Destructivity: a Political Economy of Military Effectiveness in Conventional Combat
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Destructivity: a Political Economy of Military Effectiveness in Conventional Combat by Charles A. Miller Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved Peter Feaver, Co-Supervisor Christopher Gelpi, Co-Supervisor Joseph Grieco David Soskice Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School at Duke University 2013 Abstract Destructivity: a Political Economy of Military Effectiveness in Conventional Combat by Charles A. Miller Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved Peter Feaver, Co-Supervisor Christopher Gelpi, Co-Supervisor Joseph Grieco David Soskice An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School at Duke University 2013 Copyright by Charles A. Miller 2013 Abstract Neither technological nor numerical superiority accounts for the outcome of most battles. Instead, some intangible factor has historically mattered more. The political science literature has termed this factor ‘military effectiveness’, yet using this phrase to refer solely to efficiency in one of the many tasks militaries are asked to perform can be dangerous. Armies which are good at conventional combat may be less effective at internal security, for instance. I therefore propose a new term ‘destructivity’ to refer exclusively to military effectiveness in high intensity, conventional warfare. Previous literature has suggested a number of factors which may account for variation between states in their levels of destructivity. Wealth, human capital, regime type, ethnic heterogeneity, culture and the external pressures of the international system have all been suggested by past scholars. Quantitative literature has uncovered many broad level correlations which could map onto numerous plausible causal mechanisms, while the qualitative literature has pointed to numerous theories which have remained untested outside the small number of cases which motivated them. My dissertation puts forward a unified theory of destructivity based on the recognition that armies are not unitary actors but must be understood in light of the motivations and interactions of the individual officers and men which comprise them. Borrowing a concept from organizational economics, I suggest that an Army is a large scale ‘rank order tournament’ in which individuals enter in the hope of advancement through mastering military skills and performing well in battle. The broader the funnel of entry into these tournaments, the stiffer is competition for advancement and hence the higher the Army’s level of skill. It follows from this iv that whatever restricts entry into the tournament – low literacy, politically motivated restrictions from coup vulnerable leaders and poor prospects for post service employment – reduces destructivity. Motivating troops to fight is a complex undertaking. The broader goals of the war by themselves are insufficient as any given soldier’s marginal contribution to the outcome of the war is minute. Regrettable though it is to concede, harsh negative punishments such as the death penalty can be effective in deterring the most obvious and observable forms of military shirking. In situations where soldiers’ actions are hard to observe, however, negative sanctions are less effective. Here, the concept of peer monitoring, taken from microfinance, is more important – soldiers are deterred from shirking by the prospect of censure from other members of their small groups. I first test my theory on a dataset of battles taken from Biddle and Long, Pilster and Boehmelt and Clodfelter. I then proceed to use four case studies to illustrate my causal mechanisms. Using original archival material and interviews with retired Iraqi military personnel, I show how both low literacy and coup proofing undermined Iraq’s destructivity relative to the United States. I then examine the British and German cases to answer the question – what happens when two states of equal literacy, with no history of coups, fight one another? I suggest that market structure, by affecting the relative opportunities for military recruits inside and outside the service, is the key factor in providing a marginal advantage to one side relative to the other. v Dedication I would like to dedicate this work to all of the young men and women of all nationalities who laid down their lives in the conflicts described here, especially my mother’s uncle, Private Samuel McVeigh Laird, 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who was killed on the Western Front in 1917, at the age of 19. Who knows what he or any of the others who fell could have achieved if they had been allowed to live. vi Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xii List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgments......................................................................................................................... xvi 1- Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 1.1- Why we should continue to study the blackest of swans ............................................. 6 1.2- My argument .............................................................................................................. 25 2- Theory Chapter ................................................................................................................. 30 2.1- Introduction and supergame ...................................................................................... 30 2.2- The Funnels ............................................................................................................... 33 2.2.1- Consequences of Low Literacy ................................................................. 37 2.2.2- Politically Motivated Restrictions on officer recruitment ......................... 39 2.2.3- Good alternative options on enlistment and poor post service prospects .. 40 2.2.4- Tactical consequences of a restricted funnel ............................................. 41 2.2.4.1- Devolving Power, Showing Initiative ....................................... 60 2.2.4.1.1- Conditions ................................................................. 60 2.2.4.2- Peer Monitoring ......................................................................... 61 2.2.4.3- Peer Monitoring, Hard Fighting ................................................ 63 2.2.4.3.1- Conditions ................................................................. 63 2.2.4.4- No peer monitoring, no hard fighting ........................................ 64 vii 2.2.4.4.1- Conditions ................................................................. 64 2.2.5- Why political leaders might choose to constrict the officer funnel ........... 65 2.2.6- Open Army Equilibrium ............................................................................ 74 2.2.6.1- Conditions ................................................................................. 74 2.2.7- Screened Army Equilibrium ...................................................................... 75 2.2.7.1- Conditions ................................................................................. 75 2.2.7.1.1- Baseline Coup Risk ................................................... 77 2.3 Alternative Theories ................................................................................................... 92 2.3.1- External Threat .......................................................................................... 92 2.3.2- Democratic Triumphalism ......................................................................... 95 2.3.3- Human Capital ........................................................................................... 97 2.3.4- Wealth........................................................................................................ 99 2.3.5- Alternative Coup Proofing Theories ........................................................ 100 2.3.6- Culture ..................................................................................................... 105 2.3.7- Conclusion ............................................................................................... 108 2.3.8- Hypotheses .............................................................................................. 110 2.3.9- Alternative Hypotheses............................................................................ 111 2.3.10- Plan for the Following Chapters ............................................................ 112 3- Quantitative Analysis ...................................................................................................... 116 3.1- Unit of Analysis ....................................................................................................... 116 3.2- Independent Variables ............................................................................................. 117 3.2.1- The Funnel ..............................................................................................