ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 24, No. 4 (Al)

Dec 2019

Albania external relations briefing: All quiet on the Western front Marsela Musabelliu

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

All quiet on the Western front

Introduction The complexity of the Albanian political scene can never be entirely understood without a comprehensive analysis of the foreign nations’ presence and influence. Indeed, foreign diplomats, representatives, missions and embassies in the country, not only have a substantial say in internal affairs, but in a multitude of important cases, they dictate the paths to follow and the very ongoing/outcome of crucial events that impact the entire nation. These influences have never been an issue for Albanian politicians and/or ruling class, on the contrary the support of strong international actors in many stances, has cemented the very political will and actions of one or another political fraction. International support has been flaunted as a sign of legitimacy even in the cases where the local opinion was overwhelmingly contrary. 2019 has not derailed much from above mentioned – every political internal move has been consulted with Albania’s strategic partners and the most influential foreign nations in the country. Major debates during this year with concerns to external relations has been characterized by six dominant streams: international support for Rama during the protests of the opposition, failed opening of accession talks with the EU in June, another rejection from the EU in October, the Justice Reform and its American blueprint, the debates on the so-called Balkans “mini-Schengen” and a more present China in the public discourse.

Undivided support for Edi Rama during the protests The first six months of 2019 characterized by internal political crises with weekly protests and display of violence, did not tarnish the image of Rama and his government on the international stage – on the contrary, Rama’s arguments were heard, noted, confirmed and supported almost unanimously. The actual declarations were highlighting the support for “the rule of low and in total solidity of Albanian institutions”, yet, these announcements were perceived locally as a clear sign of foreign governments approving of Rama’s actions and narrative on resolving the internal political divide. Initially from Western European countries and soon after by the United States, the condemnation of the protests and the abandonment of the Parliament by the opposition were the substance of every speech concerning Albania. The blame was specifically targeted and did not leave room for misunderstandings – the Albanian opposition was hit hard by this pouring of support for Rama and started diminishing their protest until all the turmoil faded in oblivion.

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Rama interpreted this international support to the rule of low as a direct support for the government, thus narrating to Albanians the validity and rightfulness of the same. If the international community was backing Rama on his claims it meant that his approach to the internal political crisis was appropriate. As usual in times of crisis the situation is not entirely black and white. It is true that the international community backed Rama and his claims, but it could be argued that for them anyone who would have been in power would receive the same support, at the end internal stability is what they aim for – a troubled Albania would give too much “headache” to foreign representatives. Rama’s public relations skills fit this support to his own political aims, and yet, when this support was needed the most to benefit Albania (meaning the opening of accession talks with the EU) endorsement was nowhere to be found.

A double rejection from Brussels June’s setback In June 2019, internal political events absorbed the spotlight form every other occurrence; the protests, uncertainties, elections and campaigns overshadowed a very crucial occasion: the missing deadline for opening accession talks with the European Union. Such an important milestone for Albania was again postponed by the EU mechanisms with a series of explanations on causes and motifs of this decision. The perception in Albania about this news, as for every other issue on the country, was two-folded. For the opposition, this was a clear signal the EU was giving Rama’s government - they did not manage their country well enough to deserve the opening of the accession talks. The PD blamed the establishment for not fighting organized crime, internal corruption and a European perspective for all Albanians was impossible with Rama as the leader in charge. This rhetoric is repetitive and somehow outdated, for them the Prime Minister is to blame for all what’s wrong in the country. On the other side, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declared that Albania deserved the opening of negotiations this year and this was not encouraging news. However - he continued – Albania is not to blame and cannot decide on the agenda of the Council of Europe, so there will be a waiting time until October on a final decision. The narrative of the government does not reflect the reality on the ground. Prime Minister Edi Rama seemed to be reluctant to accept another defeat. He states: “Very positive news from Europe on our path to opening negotiations! Albania is resisting!” But, was Albania really resisting? Albania is actually struggling and since the solution to its problems is not coming from Tirana, the only hope remains being part of the EU; with yet another deadline postponed, this hope was vanishing by the day. The possibility of “decoupling” (for Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia) was another thorn for Albanians, perhaps this is what the Albanian MFA

2 is mainly worried about; knowing that if this separation will take place in the bureaucratic machine of Brussels, Albania will lag behind. On the broader scenario, this postponement comes with considerable risks. Without a clear European perspective for the countries that have fulfilled all the requirements, the EU could lose its leverage and appeal in all Balkan countries. In the eyes of Albanians, by implementing the Vetting Process for the Judiciary System (the most highlighted requirement from EU) it is expected from Brussels to deliver what has been promised beforehand. There was no delivery of such promise, as consequence, how will the internal actors be motivated to move forward “no matter what”?

October’s rejection In Albania it was expected another refusal from the EU but not at the extent in which it unfolded. Not only rejection, but also blame and drastic opposition for the country’s European aspirations specifically. On October 18th the European Council withdrew the opening membership negotiations for Albania and Northern Macedonia. Macron was the loudest voice and the veto that halted the process (strongly supported by representatives of Holland and Denmark). France has long been in a conservative and refractory position (especially towards Albania) in relation to the lagging countries of the Western Balkans, which are now at the height of their aspiration to be an EU member. The implications of the European Council's decision on Albania and Northern Macedonia will have a regional impact. They are a blow to the aspirations of the countries of the region’s for progress, integration and European support for politicians in pro-Western liberal political currents. Various experts in Tirana see Western Balkans depopulation as worst consequence of failure to open negotiations. It is a consequence of a protest reaction to this isolation, to this “unworthy” treatment they are now receiving from the EU, where they have held high hopes and are extinguished by the EU itself.

Whose fault is it? The non-opening/failing of negotiation talks for Albania might be an immense question mark that could jeopardize the entirety of Albania’s integration path. Was this rejection a result of Albania’s performance or was it majorly related internal affairs and indecisions of the EU? The Albanian government argues the usual stance: “not Albania’s fault, the more we do the more its required”. Which is not entirely true as a simple example could demonstrate: the German Bundestag went from 5 conditions to 9, the most “benevolent” country towards Albania’s accession raised the bar again, thus there is a lack of performance and deterioration.

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On the other hand, Macron justified his “no” with the raise of the number of asylum-seeker of Albanian nationality, which Eurostat figures do not support. Be this an expression of the EU’s internal chaos or an incompetence of Albanian institutions, the Albanian people will have face the consequences of this ongoing isolation.

The Justice Reform and its American blueprint After three years of intense debates and political clashes, the Justice Reform is starting to take some kind of shape, at least in in paper: the creation in mid-December 2019, of the Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure (SPAK). This independent institution is subdivided in two main branches: The Special Prosecution Office and the National Burau of Investigations. Usually referred to as the future “Albanian FBI”, this is a new constitutional institution in the country which will be in charge of investigating and prosecuting corruption, organized crime and wrongdoings of high-level officials. What up to now are considered as the “untouchables” of Albania, the powerful and the well-connected, will be the target of this structure. Past and present politicians, their wealth and properties, bank accounts and financial assets, will be under scrutiny – or so it is hoped! It is not a hidden agenda that the United States are intensively involved in the creation of the new institutions of this Justice Reform. The majority of Albanians in fact embrace this fact, mostly due to the low confidence in local institutions and sometimes it is perceived as a filter of legitimacy for the new justice of the country. SPAK is considered to be the crown jewel of this Justice Reform because it took a constitutional change to make it e a reality and for Albanians it is the only hope for some accountability on decades of unpunishment on drastic and visible corruption. US Chargé d’Affaires, a.i. Moses-Ones stated at the end of 2019: “The United States has been standing with Albania, and we have encouraged these great changes. We stood with Albania when the reforms were unanimously approved three years ago. We stood with Albania during the creation of the judicial and prosecutorial councils. We are standing with Albania as the SPAK is being established. Rest assured, we will continue to stand with Albania as Justice Reform reshapes your future.” The internal debate in the country now on this American influence is on which will be the role of the US in the future of the Albanian justice: lead or support? At whatever extent the American footprint on this process will be one conviction is certain: Albanians have more trust in foreign scrutiny rather than local authorities, to no fault of their own anyway - this is what 30 years of corrupt politics does to a country’s perception.

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Massive corruption and lack of accountability is such a severe concern that it was needed the conception of fresh line of work and specific institutions - a sui generis path to justice which specifically tailored for Albanian needs.

“mini-Schengen” The idea of a common market with the neighboring countries has circulated in Albania and other Western Balkan nations for decades, but due to obvious preexisting conflicts it never materialized in an actual cooperation framework. Will this be the right try? In the 2017th Western Balkans Summit in Trieste, included a Connectivity Agenda, a regional economic integration plan, private sector development, and expanding people-to-people contacts and most importantly the foundations for a common Balkan market. Fast forward two years, on the bases of the abovementioned there are three leaders of the Western Balkans vividly proactive in creating this “common Balkan market”: Edi Rama, Alexander Vucic and Zoran Zaev. Indeed, on the first meeting, on October 10th in Novi Sad, Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia signed the declaration on regional cooperation; the following meeting was held in Ohrid on November 10th and the third one was held in Tirana, 20th December. By trying to emulate the EU’s Schengen Agreement the WB are starting to increase cooperation amongst them – but is this project really feasible for the tumultuous Balkan region and who is the major beneficiary of it? To better analyze what it really stands for, it is our argument that there are three major grounds on which this initiative can be evaluated as of end 2019: economic, perceptive and (geo)political. In economic terms, free movement of goods and capital is always a good sign of cooperation amongst countries. In fact, in every declaration of endorsement of this project it is highlighted “the creation of a market of 20 million people” and intense economic benefits of all participants. However, projections in this regard can be made while observing the real figures of economic exchange between the WB states and it is basic economics logic that removing cross-border barriers always favors the country that exports the most and has the most advanced production base. By all considerations, the country that exports and has the most developed industrial base within the potential “mini-Schengen” is Serbia. Albanian economists foresee immense losses especially for Albanian agriculture, a branch that is already in a detrimental stage as it is. In late December, hundreds of Albanian farmers had to cast their product due to slow sales and foreign competition. They argue that no government subsidy will bankrupt them soon and other regional producers will take over the Albanian market, especially

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Serbia where in 2019 the biggest subsidies were given out to the Serbian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management (around RSD 36.2 billion). In the perception sphere, the situation is more delicate and sensitive, at least in Albania - it is all perceived on nationalist lines mainly due to Rama’s attitude towards Kosovo and especially Ramush Haradinaj. While Kosovo was invited to participate, in Tirana (not in Novi Sad), Pristina did not accept to be part of it. In a senseless move during an interview, the Prime Minister of Albania sided with Vucic by calming that Kosovo was self-excluded in this process and Haradinaj was deceptive in his statements. This was enough to start a mediatic storm of anti-Rama declarations by claiming that not only Rama abandoned Kosovo, but he is working against their interests. In a melodramatic parade of patriots versus traitors the discourse strokes the cord of deeper historic issues. And perhaps this is what Rama wanted – shifting the focus from internal issues into yet another mediatic show. In the geopolitical aspect, the situation is way more complicated and the timing is critical. The creation of this “mini-Schengen” comes at a time when rumors that the EU is blocking or stopping the progress of these countries' integration process are louder than ever. Undermining EU’s influence in the WB via a Balkans coalition appears a desperate tentative for attention rather than a true intention of cooperation. What exactly is the content the essence and of this initiative, is still to be determined. Besides, in an overall view, no matter how deep this initiative goes, it will remain limited, at least in scope. The real challenges of the WB are more complicated and need a more comprehensive and multilateral approach. And last but not least, it is noted at this stage via commentaries, analysis and media declaration, and so on, that this so called “mini-Schengen” of the Balkans does not have popular support in Albania.

China in the public discourse In a country where relatively little is known about PRC, Chinese high-level officials visiting Europe and holding talks with their counterparts in Dubrovnik and Brussels have had their fair share of coverage in Albania during 2019. Mostly, Prime Minister’s Rama meeting with Premier Li Keqiang in the Dubrovnik Summit of “17+1’ Cooperation mechanism and 4th Capital Mayors Forum, placed PRC in the map of public attention. These events represented perhaps in important milestone in the prospect of rekindling the overall Sino-Albanian relations. A bizarre coupling! China and Russia in Albania. The lack of proper analysis on modern China in Albania is reflected via multiple declarations of politicians and public figures on the Chinese and Russian influences in the Balkans. In every case, not only these two nations are at the same sentence but they are both depicted as being complicit of “meddling” with the Balkans, one way or the other. The coupling

6 is astray in all perspectives, be this historic, political, social or economic. In most of the cases what was broadcasted in Albania is a mere duplicate of some Western media outlets/bureaucrats’ declarations on the Russian and Chinese “threat” for the Balkans, without any reasonable connection or at least some shred of evidence to support it. However, Russian ties to the Balkans and Chinse presence in the area, are two extremely different matters. While Russian influence in Albania is always perceived (and many times proved) to have the bases of political implications, as of 2019 China’s approach is pragmatically economic and has never proved to be more than that. Perhaps, in order to better clarify PRC’s intentions towards Albania, H.E. Ambassador Zhou Ding, in October stated clearly: “China is not interested in playing geopolitical games in Balkans area, or anywhere in the world, because we think that it won’t last long. We work with countries like Albania purely based on our traditional friendship and the principle of win-win cooperation. Expansionism is indeed not a label that should be put onto China.” It only hoped that in the near future proper study and portrayal of PRC will be present in Albania. As no nation is immune to not be impacted by the tides of history, the leading role of China in international affairs should be addressed properly by any diligent political establishment, Albania included.

Conclusions It has been a hectic year in foreign affairs, unfortunately, mostly in declarations rather than in deeds. Albania was at a crossroad and still is, in wanting and longing to be part of the EU. For Albanians the EU goes beyond having a seat at the table, it’s an opportunity for the much-needed economic growth, security and meaningful reforms at home. For as long as the “European Project” is strong and willing to endure on the inside, there are still chances for Albania to be a member. The country is determined to pursue the European path at all cost; it is up to Brussels to demonstrate if there is less or more appetite for enlargement.

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