Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy 1991-2000

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Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy 1991-2000 Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy 1991–2000 This book analyses Ukraine’s relations with each of its neighbours in its first decade of independence. It examines the degree to which these relations fitted into Ukraine’s broad objective of reorienting its key political ties from East to West, and assesses the extent to which Ukraine succeeded in achieving this reorientation. It shows how in the early days of independence Ukraine fought off threats from Russia and Romania to its territorial integrity, and how it made progress in establishing good relations with its western neighbours as a means of moving closer toward Central European sub-regional and European regional organisations. It also shows how the sheer breadth and depth of its economic and military ties to Russia dwarfed Ukraine’s relations with all other neighbours, resulting in a foreign and security policy which attempted to counterbalance the competing forces of East and West. Roman Wolczuk is a specialist on Ukrainian foreign and security policy. He has written extensively on Ukraine’s international relations since independence and is a regular contributor to Jane’s Sentinel on Ukrainian Affairs. BASEES/RoutledgeCurzon Series on Russian and East European Studies Series editor Richard Sakwa, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent Editorial committee George Blazyca, Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley Terry Cox, Department of Government, University of Strathclyde Rosalind Marsh, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath David Moon, Department of History, University of Strathclyde Hilary Pilkington, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham Stephen White, Department of Politics, University of Glasgow This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, high-quality, research- level work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social science subjects. 1. Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy 1991–2000 Roman Wolczuk Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy 1991–2000 Roman Wolczuk First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon, an imprint of Taylor & Francis 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2003 Roman Wolczuk All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Wolczuk, Roman, 1962– Ukraine’s foreign and security policy, 1991–2000 / Roman Wolczuk p. cm. – (Basees/Curzon series on Russian and East European studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Ukraine–Foreign relations–1991–. 2. National security–Ukraine. I. Title. II. Series. DK508.849 .W65 2002 327.477′009′049–dc21 2002031600 ISBN 0-203-22177-X Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-27629-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–7007–1740–4 (Print Edition) Contents List of tables vii List of acronyms ix Introduction xi PART I Regionalism and Ukraine’s foreign and security policy 1 1 A theoretical context 3 PART II The North-eastern azimuth 25 2 Ukraine’s relations with Slavic states 27 3 The North-eastern azimuth: subregional and regional integration 52 PART III The Western azimuth 69 4 Ukraine’s relations with Central and East European neighbours 71 5 The Western azimuth: subregional and regional integration 98 PART IV The Southern azimuth 127 6 Relations with Black Sea littoral neighbours 129 7 The Southern azimuth: subregional and regional integration 144 8 Conclusion 159 Notes 178 Bibliography 206 Index 213 Tables 2.1 Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for trade 38 2.2 Structure of Ukrainian exports in time perspective 39 2.3 Oil and gas extraction rates in Russia 41 Acronyms AIOC Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium BSEC Black Sea Economic Co-operation Forum BSF Black Sea Fleet CEES Central and East European states CEFTA Central European Free Trade Area CFE Conventional Forces in Europe CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CoE Council of Europe EBRD European Basis for Reconstruction and Development GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (and later, with Uzbekistan, GUUAM) IPA Interparliamentary Assembly NACC North Atlantic Co-operation Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NIS Newly independent states NISS National Institute for Strategic Studies NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PCA Partnership and Co-operation Agreement PfP Partnership for Peace Programme PTA Preferential trading agreements RSC Regional security complexes RSFSR Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic SSR Soviet Socialist Republic TMR Transdniester-Moldova Republic WTO World Trade Organization Introduction When in August 1991 Ukraine unexpectedly stumbled into independence, nobody, perhaps least of all the Ukrainians, really knew what further to expect. Indeed, the event was as much of a shock to the Ukrainians as it was to the rest of the world. Up until it actually happened, they did not really demand it, expect it, or prepare for it. As a result of its suddenness, fundamental questions had not even been asked, let alone answered. How would Moscow respond? For that matter, how would the West respond? What was going to be the likely reaction of the huge Russian minority in Ukraine to being ‘cut off’ from ethnic brethren? What was going to happen to the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine – surely the commitment to denuclearise, made in 1990, was a declaration rather than a statement of intent? How would the Soviet military forces in Ukraine be dealt with? In the days and weeks that followed independence, Ukrainian policy-makers had to hazard a guess as to likely answers. It was this guesswork that guided policy- making and policy-implementation in the days and weeks that followed, as the Ukrainian national–economic–political elite grabbed with both hands the oppor- tunities presented by independence. The fact that Ukraine lacked a foreign policy elite compounded the problem of not knowing the answers. However, the inability to find solutions was not merely a matter of time and personnel. Ukrainian independence reflected a much more profound change, namely, the collapse of bipolarity on the European continent. With the break- down of bipolarity, regions gained a hitherto subordinated prominence, at least in Europe. As has been pointed out ‘the world has now changed. The regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and co-operation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs’.1 This book will argue that the solutions to Ukraine’s problems lay at the regional level. From Ukraine’s point of view, the key date, which reflected the completion of the transition of regions from obscurity to prominence, was probably 1994. That was the year in which Ukraine signed a Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and a Partnership and Co- operation Agreement (PCA) with the European Union (EU); it was the year in which Ukraine institutionalised the role of the United States (US) in its relations with Russia through the signing of the Trilateral Agreement which finally xii Introduction terminated Ukraine’s nuclear status; it was also the year in which the Central and East European states (CEES) started to demand NATO membership. While all of these events suggested that Ukraine was ‘regionally aware’, deteriorating relations with Russia and NATO enlargement compelled Ukraine to adopt regional solutions to local problems, especially after efforts to persuade the Poles not to join NATO failed. All of the above-mentioned events reflected the increased salience of regions in international politics, along with the new threats and opportunities that emerged within them. As will be seen, Ukrainian foreign and security policy implementa- tion in 1994 and the years that followed reflected this shift of emphasis to regions and the role Ukraine could play therein. With ever-increasing assertiveness, from that time on, Ukraine sought solutions to security threats in regional policies and approaches. This book will explore these policies and approaches. The book consists of four parts. The first part develops a theoretical context useful for examining Ukraine’s policy of responding to security threats by attempting to participate in or explicitly avoid participating in regional security complexes along each of three azimuths (the North-eastern, Western and Southern) and the extent to which it achieved a degree of success in preserving its security and enlarging its freedom of manoeuvre by so doing. This examination will involve a review of the three theoretical perspectives that purport to explain regionalism, namely systemic-, regional-and domestic-level theories. Part II of the book will examine Ukraine’s regional policy along its North-eastern azimuth. Chapter 2 will focus on Ukraine’s relations with Russia and Kyiv’s efforts to come to terms with the ramifications of ties with Moscow, and the challenges these ties presented to the attainment of Ukraine’s proclaimed objective of inte- grating with Western institutions. The chapter also examines Ukraine’s relations with Belarus, a particular challenge for Kyiv in the light of Minsk’s deference to Moscow’s demands and needs.
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