Chronology of Major Conflicts and Political Events Appendices Iemed
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Profiles of New Ministers
| Tuesday, October 13, 2020 JORDAN 3 Profiles of new ministers Prime Minister Deputy Prime Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Deputy Prime and Minister of Defence Minister and of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Minister and Minister of Local Minister of State for Born on January 27, 1969, Kha- Administration Safadi, who holds an MA in Interna- Economic Affairs sawneh holds a PhD in law from tional Journalism from Baylor Uni- the London School of Economics. Born in Maan versity in Texas and a BA in English Born in Amman in He also worked as an adviser for in 1947, Kreis- Literature from Yarmouk University, 1946, Toukan ob- policies to His Majesty King Ab- han obtained has edited and written for a number tained his bachelor’s dullah as of August 18, 2020 and his BSc in ac- of newspapers, including The Jordan and master’s degrees adviser to King Abdullah for com- counting and Times and Al Ghad. Since September in business admin- munications and coordination business ad- 2016, he has served as a member of the istration from the between 2019 and 2020 and Jor- m i n i s t r at i o n Tawfiq Kreishan Senate until his appointment as a min- Ayman Safadi American Univer- Umayya Toukan dan’s permanent representative to from the Arab ister in Hani Mulki’s Cabinet. Between sity of Beirut, a post- UNESCO between 2018 and 2019. University of Beirut in 1972. He 2008 and 2011, Safadi served as adviser to His Majesty graduate diploma in economic develop- Khasawneh was also the King- was a deputy in Jordan’s 12th King Abdullah and as deputy prime minister, minister of ment from Oxford University and a PhD dom’s ambassador to France be- Bisher Al Khasawneh Parliament (1993-1997). -
Outgoing Prime Minister Joseph Muscat's Labour Party Wins The
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN MALTA 3rd June 2017 European Outgoing Prime Minister Joseph Muscat’s Labour Elections monitor Party wins the snap election in Malta. Corinne Deloy The Labour Party (MLP) of outgoing Prime Minister Joseph Muscat came out ahead in the Analysis snap election that took place on 3rd June in Malta. Taking 55.04% of the vote he beat his main rival, the Nationalist Party led by Simon Busuttil, who won 43.68% of the vote. Together the four other political parties which were standing a snap election at the beginning of May after attacks made – the Democratic Party (PD), founded in 2016 by Marlene by the blogger Daphne Caruana Galizia, who revealed that Farrugia, forged an alliance with the nationalists in this election; Muscat’s chief of cabinet Keith Schembri and Energy Minister, Democratic Alternative (AD), an ecologist party led by Arnold Konrad Mizzi (MLP) were the respective owners of the Cassola; the Maltese Patriotic Movement (NPM), a nationalist businesses Hearnville Inc and Tillgate Inc, two Panamanian party led by Henry Battistino and the Bidla Alliance (BA) a offshore companies that they are said to have acquired thanks Christian, Eurosceptic party led by Ivan Grech Mintoff – won to the help of the Panamanian legal firm Mossack Fonseca, 1.29% of the vote and no seats in Parliament. which was involved in the international Panama Papers scandal. Turnout, which is always high in the archipelago, was almost At the end of April Joseph Muscat’s wife was accused of being the same as that recorded in the previous general election on the owner of part of the Panamanian offshore company Egrant 9th March 2013: it lay at 92.1% (- 0.9 point). -
Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution
BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER ANALYSIS PAPER Number 10, February 2014 CONVINCE, COERCE, OR COMPROMISE? ENNAHDA’S APPROACH TO TUNISIA’S CONSTITUTION MONICA L. MARKS B ROOKINGS The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high- quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its scholars. Copyright © 2014 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. www.brookings.edu BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha TABLE OF C ONN T E T S I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................1 II. Introduction ......................................................................................................................3 III. Diverging Assessments .................................................................................................4 IV. Ennahda as an “Army?” ..............................................................................................8 V. Ennahda’s Introspection .................................................................................................11 VI. Challenges of Transition ................................................................................................13 -
The American University in Cairo Press
TheThe AmericanAmerican 2009 UniversityUniversity inin Cairo Cairo PressPress Complete Catalog Fall The American University in Cairo Press, recognized “The American University in Cairo Press is the Arab as the leading English-language publisher in the region, world’s top foreign-language publishing house. It has currently offers a backlist of more than 1000 publica- transformed itself into one of the leading players in tions and publishes annually up to 100 wide-ranging the dialog between East and West, and has produced academic texts and general interest books on ancient a canon of Arabic literature in translation unmatched and modern Egypt and the Middle East, as well as in depth and quality by any publishing house in the Arabic literature in translation, most notably the works world.” of Egypt’s Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz. —Egypt Today New Publications 9 Marfleet/El Mahdi Egypt: Moment of Change 22 Abdel-Hakim/Manley Traveling through the 10 Masud et al. Islam and Modernity Deserts of Egypt 14 McNamara The Hashemites 28 Abu Golayyel A Dog with No Tail 23 Mehdawy/Hussein The Pharaoh’s Kitchen 31 Alaidy Being Abbas el Abd 15 Moginet Writing Arabic 2 Arnold The Monuments of Egypt 30 Mustafa Contemporary Iraqi Fiction 31 Aslan The Heron 8 Naguib Women, Water, and Memory 29 Bader Papa Sartre 20 O’Kane The Illustrated Guide to the Museum 9 Bayat Life as Politics of Islamic Art 13 al-Berry Life is More Beautiful than Paradise 2 Ratnagar The Timeline History of Ancient Egypt 15 Bloom/Blair Grove Encyclopedia of Islamic Art 33 Roberts, R.A. -
Matteo Renzi Must Work with Italian Trade Unions Rather Than Against Them If He Is Serious About Reforming Italy's Labour Mark
201761 Matteo Renzi must work with Italian trade unions rather than against them if he is serious about reforming Italy’s labour market | New European Trad… Matteo Renzi must work with Italian trade unions rather than against them if he is serious about reforming Italy’s labour market Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has made reforming the Italian labour market a priority for his government. Chiara Benassi and Niccolo Durazzi assess the argument that Italy’s trade unions are an obstacle to reforms on the basis that they support only their core membership, rather than a broader agenda which includes ‘atypical’ workers such as agency staff. They argue that unions have taken on a much broader stance than they are typically credited with and that if Renzi is serious about reforming the country’s labour market it would be beneficial to work with unions rather than against them. It is safe to say that in Italy the main centreleft party – including all the previous versions of the most recently branded Democratic Party (PD) – and its historical ally among the unions, the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), have never been more distant. The climax was reached on the weekend of 2526 October. On that weekend, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi held his annual ‘Leopolda’ event in Florence (named after the former train station where it takes place) which brought together government representatives, members of the PD, members of civil society, entrepreneurs and employers to present and discuss, among others, the reforms which are supposed to revitalise the stagnating Italian labour market. -
Submission to the Human Rights Committee by the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation
Submission to the Human Rights Committee by The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation 130th Session, 12th October 2020 - 6th November 2020 Malta’s third periodic review Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights I. Introduction 1. Submitting Parties The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation welcomes the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) request for information regarding human rights issues concerning the ‘State Party’ of Malta. The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation is a non-profit, independent and non-governmental organisation registered in Malta and was established by the family of the investigative journalist, Daphne Caruana Galizia, who was assassinated in a car bomb attack in Malta on 16th October 2017. 2. The Foundation’s mission is accordingly; ensuring the public interest of full justice for Daphne’s assasination; supporting efforts to protect investigative journalists; ending impunity for the murder of journalists; ensuring the guardianship of Daphne’s work; promoting a culture of public interest litigation; supporting independent, non-partisan media.1 In doing so, we advocate for the complete fulfilment of the core values of international human rights laws, including but not limited to, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Malta is a state party. 3. Our submission will focus specially on the failures to implement Article 2, Article 14, Article 17 and Article 19 of the ICCPR in Malta. The Foundation hopes that our assessment of these issues will contribute towards the Human Right Committee’s evaluation of Malta’s adherence to their obligations under international law. We support the full adherence to the 2018 Venice Commission recommendations to Malta, many of which are outstanding. -
I. Diplomacy's Winding Course 2012
2012 - A Make or Break Year for Serbia and Kosovo? By Dr. Matthew Rhodes and Dr. Valbona Zeneli nstead of the hoped for turn to normalization, 2011 NATO and EU member states except Cyprus, Greece, Isaw escalated tensions over Kosovo. Agreement Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. on Kosovo’s participation in regional fora and Serbia’s formal advance to Serbia’s challenge before EU candidacy in early 2012 the International Court of have revived a cautious “The very active first three Justice (ICJ) marked the centerpiece of its strategy sense of optimism, but months of 2012 have restored unresolved underlying issues against Kosovo’s move. and approaching political a sense of calm regarding Winning support within the United Nations General contests leave the prospects Serbia and Kosovo. Intensified for further progress uncertain. Assembly in October 2008 Warnings of precipices and European and American for consideration of the case powder kegs are overdone represented a significant in the Balkans, but 2012 is diplomacy together with success for Serbian diplomacy. shaping up as a potentially leaders’ attention to larger However, the Court’s July decisive year for international 2010 decision that Kosovo’s policy in the region. goals prevented 2011’s act had not violated international law effectively skirmishes over border Despite the Euro-Atlantic closed off this challenge. community’s current internal posts and barricades from Potentially positively for both challenges, integration into sides, however, the case’s that community’s formal escalating into something conclusion opened the way structures remains the best worse. As welcome as that for direct talks on technical path for Balkan security issues between Belgrade and and development. -
What Will France's Role in Europe Be Over the Next Five Years?
September 8th, 2017 Note n°23 Eurocité, 12 Citémalesherbes, 75009 Paris [email protected] www.eurocite.eu What will France’s role in Europe be over the next five years? Spain’s expectations, by Dídac Gutiérrez-Peris For once, France’s 2017 presidential elections had a strong sense of déjà-vu in Spain. A reminder of the rifts, the changes and the divides which have marked the Spanish political life in the past 10 years, such as the rise of a more radical left beside a worn out socialist party, exhausted by the exercise of power. Many similarities are to be found in the rise of Mélenchon’s party and its relationship with the PS with Podemos’ ascent and the PSOE. Another example would be the appearance of a new centrist party which also plays the anti-system card. It’s no surprise to see that Ciudadanos claims to belong to the same political trend as Macron’s party and that the new French President views the Orange movement as a positive development for Spain. And finally, the conservative right which, despite the many crises it went through, remains present on the political scene. Les Républicains and Partido Popular are both seing their reputation damaged due to corruption scandals and yet both remain key political elements, with Partido Popular in power in Spain and Les Républicains as the main party of opposition in Parliament in France. There are two main differences between the two countries though. Even though France was the last one to go through such a transition, En Marche’s victory was a much more significant disruption of the bipartisan state of play than in Spain. -
Catalan Independence 2018
Catalan Independence 2018 On October 1, 2017, the Catalan Government headed by Carles Puigdemont of the Junts per Catalunya parliamentary alliance held a referendum on the future independence of Catalonia. A semi-autonomous region within Spain, Catalonia enjoyed comparatively larger self-governance than many of Spain’s other regions after Francisco Franco’s rule ended in 1975. While independence has had relatively strong support in recent years, a final decision has remained elusive due to inconclusive elections, referenda, and political opposition from Madrid. The 2017 referendum recorded 92% of respondents favoring Catalan independence. However, only 43% of registered voters voted in the election marred by domestic and national opposition. The government nonetheless pushed through, declaring itself independent on October 27th. Declaring the referendum and declaration illegal, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy dismissed the Catalan Generalitat and renewed elections. Puigdemont and his cabinet subsequently fled to Brussels, the headquarters of the European Union. This committee takes place in Catalonia, but Puigdemont remains in exile and his former vice president, Oriol Junqueras, remains in prison. This cabinet consists of fifteen members of Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes) who had not been prosecuted by the Spanish Government after the referendum, and five Spanish representatives sent from Madrid to ensure compliance. Each Catalan member will have access to powers retained after the dissolution of parliament and powers temporarily withheld by Madrid in response to the crisis. Each Spanish member starts with greater powers given by the Spanish government, but will lose some power if and when Madrid deems the situation more under control. -
Rethinking Islamist Politics February 11, 2014 Contents
POMEPS STUDIES 6 islam in a changing middle east Rethinking Islamist Politics February 11, 2014 Contents The Debacle of Orthodox Islamism . 7 Khalil al-Anani, Middle East Institute Understanding the Ideological Drivers Pushing Youth Toward Violence in Post-Coup Egypt . 9 Mokhtar Awad, Center for American Progress Why do Islamists Provide Social Services? . 13 Steven Brooke, University of Texas at Austin Rethinking Post-Islamism and the Study of Changes in Islamist Ideology . 16 By Michaelle Browers, Wake Forest University The Brotherhood Withdraws Into Itself . 19 Nathan J. Brown, George Washington University Were the Islamists Wrong-Footed by the Arab Spring? . 24 François Burgat, CNRS, Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman (translated by Patrick Hutchinson) Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring . 28 Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) The Islamist Appeal to Quranic Authority . 31 Bruce B. Lawrence, Duke University Is the Post-Islamism Thesis Still Valid? . 33 Peter Mandaville, George Mason University Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong? . 37 Marc Lynch, George Washington University Rethinking Political Islam? Think Again . 40 Tarek Masoud, Harvard University Islamist Movements and the Political After the Arab Uprisings . 44 Roel Meijer, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and Ghent University, Belgium Beyond Islamist Groups . 47 Jillian Schwedler, Hunter College, City University of New York The Shifting Legitimization of Democracy and Elections: . 50 Joas Wagemakers, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands Rethinking Islamist Politics . 52 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Emory University Progressive Problemshift or Paradigmatic Degeneration? . 56 Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Hobart and William Smith Colleges Online Article Index Please see http://pomeps.org/2014/01/rethinking-islamist-politics-conference/ for online versions of all of the articles in this briefing . -
Islam and Democracy
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY number 85/86 • volume 22, 2017 EDITED BY ANJA ZALTA MUHAMED ALI POLIGRAFI Editor-in-Chief: Helena Motoh (ZRS Koper) Editorial Board: Lenart Škof (ZRS Koper), Igor Škamperle (Univ. of Ljubljana), Mojca Terčelj (Univ. of Primorska), Miha Pintarič (Univ. of Ljubljana), Rok Svetlič (ZRS Koper), Anja Zalta (Univ. of Ljubljana) Editorial Office: Science and Research Centre Koper, Institute for Philosophical Studies, Garibaldijeva 1, SI-6000 Koper, Slovenia Phone: +386 5 6637 700, Fax: + 386 5 6637 710, E-mail: [email protected] http://www.zrs-kp.si/revije number 85/86, volume 22 (2017) ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY Edited by Anja Zalta and Muhamed Ali International Editorial Board: Th. Luckmann (Universität Konstanz), D. Kleinberg-Levin (Northwestern University), R. A. Mall (Universität München), M. Ježić (Filozofski fakultet, Zagreb), D. Louw (University of the Free State, Bloemfontain), M. Volf (Yale University), K. Wiredu (University of South Florida), D. Thomas (University of Birmingham), M. Kerševan (Filozofska fakulteta, Ljubljana), F. Leoncini (Università degli Studi di Venezia), P. Zovatto (Università di Trieste), T. Garfitt (Oxford University), M. Zink (Collège de France), L. Olivé (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), A. Louth (Durham University), P. Imbert (University of Ottawa), Ö. Turan (Middle-East Technical University, Ankara), E. Krotz (Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán / Universidad Autónoma de Metropolitana-Iztapalapa), S. Touissant (École Normale Supérieure), B. Mezzadri (Université d’Avignon), A. Bárabas -
Kosovo Political Economy Analysis Final Report
KOSOVO POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT DECEMBER 26, 2017 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International, A Tetra Tech Company. KOSOVO POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT December 26, 2017 IDIQ No. AID-167-I-17-00002 Award No: AID-167-TO-17-00009 Prepared by Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company 200 12th St South, Suite 1200 Arlington, VA, USA 22202 DISCLAIMER This report is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of the Management Systems International and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. CONTENTS Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... ii Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 6 II. Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 7 A. Foundational Factors ........................................................................................................................................... 7 B. Rules