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Regional Integration in the Framework of the Entire Post-Soviet Area

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Regional Integration in the Framework of the Entire Post-Soviet Area Chapter 2 Regional Integration in the Framework of the Entire Post-Soviet Area 5 Emergence of the CIS 5.1 Prelude (the Collapse of the Soviet Union) The Soviet experiment, which begun following the October revolution in 1917 and led to the creation of the USSR on the basis of the Union Treaty on December 30, 1922,49 had ended in failure. Although the USSR was conceived as a federal state50 and had even some attributes of confederation,51 Stalin, the chief architect of the Soviet system, perceived that the USSR could only be kept together by a strong central hand that was willing to use coercion. Attempts at democratization under Khrushchev began a slow unraveling of the empire. However, the real breakup was triggered off only by Gorbachev’s programs of perestroika and glasnost, who tried thus to pursue both the economic and political liberalization simultaneously. First, as the socialist alternative to the market economy turned out to be an illusion, the planned, highly centralized command economy was to be replaced by the progressive introduction of elements of a market economy (perestroika). 49 The text of the Treaty of 1922 was incorporated into the Constitution of the USSR of 1924. For a full English translation of the latter, see, e.g. Triska, Constitutions of the Communist Party States 17–28 (1968). 50 The constituent republics establishing the USSR were four socialist republics established following the 1917 Revolution on the territory of the former Russian empire: the Russian and Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR. Additional union republics were set up in subsequent years: the Turkmen and Uzbek SSR’s in 1924, the Tajik SSR in 1929, and the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR’s in 1936. In that year the Transcaucasian Republic was abolished and its territory was divided between three new republics: the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR’s. In 1940 the Karelo-Finnish, Moldavian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian SSR’s were established. In 1956 the Karelo-Finnish SSR became an autonomous republic inside Russia, leaving a total of 15 union republics. 51 For example, every union republic retained the “right of free exit” from the Union which was also provided by the subsequent constitutions of the USSR (1936 and 1977) and existed thus to the very end of the USSR. See, e.g. Schweisfurth, Vom Einheitsstaat (UdSSR) zum Staatenbund (GUS): Juristische Stationen eines Staatszerfalls und einer Staatenbundentstehung, 52 HJIL 541 (1992). Z. Kembayev, Legal Aspects of the Regional Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Area, 25 © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009 26 2 Regional Integration in the Framework of the Entire Post-Soviet Area Second, the political reforms were initiated aiming to replace the communist system with a democratic one (glasnost). But perestroika proved itself to be too difficult to achieve and was accompanied by declining production in many sectors and increas- ing distribution problems. At the same time, glasnost led to the conflicts developed between the parliament of the USSR and those of the individual republics, mainly over the respective powers of the centre and the republics. In addition, these enor- mous problems were even more exacerbated by the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and increasing demands for autonomy and even for full independence. Attempts were made to establish a new “Union of Sovereign States” with high degree of integration in foreign policy, defense, and economic affairs which aimed to preserve “the sovereign state, subject of international law”,52 but following the attempted coup of August 1991 the republics rushed to be free of Moscow’s con- trol before another coup succeeded. The three Baltic republics successfully seceded from the union and were followed by many others. The key republic was Ukraine, politically and economically number two in the Soviet Union which voted for independence on December 1, 1991. Thus, by December 1991 the USSR had virtually ceased to exist, and the future of its territories and peoples was highly uncertain. 5.2 Establishing Acts of the CIS 5.2.1 Minsk Agreement The process of the disintegration of the USSR culminated on December 8, 1991, in the signing of the Minsk (called also Belovezh) Agreement by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The Minsk Agreement laid down two fundamental decisions. First, it concluded that “the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality”53 and that “the activities of the organs of the former USSR are discontinued on the territories of the member states of the Commonwealth”.54 Second, the Agreement formally established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that com- prised the three above states and was open for all member states of the former USSR to join as well as for all other states which would share the purposes and principles of the founding agreement.55 52 See, e.g. Russel, Improbable Unions: The Draft Union Treaties in the USSR 1990–1991, 22 Review of Central and East European Law 389 (1996). 53 Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States [hereinafter Minsk Agreement] (Dec. 8, 1991), at Preamble. 54 Ibid, Art. 14 (2). 55 Ibid, Art. 13. 5 Emergence of the CIS 27 The Minsk Agreement recognized the sovereignty and equality of each former Soviet republic.56 The contracting parties also pledged themselves to govern their relations by generally recognized principles and norms of international law such as sovereign equality of states, non-intervention in the affairs of other states, the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, protection of human rights and self- determination of peoples as well as other principles and norms set forth in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).57 Besides, the contracting parties clearly stated that they would guarantee the fulfillment of the international obligations binding upon them from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR.58 Although the creation of the CIS signaled the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Agreement explicitly stated that the CIS is based on the historic community of the member states’ peoples and the ties which have been established between them.59 The CIS was also supposed to assume “through common coordinating insti- tutions of the Commonwealth” the following functions: (a) coordination of foreign policy; (b) cooperation in forming and developing a common economic space, common European and Eurasian markets; (c) cooperation in the sphere of customs and migration policy; (d) cooperation to develop transport and communications systems; (e) cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection, participation in creating of the all-encompassing international system of ecological security; and (d) the fight against organized crime.60 Moreover, the member states agreed to preserve and maintain under united com- mand a common military-strategic space, including unified control over nuclear weapons.61 Further, while the contracting parties recognized one another’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth, they also guaranteed openness of borders, freedom of movement for citizens and of transmission of information within the CIS.62 In addition, the Agreement con- cluded that the development and strengthening of relations of friendship, good- neighborliness and mutually beneficial co-operation between the member states correspond to the vital national interests of their peoples and serve the cause of peace and security.63 However, what the Minsk Agreement did not express was the former Soviet republics’ fundamentally divergent perceptions concerning the future evolution 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid, at Preamble. 58 Ibid, Art. 12. 59 Ibid, at Preamble. 60 Ibid, Art. 7. 61 Ibid, Art. 6. 62 Ibid, Art. 5. 63 Ibid. 28 2 Regional Integration in the Framework of the Entire Post-Soviet Area and role of the CIS ranging from a confederative union to a loose non-institution- alized association.64 Furthermore, from a technical legal point of view, the Minsk Agreement was far from perfect. Its text was drafted very hastily and political considerations of its signatories obviously prevailed over the legal correctness and accuracy of the docu- ment.65 First, it should be mentioned that the text of the Agreement does not contain any provision on its entering into force.66 Second, Article 11 of the Agreement states that: “From the moment of signature of the present Agreement, application of the laws of third States, including the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall not be permitted in the territories of the signatory States”. This provision cre- ated in effect two political entities in the same area since other republics still con- sidered themselves members of the union. Moreover, a practical application of this rule with regard to the laws of the Soviet Union (even admitting hypothetically that it could be considered “the former” from the moment of signature) would inevita- bly uncover many lacunae in the legal systems of the newly emerged independent subjects of international law, and would in many ways hinder and disrupt their normal functioning as sovereign states.67 Third, from the legal viewpoint it is evi- dent, that three of the remaining 12 republics of the USSR, even though they were the founding and most powerful members, could only withdraw from the USSR and set up a new association but they were not entitled to dissolve the Union.68 64 In addition to the fact that Russian President Yeltsin saw in the dissolution of the USSR a con- venient vehicle for the removal of Gorbachev from the post of president of the Soviet Union, he also thought of the CIS as a new type of union, formed to rescue Soviet integration as the Soviet state was falling apart, leading in a few years to a confederal arrangement, similar to the European Union.
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