Dealing with Pakistan Needs a Grand Strategy
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STRATEGIC AFFAIRS stood out in the Indian toolkit. Dialogue Dealing with Pakistan Needs with an elected civilian leadership has usually been presented as part of strength- a Grand Strategy ening the process of the embryonic and fragile democracy in Pakistan that over time would rectify the domestic imbal- Zorawar Daulet Singh ance and weaken the security establish- ment’s near total control over Pakistan’s For the past few decades, India he February 2019 Pulwama attack foreign policies. There is also a deterrent has adopted a lopsided Pakistan against Indian security forces in component, which includes maintaining policy with engagement as TJammu and Kashmir and the a conventional posture backed by a Indian government’s willingness to take credible capacity to infl ict costs on Paki- the only means to reorient fi ght to the Pakistani heartland is a clear stan in the scenario of a Kargil-style Pakistan’s foreign policy. India departure from the policy of strategic adventurist intrusion into Jammu and must transition to a realpolitik restraint. Even if the main impetus for Kashmir (J&K), or in other theatres. approach backed by a range this strategic shift was an impending Finally, there are interested third par- national election in India, the geostrategic ties—the US given its long-standing alli- of power instruments, along consequences will outlast this phase. ance with Pakistan, and China with its with creatively leveraging the Stripped to its core, India’s emerging renewed involvement in Pakistan over international environment. approach can be described as a counter- the past fi ve years—who are very infl u- India should pursue cultural coercive strategy, since it aims to deter ential behind-the-scenes players in the Pakistan from engaging in coercion India–Pakistan relationship and with and commercial ties with liberal through targeted terrorism in Kashmir. whom India seeks to further its counter- constituencies inside Pakistan, The next challenge before the Indian terrorism goals. and remain open to dialogue leaders is to incorporate this approach as It should be apparent that India’s with political forces that are part of a grand strategy. What could be approach has essentially been a persua- the principal elements of this broader sion-based one to advance the twin reconsidering Pakistan’s role strategy? What goals should India seek? goals of changing Pakistan’s external in the region. What are the possibilities for reorienting behaviour and its domestic politics. The domestic political incentives inside Paki- military instrument has so far been visu- stan? How do other pieces of the geo- alised either as a passive defence instru- political puzzle in terms of Pakistan’s ment—that is, fi ghting the incoming patrons and allies fi t into India’s aims proxies on Indian soil—or as a broader and interests? deterrence instrument to deal with audacious conventional surprises. Yet, to A Comprehensive Approach be effective in this case and instil confi - India’s strategy has been shaped by goals dence to the civilian side of the Pakistani that have sought to alter the situation on equation in its aspiration for democracy, three interrelated levels. First, changing persuasion actually requires parallel Pakistani behaviour so it ceases or decel- counter-coercive instruments in India’s erates cross-border terrorism. Second, toolkit. Aside from India’s restrained changing Pakistan’s internal structure military defence posture to hold fi rm on and its imbalanced civil–military relations the frontiers and the Line of Control that perpetuate a structural confronta- (LoC) in J&K, there has been little so far tion with India. Third, changing how the in India’s repertoire to alter the Pakistan international community, particularly the Army’s irredentist behaviour. There has United States (US) and China, perceive been no known cost imposition strategy India’s predicament and are willing and to reshape the incentives of Rawalpindi. able in their self-interests to restrain The 26 February air strikes were, there- Zorawar Daulet Singh (zorawar.dauletsingh@ Pakistan’s proxy war. And then, what are fore, a fi rst step in exploring options that gmail.com) is a fellow at the Centre for Policy the instruments or means that have been impose costs before they occur (India’s Research and the author of Power and envisaged to pursue these three goals? casus belli presented the move as a “pre- Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Until a few years ago, it was the emptive” one) and, equally importantly, Cold War. primacy of a diplomatic instrument that a signal to the adversary that Indian 10 march 30, 2019 vol lIV no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly STRATEGIC AFFAIRS restraint is no longer a taken-for-granted public opinion cannot but abandon terrorist networks while also presenting assumption when the Pakistani deep the engagement process after a violent the Pakistan Army with a costly choice state is plotting plans to stir trouble in backlash from the Pakistani deep state. to escalate to a bigger conventional clash. Kashmir. Put another way, by its recent Historically then, India has placed far actions, India has introduced an element too much burden on the civilian side in Leveraging the Global Situation of ambiguity and uncertainty in the Pakistan to change the domestic struc- As early as 1947, South Asia had become Pakistan Army’s calculus, which, hence- tural dynamic, without, in any meaning- entangled in a wider geopolitical setting. forth, cannot count on strategic restraint ful way, also sharing responsibility of In the ensuing decades, major powers from the other side. changing the incentives of institutions acquired enduring stakes in the strategic At some stage after the 2019 national such as the Pakistan Army which thrive interactions between India and Pakistan. elections, a new Indian government would on controlled confrontation with India. The subcontinent’s nuclearisation has explore diplomacy with an elected regime Most debates on India’s coercive options merely reinforced international interest in Islamabad. Let us assume that the treat it as a mutually exclusive process— in strategic stability and impelled exter- Indian overture is reciprocated. Such a false choice between engagement and nal powers to strike a fi ne balance bet- engagement would be sustainable only containment—rather than as a vital ween the vital interests of both countries. if it were accompanied by a parallel component of a grand strategy. If India Getting the international situation right strategy to blunt and weaken the Pakistani seeks more than fl eeting success, it needs is important for two reasons. Pakistan’s deep state and its military. This dual to develop a policy strategy that is logi- incentives to alter course would be game, somewhat ironically, would become cal and consistent with the two mutually closely linked with its expectations of even more imperative if India’s engage- inclusive goals that have shaped Indian international support. And, any moves ment with the civilian regime develops thinking for decades: the transformation by India to raise the stakes in its quest apace since the Pakistan Army will in all of Pakistan’s regional behaviour and its for legitimate security would only suc- likelihood employ sub-conventional tools internal power structure. ceed if Pakistan’s benefactors do not at its disposal to ratchet up terror strikes At whatever levels it is pursued, civilian obstruct or constrain Delhi’s policy. The in India to disrupt or modulate the engagement must be supplemented by a recent crisis showed that both Washing- détente process according to its own strategy to impose costs and undermine ton and Beijing did not necessarily play a preferences. And, this pattern will con- the prestige of the Pakistan Army. This negative role and increased their involve- tinue to repeat until the missing link in would involve a more robust internal ment to defuse the stand-off when events India’s toolkit is addressed. security framework, including the intro- appeared poised for a costly regional If we assume that the civil and military duction of more advanced counter-terror escalation. Tellingly, US rhetoric even groups in state and society have diverg- capabilities that seek to substantially endorsed the idea of India’s right to ing goals and visions for Pakistan (the minimise Indian military casualties in defend itself in a proactive fashion from degree of these differences is a question operations in J&K (since 2008, over 740 cross-border terrorist attacks. of legitimate debate and disagreements security forces personnel have lost their If we step back and evaluate the in the strategic community)—and India lives1), developing covert proxy capa- India–Pakistan equation over the past would like to provide an impetus to the bilities that impose reciprocal costs on fi ve years, what stands out is that both civilian side via diplomacy and a pre- Pakistani security institutions, and a sides proceeded from a perception that dictable dialogue process—the parallel more sophisticated conventional military each holds an advantageous position. side of anticipating and blunting the posture that can offer the political lead- India’s confi dence emanated from Modi’s lashing out by the security establish- ership a variety of highly limited and 2014 victory that yielded a strong central ment in Pakistan cannot be ignored. For, targeted options to degrade the fl ow of government and expectations of stable how can we expect Pakistan’s civilian leadership and civil society to place its confi dence in a modus vivendi with India Licensing by EPWI if it fi nds the Pakistan Army can slap it down at home on foreign policy issues and EPW has licensed its material for non-exclusive use to only the following content aggregators— continue to bleed India at will? There Contify, Factiva, Jstor, Magzter and Reliance Jio.