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PROMOTION EXAM PART ‘B’ MIL HISTORY 2015-16

COMPILED & PUBLISHED BY THE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING (MT-2) INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS OF MoD (ARMY)

INDEX

MILITARY HISTORY : PART ‘B’ EXAM (2015-16)

Ser Chapter Page No From To 1. Syllabus i ii PART - I : BATTLE OF 2. Background 02 02 3. 03 08 4. The air armada 09 17 5. The vital hours 18 26 6. Formation of perimeter : 20 Sep 27 34 7. Evacuation 35 36 8. Aftermath 37 38 9. Reasons for failure 39 40 10. Lessons learnt 41 42 11. Conclusion 43 43 PART - II : OP DEADSTICK - CAPTURE OF 12. Background 45 48 13. Prep & plg for the Op 49 54 14. Airborne on D-day 55 58 15. Aftermath 59 59 16. Conclusion 60 60 17. Lessons learnt 61 62 PART - III : BIOGRAPHY - JOHN HOWARD, DSO 18. The Early Years 63 65 19. Personal and Military Traits 65 69 20. Life After the War 69 69

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SYALLABI FOR PROMOTION EXAMINATION PART 'B' : MIL HISTORY (2015) (WRITTEN)

Ser Subject Total Pass Time Syllabus Remarks/ No Marks Marks Allowed Recommended Study 1. Military 500 200 3 hr Aim. The aim of Military History paper is to 1. The topics for Military History History test the candidates‟ ability to draw lessons from paper would be promulgated by the prescribed campaigns and biographical DGMT (MT-2) in a block of four studies and apply these to contemporary and years. This would also include the future war situations. books to be read for each topic. The topics to be changed each year. The DETAILS OF SYLLABUS topics of Military History would be revised after every four years. 1. Military Campaign. The study 2. Philosophy of Selection. should including the following :- The philosophy of selecting the topic (a) Military Geography of the would be as under :- theatre. (a) The topic selected (b) Application of Principles of War. should be commensurate (c) Major Tactical Battles. It to the knowledge level and should include :- service maturity. (i) Planning of unit level (b) Lessons. Officers battles and should draw lessons application. which they can apply (ii) Conduct of operation immediate or in the including battle array of units. immediate future, in their (iii) Small team operations. respective service levels. (iv) Lessons learnt at sub- 3. Selection of Topic. One unit / unit level. campaign (with two specific battles) (v) Operations logistics and one related biography. challenges and solutions. 4. Reference material issued by (vi) Relevance in today‟s DGMT (MT-2). context at unit level. (vii) Unconventional / innovative concepts and procedures adopted including out-of-box thinking. (d) Human Element. Highlights of tactical battles amplifying following issues :- (i) Junior Leadership. (ii) Personal courage and sacrifice. (iii) Espirit-de-Corps. (iv) Morale. (v) Training at sub-unit level. (vi) Human elements. 2. Biographical Study. To include the following :- (a) Background, early life, self and formal training. (b) Junior leadership traits evident / development during formative years. (c) Personality and their affect on their command at sub unit/ unit level. (d) Leadership and command techniques at unit / sub-unit level and their relevance in today‟s context. ii

Ser Subject Total Pass Time Syllabus Remarks/ No Marks Marks Allowed Recommended Study 3. Junior Leadership. Aspects amplifying following issues :- (a) Man management. (b) Officer-men relationship. (c) Welfare of troops. (d) Human psychology. (e) Morale. (f) Motivation. (g) Efficiency including time management. (h) Physical and moral courage. (j) Espirit-de-corps. (k) Self discipline. (l) Truthfulness. (m) Honour code. (n) Junior leadership traits. (o) Tactical acumen.

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BATTLE OF ARNHEM (17TH SEP - 26TH SEP 1944)

Four months after the allies had landed at Normandy the German army was rapidly retreating from . British Field Marshal Montgomery’s audacious plan to drive deep into the heart of industrial Germany relied on British and American to capture and hold vital bridges over the until relieved by reinforcements. The key to success would rest on British 1stAirborne Division at Arnhem. ULTIMATELY IT WAS

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CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

1. Background. By , the Second World War had almost reached a conclusion. The Allied armies had rapidly pushed the disorganized Germans almost completely out of France and , and it was here that the front line stood, several miles short of the Dutch border. This rapid advance had caused the Allies crippling supply problems and despite their best efforts, all the armies did not have the resources to keep advancing at their present pace. Given the view that the Germans were almost at the point of collapse, it was agreed that a single army should be given priority of the supplies to enact a plan that would deal the final blow and win the war before the end of 1944. This honour fell to Field Marshal Montgomery and his 2nd . Montgomery proposed a highly ambitious plan to fly three divisions of glider and parachute troops (35,000 men) and land them in various parts of Holland to capture no less than five key bridges. British tanks would simultaneously break through the front line and link up with the Airborne Divisions one by one to properly secure these bridges. Once they were all taken, there would then be no further river obstacles between the British and Germany, and a quick conclusion to the war would surely follow. The plan, the largest airborne assault in the history of warfare, was codenamed Operation Market Garden. D-Day was set for Sunday, 17th September.

2. Operation Comet. Montgomery desperately tried to persuade Eisenhower to agree to a number of plans that he felt would achieve this, one of these was given the codename Operation Comet. The plan was to drop the elite 1st British Airborne Division by parachute and glider into Holland to capture the five key bridges in and around the towns of , and Arnhem. The 2nd British Army would then break through the German front line and advance the sixty four miles to the River Rhine at Arnhem, properly securing each of the bridges as they went. Once the final bridge at Arnhem had been reached, there would be no more river obstacles standing between the 2nd British Army and Germany. Montgomery then wished to advance on Berlin and seize it from under the noses of the Russians, but with the great distances that this involved it was considered far too cavalier a move to be possible. Eisenhower, however, was persuaded of the merit of capturing the Dutch bridges and so gave his consent to Operation Comet. It was to have been launched on 9th September, but Comet was cancelled shortly before takeoff as it became apparent that it was asking too much of a single division to capture and defend so many bridges over such an expanse of territory. It is widely accepted that if Comet had taken place then it would have been a complete disaster for all concerned.

3. The plan was not dead, however. Instead it was renamed Operation Market Garden and the number of airborne troops involved was dramatically increased with the addition of the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. The plan was essentially the same, except that the bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen areas became the responsibility of the 101st and 82nd Airborne respectively, allowing the 1st Airborne Division to concentrate on the bridges at Arnhem. At the moment that these troops began to land on their drop zones, the 2nd British Army, with XXX Corps in the lead, would then drive with all speed to Arnhem, linking up with the airborne troops in turn. Success at Arnhem would enable the 2nd British Army to begin an encircling movement from the north whilst the 1st US Army did likewise from the south. If the was captured, Germany's production capabilities would collapse and it was believed that the war would be over before the end of 1944.

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CHAPTER 2

OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

1. Operation Market (Market being the codename for the airborne phase of the plan, Garden being that of the ground forces) involved a high degree of risk for all the units involved. The danger was particularly severe for the 1st Airborne Division landing at Arnhem, sixty four miles into German territory, because their fate largely depended upon the success of others. If the Americans, landing to the south, failed to capture any one of their major bridges, then all of the estimated eleven thousand nine hundred men of the 1st Airborne Division and its attached units would likely be cut off from friendly forces and inevitably captured. Even an unusually long delay in the arrival of the relieving ground forces could result in the same fate.

ALLIED FORCES PROGRESS OF OPS : SEP 1944 4

2. The Plan.

(a) Forces. The 1st Airborne Division consisted of three infantry brigades and assorted support units such as artillery, engineers, pathfinders etc. Due to the insufficient number of transport aircraft available, the first lift on Sunday, 17th September would see only the following units transported to Arnhem: the 1st Parachute Brigade, the glider borne 1st Airlanding Brigade (less two companies of the 2nd South Staffordshires), Major General Urquhart's Divisional Headquarters, and approximately half of the divisional units, including two of the three artillery batteries of the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, and the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron.

DROPPING AND LANDING ZONES FOR FIRST LIFT

(b) DZs & LZs. The three drop and landing zones used for the first lift, DZ-X, LZ- S and LZ-Z, were all situated very close to each other, between six and eight miles west of Arnhem. Twenty minutes before the main formations were due to arrive, the pathfinders of the 21st Independent Parachute were to drop on each of the zones to lightly secure and mark them with their Eureka beacons. The gliders of the 1st Airlanding Brigade were then to land on LZ-S, followed twenty minutes later by 5

Headquarters and the divisional units on LZ-Z, and finally, half an hour after them, the 1st Parachute Brigade on DZ-X.

(c) The drop and landing zones for the second lift were to be protected overnight by the 1st Airlanding Brigade, with the remainder of the division established in the general area around the village of , bordering LZ's S and Z. Meanwhile the two thousand strong 1st Parachute Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Lathbury, were to capture Arnhem Bridge and defend it until reinforced by the remainder of the Division.

(d) Initial Plan. As the brigade was to land on a drop zone eight miles from their objective, Lathbury knew that it would take many hours for his men to reach Arnhem on foot, by which time the enemy would be alerted and may likely have ordered the demolition of the bridge. It was therefore essential that it be seized at the earliest opportunity. Under normal circumstances a coup de main raid would have been attempted whereby, a small number of paratroopers or glider troops would land alongside the objective to capture and hold it until more substantial forces could arrive to relieve them. The , however, refused to land any troops so close to Arnhem, and so Lathbury sought an alternative. His solution was to take Major Gough's 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron under his command and charge them with undertaking a coup de main. This unit, consisting of one hundred and eighty men, was all mounted on Jeeps which were vulnerable to enemy fire but armored with powerful twin Vickers „K‟ Machine Guns. Although completely unsuited to the purpose, the squadron was expected to face only minimal opposition and so should have little difficulty in racing to the bridge as soon as their vehicles had been unloaded from their gliders and holding it until the leading elements of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived several hours later.

(e) The 2nd Parachute Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Frost, the most experienced battalion commander in the Division, were to advance on Arnhem alongside the riverbank, codenamed the „Lion‟ Route, and capture the Railway Bridge, four miles to the west of Arnhem, and then the pontoon and main road bridge in the town itself. Proceeding along a different path, the Utrechtsewegmain road, codenamed the „Tiger‟ Route, Lieutenant Colonel Fitch's 3rd Battalion were to reinforce Frost's positions around the bridge, whilst Lieutenant Colonel Dobie and his 1st Battalion headed along the Amsterdamseweg, the Leopard Route, to secure an area of high ground to the north of Arnhem, overlooking a road down which German reinforcements were expected to come.

(f) Second Lift. On the morning of the second day, Brigadier Hackett and his 4th Parachute Brigade would arrive on DZ-Y, ten miles west of Arnhem, together with the remainder of the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the divisional units. As soon as these troops were assembled, the whole division would then march to Arnhem, relieve the 1st Parachute Brigade and establish a wide defensive perimeter around Arnhem and Oosterbeek.

(g) Polish Bde. Finally, on the third day, Major General Sosabowski and his 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade Group would land their heavy glider borne equipment on LZ-L, five miles to the west of Arnhem, whilst their parachutists jumped over DZ-K, a mile to the south of Arnhem Bridge. This latter zone was the same as that which had been denied to the 1st Parachute Brigade on the first day for the use of 6

a coup-de-main raid, but the Royal Air Force agreed to drop the Poles here because it was assumed that the 1st Airborne Division would have cleared Arnhem of defences by this time and also that the 2nd British Army would have arrived and cleared the emplacements around Deelen Airfield. If, for whatever reason, Sosabowski landed on DZ-K and discovered that the bridge was still in enemy hands, he was ordered to take it himself.

(h) All being well however, the Polish Brigade would occupy positions to the east of Arnhem whilst the 4th Parachute Brigade secured the north of the town and the high ground earlier seized by the 1st Parachute Battalion. The 1st Airlanding Brigade and 1st Airlanding Light Regiment were to establish themselves in and around Oosterbeek, four miles to the west, whilst the 1st Parachute Brigade were withdrawn into reserve, holding the bridge itself and the land to the south of the Rhine. Following a successful outcome to Operation Market Garden, the 1st Airborne Division were to remain in the area to act as ordinary ground troops, and they were to be joined by the air transportable 52nd (Lowland) Division, who were to be flown to Deelen Airfield as soon as it was secured.

(j) Weaknesses. The main weaknesses of the plan outlined above were the large distances from the drop zones to the Bridge, the fact that it would require three lifts over three days to get the Division onto the , and the belief that there would be very little enemy to oppose the landings. There was, however, no evidence available to the Division to suggest that there would be serious opposition in the area and, with this in mind, it was believed that the plan would work very well.

3. Narrow Front Strategy and Terrain.

(a) The terrain that the Garden forces were to operate to accomplish their objectives stood in sharp contrast to the broad front strategy that was preferred by General Eisenhower and made the success of the operation a risky proposition. Montgomery believed that a narrow front offensive would allow the concentration of force and would allow the Allies to launch an immediate offensive by concentrating the limited supplies to only the forces assigned to the narrow front assault.

(b) General Eisenhower believed that a single narrow front advance would lead to a collision of forces on the narrow front with no room to manoeuvre and there would be little space to correctly apply armour. The narrow front would also allow the Germans to concentrate their defensive efforts at the point of main effort and would leave extended flanks that would be vulnerable to counter attacks. The Allies would be forced to reinforce their flanks which would reduce the forces available for the primary effort of the attack.

(c) Adv of XXX Corps. The terrain that was chosen for Montgomery‟s narrow front had many of the characteristics that Eisenhower feared. The British ground forces would have only Highway 69 to advance the entire XXX Corps to Nijmegen toward Arnhem. There were no other parallel roads that could be used to support the advance and cross country movement was impossible for tanks because the terrain was too soft and sandy and was intersected with steep ditches and small canals.

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(d) The nature of the terrain on which XXX Corps was to advance was not ideal for armoured warfare. Despite this fact, the British operational doctrine in northwest Europe gave the British ground commanders‟ confidence. They firmly believed they could advance the sixty two miles over difficult terrain and reach the at Arnhem. The British commanders‟ confidence in their doctrine originated from the fact that their doctrine in northwest Europe emphasized narrow front assaults by their armoured formations.

(f) Trn in Tgt Area. The terrain in Garden target area was better suited for infantry, which could manoeuvre in the soft and wooded terrain of the countryside when compared to an offensive that relied on armour to make the advance. Armour provided mobility and therefore the vital speed needed to make the advance to Arnhem. However, the absolute reliance on a single highway and the restricted terrain to move the entire XXX Corps was a comparative disadvantage to an armour led ground offensive and provided a defensive advantage to the Germans. The Germans would have the defensive flexibility to launch counterattacks along the British flanks as XXX Corps advanced. German defensive efforts were facilitated by the two flanking British corps that was unable and unwilling to press their attacks to draw German forces away from and cover XXX Corps flanks. The Germans could also focus their defence on a narrow strip of road to slow the advance to the airborne forces.

4. Factors Jeopardising Operations.

(a) Low Opinion of En. An over optimistic view that the Germans were already beaten. The Allies knew that had reformed and established a strong front line but there was general feeling that it would only require another firm blow to send them reeling again.

(b) The Germans were excellent soldiers and could fight viciously even when the situation was hopeless.

(c) The report that Arnhem was free of serious resistance was incorrect. Although Germans were numerically weaker to the 1st Airborne Division, they possessed a range of tanks, self-propelled guns, other armored vehicles and artillery pieces. Their men were all excellently trained and battle hardened.

(d) Lack of Time. One of the main complicating factors was the short time available for planning the operation. The operation was announced on 10th September and was to be launched on Sunday, 17th September, leaving the three airborne divisions just seven days to plan their battle.

(e) Intelligence failure.

(i) The British were aware of the presence of the two divisions, but little word of it filtered through to the 1st Airborne.

(ii) The primary source of the intelligence was , the codename for the interception and decoding of German signals received through the . Ultra clearly identified the presence of the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions, but due to the vital need to protect the system and not give the 8

Germans cause to suspect that their codes had been broken, only a select few were privy to this information in its purest form.

(iii) The 1st British Airborne Corps, under whose umbrella all the airborne units involved in Market Garden were to fight, only received a vague suggestion of armored strength in the area.

(iv) 1st British Airborne Corps received photographs from their Intelligence Officer, Major which showed a small number of tanks close to one of the 1st Airborne Division's drop zones, but a mere handful of armored vehicles did not automatically mean the presence of an entire panzer division. Lt Gen Browning chose to play down the significance of these photographs and when Major Urquhart persisted with his opposition to the plan, Browning forced him away on a period of sick leave.

5. Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski, the commander of the Polish Parachute Brigade, lodged serious objection to Operation Market Garden and his objection to Operation Comet, the original version of the Market Garden plan which involved just the 1st Airborne Division and Polish Brigade, contributed greatly to its justified cancellation. He was becoming increasingly isolated from his fellow commanders due to earning himself a reputation of objecting to absolutely everything.

6. Morale. The men of the 1st Airborne Division had suffered a prolonged and intensely frustrating period of inactivity throughout 1944. They had expected a prominent role in the , and so were not pleased to discover that the honour had instead been given to the newly formed 6th Airborne Division. The constant preparation and subsequent abandonment of many operations planned during that time had a severe impact upon the Division's morale.

7. Air. At Arnhem, the 1st Airborne Division's drop zones were between six and ten miles from the bridge. The main reason for this seemingly extraordinary decision was that there were no areas of land closer to the town that were suitable for a large scale glider landing.

8. The Allies did not have enough transport aircraft to fly thirty five thousand airborne troops to Holland in a single airlift. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the first days of Market Garden would occur during a new moon period and so to avoid the inevitable shambles that would arise from dropping and assembling thousands of men in total darkness, the landings could only take place in broad daylight.

9. Loc of Corps HQ. The Corps HQ were to land at Nijmegen, alongside the and their ability to exercise control over three divisions, fighting independent actions at great distances from each other, was particularly remote.

10. Surprise. Only half of the 1st Airborne Division was to land on the first day, and less than half of these were able to advance on the bridge because the remainder had to defend the drop zones for twenty four hours until the second lift arrived. Surprise became impossible to maintain as they arrived over a period of three days and marched a distance of eight miles to their objectives in the face of a now fully alert enemy. Before a shot had been fired, the fate of Market Garden was sealed. 9

CHAPTER 3

THE AIR ARMADA

1. The First Lift.

LOCATION OF AIRFIELDS FOR OP MARKET GARDEN 10

(a) Air. The first actions of Operation Market Garden were undertaken by the Allied air forces. During the night on the eve of the operation and throughout the following morning, Bomber Command and the 2nd Tactical Air Force of the RAF and the US 8th and 9th Air Forces flew one thousand three hundred and ninety five sorties against targets in the Market Garden area, escorted by one thousand two hundred and forty fighters. Key German airfields and flak positions were demolished.

(b) At 1240 Hr, the first British troops were dropped near Arnhem from twelve Stirlings of 190 and 620 Squadrons. These were the one hundred and eighty six pathfinders of the 21st Independent Parachute Company. A platoon landed on each of the three drop and landing zones to lightly secure them against enemy action. At 1300 Hr, the first gliders began to descend on LZ-S, carrying the 1st Airlanding Brigade, less A and C Companies of the 2nd South Staffordshires. Twelve men died as a result of crashes or collisions. At 1350 Hr, the two thousand two hundred and eighty three men of the 1st Parachute Brigade and assorted other parachute trained units, including the majority of the Reconnaissance Squadron, began to jump over DZ-X.

(c) The first lift was now complete. The landings had been almost completely unopposed and had taken place with such efficiency that, in terms of casualties sustained at least, it was certainly the cleanest major drop of the war .Whilst the paratroopers assembled for the advance into Arnhem, the 1st Airlanding Brigade busied themselves with the task of securing the zones for the next day. Two platoons of the 2nd South Staffordshires entered Wolfheze and cleared it of enemy resistance, whilst the remainder of the Battalion, only half of which had arrived with the first lift, proceeded to establish a screen around the north eastern edge of LZ-S.

(d) It was decided to secure a perimeter around DZ-X and LZ-Z, and in the process „D‟ Company liberated the village of Heelsum on the southern edge of the two zones. The 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers, meanwhile, headed westwards to the isolated Ginkel Heath position, designated as DZ-Y for the 4th Parachute Brigade on the second lift. „A‟ Company established themselves on the Amsterdamseweg, the main road between the towns of Arnhem and Ede.

2. The German Reaction.

(a) The 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions had been sent north of the River Rhine to rest and refit, and to this end the 9th had been ordered to hand over all of their vehicles and equipment to their sister division, prior to returning to Germany. When the landings took place, much of the 9th Division's tanks were temporarily out of service, typically having had their tracks removed.

(b) The landings were observed by German soldiers and generals all over the Market Garden area, suitably impressing and troubling them at the same time. Yet few appreciated the size of the landings and none suspected that this was only the first of three air lifts. German units throughout the Market Garden area reacted with astonishing speed and considerably hardened their defenses.

(c) The Germans realised that their objective must be Arnhem Bridge. Meanwhile, back on the drop zones, things began to go wrong for the British when the men of the 1st Airborne Divisional Signals discovered that their radios were not working correctly. 11

3. 1st Para Bde.

1st PARA BRIGADE OP PLAN 12

(a) While the 1st Airlanding Brigade and divisional units remained on the drop zones to await the arrival of the second lift on the following morning, Brigadier Lathbury's 1st Parachute Brigade was required to move off as soon as possible to capture Arnhem Bridge. The Brigade's three battalions and their attached units assembled very quickly and were able to begin the march to Arnhem at 1500 Hr. The 2nd Parachute Battalion, with Lathbury's Brigade Headquarters in tow, began to move along the lower „Lion‟ Route, which followed the River, whilst the 3rd Battalion took the central „Tiger‟ Route along the Utrechtseweg. The ultimate objective of both units was Arnhem Bridge, with the 2nd Battalion due to arrive first.

(b) Major Gough's Reconnaissance Squadron, who were to race to Arnhem Bridge in their jeeps and seize it as a coup de main in advance of the paratroopers, should have set out along the Leopard Route at 1500 Hr, however they experienced difficulties in unloading their jeeps from the gliders and so slipped half an hour behind schedule. If this setback had not occurred, it is possible that they would have been able to proceed along the Leopard Route before Battalion Kraft could assemble their blocking line. As a result they were halted.

(c) Brigadier Lathburyset out in his jeep to inform all of his battalion commanders that they should press on with all speed as there would be no friendly force waiting for them at the bridge. Major General Urquhart had also heard about the failure of the coup de main force, but due to the radio blackout he did not know that Lathbury was already aware of this, and so he took the dangerous decision to leave Divisional Headquarters to personally inform him. Urquhart eventually caught up with Lathbury whilst he was visiting the 3rd Battalion.

(d) Actions by 3rd Bn. Shortly 3rd Battalion's „B‟ Company, who were in the lead, shot up a German staff car when it suddenly appeared amongst them from off a side road. Major Dennison's ‟A‟ Company, at the rear of the Battalion's column, came under consistent and effective machine gun and mortar fire from the nearby woodland. The following two hours they were locked in battle with the Germans in this area. It was clear that the enemy was intending to employ these delaying tactics all the way along the „Tiger‟ Route to Arnhem, and so the Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch, made the shrewd decision to detach Major Lewis's ‟C‟ Company with orders to move north, off the road and attempt to flank German resistance by proceeding along the railway line.

(e) By now the 3rd Battalion had become fragmented. „C‟ Company was detached, „A‟ Company was still fighting in the rear and so for the time being the only unit which was free to advance was the leading „B‟ Company. It was unsafe, however, for them to press on alone and so increase the gap between themselves and „A‟ Company, and so the decision was taken for the Battalion to halt at the Hartenstein Hotel, in Oosterbeek.

(f) Both Urquhart and Lathbury were now trapped with the 3rd Battalion and desperately wanted to return to his Headquarters. As a consequence, the 1st Airborne Division became cut off from both its commander and its acknowledged deputy.

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1st PARA BRIGADE PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS 14

OPERATIONS ALONG RIVER RHINE : 1st PARA BRIGADE

(g) While this was going on, „T‟ Company took over the lead and attempted to gain the main road further to the east, but they continued to encounter enemy armour and it was clear that the Battalion's light armaments were of limited effectiveness against them. Dobie ordered „T‟ Company to press on through the woods to the south of the road instead. They carried on through the night but continued to encounter enemy patrols. „R‟ Company was far behind at this point and so, in the absence of radio contact, guides were left to ensure that they did not become lost when they were finally able to disengage. In all, the 1st Battalion suffered twelve dead and ninety wounded during the first twenty four hours of Market Garden. 15

4. The 2nd Bn.

(a) Moving along the lower „Lion‟ Route, Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's 2nd Battalion did not experience the heavy opposition that the rest of the 1st Parachute Brigade had encountered. Kraft did not have enough men to completely screen Arnhem from the British and so he had based his defences between the railway line and the Utrechtseweg, leaving the river road undefended but for the light patrols of his reconnaissance units.

(b) Opposition was still encountered, but Major Tatham-Warter's ‟A‟ Company, who had been given the lead, cut their way through this with great speed and skill. They had barely left the drop zones before Lieutenant McDermont's No 3 Platoon ambushed a convoy of lorries, likely carrying the reconnaissance troop of Battalion Kraft‟s No 2 Company, killing and taking prisoner the thirty Germans inside them. In the woods beyond, „A‟ Company were attacked and lightly mortared by minor opposition, but soon Lieutenant Grayburn's No 2 Platoon charged the position under the cover of a smokescreen.

(c) The tasks assigned to the 2nd Battalion were considerable. Not only did they have to reach the bridge and capture it, but they also had to seize the railway bridge, four miles to the west of Arnhem, and a small pontoon bridge in the town itself.

(d) Meanwhile „C‟ Company was ordered to withdraw and rejoin the rear of the Battalion's column, proceeding instead to capture a German Headquarters in Arnhem. As „A‟ Company drew near to Arnhem they suffered some casualties under the fire of an armored car, which promptly withdrew when it observed an anti-tank gun being brought forward. The Company pressed on but was again halted shortly after, this time by a machine gun position sited on an area of high ground known as Den Brink. To prevent the 2nd Battalion's vanguard being delayed by this menace, „B‟ Company were ordered to advance on Den Brink and clear it. Lieutenant Cane's No 6 Platoon began to move into position, but as they did so they came under fire from another machine gun and Cane and three other men were killed with several more wounded. „B‟ Company fought their way onto Den Brink but were not able to clear it of the enemy dug in there.

(e) „B‟ Company slipped off Den Brink during the night and headed to the Pontoon Bridge, their own objective, located a mile to the west of Arnhem Bridge. Before they had left England, the company had learned from aerial reconnaissance photographs that the center span of the pontoon had been detached and was moored alongside the riverbank. With no means of reconnecting it, the Company hoped to locate boats or improvise some other means of crossing to enable them to assault the southern end of Arnhem Bridge.

(f) Actions on Arnhem Bridge. „A‟ Company entered Arnhem just as it was getting dark. Occasional light resistance was met but all comers were rapidly dealt with. „A‟ Company arrived at the northern end of Arnhem Bridge at 1930 Hr and proceeded to occupy positions on either side of the ramp. „A‟ Company made two attempts to capture the southern end of the Bridge during the night. The first was a 16

token effort mounted by a vanguard of just seven men, but when these encountered German soldiers on the bridge they had to fall back as their numbers were insufficient for the purpose. Lieutenant Grayburn's No 2 Platoon attempted a more substantial effort, but they came to an abrupt standstill and suffered eight wounded when a machine-gun opened fire from a pill box position at point blank range, later joined by the fire of an armored car from the other end of the bridge.

(g) Further attempts to cross were rendered impossible when attempted to silence the pill box with a flame-thrower and their aim fell wide and set fire to several huts alongside. This turned out to be an ammunition and petrol store, and the subsequent explosions set fire to the paintwork on the bridge, which continued to blaze throughout the night. Needless to say, a further assault was now impossible. Not only was the whole area lit up as if it were daylight, but the heat from the fires was immense, rendering the bridge unapproachable.

(h) „T‟ Company was on their way to the bridge. The 1st Battalion kept moving through the night and did all they could to avoid the attention of the enemy, even switching off the engines of their jeeps and manhandling them and their anti-tank guns silently past German patrols. Resistance, however, continued to be encountered and casualties were increasing. By far the biggest problem were the small groups of men becoming lost in the dark after being delayed by such actions. With various parties coming under fire from snipers and isolated machine-gun posts, along the full length of the mile long column, the Battalion gradually fragmented and it became easy for the Germans to mop up the stragglers. By morning, the 1st Battalion had lost contact with half of the five hundred and forty eight men that it had taken into battle

5. Arnhem Brigade :18 Sep.

(a) The 10th S.S. Panzer Division's reconnaissance battalion was tasked to clear the British at Arnhem Bridge. Also under the command of Sturmbannführer Brinkmann, as of the early hours of Monday morning, were the eight tanks and four infantry companies of Knaust, a unit of Wehrkreis VI, who were to carry out attacks on the bridge from the north whilst Brinkmann did likewise from the east.

(b) During the night, Lieutenant Colonel Frost had sent out a radio message appealing for reinforcements, and as a result the 1st Battalion had altered its course and was heading to Arnhem, whilst the 3rd Battalion, who did not receive the message, also resumed their advance on the Bridge after resting overnight at Oosterbeek. The 2nd Battalion's „B‟ Company was still at the pontoon bridge, a mile to the west, but as they had been unable to improvise any crossing to the southern bank, Frost ordered them to come to the Bridge and reinforce his defences. German resistance had stiffened by this time and so the company had to fight its way through opposition.

(c) With the arrival of „B‟ Company at the bridge, however, Frost had some three hundred and forty men of the 2nd Battalion at his disposal and other elements had arrived during the night to increase this number. All of these units had followed in the 2nd Battalion's wake along the „Lion‟ Route on Sunday, 17th September but during the night there came one unexpected addition in the form of the 3rd Parachute Battalion's „C‟ Company, who had been detached in Oosterbeek on the previous day to find their way to Arnhem along the railway line. For the most part they had met no organised 17

opposition, though at various stages they had encountered four armored vehicles and destroyed three of them. (d) „C‟ Company entered Arnhem during the night, and to avoid a confrontation with the now increasing numbers of Germans around them, Major Lewis ordered his men to form up in the enemy fashion and march to the bridge in the hope of being mistaken for German troops. The plan worked, but when Major Lewis went forward to inform Lieutenant Colonel Frost of his arrival, two of C Company's platoons found themselves marching alongside German troops who were about to begin an attack on the British positions. In the darkness it took some time for both sides to become aware of the other's presence, whereupon they clashed violently. The German attack was broken up with heavy losses, but half of „C‟ Company was cut-off and taken prisoner, and so Major Lewis was only able to lead forty five into the perimeter. Their arrival, however, brought the total defence up to a very respectable seven hundred and forty men.

(e) Control of the Bridge. When the fires on the bridge had finally died down, Lieutenant Colonel Frost considered a third attempt to capture the other end, but it became apparent that the southern approaches were now too well defended by German infantry and armored cars for this to be possible. Nevertheless, the Airborne troops were effectively in control of the bridge as they could bring down fire all around it, and it would only require the mere presence of XXX Corps on the opposite side of the river for it to fall completely into Allied hands.

(f) By dawn, however, Frost became aware that his force was completely surrounded, yet he remained confident that he could hold out until the rest of the division arrived, and at this stage he had no reason to suspect that this would not be achieved within a matter of hours. At this stage, time was more pressing for the Germans, who needed to clear the Bridge as soon as possible. At 0930 Hr, British lookouts reported that armored cars were approaching the Bridge from the south. The initial reaction was that the vanguard of the Guards Armored Division had put in an unexpectedly early appearance, but these hopes were soon dashed when the vehicles were identified as German. This was the 9th S.S Reconnaissance Battalion, returning from their scouting mission to Nijmegen on the previous day.

(g) The Airborne men were alert and waiting, and they allowed the first four vehicles to pass by unhindered, but those behind were badly shot up by anti-tank weapons and small arms fire. The fighting lasted for two hours before the heavily mauled Germans withdrew to safety, leaving the bridge littered with their dead and the burning wreckage of twelve of the Battalion's twenty two vehicles.

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CHAPTER 4

THE VITAL HOURS

1. The 2nd Lift.

(a) Divisional HQ was starting to grow concerned. Furthermore, Major General Urquhart was still missing and German public radio broadcasts were boasting that he had been killed. It was decided to release the 2nd South Staffordshires from their positions around LZ-S, to the north of Wolfheze. The commander of the 2nd South Staffords, Lieutenant Colonel McCardie, was ordered to make his way in to Arnhem to support the 1st Parachute Brigade.

(b) It had been planned that the second lift would begin to arrive at 1000 Hr, however fog had descended upon the airfields in Britain and so the airborne armada was delayed in taking off for four hours. The German commanders knew that for an airborne operation to succeed it needed to be supplied from the air, and so they had made the effort to line the likely air routes to Arnhem with anti-aircraft weapons. Due to the short range of transport aircraft and the great distance between Britain and Holland, it was obvious that such supplies could only be delivered from the south or west. The also put ninety of its fighters in the sky to intercept and wreak havoc amongst the vulnerable transport aircraft, however Allied air support was so complete that none of these aircraft came anywhere near the armada.

PLAN FOR SECOND DROP : 18 SEP 1944

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(c) The 4th Parachute Brigade had been told that by the time they arrived, their drop zone would be both secure and peaceful. Needless to say, as they waited for the order to jump, they were a little surprised to discover that they were about to drop on top of a battlefield. German flak gunners poured their fire up at the aircraft and caused serious causalities. A few damaged aircraft lost height and made ready to ditch as the paratroopers inside made premature jumps, but there was one incident of a C-47 receiving a direct hit and crashing to the ground in flames; killing all three flight crew and nineteen paratroopers of the 156th Battalion's Machine Gun Platoon.

(d) Despite the confusion and the fires around the zone, caused by both German and British mortaring which had set the heathland alight, the American aircrews of the 314th and 315th Troop Carrier Groups flew their aircraft true and steady and dropped the 4th Parachute Brigade on target. Despite German machine gunners and riflemen firing upon the brigade as they dropped, most were able to land safely and quickly got off the zone to assemble in the comparative safety of the surrounding woodland.

(e) Actions on LZs X, L & S. Shortly afterwards, gliders approached Landing Zones S and X but many were forced to take evasive action due to heavy flak bursting around them, and so many entered steep dives to pick up as much speed as possible for their final approach. The gliders came down precariously amongst the abandoned gliders that had been used in the first lift, but despite this there were no serious crashes and the troops were able to go about their business without much difficulty. The north east of the zone, which had been left largely unprotected in the absence of the 2nd South Staffordshires, was not detected by the Germans.

(f) The two hundred and four gliders that landed on LZ-X, carrying the remainder of the divisional units, came under sporadic fire from a group of Germans who had infiltrated between A and D Companies of the 1st Border on the western side of the zone. Several gliders were hit, but luckily there were few fatalities and injuries as a result of this action, mainly due to the skill of the mortar crews of the Battalion who brought their bombs down on the German positions whenever a glider approached within their sight.

(g) On LZ-L, thirty three RAF Stirlings dropped eighty six tons of supplies, but unfortunately the Germans had already overrun much of this area and only an estimated twelve tons found their way into British hands. Despite this setback, the 1st Airborne Division was now complete, and all of its units were free to advance on Arnhem Bridge.

2. 4th Para Bde.

(a) There was some initial confusion amongst the 4th Parachute Brigade as to what their objectives were. They had expected to assemble on a quiet drop zone and then proceed along the Amsterdamseweg to relieve the 1st Parachute Battalion on the high ground to the north of Arnhem, and from there secure the northern and eastern areas of the town; the latter sector to be handed over to the Polish Brigade when they arrived with the third lift. Due to the breakdown in radio communications, they had received no news in England to suggest that things were not going according to plan, nor did they know that the 1st Battalion had not taken the high ground but were instead desperately trying to fight their way through to Arnhem Bridge. 20

th PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS : 4 PARA BRIGADE

(b) The 4th Parachute Brigade, however, received no new orders and so they proceeded with the original plan. In the absence of the 11th Battalion, progress was slow because only 156 Parachute Battalion was free to move off as the 10th Battalion was still on the drop zone, providing cover for 133 Parachute Field Ambulance as they tended the wounded. Shortly afterwards, the 7th KOSB arrived on LZ-L, which they had been sent to secure, and their „B‟ Company too came up against strong opposition. Both battalions had encountered Sperrverband Spindler; a blocking line established by the 9th S.S. Panzer.

3. 1st Para Bde.

(a) The 1st Parachute Battalion, having abandoned its original objective of seizing the high ground to the north of Arnhem, moved in a south easterly direction during the night until they arrived on the Utrechtseweg, the 3rd Battalion's „Tiger‟ Route. It was well known that the Germans disliked fighting in darkness, and as such the Battalion, 21 with Major Stark's ‟S‟ Company in the lead, made excellent progress before dawn and passed through Oosterbeek unhindered. At 0500 Hr, to the east of the town, they met determined opposition whilst trying to pass beneath a railway bridge. No 7 Platoon suffered heavily during the subsequent exchange of rifle and mortar fire, losing seven men killed, several more wounded and two prisoners. Major Stark was about to attempt a flanking attack with his remaining two platoons when, owing to the strength of the enemy and his unwillingness to become further delayed by such actions, Lieutenant Colonel Dobie ordered „S‟ Company to disengage. „T‟ Company took over the lead and guided the Battalion south in the hope of forcing an easier passage along the „Lion‟ Route, which had been so successfully used by the 2nd Battalion on the previous day. (b) Advance of 3rd Battalion. After resting overnight, the 3rd Battalion resumed their advance at 0430 hr. The road ahead was believed to be held in strength by the enemy, so Lieutenant Colonel Fitch decided to side-step this opposition by moving his Battalion onto the lower „Lion‟ Route. Like the 1st Battalion they made swift progress in the darkness, and by 0700 Hr, „B‟ Company, who were in the lead, had entered Arnhem and were only a mile short of the bridge. A, Headquarter sand B companies of the 3rd Battalion were not to be reunited as those in the rear did not know where „B‟ Company was and so ended up taking a different route.

(c) By now the German patrols were everywhere and there was hardly any progress by the allies. The 1st Battalion meanwhile, had made their way down onto the „Lion‟ Route and was drawing near to the same railway bridge that „B‟ Company had successfully passed through earlier. It was here that they encountered those elements which had become separated from the 3rd Battalion. With the 1st and 3rd Battalions losing strength and Sperrverband Spindler gaining it with every hour that passed, the outlook was not promising for allies.

(d) Placing of Blocks. German troops of the Sperrverband Spindler blocked lines to organise and harden fresh positions closer to the bridge but it denied them almost all of the precious hours of darkness that night. It did, however, gave enough time for the 11th Battalion, the remaining South Staffords and the 1st Battalion's „R‟ Company to come forward. The revised plan was to take place at 0400 Hr, with the 1st Battalion leading the way on the southern-most route, alongside the riverbank. Protecting their left flank, along the Utrechtseweg, were the 2nd South Staffords with the 11th Battalion following behind both of them in reserve.

(e) The advance of the 1st Battalion went well in the darkness, but as soon as it became light the battalion was spotted and came under heavy fire from enemy troops. The remnants of the 1st Battalionwere pinned down by heavy fire from all directions. Dobie ordered them to break off the attack and seize the houses on the left, but few made it. Many had been wounded and almost everyone involved was taken prisoner including Lieutenant Colonel Dobie. The 3rd Battalion fared no better. Lieutenant Colonel Fitch was killed by a mortar on the way.

(f) Urquhart had returned safely to Oosterbeek and, after witnessing the fighting on the outskirts of Arnhem, had swiftly come to the conclusion that the 1st Parachute Brigade could not breakthrough on their own and so ordered the 11th Battalion to hold their current position and not to make any attempt to intervene in a battle which would only result in their unnecessary sacrifice. As there was no overall leader to command 22

the units fighting in Arnhem, Major General Urquhart dispatched Colonel Barlow, the deputy commander of the 1st Airlanding Brigade, to take charge of the situation, however he was killed by a mortar shortly after arriving.

1ST PARA BDE PROGRESS

(g) The 11th Battalion was fully occupied in fighting off German attacks at this time. „A‟ Company had become cut-off and was experiencing severe difficulties with enemy tanks when they attempted to break out northwards over the railway line, believing the 4th Parachute Brigade to be on their left flank and not knowing that they were four miles away at this time. Upon realising that there were only German soldiers in this direction, the remnants of the Company made a last stand in a house but were soon forced to surrender.

(h) Having absorbed the numerous assaults of the 1st Parachute Brigade in Arnhem, Sperrverband Spindler now went over to the attack and slowly began to blast the remnants out of the town with tanks. In all, only five hundred of the Brigade's men were able to withdraw towards Oosterbeek. The 1st Airborne Division's hopes of a decisive breakthrough now rested with the 4th Parachute Brigade in the north.

4. 4th Para Bde.

(a) As dawn arose on Tuesday, 19th September, the men of the 4th Parachute Brigade prepared to resume their advance on Arnhem. Lieutenant Colonel Des Voeux's, 156 Parachute Battalion was to move first to secure three areas of high ground in turn; the first overlooking the Johannahoeve Farm near LZ-L, the second in the woods near Lichtenbeek House, and finally the area known as Koepel, three miles from Arnhem. In support of this move, advancing on their left flank along the Amsterdamseweg main road, was Lieutenant Colonel Smyth's 10th Parachute 23

Battalion. Once Koepel had been secured, the Brigade was then to attack in the direction of Arnhem on what was believed to be the left flank of the 1st Parachute Brigade.

(b) Actions by 156 Para. 156 Battalion's „C‟ Company advanced without incident to secure the ground overlooking the Johannahoeve Farm. The main German line was based along the length of the Dreijenseweg road, running between the railway line and the Amsterdamseweg. Major Pott's ‟A‟ Company were to lead the Battalion's attack. They were at a disadvantage as their No 3 Platoon was still on the drop zone, guarding the Brigade's wounded and prisoners, and in their place had come a composite platoon of glider pilots under the command of Captain Muir; worthy men but not equal to the attacking capabilities of the Parachute Regiment.

(c) „A‟ Company made good initial progress towards the blocking line, using the dense woodland for cover, however as they approached the Dreijenseweg and the trees thinned out, the leading No 4 Platoon was quickly pinned down by fire from several enemy machine guns. No 5 Platoon, supported by their Bren guns, attempted a left flanking attack with the glider pilots following on behind, but they too were brought to an abrupt halt by a dense volley of fire. With heavy casualties being suffered, Major Pott gave the order to fix bayonets and „A‟ Company made a desperate charge to get over the Dreijenseweg and into the woodland beyond. They overran the front line positions and dealt with the defenders accordingly, however fire from armored vehicles on their flanks took a toll on the now divided company. Without any substantial anti-tank weaponry, all attempts to deal with these threats failed and casualties continued to rise. Only the wounded Major Pott and six of his men managed to break free of the Dreijenseweg to arrive on top of the Lichtenbeek feature, where despite their small numbers, they were able to mount a spirited defence of the Company objective for an hour before they were captured.

(d) Due to the poor performance of the radio sets, Battalion Headquarters did not learn of A Company's fate for some time and so, believing that they had reached their objective without too much trouble, Lieutenant Colonel Des Voeux ordered Major Waddy to move his „B‟ Company around their left flank. As they advanced, A Company's many wounded fell back through Waddy's men, so it was quite clear that all had not gone well. As they reached the Dreijenseweg, „B‟ Company came under similarly heavy fire, not only from snipers and machine gunners, but also armored cars and dual purpose anti-aircraft weapons too. Losses were high and recognising the futility of the situation, Brigadier Hackett ordered 156 Battalion to withdraw. In terms of killed, wounded and missing, they had lost half of their strength during the morning, and only „C‟ Company remained as a cohesive unit.

(e) Withdrawal by 10 PARA. The 10th Battalion's advance on the Amsterdamseweg-Dreijenseweg junction progressed without any substantial incident until „D‟ Company On the whole, however, the 10th Battalion had not suffered near so badly as the 156th, and as it was clear that it would be pointless to persevere with the action around the pumping station, the Battalion was ordered to save its strength and withdraw. This was, however, easier said than done; it was a simple process to join a battle, but very difficult and dangerous to break it off in broad daylight whilst in contact with the enemy. Nevertheless, the 10th Battalion was able to disengage under cover of smoke; the only heavy loss being suffered by the rearguard platoon, several of whose 24

men became cut-off and were eventually taken prisoner after three days of wandering around the area, trying to discover where the Division had gone.

5. The 3rd Lift.

(a) While the 4th Parachute Brigade had been attacking Dreijenseweg, the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers had been holding a defensive position around LZ-L, on which the gliders of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade Group were to arrive. The Brigade's vehicles and anti-tank guns were to land here whilst the main parachutist element was to drop on DZ-K, a mile to the south of Arnhem Bridge. This latter lift was cancelled, however, as dense fog had descended on the USAAF airfields from where they were to take-off. (b) Time passed and H-Hour for the third lift came and went. As with the second lift on the previous day, the 1st Airborne Division knew nothing of the delayed take-off, and so could only wait until the airborne armada eventually materialised. This delay left the 4th Parachute Brigade in an awkward position. The 10th and 156th Battalions were in the process of falling back on LZ-L, and they were being closely followed by enemy troops and armored vehicles, thus raising the prospect of the zone being overrun before the gliders could land.

(c) Lack of Comn. Also heading for Arnhem were one hundred and sixty four RAF transport aircraft carrying supplies. Sadly, neither this nor the glider formation managed to link up with its fighter escort, leaving the slow and unarmed aircraft at the mercy of no less than five German flak batteries. Flying at only nine hundred feet, they were a perfect target and ninety seven aircraft, over two-thirds of those involved, were damaged by enemy fire, and nine Stirlings and four Dakotas were shot down at a loss of fifty two men. Nevertheless, the aircraft boldly flew into the flak and dropped their supplies accurately. It was during this process that Flight Lieutenant Lord was killed whilst performing feats that would see him posthumously awarded the . The great tragedy of these valiant efforts was that Germans had overrun the supply dropping point, and due to the radio blackout there had been no means of informing the RAF of this fact. Therefore, not only were the supplies denied to the 1st Airborne Division, but the Germans were able to make full use of them against their intended recipients. The Germans in the Arnhem area, like so many others elsewhere, had been short of food and ammunition, and so they were naturally delighted with these packages which fell from the sky, many enjoying the taste of chocolate for the first time in years.

(d) The 7th KOSB were unable to prevent the Germans from firing at the gliders whilst they were in the air, but once below the cover of the tree-tops they were able to land without any interference. Unfortunately many of the gliders came down heavily and much of the equipment they carried could not be salvaged. Only three of the Polish Brigade's ten anti-tank guns that had left England were in serviceable order

25

6. 4TH Para Bde Retreat.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS BY 4th PARA BRIGADE

26

(a) With German troops descending upon LZ-L, the 4th Parachute Brigade had to get themselves and their equipment south of the railway line and into the comparative safety of the woodland beyond, before making their way to Oosterbeek, where the rest of the Division was gathering. Most of the infantry were simply able to cross the line by climbing the embankment, some running a gauntlet of snipers and machine gunners as they did so, and in this fashion Brigade HQ and the majority of the 7th KOSB managed to cross. They were followed by the 156th Battalion, but a breakdown in communication resulted in half of their number, included amongst which was „B‟ Company, almost all of Support Company and a platoon of „C‟ Company, continuing to march in the direction of Wolfheze. The two groups were never to be reunited.

(b) Half a mile to the east of Wolfheze, the Brigade discovered a small drainage tunnel that ran beneath the railway line. It was just large enough to enable a Jeep to pass through, and so the slow process of transferring the entire Brigade's vehicles through this highly congested area began. To prevent enemy interference, „A‟ Company of the 10th Battalion were ordered to hold a finger of woodland a quarter of a mile to the north-west whilst the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers' „B‟ Company, some of whose men had been cut-off in the withdrawal, did likewise in the north east. Both of these outposts were soon heavily engaged with the pursuing Germans.

(c) Rearguard Action. The 10th Battalion's rearguard of Captain Queripel's ‟A‟ Company were forced to fight off repeated and sustained attacks throughout the day and into the night. Despite being heavily taken on, the Company fiercely defended this strip of woodland, which was so vital to the Brigade's safety, until they were eventually evicted on Wednesday morning. Those who were able to do so moved back, however Captain Queripel stayed behind to cover his men, armed only with a pistol and several grenades. He was fatally wounded shortly after, and his supreme conduct earned him a posthumous Victoria Cross.

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CHAPTER 5

FORMATION OF OOSTERBEEK PERIMETER : 20 SEP

DEFENCES OF OOSTERBEEK PERIMETER : 20 SEP 1944

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1. Wednesday morning saw a change in tactics for the 1st Airborne Division. So much of their infantry strength had been lost during the previous days that it was now quite clear that they had no hope of being able to fight their way through to Arnhem. Lieutenant Colonel Frost's men at the bridge, therefore, would have to defend it by themselves until XXX Corps arrived and relieved them. Urquhart ordered the Division to concentrate in the Oosterbeek area and form a defensive pocket that stretched down to the riverbank.

2. Victoria Cross by Baskeyfield. Throughout the remainder of Wednesday, the Oosterbeek Perimeter began to take shape as the Division's units slowly came together. To the east, in an isolated position in Oosterbeek itself, were the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, 11thParachute Battalions and the 2nd South Staffords, collectively amounting to an under- strength battalion. This leaderless group had been in a disorganised retreat from Arnhem until Lieutenant Colonel "Sheriff" Thompson halted them in the village and instructed Major Cain of the 2nd South Staffords to begin forming a defence. Thompson returned to his Headquarters and arranged for food and ammunition to be sent forward, and with it came a new overall commander, Major Lonsdale. On Wednesday, a series of attacks was launched against Lonsdale Force by the Germans of Kampfgruppe Spindler who had followed up their retreat from Arnhem. The fighting was desperate as the battered airborne men fought at close-quarters with the German infantry and tanks. It was during this fighting that the wounded Lance Sergeant Baskeyfield of the was killed whilst valiantly manning his anti-tank gun, single handedly thwarting an enemy armour attack. He allowed the tanks to come within 100 yards of his position before opening fire. His gun destroyed two tanks and one self-propelled gun. All the members of his gun detachment were either wounded or killed. Despite being wounded, he refused to be evacuated; he crawled across to another 6-pounder gun and manned it alone till the time he was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

3. Shaping of Oosterbeek Perimeter. In the west, the 4th Parachute Brigade was similarly heading for Oosterbeek, but they had to fight through particularly heavy opposition to get there. On Wednesday morning, the 10th Battalion led the advance and rushed their way through enemy fire to enter the Perimeter at 1310 Hr. Only sixty men arrived, however, a substantial number of the remainder had become separated in the woods and many were captured. Brigade Headquarters and 156 Battalion were unable to follow the 10th Battalion's lead as they were under continual mortar bombardment and had to fight off repeated and severe attacks by infantry and tanks, some of which were equipped with flame throwers. Casualties were heavy and progress was slow, yet it is a credit to the Brigade that the Germans did not realise that the paratroopers were in retreat, as they defended their positions fiercely and constantly counterattacked to throw the enemy back from lost ground

4. Meanwhile „B‟ Company of 7 KOSB had spent the night at the Hotel Wolfheze, and in the morning they joined up with that portion of 156 Battalion that had mistakenly entered the village during the confusion of the previous day's withdrawal but had, during the morning, been forced to abandon it. This group was out of contact with the remainder of the Division and spent the morning awaiting orders that did not come. In the afternoon, Major Forman, B Company's commander, led the force south-westwards where he hoped to meet British troops; however he could not have known that he was marching away from the Perimeter. Tired and hopelessly short of ammunition, the men were unaware until it was too late that a strong German force, who had been tracking their progress, had surrounded them whilst in a most vulnerable position. Without opening fire, the Germans called upon them to surrender, leaving Major Forman with no option but to comply. 29

5. Casualties. 4 Parachute Brigade's withdrawal into the Oosterbeek Perimeter was now complete, but it had been at great cost. Of the two thousand one hundred and seventy men that had dropped on DZ-Y two days previously, only five hundred men remained, including the numbers of those in the 11th Battalion with the Lonsdale Force. In addition, the Brigade suffered heavily in terms of its leadership structure, with very few officers present and unhurt.

6. Of the original ten thousand strong 1st Airborne Division, a mere three thousand six hundred fighting men, excluding medical staff, defended the Oosterbeek Perimeter. Having been under continuous attack for three days, they were exhausted, hungry, and short of ammunition. The 1st Airborne Division had never been designed to fight its way through such heavy opposition and their advances of the first few days had cost them dearly. However the men who had made it into the Perimeter were now able to fight the defensive battle for which they had been trained. Their only orders now were to dig deep into their present positions and defend them fiercely until XXX Corps arrived.

Arnhem Bridge : 19 Sep

7. Actions by Lt Col Frost. Throughout the four days that 1st Airborne Division had been fighting to get through to the bridge, Lieutenant Colonel Frost and his seven hundred and forty men had been desperately struggling to hold it .Later in the morning, three German Mk III tanks arrived in the eastern sector and began to shell several of the occupied buildings, having cleverly positioned themselves where the British anti-tank guns could not fire on them.

8. Shortly afterwards the Germans appealed to the British to surrender by sending a captured sapper, Lance Sergeant Halliwell, to pass on the message to John Frost. The Germans were of the belief that the British troops ought to lay down their arms as they had no hope of being relieved by friendly forces. Frost thought the offer to be rather absurd as, despite being surrounded, he held a strong position and had no reason to suspect that either the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division or XXX Corps would not be arriving at any moment, or so he did not even bother to reply to the message.

9. German Reaction. The strength of the British position and their refusal to move left the 10th S.S. Panzer Division in an awkward position as they had still not been able to pass significant numbers of their forces down to Nijmegen to defend the bridges over the River . Small quantities of men and vehicles were slowly being ferried across the Rhine at Pannerden, six miles to the east, but this was not enough. There was, therefore, only one course of action, to destroy the resistance around Arnhem Bridge as quickly as possible.

10. As the bombardment continued, a high number of German snipers had established themselves in positions to restrict British movement as much as possible and concentrated attacks of tanks and infantry were frequent. During the evening, huge German Tiger tanks attached to Kampfgruppe Brinkmann made their debut on the scene. These were deployed to trouble positions in the north-eastern corner of the perimeter. As darkness fell on Tuesday, no determined attacks had been brought against the beleaguered paratroopers; however, spirits amongst the airborne men remained high, despite the critical nature of their situation. Up to one hundred and fifty men were now lying wounded in the cellars and all supplies, whether they be food, water, medical or ammunition were now desperately low. Relief was needed most urgently. 30

11. By dawn on Wednesday 20th September, German snipers and machine gunners had covered the entire area so well that the positions on either side of the bridge had become isolated from each other. Phosphorus ammunition was being increasingly used to set buildings on fire, while armour and infantry continued to attack the British positions from all directions. During the morning, despite the poor performance of the radio sets, Lieutenant Colonel Frost received a message from Major General Urquhart at Divisional HQ in Oosterbeek. Frost insisted that he needed reinforcements and supplies most urgently, but it quickly became clear to him that the rest of the Division was in a similarly desperate state and that there was nothing that they could do to help. Relief, therefore, could only come from the south in the shape of XXX Corps, but looking in that direction, there was no comforting sign of battle eleven miles away at Nijmegen. The outlook was not promising.

12. Victoria Cross by Lt Grayburn. German engineers fought desperately to place their charges, only for a similarly valiant attempt to be made by British engineers, led by Lieutenant Hindley of the 1st Parachute Squadron with the support of „A‟ Company, under the command of Lieutenant Jack Grayburn, to remove the fuses. He dashed out, while under fire with his party to remove the fuses from the charges. He was wounded badly but returned to lead the operation. Later in the day the Germans made another attempt to lay explosives on the archway and this time the British attempted to remove the charges completely, however their gallant effort ended in failure as they were now terribly exposed to enemy fire and they suffered many casualties in the process. Amongst the dead was the Jack Grayburn, who was killed when he stood up in full view of a tank in order to direct his men safely back to their positions. For his supreme conduct throughout the battle he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

13. By this time, practically every building in the small perimeter was on fire. Due to the many wounded and above all else, lack of ammunition, the British defence around the bridge was beginning to crumble and so the decision was made to gather all the available men in the large garden area behind 1st Parachute Brigade Headquarters .Here they could maximise their remaining firepower and still be in a position to fire on the Bridge, and so prevent troops and vehicles of the 10th S.S. Panzer Division moving down to Nijmegen.

14. Defense of Arnhem Bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Frost's men continued to fight, though by now all the remaining buildings being used for the defence were heavily ablaze and the scores of wounded in the cellars were in serious danger as a result. The medical officers advised Frost that it was essential that a truce be arranged to evacuate the wounded from the area. This was desirable because not only were the lives of the wounded in jeopardy, but the sparse medical supplies the force had available to it had long been spent and so it was only humane to place the wounded in the hands of the Germans where they could at least be sure of receiving treatment. Furthermore, the mere presence of so many wounded was inadvertently hampering the ability of the defenders to continue resisting, and they also hindered a possible retreat from the bridge as wounded men could not be abandoned in burning buildings. Although the truce would also necessitate his evacuation and becoming a , Frost agreed.

15. The gallant defence of Arnhem Bridge was over. The infamous manner in which S.S. troops were known to treat their prisoners was well known, yet in contrast to this image the British, for the most part, were treated with respect. Perhaps the most fitting tribute was paid by a German Major who spoke with Major Gough and informed him that he had fought in Stalingrad and that it was therefore obvious to him that the British paratroopers had a great 31 deal of experience in street fighting. Gough replied that they had never done it before, and that they'd be much better at it next time. The battered and exhausted men who had struggled to hold Arnhem Bridge had done everything that could have possibly been asked of them. They felt terribly let down and they bitterly wondered what had become of XXX Corps.

XXX Corps : 17 – 20 Sep

16. It had been anticipated that XXX Corps would reach Arnhem in two to three days, however as dusk fell on Wednesday 20th September, the 1st Airborne Division could detect no signs of their approach to the south. The ground forces had been having problems of their own. There was only a single road leading to Arnhem, and XXX Corps was faced with the logistical nightmare of passing twenty thousand vehicles along its narrow, sixty four mile length in just three days. Even with minimal opposition, frequent blockages and delays were expected. To make matters worse the road was only wide enough, at best, to allow two vehicles to drive side by side, and the terrain from top to bottom was ideal for rearguard and delaying actions by even a small enemy force.

17. It had been hoped that XXX Corps would link up with 101 Airborne Division in Eindhoven after just a few hours, however by the end of the first day they had only achieved half of the distance, just seven miles. The Irish Guards halted overnight, due to being exhausted after having been in action for most of the day; however the remaining formations of the Guards Armored Division made no attempt to push on during the night. The advance, therefore, was needlessly stalled for twelve hours. After lot of delay and intense struggle Nijmegen Bridge was finally in Allied hands and only the mere eleven miles to Arnhem separated XXX Corps from victory

Oosterbek Perimeter : 22- 24 Sep

18. The landing of the Polish Brigade at forced the Germans to re-assess their troop dispositions. They feared that the new arrivals would cut the main road to Nijmegen, thereby trapping 10 S.S. Panzer Division or even attempt to retake Arnhem Bridge. Consequently some two thousand four hundred German soldiers, who would have been committed to the Oosterbeek battle, were instead relocated south of the Rhine to form a blocking line, Sperrverband Harzer, to counteract a move that would never take place. Despite this seemingly static approach to the battle on the southern side of the Rhine, the Polish Brigade were nevertheless heavily attacked throughout Friday; their positions were first heavily mortared and then assaulted by infantry, supported by tanks. Several outlying positions were overrun by the German advance, however the Poles clung fiercely to their positions and threw the enemy back from Driel.

XXX Corps : 21 – 24 Sep

19. With the capture of Nijmegen Bridge on Wednesday 20th September, there were no further river obstacles remaining between XXX Corps and the Polish Brigade at Driel, a mere eleven miles to the north. Despite this fact, progress was slow. After the first British tanks had crossed the Bridge on Wednesday, they paused for nineteen hours to rest, refuel and rearm; their supplies having been run down during the prolonged fighting through Nijmegen. This failure to exploit the broken German defences along the River Waal caused bitter resentment amongst the American paratroopers who had suffered such terrible casualties to capture the bridge. 32

20. Nijmegen Blocking Line. The Germans had already been able to form a blocking line north of Nijmegen, centered around the town of Elst, but following the overnight collapse of resistance at Arnhem Bridge, they had been able to considerably reinforce this with tanks and self-propelled guns. With the Irish Guards in the lead, the Guards Armored Division finally resumed their advance only to come to a complete standstill when they encountered the German defences later in the morning. The leading tank was destroyed and blocked the road, which was not wide enough for two tanks to run parallel. The marshy ground on either side of it was wholly unsuitable for heavy armour. The infantry were quickly pinned down by mortar and small arms fire, and so, hampered by a lack of artillery support and broken communications with the RAF fighter-bombers circling overhead, they could make no progress.

21. The Guards Armored Division did not have sufficient infantry strength to continue the advance any further, so the task of securing a route to Driel around the west of the main German line was handed to Major General Thomas and his 43rd (Wessex) Division. They were, however, painfully slow in coming forward, and did not begin to advance north of Nijmegen Bridge until the following day, Friday 22nd September. On that morning, a small number of armored vehicles of the 2nd arrived in Driel, having made use of the foggy conditions to slip through the German lines. The leading elements of the 43rd Division, 5 Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry supported by the tanks of the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, were sadly unable to follow and they did not reach the Polish Brigade until evening, despite making excellent progress. All that now stood between XXX Corps and a successful end to Operation Market Garden was the River Rhine.

22. Major General Urquhart meanwhile, had been sending urgent messages to his Corps Commander at Nijmegen, Lieutenant General Browning, insisting that the situation was desperate and that relief was required immediately. With the northern bank not secure, infantry from XXX Corps would first need to cross and reinforce the Oosterbeek bridgehead before a could be constructed to enable tanks and substantial reinforcements to enter the fold.

23. Crossing by Polish Brigade. On Friday night, with only this vanguard of the ground forces in the area, the Polish Brigade made an attempt to put some of its men across the Rhine, however the only methods that could be used to facilitate this were crude and improvised. Royal Engineers of the 1st Airborne Division had gathered a small number of boats and linked them together with signal cables carrying fifteen men at a time, it was hoped that two hundred Poles could be brought over by dawn. Unfortunately, the signal cables displayed a consistent tendency to break, forcing the Polish soldiers to slowly paddle against the strong current. To make matters worse, German patrols along the northern bank had spotted the crossing and opened fire on the men forming up on the opposite side. With the prospect of his men being terribly exposed to enemy fire at first light, Major General Sosabowski called a halt to the operation before dawn. Only fifty two Poles had been taken over the Rhine.

24. On Saturday night the Polish Brigade tried again, only this time Major General Sosabowski had managed to obtain proper assault boats from XXX Corps, capable of carrying sixteen men each. When the boats arrived, however, they were found to only have enough space to carry twelve men, and much time was lost as the Poles reorganised themselves accordingly. Furthermore, it had been expected that experienced British sappers 33 would be on hand to man the craft and deal swiftly with the troublesome current that would hamper the crossing, but none arrived and so the Poles, completely untrained for this task, had to paddle the boats themselves. The Poles struggled to make their way across they came under heavier fire than had been encountered on the previous night. It had been hoped that a battalion size force of some six hundred infantry could have been put across by dawn, however only one hundred and fifty three Poles were taken across, and some of these, being in unfamiliar surroundings, were captured when they accidentally strayed into German positions.

25. By now, XXX Corps had arrived at Driel in strength and a properly organised, large scale crossing was planned. Major General Sosabowski had surveyed the scene prior to the British arrival, and he correctly believed that although the German strength was considerable on the far bank, it was mostly concentrated in the immediate area occupied by the 1st Airborne. He therefore proposed a major crossing, involving the whole of 43 (Wessex) Division and his Polish Brigade, to take place several miles downstream. It is likely that had his plan been heeded, then the force would have been able to assemble without great difficulty and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat at Oosterbeek. Due to internal friction, the British Commanders, Lieutenant Generals Horrocks and Browning, and Major General Thomas of the 43rd Division, had by now lost all patience with the stubborn Polish General and they ignored his advice and proceeded to undermine his authority.

26. Securing of Westerbouwing High Ground. Major General Thomas had a plan of his own. He proposed that one of his own units, the 4th Battalion The Dorset shire Regiment should cross directly opposite the high ground of the Westerbouwing Restaurant at the south- western end of the Oosterbeek Perimeter; an area that was now firmly under German control. Without Sosabowski's consent, the 1st Battalion was removed from his command with orders to follow behind the Dorsets, and with them would go a large consignment of supplies for the 1st Airborne Division. At the same time as this crossing was taking place, the remainder of the Polish Brigade was to cross the River several miles upstream of the perimeter.

27. In the event, this latter Polish crossing was cancelled because so few boats could be found, and so priority was given to the Westerbouwing crossing. The 4th Dorsets, although now equipped with proper, motorised craft, experienced the same difficulties and delays that the Poles had suffered on the previous evening. Their A and B Companies made their way over without too much enemy interference, but this soon increased to such a degree that all further crossings were called off. Three hundred and fifteen Dorsets had gained the far bank, but they had landed in small and scattered groups, directly in amongst the enemy positions. The Battalion never had the chance to properly form up, and so the isolated groups were easily rounded up by the Germans. Only seventy five of these men, and none of the much needed supplies, arrived in the Oosterbeek Perimeter.

28. This disastrous crossing convinced the British commanders that Operation Market Garden could no longer succeed and the decision was made to cease all attempts to reinforce the 1st Airborne Division, who instead received the order to withdraw across the River. It was still possible that another, more sensible crossing, could have produced a victory, but the whole Market Garden plan, which had been designed on the assumption that the German Army was beaten, was finally collapsing. On Friday 22nd September, a German counterattack in the Eindhoven area had cut the long and precarious road to Arnhem. British tanks and American troops of 101 Airborne Division fought desperately to reopen the road, 34 but it would remain blocked for the next forty eight hours. The dream of liberating Holland, entering Germany and ending the war by Christmas, was over.

29. Shortly after 0600 Hr on the morning of Monday 25th September, Urquhart was presented with a letter from Major General Thomas of 43 Wessex Division, informing him that XXX Corps had abandoned hope of reinforcing the 1st Airborne and that he should therefore, withdraw his Division back across the Rhine at a time of his choosing. With the perimeter showing definite signs of strain, Urquhart considered this for two hours before contacting Thomas and telling him that they would pull out that night. 35

CHAPTER 6

EVACUATION 1. Plan. Major General Urquhart based his withdrawal plan upon the excellent evacuation carried out at Gallipoli during the Great War. The main feature of the plan, Operation Berlin, was to convince the enemy that the British were still holding their positions in Oosterbeek and intended to carry on fighting. Urquhart was quite certain that if the Germans suspected that the Division was pulling out then they would launch an immediate and violent assault along the river in an attempt to cut them off. With his troops out of their positions and falling back, it was vital that every ruse be employed to convince them otherwise.

2. Deception by Arty. At 2050 Hr, to dissuade German patrols from venturing out of their trenches, where they might glimpse the activity and detect a sudden lessening of resistance, the light regiment and the supporting artillery of XXX Corps acted upon a particularly complicated artillery plan and began to bombard the enemy positions. With precious little hope of evacuating them, Urquhart took the reluctant decision to leave behind the non-walking wounded, and those who were able to do so occupied the abandoned positions to give the impression that the British defences were unaltered. Most of the medical staff also remained behind to tend the wounded, and several radio operators stayed with their sets for a time to transmit a series of fictitious orders to give the Germans something to listen to. There were several of the Division's units, however, who were in such isolated positions that they could not be contacted and so never received word that an evacuation was taking place.

3. Execution of Withdrawal. The withdrawal began after dark when the northern-most men, principally the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers, silently left their positions and headed towards the embarkation point, closely followed by the next set of troops. The defence proceeded to collapse in this manner throughout the night, with the northern-most troops leaving first and those to the south gradually falling in behind them. Stealth was vitally important, and so all the men blacked their faces, tied their weapons down and wrapped their boots in rags to dull any noise they might make. Any equipment that had to be left behind, such as radios, vehicles and artillery guns, were destroyed.

4. The route to the embarkation area was by no means an easy one. It was raining and dark, so the men had to proceed in file and follow the tape that lined each of the two paths leading to the river. Several parties inevitably lost their bearings and became detached on the way, usually resulting in their capture. There was no panic at the embarkation point. With the exception of the wounded, which were given priority, all ranks of the Division, from privates to generals, queued in the order in which they had arrived and calmly waited for their turn to cross.

5. Due to a misunderstanding on their part, XXX Corps were under the impression that the 4th Dorsets had secured enough of the Westerbouwing high ground to enable the Division to also withdraw some of its men through this area. Almost half of the available boats spent the night at this crossing point, and they were collectively able to withdraw a total of forty eight men, mostly Dorsets who had been in hiding since the previous evening. By the time that it was realised that the Division had no intention of embarking from this area, which had been firmly under German control since Thursday 21st September, it was too late for these boats to assist with the main evacuation. 36

6. Nevertheless, Operation Berlin was proceeding well. The sappers manning the boats suffered little interference for several hours, although the Canadians experienced numerous difficulties with the engines of their powered craft. Eventually the Germans became aware that crossings were taking place, but believed that they were carrying reinforcements north, not evacuating the Airborne troops south, and they responded by firing on the boats and shelling likely assembly points to the south of the Rhine.

7. As dawn drew near, most of those at the embarkation area had been evacuated, but with no more serviceable boats in operation, those that remained behind either had to surrender or brave the strong river and swim across. Stripping themselves off, most of those who chose to swim successfully made their way across, but the strong currents swept many of the exhausted men downstream, often washing them up into the hands of German patrols on the northern bank, and a large number of men also drowned. It has been estimated that ninety five airborne soldiers died during the evacuation, and three hundred men, possibly far fewer, were left on the riverbank to become prisoners of war.

8. It was not until the following morning that the Germans began to appreciate what had taken place during the night. They began their usual attacks on the British positions at dawn, and were greatly surprised by the ease of their progress. The men who had stayed behind, as they had been ordered, laid down their arms and surrendered. Operation Market Garden was over.

37

CHAPTER 7

AFTERMATH

1. Casualties. Of the approximate ten thousand six hundred men who fought north of the river, only two thousand three hundred and ninety eight returned. Of the rest, including the Polish Brigade south of the Rhine and men who died in captivity, as a result of their wounds or other causes until the end of 1944, one thousand four hundred and eighty five men had died, and six thousand four hundred and fourteen were taken prisoner, of whom about one- third were wounded. Official German figures record that they suffered three thousand three hundred casualties in the Arnhem area, with one thousand three hundred of that number killed. It is certain, however, that these figures are a highly conservative estimate, and further investigations have accounted for at least one thousand seven hundred and twenty five German dead, and as many as six thousand wounded. The estimated number of total deaths during the battle including four hundred and fifty three civilians and four hundred and seventy four aircrew, is in excess of four thousand one hundred.

2. Dutch Underground. Still in the Arnhem area, however, there was an unusually high number of the 1st Airborne Division's men in hiding, courageously sheltered by the Dutch Underground. The force of several hundred men was chiefly organised by Major Tatham- Warter and Brigadier Lathbury. They established communications with the Allies, obtained weapons, and planned to use themselves as a coup-de-main party should XXX Corps attempt a further crossing of the Rhine. When it became clear that no such operation would take place, plans were made, in co-ordination with MI9 and the Belgian SAS, for the evacuation of these men to the British lines. On 22nd October, under the codename of , one hundred and thirty eight of them, amongst whom were Tatham-Warter, Lathbury and Lieutenant Colonel Dobie of the 1st Battalion, were carried across the Rhine without mishap

3. Militarily, Operation Market Garden was a complete disaster. The British press however, hailed Arnhem as a great success and it is indeed true that those who participated are worthy of the very highest praise. It is important to recognise that the was not a failure on the part of the 1st Airborne Division. They had been asked to capture and hold Arnhem Bridge for two or three days. The 2nd Parachute Battalion and supporting units held it for four days, while the remainder of the Division maintained a bridgehead for a further five, all against far greater opposition than had been anticipated. The fact that the 2nd British Army was unable to reach and relieve them in time was not the fault of the men of the 1st Airborne Division.

4. Field Marshal Montgomery was officially said to be pleased with the outcome of Operation Market Garden and he concluded that it had been 90% successful. This dubious assessment was based on the quantity of bridges and ground that had been captured, but the reality of the situation was that this gain was quite useless without the final bridge at Arnhem. Lacking that final link, he could not proceed with the ambitious plan of finishing the war by the end of the year.

5. Position of XXX Corps. Market Garden left the 2nd British Army in an unstable position with vulnerable flanks, and so their eyes quickly turned towards consolidation. XXX 38

Corps promptly abandoned their position on the Rhine and withdrew to a line five miles to the south of Driel, all the land in between becoming a No-Man's Land. On 1st October, Army Group B launched a three corps counterattack on the British position but within five days this had been repulsed with severe losses. On 7th October, to deny its use to the Germans, American bombers destroyed Arnhem Bridge.

6. Despite this untidy end, the ground won by the 2nd British Army was not at all strategically useless. On 24th March 1945, the 6th British and 17th US Airborne Divisions secured a bridgehead over the River Rhine at . This operation, which led to the end of the war, had only been made possible through the capture of Nijmegen and the surrounding area.

7. Status of Formations. The survivors of the 1st Airborne Division were immediately transported to Nijmegen, where they were fed, given clean clothes, and allowed their first real chance to sleep in nine days. They were all flown home, via Brussels, to a heroes' welcome on 29th September 1944. They were soon followed by the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group, but the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, who were to have been withdrawn from the battlefield at the earliest opportunity, instead remained in the area until mid to late November, to help shore up the 2nd Army's position.

8. The 1st Airborne Division was in an exceptionally poor state. Not only had Major General Urquhart lost 85% of the men under his command, but two of his three brigade commanders were as yet still missing, only one of his nine battalion commanders had returned, and these battalions had suffered heavily in terms of experienced officers and NCO's. In short, Urquhart's fine Division had been all but destroyed, and he was struggling to think of a reason to justify their sacrifice. The Division was reduced to two brigades with the disbandment of the 4th Parachute Brigade, its remnants being distributed amongst the battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade. Over the coming months, drafts of reinforcements arrived to swell the ranks, yet the Division was never able to rebuild itself to a state approaching full strength before it too was disbanded in August 1945.

9. Polish Brigade. The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group had performed as well as circumstances had allowed them in Operation Market Garden but in its aftermath the British commanders conspired to make them a scapegoat for the failure. Montgomery wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, reporting "Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy." Lieutenant General Browning, meanwhile, wrote to the Deputy CIGS and recommended that Major General Sosabowski be removed from his position. He was dismissed on 9th December 1944.

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CHAPTER 8

REASONS FOR FAILURE

1. Over-Optimistic Attitude of the Allies. The pencil-like thrust of the ground forces to Arnhem, the distant location of the drop zones, the subsequent plan to encircle the Ruhr: all of these were only possible if resistance crumbled upon first impact. Many of the reasons for the failure of the operation can be attributed to this buoyant outlook blinding the Allies to the dangers.

2. Poor Selection of Drop Zones. At Arnhem, the operation was doomed from the outset because of the poor air plan. Due to a shortage of transport aircraft, the 1st Airborne Division lost its chief weapon of surprise through being flown to distant drop zones over a period of three days.

3. Poor Planning of XXX Corps. The challenge with which XXX Corps had been presented, of passing its entire strength along a single road through sixty four miles of enemy- held territory was complicated and hazardous.

4. Low Priority to Nijmegen Bridge. The failure of the 82nd Airborne Division to attach maximum importance to the early capture of Nijmegen Bridge was a fatal mistake. If the bridge had been taken in strength and with all speed, then it is possible that British tanks would have reached Arnhem Bridge before John Frost's defence finally collapsed.

5. 1st British Airborne Corps HQ. The decision to commit 1st British Airborne Corps Headquarters to the battle is a highly questionable one. All of the Airborne Divisions involved were operating independently and at great distance from the other, therefore the need of a higher command structure to co-ordinate their efforts remains a mystery. It would seem likely that the Corps HQ was deployed for theoretical, rather than tactical reasons. The reality of the matter is that there was no need for the Corps HQ to actively participate in the battle at all, in fact, if they had stayed at their Headquarters in England, with its superior communications, they would have been far better placed to direct what little of the battle was under their control.

6. Communications. The Battle of Arnhem may still have had a successful outcome if only the radios had functioned correctly.

7. Intelligence. Lieutenant General Browning‟s failure to act upon Intelligence reports that two S.S. Panzer divisions were based in the Arnhem area suggests that he knowingly sent the 1st Airborne Division to its fate to enhance his own career prospects.

(a) Interpretation of intelligence has always been a difficult business because the evidence is often conflicting and vague, rarely speaking of specific threats.

(b) The other sources came from the Dutch underground and Major Brian Urquhart's reconnaissance photographs. British intelligence had very good reason to mistrust the Dutch, not merely because of their experiences of betrayal earlier in the war, which had resulted in the capture of fifty agents, but also the 40

was much less organised than their French counterparts who the British had been happy to make full use of.

(c) The information that Browning received was too vague to counter the widespread optimism that the German front line required only a firm strike to shatter it completely. If he was at fault then it was certainly because he made no effort to warn the 1st Airborne Division that there was a possibility of strong, armored resistance in their area. At such short notice the basic plan could not have been altered, but it is certainly possible that the 1st Parachute Brigade would not only have taken more anti- tank ammunition with them, but also concentrated their strength for the advance into Arnhem, rather than scattering it on three separate routes. Had a warning been issued, the outcome at the end of the first day may have proved to be very different.

8. Rapid German Reaction. The German forces throughout the entire Market Garden area, however, reacted with such efficiency and ferocity that the element of surprise gained the Allies little.

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CHAPTER 9

LESSONS LEARNT

1. Operation Market Garden was without a doubt the biggest para drop of its time and it was also one of the biggest operational failures. What strategy, or lack of it, could have resulted in such an unbelievable failure for the Allies? What lessons learned can apply to contemporary and future military operations? Some timeless lessons are evident from the operations‟ analysis:-

(a) Surprise and Initiative. The fact that the British first wave consisted of only half of the 1st Airborne Division and was forced to land seven to nine kilometres from Arnhem emphasizes the importance of concentration and surprise for an offensive. The attacking force must immediately seize the initiative, set a fast tempo in battle and keep the defender off guard for an offensive operation to be successful. Failure to do so will give the defender an opportunity to slow the tempo, improve their defences, and redistribute combat power to the points of attack.

(b) Op Security. Documents detailing 101 Airborne Division‟s orders for Operation Market (the airborne portion of Operation Market Garden) were recovered by the Germans and delivered to General Kurt Student‟s headquarters. The most obvious lesson from this event is the need to maintain security of plans at all times. Especially in today‟s contemporary environment where volumes of data on operations, units and soldiers can be stored in a single memory stick, constant vigilance is required on the part of every leader to ensure that information is properly safeguarded.

(c) Communications. During one instance at Arnhem, the Divisional Commander and his Deputy were forced to take refuge in an attic. Due to this, the Division‟s two top commanders were denied the ability to command and control their forces. This lesson draws out the importance of communications in developing a situational understanding on the battlefield and the importance of positioning a commander so that he may best influence the fight. Leaders should lead as far forward as possible but they must also maintain adequate communications so that their forward positioning does not hinder their understanding of the big picture. Additionally, it emphasizes the necessity of performing proper pre-combat checks on all vital systems.

(d) Operational Level. Planning and coordinating fully with all elements of an operation is of fundamental importance for the successful implementation of any plan. Whether these elements are ground or air their coordination is necessary for the plan to be executed successfully. In the Market Garden operation, planners did not consider fighter/ bomber cover or ground bombing to weaken the target area prior to the airdrop. Additionally, no one reviewed the plan when Montgomery got information that there were inadequate transport aircraft to see through the drop on Day One. Definitely there 42 would have been a change in the plans had fighter and transport planning expertise been incorporated in the initial and ensuing planning.

(e) Logistics. Logistics are a major factor in preparation levels. The port of Antwerp being opened or delay in launch of the operation by a few days would have probably alleviated the occurrence of debacles like the delivery of inappropriate ammunition and the shortage of working radios. A wholly coordinated plan combined with better logistical support might have given a different result.

(f) Leadership. From a leadership perspective, the lesson that great leaders must be ready to forfeit their own ambitions to support the mission‟s efforts is drawn. Eisenhower and Montgomery, though accomplished soldiers in their own right, were miles apart in leadership styles and personality. Eisenhower, the Allied supreme Commander, appreciated the political consequences and sensitivities of the alliance. Montgomery on the contrary, as the legendary leader of only saw the British viewpoint and failed to appreciate the shared command. He could not appreciate why the USA, being the major provider of both financial, materiel and manpower support was not willing to let the British lead the Allied attack on Berlin. He did not appreciate that if the USA had, having provided all those resources, allowed him to act in his way and yet have failed, it could have led to a crisis in the Allied camp.

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CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

1. The Battle of Arnhem was a complete disaster, where virtually everything that could go wrong, did go wrong. However for the men who fought there, it was one of the most courageous and determined stands in the history of modern warfare. The defence of Arnhem Bridge is a prime example of glory in defeat though it is often highlighted to the detriment of the units involved in the battle. Those who fought within the Oosterbeek Perimeter were exhausted, lacking food, water, ammunition and medical supplies and they were constantly under attack from a force estimated to have been four times their number, well-equipped with armored vehicles and artillery pieces. Yet they clung doggedly to their positions for a total of nine days, far exceeding the four days that it was thought that the entire, properly fortified Division could have lasted in isolation. There is no doubt that the defeat at Arnhem was not in any way the responsibility of those who fought and died there. The conduct of those men is beyond praise.

2. Today, Operation Market Garden is commonly regarded as a misguided blunder that unnecessarily sent thousands of men to their deaths. Such views are made with the benefit of hindsight. In reality, given the conditions at the time, it was a perfectly reasonable operation to have been attempted. Its success was a gamble, but given the potential prize, it seemed worth the risk. Market Garden was designed to exploit the belief that the German armies were beaten and would collapse before a renewed Allied onslaught. If this assessment had proved to be true, then it is certainly possible that the war would have been over before the end of 1944 and the plan that brought it about would have been hailed as a piece of tactical genius on behalf of Field Marshal Montgomery. Instead, Market Garden proved to the Allies that the Germans were far from beaten. Not only were they still capable of organised resistance, but three months later they shocked the Allies again by launching a sudden offensive in the Ardennes.

3. It has been said that Germany's greatest mistake ever, was to win the Battle of Arnhem. If they had lost and their will to fight collapsed, then the Western Allies would have entered and conquered Germany long before Stalin and the Red Army were anywhere near the Reich. If this had been so then there would not have been any of the hard fighting of 1945, which saw the utter destruction of Germany and the loss of so many lives, military and civilian. It is therefore, questionable whether there would have been an East-West divide in Germany and although the subsequent Cold War was inevitable, it may not have proved to be quite so perilous. When the Russians invaded Germany, they acquired knowledge of rocketry and nuclear weapons through plundered scientific research. Russia would have developed this technology eventually, but had the German research been denied to them, they would certainly have been many years behind the Americans in terms of nuclear weapons and the space race. If Market Garden had succeeded world politics of the last fifty years, for better or worse, would have been very different.

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OP DEADSTICK : CAPTURE OF PEGASUS BRIDGE

45

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

1. Operation Deadstick was the codename for an airborne forces operation by the British Army that took place on 6 June 1944 as part of the Normandy landings. The mission's objective was to capture intact two road bridges in Normandy across the River Orne and the Caen Canal providing the only exit eastwards for British forces from their landing on . Intelligence reports said both bridges were heavily defended by the Germans and wired for demolition. Once captured, the bridges had to be held against any counter-attack until the assault force was relieved by commandos and infantry advancing from the British landing zone.

Sit in Europe

2. Spring 1942 was a hard time for the Allies. In North Africa, the British were taking a pounding, In Russia; The Germans had launched a gigantic offensive aimed at Stalingrad. In the Far East, the Japanese had over-run the American, British, and Dutch colonial possessions and were threatening . In France, and throughout Western and Eastern Europe, Hitler was triumphant. The only bright spot was that the previous December 7, America had entered the war. But to date that event had produced only a few more ships, no troops, no planes, hardly even an increased flow of lend- lease supplies. Throughout the British Army, nevertheless, boredom reigned. The so called Phony War was from September of 1939 to May of 1940, but for thousands of young men who had enlisted during the period, the time from spring 1941 to the beginning of 1944 was almost as bad. There was no threat of invasion. The only British army doing any fighting at all was in the Mediterranean.

Seaborne Invasion of Europe

3. The decision to undertake a cross-channel invasion in 1944 was taken at the Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and General was named as commander of the 21 Army Group, which comprised all the land forces involved in the invasion. The Normandy coast was chosen as the site of the invasion, with the Americans assigned to land at Utah and Omaha Beaches, the British at Sword and Gold Beaches, and Canadians at . To meet the conditions expected on the Normandy beachhead, special technology was developed, including two artificial ports called Mulberry harbors and an array of specialized tanks nicknamed Hobart's Funnies. In the months leading up to the invasion, the Allies conducted a substantial military deception, , using both electronic and visual misinformation. This misled the Germans as to the date and location of the main Allied landings. Hitler placed Field Marshal in charge of developing fortifications all along the in anticipation of an invasion.

46

Op Overlord

4. „Overlord‟ was the name assigned to the establishment of a large-scale lodgment on the Continent. The first phase, the amphibious invasion and establishment of a secure foothold, was codenamed Operation Neptune. To gain the required air superiority needed to ensure a successful invasion, the Allies launched a bombing campaign (codenamed Operation Pointblank) to target German aircraft production, fuel supplies, and airfields. Under the , communications infrastructure, road and rail links were bombed to cut off the north of France and make it more difficult to bring up reinforcements. These attacks were widespread so as to avoid revealing the exact location of the invasion. Elaborate deceptions were planned to prevent the Germans from determining the timing and location of the invasion.

5. Sectors. The coastline of Normandy was divided into seventeen sectors, with codenames using a spelling alphabet – from Able, west of , to Roger on the east flank of Sword Beach. Eight further sectors were added when the invasion was extended to include on the Cotentin Peninsula. Sectors were further subdivided into beaches identified by the colors Green, Red, and White.

6. The landings were to be preceded by airborne drops near Caen on the eastern flank to secure the Orne River bridges, and north of Carentan on the western flank. The initial goal was to capture Carentan, Isigny, Bayeux, and Caen. The Americans, assigned to land at Utah 47 and Omaha, were to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula and capture the port facilities at Cherbourg. The British at Sword and Gold Beaches, and the Canadians at Juno Beach, were to capture Caen and form a front line from Caumont-l' Éventé to the south-east of Caen in order to protect the American flank, while establishing airfields near Caen. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Anglo-Canadians a suitable staging area for a push south to capture the town of Falaise. A secure lodgment would be established and an attempt made to hold all territory captured north of the Avranches-Falaise line during the first three weeks. The Allied armies would then swing left to advance towards the River Seine. Montgomery envisaged a ninety-day battle, ending when all the forces reached the Seine.

7. Task Forces. The invasion fleet, led by Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, was split into the Western Naval Task Force under Admiral Alan G Kirk supporting the American sectors and the Eastern Naval Task Force under Admiral Sir Philip Vian in the British and Canadian sectors. The American forces of the First Army, led by Lieutenant General , comprised VII Corps (Utah) and V Corps (Omaha). On the British side, Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey was in command of the Second Army, under which XXX Corps was assigned to Gold and I Corps to Juno and Sword. Land forces were under the overall command of Montgomery, and air command was assigned to Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. The First Canadian Army included personnel and units from Poland, Belgium, and the . Other Allied nations also participated.

Op Neptune

8. The Normandy landings (codenamed Operation Neptune) were the landing operations on 6 June 1944 (termed D-Day) of the Allied invasion of Normandy in Operation Overlord during World War II. The largest seaborne invasion in history, the operation began the invasion of German-occupied Western Europe, led to the restoration of the French Republic and contributed to an Allied victory in the war.

9. Planning. Planning for the operation began in 1943. In the months leading up to the invasion, the Allies conducted a substantial military deception, codenamed Operation Bodyguard, to mislead the Germans as to the date and location of the main Allied landings. The weather on D-Day was far from ideal, but postponing would have meant a delay of at least two weeks, as the invasion planners had requirements for the phase of the moon, the tides, and the time of day that meant only a few days in each month were deemed suitable. Hitler placed German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in command of German forces and of developing fortifications along the Atlantic Wall in anticipation of an Allied invasion.

11. The amphibious landings were preceded by extensive aerial and naval bombardment and an airborne assault and the landing of 24,000 British, US and Canadian airborne troops shortly after midnight. Allied Infantry and Armored divisions began landing on the coast of France starting at 0630 Hr. The target 50 mile (80 km) stretch of the Normandy coast was divided into five sectors: Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword Beach. Strong winds blew the landing craft east of their intended positions, particularly at Utah and Omaha. The men landed under heavy fire from gun emplacements overlooking the beaches, and the shore was mined and covered with obstacles such as wooden stakes, metal tripods, and barbed wire, making the work of the beach clearing teams difficult and dangerous. Casualties were heaviest at Omaha, with its high cliffs. At Gold, Juno, and Sword, several fortified towns were cleared in 48 house-to-house fighting, and two major gun emplacements at Gold were disabled using specialized tanks.

12. First Day. The Allies failed to achieve all of their goals on the first day. Carentan, St. Lô and Bayeux remained in German hands, and Caen, a major objective, was not captured until 21 July. Only two of the beaches (Juno and Gold) were linked on the first day, and all five bridgeheads were not connected until 12 June. However, the operation gained a foothold that the Allies gradually expanded over the coming months. German casualties on D-Day were around 1,000 men. Allied casualties were at least 10,000, with 4,414 confirmed dead.

VARIOUS LANDING POINTS ON D- DAY 49

CHAPTER 2

PREP & PLG FOR THE OP

Op Tonga

13. Operation Tonga was the codename given to the airborne operation undertaken by the British 6 Airborne Division between 5 June and 7 June 1944 as a part of Operation Overlord and the Normandy landings during the Second World War.

14. Objectives. The paratroopers and glider-borne airborne troops of the division landed on the eastern flank of the invasion area, near the city of Caen, tasked with a number of objectives. The division was to capture two strategically important bridges over the Caen Canal and Orne River which were to be used by Allied ground forces to advance once the seaborne landings had taken place, destroy several other bridges to deny their use to the Germans and secure several important villages. The division was also assigned the task of assaulting and destroying the Merville Gun Battery, an artillery battery that Allied intelligence believed housed a number of heavy artillery pieces, which could bombard Sword Beach and possibly inflict heavy casualties on the Allied troops landing on it. Having achieved these objectives, the division was then to create and secure a bridgehead focused around the captured bridges until they linked up with advancing Allied ground forces.

15. The division suffered from a combination of bad weather and poor pilot navigation which caused many of the airborne troops to be dropped inaccurately throughout the divisional operational area, causing a number of casualties and making conducting operations much more difficult. In particular, the battalion assigned the task of destroying the Merville artillery battery was only able to gather up a fraction of its strength before it had to attack the battery, with the result that the depleted force suffered a number of casualties. However, the battery was successfully assaulted and the guns inside it disabled, and the division's other objectives were also achieved despite the problems encountered. A small force of glider- borne airborne troops secured the two bridges over the Caen Canal and River Orne, the other bridges were destroyed, and a number of towns were occupied. A bridgehead was formed by the division, and it successfully repulsed a number of German counter-attacks until Allied ground forces from the invasion beaches reached its positions. The actions of the division severely limited the ability of the German defenders to communicate and organize themselves, ensuring that the seaborne troops could not be attacked during the first few hours after landing when they were most vulnerable.

Op Deadstick

Background

16. During the planning stage of the Normandy invasion, the decision was made to land the 6 Airborne Division on the left flank of the invasion beaches between the River Orne and the River Dives. Their primary objective was to capture the two road bridges over the River Orne and the Caen Canal and prevent a German flanking attack on the landing area. Failure to capture the bridges would leave the 6 Airborne Division cut off in enemy territory, so the 5 50

Parachute Brigade were earmarked to defend the bridges against counter-attacks. However, divisional commander Major General Gale decided that the only way to capture the bridges intact was by a glider coup de main assault. He then asked Brigadier Hugh Kindersley of the 6 Air landing Brigade to nominate his best company for the operation.

Training and Rehearsals for the Impending Task

17. 'D' Company, 2nd (Airborne) Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, under the command of Major John Howard and second in command Captain Brian Priday, was selected for the mission. Howard set out, on his own, to make D company into a first class night fighting unit. It was not that he had any inkling that he might be landing at night, but rather he reckoned that once in combat troops would be spending a good deal of their time fighting at night. He was also thinking of a favourite expression in the German Army that he had heard: “the night is the friend of no man.” In the British Army, the saying was that “the German does not like to fight at night.” The company had trained hard and became the fittest in the battalion, often utilizing bomb-damaged inner-city areas to practice street fighting with live ammunition. Howard expected the invasion to involve night-fighting and changed the daily routine to ensure that his men were up to the task. For weeks at a time, they rose at 2000 Hr and completed exercises, drills and normal paperwork throughout the night before retiring at 1300 Hr.

18. Realism in Training. Howard concentrated on training. He used tape to lay out a river and a canal, with two bridges over them, all at the exact distances of his real targets. Day and night, his platoons practiced capturing them; sometimes one platoon, sometimes three, sometimes all six. Howard felt that above all his plan had to be flexible. If only one glider hit the target, that platoon had to be prepared to do the job of all six platoons. Simultaneously, Howard worked on the men to use their voices, reminding them of the cost of silence in Operation Mush. Howard told them that as soon as the first shot want off, they should all start shouting at the top of their lungs. No 1 glider was Able, No 2 was Baker, No 3 was Charley, and so on. Howard wanted the men to shout out their identifications, over and over, both to identify one another and to give the Germans the feeling that the enemy was there in great numbers.

19. From these exercises over the taped bridges and roads, Howard decided that General Gale‟s plan for landing inside, that is between the bridges, rather than outside them, was correct. The LZs on the inside were awfully small and so situated that one group of gliders, at the canal bridge, would have to land facing north, towards the coast, the other group facing south, toward Caen, which required splitting the glider formations at take-off. These disadvantages were outweighed by two major advantages: the inside landing sites were smack against the bridges, instead of some distance away; and by having all his platoons inside, Howard could call on them to support one other.

20. Reorganisation. General Gale tested the company through two exercises where the objective was to capture bridges when it became apparent that the company would not be able to carry out the mission on its own. Asked to select two more platoons from the battalion to join them, Howard chose two from 'B' Company commanded by Lieutenants Fox and Smith. Any explosive charges found attached to the bridges were the responsibility of 30 Royal Engineers from the 249th (Airborne) Field Company, commanded by Captain Jock Neilson. Changes were then made to the operational plan to accommodate six platoons. Three were assigned to attack each bridge simultaneously with infantry overcoming the 51 troops on guard duty while the engineers located and dismantled any demolition charges. For six days and nights the company carried out exercises just outside Exeter, in the south west of England, where two bridges similar to their objectives were found over the River Exe.

21. Transport to Normandy was arranged in six gliders, piloted by 12 NCOs from 'C' Squadron, Glider Pilot Regiment. The Horsa had a wingspan of 88 feet (27 m) and a length of 67 feet (20 m), with a maximum load of 15,750 pounds (7,140 kg) or space for two pilots, twenty-eight troops or a mixture of two jeeps, artillery guns and trailers. Pilot mission training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training flights, flying in all weathers both day and night.

22. German opposition for his exercises- that is, the bridge defenders wore German uniforms, used German weapons and tactics, and insofar as possible shouted out their orders in German. He got captured German Rifles, carbines, and machine gun, German mortars, German hand grenades, so that all his men were thoroughly familiar with what these weapons could do, and how to operate them. He had but to snap his fingers and trucks would appear, to carry his platoons to wherever he wanted to go.

23. Bridges on Exeter. Howard asked the topographical people to search the map of Britain and find him some place where a river and a canal ran closely together and were crossed by bridges on the same road. They found such a spot outside Exeter. Howard moved the company down there, and for six days, by day and by night, attacked those Exeter bridges. He taught every man the basic rudiments of the sappers jobs; he instructed the sappers in the functions of the platoons; he made certain that each of his officers was prepared to take command of the whole operation, if need be. Howard insisted that they all became proficient in putting together and using the canvas boats that he was bringing along in the event the bridges were blown. Assault boat training was “always good for morale,” according to Howard, because “somebody inevitably went overboard and that poor individual never failed to make sure he wasn‟t the only one who got wet.”

24. At the end of May 1944, 'D' Company left the battalion camp at Bulford in Wiltshire for RAF Tarrant Rushton in Dorset. The base was then secured and Howard briefed everyone on the mission, distributing photographs of the bridges and unveiling a model of the area. Glider pilot commander Staff Sergeant told Howard that with a full load of men, ammunition, assault boats and engineers' stores his gliders would be dangerously overloaded. Howard decided to only take one assault boat per glider and leave behind two men from each platoon. At the last minute Doctor John Vaughan replaced an injured man in one of the platoons.

25. On 5 June 1944 the company made final preparations for the mission. Each man was issued their personal weapon and ammunition as well as up to nine hand grenades and four Bren gun magazines. Each platoon also had a 2-inch mortar and a radio. Just before the men boarded the gliders, code words were issued. 'Ham' indicated the canal bridge was captured and 'Jam' the river bridge. Capture and destruction of the canal bridge would be signalled using the code word 'Jack'; 'Lard' would be used if a similar fate befell the river bridge.

52

Objective: Ranville Bridge & Bénouville Bridge

26. Ranville Bridge spans the River Orne and the Bénouville Bridge (Pegasus Bridge) crosses the Caen Canal to the west. They are 5 miles (8.0 km) from the coast and provided the only access to the city of Caen. The main road between the two communes crosses the bridges and then continues east to the River Dives. At 190 feet (58 m) long and 12 feet (3.7 m) wide, the Caen Canal Bridge opens to allow canal traffic to pass underneath. The controls were housed in a nearby cabin. The canal itself is 27 feet (8.2 m) deep by 150 feet (46 m) wide, with earth and stone banks 6 feet (1.8 m) high. Small tarmac tracks run on both banks along the canal's entire length. Between the two bridges there is a strip of mostly marshy ground some 550 yards (500 m) wide, broken up by ditches and small streams.

27. Ranville Bridge. The Ranville Bridge over the River Orne is 350 feet (110 m) long and 20 foot (6.1 m) wide and can be opened to allow river traffic to pass. The river is between 160 and 240 feet (49 and 73 m) wide and with an average depth of 9 feet (2.7 m). It has mud banks averaging about 3.6 feet (1.1 m) high and a tidal rise and fall of between 16 and 6.5 feet (4.9 and 2.0 m). A number of small houses lie to the west of the river interconnected by a track between 8 and 10 feet (2.4 and 3.0 m) wide runs along both banks.

PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN FROM A RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DAYS BEFORE D DAY

53

THE PEGASUS BRIDGE (LEFT) & THE ORNE BRIDGE (RIGHT) WITH

LANDING ZONES

Task

28. The task assigned to Maj Howard was to seize the bridges over the River Orne and Caen Canal at Bénouville and Ranville intact and hold them until relieved. The relief force would initially be a company from 7 Parachute Battalion under Howard's command. When the remainder of the parachute battalion arrived, he would hand over to their commander Lieutenant Colonel Richard Pine-Coffin. 3 Infantry Division and the commandos of 1 Commando Brigade were scheduled to land at Sword Beach at 0600 Hr on the day then advance to the bridges where they were expected to arrive at 1100 Hr.

Final Plan

29. Howard made his final plan. The key to it was to put the pillbox out of action while simultaneously getting a platoon across the bridge and onto that side of the road. It had to be accomplished before shots were fired, if possible, and certainly before the Germans were fully aroused. The pillbox was a key not only because of its firing power, but because that was where the button that could blow the bridge was located. Howard detailed three men from No 54

1 Glider (Brotheridge‟s platoon) to dash to the pillbox and throw grenades through the slits. To take physical possession of the opposite bank, Howard detailed Brotheridge to lead the remainder of his platoon on a dash across the bridge. Ideally, Howard wanted Brotheridge to hear the thuds of the grenades in the pillbox as he was midway across the bridge.

30. No 2 Glider, David Wood‟s platoon, would clear up the inner defences, the trenches and machine gun nests along the east bank. No 3 Glider, Sandy Smith‟s platoon, would cross the bridge to reinforce Brotheridge. On the river bridge, the procedure would be the same, with Priday in No 4 Glider (Hooper‟s platoon), Fox in No 5, and Sweeney in No 6. Each would carry five of the thirty men under the command of Captain R. K. jock Neilson. The sapper‟s job was to move immediately to the bridges, then hand over hand move along the bottom beams, cutting fuses, looking for and disposing of explosives.

31. It was Major John Howard‟s plan. His superiors let him work it out himself, and then approved his final presentation. He ran through it again and again, until the men were exhausted; too tense and too bored to care any longer. But each time he ran through it, Howard saw something he had overlooked. One day, for example, he stopped an exercise and said he had been thinking that if so and so happened, and such and such, he‟d need volunteers to swim the canal with a Bren gun to set up a flanking fire.

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CHAPTER 3

AIRBORNE OPS ON D-DAY

EXECUTION

32. At 2256 Hr on 5 June 1944, the six gliders towed by Halifax bombers took off from RAF Tarrant Rushton. Horsa No 1, the first of the three headed for the Caen Canal, carried Howard with Lieutenant Den Brotheridge's platoon, No 2 bore Lieutenant David Wood's platoon, and No 3 carried Lieutenant Smith's platoon. Priday with Lieutenant Hooper's platoon made for the river bridge aboard No 4. Horsa No 5 carrying Lieutenant Fox's platoon was followed by No 6 bearing Lieutenant Sweeney's platoon. Each glider also carried five soldiers of the Royal Engineers. Flying over the at 7000 feet (2,100 m), the bombers crossed the Normandy coast at 00:07 on 6 June, 1944 and released their towed gliders. With Wallwork at the controls, the No 1 glider crashed into the barbed wire surrounding the canal bridge defences at 0016 Hr. The other two gliders followed at one minute intervals. No 2 glider broke in half and came to halt at the edge of a large pond. One of the men fell into the water and drowned, becoming the first casualty of the operation. Brotheridge and Smith's platoons headed for the bridge, while Wood's platoon moved towards the trenches on their northeastern side.

SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF THE TWO BRIDGES

56

CAPTURE OF THE BRIDGES

33. The Germans knew the invasion was imminent if not the exact location; Major Schmidt, in command of the bridges, had been told that theirs was one of the most critical points in Normandy. The defenders however, were not on full alert and only two sentries were on duty when the gliders landed. The sound of a gunshot alerted the two sentries on the bridge. As Brotheridge's platoon attacked, one ran off shouting "Paratroops" while the second fired a flare gun to alert nearby defenders. Brotheridge shot him while other members of his platoon cleared the trenches and pillbox with grenades. Alerted by the flare, the German machine gunners opened fire at the men on the bridge, wounding Brotheridge as he threw a grenade. The grenade silenced one of the machine gun positions and another was taken out by Bren gun fire. No1 Platoon crossed the bridge to take up a defensive position on the west bank. The Royal Engineers from No1 glider searched for explosive charges and cut the fuse wires when they found any. Smith's platoon crossed the bridge next, exchanging fire with the German defenders, whereupon Smith was wounded by a grenade. Using grenades and sub- machine gun fire, the platoons cleared the trenches and bunkers. By 0021 Hr German resistance on the west bank of the canal bridge was over. Checking the area, the men of Brotheridge's platoon now realised that their leader was wounded. He failed to recover and soon died of his wounds, becoming the first Allied soldier killed by enemy action during the invasion. On the east bank Wood's platoon cleared the trenches and bunkers with little opposition. Woods was hit in the leg by machine gun fire as he ordered the platoon to storm the German defences. All three platoon commanders at the canal bridge were now either dead or wounded.

34. At 0019 Hr pathfinders from 22 Independent Parachute Company landed in the area between the River Orne and the River Dives. Brigadier Nigel Poett commanding 5th Parachute Brigade and a small team accompanied them. Disoriented after landing, Poett heard Brotheridge's sten gun and set off for the bridges with the only man he could locate . Only one of the Germans at the bridge, Unteroffizier Weber escaped 'D' Company's attack, he reached Bénouville and reported the bridge had been captured.

35. Glider Landings. Fox's glider No 5 was the first to land 330 yards (300 m) from the river bridge at 0020 Hr while glider No 4 was reported missing. When the Germans opened fire with a MG 34, the platoon responded with a 2-inch (51 mm) mortar and destroyed the gun with a direct hit. They then crossed the bridge without further opposition. At 0021 Hr No 6 glider landed 770 yards (700 m) short of the bridge. Sweeney left one of his sections on the west bank then moved the rest of the platoon across the bridge to take up defensive positions on the east bank.

36 From his newly established command post in the trenches on the eastern bank of the canal near the bridge, Howard learned that the river bridge had also been taken. Captain Neilson of the engineers reported that although the bridges had been prepared for demolition, the explosives had not been attached. Howard ordered his signalman to transmit the code words 'Ham' and 'Jam' then brought Fox's platoon across the canal bridge, positioning them at the Bénouville to Le Port crossroads as the company's forward platoon.

LINK UP WITH 7 PARA

37. At 0050 Hr aircraft carrying the rest of the 6th Airborne Division appeared overhead and the paratroopers descended into drop zones marked out by the pathfinders. Howard began blowing the morse code letter 'V' on his whistle, to help guide 7 Parachute Battalion to 57 the bridges. The first paratroops to arrive at 0052 Hr were Brigadier Poett and the soldier he had picked up en route. Briefed by Howard on the situation, they heard tanks and lorries moving around in Bénouville and Le Port. On the drop zone, only about 100 men of 7 Parachute Battalion had made it to the rallying point but all their signal equipment, machine guns and mortars were missing. Pine-Coffin, aware that his battalion was the only unit allocated defensive positions west of the bridges, decided they could not wait any longer and at 0110 Hr left for the bridges.

38. The first company of 7 Parachute Battalion, commanded by Major Nigel Taylor, arrived at the bridges. Major Howard directed them to defensive positions west of the canal inBénouville and Le Port. When Lieutenant Colonel Pine-Coffin arrived at the bridges, he was briefed by Howard, and crossed into Bénouville and set up his headquarters beside the church. Pine-Coffin had about 200 men in his three companies. He positioned 'A' and 'C' Companies in Bénouville facing south towards Caen and 'B' Company in Le Port facing Ouistreham. 'D' Company was now pulled back into the area between the two bridges and held in reserve. A further check of the trenches and bunkers captured a number of Germans.

German Counter Attack to Retake The Bridge

39. The commander of 716 Infantry Division, Gen Wilhelm Richter was informed at 0120 Hr of the parachute landings and that the bridges had been captured intact. One of his first actions was to contact Gen Edgar Feuchtinger of 21 Panzer Division. Richter ordered the division to attack the landing areas. While Feuchtinger's tanks were delegated to support the 716th, it was also part of the German Armoured reserve, which could not move without orders from the German High Command. All German panzer formations could only be moved on the direct orders of , who was sleeping at the time and his staff refused to wake him. When Colonel Von Luck of 125 Regiment received the news of the airborne landings at 0130 Hr he ordered the regiment to their assembly areas north and east of Caen and waited for further orders.

40. The closest large German unit to the canal bridge were the 2nd Battalion, 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment based at Cairon. General Feuchtinger ordered them to recapture the bridges and then attack the parachute landing zones further west. At 02:00 the 2nd Battalion headed for the bridges from the west, supported by 1Panzerjager Company and part of 989 Heavy Artillery Battalion coming from the north. As the first Panzer IVs from the north reached the junction leading to the bridge, the leading vehicle was hit by a round from 'D' Company's only serviceable PIAT anti-tank weapon. The vehicle exploded, setting off its stowed ammunition, and the other tanks withdrew.

41. Actions by 192 Panzergrenadier Regiment. At 0300 Hr 8 Heavy Company, 192 Panzergrenadier Regiment with 75 mm SP guns, 20 mm AA guns and mortars attacked 'A' and 'C' Companies, 7 Parachute Battalion, from the south. The paratroops were forced back and the Germans established their own positions in Bénouville, but were unable to break the British line. They dug in and waited for tank support before moving forward again. The Germans fired mortar rounds and machine guns at the paratroopers and attempted small assaults on their positions throughout the night. Just before dawn Howard summoned his platoon commanders to a meeting. With their senior officers dead or wounded, Nos 1, 2 and 3 Platoons were now commanded by . Howard's second in command, Captain Priday and No 4 Platoon were missing. Only Lieutenants Fox and Sweeney in Five and Six Platoons had a full complement of officers and NCOs. 58

42. The landings at Sword Beach began at 0700 Hr, preceded by a heavy naval bombardment. At the bridges, daylight allowed German snipers to identify targets and anyone moving in the open was in danger of being shot. The men of No1 Platoon who had taken over the 75 mm anti-tank gun on the east bank of the canal used it to engage possible sniper positions in Bénouville, the Château de Bénouville and the surrounding area. At 0900 Hr, two German gunboats approached the canal bridge from Ouistreham. The lead boat fired its 20 mm gun and No 2 Platoon returned fire with a PIAT, hitting the wheelhouse of the leading boat, which crashed into the canal bank. The second boat retreated to Ouistreham. A lone German aircraft bombed the canal bridge at 1000 Hr, dropping one bomb. The bomb struck the bridge but failed to detonate.

43. The German 2nd Battalion, 192 Panzergrenadier Regiment continued to attack Bénouville and Le Port, assisted by their tanks, mortars and infantry. The attack caused serious problems for the under strength 7 Parachute Battalion until the leading tank was blown up with a Gammon bomb, blocking the road. During the attack 13 of the 17 tanks trying to get through to the bridge were destroyed. The paratroopers were then reinforced by No1 Platoon from 'D' Company. The platoon moved forward into Bénouville and cleared the Germans in house to house fighting. No 5 and 6 Platoons also moved into positions opposite the Gondree Cafe on the west bank of the canal. By midday most of the missing men from 7 Parachute Battalion had arrived at the bridges and the three platoons were moved back to their original positions.

44. Just after midday, 21 Panzer Division received permission to attack the landings. Colonel Von Luck east of the River Orne moved 125 Panzergrenadier Regiment towards the bridges. The column was quickly spotted and engaged for the next two hours by Allied artillery and aircraft causing heavy losses. 1st Battalion, 192 Regiment and 100 Panzer Regiment, attacking from west of the canal, had more success reaching the beaches between the British Sword Beach and the Canadian Juno Beach.

1st Commando Bde Joins the Action

45. At 1330 Hr the men at the bridges heard the sound of bagpipes, played by Bill Millin of the 1st Commando Brigade. As the commandos arrived they crossed the bridges and joined the rest of 6 Airborne Division defending the eastern side of the bridges. Some of the tanks accompanying the commandos moved into Bénouville to reinforce its defences while others crossed the bridges with the commandos. At 1500 Hr a boat loaded with German infantry approached from Caen. It was engaged with the anti-tank gun manned by No 1 Platoon. It was hit in the stern by the second round fired and retreated back toward Caen.

46. At 2115 Hr the 2nd Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment of 185 Infantry Brigade arrived from Sword Beach and began taking over the bridges' defences. At around midnight Howard handed over command of the bridges to the Warwickshire Regiment and his company left to join the rest of their battalion at Ranville. At 0330 Hr they finally located the battalion's positions. They found Captain Priday and No 4 Platoon had already joined the battalion. The platoon had landed beside the River Dives at Varaville about 8 miles (13 km) away, and had spent the previous day fighting their way towards the bridges, trying to rejoin the company.

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CHAPTER 4

AFTERMATH

47. Bénouville was the farthest point of the British advance on 6 June 1944. Of the 181 men (139 infantry, 30 engineers and 12 pilots) of 'D' Company involved in the capture of the bridges, two had been killed and fourteen wounded. On 9 June, the German Air Force attacked the bridges with 13 aircraft. The British had positioned light and medium sized anti-aircraft guns around the bridges and in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire the attack failed, although they did claim one of the bridges was destroyed by a direct hit.

48. Casualties. 6 Airborne retained control of the area between the Rivers Orne and Dives until 14 June, when 51 (Highland) Infantry Division took over the southern part of the Orne bridgehead. In the days that followed the division was reinforced by the Dutch Princess Irene Brigade and the 1 Belgian Infantry Brigade. A period of static warfare ended on 22 August when the division crossed the River Dives. Within nine days it had advanced 45 miles (72 km) to the mouth of the River Seine. Between 6 June and 26 August when they were pulled out of the front line the division's casualties were; 821 killed, 2,709 wounded, and 927 missing. After Operation Deadstick the engineers, glider pilots and 'B' Company men were returned to their parent formations. 'D' Company played their part in the division's defence of the Orne bridgehead and advance to the River Seine. On 5 September when the division was withdrawn to England, all that remained of the company were 40 men under the only remaining officer, Howard. The other officers, sergeants and most of the junior NCOs having been amongst the casualties.

49. The glider pilots were the first group to leave 'D' Company, their expertise being required for other planned operations. In particular Operation Comet, which included another coup-de-main operation where eighteen gliders would be used to capture three bridges in the Netherlands. The mission would be carried out by the 1st Airborne Division with a brigade allocated to defend each bridge. Comet was scheduled for the 8 Sep 1944, but was delayed and then cancelled. The plans were adapted and became Operation Market Garden, involving three airborne divisions; however the coup-de-main assault plans were not carried out.

50. Gallantry Awards. Prior to being withdrawn on 16 July, Howard was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, presented in the field by General Bernard Montgomery. Other awards were the Military Cross to Smith and Sweeney, the Military Medal to Sergeant Thornton and Lance Stacey, Lieutenant Brotheridge was posthumously mentioned in dispatches. Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory of the Royal Air Force praised the pilots involved, saying the operation included the "most outstanding flying achievements of the war". The feat was recognized by the award of the Distinguished Flying Medal to eight of the glider pilots involved.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

51. Op Deadstick was a thumping success of the D Day landings. The attacking forces achieved all their objectives within the stipulated time frame and carried out their assigned tasks to perfection. The significance of capture of the „Pegasus Bridge‟ will never be known, lest the operation had been a failure. The dash, initiative and aggression displayed by D Coy in the initial moments that led to the capture of the twin objective was well complimented by their actions thereafter. Holding the bridges in the face of stiff counter attacks by German tank bns, in spite of having limited anti-tank means. The sheer determination and dogged resolve displayed by the troops speaks volumes of their high standard of leadership and training.

52. The study of Operation Deadstick is relevant even today for students of military history & junior leaders and coy commanders. It gives an insight as to how innovative & realistic training will benefit the unit/sub unit, how pushing your troops to the limit during peace time will help in times of war and how rehearsals under right settings will reduce the chances of failure as it gives you ample opportunity to rectify your omissions.

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CHAPTER 6

LESSONS LEARNT

1. Operation Deadstick was without a doubt the one of the biggest successes of D Day. The operation involved a lot of planning, coordination and rehearsals, the importance of which is still relevant in the present day. The lessons learnt from Op Deadstick are as under:

(a) Realistic Training. The realism in training for the operation was a key battle winning factor. Maj John Howard apart from ensuring holistic training to incorporate simulated exercises and night training, organised training at Exeter in Britain so as to acquaint his troops with the nuances of such an operation involving two obstacles. Various contingencies were thrashed and troops were tested in all of these. Inter arm training, assault boat training, night flying by glider pilots of C Sqn, Glider Pilot Regt and knowledge of German tactics acted as a catalyst towards the success.

(b) Op Security. The capture of the bridges was a coup-de-main operation depending largely on surprise of the mission. Germans had an insight on likely beach landings; however the airborne operation was undertaken in such a manner that Hitler‟s forces including his Panzer divisions could only react piece meal against the Allies.

(c) Planning for Coup de Main. Op Deadstick was the result of decisions Gen Gale had taken realising the tactical problem of securing left flank of Sword Beach. This was possible only by taking effective control of the bridges over River Dives. The correct employment of airborne forces in support of major ground offensive lead to the success of Allied landing on Normandy.

(c) Directive Style of Command. Maj Howard was given complete freedom of planning for the Op Deadstick. This allowed Howard to carefully schedule training of D Coy as also pick and choose training locations. The only term of reference given to him was to plan landing between the two obstacles, which Howard realised proved as a catalyst though against the principal of surprise. The directive style displayed by Cdrs at all levels, ensured freedom of action and flexibility in execution.

(e) Flexibility in Planning. Maj Howard trained his sub units in such a manner that in any contingency, sub units could interchange their roles and accomplish the mission as per initial plan. Towards this engineers and infantry were adequately trained in switching their roles.

(d) Leadership. Maj Howard displayed exemplary leadership qualities. The dwindling morale of his men under heavy casualties was a litmus test for any leader in the face of the enemy. This was overcome by maintaining aggressiveness in all actions by the airborne troops. Active patrolling and sniping teams behind enemy lines were some actions taken by Howard.

(e) Joint Operations. Maj John Howard right from day one realised the importance of joint training with the pilots of Glider Pilot Regiment. By the end of their 62

training the pilots had flown in every weather condition with all possible battle loads. The loading of the Horsas was meticulously planned to ensure precision landing from six thousand feet on the narrow stretches of open space available between the two bridges.

(f) Intelligence. Timely and factual intelligence is must for success of any military operation. The British Government had invested enough to gather int in support of this operation. The prior info of an anti-tank gun emplacement and a pillbox protected with barbed wires helped Howard in planning. Second incident was prior info on move of 21 Panzer Division from Britany to Normandy in mid May and further to Caen on 23 May 1944. British int staff prepared a model of the area, 12 feet by 12 feet, displaying each road, track, building, trenches, etc. This model was modified based on the inputs of daily recce flights over the target area.

2. The lessons learnt are relevant today as well. Though the technology and means of transportation have improved but the deciding factor in any battle – “The Men” remain the same. It ultimately comes down to how well an outfit is trained and how well it is led.

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BIOGRAPHY: MAJOR JOHN HOWARD, DSO

Introduction

1. Major John Howard, DSO was a rarity amongst officers, in that he was not born amongst the higher classes but instead rose from humble beginnings. He was born in the West End of London on 8th Dec 1912, the eldest of nine children of Ethel and Jack Howard, who had served on the Western Front during the Great War. Major (Reginald) John Howard, DSO led a glider-borne assault on two bridges between Bénouville and Ranville in Normandy, France on 6 June 1944 as part of the D-Day landings during the Second World War. These bridges spanned the Caen Canal and the adjacent River Orne (about 500 yards to the east) and were vital to the success of the D-Day landings. Since the war the bridge over the canal has become to be known as "Pegasus Bridge", as a tribute to the men who captured it, while the bridge over the River Orne later became known as Horsa Bridge after the Horsa gliders that had carried the troops to the bridges. His role in the assault on the bridges was detailed in a number of books and films since the war. After he retired he gave a number of lectures in Europe and the on tactics and on the assault itself. He died in 1999, at the age of 86 in Surrey, England.

The Early Years

2. Reginald John Howard was born on 8 Dec 1912 to Jack and Ethel Howard, who lived in London's West End. The eldest of nine children, Howard's family background was working class. His father worked as a barrel maker for a brewery after serving in the trenches of France during World War I, while his mother kept the house and looked after the children.

3. School Years. During his formative years, Howard was an active member of the Boy Scouts. He enjoyed attending school and did very well, earning a scholarship to attend secondary school. At school, John Howard excelled both as an academic and as a sportsman. After he joined the Scouts, in spite of the derision he received from his friends who poked fun at his shorts, he greatly enjoyed the world that the experience exposed him to, such as sports and summer camping expeditions outside of London. At the age of fifteen, such was Howard's skill at mathematics that he was awarded a scholarship to attend secondary school, however the family finances were very limited and so he left school seeking employment.

4. Still maintaining contact with the Scouts, he began by working as a clerk to a stockbroker, but every evening, with a view to enhancing his situation, he turned his attentions back towards his education, taking classes in maths, english, economics, accountancy, typing and shorthand. His situation took a turn for the worse, however when his firm fell victim to the Great Depression and he was left unemployed. By this time his family had expanded to such a degree that their home was becoming most cramped. Howard proposed to leave home and establish himself elsewhere, however his mother would not hear of it. Nevertheless, he did leave and enlisted as a common soldier in the Army.

5. Military Service. He was posted to the King's Shropshire Light Infantry and received his basic training at Shrewsbury. His first few days there were not happy ones as he found his new companions to be "very rough and tough... He freely admitted that he cried his eyes out 64 for the first couple of nights when he was in the barracks with these toughs and wondered if he would survive." In spite of the intimidating atmosphere, Howard excelled, mostly due to his old passion for sports. An important feature of the peacetime Army was excellence in athletic, and as the Scouts had introduced him to cross-country runs, swimming, and boxing, Howard was given the freedom to hone his talents. Following the completion of his military training he was sent to one of the Regiment's battalions and soon after arrival he so his commander that he was made the company clerk. The abundance of free time that this position allowed Howard, enabled him to pursue his sporting interests further and before long he had passed a course to become a qualified Physical Education instructor. His ambition did not stop here however, and later he applied for a commission. Despite the fact that he was sufficiently qualified his application was rejected; it was almost impossible for a ranker to become an officer during peacetime. He did, however, receive a promotion to Corporal.

6. Marriage. In 1936, Howard was invited out for the evening by a friend of his who had found himself with two ladies to entertain. One of these was Joy Bromley, a sixteen year old from a respectable middle class family, to whom common soldiers were off limits. She and Howard had got on so fabulously that by the end of the evening the foundations of their courtship had been laid. Joy was very much afraid that her mother would not approve of her associating with someone from beneath her position and so it was that their relationship continued in secret. It was not in John Howard's manner to be covert and so, much to the horror of Joy, he decided to visit her mother and introduce himself. This he did, and much to everyone's surprise he was very much approved of. So much so that in April 1938 the couple were engaged, and they married on 28th Oct 1939. In mid-1938, he left the army and joined the Oxford City police.

7. Rejoining the Army. On 2nd Dec 1939, following the outbreak of the war, he rejoined the King‟s Shropshire Light Infantry as a corporal, however, he was quickly promoted to Company Sergeant Major and within five months of joining he became the Regimental Sergeant Major. In May 1940, the Brigade commander offered him a chance to earn a commission. Howard was reluctant, however, because he enjoyed the position of RSM as it was an extraordinarily powerful one, in some ways more so than that of officer. Furthermore he did not have a high opinion of the flood of young second lieutenants that were being drafted into the Army and he had very little desire to become one of them. He discussed the matter with Joy and she convinced him that he must try. This time he was successful and he decided to leave the Regiment in favour of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, partially because of his association with the city whilst a policeman, but also because of their first class regimental history.

8. Howard was posted to the 2nd Battalion, who had recently returned from India with a complement of peacetime officers. Many of them were not happy to have a former ranker in their midst and they made little secret of the fact. Howard did not take kindly to the constant snubbing he receive and so, fearing that he would not be able to stand it otherwise, he asked Joy to move to Oxford so that he could have her support. As it happened, his commanding officer had noted Howard's mood and made the same suggestion the very next morning. Within a few weeks, however, having had time to prove his worth, his fellow officers came to accept him as one of them.

9. Company Commander. In 1941, Howard was promoted to Captain and given command of a company. At the end of the year, news filtered through to him that the Battalion was to be converted into a glider borne unit and become a part of the newly formed 1st Air 65

Landing Brigade. Howard was very enthusiastic at the prospect of this exciting new role, even though the transition required him to be demoted to Lieutenant. This was only a short-term inconvenience though, and within a few weeks he was given command of „D‟Company and restored to Captain, promotion to Major followed in May 1942. He was most satisfied with the shape of the company, both in terms of its officers and men. He too felt at home with them as many were fellow Londoners. In training, Howard was ruthless and demanded nothing less than first class standards of fitness. He took his responsibility as a commander very seriously indeed. So much so that, for the most part, he abstained from drinking in order to keep a clear mind.

Personal and Military Traits

10. Moral Courage. Major John Howard was the epitome of moral courage. This attribute is highly regarded by soldiers. Examples of this are :-

(a) Leakage of Top Secret Plan. ColonelMike (his CO) informed him that a sergeant in the Glider Pilot Regiment over at the Tarrant Rushton Air Force Camp, had been overheard in the bar talking about matters he should have not been discussing or even have known. Hauled up in front of his senior officers he told them that he had learned it from Major John Howard while on their way to Tarrant Rushton from Broadmoor in a convoy of Army trucks on the day of their arrival, 26 May 1944. The shock that Major John Howard felt at first very quickly turned to outrage and then to anger, at this was an attack his integrity. Major John Howard refuted the allegation immediately and demanded to confront the man concerned but knowing histemperament, Colonel Mike Roberts decided that such a meeting would definitely not be a good idea at the time. Colonel Mike Roberts was instinctively aware that Major John Howard was completely innocent of such a lapse and realized that Sergeant Garner, cornered by his own senior officers, had just blamed Major John Howard because he knew his name and had travelled in the same truck. It was obvious that he was covering up for his mates in the Sergeants‟ Mess who had been gossiping and speculating after a few drinks. He talked to his own sergeants, carefully concealing his real interest in what had taken place in the Sergeants‟ Mess. Major John Howard learned that Sergeant Garner had been in the Airborne Sergeants‟ Mess, on the night of 26 May 1944. It seems that they had all been discussing the recent exercises at the Countess Wear Bridge and his men admitted that they‟d probably mentioned the distance between those two bridges and that it had been intimated that the „real bridges‟ were further apart. That would have been all it took for Sergeant Garner to learn that piece of information.The Glider Pilot Regiment gave no further information after they had passed on this allegation to the Airborne. It was up to Major John Howard to defend himself and he was unbelievably angry and frustrated. He told no one else about it and carried on with his job as if nothing had happened. When Brigadier Kindersley came down to talk to „D‟ Company on 3 June 1944, he discussed the matter privately with the Brigadier, Major John Howard was told that „from our point of view the matter is closed‟. However, he wrote his explanation in a letter for the Sergeant‟s indictment and added that Major Howard could not leave the country without making some kind of a reply as seriousness of security regarding this part of the operation was very clear to him. He further said that he trusted that his point of view would be considered and that the NCO would be severely dealt with.

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(b) Questioning Honours and Awards. Major John Howard felt that the Army moved in mysterious ways when it came to handing out honours and awards as it was customary to award medals according to rank other than in exceptional circumstances. He felt sad that many deserving soldiers of the Glider Regiment and the Sappers were ignored. He strongly felt that hisplatoon leaders should have received higher awards and honours for their exceptional leadership and bravery. After he returned back to UK, he did his best to put right what he considered to be a notable wrong. He wrote countless letters and recommendations to the War Office on this matter but to no avail.

11. Physical Courage. Major John Howard showed commendable physical courage at various instances during his life in the Army.

(a) Fighting at Escoville. During the fighting at Escoville, he personally would check all his platoons without bothering about the accurate sniper fire from the Germans. Once, in a forward platoon which was taking shelter in the lee of a stone wall, he could hear the sound of vehicles possibly tanks. He tried to look around the wall with binoculars but as he moved his head out of the cover of the wall a shot rang out and the men saw him fall backwards, unconscious and bleeding from the head. At first, they all thought that he was dead but after a few minutes or so, he began to groan. He was assisted to the farmyard where they had set up the company HQ. Captain BrianPriday had the medical orderly look at Major Howard‟s wound and it was discovered that he‟d had the most amazing escape. The sniper‟s bullet had pierced his helmet from front to back, the bullet actually grazing the top of Major John Howard‟s head. Minutes later, he was on his feet checking and motivating his company as if nothing had happened.

12 Professional Competence. He was an extremely competent officer who believed in continuous training and refining oneself to achieve his aims in life. He adopted the same principle he adopted while preparing for the capture of the two bridges on the Caen Canal and Orne River. He would ensure that thorough planning had been done by him first and then put it into practice subsequently. He never shied away from clarifying his doubts from anyone whether senior or junior. For him the main aim was to get the job done in a thorough and professional manner.

13. Initiative. Major John Howard possessed an extremely high degree of initiative. He could visualise opportunities in the making both on and off the battlefield.

(a) Training. Once when he was told by his commander Brigadier Poett to go down to Exeter to report to Colonel Pine-Coffin of the 7th Para who been doing some training across the Countess Wear Bridges near Exminster. He rushed there immediately. While there it occurred to him that the bridges were an excellent replica of the actual two bridges in Normandy and that the area would make a good training ground. The following morning he took the opportunity of talking to Colonel Pine-Coffin and Major Dick Bartlett, commanding „C‟ company of 7 Para, planned his training and rushed back to get „D‟ company to get some actual training done.

(b) Battlefield. During the attack on Escoville, „D‟ company had no communication with Regimental HQ because they (RHQ) had lost all their wireless sets in the glider landings. He did not let this handicap deter him in anyway and carried on 67

with the task at hand by effectively utilising runners, keeping the RHQ updated as well as receiving any new orders for his company.

14. Man Management. Major John Howard had a special talent for deft handling of men. He knew his command well and used his leadership skills effectively. On the morning of 7 June, after the successful capture of the two bridges at Caen Canal and the Orne River, „D‟ company was reduced from the original force of 181 to 110 men. He effectively reorganized them into four platoons - the remnants of 23 Platoon under Lieutenant Tod Sweeney, 22 Platoon under Lieutenant Tony Hooper, 24 Platoon under Corporal Godbold and 25 Platoon under Corporal Caine. He decided to keep an eye on 25 platoon and Captain BrianPriday (Coy 2IC) would do the same for 24 platoon. Since he knew his command inside out, he could still obtain optimal output from his company.

15. Flexibility. Major John Howard employed the principle of flexibility optimally during preparation for the capture of the bridges as well as during the actual fighting. He did not believe in pre-conceived ideas and understood the fluidity of situation at hand.

(a) Weight Problem. During the preparation for the capture of the two bridges, Major John Howard decided to weigh his company with full battle loads and found that his men weighed 250 lb instead of the average allowance of 210 lb for an infantryman. When they considered what this overload would amount to for twenty-eight soldiers in each glider, it came to about 1,400 lb overweight. This caused a real crisis for them. It didn‟t take much imagination to realize that this overloading of each glider would be extremely dangerous; especially when it was considered that they had to land in such a small area. After due deliberations and discussions with seniors and juniors, it was decided that certain items would have to be left and the biggest items to go were two of the assault boats. The decision was also made to cut down the load on each glider by one man from each platoon, as well as one Sapper from each glider. An „arrester parachute, was fitted to each glider as well, that could be deployed to help bring the aircraft to a halt. He had to make minor changes in assigning of tasks to his Platoon but it didn‟t affect the operation in anyway.

(b) Missing Platoons. During the glider landings for the capture of the two bridges at Caen Canal and the Orne River, Major John Howard had to capture the bridges and subsequently fight the enemy counter attacks without two of his platoons as three gliders landed in the wrong location and could not marry up with „D‟ company. But Major John Howard carried on with his task without missing a beat and it had lot to do with his ability to be mentally flexible in adverse situations.

16. Foresight. Major John Howard had the ability to foresee certain aspects which many individuals would not notice or comprehend. During the training for the capture of the bridges, he made his company undergo realistic training in similar areas as they would encounter subsequently in Normandy. Also, when he briefed his company in detail about the plan for the capture of the two bridges, he ensured that each and every soldier in the company was aware of the plan and could therefore the tasks could be interchangeable. This was to prove invaluable in the actual operation where his Company 2IC Captain BrianPriday would not be available to the company for the task assigned to him.

17. Integrity. Major John Howard‟s level of integrity was known to one and all. His friends, juniors and superiors would swear by his loyalty and integrity. This trait was well 68 displayed during his briefing for the operation for the capture of the two bridges „Op Deadstick‟. Brigadier Kindersley him that he was now officially on the „X List‟. This meant that he would be given the outline of the whole British plan for the invasion of Europe. He was then given the written orders for the operation „The task is to seize intact the bridges over the canal at Benouville and the river Orne at Ranville and hold them until relieved by the 7th Parachute Battalion‟. But he was to keep it to himself till the orders to brief „D‟ company were given to him as the higher commanders didn‟t want a security breach of the top secret operation. Major John Howard would keep this plan hidden from his closest peers and men till he was officially told to brief his company in detail about the operation.

18. Religious & God Fearing.Major John Howard was an extremely religious and God fearing person. He was a regular at the church service on Sundays and would also encourage his men to have faith in God. Just before the operation in June 1944, he wrote in his memoirs, “The following day was a Sunday, and all the officers attended Holy Communion at Bardney parish church. I have always had a strong spiritual side to my nature and that day I knelt and prayed fervently for the Lord‟s blessing in our task. Later that morning, there was a voluntary Church Parade and I was delighted to see that almost all of my men turned up. The two church services were of great comfort to me.”

19. Family Man. He was extremely close to his wife Joy and children, daughter Penny and son Terry. He would often rush back home between training even if it meant just a couple of hours with Joy and the children. He and Joy had been more than just husband and wife, they were best of friends. Major John Howard would often share his concerns with his wife and her indulgence itself in the problem would be a great morale booster for him. More so, during the training and the war, Joy would religiously write to him every day without fail and Major John Howard found strength in those letters.

20. Emotional and Sensitive. Major John Howard was an extremely emotional person even though he would never show his emotions in front of his men or superiors.

(a) Moving to the Transit Camp. While finally moving to the transit camp at Tarrant Rushton in Dorset, Major John Howard would write in his diaries, “Back in my room in the officer‟s accommodation hut, I faced the difficult task of packing up all my personal belongings. This was standard practice for all men going into action, in case they were unable to return to their unit. If they were lucky, they might just have been wounded. I put all my personal kit into my grip and with a choking lump in my throat; I placed a pair of sunglasses on the top of the pile that Joy had particularly coveted. I had arranged that a friend would deliver it to my home a couple of weeks after we‟d gone and as was customary, I wrote a parting note to Joy and placed it inside the sunglasses case. It was the most emotionally difficult letter I think I ever had to write in my life and I had to look away several times as the tears welled up in my eyes.”

(b) Casualties at Escoville. When „D‟ company was moving towards Escoville on 07June 1944, at 1500 Hr the enemy attacked from the east as well as the south and all platoons suffered many casualties. At 1600 Hr a runner from RHQ at last managed to get to „D‟ company and told them that they should have withdrawn to Herouvillette through „C‟ company who had been brought forward to cover the withdrawal from Escoville. There were many casualties from all companies and Captain Priday and Major John Howard organized the withdrawal of „D‟ company as quickly as possible, taking with them as many of the wounded as they could under fire. Once back in 69

Herouvillette some of the men were sent back to salvage some of their precious stores that had been left there in the hurried withdrawal. They desperately needed food, ammunition and medical supplies and it was considered a priority to retrieve them as well as any wounded men. They established CHQ in Herouvillette in a wooden caravan parked in a farmyard and counted up their casualties. It was to be the saddest reckoning of his life, for „D‟ company had lost fifty-eight men, killed, wounded or missing in just one days fighting.

Life After the War

21. Major John Howard took premature retirement from the Army in 1945 due to a disability he suffered from a road accident. He took a job with National Savings till 1951. John Howard then transferred from National Savings to the Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, moving to Nottingham in 1951 where Terry and Penny grew up. That year he received the Croix de guerreavac Palme, France‟s highest award for bravery, from the French president. Through the 1950s and 1960s Howard returned to Normandy each June and lectured to the Sandhurst Staff College on the landing zone by Pegasus Bridge. In 1961 he was a technical advisor for the making of the film The Longest Day in which his role was played by Richard Todd, himself a veteran of the D-Day landings. In 1964 Howard was promoted to head of the Ministry of Agriculture for Cornwall and the Scillies and moved, with his wife Joy, to Truro in Cornwall where eventually Terry settled as well.

22. Joy Howard suffered a major stroke in 1969 when she was only forty nine years old and was an invalid for the rest of her life. Howard took early retirement to care for her in 1972 and they moved to Burcot near Abingdon in Oxfordshire, where Joy died in January 1986. John Howard then moved to the Mansion at Albury near Guildford (a Country House Association property) where he had the „battlement‟ apartment.

23. Freed from the responsibilities of a house, and with Joy gone, John Howard enjoyed some contented years making several trips to Normandy annually. The Staff College trips falling victim to defence cuts in the early seventies, the Swedish Navy were quick to seize Howard‟s lecturing abilities and unique experience to lecture their own cadets during the Cold War years, when there was a distinct possibility of a Soviet attack on their coastline. Howard continued to lecture to the Swedish cadets almost to the end of his life.

24. In 1984, he assisted the American historian Stephen Ambrose with his own notes and editing for the book Pegasus Bridge. It was reissued as a paperback in 2001, following Ambrose‟s death and became a UK best seller. Howard had made several trips to the USA both lecturing for Stephen Ambrose‟s group and visiting the many friends he made, especially in Texas. He suffered from the injuries he received in the car crash in November 1944 for the rest of his life, using a stick and eventually elbow-crutches, but very seldom succumbing to a wheelchair. He lived near to his daughter Penny in his last years and died on 05 May 1999.