STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

stood out in the Indian toolkit. Dialogue Dealing with Needs with an elected civilian leadership has usually been presented as part of strength- a Grand Strategy ening the process of the embryonic and fragile democracy in Pakistan that over time would rectify the domestic imbal- Zorawar Daulet Singh ance and weaken the security establish- ment’s near total control over Pakistan’s For the past few decades, he February 2019 attack foreign policies. There is also a deterrent has adopted a lopsided Pakistan against Indian security forces in component, which includes maintaining policy with engagement as TJammu and and the a conventional posture backed by a Indian government’s willingness to take credible capacity to infl ict costs on Paki- the only means to reorient fi ght to the Pakistani heartland is a clear stan in the scenario of a Kargil-style Pakistan’s foreign policy. India departure from the policy of strategic adventurist intrusion into and must transition to a realpolitik restraint. Even if the main impetus for Kashmir (J&K), or in other theatres. approach backed by a range this strategic shift was an impending Finally, there are interested third par- national election in India, the geostrategic ties—the US given its long-standing alli- of power instruments, along consequences will outlast this phase. ance with Pakistan, and with its with creatively leveraging the Stripped to its core, India’s emerging renewed involvement in Pakistan over international environment. approach can be described as a counter- the past fi ve years—who are very infl u- India should pursue cultural coercive strategy, since it aims to deter ential behind-the-scenes players in the Pakistan from engaging in coercion India–Pakistan relationship and with and commercial ties with liberal through targeted terrorism in Kashmir. whom India seeks to further its counter- constituencies inside Pakistan, The next challenge before the Indian terrorism goals. and remain open to dialogue leaders is to incorporate this approach as It should be apparent that India’s with political forces that are part of a grand strategy. What could be approach has essentially been a persua- the principal elements of this broader sion-based one to advance the twin reconsidering Pakistan’s role strategy? What goals should India seek? goals of changing Pakistan’s external in the region. What are the possibilities for reorienting behaviour and its domestic politics. The domestic political incentives inside Paki- military instrument has so far been visu- stan? How do other pieces of the geo- alised either as a passive defence instru- political puzzle in terms of Pakistan’s ment—that is, fi ghting the incoming patrons and allies fi t into India’s aims proxies on Indian soil—or as a broader and interests? deterrence instrument to deal with audacious conventional surprises. Yet, to A Comprehensive Approach be effective in this case and instil confi - India’s strategy has been shaped by goals dence to the civilian side of the Pakistani that have sought to alter the situation on equation in its aspiration for democracy, three interrelated levels. First, changing persuasion actually requires parallel Pakistani behaviour so it ceases or decel- counter-coercive instruments in India’s erates cross-border terrorism. Second, toolkit. Aside from India’s restrained changing Pakistan’s internal structure military defence posture to hold fi rm on and its imbalanced civil–military relations the frontiers and the that perpetuate a structural confronta- (LoC) in J&K, there has been little so far tion with India. Third, changing how the in India’s repertoire to alter the Pakistan international community, particularly the Army’s irredentist behaviour. There has (US) and China, perceive been no known cost imposition strategy India’s predicament and are willing and to reshape the incentives of Rawalpindi. able in their self-interests to restrain The 26 February air strikes were, there- Zorawar Daulet Singh (zorawar.dauletsingh@ Pakistan’s proxy war. And then, what are fore, a fi rst step in exploring options that gmail.com) is a fellow at the Centre for Policy the instruments or means that have been impose costs before they occur (India’s Research and the author of Power and envisaged to pursue these three goals? casus belli presented the move as a “pre- Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Until a few years ago, it was the emptive” one) and, equally importantly, Cold War. primacy of a diplomatic instrument that a signal to the adversary that Indian

10 march 30, 2019 vol lIV no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly STRATEGIC AFFAIRS restraint is no longer a taken-for-granted public opinion cannot but abandon terrorist networks while also presenting assumption when the Pakistani deep the engagement process after a violent the Pakistan Army with a costly choice state is plotting plans to stir trouble in backlash from the Pakistani deep state. to escalate to a bigger conventional clash. Kashmir. Put another way, by its recent Historically then, India has placed far actions, India has introduced an element too much burden on the civilian side in Leveraging the Global Situation of ambiguity and uncertainty in the Pakistan to change the domestic struc- As early as 1947, South Asia had become Pakistan Army’s calculus, which, hence- tural dynamic, without, in any meaning- entangled in a wider geopolitical setting. forth, cannot count on strategic restraint ful way, also sharing responsibility of In the ensuing decades, major powers from the other side. changing the incentives of institutions acquired enduring stakes in the strategic At some stage after the 2019 national such as the Pakistan Army which thrive interactions between India and Pakistan. elections, a new Indian government would on controlled confrontation with India. The subcontinent’s nuclearisation has explore diplomacy with an elected regime Most debates on India’s coercive options merely reinforced international interest in Islamabad. Let us assume that the treat it as a mutually exclusive process— in strategic stability and impelled exter- Indian overture is reciprocated. Such a false choice between engagement and nal powers to strike a fi ne balance bet- engagement would be sustainable only containment—rather than as a vital ween the vital interests of both countries. if it were accompanied by a parallel component of a grand strategy. If India Getting the international situation right strategy to blunt and weaken the Pakistani seeks more than fl eeting success, it needs is important for two reasons. Pakistan’s deep state and its military. This dual to develop a policy strategy that is logi- incentives to alter course would be game, somewhat ironically, would become cal and consistent with the two mutually closely linked with its expectations of even more imperative if India’s engage- inclusive goals that have shaped Indian international support. And, any moves ment with the civilian regime develops thinking for decades: the transformation by India to raise the stakes in its quest apace since the Pakistan Army will in all of Pakistan’s regional behaviour and its for legitimate security would only suc- likelihood employ sub-conventional tools internal power structure. ceed if Pakistan’s benefactors do not at its disposal to ratchet up terror strikes At whatever levels it is pursued, civilian obstruct or constrain Delhi’s policy. The in India to disrupt or modulate the engagement must be supplemented by a recent crisis showed that both Washing- détente process according to its own strategy to impose costs and undermine ton and Beijing did not necessarily play a preferences. And, this pattern will con- the prestige of the Pakistan Army. This negative role and increased their involve- tinue to repeat until the missing link in would involve a more robust internal ment to defuse the stand-off when events India’s toolkit is addressed. security framework, including the intro- appeared poised for a costly regional If we assume that the civil and military duction of more advanced counter-terror escalation. Tellingly, US rhetoric even groups in state and society have diverg- capabilities that seek to substantially endorsed the idea of India’s right to ing goals and visions for Pakistan (the minimise Indian military casualties in defend itself in a proactive fashion from degree of these differences is a question operations in J&K (since 2008, over 740 cross-border terrorist attacks. of legitimate debate and disagreements security forces personnel have lost their If we step back and evaluate the in the strategic community)—and India lives1), developing covert proxy capa- India–Pakistan equation over the past would like to provide an impetus to the bilities that impose reciprocal costs on fi ve years, what stands out is that both civilian side via diplomacy and a pre- Pakistani security institutions, and a sides proceeded from a perception that dictable dialogue process—the parallel more sophisticated conventional military each holds an advantageous position. side of anticipating and blunting the posture that can offer the political lead- India’s confi dence emanated from Modi’s lashing out by the security establish- ership a variety of highly limited and 2014 victory that yielded a strong central ment in Pakistan cannot be ignored. For, targeted options to degrade the fl ow of government and expectations of stable how can we expect Pakistan’s civilian leadership and civil society to place its confi dence in a modus vivendi with India Licensing by EPWI if it fi nds the Pakistan Army can slap it down at home on foreign policy issues and EPW has licensed its material for non-exclusive use to only the following content aggregators— continue to bleed India at will? There Contify, Factiva, Jstor, Magzter and Reliance Jio. have been numerous instances of this in Contify currently disseminates EPW content to LexisNexis, Thomson Reuters, Securities.com, the past: the Vajpayee–Nawaz Sharif Gale Cengage, Acquiremedia News Bank and ProQuest. engagement before the , the Factiva and Jstor have EPW content on their databases for their registered users, engagement process prior to the 26/11 Magzter on its subscriber-based portal and Reliance Jio on its mobile app platform. 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Economic & Political Weekly EPW march 30, 2019 vol lIV no 13 11 STRATEGIC AFFAIRS ties with all the major powers. Mostly structures and an elite with a wider perceptions of the great powers. Main- overlooked in India, Pakistani analysts world view. A Pakistan that looks taining that India has the right and the and former offi cials too have displayed beyond South Asia could be a useful capacity to adopt an active defence pos- confi dence that the international envi- potential partner in burden sharing, ture—that is, blocking the fl ow of cross- ronment was moving in a direction that ironically for both the US and China. For border terror by proactive operations on opened options for Pakistan that were Washington, the Pakistan Army is an the LoC along with reserving the option unavailable in the previous decade. This insurance card for persisting security for more ambitious punitive strikes in included the renewed patterns of Paki- challenges such as regime survival for response to major terrorist attacks on stan’s ties with the US and China, and US client states in West Asia as well as Indian military targets—would play an the latter providing their reassurances for the containment of . For China, a important part in shaping how third to Pakistan and most importantly to the stable Pakistan can be a partner in the parties view Indian interests and thereby army on their respective strategic com- Belt and Road connectivity projects and assume constructive roles in managing mitments and bilateral partnerships. In future continental industrial and energy Pakistani behaviour. Washington’s case, this appears to have corridors. As Andrew Small (2015: 200) been undertaken somewhat discreetly underlines, Beijing’s large economic In Conclusion to avoid ruffl ing Delhi’s feathers, with investments “come with some clear India’s future Pakistan policy must strive the result that the enduring aspects of expectations about the choices that Paki- to cultivate deterrence and change the US–Pakistan ties remain obscure, but stan’s political and military leadership calculus of the Pakistani security elite in still very real. That Pakistan has sym- make about their country’s future.” their use of proxy terror as an instrument bolically managed to also advance its Pakistan “will not have the free hand of statecraft. To this end, India’s posture public diplomacy with Moscow is seen as that it used to enjoy.” must remain unswerving even as the tac- further proof of its geopolitical relevance. In sum, both the US and China seek a tics remain fl exible. India should also Much of Pakistan’s leverage can of strong, stable, and secure Pakistan that creatively leverage its growing bilateral course be traced to the ongoing phase controls its destabilising behaviour stakes with the US and China to adapt of the Afghan confl ict. It fended off because that undermines their wider their Pakistan policies, and together con- the most dangerous phase when US regional interests. For the US, a revision- template a vision of Pakistan that is in policy might have shifted in an adver- ist Pakistan pulls India inward and away consonance with their main geopolitical sarial direction, or instability in the tribal from potential cooperation on Asian int erests and concerns. Finally, India must frontier areas might have completely geopolitics. For China, it undermines its take the longue durée and remain sensitive exp l o ded. Thus, the Pakistan Army industrial and connectivity projects in to the prospect of change inside Pakistan— probably perceives itself in a position of Pakistan, while negatively impacting however modest and incremental—to reasonable strength where Washington, India–China ties. Hence, evolving inter- develop societal, cultural and commer- Beijing, and Moscow have recognised ests of the great powers in South Asia cial ties with liberal constituencies, and Pakistan’s role in a future settlement on might not necessarily portend an adverse engage in dialogue with political forces the confl ict in Afghanistan. geopolitical setting for India in the that are reconsidering Pakistan’s role in So, both India and Pakistan perceive medium term. This is even more plausible the region. A sophisticated grand strat- themselves to be in a comfortable strate- if the widening comprehensive national egy backed by a range of power instru- gic position. At any rate, the evolving power gap between India and Pakistan ments and nimble enough to adapt to roles and interests of third parties are make the latter’s traditional role as a changing circumstances would not only becoming signifi cant again, and how balancer or spoiler unattractive in the enable India to reduce cross-border ter- Delhi leverages the international envi- eyes of the great powers. As Pakistani ror, it could open unforeseen windows ronment will determine the success of scholar Hussain Haqqani predicts, “You to a more stable subcontinent. The sur- its grand strategy. can try to leverage your strategic loca- rounding politics of the recent crisis Both Washington and Beijing have tion as much as you like, but there will must not distract Indian strategists from overlapping interests in regional stabil- come a time … when strategic concerns moving the needle in new directions. ity and avoidance of a major subconti- change” (Lammon 2019). nental confl ict. While each maintains So, while it is reasonable to forecast note deep ties with Pakistan for different that both the US and China benefi t from 1 South Asia Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp. reasons, it is unclear to what extent their a more normalised Pakistan, Indian org/. longer-term interests coincide with India, policymakers should also remain clear- which seeks a structural transformation eyed that neither country would be will- References in Pakistan’s domestic politics and exter- ing to expend much strategic capital in Lammon, Adam (2019): “Pakistan and India Can’t Escape the Confl ict Cycle,” National Interest, 18 nal behaviour. The US and China appear an ambitious policy to reorder the domes- M ar ch, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/p ak- content with, or probably prefer, a Paki- tic scene or civil–military relations in i stan-and-india-cant-escape-confl ict-cyc le- 47972. Small, Andrew (2015): The China–Pakistan Axis: stan with a strong Rawalpindi, along Pakistan. Not yet, at least. In any case, Asia’s New Geopolitics, Gurgaon: Penguin with competent civilian governance Indian agency is essential to reorient Random House.

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