Globalisation and Indentity Building a Social
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GLOBALISATION AND INDENTITY BUILDING A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO SINO-TAINWANESE RELATIONS By Uwe Wunderlich Draft only! No Quotation without author’s prior consent! Globalisation and Identity Building: A Social Constructivist Approach to Sino- Taiwanese Relations Introduction During the last decade Taiwan has slowly moved away from the mainland and from the ‘One China’ principle as the cornerstone for Sino-Taiwanese relations. This has resulted in a period of enhanced tensions (periodically reaching crisis level) with China. The 2004 presidential election in Taiwan and the campaign preceding it have done nothing to improve cross-Strait relations. In some ways the re-elected president, Chen Shui-bian, has taken the island closer to a formal separation from China than ever before, resulting in an angry response from Beijing. Three issues stand out in this context: Chen Shui-bian’s call for a new constitution, his visit to the United States (US) in October 2003 and his call for a referendum on national security matters. Yet Beijing has remained remarkably calm so far.1 As one commentator states: ‘Beijing had clearly learned its lessons from Taiwan’s previous two presidential elections when its sabre-rattling backfired.’2 Curiously enough, Chen’s timing could not have been worse – as far as international relations are concerned. Taipei’s main security guarantor, the United States (US), is everything but enthusiastic about a possible confrontation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Washington needs Beijing’s co-operation in its ‘war on terrorism’ and regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsular. Following a visit of the Chinese Premier. Wen Jiabao, President Bush asserted ‘We oppose any unilateral decision, by either China or Taiwan, to change the status quo [of Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland] … And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally that change the status quo, which we oppose.’3 Chen Shui-bian’s confrontational style had indeed become a sensitive issue for Washington. Despite his promise to defend Taiwan against an unprovoked attack, President Bush rebuked Chen-Shui-bian for his referendum plans 1 See A. Kuhn, ‘China bites its Tongue’, Far Eastern Economic Review (1April 2004). 2 A. Kuhn, ‘The View from Beijing: A Sliver of Hope Would be Welcome’, Far Eastern Economic Review (4 March 2004). 3 S. V. Lawrence, J. Dean, ‘Taiwan – A New Threat’, Far Eastern Economic Review (18 December 2003). 2 to win support for additional military countermeasures to China’s missile build-up and for a political dialogue with the mainland on an equal footing.4 The question arises as to why Taipei appears to be pursuing a policy that will ultimately bring it into direct confrontation with an increasingly assertive China, while at the same time forcing its most important supporter, the US, into a position which may make it necessary to rethink its pledge to defend the island. The fragility of cross-Strait relations were dramatically pointed out by the renewed threat from Beijing that ‘the use of force may become unavoidable.’5 This paper argues that behind Taipei’s recent independence noises are more than just election politics. Although Chen Shui-bian’s push for Taiwanese voters to hold a referendum on threats from the PRC and to rewrite the constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) have been heavily influenced by campaign politics, it is also indicative of something more substantial – a drive to reshape Taiwan’s understanding of itself and of its relationship with the mainland. Taiwan is steadily developing a new identity as a cultural, political and economic entity, separate from the mainland. This is a very broad and long-term process. Even the main challenger of the Democratic Peoples’ Party (DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT), which originally propagated eventual re- unification with the mainland, no longer regards Taiwan and China as an undividable unit.6 Identity issues are at the heart of international security in the Taiwan Strait and, by extension, of relevance for the wider Asia-Pacific region. Yet, despite their obvious influence on the risk of war, mainstream International Relations theory has failed to pay sufficient attention to the linkages between identity dynamics and matters of international security.7 Drawing on the conceptual framework offered by social constructivism, this paper examines Taiwan’s recent drive to build a national identity in relation to the globalisation process, international forces and domestic reform in Taiwan. A first section will briefly review social constructivism as a framework of 4 See D. Lague, ‘The Result is Final: A Divided Taiwan’, Far Eastern Economic Review (1 April 2004). 5 R. Cheung, ‘Beijing threatens War on Taiwan’, South China Morning Post (18 November 2003). 6 As Shiu Sho-zu, a KMT official put it, ‘Everyone, regardless their affiliation, feels Taiwanese’ [Quoted in: J. Watts, ‘Taiwan Provokes China with Missile Referendum’, The Guardian (19 March 2004)]. 7 Mainstream IR theory refers predominantly to neorealist and neoliberal paradigms. 3 analysis within the academic field of International Relations. The second part of the paper analyses the development of a Taiwanese national identity and its implications for international security in the Taiwan Strait. Social Constructivism – A Brief Review As indicated, neorealism and neoliberalism appear to be inappropriate in analysing the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Both paradigms are too narrow and tend to ignore major factors of influence in international relations. A neorealist interpretation of Sino-Taiwanese relations, for instance, would deem a military confrontation between Beijing and Taipei unavoidable. This argument is supported by China’s economic and military modernisation in conjunction with rising nationalisms on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. While the latter results in the further drifting apart of both countries, the former provides an increasingly assertive China with the economic and military capabilities to enforce its foreign policy objectives. Despite recognising that identity factors play a role in security relations, the neorealist paradigm offers no satisfactory explanation for these dynamics. Instead, it takes notions of identity and actor interests as exogenously given, determined by changes in the international structure. Neorealism, therefore, tends to focus on power and ignores largely the development of a Taiwanese national identity. In addition a neorealist outlook on Sino-Taiwanese relations has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy if rigidly applied by political decision-makers. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, paints a more optimistic picture of the future of cross-Strait relations. This paradigm points to the possibility that economic growth on the mainland has the intrinsic potential to lead to democratisation and pacification of Beijing. Commercial relations between countries have never been better and there is plenty of evidence of economic integration on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Neoliberalism assumes that economic progress in the PRC will lay the groundwork for eventual democratisation and political pluralism. After all, something similar happened not too long ago in another Chinese state/ society – Taiwan. In fact, the PRC today looks in many ways similar to Taiwan of the 1970s: a one-party authoritarian regime presiding over a fast-growing economy. It is assumed that closing the economic gap and pushing for political reform on the mainland will 4 motivate Taipei to consider a new political settlement. However, enhanced economic integration and democratisation in China may not necessarily have the effects neoliberals predict. Ironically, although economic exchange between the PRC and the ROK has increased dramatically in recent years, Taipei is further away from unification than ever before.8 Furthermore, even a democratically elected Chinese government would find it difficult to give up sovereignty claims over Taiwan. The problem is that neither neorealism nor neoliberalism pay particular attention to the dynamics of identity issues. Both approaches tend to focus on material factors such as power and economics. It is in this respect that social constructivism becomes a useful instrument for analysing Sino-Taiwanese relations. The approach emphasises the importance of cognitive and ideational forces. Instead of taking international and national structures and interests as given, social constructivists share a belief that institutions and structures are social normative constructs. Preferences and interests of agents in international relations are not pre-determined externally but are influenced by the interaction of norms, culture and identities.9 It is through these processes of interaction that meaning arises, which creates structures affecting behaviour and identities. Key structures in international relations are, therefore, intersubjective. This implies that conditions such as anarchy at the international level and security dilemma situations are not inevitable but are socially constructed and, therefore, can be de- constructed.10 Nicholas Onuf remarks that ‘people always construct, or constitute, social reality, even as their being, which can only be social, is constructed for them.’11 Constructivists do not deny the influence of material factors: 8 A more detailed analysis of neorealist and neoliberal arguments on Sino-Taiwanese relations can be found in: U. Wunderlich,