University of Cincinnati Law Review Volume 86 Issue 1 Article 3 October 2018 Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Between Theory and Doctrine Clay Calvert
[email protected] Stephanie McNeff Austin Vining Sebastian Zarate Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr Recommended Citation Clay Calvert, Stephanie McNeff, Austin Vining, and Sebastian Zarate, Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Between Theory and Doctrine, 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 99 (2018) Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Calvert et al.: Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Betwe FAKE NEWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: RECONCILING A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THEORY AND DOCTRINE By Clay Calvert,* Stephanie McNeff,** Austin Vining,‡ & Sebastian Zarate‡‡ Abstract This Article analyzes calls for regulating so-called “fake news” through the lens of both traditional theories of free expression – namely, the marketplace of ideas and democratic self- governance – and two well-established First Amendment doctrines, strict scrutiny and underinclusivity. The Article argues there is, at first glance, a seeming disconnect between theory and doctrine when it comes to either censoring or safeguarding fake news. The Article contends, however, that a structural rights interpretation of the First Amendment offers a viable means of reconciling theory and doctrine.