Modern History

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Modern History MODERN HISTORY Leon Trotsky Leon Trotsky was one of the most significant figures in the revolutionary period of Russian history. Born in 1879 in the Ukraine, he rose to prominence during the 1905 revolutions. His alliance with the Bolshevik came late, in 1917, however in the events leading to the Bolshevik revolution his organisational abilities and intellectual gifts meant that he was second only to Lenin. Trotsky’s life spanned an illustrious sixty one years, and centred primarily on the political and ideological stage of Russia. His decline, however, began following Lenin’s death in 1924 as he was outmanoeuvred by Stalin in the subsequent power struggle. Trotsky spent in later years in exile, until in 1940 he was murdered, presumably by one of Stalin’s assassins, with an ice pick. Prior to the Bolshevik’s revolution in 1917, Trotsky was independent of both Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. Following the overthrow of the Tsarist government, Trotsky assumed the role of leading the Interdistrict Committee of Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) – which included both Mensheviks and Bolshevik. He also joined the newly established Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Democratic Soldiers. However, because he disapproved of the support which the Mensheviks were providing the Provisional government and the war effort; Trotsky joined the Bolshevik in July, 1917. He then became the leader of Military Revolutionary Committee. “On 12th October a Military Revolutionary was established … whereby the mechanics of the seizure of power were worked out and put into effect” (Gill). Through this Committee, Trotsky led the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. “The MRC operations, headed by Trotsky, had carried the day.” (McCauley) Following the fall of the provisional government and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, the Congress appointed a new Chairman – Lenin, and a new Commissar for Foreign Affairs – Trotsky. As the new minister for foreign affairs, Trotsky became a principle figure in negotiations concerning Germany and central powers in 1918. Trotsky’s belief in ‘worldwide revolution’ meant that there would be little or no need for a foreign policy as all states would be united under the ideology of socialism. The reality, however, was quite different as some foreign capitalist states as well as Germany posed a dangerous threat to the Russian revolution. Peace negotiations began at the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which Germany demanded unrealistic portions of Russian land in return for peace. “Trotsky, who was the main negotiator at the peace talks, supported a strategy of ‘no war, no peace’”. (Gill) Trotsky was soon to resign from his role as commissar of foreign affairs due to his opposition to the demands made by Germany within the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. He then became Commissar of War and Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Russia. Following the Bolshevik revolution, it was decided by Lenin that the Old Russian army would have to be turned into an instrument of the Communist party. Trotsky began to demobilise the old army, and in 1918, he formed an efficient military forced known as the ‘red army’. The Bolshevik used terror to stamp out any insurrection and prevent retreat. Both Trotsky and Lenin saw terror as a necessary instrument of government. Through Trotsky lacked extensive military skills, he was a talented organiser and easily won the respect of his troops. Lenin was so pleased with Trotsky’s achievement that in 1919 he declared, “Show me another man who could have practically created a model army in a year and won the respect of the military specialist as well.” It was mostly due to Trotsky’s management of the red army that the Bolshevik eventually won the civil war on 1918 to 1921. This ensured the survival of the Bolshevik government and resulted in Trotsky being elected as a member of the Communist Party Central Committee. Within the politburo, Trotsky was second only to Lenin, and Lenin viewed Trotsky as extremely able. The two clashed in 1920 over the role of trade unions, however were reunited by the 1921 Kronstadt Uprising. In this uprising, a wave of strikes swept Petrograd as soldiers and sailors became restless due to the effects of war Communism. Trotsky’s red guards suppressed the mutineers with great bloodshed. This indicated that the party elite were prepared to use brutal force on their own supporters. By the mid 1920’s there were many debates regarding what should be done about Russia’s economy. It was generally agreed that the tempo of industrialisation needed to be increased, however, such a development had to be financed by the peasants. Grain exports had to be expanded to pay for machinery imports and to finance development projects. Bukharin and the Right suggested the need to increase the production of consumer goods in order to provide incentives for the peasants to increase production of their own grain. Trotsky, however, proposed that the government should take a fixed percentage of grain and let the peasants sell the rest at free market prices. Lenin opposed this however, as he like many after the civil war, resisted the idea of reintroducing capitalism. Trotsky then began to argue for methods of direct mobilisation of grain. Lenin soon saw the merits of Trotsky’s first idea, and the incorporation of this policy (NEP) meant the end of war Communism. In 1925, Trotsky demanded an end to NEP, proposing the government should tax peasants as hard as possible, thereby increasing productivity through methods of socialism rather than capitalistic NEP. This strategy depended on the abandonment of NEP and a rapid expansion of socialism in the countryside, however it also had serious problems such as retaliation from peasantry and abroad. Following Lenin’s death in 1924, Trotsky and Stalin became involved in an intense struggle for power and leadership of Russia. After Lenin the most dominant member of the Party was Trotsky, however the most influential member was Stalin. Lenin himself saw Trotsky as the more likely and obvious successor, however it was Stalin who eventually overpowered Trotsky and filled the void left by Lenin’s death. Many factors contributed to Trotsky’s demise, such as the fact he was not widely liked by other Party members due to his late involvement in the Bolshevik Party and a history of bitter disputes with Lenin. The two suffered irreconcilable ideological differences – Stalin’s theory of ‘revolution in one country’ opposing Trotsky’s ‘world revolution’. Stalin himself also held four highly important positions, being Commissar for Nationalities, Liaison Officer between Politburo and Orgburo, Head of the Worker’s Inspectorate and General Secretary of the Communist Party. It was to Stalin that Trotsky lost his position as commissar of war in 1925 – another crucial factor contributing to his demise. Although it appears that Stalin’s supremacy over Trotsky was only obvious in the political arena, it was also evident in a social context as a result of events to which Trotsky failed to appear at, such as Lenin’s funeral, and the result of Lenin’s final testament never being publicly read out directly after his death. The positions which Stalin held meant that he had the control and the ability to manipulate other party member’s opinions and action. Stalin boasted strength and will of character; he was an intense and coercive leader who overpowered Trotsky in the struggle for power in the USSR. Despite Trotsky’s succession over Lenin as appearing to be of a more likely and logical nature, he could not prevent Stalin from triumphing as leader due to his lack of political power and character strength. Stalin’s power over Trotsky eventually led to his exile from Russia in 1928 and his expulsion in 1929. During his time in exile, Leon Trotsky continued his prolific writings. From 1929 to 1940, he published the journal, “Bulletin of the Opposition”, in which he supplied articles on matters such as Soviet politics and international affairs. In 1930, he published his famous autobiography, “My Life”, which is re-known for its self – analysis. One of Trotsky’s finest works appeared from 1931 and 1933, entitled, “History of the Russian Revolution”. Texts which also emerged from Trotsky’s time in exile include, “The Russian Betrayed” (1937), and “Stalin” (1941). After one assassination attempt in May 1940, Leon Trotsky was murdered following Stalin’s orders in August of the same year, by Ramon Mercader, a Spanish agent for the Soviet Secret Police. As one of Soviet Russia’s most brilliant Marxist leaders, Trotsky was “a man of action”, thinker and a writer, whole political and literary activity spanned the first four decades of the 20th Century. His skills as an organiser and military strategist did a lot to ensure the success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the defeat of the Bolshevik enemies in the following Civil War. His conviction in world revolution effectively created a commitment to radical domestic policies and to the use of severe measures when needed. For Trotsky, the success of the Bolshevik revolution was a necessary factor of the process of world revolution, which is one of the reasons why he refused to sway from the use of violence against Bolshevik enemies. Yet despite his ability to be ruthless and merciless, Trotsky failed to match Stalin’s ability to manipulate and control other party members, thus demise and downfall was inevitable. As for the second one, here’s my response for a similar question or maybe the same one can’t remember. Leon Trotsky was made Commissar of War in 1918, on the eve of the Civil War in the spring of 1918 which erupted between the centralised, unified Red Army and the decentralised, unorganised White Army.
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