomb Group centralized control over deception operations at high 11 May Corps Commanders of the Battle of the Bulge levels (LCS), used sound techniques, made deception serve their strategic and operational objectives, and allowed sufficient time for the execution of the de- ception plans. The Russians fully integrated maskirovka into the planning and execution of opera- tions at all levels, leading the Germans to routinely underestimate Soviet strength by fifty percent. Further Readings: Jonathan Gawne, Ghosts of the ETO: American Tactical

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