Issue 3(9), 2017 LESSONS

MEDIATION

PEACEKEEPING

KOSOVO BALKANS VIOLENCE VIOLENCE THIRD PARTIES PEACE RESOLUTION

PEACE FROZEN PROTRACTED FROTHEN VIOLENCE BOSNIA

RESOLUTION FROZEN

UKRAINEMEDIATION

LESSONS CONFLICWAR T

CEASE FIRERECONCILIATION

• PROTRACTED CONFLICTS • LESSONS FOR

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 1

BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the European Policy Institute) Issue 3 (9), 2017 Dr. Iulian Chifu Analysis and Early Warning Center) (Romania, Director of the Conflict Protracted Conflicts H.E., Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky (Ukraine, Director of the Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)

Editors Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National Dr. Hanna Shelest University by I.I. Mechnikov) Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko Dr. Sergey Minasyan (, Deputy Director at the Caucasus Institute) Publisher: Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural Marcel Rothig (, Director of the Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Romania) of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support Foundation in Ukraine, and the Black Sea Trust. James Nixey (, Head of the and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the UA: Ukraine Analytica Royal Institute of International Affairs) analytical journal in English on International is the first Ukrainian Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, State Secretary, is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, Ministry of Defence) students interested in the and Ukraine in particular. H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Contacts: ) website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ e-mail: [email protected] Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ Director Defence Transformation at The Hague ukraineanalytica Center for Strategic Studies) : https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice- The views and opinions expressed in Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic articles are those of the authors and do not Integration of Ukraine)

Analytica, its editors, Board of Advisors or Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director of necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine donors. the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University ()) ISSN 2518-7481

500 copies Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the Norwegian Nobel Institute)

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

OUR MAIN TASK: TO SURVIVE THIS ...... 3 Interview with Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies Dr. Horbulin

THE “FIRST HYBRID”: THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT ...... 7 Artem Fylypenko

THE SOURCES OF SUSTAINABILITY OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN STATE. . . 14 Ruslan Kermach

PROTRACTED CONFLICTS’ RESOLUTION: LESSONS OF THE GREECE-TURKEY CONFLICT FOR THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA CASE...... 23 Nadiia Koval

CYPRUS CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE: LESSONS FOR UKRAINE...... 31 Mykola Zamikula

THE NORTHERN PEACE PROCESS: LESSONS FOR UKRAINE?...... 39 Donnacha Ó Beacháin

RELEVANCE OF THE ULSTER MODEL IN RESOLVING THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT. . 50 Abdullah Al Yusuf

CONFLICTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR LESSONS FOR UKRAINE. . . 58 Mariya Heletiy

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE BALKANS. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FOR UKRAINE ...... 67 Miruna Troncotă

ACCESS TO INFORMATION: THE “ACHILLES’ HEEL” OF REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES...... 77 Lesia Vasylenko

2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 OUR MAIN TASK: TO SURVIVE THIS WAR

Interview with Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies Dr. Volodymyr Horbulin

What, In Your Opinion, Do “Frozen” Now, prerequisites for multilateral diplomatic Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space Have dialogue among the post-Soviet states are in Common? brewing, which aims to support peace and security in the post-Soviet territories. Negotiations on Donbas and may have become the consequence of exacerbating become the beginning of a wider regional ethnic“Frozen” and conflicts linguistic in tensions the post-Soviet with the crucial space negotiation process, which would cover role of the Russian in it. Russian the whole post-Soviet space and would be held in the form of international conference. further occupation of disputed territories wasmilitary legitimized presence under in the conflict pretext zones of these and Negotiations on Donbas and Crimea may become the beenconflicts’ strengthening, resolution. Atas thewell same as the time, process Russian of «beginning of a wider regional Russianeconomic citizenship influence granting on these was territories established. has negotiation process, which would Afterwards, unrecognized states, created as a cover the whole post-Soviet space result of “freezing” (, South , Transnistria), have become the zones of “controlled chaos” whereby Moscow has got leverage over domestic situation in countries embarked on the path of democratic transition. , , and Ukraine, being victims of the Russian aggression, have the full right After 2014 – the year of Crimea annexation to launch such a process, and they have and occupation of a part of Donbas, the diplomatic opportunities to do it. Russian Federation has continued the transformation of the post-Soviet space into How Long Do You Think the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine Will Last? zone,a regional threatening conflict zone,global which peace is and dangerously security. Ukraine remains a priority of the Russian Thatmerging is whywith resolutionthe Middle Eastof the regional Crimean conflict and foreign policy. The Kremlin spent Donbas problems, which did not have ethnic considerable resources on pursuing a “hybrid or linguistic preconditions, became closely war” against our state. intertwined with the problems of Transnistria, Abkhazia, , and Nagorno- The Russian government does not abandon hope for success of the “long game” and each other and have a common source – the expects to reach its aim to establish a proxy imperialKarabakh. nature All these of Russia conflicts considering are related itself toa government in Ukraine in several years. To this regional hegemon.

end, financing of pro-Russian political forces, UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 3 support for pro-Russian non-governmental military. That is why the only way out of the bodies, certain experts, and humanitarian stalemate for Russia is a new escalation or, projects, etc. are being enhanced. at least, a threat to do it. It does not matter whether the threat is real or is just a way to induce us to “cooperation” by this means. turbulence in all spheres of the Ukrainian life.At this One stage, of them the isKremlin’s the international aim is to spherecreate Meanwhile Russia keeps seeking any (by means of “reconciliation plans”), equivalent of the “Helsinki Final Act 2.0”. another – economic (through increasing The expectations of the Russian government the complexity of economic relations within to make a “big deal” with Western states Ukraine), the next one is the political realm do not seem to be met. Therefore, in the (agitation for re-elections at all levels). There short term, confrontation is likely to be are plenty of such spheres. We manage to continued. tackle a lot of these challenges. But not all of them. And this is that very problem which Can “Freezing” of the Conflict has not been solved within the security in Donbas Be Considered as an and defence sector reform. Although our Alternative Option to Its Solution? Is Western partners have actively helped us It Beneficial for Ukraine? during these years, saying we do not have problem areas would be a big exaggeration. advantageous, primarily, for Russia. Its essence“Freezing” lies of in thethe conflictfact that in the Donbas districts is

the so-called “DPR” and “LPR”, will “Freezing” of the conflict in that suffered from the conflict the most, Donbas is advantageous, remain a “burden” for Ukraine. Under this «primarily, for Russia scenario, economic relations between these territories and the rest of Ukraine should be restored, and hence Ukraine will have to take the responsibility for economic recovery of The should be considered the destroyed areas of Donbas. Meanwhile, through this lens. The current state of the a proxy regime controlled by Russia will de facto operate in Donbas. It will try to does not need this region as a part of Russia, conflict in the east proves that the Kremlin policy by pursuing interests of another state. weaken Ukraine. Attempts to arrive at a influence Ukrainian foreign and domestic politicaland in fact, solution the conflict face Russia remains blocking a way any to In case of implementation of this scenario, initiative to promote rapid reintegration Ukraine will obviously slow down on its way of this region into our state. The Kremlin to , get a source of political instability as well as economic load represented by the “damaged” dependent regions. We should contradictions,is interested in establishment the creation of of a specifica false identity“conflict in trap” the uncontrolled – consolidation territories, of existing and smoulder, destabilizing the situation by the maximal involvement of the population threatnot expect of return a quiet to its life, active as thephase. conflict will in the cooperation with the occupation regime. Meanwhile, termination of military actions in Donbas and “reconciliation” under this scenario will give ground for European countries to lift the sanctions against Russia terroristFor the three groups years in ofany the other conflict, dimension Russia hasbut and its political leaders and to restore not managed to find ways to exploit these

4 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 economic ties, which will contribute to with-nuclear-arsenal Russia, maintaining Russian economic growth. At the same time, considerable military contingent on the leaders of the European countries will get border with our state. the opportunity to shift their attention to tackling domestic problems in the EU. It The experience of these and other similar will facilitate the increase of their political ratings instead of the growth of “fatigue” negotiation formats and the mediation of caused by the continuation of the Russian- internationalconflicts shows organisations that the use ofor international individual states is a necessary, but not always effective,

AlthoughUkrainian conflict.such a scenario provides a and mitigate their consequences. That is rapid cessation of hostilities in Donbas, measure to prevent or resolve such conflicts in the long run, Ukraine will remain an and be ready to take decisive actions under unattractive state of permanent crisis favourablewhy Ukraine conditions should, first for ofthe all, restoration rely on itself of with a considerable number of various its territorial integrity. humanitarian aid trade, smuggling, illegal What Are the Lessons of the Ongoing international organisations’ representatives, Conflict for Ukraine? of Blue Helmets on the demarcation line. arms and drugs trafficking, and thousands The example of Ukraine shows what can remain in the “frozen” form as well as the happen if Russia is not repelled on time; what consequencesIt is unknown of how that. longHistorical the conflict experience will happens if Russia is given the opportunity to sponsor politicians, to form your information Ukraine will turn back to the starting point, space at its own discretion, to promote its beginningproves it maya new last circle for of decades antagonism. and, finally, to destroy the system of public administration Which Conflict Experience Has fromagents the of influence inside). toWe public lived offices through (who all start of the Ukrainian Side Studied? What this and paid dearly for our credulity and Parallels Do You See? unwillingness to look at the world without “rose-coloured glasses”. We are ready to do to the scope of confrontation, geopolitical our best so Europe and the whole world will consequences,The war in Donbas and internationalis a unique conflict diplomatic due not have to pay the same price.

Russian impact is considerable (Transnistria, In the meantime, Ukraine is in a unique Nagorno-Karabakh,efforts to solve it. TheAbkhazia, conflicts South where Ossetia) the situation. We did not just experience a are the most similar to it. The existence of new model of aggression from the Russian permanently unstable areas in the post- side, but manage to defend ourselves, to Soviet space let the Russian Federation develop mechanisms to counter the most maintain additional opportunities to realize aggressive methods of hybrid attacks, its geopolitical interests. while continuing trench warfare against a much stronger adversary. That is why our experience not only deserves close scrutiny resolution can be an example for Ukraine. (as NATO bodies and representatives of ZagrebThe Croatianmanaged experienceto get the of occupied conflict certain Eastern European states have territories back after a well-planned military already done) – it is the only one in terms of operation. But in this case, Croatia faced assessing the threats with which the world confrontation with a rather weak , (and especially Europe) will have to deal in which can hardly be compared to the armed- the near future.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 5 Our main task, simple and concrete, is to survive this war; the second one is to get Dr. Prof. Volodymyr Horbulin is a director of the out of it being much stronger; the third – to National Institute for Strategic Studies, vice-president of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, and advisor and the last one – to join forces with those to the . He is a former Secretary of whoteach are our ready partners to resist (who as we want do. it) to fight; the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and a former director of National Space Agency of Ukraine. Dr. Horbulin is one of Ukraine’s leading national security specialists, the author of numerous articles, policy-papers, and books on the issue.

6 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 THE “FIRST HYBRID”: THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Artem Fylypenko Political expert, Ukraine

The article presents an analysis of the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992 through the lens of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and criteria for “hybrid warfare”. According to the author, the Transnistrian conflict may also be considered a “hybrid” one due to its methods and means. Just like the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it has also been a part of the Russian strategy to restore Moscow’s control over the former Soviet republics.

Is the Transnistrian Conflict a Hybrid One? writtenThe Transnistrian enough books conflict about it cannot in the 25 be classified as understudied. There have been and its completion1. At the same time, this localized by March-July 1992, and the armed historicalyears since event the activein itself phase was of theconsidered conflict confrontationTraditionally, thein Dubossary Transnistrian on conflict2 March is beyond the interrelationship with similar 1992 is considered its beginning. At the events that were happening at the beginning of the 1990s in the former Soviet republics. was just the culmination of confrontation. The Russian aggression against Ukraine Thesame referendum time, the armed on the phase establishment of the conflict of TMR (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic) only within the certain historical context was held in December 1989-November makes it possible to regard this conflict not 1990 (due to the impossibility to hold the of 1990-1992 and those of 2014-2017 but referendum simultaneously throughout alsoand toto finddetermine similarities political between interconnection the events between the events separated by the time place in November 1990, with the seizure of gap of 20 years. administrativethe territory); thebuildings first armed by the clashes separatists, took

1 Создание Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (Creation of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic), История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (History of the Transnistri- Волкова,an Moldovan А.З. Republic), Бендеры, 2010., Непокоренное Приднестровье. Уроки военного конфликта (The UnconqueredТом 2-2, Transnistria. Тирасполь: Lessons Риопгу, of Приднестровски the Armed Conflict),й� Государственны й� УниверситетКонфликт в Приднестровье.им. Т.Г.Шевченко, Причины, 2001., А.В. проблемы Козлов, В.Н.и прогноз Чернобривы развитияй� , (Conflict in Transnistria. Causes, Problems, and Develop- ment Forecast), М., 2015., Г. Перепелица,

К., 2001. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 7 and the establishment of their own • The formation of two poles of the social authorities and armed units was completed confrontation: the Popular Front of Moldova by the end of 1991-beginning of 1992. against the International Movement (Maidan and Anti-Maidan in Ukraine). First of all, it is necessary to answer the • Transnistria was supported by Moscow, which was, at that time, the centre of the question: Can the Transnistrian conflict , seeking to retain Moldova be classified as a “hybrid war”? There are in the USSR with the help of separatist several definitions characterizing this type enclaves, though the position of the of conflicts. One example is a “classical” Communist Party Central Committee definitionHybrid warsby F. Hoffman:can be conducted by both was not consistent in this matter. In states and a variety of non-state actors. 1990-1991, the leaders of Transnistrian Hybrid incorporate a range of separatists, I. Smirnov and G. Marakutsa, different modes of warfare, including as well as the leadership of had conventional capabilities, irregular tactics numerous informal meetings in Moscow and formations, terrorist acts including with the Head of the Supreme Council indiscriminate violence and coercion, of the USSR, A. Lukyanov, who fully and criminal disorder. These multi-modal supported and contributed to declaring activities can be conducted by separate and establishing new state entities on units, or even by the same unit, but are the Moldovan territory. Despite the fact generally operationally and tactically that Moldova boycotted the referendum directed and coordinated within the main on the preservation of the USSR (17 battlespace to achieve synergistic effects2. March 1991), it was held in Transnistria and Gagauzia. Among 84% of the Thus, it is worth noting that a number of Transnistrian population, 98% voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union. Permanent close ties of the Ukrainian undersimilarities which unite the the events Transnistrian in Donbas conflict are President V. Yanukovych government and developingand the conflict is very in similar Ukraine. to Thethe events scenario of the Party of Regions with Russia were 1990-1992 in Transnistria: well-known as well.

• The language issue was the formal • After the collapse of the Soviet Union, reason for confrontation (adoption of the Transnistria received not just political but Law of the Republic of Moldova “On the also military support from Russia. Units of functioning of languages on the territory the republican guard have been armed with of the Moldavian SSR” [September the assistance from the 14th Russian army. 1989], according to which the Moldovan Units of Cossacks arrived at Transnistria language received the status of a state from Russia. Igor Strelkov (Girkin), who language and was transliterated into Latin). In the Ukrainian situation, the Donbas seizure, had gone through combat eastern regions actively referred to “practice”later became exactly the main in mediathe Transnistrian figure of the the attempt to repeal the law on the principles of state language policy (2012) Sea Fleet units and supplies of Russian by the representatives of the Maidan. weaponryconflict. In theto Donbas Ukrainian played situation, a decisive the Black role.

2 F. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies: Arlington, p. 14.

8 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 • The so-called “state security institutions” attack on Moldovan positions turned the of Transnistria were established with the tide in favour of separatists. Similarly, assistance from Moscow. In late 1991, direct participation of the Russian armed Vladimir Artyufeev, under the name forces units reversed the course of events of Vadim Shvetsov, and other wanted near Ukrainian Illovaisk in August 20144. (because of the armed dispersal of Latvian Methods and Tools Used Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs came toprotests the unrecognized for independence) republic officials to participate of the Thus, it should be noted that during the in the establishing of the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security. It is noteworthy war in Donbas a similar set of methods and that V. Artyufeev, forced to leave the post toolsTransnistrian was used, conflict namely: as well as during the of the head of the Transnistrian special services in 2011, and his former employees • active use of irregular forces supported have become active in the Russian “hybrid and armed by Russia; war” against Ukraine. Initially they participated in the operation to occupy • information warfare: discrediting the Crimea and then they were sent to DPR for leadership of the states (Ukraine and strengthening the cadres there. In a short Moldova), their armed forces and security while, the Transnistrian leaders gained forces within and outside of the state; leading positions: Artyufeev himself took shaping a negative attitude toward attempts the post of the vice prime minister for of the government to regain control over security issues3, the former TMR vice the separatist territories, etc.; prime minister A. Karaman became the vice prime minister for social affairs and • direct participation of the Russian armed then minister of foreign affairs in DPR; forces in military actions. other leading positions were also taken by In the Ukrainian case, a range of methods special services. applied was enlarged through economic other former officials of the Transnistrian sanctions and terrorist acts (Odessa and • 14th Russian army, located on the territoryIn the courseof the separatist of the conflict,enclave, was the Kharkiv, late 2014-first half of 2015). increasingly getting involved in the to each other not only by means of similar armed confrontation, pretending to be methodsAt the same and time,tools. bothThe analysis conflicts of areideological related “volunteers who want to defend their methods, myths, templates, memes that families” at the early stage. Participation were used in the Russian information wars of the Russian military in the war became against Moldova (1991-1992) and Ukraine undisguised in June 1992 at the height of (2014-2017) is indicative of certain schemes the Battle for Bender: The tank attack on and templates for waging these wars. the Bender Bridge, retained by Moldovan The following directions of information military and police, and the artillery campaigns can be distinguished:

3 Экс-министр КГБ Приднестровья стал «вице-премьером» ДНР (Ex-minister of Transnistrian KGB Became “Vice Prime Minister”), “NB News”, 11 July 2014, http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/126804. 4 Прокуратура выяснила все обстоятельства Иловайской трагедии (The Prosecutor’s Office Discovered All Circumstances of the Ilovaisk Tragedy), “.com.ua”, 14 August 2017, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ news/2017/08/14/7152171.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 9 • dehumanization of the enemy, a constant emphasis on the difference dissemination of information about between Romanians and ; also, their cruelty and inhumanity (rumours Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist about a mass rape of school graduates Republic, which existed within Ukrainian committed by Moldovan soldiers; Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924-1940 dissemination of information about and covered territory of TMR and several Moldovan military throwing booby traps districts of Odessa region in Ukraine, made in the form of toys for children; was considered a historical basis for in the Ukrainian case – a sensational Transnistrian statehood; fake about the national guards crucifying a boy in Sloviansk; a story that “nationalists • restoration of the constitutional order played football with severed heads of police terrorism are presented as an aggression ofand one the state fight against against another. Therefore, and officers”, etc.); there are attempts to bring negotiations into an “equal” bilateral format, with the The analysis of ideological presentation of Russia as a mediator; methods, myths, templates, «memes that were used in • the Russian information wars a continuation of the “Great Patriotic War”: against Moldova (1991-1992) an effort to present separatists’ actions as and Ukraine (2014-2017) is against “Romanian fascists”, separatists in indicative of certain schemes and DonbasTransnistrian – against separatists “banderites claimed and toNazis”; fight templates for waging these wars the use of symbols related to the war times;

• the use of vocabulary that revives • manipulation of historical facts. The most stereotypes of the Soviet era: “junta” (the widespread manipulations against Ukraine analogy is with “Pinochet junta” in 1970- are the following: “ and the 1980s), “punishers”, “fascists”; were invented by the General Staff of -Hungary at the • dissemination of information about the time of the First World War in order to participation of foreign mercenaries in weaken Russia”5; “Ukrainian language is military actions on the side of governmental the Polish dialect of Russian language”; “the forces: Lithuanian snipers and Romanian war in Ukraine is waged by Uniates (Greek Catholics), Protestants, and schismatic 1992; Georgian snipers, German, Polish, (supporters of Kyiv Patriarchate)”6; “all the andsoldiers American in the soldiers Transnistrian in Donbas conflict7; in patriotic actions in south-eastern regions are held by Western Ukraine citizens”. • emphasis on the “popular” nature of the There were also active attempts to use separatist movements, and lack of weapons

independence in Transnistria: for example, historical facts for justification of claims for in their hands at the first stage of the conflict.

5 Корифей украинской мифологии (The Coryphaeus of Ukrainian Mythology), “Stoletie”, 24 August 2014, http://www.stoletie.ru/territoriya_istorii/korifej_ukrainskoj_mifologii_337.htm. For example: В. Панов, 6 Получите, «суки православные». На Украине готовится чудовищная провокация против Православия (Take That, “Orthodox Bitches”…), - ite-suki-pravoslavnie.-Na-Ukraine-gotovitsya-chudovishchnaya-provokatsiya-protiv-Pravoslaviya-17096.html.For example: А. Никишин, “Русская Правда”, http://ruspravda.info/Poluch

10 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 What Makes It Different? Russian Goals

However, despite formal resemblance However, the creation of controlled enclaves (TMR in Moldova, DPR and LPR should not be ignored. The Transnistrian between the conflicts, serious differences objective to get these states back under context, when centrifugal tendencies covered in Ukraine) has not reached the final theconflict entire developed Soviet Union. within Attempts another to historicalestablish an independent Republic of Gagauzia in favourablethe Russian for political Russia conditions, influence. namely The final the Moldova and Republic of Bessarabia in conditionsobjective is deprivingthe settlement Moldova of the and conflict Ukraine on Ukraine (in the south of Odessa region) were of international subjectivity and of the the integral parts of this process. possibility to implement their foreign policy

The economy of Moldova was not integrated into the global one and was a part of the Inirrespective 2003, Moldova of Moscow’s was closepolitical to will.signing a single all-union Soviet economy. From the document, which, under the pretext of solving like a movement for preserving the USSR. state of a Russian vassal. It is about the well- Thebeginning, economy the Transnistrianof Donbas, on conflict the contrary, looked knownthe Transnistrian Kozak Memorandum, conflict, would which have envisaged fixed its has already been integrated into the global the transformation of the Moldovan Republic into an “asymmetric federation”. oriented to the Russian market. economy, although its significant part was An analysis of demands to Ukraine, Furthermore, in the Ukrainian case, an articulated by Russia and terrorists from the so-called DPR and LPR (controlled by Russia), points to similarities between them borderimportant with factor Russia. influencing As for theTransnistria, nature of and leads to the conclusion that they are itthe is conflictan enclave is the separated existence from of aRussia common by parts of a single scenario. The principles are Ukraine, which complicates economic and as follows: military relations with Moscow. • at the constitutional level, establishing Thus, the similarity of scenarios, means, quotas in the parliament for representatives tools, ideological methods used in both of the separatist enclaves and actual transformation of Ukraine into a federation; well as their interim results (establishment ofconflicts the enclaves (Ukrainian that andare not Transnistrian) controlled by as • granting for the separatist enclaves the the legitimate governments) suggest that right to recruit staff for police, security belong to the category of “hybrid” ones. border guards, etc. independently, without Wethe can Transnistrian say Transnistria and Ukrainian was a “test conflicts case”, coordinationservices, judiciary, with the central prosecutor’s authorities; office, experiment that allowed Russia to • granting broad economic (freedom of accumulatethe first and, the unfortunately,necessary experience successful to foreign economic activity), political conduct such operations. (right to choose its own parliament,

7 Американский блогер: В Донбассе воюют и гибнут кадровые офицеры стран Запада (American Blogger: Western Officers Fight and Die in Donbas), - ions/1439583413. “Русская весна”, 14 August 2015, http://rusvesna.su/recent_opin

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 11 government, and president), and cultural military formations temporarily located on (protection of the Russian language) the territory of the Republic of Moldova. autonomy of the region; As for now, the existence of the unrecognized • granting the right to coordinate all TMR constitutes direct and indirect threats passing laws and the right to veto all to Ukraine. decisions of the states (Ukraine and Moldova) in foreign policy; The direct threats include:

• neutral or non-aligned status for the state. • intelligence activities against Ukraine;

History does not know conditional clauses, but • presence of the Russian armed forces units if the Kozak Memorandum had been adopted, the territory of TMR; numbering 1,400 soldiers and officers on post-Sovietthe model ofspace conflict (particularly resolution the servingUkrainian as • Transnistrian armed forces (4,000 soldiers, one)an example would havefor other been similarimplemented. conflicts in the artillery, armoured vehicles including heavy armour, aircrafts); Ukraine itself joined negotiations on the political status of Transnistria in • weapons depots at the Colbasna station; 1995. The Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the The indirect threats include: Republic of Moldova and Transnistria was signed on 8 May 1997. According to it, • necessity to improve security of the Ukraine alongside with Russia and the OSCE Transnistrian part of the border, which act as guarantors of the negotiation process. Within these years, the Ukrainian position directions; in the negotiation process was ambivalent. diverts significant forces from other Standing for the territorial integrity of • threat of blockade of the railway Moldova, offering its own settlement plans communication with the Danube ports;

often followed the Russian position. Many of • disconnection of southern districts of the(e.g. problems Yushchenko’s were planoverlooked. of 2005), Kyiv very Odessa region from electricity supply from the Moldovan hydro power plant; The attitude to Transnistria changed after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning • participation of Transnistrian residents of the events in Donbas. The presence of the in the anti-governmental actions in Russian military forces in the unrecognized Odessa region; republic gave grounds for considering this enclave to be a threat to the national security • broadcasting of Russian TV channels in the border areas of Odessa region, information strategic documents. During 2014-2017, warfare; Ukraineof Ukraine. took Itsteps was to fixed reduce in risks the relevantrelated to Transnistria: It increased security of the • smuggling of goods. Ukrainian-Moldovan part of the border, including establishing of the common Furthermore, there is a risk of retaking border and customs posts. The Parliament of the Kozak Memorandum as a model of the Ukraine denounced the agreement on transit through the Ukrainian territory of Russian of Moldova I. Dodon claimed reintegration Transnistrian conflict resolution. President

12 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 of Transnistria by means of transforming Given the fact that Ukraine and Moldova are Moldova into a federation to be one of his subjects to Russian foreign policy ambitions to the same extent, there is a need to join his visit to Moscow in January 2017. At the jointpriorities. press He conference reaffirmed hiswith intention the Russian during region, force the Transnistrian separatists to president, Dodon admitted that the refusal obeyefforts the to rules weaken worked Russian out influencein Chisinau in and the to implement the Kozak Memorandum Kyiv on the terms of legitimate authorities. in 2003 was a mistake8. If the plan is successfully implemented, this model can be The key conditions for the reintegration of imposed on Ukraine, which will contribute Transnistria should be the following: to reaching the aims of the “hybrid war” waged by Russia against Moldova in 1990- a) demilitarization of the region: withdrawal 1992 and Ukraine in 2014-2017. of Russian troops and weapons, replacement of armed peacekeepers with a police mission Conclusions under the auspices of the ;

b) democratization of the region: authorization of activity of Moldovan political inThe the Transnistrian Eastern Ukraine conflict in 2014-2017 in 1990-1992, are the parties, non-governmental organisations, partsthe annexation of the Russian of Crimea, general andstrategy the conflictto keep and mass media in Transnistria;

c) restoration of the single economic space, Moldova and Ukraine in Moscow’s sphere of namely, the use of the Moldovan leu as the influence. In this context, the Transnistrian single national currency; establishing a reintegrationconflict has anof the apparent separatist “hybrid” enclaves nature. on single banking system; favourableThe final objectivefor Russia of thisterms, strategy namely: is the d) development of a single educational of foreign policy priorities (abandoning thepossibility course to on influence European foreign and policy,Euro-Atlantic change of educational programs and systems of integration), and maintaining dependence educationand cultural assessment, space: gradualadoption unification of single on energy supplies from Russia. of teachers, etc. Responses to the “hybrid” aggression can be rules of getting academic titles, certification in the following forms: asymmetric actions Artem Fylypenko – journalist, historian, political on certain regions of states undergoing expert. In 2012-2015, he was the director of Odessa humanitarianaimed at neutralizing aggression, Russian including influence branch of the National Institute for Strategic Transnistria; an active humanitarian Studies. The author of about 30 books and academic policy (publishing books, creation of movie publications on the history of Moldovan republic, the and TV products, support for national Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, the economy of the culture, holding conferences, culture and Ukrainian Black Sea area. social campaigns) aimed at neutralizing the Russian impact; holding information campaigns abroad in order to shape the image of Russia as an aggressor.

8 Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом Молдовы Игорем Додоном (Joint Press Conference with Presi- dent of Moldova Igor Dodon), “Kremlin”, 17 January 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 13 THE SOURCES OF SUSTAINABILITY OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN DE FACTO STATE

Ruslan Kermach Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Ukraine

The article is aimed at identifying the key factors and policies contributing to the economic sustainability of the Transnistrian republic, which over a long period of time functions as an unrecognized de facto ‘state’ on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Moldova. The author indicates the role of the Russian economic patronage for the breakaway republic and explains the rationale behind the ambiguous hybrid soft policy approach taken by Chisinau with regard to Transnistria, which along with the Russian factor substantially contributed to the maintaining of the unrecognized regime of .

For more than 25 years so far, on the left evidenced by their rather active participation bank of the Dniester River in the Republic in the electoral procedures and elections of Moldova a fairly sustainable quasi-state of the breakaway republic.2 Being deprived entity exists, which is not recognized by any of external international legitimacy, the member-state of the UN.1 Being from legal authorities of the self-proclaimed republic standpoint an integral part of the Republic possess certain domestic legitimacy or of Moldova, the so-called “Transnistrian recognition on the part of the population Moldovan Republic” or Transnistria was living in the respective territory. Transnistria, able to bestow on its de facto controlled being illegitimate from the international territory most of the attributes inherent to legal standpoint, has nonetheless managed

the government and other state bodies, a tax system,a real full-fledged passports (citizenship), state: the national the police, flag, Paradoxically,to form itself as ateven least in a ‘dethe facto ambiguous state’. army, customs service, and even the national position of the international non-recognition, currency. the very existence and functioning of the unrecognized institutions of the In addition, there is a population of the Transnistrian de facto state over a fairly long unrecognized republic that is quite loyal period of time have still been possible. This to local authorities in Transnistria, as article is aimed at clarifying the factors and

1 Transnistria was recognized in 2006 only by three states with limited recognition – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh republic. This fact does not give a reason to claim even a partial recognition of Transnistria, as it was not recognized by any UN member-state. See also: http://www.newsru.com/russia/17nov2006/aup.html 2 The turnout was over 60% for the last presidential elections in 2016 and 47% for the elections of the Supreme Soviet of TMR (2015). See: “Central Election Commission of the TMR”, 30 November 2015, [http://www.cikpmr. com/index.php/novosti/item/1131-pobedil-vadim-krasnoselskij]

14 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 policies which might have contributed or population and economic agents (companies) continue directly or indirectly to contribute in Transnistria at the tariffs which were to the sustainability of the unrecognized de facto state in Transnistria. than those on the right bank of the Republic of Moldova.significantly The below money the obtainedmarket price from and the lower sale The Role of the Russian Economic of natural gas (about $ 270 million per year)5 Patronage are accumulated in a separate bank account and used by the self-proclaimed Transnistrian First and foremost, one should mention authorities, in particular, to cover enormous Russia as a long-term contributor and de 6 facto patron of the Transnistrian breakaway republic of Moldova over the whole period Besides,budget deficits. natural gas sold at subsidized of its existence. Moscow provided support prices allows residents of the breakaway to the Tiraspol regime over the course of its Transnistrian republic to spend considerably existence through several key channels. less money for housing and, at the same time, provides local economic agents with hidden The Russian Ministry of Finance has been competitive advantages. In the breakaway providing annual funding to the social needs republic, where according to the statistics of Transnistrian pensioners (the so-called provided by the “State Statistics Service” of pension supplement) since 2008.3 Such Transnistria almost 1/3 of the population regular appropriations, although not fully is employed in the industry sector, these covering the amount of required pension subsidies might be of utmost importance.7 payments, certainly allow for relieving the budgetary costs for Tiraspol for the social It is also worth noting that the Transnistrian protection of its own population. economy is highly dependent on imports from neighbouring countries. According The second, and probably crucial for maintaining viability of Transnistria, factor is republic, annual imports of Transnistria an indirect subsidy of the regime through the exceedto the officialthe respective statistics exports of the more breakaway than provision of natural gas to the Transnistrian twice, and almost a half of the total imports company called “TiraspolTransGaz” by last year were from Russia.8 A major part of “Gazprom” free of charge starting from 2009.4 these Russian imports apparently consists of The former company in turn sold the gas to the the supply of energy (natural gas).

3 By 2015, the Russian pension supplement for the retirees residing in Transnistria was about 15 USD for one per- son, but in 2015 it was reduced to 9 USD. See more: https://republic.ru/posts/66931; See also: Russian Surcharge, “Information and news resource TMR”, [http://newspmr.com/novosti-pmr/obshhestvo/11822] 4 At the same time, the debt for the supplied natural gas (that according to some sources already exceeds 5 billion Transnistria Has a Significant Debt for the Russian Natural Gas in the Short Term and in 10-20 Years, the Region Will Be not Able to Pay It off-, Yevgeny Shevchiuc, “InfoMarket”, 06 April US dollars) is assigned to official Chisinau. See: - ral_gas_in_the_short_term_and_in_10-20_years_the_region_will_be_not_able_to_pay_it_off-_Yevgeny_Shevchiuc] 2015, [http://www.infomarket.md/en/transdniester/Transnistria_has_a_significant_debt_for_the_Russian_natu 5 K. Calus, Transnistria’s Economy Going from Bad to Worse, “New Eastern Europe”, 23 January 2015, [http://newea- sterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1462-transnistria-s-economy-going-from-bad-to-worse] 6 28%. See also: K. Calus, An Aided Economy. The Characteristics of the Transnistrian Economic Model, “OSW Com- Accordingmentary”, 16to theMay data 2013, provided [https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-05-16/aided-econo in the Statistical Yearbook of TMR (2015), the budget deficit in 2014 was around- my-characteristics-transnistrian-economic-model] 7 See: Statistical Yearbook of TMR – 2015, 8 Ibid, p. 32 Tiraspol, 2015, [http://mer.gospmr.org/assets/files/pdf/stat-2015.pdf]

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 15 It could be assumed that without such a gained from the Russian direct and indirect continuous economic support on the part of subsidiesThus one canfor speakthe Transnistrian of, at least, triple regime: benefit (1) Russia, the real capacity of the unrecognized the unloading of the budget social spending political regime in Tiraspol to maintain (pensions); (2) the actual revenues for sustainable and functional state institutions the budget due to the sale and usage of would be quite limited, if at all possible. natural gas; (3) the possibility for the citizens and the local economic agents in the Maintaining Separatists or the Role country to save on the purchase of energy of Chisinau in Sustaining the Tiraspol resources, which allows the latter to remain Regime

markets.9 The covert maintaining of the Support on the part of Russia, although profitable and competitive on external being of crucial importance, yet is far to the subsidized rates (much lower than the from being the only factor contributing market)profitability allows of companies local industrial in the enterprisesregion due to the sustainability of the unrecognized of the energy and metallurgical sectors, the Transnistrian de facto statehood. backbone of the Transnistrian economy10, Opportunities of an unrecognized state to budget of breakaway Transnistrian republic perform legal foreign trade are severely withto stay tax afloat revenues. and thus to be able to fill the limited because of the need for such a state

Furthermore, the region receives some Chisinau, while not recognizing interest-free loans11 because of the activities Transnistrian statehood officially oftangible social economic and humanitarian benefits from projects Russian «and considering this territory undertaken in Transnistria with the support being an integral part of the Republic of Moscow. For instance, the projects already of Moldova, went for quite a serious implemented by the Russian NGO “Eurasian concession to economic agents Integration” in the recent years included functioning in the breakaway region. the construction of several educational and healthcare facilities.12

Thus, Russia has taken over a substantial part of the economic burden, which the to have an internationally recognized status. self-proclaimed authorities of Transnistria Since the Transnistrian breakaway republic would have inevitably faced and would have from the international legal standpoint is had to deal with under the international non- an integral part of the Republic of Moldova, recognition and lack of internal resources.

Tiraspol needs customs certificates

9 The natural gas provided by Russia is used as a fuel for producing electricity on the Kuchurgan Power Plant, which is further exported to the right bank of Moldova. See more: https://moldovanpolitics.com/tag/kuchurgan-pow- er-plant/ 10 The electricity sector (32.2%) and ferrous metallurgy (27.2%) in aggregate account for about half of the total industrial production in the TMR, according to statistics. See more: Statistical Yearbook of TMR – 2015, Tiraspol,

11 Farmers of Transnistria Has [sic] Received from Russia Interest-free Loans, “Agro2b”, 29 December 2015, [http://agro2b.ru/en/news/26322-Farmers-Transnistria-has-received-from-Russia.html]2015, [http://mer.gospmr.org/assets/files/pdf/stat-2015.pdf] 12 Results of the Year. Projects NGO ‘Eurasian Integration’, “News of Transnistria”, 21 December 2015, [http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/15-12-21/itogi-goda-proekty-ano-evraziyskaya-integraciya]

16 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 has with the (DCFTA and Moldova to export its products abroad. Autonomous Trade Preferences regime), as (certificates of origin) of the Republic of well as within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other free trade agreements.14 recognizingParadoxically, asTransnistrian it may seem atstatehood the first glance, the official Chisinau, while not Such an ambiguous state of affairs seems being an integral part of the Republic of to contribute to the sustainability of the Moldova,officially went and for considering quite a serious this concession territory to economic agents functioning in the less than the Russian support does. After breakaway region. all,Transnistrian the revenues economy from andforeign ‘statehood’ economic no activity of Transnistria allow local economic authorities have been allowing economic republic. The latter ensures the functioning agentsIn fact, from since the 2006 left thebank official of the Moldovan Dniester ofagents all toinstitutions fill the budget of the of theunrecognized breakaway River (territory of Transnistrian region), state, ranging from defence to the social, which re-registered in the Ministry of healthcare, and education systems of Justice of the Republic of Moldova, to Transnistria. conduct legal foreign trade (exports) on behalf of the Republic of Moldova.13 And it Moreover, it is the Republic of Moldova (the is particularly remarkable in this context right bank of the Dniester), according to the that the Transnistrian companies re- registered in such a way continue to pay major market for the Transnistrian economy. taxes on exports to the budget of the self- Theofficial share statistics of Moldova of Transnistria, in the structure that is of a proclaimed Transnistria but not to the state Transnistrian exports has even grown budget of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, in 2016 up to 46% (while only 8-8.5% is even being unrecognized, the Tiraspol exported to Russia).15 regime has gained a unique opportunity to carry out foreign trade operations through The above clearly serves to prove that its economic agents that are legalized in the Republic of Moldova itself, despite its Moldova. actually serves as one of the sponsors of Apart from this, it is also worth noting that itsofficial economic non-recognition sustainability of Transnistria,along with the business of Transnistria, legalized in the Russia. Economic agents of Transnistria Moldovan legal framework, enjoys all the enjoy preferences in foreign trade (without paying taxes to the Moldovan budget) and agreements that the Republic of Moldova have access to the Moldovan market, the benefits of trade preferences and free trade

13 See: K. Calus, An Aided Economy. The Characteristics of the Transnistrian Economic Model, “OSW Commentary”, 16 May 2013, [https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-05-16/aided-economy-characteris- tics-transnistrian-economic-model] 14 See: Free Trade Agreements: Moldova, European Commission – Export Helpdesk, [http://exporthelp.europa.eu/ Council Regulation (EC) No 55/2009 of 21 January 2009 Introducing Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) for the Republic of Moldova andthdapp/display.htm?page=cd%2Fcd_Moldova.html&docType=main&languageId=en]. Amending Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 and Commission Decision 2005/924/EC, European See also: Commission – -

Export Helpdesk, [http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/display.htm?page=cd%2Fcd_Moldova.html&docType= 15 See: Statistical Yearbook of TMR main&languageId=en] also: Where Transnistria Supplied Goods in 2016: The Exports Geography, “News of Transnistria”, 16 December 2016, – 2015, Tiraspol, 2015, [http://mer.gospmr.org/assets/files/pdf/stat-2015.pdf]. See

[https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-12-16/kuda-pridnestrove-postavlyalo-tovary-v-2016-godu-geografiya] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 17 population of the region does not experience substantial obstacles in visiting the right parties. Taking a tougher political stance bank of the Dniester, and the Transnistrian towardspossible Tiraspol conflict escalationcould potentially between cause the holders of Moldovan biometric passports counteraction on the part of Russia, which (75,000 people) have actively been using the opportunities of visa-free travel to EU breakaway republic. countries for several years.16 carries out efficient patronage over the An important hidden leverage that Moscow However, with respect to such an ambiguous soft policy of Chisinau towards breakaway debt for the consumed gas of the “Gazprom” company,has at its which disposal accounts is Transnistria’s for around huge 6 reasons are being voiced. First of all, there billion US dollars.17 isTransnistria, a conviction that a numbersuch a policy of of significant the ‘most not recognize breakaway Transnistria as a sovereign state, it considers As Russia the officially debt of does the impediment) with regard to the Transnistrian self-proclaimed separatist republic as the regionfavoured’ can (or create vice important versa – ofpreconditions the lowest debt of the Republic of Moldova and this approach of Moscow might become a crucial and even the possibility of reintegration of obstacle for the future reintegration of the thefor region rapprochement, into the Republic confidence of Moldova building, in Moldovan state.18 The range of possible the long run. Maintaining and deepening leverages of pressure Moscow has over economic relations, the actual retraction Chisinau is quite extensive: from economic of different business entities (and ordinary sanctions (embargo) and manipulations residents of the Transnistrian region) with gas prices or supply up to the possibility into the legal framework of the Republic of direct military provocations ignited by the Russian military forces stationed in the of TMR depending on Chisinau (customs Transnistrian region.19 Given the prevailing of Moldova, creation of certain ‘threads’ military capabilities that Transnistria enjoys supply contracts, visa-free regime with the over the rest of Moldova, Chisinau might EU,certificates, etc.) – all free this trade supposedly agreements, strengthens energy reasonably fear the scenarios that could potentially lead to the escalation of tension Tiraspol and its policies, creates a space for on the line of the Dniester. the levers of influence that Chisinau has over between the parties. However, it is quite clear that under the ongoing dialogue and confidence-building conditions of a continuous dialogue and Besides, it should be recognized that such a openness between the parties, the possibility soft policy approach as applied by Chisinau to reach an agreement with the appearance reduces the tension and potential for a

of a real ‘window of opportunity’ for the

16 R. Schwartz, Visa-free Travel for Eastern Europe, but with a Lot of Question Marks, “Deutsche Welle”, 26 December 2015, [http://www.dw.com/en/visa-free-travel-for-eastern-europe-but-with-a-lot-of-question- marks/a-18933243] 17 Gazprom Rejected Moldova’s Proposal to Separate Its Gas Debt from that of Transnistria, “Moldova.org”, 13 February 2017, [http://www.moldova.org/en/gazprom-rejected-moldovas-proposal-separate-gas-debt-transnistria/] 18 Tri missii Rogozina (Rogozin’s Three Missions), “Economicheskoye obozrenie”, No.15 (943), April 2012, [http://logos.press.md/node/34164] 19 Russia has already imposed import duties on the 19 types of goods from Moldova in September 2014 after the country has signed the Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU. See: [http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/u- moldovy-i-rossii-vse-poydet-po-planu-chto-soderzhit-soglasovannyy-dokument-o-vos-28632]. The Joint Group of Russian Forces (JGRF) that has around 1,300 soldiers being stationed on the territory of Transnistria (Moldova).

18 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 Anyway, the current Moldovan policy of the under conditions of hostile confrontation andreintegration economic will blockade be significantly of the Transnistrian better than is actually rather ambiguous or even region on the part of Moldova. Some experts multifaceted.‘most favoured’ On withthe one respect hand, to such Transnistria a policy also point to the necessity of increasing people-to-people contacts between Moldova and Transnistria as a part of the broader building,is justified bringing by the together strategic the considerations two banks of theof creating Dniester, real solving prerequisites common forissues, confidence which the parties and in the longer term – of the might be crucial and essential steps to reunify bottom-upcontext of reintegration confidence process. building20 between the Moldovan state. On the other hand, this policy in some respects contributes to the Readiness for the reintegration of sustainability and viability of the Transnistrian Transnistria should be demonstrated by the citizens living on both banks of the Dniester River. Without implementing trust- regardde facto to statehood, its separatist which region. is definitely at odds building measures between the parties, with at least the official line of Chisinau with The Factor of Corruption behind the of such an ambitious goal as stapling the Hybrid Moldovan Policy Regarding stateit is – difficult the Republic to imagine of Moldova the attainability – in its full Transnistria internationally recognized borders. One should not exclude potential hidden An important point that is also often corrupt interests, which may be behind the stressed to justify the current Moldovan current soft policy of Chisinau regarding soft policy approach with regard to the Transnistria. The Republic of Moldova is breakaway republic is based on the very fact a rather corrupt state, according to the that the Transnistrian region uncontrolled Transparency International Corruption by Moldovan authorities is a home for Perception Index.22 The latest indication of many citizens of the Republic of Moldova. the problems that the country faces with regard to the institutional transparency at least 107,600 Transnistrians held the and corruption was the resonant bank citizenshipAccording toof the the Republic unverified of Moldova data of (which 2009, fraud in 2014 when the National Bank of was about 19.4% of the then population of Moldova loaned about 1 billion USD to three Transnistria).21 This consideration could be Moldovan banks (Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala, and Unibank), which were further to apply a rather soft and balanced policy transferred to offshore accounts and led towardsthe defining breakaway principle thatTransnistria, guides Chisinau which these banks to declare bankruptcy.23 of ordinary Moldovan citizens living on the Some experts point to the possible corrupt territorywould not of significantlythe unrecognized complicate republic. the life interests in the energy sector and electricity

20 N. Popescu, L. Litra, Transnistria: A Bottom-Up Solution, on Foreign Relations, “ECFR/63”, September

21 Problem of Organising Elections in Transnistria, “E-democracy”, 14 February 2009, [http://www.e-democracy.md/en/ monitoring/politics/comments/20090214/]2012, p. 4, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/173479/ECFR63_Transnistria_Brief_AW.pdf] 22 Corruption Perceptions Index 2016: Moldova on the 123rd place with a score of 30/100, [http://www.moldova.org/en/ corruption-perceptions-index-2016-moldova-123rd-place-score-30100/] 23 T. Whewell, The Great Moldovan Bank Robbery, “BBC News”, 18 June 2015, [http://www.bbc.com/news/maga- zine-33166383]

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 19 supplies to Moldova (the right bank of the Corrupt interests of a part of political Dniester) from the breakaway territory of elites in Moldova could have led to the Transnistria. As it is known, the Republic of current ambiguous or hybrid policy Moldova has recently imported electricity approach of Moldovan authorities with from Transnistria through the dubious regard to the breakaway territory when it intermediary company “Energocapital”

is not recognized at the official level but rootsregistered may be, in according Tiraspol. to some The reports, final Dniester.preserving However, its sustainability it is worth as amentioning ‘grey zone’ somebeneficiaries of the ofMoldovan this company and Transnistrianwith offshore thatis beneficial since 2005,for elites when on boththe sidesEU Border of the 24 Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was launched, Besides, the contract for the electricity and later on after some agreements have high-rankingsupply to Moldova, officials as and the businessmen. Transnistrian been reached between Moldova and minister for economic development Ukraine (since 2014) on strengthening admitted, “made up 37% of all the export common border control, the smuggling of Transnistria and if not signed for 2016, capabilities through Transnistria have been then for the Transnistrian economy it substantially limited. would be a disaster.”25 Conclusion Corruption might also be among the The Russian patronage and support in the unwillingness to undertake for all the years form of social subsidies, interest-free loans, ofcentral its independence reasons of Moldovan any substantial political elites’steps towards creating an alternative to the Russian gas-transporting infrastructure, for ofand the free breakaway energy resources republic covers of Transnistria. a significant instance, with the neighbouring Romania. However,part of the contrary financial to a and popular economic view needsabout Only in 2014, a new gas pipeline with the pivotal role of Russia in providing Romania called Iasi (Romania) – Ungheni sustainability of the Transnistrian republic, (Moldova) was launched. However, it a more precise analysis shows that it is remains virtually empty due to the lack Chisinau that also contributes substantially of funding for the project to become a to the economic sustainability of the current political regime in Tiraspol. distribution for the Republic of Moldova.26 significantDependence factoron the in Russian diversifying import gas- of The Moldovan soft policy of the ‘most energy resources (mainly, gas) among other things might give Moscow a certain leverage conditions for deepening cooperation and over the decisions taken by Chisinau.27 buildingfavoured’ sustainable might be aimed trust atbetween constructing the

24 Energocapital vs. Energocom: A New Postponed Meeting, “Crime Moldova”, 01 June 2015, [http://en.crimemoldova. com/news/social/energocapital-vs-energocom-a-new-postponed-meeting/]. See also: M. Andreev, The Head of Trans- nistria Has Been Accused of Involvement in the “Theft” of 100 Million USD, “NewsMaker”, 12 April 2016, [http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/evgeniya-shevchuka-oblozhili-prokladkami-glavu-pridnestrovya-obvinili-v-pri- chastno-24088]. 25 Not Preserving Electricity Supplies to Moldova Would Threaten Transnistria with the Disaster – Ministry of Economic Development, “News Agency Infotag”, 04 March 2016, [http://www.infotag.md/rebellion/219664/] 26 The one who provides gas is a boss: by an example of Moldova and Russia.

25, 2014, [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70161] ‘Jamnews’, February 23, 2017, [https://jam-news.net/?p=20924]; See also: Puiu V. Moldova Struggles to Escape Russian Gas. ‘EurasiaNet’, September 27 S. Gerasymchuk, Ukraine-Moldova: Complicated but Promising Relations, “Ukraine Analytica”, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2016, p. 42

20 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 Moldovan left and the right banks of the further legitimization of the unrecognized Dniester. But without adjustment of this political regime in Tiraspol. policy and binding the perspective of its further implementation to the long-term It is important for the policy of Chisinau political objectives of Chisinau, it is naive to regarding Transnistria to be not only agreed hope that it will lead to any meaningful result upon with key partners but also consistent in terms of the political dialogue between and subordinated to the long-term strategic the parties. At the current stage, when the objectives of the Republic of Moldova itself. economic situation in Transnistria has Having clear policy objectives on the issue substantially worsened, not least due to the (on what terms should reintegration occur, 28, a what should be the future status of the territory, etc.) is also a valuable factor that weakening Russian financial capabilities strengthens the bargaining position of the of‘window the Transnistrian of opportunity’ settlement opens process.for Chisinau country in the negotiation process. to softly impose ‘its own game’ in the context The format and experience of relations chosen by Chisinau with regard to the The Russian patronage and breakaway Transnistria might be quite support in the form of social revealing for Ukraine, which in the past few «subsidies, interest-free loans, years also faced an acute problem of dealing and free energy resources covers a with uncontrolled and Russia-supported significant part of the financial and separatist entities in Donbas. economic needs of the breakaway republic of Transnistria. At the current stage, Kyiv adheres to the opposite strategy, directed rather at isolation of the occupied territories of Donbas and restriction of economic relations with them, which is in many Above all, the official Moldovan respects dictated by the ongoing armed authorities need to be consistent in the implementation of their policy with regard socio-political moods in Ukraine formed to Transnistria. It would also be necessary inconflict the conditions of low intensity of the protracted and the Donbas current to coordinate the efforts and work out a common approach with partners (mainly, situation, simply adopting the current the EU and Ukraine) with respect to Moldovanconflict. In soft such policy a complicated approach regarding political the breakaway territory. Elaborating a Transnistria in the Ukrainian context would common integrated policy approach might be fraught with sharp public rejection and significantly strengthen the bargaining could potentially aggravate the already position of Chisinau in the context of the shaky political situation in Ukraine. Transnistrian settlement process (in the However, in case of overcoming the hot phase for the common policy approach, Chisinau of the military confrontation in Donbas ‘5+2’ negotiation format). While searching and general normalization of the situation should not be crossed due to possible in the region, the Moldovan experience at has to clearly delineate its ‘red lines’ that

28 M. Tishchenko, At the Bottom of the Barrel. How Russia Is Funding Transnistria in the Time of Crisis? “Republic”, 20 April 2016, [https://republic.ru/posts/66931]

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 21 least in some aspects could turn out to be sides, and creates some economic ‘binding relevant for Ukraine and could be adopted by authorities in Kyiv depending on the run creates a more favorable context for goals pursued regarding the temporarily territorialties’ between reintegration them, which at inthe thebottom long uncontrolled territories of Donbas. people-to-people level than the contrary isolationist approach does. Although the Moldovan policy approach, like the other policy strategies towards breakaway separatist territories (e.g. in Ruslan Kermach is a political analyst at the Ilko Georgia or ) in the post-Soviet Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) space, is not exemplary – as none of them has and a postgraduate (PhD) student at the National led to the restoration of territorial integrity University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy studying mainly the issues of the Russian foreign and domestic policy, frozen conflicts, and de facto statehood. Fellow of the is– itintentionally has certain or significantunintentionally advantages. being DAAD semester study program at the Friedrich Schiller implementedThe soft policy byof theMoldova ‘most favored’,regarding which its University of Jena in Germany (2013/14) and PASOS breakaway territory (including economic cooperation, socio-humanitarian contacts, Democracy Program Fellow (2016). He is a political observer and columnist in several Ukrainian internet media outlets and freelance contributor for the US resumptionand introducing of military various escalation, confidence-building increases news organization EurasiaNet since 2017. measures) significantly reduces the risks of

trust between residents of the conflicting

22 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 PROTRACTED CONFLICTS’ RESOLUTION: LESSONS OF THE GREECE-TURKEY CONFLICT FOR THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA CASE

Nadiia Koval Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”/Ukrainian Institute for the Future

The article analyses the Greek-Turkish conflict as an example of a protracted international conflict, which proved to be resilient to the years of resolution attempts. Some possible applications of its lessons to the current state and future development of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict are suggested. Special attention is paid to the prospects and limitations of using international legal instruments.

Introduction: The Resilience of Protracted Conflicts follows this logic, with hybrid tactics at the coreThe ongoingof the Russian Ukraine-Russia strategy, conflictbut it is partly also The severe restriction on the use of force unique in a couple of dimensions. The most in interstate relations in the nuclear age important of these is the precedent of the and utmost attention to negotiations and outright annexation of a part of a sovereign peaceful resolution did not manage to state (the case in point is, obviously, the Crimean Peninsula). This becomes even Nevertheless, these approaches have more prominent in view of the fact that the prevent interstate conflicts altogether. aggressor is a nuclear state and a permanent UN SC member attacking the country that Asdiminished a result, hybrid the warfare number and of proxy conflicts wars surrendered a huge nuclear arsenal in significantly and influenced their structure. exchange for security and territorial integrity 1. assurances (1994 Budapest Memorandum). proliferated while intrastate conflicts started Some researchers even categorize the to– dominatelong-term overstandoffs the interstate that periodically conflicts Russian aggression as a possible breaking burstIn addition, into deep numerous crises protractedor even wars, conflicts with point for the future of international law and underlying deep historical and identity post-war security system2. grievances – became one of the most Formally in its fourth year, the Ukraine- resolution. pressing issues in contemporary conflict Russia conflict does not yet meet the

1 K. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York, 1996. 2 T. Grant, Aggression against Ukraine. Territory, Responsibility and International Law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 23 criteria to be categorized as a protracted to NATO in 1952 for strategic

requires “lengthy duration – at least ten yearsconflict – and (according three or to more Michael interstate Brecher, crises, this almostreasons, immediately. creating a so-called Bloody southeastintercommunal flank often accompanied by war or lesser degrees of the Alliance. The conflicts have broken out of violence between the PC adversaries, the 1950s-1960s provoked the establishment and, sometimes their patron(s) and/or offights the inUN-peacekeeping colonial and independent mission (UNFICYP), Cyprus in ally[ies]”3). Nevertheless, it has all the controlling the “Green line” that has been potential to become one, due to the existential dividing the island in two parts since 1964. differences between the parties and lack of any viable and long-term resolution plan so far. As the implementation of the Minsk Agreements stumbled, the bulk of the efforts The Greek-Turkish conflict of international mediators concentrate is a useful example of a on decreasing the degree of violence and «protracted conflict, which assisting populations of the combat-affected proved to be notoriously resistant areas, while relying on diplomatic efforts to resolution, notwithstanding all and reconciliation processes in the longer the efforts that have been put in perspective. Surely, this has a potential to

some politicians have even supported such abecome course of another events, protractedespecially with conflict, regard and to The pogrom of Istanbul Greeks in September the Crimean dimension4. Although in a world 1955 and deportations of Greek nationals that progressively relies more on power from Turkey in 1964 initiated the process of and less on institutions, even the existing a drastic decrease of the Greek minority in

will evolve; learning from other protracted Western Thrace has encountered education, protracted conflicts and ways to resolve them property,Turkey, while and the Muslimpolitical minority representation in Greece’s problems. The Turkish military incursion conflicts’Greek-Turkish examples could : be instructive. Cyprus into Cyprus as a guarantor power in 1974 Reunification Talks’ Failure And resulted in an occupation of one third of Beyond the island, where the Turkish Republic of was established in 1983, but remains virtually non-recognised ever since. The emergence of Aegean territorial beThe Greek-Turkishnotoriously resistantconflict is a touseful resolution, example disputes in the 1970s-1980s over the size notwithstandingof a protracted all conflict, the efforts which that provedhave been to of the Greek continental shelf was gradually put in by prominent politicians, civil society “enriched” with additional dimensions, initiatives, and international organisations. culminating in 1996 with the Imia/Kardak The two countries, overloaded with a long incident: a severe crisis as to the territorial allegiance of a small uninhabited island. Not

and difficult common history, were accepted

3 M. Brecher, The World of Protracted Conflicts, Lexington Books, 2016, p. 4. PC in the citation is the acronym for “pro-

4 tracted conflict”. annexation of Crimea as “permanent provisional solution”. See for example: Christian Lindner: Germany Should Accept CrimeanThe recent Annexation prominent as example ‘Permanent was Provisional the German Solution Free Democrats Party leader Christian Lindner’s call to accept the article/christian-lindner-germany-should-accept-crimean-annexation-as-permanent-provisional-solution/] ’, “Politico.eu”, 06 August 2017, [http://www.politico.eu/

24 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 only the extended timeframe but also the resulted in the failure of the negotiations, sheer range of bilateral problems illustrates with the insurmountable problem of the the inherent complexity of the problem and withdrawal of the over 30,000-strong Turkish its development over time. army from the island, present in Cyprus since the swift Turkish military operation Although in the last two years, heightened in 1974, notwithstanding UN resolutions expectations emerged that the Cyprus that demanded withdrawal. Related was crisis could be resolved once and for all, the the future of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, solution, which seemed to be at hand in 2015- 2017, turned into a sound defeat. It was the most real possibility to reunite Cyprus since involvement.which provided Most at leastplayers partial suggest justification such a regimeto guarantor is unfair states’and outdated external and the military two failure in 2004, and the motivation of all the of the three guarantors – Greece and United partiesthe time was of strong. the Annan The success reunification of Cyprus plan Kingdom – declared readiness to drop their guarantor status. Turkey, however, decided could substantiate its political preference of not to abandon such a powerful instrument reunification was crucial for the EU, as it of control. The failure of the negotiations success, and practically integrate Northern peaceful conflict resolution with a palpable mode, starting with the issue of the drilling could counter the powerful disintegration rightsquickly offshore returned Cyprus the situation5. to a conflicting trendCyprus launched into the by EU via reunification. and demonstrate This that the EU, notwithstanding all the In addition, almost concomitantly, the differences, is moving in the right direction. It could also become a breakthrough for Greece and Turkey, which needed smooth 2016quarrel coup as emerged, to Greece’s and refusal the bulk to of extradite Aegean cooperation in dealing with a migration crisis semi-dormanteight Turkish disputes officers overhave been the failedreignited: July with a view to the implementation of the EU- Turkey migration deal, entering into force in March 2016. Also, the presidents of the two dangerousIncidents onlevels, sea amounting and airspace to claims dogfights from parts of the island, representing possibly the Turkishhave intensified. politicians Political as to validity rhetoric of the reached basic last generation that has physically lived in united Cyprus, were enormously motivated borders between the two countries. President to amend the gap. Nevertheless, negotiations, Erdogan1923 Lausanne himself raised treaty the that bar, defined claiming: the sea

July 15 [coup attempt] is the second War of stalled since January 2017, have finally and Independence for the Turkish nation. Let us Evenofficially though failed the in issueJuly that of Cyprus year. is evidently know it like that. They [threatened] us with so much more than bilateral, engaging Sèvres in 1920 and persuaded us to [accept] players from the local communities up to Lausanne in 1923. Some tried to deceive the UN, still its importance to the Greek- us by presenting Lausanne as victory. In Turkish relations cannot be underestimated. Lausanne, we gave away the [now-Greek] Moreover, it was this bilateral dimension that islands that you could shout across to.6

5 Tensions Grow over Cyprus Gas Drilling, “ekathimerini”, 12 July 2017, [http://www.ekathimerini.com/219986/article/ ekathimerini/news/tensions-grow-over-cyprus-gas-drilling] 6 As cited in: Erdoğan’s Remarks on Treaty that Formed Modern Turkey Irk Opposition, “Hurriyet Daily News”, 29 September 2016, [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-remarks-on-treaty-that-formed-modern-tur-

key-irk-opposition.aspx?PageID=238&NID=104386&NewsCatID=338] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 25 With the Turkish-EU relations hitting low again and the Greek-Turkish relations is the one that champions international returning to a standoff over security issues, lawthe weakerover direct part innegotiations. this asymmetric It is aconflict, status the question that remains open is: Was this

quo power that has profited from the 1982 failure due to some structural deficiencies in In the world where Whilethe conflict the current resolution environment process orin thedid regionit just become a victim of external circumstances? international law is deemed «compulsory but oftentimes lacks mechanisms of enforcement, tois difficult a decisive indeed, resolution the deplorable gives us possibilities longevity of the Greek-Turkish conflict and its resilience its application to the conflict resolution has only limited effects to see into the influence of long-term trends resolutionon conflict instruments.resolution and reconciliation and to assess the effectiveness of some conflict United Nations Convention on the Law of the Aegean Puzzle between Strategic Sea (UNCLOS) that permitted it to extend its Interests and International Law territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, and has quite a strong position in legal In the world where international law is respect. Since the 1970s, Turkey has started deemed compulsory but oftentimes lacks to progressively challenge that status mechanisms of enforcement, its application quo, and the scope of these challenges has progressed. It started from the continental effects. Except for the transitional justice and shelf issues (claims that islands have no tribunalsto the conflict for atrocities, resolution which has are only regularly limited continental shelf), and related problems of international waters and exploration rights; then it challenged 10 miles aerial space, isemployed relatively in rare a post-conflict and limited resolution in scope. period, authority of Athens Flight Information applying law instruments to resolve conflicts The core of the present-day dispute between sovereignty of the islets that have not been Greece and Turkey is territorial, and at mentionedRegion over by the name Aegean in the Sea Lausanne and finally treaty the7. the heart of it presently stands an array of sovereignty disputes in the Aegean Sea. While Having never considered becoming party no direct military attack has happened so far over the Aegean issues, several open threats opposition to its eventual implementation by of war, important military build-up, an Greece.to the As UNCLOS, virtually all Turkey Aegean adopted islands belong fierce impressive , and a few dangerous to Greece, with territorial seas going from 6 incidents involving casualties still make this to 12 nautical miles, Greece could control theatre vulnerable to eventual escalation. 64% of the Aegean Sea (currently 35%) and a proportion of the international waters will decrease from 56% to 26%. The rhetoric of not letting the Aegean Sea to become a stressesAsymmetric power nature and ofinterests, conflict while also hasthe “Greek lake” gained ground in Turkey. Thus, weakerits influence: player The recourses stronger to playerinternational usually law and international support. Greece, as the Turkish parliament adopted a resolution after Greece ratified the Convention in 1994,

7 For more details see, for example, H. Athanasopoulos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea. A Case Study in International Law,

McFarland & Company, 2001. 26 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 that authorized the government to use helped, to a degree, to defuse the tensions and better control the situation on the the Aegean, eventually declaring 12 miles ground, preventing unwanted escalations. territorialall measures water to protectimplementation Turkey’s rightsa casus in Still, as the development of the events (both belli. As an alternative, Turkey proposed in the Aegean and Cyprus negotiations) has demonstrated, the idea of reconciliation via moving from the less contested issues to the Nevertheless,bilateral negotiations Greece, over acknowledging all the conflicting the more problematic ones did not bear much issues to incorporate all parties’ interests. fruit. continental shelf, has repeatedly proposed toexistence submit ofthe the case only to conflicting the International issue – Sanctions and Responsibility for Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, but to Occupation in the Cyprus Case no avail. After the Imia incident, Greece also The description of all international law sovereignty in the Aegean to the ICJ, but was puzzles in the Cyprus case exceeds the nosuggested more successful. to file the To case this onday, the the disputed essence limits of a small overview article, as for roughly six decades this had been is a

Inof the meantime,conflict remains the focus unresolved. in the Aegean was over 130 UN SC resolutions adopted up to to keep dialogue and communications lines highly internationalised conflict issue with open and provide for more transparency decisions which could be the most relevant fordate. the I willUkraine-Russia just briefly case.stop at a few judicial measuresin each country’s (CBMs), military oftentimes undertakings under the via One prominent precedent happened in 1994, introducing different confidence-building when the European Court of Justice took a reason was to prevent dangerous escalation decision in 1994 ruling against acceptance fromNATO incidents, sponsorship. which The were first not and infrequent utmost of Turkish Cypriot goods by the other and at times dangerous. The second aim was countries. By this decision, furthermore, to create the atmosphere of mutual trust, it effectively established severe economic which would later contribute to resolving sanctions against the self-proclaimed hard security problems and reconcile TRNC9, which remain in force today. The security interests. The CBMs have been non-recognition is reciprocated: Turkey introduced in a series of instances starting does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus, from 19888 up to today, most importantly in and thus deems its passports invalid and 2002-2004, when a direct dialogue between ports. The impasse around the question Aegean disputes took place. These included overprohibits lifting entry these of Cypriot mutual ships sanctions in Turkey’s also rulesthe officials or limitations of the two to countriesmilitary exercises, over the produced no result in the latest negotiations special phone hotlines between the prime over Cyprus, as they have been a stumbling ministers and army chiefs, and a range of block in the earlier Turkey-EU accession different self-restraint commitments. This negotiations.

8 For the CBMs evolution, see for example Z. Lachowski, Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the New Europe,

- tweenSIPRI Research the two states” Report (p. No. 155) 18, Oxfordstill holds University true in 2017. Press, 2004, pp. 151-155. The author’s conclusion that “the existing CBMs are not supported by strong political determination, but are symbolic and insufficient to reduce tension be 9 S. Talmon, The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice, “European Journal of International Law”, Vol. 12, No. 4, 01 September 2001, pp. 727-750.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 27 The second prominent example of using not accept the ruling). More importantly, the instruments of international law in the the ruling also has wider implications, as Cyprus question relates to the individual an international law professor Philip Sands applications of the Greeks who lost their commented to , properties in the north after 1974 to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It’s a strong signal that the passage of The success of one such application, Loizidou time will not diminish the consequences or case10, forced Turkey to pay 1.2 euro as costs of illegal occupation. It has obvious a compensation, and numerous similar relevance to the situation in Abkhazia and applications to the ECHR followed. However, South Ossetia, which are occupied parts with Turkey establishing a restitution of Georgia, and Crimea, which is occupied commission (recognised by the ECHR to be a Ukraine.13

individual applications from the Greek Before the 2014 ECHR ruling, Turkey Cypriots,sufficient remedyit could indrastically 2010), which decrease accepted the only suffered a US-imposed short-term amount of money to pay (compared with the arms trade embargo (1975-1978) due to payments according to the court verdicts). the Cyprus invasion, and calls for direct Turkey also became more reluctant to give economic sanctions against the state have even small territorial compensations to the not reached their aims. Still Greece managed Greek Cypriots, as the last negotiations have for some time to impose indirect sanctions, demonstrated11. This one is an instructive using some instruments proposed by its EU precedent for Ukrainians who lost their membership and balancing in this way a property after the annexation of Crimea. generally weaker position.

The potentially seminal international-law- It is instructive nevertheless that Greece related development happened in May 2014 did not manage to get military support or with another ruling of the ECHR, which hard security guarantees from the EU in obliged Turkey to pay 90 million Euro as a its standoff with Turkey (in the 1990s, the compensation for its 1974 Cyprus invasion. Western European Union directly stated In 1998, the ECHR ruled that both the that it would not interfere in the Greek- invasion and occupation were illegal, and 14. Moreover, in an attempt occupation discourse appeared in UN SC to lower tensions, international partners resolutions as early as 198412. This decision, Turkishwere keen conflict) on limiting military build-up and if implemented, could be a game-changer arms race in the region, pressuring both for Turkey (although at the moment it does states simultaneously. Thus, when Greece

10 The different interpretations of the Loizidou case: Republic of Cyprus MFA, [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.

of%20Loizidou%20v%20Turkey.pdf], Republic of Turkey MFA, November 1999, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the- loizidou-case-a-critical-examination-by-zaim-m_necatigil_-november-1999.en.mfa]nsf/CC8E93A64DF9F2FFC2257F9C00386EA3/$file/European%20Court%20of%20Human%20Rights-Case%20 11 B. Yinanç, Time to Think Outside of the Box on the Cyprus Issue, “Hurriyet Daily News”, 15 August 2017, -

12 [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/time-to-think-outside-of-the-box-on-the-cyprus-issue.aspx?page ID=449&nID=116732&NewsCatID=412] Ercan, The Cyprus Question: At an Impasse for Too Long, [in:] Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality andFor theGlobal overview Reach, ofPalgrave UN SC resolutionsMacmillan, and2017, most pp. up-to-date321-342. summary of the legal dimension of Cyprus conflict, see: P. 13 J. Borger, European Court Orders Turkey to Pay Damages for Cyprus Invasion, “The Guardian”, 12 May 2014, [https:// www.theguardian.com/law/2014/may/12/european-court-human-rights-turkey-compensation-cyprus-invasion] 14 P. Tsakonas, A. Tournikiotis, Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The ‘Expectations–Reality Gap’, “Security Dialogue”, September 2003, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 307.

28 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 announced the Joint Defence Doctrine with bilateral agenda, the increased economic Cyprus in 1993 and announced that it was and tourist turnaround exists on a parallel going to deploy Russian S-300 ground-to-air track with strategic quarrels. The possibility missiles there, it was followed by the threat of translating economic ties into peace still from Turkey to remove the missiles by force. needs to be proven. The US and the UK pressured both Greek and Conclusions: Are Any Cross-case the deployment. Lessons Possible? Cypriot governments and finally prevented However, the failure to get military support The remarkable resilience of the Greek- was somehow compensated by the EU support to the resolution of the Aegean instruments, and policies that were assessed inTurkish this conflictarticle driveto the certainresolution conclusions. attempts, as well as letting Cyprus to become the EU Although direct analogies can be faulty conflict according to the international law, at least, some developments reveal to be both countering Turkish positions. Finally, extremely instructive. First, the use of the themember-state EU membership before theprovided conflict Greece resolution, with international law possibilities is still a way important diplomatic leverage to veto Turkish EU integration initiatives (up to rejecting the Turkish membership bid in 1997). the use of the international law possibilities is still a way to «go that should be thoroughly The longest known and most successful détente and rapprochement period in explored by Ukraine, both in the view bilateral Greek-Turkish relations began of compensation for lost property and in 1999, following a change in the Greek paying damages for the occupation strategy, removing its veto and introducing its subsequent support, albeit conditional, to go that should be thoroughly explored by the idea that economic cooperation and Ukraine, both in the view of compensation increasedto Turkey’s societalEU membership. contacts Inbring this period,peace for lost property and paying damages for gained ground. While changing attitudes the occupation. As the Greek-Turkish case and stereotypes is believed to be the most demonstrates, this could take decades, important condition to get sustainable but the consequences both in terms of peace in the Greek-Turkish relations15, this kind of psychology change needs quite a international arena are huge. Second, looking long-term framework. Thus, the links from atresponsibility the Aegean disputes, and parties’ the territorial standing inissues the economic cooperation were believed to as to the sea territories could be the next contribute to peace and many governmental area of contention with Russia, albeit in a and non-governmental initiatives took place. different environment with the ongoing The result was that considerable successes occupation of Crimea and Russian de facto were recorded in the development of control of the Kerch straight, which could trade and tourism. But again, with the EU- threaten the navigation in the Azov Sea Turkey relations going south and the old and economic well-being of the coastal strategic problems re-emerging on the

cities. Third, confidence- or trust-building

15 A. Heraclides, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 29 measures are mostly effective for the and encouraging intra-regional cooperation control of the situation on the ground and in the post-Soviet space. for preventing unwanted escalations. Yet, they do not help much to resolve strategic disputes. Nevertheless, the pressure to Nadiia Koval is a Board Member of the Foreign Policy adopt this kind of measures increases Council “Ukrainian Prism” and analyst in foreign policy and security issues at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. She previously worked as a foreign and domestic as the conflict grows longer. Fourth, the economic cooperation brings peace would policy analyst at the National Institute for Strategic persistence of the idea that intensified have a double consequence for Ukraine: Studies, and studied in the doctoral programme at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and lobby and their idea of restoring and Civilizations (INALCO, Paris) and National University, improvingfirst, the pressurerelations ofwith the Russia anti-sanctions through trade; and second, sponsoring the renewal “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”. Her research interests are of economic ties not only with the occupied focused on post-conflict settlement, reconciliation territories, but also between Ukraine and policies, and Ukrainian-Polish and Greek-Turkish Russia in a kind of a new “Eastern policy” relations.

30 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 CYPRUS CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE: LESSONS FOR UKRAINE

Dr. Mykola Zamikula National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine

The article examines the Cyprus conflict in the context of international efforts applied in order to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem and to unify the island. A brief description of the events since 1974 – from the time of the Turkish invasion – is provided. Special attention is given to the peacekeeping initiatives proposed by the United Nations – both during the Cold War era and in the post-bipolar times. The Cyprus case is an example indication of the inefficiency of modern peacekeeping tools that were used by international community.

Introduction Origins of the Conflict and the Turkish Invasion of 1974 Russian aggression is the main threat Cyprus for a long period of its history was appropriate counter-strategy became a British colony. It gained independence anfor important Ukraine’s task security. for the Designingstate. In this an in 1960 – but this did not bring peace to context, it is necessary to consider the island. Almost immediately ethnic the position of the international confrontation between the Greek Cypriot community, to study its tools in the field majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority of peacekeeping processes. It requires a erupted. Over the course of 14 years, the detailed analysis of the past experience two communities gradually disassociated – various examples of such conflicts in different regions of the world that remain low intensity was aggravated in 1974 when, unresolved today or are already over. In asthemselves a result of from a military each other.coup, Thethe authorities conflict of this article, it is proposed to consider the of the island were seized by supporters of context of the Cyprus conflict, which for more than 40 years remains a hotbed of sharply. After an unsuccessful attempt to instability in the Eastern Mediterranean enlistits unification the support with of Greece. the United Ankara Kingdom reacted and has certain formal similarities – the guarantor of the neutrality of Cyprus, (external aggression, creation of an Turkey acted unilaterally. Turkish armed unrecognized state) with the Ukrainian forces invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974. case, as one such example. Despite the swift adoption of the UN Security

1 UN Security Council Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974, [http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/71441/S_

RES_353%281974%29-EN.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y access 23 August 2017] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 31 Council Resolution 3531, which called for was proclaimed in the north of the island. This step corresponded to the Turkish view 22 July. As a result, the Turks were able to of the problem – to create a federal state gaina cease-fire, a foothold the in fightingthe bridgehead, continued holding until consisting of two ethnic parts. However, a corridor from the port city of Kyrenia it was not supported by either the Greek to Nicosia. At the same time, the Greek Cypriots or the international community. Cypriots captured the Turkish enclaves in The UN Security Council Resolution 3672 the south of Cyprus. condemned it.

Taking into account the ethnic nature of the 1974, attempts of peace talks in Geneva did confrontation, the resolution of the issue notDuring succeed. the end The of fall July-first of the halfmilitary of August junta in Greece and formation of a democratic aspect in the relations between the two government changed the point of view of opposingof population parties. exchange An agreement became a on specific this the international community in favour of was reached in Vienna on 2 August 1975, as part of the negotiation process initiated by Cyprus according to the Swiss scenario, the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim. withAthens. the division Ankara’s of proposalthe state territory to reorganize along As a result, thousands of Greeks and Turks were forced to leave their homes and move among the Greeks. The Greek Cypriots to the south and north respectively. At the insistedthe ethnic on principle,the constitutional did not consolidation find support of the coexistence of two nations within the consequences for overcoming the framework of a single, integral sovereign contradictionssame time, this and dialogue developing had no an significant effective state. Under these conditions, the Turkish government initiated the second phase of the military operation. As a result of the Certainplan for successthe unification was achieved of the island. only in early offensive, Turkish troops occupied the 1977. The leaders of the communities – north-eastern part of the island. A status Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktas quo has been formed with the creation of the – met in Nicosia and signed an agreement line of demarcation (the so-called “Green Line”), which is maintained until today. The in the form of a federal state. However, furtherconfirming negotiations their vision were of adeadlocked. unified Cyprus The the international image of Ankara, exposing parties had different views on the format itTurkish as an aggressor actions have and significantlycausing aggravation spoiled of the federal arrangement. The Turks saw of relations with Europe. it as an alliance of two ethnically divided parts of a federation. The Greeks defended Peacemaking Process in the Cyprus the principle of coexistence of ethnic Problem in 1970-1990s groups within the subjects of the federation (undoubtedly – with the dominance of one Solution of the Cyprus problem became of them in each part of the country). Ankara one of the core issues for the international community. The situation became more in 1983, the so-called Turkish Republic of complicated in February 1975, when the Northernwas not satisfied Cyprus with was the proclaimed, negotiations, which and Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus has been recognized only by Turkey. The

2 UN Security Council Resolution 367 of 12 March 1975, [http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/367 access 23 August 2017]

32 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 UN Security Council condemned these the 1990s were also unsuccessful. The Turkish actions as well in resolutions 5413 and 5504. side was not ready to make concessions. In the mid-1990s, the peacekeeping processes However, negotiations over the possible were increasingly stalled. The anti-Turkish integration of the two parts of Cyprus decisions of the European Court regarding did not stop. In the mid-1980s, they were the actions of Ankara in Cyprus and the characterized by both successes and failures. clashes in the buffer zone, resulting in human On the one hand, the call of the United Nations casualties, had aggravated the situation even to withdraw the occupation forces from the further. other hand, development of a solution in the The Development and Failure of the practicalisland caused format Turkey’s continued. indignation. The initiative On the to exchange part of the occupied territory, to withdraw the Turkish troops, and to have At the turn of the 21st century, the United 40% representation in the central organs Nations proposed a complex vision for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. On the Turkish representatives. However, the eve of a new wave of enlargement of the Greeksof the unifieddid not statelike this met form support of interaction, from the European Union, which was supposed to which was seen as essentially confederative. affect Cyprus, an attempt was made to unite the two parts of the island. UN Secretary- in 1985, 1988, and 1990 did not bring New meetings of the communities’ leaders the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus Didier Agreement5 and Set of Ideas6, which were General Kofi Annan and Special Adviser to significantproposed by results. UN Secretary-General The Draft Framework Javier de AccordingPfirter developed to the latestthe corresponding version of the plan. plan, it was supposed to reach a compromise by ContradictionsCuellar, remained between unfulfilled the Greeksinitiatives. and the Turks in Cyprus acquired another painful United Republic of Cyprus. It was supposed to point when the Greek Cypriots stated their consistcreating of a twounified parts Cyprus – the Greekfederal and state Turkish – the desire to integrate into the EU. However, states (each with its own constitution), but North Cyprus stressed that it would not be united by federal government structures. It possible before the completion of the process was intended to take the Swiss model as an of the European integration of Turkey, which example. The main governing element of the had already been initiated. The EU did not state system was to become the Presidential listen to this wish. The result was a deepening Council, consisting of nine people. The diplomatic confrontation over the creation of national composition of the council was a customs union of the Turkish Republic and clearly determined by the percentage ratio its unrecognized satellite. Attempts by the of the Greek and Turkish population of the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros- island in the proportion of 2 to 1. Among the members of the council, the president and

Ghali, to resolve the dispute in the first half of

3 UN Security Council Resolution 541 of 18 November 1983, [https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/

4 UN Security Council Resolution 550 of 11 May 1984, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/550(1984) access 23 August 2017] NR0/453/99/IMG/NR045399.pdf?OpenElement access 23 August 2017] 5 Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus Presented by the Secretary-General on 29 March 1986, “Report of the Secre- tary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (for the period 10 December 1985–11 June 1986)”, pp. 13-17. 6 UN Security Council Resolution 789 of 25 November 1992, -

[http://www.law.gov.cy/Law/lawoffice.nsf/0/61532046D C1283ACC225742B003BA117/$file/Resolution%20789%20_1992_.pdf access 23 August 2017] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 33 get rid of the invaders. On the contrary, it elected, each of them representing a separate ethnicvice president community. of the Legislative unified state power were was to beto preserving the Turkish military presence on be concentrated in the hands of a bicameral thelegalized island. many The proposed of Ankara’s ethnic achievements, division of parliament. In the upper chamber, equal public authorities also did not suit the Greek representation of the two communities was Cypriots. In their opinion, the proportions emphasized. The lower chamber was to of the Annan Plan did not correspond to be divided based on the ethnic proportion of the population. The judiciary power Turkish population. As a result, the majority was to be concentrated in the hands of the ofthe voters real figures– nearly and 76% the – influencerejected the of theUN Supreme Court, whose members were an initiative9. In the Turkish part of the island, equal number of representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities, as well as represented the need for a compromise to three foreign experts7. It was also proposed endopinions the international were divided. isolation Official of propaganda Northern to ensure the right of return for displaced Cyprus. The long-standing leader of Turkish refugees who were forced to leave their Cypriots Rauf Denktas, as well as Turkish homes after the division of Cyprus. The nationalist forces (the “Grey Wolves” territory of the Turkish part of the island movement), spoke against the peace had to be reduced – from 37%, which is initiative. On the contrary, Prime Minister currently occupied the Turkish Republic of of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Northern Cyprus, to 28.5%8. It was intended Mehmet Ali Talat expressed support for the to preserve the Greek and Turkish military presence on the island. initiative. This position was dictated by the desireplan. Officialto settle Ankaradisputes also in the supported relations with this The provisions of the Annan Plan were put to a referendum that took place in Turkish European integration policy. As a both parts of Cyprus on 24 April 2004. result,the EU nearlyin the context 65% of of the intensification participants of the referendum voted for its adoption10. this issue – the turnout of the population wasIt showed 89% in the the public’sGreek part keen of interestthe island in Peacekeeping Talks after 2004 and 87% in the Turkish part. At the same time, it demonstrated striking differences In the 21st century, both parties repeatedly in relation to this initiative between the expressed their commitment to the basic Greeks and the Turks. The Greek population principles of peaceful settlement. However, of the island and their political leaders real steps in this area were not undertaken. initially opposed the proposed conditions. An essential role in this was played by the They stressed that that they were the real irreconcilable position of President of the victims of the 1974 invasion. The proposed Republic of Cyprus T. Papadopoulos. The compromise did not satisfy their desire to situation altered only after the change of

7 The Annan Plan for Cyprus, [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html access 23 August 2017] 8 The Annan Plan for Cyprus, [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html access 23 August 2017] 9 Referendums in Cyprus, Parliamentary questions by Ioannis Marinos (PPE-DE) to the European Commission, European -

Parliament, 2004, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2004-1444+0+ 10 Referendums in Cyprus, Parliamentary Questions by Ioannis Marinos (PPE-DE) to the European Commission, European DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=hr access 23 August 2017] -

Parliament, 2004, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2004-1444+0+ DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=hr access 23 August 2017] 34 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 power in the south of the island. A new disagreements. Negotiations on the Cyprus impetus in the negotiation process was settlement reached an impasse in May 2012 provided by President of the Republic of during the preparation of the Republic of Cyprus for the presidency in the EU, talks on this issue between the leaders of which was strongly opposed by Turkey and Cyprus D. Christofias, who initiated direct the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots. The

In 2014, leaders of the two communities At the end of the first decade issuedfinancial a crisisjoint declaration, postponed the which negotiations. stressed of the 2000s, the situation the unacceptability of the existing status «in Cyprus was somewhat quo; willingness to meet at the negotiating paradoxical. A rather active table; commitment to an idea of a bi- negotiation process, in which UN zonal, bi-communal federation, created Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was by the Greek and Turkish parts with their involved, was not accompanied by own constitutions; the need to achieve a significant changes and compromises comprehensive solution to all disputes13. in the most important issues are still far from accomplishment. However, the real prospects of unification both communities of the island in September To date, there are two approaches to the 2008. The subjects of negotiations were six main areas: management and distribution of power; the questions of membership in partssolution of the of island the Cyprus in a single conflict. state. The It is firstthe the EU; the economy; the property of the focusprovides of the the international idea of a unification community. of bothThe Greek Cypriots in the occupied territories; second approach involves the legalization territorial issues; security and guarantees11. of the existing status quo and the continued development of the two independent states in Cyprus. Today this idea is popular in the situation in Cyprus was somewhat Turkish circles in an environment where paradoxical.At the end of Athe rather first decade active of negotiation the 2000s, the deterioration of relations with the process, in which UN Secretary-General European Union eliminates the need for Ban Ki-moon was involved, was not compromises for Ankara. It should be noted that the long history of divided life reduced compromises in the most important issues. Accordingaccompanied to byanalysts significant12, the changesachievement and among the inhabitants of Cyprus – they have of agreement between the parties is quite becomethe popularity accustomed of the to the idea situation of unification and do problematic given the existing serious not believe in the prospects of change14.

11 B.I. Gumeniuk, Ukrainsko-Kiprski Vidnosyny: Dvadsyat Rokiv Dynamichnoho Rozvytku (Ukrainian-Cyprus Relations: Twenty Years of Dynamic Development), No. 2, p. 7. “Scientific Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine”, 2014, Vol. 21, 12 B.I. Gumeniuk, Ukrainsko-Kiprski Vidnosyny: Dvadsyat Rokiv Dynamichnoho Rozvytku (Ukrainian-Cyprus Relations: Twenty Years of Dynamic Development), No. 2, p. 8. “Scientific Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine”, 2014, Vol. 21, 13 Joint Declaration: Final Version as Agreed Between the Two Leaders, “Cyprus Mail Online”, 11 February 2014,

23 August 2017] [http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/ access 14 Why the Majority Want , “Cyprus Mail Online”, 5 February 2017, [http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/02/05/ majority-want-partition/ access 23 August 2017]

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 35 Cyprus Case as an Example of the Crimea and Donbas. Over time, this issue will Ineffectiveness of International be updated, and its resolution will become Peacekeeping Tools more complicated. As a result, the freezing

The current status quo in Cyprus is not a the situation and to make restoration of the pre-warof the conflict status willquo onlyimpossible. serve to complicate were unsuccessful and have not found due recognition.solution of the Long conflict. truce International and the mediation efforts efforts of international organizations the positions of the victims of aggression and allowed the creation of an effective buffer theWe defineinternational the main peacekeeping contradiction institutions between zone between the parties in order to cease in the framework of a settlement, which is hostilities. However, the more than 40-year typical for both Cyprus and Ukraine. The period of reconciliation attempts did not former seeks to restore its sovereignty over bring the positions of the parties closer. the lost territories, to cancel the effects of foreign intervention. For the latter, the The failure of the Annan Plan is not merely an main objective will always be a cessation of example of how international efforts towards a view to a subsequent development of a failed. The nature of the proposed initiatives peacefulhostilities, solution. the freezing However, of the such conflict a freezing with itselfa peaceful clearly resolutiondemonstrates of athe conflict inability have of is always contrary to the interests of the international institutions to facilitate the victim. The longer it goes on, the harder it is to ensure the return to the pre-war balance of compromise was characterized by a number power. Too many factors affect the situation ofsettlement controversial of a frozen moments. conflict. One The of themproposed was in this case. In the end, the victims face a equating the rights of the aggressor and the situation when the international community victim. Whatever were the circumstances, – which condemned and continues to Turkey initiated a direct, armed invasion in condemn the aggression – offers such a a sovereign territory in 1974. This provoked plan of action that means giving up a certain a split of an independent state; it led to the share of sovereignty over the lost territories expulsion of the Greek Cypriots from their in exchange for the return (very often – only native homes. However, the Annan Plan suggested building relationships between both the Annan Plan and Western initiatives the communities with a kind of a blank forformal) Donbas of the can unified be described. state. In those terms, slate, offering reciprocal concessions. Not surprisingly, for Greeks, it seemed Difference of the Cyprus Problem unacceptable – from their point of view, from the Ukrainian Crisis only they made concessions in relation to the positions of the parties that had existed A distinctive feature of the Cyprus problem before 1974. The Turks only legalized is a national-ethnic factor. Despite a rather some parts of their illegal acquisitions. cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman Legalization of the Turkish settlers who have moved to the island since 1974 and the Turks has rich historical background. were considered by the Greek Cypriots as ThroughoutEmpire, the conflictthe 20th between century, the Greeks it wasand illegal migrants was also controversial.

We should note that many of these problems Warradicalized of Independence), under the influence the mutual of the exchange armed are already observed in the occupied ofconflict populations, (Greco-Turkish and pogroms. War, or Asthe a Turkish result, Ukrainian territories. Mostly it is about a Cyprus has become another arena for such a confrontation between the two nations,

flow of Russian immigrants who come to 36 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 to which it is impossible to turn a blind Another important difference between eye. On the contrary, the relations of the the Ukrainian and Cypriot cases is the Ukrainian and Russian peoples are without geopolitical weight of the aggressors. Turkey, despite its strategic position, glorious level. Infringement of the rights of the Ukrainiansa conflict by framework the Russian on state the has personal always and claims to regional leadership, remains ahistory, state economicof moderate success, strength. political Undoubtedly, influence, policy towards its colonies. In Ukraine, its military power is absolutely superior to preconditionsbeen associated and with manifestations imperial Moscow’s of an the potential of Cyprus, and it eliminates the factor of the Greek support. However, in any case, Ankara is a minor player compared to Inethnic this conflictcontext, with it is Russia worth are considering absent. the Russia. On the contrary, Ukraine is suffering factors and events that accompanied the from the aggression of a nuclear state, a UN Security Council permanent member, which aggressive actions in relation to Cyprus claims to superpower status and the title andimplementation Ukraine respectively. of Turkey’s Indeed and Russia’s some of the world centre of power. This radically parallels can be made. In both cases, there changes the context of international was a change of power in the states that negotiations under the peace process, taking became victims of aggression. In both them to a qualitatively new level. protect compatriots from hostile actions. Conclusions However,cases, invasion Turkish was actions justified – bydespite a desire their to illegality – seem more reasonable. Escape An analysis of the Cyprus confrontation and of President Yanukovych from Ukraine has international efforts to resolve it clearly little similarity with the military coup that settlement in a frozen stage. The cessation on the island occurred in reality, not only ofdemonstrates hostilities is the an complexityundoubted success of conflict for wastook createdplace in in1974 the inpropaganda Cyprus. Ethnic rhetoric conflict (as it was in the case of Crimea and Donbas). Furthermore, there was a danger of losing the independence of Cyprus. Under these years of negotiations in circumstances, Ankara had reasons to various formats concerning the worry about the well-being of the Turkish «conditions of unification of the population of the island. two parts of the island only lead to one thing – they alienate the real prospect An important element of the Cyprus issue of returning to the united Cyprus is the presence of the British military bases on the island. They serve as a deterrent to

the international community, which clearly importancea possible escalationof the resolution of the of conflict. the crisis On saves lives of people. However, years of forthe Western other hand, actors. their For presenceLondon, and defines to some the negotiations in various formats concerning extent – for Washington, it concerns the guarantees of preservation of their military parts of the island only lead to one thing – presence in the strategically important theythe conditionsalienate the of real unification prospect of of returning the two region. It becomes particularly relevant to the united Cyprus. Moreover, in these today, when the metamorphoses of Turkish – except for the question of image and transatlantic partnership less reliable. credibilitycircumstances, – is the becoming need for suchless unificationimportant politicians make the southern flank of the

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 37 really want to return the occupied part of Thus, we should learn a clear lesson – the Donbas and Crimea. demarcationand popular forline, the buffer parties zones, to the and conflict. even the presence of peacekeepers can help save lives, but these will hardly assist in the Mykola Zamikula, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow restoration of the Ukrainian sovereignty at the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, over the occupied territories. Ukraine. Also he is a Senior Lecturer of International Relations and Foreign Policy department of Vasyl’ Stus In addition, the example of Cyprus shows National University (displaced in Vinnytsia). that the existing international tools of His current scientific interests cover Euro-Atlantic cooperation issues, international relations in Northern Endless negotiations and harmonization Europe, and modern foreign policy of the Republic of ofconflict conditions settlement do arenot not bring always a effective.solution. Turkey. Considering this, we must clearly understand that we cannot count on such a course if we

38 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 THE PEACE PROCESS: LESSONS FOR UKRAINE?

Dr. Donnacha Ó Beacháin Dublin City University

This article explains the factors that have made Northern Ireland an arena of conflict, and evaluates the obstacles that for so long hindered a negotiated settlement, before exploring the factors that contributed to creating a sustainable peace process. It concludes with some general observations on what lessons might be taken from the Irish peace process and considers how these might be of relevance to other conflicts, such as that which is ongoing in Ukraine.

Introduction: Unhappy Families made for Northern Ireland to unite with the rest of Ireland at some point in the future. The agreements constitute a successful political problem but few are prepared to say what‘Many the talk problem about is. aThe solution problem to is Ulster’sthere is is perhaps too big a leap to say that what 1 attempt at conflict management though it pessimismno solution’. that Richard for decades Rose’s had grim dominated analysis Irelandhas been retains achieved the isscars conflict of resolution,prolonged coverageduring the of the 1970s Northern reflected Ireland the imbroglio. general misrule.let alone conflictSociety transformation. remains segregated Northern in the most fundamental of ways, with nationalists and unionists living apart, byThe its perceptionlongevity. The that labyrinthine the Irish road conflict to going to separate schools and churches, awas negotiated intractable agreement was in after part influencednumerous reading rival communal newspapers, playing different sports and so on. The observation that peace is a process, not an agreements have respected the integrity event.false dawns has confirmed the oft-noted

The Good Friday and St Andrews formof the of conflict government by institutionalising that is not a coalition it to an Agreements institutionalised a peace ofextent opposites where itcomposed is difficult of to unionists conceive ofand a process that has fundamentally altered day- nationalists who have little in common to-day life in Northern Ireland. Violence beyond a mandate to rule bestowed by the has abated and erstwhile antagonists have peace agreements. One can perhaps say shared power, supported by the British and that such a form of government is the worst Irish Governments. While remaining within for Northern Ireland except for the realistic the United Kingdom, provision has been alternatives.

1 R. Rose. 1976. Northern Ireland: a time of choice

. New York: Springer, p. 166. Ulster is one of Ireland’s four historic provinces and Northern Ireland is composed of six of Ulster’s nine counties. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 39 they declared the country independent begins with the observation that ‘Happy and established a parliament in Dublin. To familiesLeo Tolstoy’s are all alike; Anna every Karenina unhappy famously family complement these political endeavors, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) conducted a say the same of communal discord. While war for independence against the British is unhappy in its own way’. One might regime in Ireland. very often loss of life, all to some degree aresocietal sui generis, conflicts with involve a unique animosity, history and In deference to unionist preferences and their own peculiar way. Since 2013, Ukraine Why then was Northern Ireland established? with each protagonist hating the ‘other’ in partitioned in 1921 by a unilateral act of features of a foreign invasion with those theLondon’s British strategic Parliament. objectives, Two new Ireland political was has become an arena of conflict combining regimes were created, the pessimistic prognoses for a speedy end of (now the ), which was theof a discord civil conflict. in Ukraine, Considering not unlike the currentthat of almost homogeneously nationalist, and Richard Rose cited above, there might be Northern Ireland, which constituted less than some value in outlining how Ireland exited the cycle of continual violence that infected where unionists outnumbered nationalists politics for decades. by17% two of tothe one. island Northern of Ireland’s Ireland territory possessed but the formal features of a parliamentary Why Ireland Has Been a Conflict Zone democracy but, with an inbuilt unionist majority, was in reality a one-party state. Despite its relatively isolated position on The unionist regime enshrined anti-Catholic the western edge of Europe, Ireland has an apparatus of economic hegemony that excludeddiscrimination nationalists as official from policy, political, establishing social coincidedbeen an arena with of itsconflict growth for manyas an centuries. imperial and economic power. Complementing this ’s conversion to Protestantism system of the state invoked a series acknowledged defeat in 1603, Britain of repressive laws enforced by a paramilitary embarkedpower and on whenan intensive Irish chieftainspolicy of colonial finally police that was almost entirely Protestant plantation, particularly in the north of the in composition. When a combination of country, which had been the centre of Gaelic social and political forces during the 1960s resistance. These settlers, mainly English brought forth a non-violent campaign Anglicans and Scottish Presbyterians, are to obtain basic civil rights, the Northern Ireland state could not accommodate it, as in Northern Ireland. Ireland remained predominantlythe ancestors of today’sCatholic, unionist however, population and of unionist supremacy in perpetuity. The almost every generation witnessed a major violentits very response raison d’être of state was thesecurity maintenance forces rebellion against British rule. The slow and civilian irregulars to the civil rights democratisation of the British polity allowed an Irish nationalist parliamentary movement and an armed nationalist insurgency that to develop while the physical force tradition propelledcampaign precipitatedsociety downwards a social conflagrationinto a spiral continued to attract a substantial minority of violence, euphemistically known as ‘the of adherents. When the separatist Sinn Féin 2 party gained a majority of Irish seats in 1918, Troubles’, which would last for decades.

2 Destiny of the Soldiers–Fianna Fáil, and the IRA, 1926–1973. Dublin:

See D. Ó� Beacháin. 2010. Gill & Macmillan, pp. 249-370. 40 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 The biggest fallacy and source of confusion is, perhaps, the belief that religion is the accepting legitimacy/position of opponents) wereand inimmediate the long-term, and certain. while This ‘losses’ meant (e.g.that Like all popular errors, the perception has a causalroot cause relationship of conflict with in the Northern truth. Unionists Ireland. to take risks in situations where they could (those who wish for Northern Ireland to makethe conflicting serious partiesgains. wereProtagonists often unwilling often remain part of the United Kingdom) are in general from a Protestant family or ancestral background, while nationalists (those who Psychological and emotional would like to see a united Ireland) are factors (e.g. fear, anger, much more likely to be the descendants «mutual distrust) inhibited of those Catholics displaced during the conflict resolution as unionists and colonial project. The fundamental issue, nationalists fixated on fears generated however, is not theological. Were it so, it by past events that sometimes would be impossible to understand how led to pre-emptive aggression Catholics and Protestants are able to leave peaceably in the Republic of Ireland, in Britain, or indeed, in any part of the world. viewed gains simply as entitlements, but For centuries, and with the support of the were slow to accept a loss. This frequently BritishThe conflict Government centres onin theLondon, issue ofunionists power. led to disagreements between parties over the value of concessions, reinforcing feelings the majority Irish Catholic population and, of suspicion and mistrust, and further afterexercised partition, untrammelled within power,Northern firstly Ireland over hindering efforts designed to transform the over the minority nationalist/republican community. In Northern Ireland today, the population is almost evenly divided between Givenconflict the dynamic. duration and intensity of the nationalists and unionists.3

Why Conflict Endured negotiatingconflict it notparties surprising felt entitled that to the receive quest somefor ‘justice’ sort of inhibited justice for mediation past events. efforts, This as Psychological and emotional factors (e.g. expectation stemmed from the belief on fear, anger, mutual distrust) inhibited both sides that it was they who had acted the most honourably in the past, and who had suffered the most. In such a scenario byconflict past events resolution that sometimes as unionists led to pre- and both parties were likely to believe that what emptivenationalists aggression. fixated onLoss fears aversion generated was to outside observers might seem like a fair deal gave their side less than it deserved and as parties frequently attached much greater was too generous to their traditional foes.4 another key barrier to overcoming conflict potential gain, particularly when future There has also been the phenomenon of gainssignificance (e.g. peace, to a prosperity) potential losswere thanuncertain to a reactive devaluation, a cognitive bias that

3 In the 2017 elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, unionist and nationalist parties each won exactly 39 seats. 4 For some international examples of these phenomena, see D. Bar-Tal. 2001. ‘Why does fear override hope in socie- Political Psychology, 22.3: 601-627; B. Bland,

ties engulfed Understandingby intractable conflict,social action, as it doespromoting in the humanIsraeli society?’rights, pp. 265-291. B. Powell and L. Ross. 2012. ‘Barriers to dispute resolution: Reflections on peacemaking and relationships between adversaries’. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 41 occurs when a proposal is refused (or between the unionist wish to remain within devalued) if it appears to have come from an the United Kingdom and the nationalist antagonist or enemy, ignoring whether or not desire for a united Ireland. However, any 5 Protagonists solution that was not negotiated between in Northern Ireland prided themselves all the major players and/or which was onsuch their a proposal unwillingness is beneficial. to compromise on imposed at a time of war had little chance of fundamental principles. The two most success. By the 1990s, the and common unionist slogans have been ‘No the IRA had reached a stalemate whereby neither had defeated the other and neither When the IRA was asked to decommission could attain outright military victory. After Surrender’ and ‘Not an Inch’ (of territory). several false starts, the Belfast (or Good appeared on Belfast walls declaring ‘Not an Friday) Agreement was negotiated on 10 their explosives and weapons, graffiti April 1998 and a second pact, designed to re-energise the peace process, was agreed at protagonistsounce, not a bullet’.have tended Such intransigenceto view political has St Andrews in October 2006. developmentsmade brokering in zero-sum agreements terms, difficult, whereby as any gain by the other side is seen as a loss to their own. andThe foremost ‘solution’, on in power-sharing a nutshell, is abetween three- Finally, the relationship between political unionistsstranded and process, nationalists which within centres Northern first leaders and their followers/supporters, Ireland (strand 1), combined with and the competing interests of different institutional links between Northern Ireland political actors within a single community, and Ireland (strand 2) and between Ireland and the United Kingdom (strand 3). A Many political representatives, most notably guarantee of equal rights and an open-ended thealso Democratic acted as barriers Unionist to Party conflict (DUP) resolution. leader, constitutional future have also been at the , publically announced their heart of the peace agreements. unwillingness to compromise, sometimes as a negotiating device or because of an inability Though the (GFA) is remarkably similar to that negotiated at in turn induced their electorates to adopt Sunningdale in 1973, its chances for success similarto reach trenchantmutually beneficial positions, settlements. which further This were greater as the latest peace process limited manoeuvrability in negotiations.6 attracted the support of both the IRA and the A popular aphorism coined by Ian Paisley, loyalist paramilitaries, which had destroyed provided a salutary warning to those who the power-sharing institutions established in

and a traitor were the same, he claimed, reach a point where they are ready for becausemight flirt they with both compromise: go over to thea bridge other builder side. resolution,1974. The concept is relevant of ripeness,here. William that Zartmanconflicts maintains that protagonists will only seek Exiting the Violence mediation once they have exhausted all their resources and recognise that they enjoy negligible chances of achieving victory. In politicians sought to identify a middle way such circumstances, the cost of maintaining During the ‘Troubles’, academics and

5 Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 6 See G.L. Ross.Bachar 1995. and ‘ReactiveA. S. Weiner. Devaluation 2014. ‘Governments, in Negotiation publics, and Conflict and enemies: Resolution’, Intragroup in Kenneth dynamics J. Arrow, as barriers et al., (eds.), to New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 27-42. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 7.2-3: 198-225.

conflict resolution’, 42 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 the mutually hurting stalemate is so great for all parties that protagonists begin to entertain less maximalist approaches.7 nineFáil’s months return tolater, power the withBelfast Ahern Agreement at the hadhelm, been the negotiated.IRA was reinstated and Mediation The British and Irish governments did much of the running throughout the peace place under the tutelage of two sovereign process and proved vital in maintaining democraticThe fact that thegovernments, 1990’s peace Ireland process tookand momentum when relationships broke the United Kingdom, was central to its down within Northern Ireland. Both ultimate success. A cooperative Anglo-Irish administrations played a full role in the partnership had frequently been absent negotiations, allowing each side of the during previous decades. Indeed, for much conflict in Northern Ireland to believe of the time since the in that they had an external guarantor that 1921, and throughout most of , represented their interests. Crucially, there had been no meeting of minds Dublin and London appointed a political between the governments in London and figure from outside the region, former Dublin as to what constituted the causes US Senator George Mitchell, to chair the negotiations. The goodwill and unanimity on how to resolve the imbroglio. interventions of the Clinton administration Moreover,of conflict for in Northerndecades successive Ireland let British alone in the US, along with the prospect of Governments refused to countenance EU funding to underpin aspects of the external mediation on the basis that this peace process also provided favourable would infringe upon their sovereignty. conditions for a settlement.

Anglo-Irish initiatives on Northern Ireland While external mediation proved an were also frequently inhibited by electoral integral part of the negotiating process cycles. Instability in Britain throughout that led to the Good Friday Agreement it 1974, for example, undoubtedly affected the implementation of the Sunningdale Though it is ostensibly designed to facilitate Agreement to which a recently elected Irish reconciliation,doesn’t always assistthird conflictparty mediation management. can Government with a clear majority had been be a barrier to establishing a sustainable committed. Electoral cycles (and many peace process. Wendy Betts, for example, would argue the personalities too) were in has examined how the motives, roles almost perfect harmony during the summer and number of mediators exacerbated of 1997 with the election of Tony Blair and the quarrel over Nagorno-Karabakh and as British and Irish prime ministers respectively. The security their resolution is impossible when different electoral mandates gave these two leaders thirdargues parties that a cohesivepursue their approach own toagendas. conflict8 allowed them to devote a decade of their time, energy and focus to seeing the peace process through a myriad of obstacles that place.Conflict among mediators must be solved followed the GFA. Within a month of Fianna before any other conflict resolution takes

7 Irish Studies in International Affairs 26: 147- For162. an application of Zartman’s theory to Northern Ireland, see E. Connolly and J. Doyle. 2015. ‘Ripe moments for Exiting Political Violence: an Analysis of the Northern Ireland Case’, 8 SAIS Review 19.2: 161-183.

W. Betts, 1999. ‘Third party mediation: an obstacle to peace in Nagorno Karabakh’. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 43 Favourable International Context Until the mid-1990s, it had been assumed that any power-sharing system of Nobody wants to be on the wrong side of government within Northern Ireland history and the peace process chimed with the prevailing optimistic zeitgeist of the and unionists, in other words the Social early and mid-1990s. had Democraticwould be between and Labour ‘moderate’ Party (SDLP) nationalists and collapsed throughout Europe during the the (UUP). However, dying months of the 1980s, culminating while the power-sharing executive was in the dismantling of the , the initially based on these two factions, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War.9 Nelson Mandala was freed the SDLP and UUP and for the last decade from prison in South Africa and apartheid havemore ‘radical’formed DUPthe andbedrock Sinn Féinof Northern eclipsed quickly replaced by majority rule. Initially, the Oslo peace accords in the Middle East also generated optimism before Ireland’s power-sharing administration. quickly becoming a parable of what can wasIndeed, led the firstby power-sharingerstwhile fundamentalist government go wrong in a peace process. Moreover, Ianformed Paisley after and the the St Andrew’sformer IRA Agreement military the establishment of legislatures in commander, Martin McGuinness. and , following referenda in those countries, made within This reversal of fortunes was largely due Northern Ireland easier for unionists to to the changed context created by the digest. No longer did it necessarily signify peace process. The SDLP had defined that Northern Ireland was a place apart itself first and foremost as a party that requiring exceptional treatment but, pursued its objectives through exclusively rather, it could be presented as part of an peaceful means and eschewed support for ongoing process of decentralisation within the IRA. As the peace process advanced the United Kingdom. and militarism faded, nationalist voters switched to Sinn Féin believing that they Inclusivity and Legitimacy could more vigorously agitate for an agenda it largely shared with the SDLP. But In addition to the on-going support of whereas Sinn Féin thrived electorally as the Irish and British governments, the a result of moving to the centre, unionist peace process includes all major parties in voters rewarded the DUP for excoriating Northern Ireland, including the late converts UUP leader, David Trimble, for engaging of the DUP, and this inclusivity has been an with his republican opponents. Once essential reason for its success. Moreover, the UUP and DUP switched places in the as part of the Good Friday Agreement, all hierarchy of parties, however, they also prisoners whose militant organisations traded political stances. Now potentially had signed up to the peace process were in the driving seat during any forthcoming quickly released. Previous initiatives had negotiations, the DUP were at pains to been opposed by the IRA, the organisation appear reasonable so as not to provide the responsible for the majority of fatalities two governments with an opportunity to undermine them. ceiling on expectations. during the conflict, and this rejection put a

9 International Affairs StudiesSee for examplein International M. Cox. 1997.Affairs ‘Bringing 9: 73-84. in the ‘international’: the IRA ceasefire and the end of the Cold War’. 73.4: 671-693 and M. Cox. 1998. ‘Northern Ireland: The War that came in from the Cold’. Irish

44 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 The peace process received an early boost defensive and argue that with a successful when aspects of the Good Friday Agreement peace process the need for armaments were approved in a referendum by 71% in would wither away. In the past, the IRA had Northern Ireland and by 95% in the Republic never destroyed their weapons, let alone of Ireland. Having the vote in both parts of handed them over. Rather they had, as in 1923 and 1962, dumped arms. Unilaterally simultaneously undermining the positions destroying weapons smacked of surrender ofIreland on the republicanssame day was and also recalcitrant significant, unionists. IRA members, particularly those of the youngerand would generation. be very difficult For theto sell Sinn to manyFéin Decommissioning, Demilitarization leadership, decommissioning was not just and Policing about what was desirable but what they could sell to the IRA and their own party Decommissioning IRA weapons was grassroots. The overriding objective was central to the peace process and imbued to keep the republican movement intact; with symbolism for both sides. But as Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern realised, getting themselves some years hence negotiating the republican movement to sign up to withotherwise, a new splinter the governments group that had might eclipsed find the principle of majority consent within the current leadership. Northern Ireland being a prerequisite for Making decommissioning a precondition for in the long term that dispensing with its armoury.a united IrelandWeapons was were far easy more to significant procure the British Government initially tried to do, and decommissioned weapons could be riskedSinn Féin’s derailing participation the peace in process. negotiations, Opposing as protagonists engaged in a circular argument was the degree of trust and cooperation whereby the IRA used the British Army necessaryeasily replaced. to push Far the more use difficult of military to acquire means presence to justify a leisurely approach to the periphery. to decommissioning, whereas this in turn was cited as a reason for maintaining a Unionists could not understand why the substantial British military force in Northern IRA (whom they assumed, at least for public consumption, was the same as Sinn Féin) was a product and not the cause of the deep should wish to hold on to their weapons divisionsIreland. Armedin society conflict, and only Sinn maintaining Féin argued, a if they had renounced the use of force for sustainable and inclusive government could political ends once and for all. Either the IRA help banish the gun from Irish politics. commitment to non-violence was insincere, or they wished to use the threat of force as Ultimately, the process of decommissioning leverage during the negotiations, which would have to be internationalised to be would give them an unfair advantage. successful. An Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), Republicans preferred to focus on the British composed of military and diplomatic armed forces in Northern Ireland and sought a demilitarisation of society. This suggested and chaired by Canadian General John de a parity of responsibility between the British Chastelain,figures from was Finland established and Northto oversee America, the army and the IRA to put weapons aside, process. Former President of Finland, Martti rather than a unilateral decommissioning of Ahtisaari, and African National Congress weapons held by republicans. As a minority leader Cyril Ramaphosa, were appointed within Northern Ireland, republicans were to inspect IRA weapons dumps in order to inclined to view IRA weapons as primarily

facilitate the decommissioning of firearms, UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 45 supporters were guided by the objective completed decommissioning their military of depoliticising the police and sought arsenalammunition on and26 Septemberexplosives. The2005. IRA Britishfinally to facilitate a move away from policing army demilitarization – the removal of British troops from Northern Ireland, the community policing with a strong emphasis destruction of much of the British army onduring impartiality a state of and armed human conflict rights. to a form of military infrastructure such as bases and watchtowers – also continued apace until People, Not Territories, Have Rights September 2007. However, while the decommissioning of weapons was a process that took several years to negotiate, the been the unwillingness of protagonists to dismantling of sectarian mindsets will take recogniseA major barrieror acknowledge to conflict the resolution basic rights has much longer. of the other side.13 parties, such as those in the Caucasus or Allied to decommissioning and the Balkans, are looking Frequently, for separation conflicting and, demilitarization was the task of making whether negotiated or unilateral, a parting policing acceptable to both communities in Northern Ireland.10 in Northern Ireland, a divorce is impossible of Staff, Jonathan Powell, noted ‘the IRA becauseof ways has of beenthe relatively the final outcome. equal size When, of the as As Tony Blair’s Chief protagonists some form of power sharing 11 to deliberate on how society is governed is Chriscouldn’t Patten, police a the former community senior anyConservative more, yet an easier – as opposed to an easy – sell. A they wouldn’t let the police do so either’. vital component of the peace process, and , was entrusted with the task the agreements that underpin it, has been ofParty chairing figure the and commission the last to Governor review the of the notion of a shared political future, where future of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and his report on 9 September denial of civil rights had fuelled the Troubles 1999 advocated a radical overhaul of the duringthe other the side’slate 1960s, presence a peaceful is tolerable. transition As composition, ethos, training and structure of the police.12 The report recommended that esteem for both nationalists and unionists the RUC be given a more neutral name - the withinfrom protracted Northern conflictIreland. requiredThe Good parity Friday of Northern Ireland Police Service - and that Agreement guarantees equality of political, half of all new recruits would be drawn from civil, social and cultural rights. Consent the nationalist community with the aim of was designed to be a two-way street so that eventually reaching parity. The police force neither unionists nor nationalists would be could not be drawn exclusively from the able to achieve much in Northern Ireland unionist community so that, as in the past, former adversaries with whom they now expense, policing the other. Patten and his sharedwithout government first securing power. the agreement of their one side of the conflict was, at government

10 See J. Doyle. 2010. Policing the narrow ground: Lessons from the transformation of policing in Northern Ireland. Dublin: Royal Irish Academy. 11 J. Powell. 2008. Great hatred, little room: Making peace in Northern Ireland. London: Random House, p. 275. 12 A New Beginning: Policing In Northern Ireland: The Report of Commission on Policing For Northern Ireland [Patten Report]. London: HMSO 1999 13 Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict,See R. Nagar 72-3, and pp.150-164. I. Maoz. 2014. ‘(Non) acknowledgment of rights as a barrier to conflict resolution: Predicting Jewish Israeli attitudes towards the Palestinian demand for national self-determination’.

46 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 While nationalists of all hues, bar allows for an open-ended constitutional development. The GFA acknowledged republicans, were united in favour of that a majority of people on the island of the general electorally thrust insignificantof the peace dissidentprocess, Ireland wished for a united Ireland, and that unionism endured multiple schisms and this this included a substantial section within continually acted as a brake on momentum. Northern Ireland, but emphasised that a Sinn Féin had prepared supporters for majority in the six counties, freely exercised compromise and the party leadership and legitimate, supported the status quo. united behind Gerry Adams and Martin In deference to nationalist aspirations, it McGuinness. David Trimble, by contrast had not done the groundwork within the UUP Northern Ireland opt for a united Ireland and was beset by internal sniping, sabotage itwas would affirmed be athat binding should obligation a majority for within both and attempted coups, as his party struggled governments to introduce legislation to to accept governing with Sinn Féin. give effect to that wish. Had the GFA been presented as an end in itself, without Ultimately, Sinn Féin accepted a formula leaving open the possibility of a united in which self-determination incorporated Ireland at some point in the future, it is most unlikely that it would have been accepted as unionist consent. Reaching consensus by nationalists within Northern Ireland or, the hated ‘loyalist veto’, now repackaged indeed, by the Irish Government. breakthrough.on defining the The political Good Friday unit thatAgreement might The Trouble with Brexit includedbenefit from the unwieldyself-determination formula that was it awas major for the alone, by agreement between When Ireland and the UK joined the EEC the two parts respectively and without in 1973 there was a hope that common external impediment, to exercise their right membership of this supranational of self-determination but reiterated that community would, over time, erode borders and reduce animosities within Ireland and electorate was a prerequisite. The birth- between Ireland and Britain. With Brexit, majority consent from Northern Ireland’s many of the old certainties and assumptions, identify themselves as Irish, British or both on which the peace process was predicated wasright recognised of all of Northern and this Ireland’sright could people not be to evaporated overnight. Brexit immediately affected by any change to the constitutional raised several important questions regarding

Government in Dublin agreed to reformulate its relationship with the rest of the island. Articlesstatus of2 and the 3 of North. the Irish Significantly, constitution theso AsNorthern the EU Ireland’s treaties ofstatus Rome, within Maastricht the UK and that it moderated what was perceived to be Lisbon underpinned the foundations of the GFA and its successor pacts, many feared revised constitutional provision shifted the that Brexit would undermine the work of emphasisa ‘territorial away claim’ from on theNorthern rights Ireland.to territory The reconciliation and destabilise the region. towards the rights of people.14 Consent is at the heart of the Good Friday Finally, neither the Belfast nor St Andrews Agreement, particularly the principle that there could be no change in the settlement. Rather, the peace process constitutional status of Northern Ireland Agreements was presented as a final

14 Great Events of the 20th Century. Pasade- na: Salem Press. Vol. 8: 3120-3122. D. Ó� Beacháin. 2002. ‘Ireland Amends Its Constitution’ in Mark Rehn (ed.)

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 47 without a majority agreeing to such a change. Brexit now threatened to fundamentally theconflict obstacles resolution to resolution must be defytempered uniformity. by an explicit wishes of the majority that had understanding that the origins of conflict and indicatedalter Northern a wish Ireland’s to stay status within against the EU. the As the people of Northern Ireland are by oneAnd must while be Ireland’s wary experienceof being prescriptive. provides a birth-right entitled to be Irish citizens it is Duringunique itsperspective chairmanship on conflict of the OSCEmanagement, in 2012, unclear how their rights as EU citizens can the Irish Government repeatedly asserted be protected post-Brexit. Many fear that the that it would not offer a set of formulas or reintroduction of a physical border between blueprints that could be exported to the the north and south of Ireland could have 16 Rather, it a negative impact on the peace process. hoped that by sharing the experience of the post-Sovietpeace process protracted it could assistconflicts. others engaged jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice willSimilarly, almost Britain’s certainly intentionundermine to many leave areas the of human rights law in Northern Ireland. in similar conflict resolution efforts. It will also deprive Northern Ireland and That there is a stalemate funding for programmes supporting the Ireland’s border15 region generally of EU within Ukraine and between peace process. «Moscow and Kyiv is undeniable but whether it is mutually hurting Following its failure to win the snap election to the degree likely to push the of June 2017, the ruling Conservative Party protagonists to a transformational entered into a pact with the DUP, the only settlement (as opposed to the current party within Northern Ireland to have ceasefire agreement) is debatable supported Brexit during the referendum campaign. So long as the British Government depends on the DUP for its survival, it

comprehensive settlement that will satisfy Ireland,weakens as London’s required ability by the to beGood ‘rigorously Friday It is difficult to be optimistic about a Agreement.impartial’ inBrexit its dealingshas introduced with Northernprofound there is a stalemate within Ukraine and uncertainty into Anglo-Irish relations. It will betweenall parties Moscow to the conflictand Kyiv in is Ukraine. undeniable That take many years before the full effects are but whether it is mutually hurting to the felt and can be properly assessed. degree likely to push the protagonists to a transformational settlement (as opposed Conclusion debatable. It is a challenge to get accurate Though it has occasionally faltered, the informationto the current about ceasefire the political agreement) preferences is Northern Ireland peace process has of people living in Crimea or in the parts endured for two decades. Nevertheless, is of and Donetsk currently outside the control of the Ukrainian government,17

it a model that can be exported? Confidence in Ireland’s credentials in the sphere of and as the conflict appears to have ‘frozen’,

15 The Law & Politics of Brexit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See J. Doyle and and E. Connolly. 2017. ‘Brexit and the Northern Irish Question’ in Federico Fabbrini (ed.), 16 Irish Studies in International Affairs (2012): 89-109. See D. Ó� Beacháin. “Ireland’s Chairmanship of the OSCE—A Mid-Term Review.”

48 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 international interest has waned. More than anything else, the absence of two sovereign or names are contentious, it is sometimes democratic partners that have a common advisablecrafted deal to depoliticise may flounder. them When as much symbols as interest in ameliorating the situation, as existed between Ireland and Britain, inhibits territory.possible. After all, a territory without a flag is more important than a flag without a Whileconflict external resolution. mediation or facilitation is not, by itself, enough to produce a peace Dr. Donnacha Ó Beacháin is Associate Professor process, the Irish experience suggests at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University where he lectures on post-Soviet politics, International involvement proved vital, for Irish studies, foreign policy and unrecognised states. it is difficult to cultivate one without it. example, in providing a mechanism whereby He is currently lead researcher in the €3.6 million the disposal of weapons belonging to non- FP7/Marie Curie Initial Training Network in Post- Soviet Tensions (http://postsoviet.eu) and the €3.8 in a manner that minimised the stigma of surrender.state actors The could negotiations be verified andleading conducted to the million Horizon2020 project on the Caspian region Good Friday Agreement were chaired by a (http://caspianet.eu). During 2011-12, he was senior US politician while Irish diplomacy awarded a major grant by Ireland’s Department and diasporans kept Ireland higher up the of Foreign Affairs Conflict Resolution Unit to lead a list of the US priorities than would otherwise research team to examine the role of the OSCE and EU have been the case. International actors can in the post-Soviet protracted conflicts. Recent books also prove vital in providing economic aid include ‘The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet and political support to underpin what is Republics: Successes and Failures’ (with Abel Polese, agreed. Routledge), Destiny of the Soldiers: Fianna Fáil, Irish Republicanism and the IRA 1926-1973, (Gill and Finally, while political elites negotiate Macmillan), Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe settlements, it is important that the supporters of these elites and the electorate After EU Membership (with Vera Sheridan and Sabina generally, be prepared for the necessary Stan, Routledge) and Political Communication in compromises. Otherwise even the best- Ireland (with Mark O’Brien, Liverpool University Press)

17 support for a separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs 33.2: 124-144. A notable exception is J. O’Loughlin, G. Toal, and V. Kolosov. 2017. “The rise and fall of “Novorossiya”: examining

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 49 RELEVANCE OF THE ULSTER MODEL IN RESOLVING THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Brig. Gen. Abdullah Al Yusuf Rotary Peace Fellow

The Irish conflict was generally perceived as intractable, rooted in the question of identity. Given the stringent ‘positions’ framed by identities, no solution seemed possible. When attention was paid to addressing the interests underlying the conflict, the identity issue faded away. The popular perception of an identity crisis notwithstanding, the Ukrainian conflict is also rooted in socio-economic and geo-political interests. Drawing lessons from Ulster, a solution in Ukraine is possible. However, Ukraine should remain careful about not copying the consociationalist outcome of Ulster, for a power-sharing arrangement will establish a false sense of a divided society in East Ukraine.

Historical Roots the locals in allocating economic resources

paidwas identifieddue attention as a keyto addressing factor perpetuating the interests the asMuch intractable. like the ongoingFor centuries, conflicts the in people Ukraine, of conflict. The Ulster model of conflict resolution Ulsterthe Irish remained conflict divided was generallyacross the perceivedsymbolic boundaries created by identity. Nonetheless, of the locals, and consequently, conflict the identity markers transformed over time. When King Henry VIII of England broke with When attention was paid to addressing the interests «underlying the conflict, the Catholicthe Holy and Roman Protestant Church, dominance the conflict over took the on identity issue faded away island.a religious However, flavour since – a contest1921, after between splitting the Ireland into North and South, national identities came to dominate over the religious over identity diminished. We argue that identities.1 the popular perception of an identity crisis framed by identities, no negotiation between the belligerents Given seemed the stringent possible. ‘positions’However, rooted in socio-economic and geo-political interests.notwithstanding, Following the the Ukrainian lessons conflict of the isUlster also model, policy makers should concentrate on viewed through the lens of ‘interests’, preferential treatment of the ‘planters’ over

1 P. Hain MP, Peacemaking in Northern Ireland: A Model for Conflict Resolution? Speech at Chatham House, 12 June 2007, p. 3.

50 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 from over 300 years of Russian control and became independent in 1991, it had resolving the conflicting interests in Ukraine to wait for three more years to secure a instead of getting obsessed with the ‘positions’ Sinceof the theconflicting end of theparties. Cold War, political actors its sovereignty, independence, territorial within and outside Ukraine have invested integrity,flimsy commitment and inviolability from Russia of to borders respect considerable efforts to construct and maintain through the 1994 Budapest Memorandum5 ethnic boundaries dividing the people of – a security assurance less substantial than Ukraine with a questionable degree of success. what Ukraine had expected.6 Ukraine must Ironically, some of these attempts were have taken lessons from its long history of inspired by an urgent desire to consolidate Ukraine as an indivisible state. A sense of notable dependence on Russia for oil, gas, and nation building encouraged the policy makers trade,subjugation and its by centuries-long others. Besides, demographic Ukraine’s to bring some sort of homogeneity among fusion with Russia, manifested through the Ukrainians through promoting a single common religious orthodoxy, customs, a language and a single historical narrative.2 large percentage of bilinguals, and a high Sometimes, external actors, Russian leaders percentage of intermarriage, must have persuaded the policy makers to search to highlight the boundaries to reassert their for a unique identity to consolidate its formerto be moresuperpower specific, status made by visible spreading attempts their independence lest it gets drawn back into the Russian geopolitical orbit again.7 That such in areas inhabited by ethnic .3 This fear was not unfounded has been proven papersphere begins of influence with the across assertion the national that despite border all beyond question through Russian actions in these moves, the people of Ukraine remained Crimea in 2014. socially united until the developments following started forcing them Therefore, following the Orange Revolution apart. A real boundary is now in the making. that temporarily relieved Ukraine from the Whether this boundary will continue to exist or disappear depends to a large extent on what Yushchenko together with other like- choice and policy approach the leaders within mindedshadow leaders of Russian made influence, hasty efforts President to and outside Ukraine, including those in East consolidate Ukrainian nationhood. In the Ukraine, make today. absence of democracy, and with the legacy of communism still haunting many aspects of In the 700-odd years following the decline public life, the civic conception of nationhood of Kievan Rus in the 13th century, Ukraine did not seem to gain currency in Ukrainian got the taste of independence for only about society. So, the planners preferred an ethnic 10 years.4 Though the country broke free track. Ukrainian ethnicity and language were

2 A. Polese, Language and Identity in Ukraine: Was It Really Nation-Building? “Studies of Transition States and Socie- ties”, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 37. 3 E. Giuliano, The Social Bases of Support for Self-determination in East Ukraine, “Ethnopolitics”, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2015, pp. 515-516. 4 R. Popadiuk, Ukraine: The Security Fulcrum of Europe? “Strategic Forum”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No. 69, April 1996, p. 1. 5 M. Budjeryn, The Breach: Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum, Wilson Center, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Issue Brief 3, p. 2. 6 Ibid., p. 3. 7 Popadiuk, op. cit., p. 2.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 51 identity.8 In an attempt to legitimize state in the face of strong domestic as well as independenceassigned the central and arouserole in defininga strong the sense new internationalofficial regional criticism. language13 alsoIn fact,proved despite futile of patriotism among the new-generation multiple attempts, language could not Ukrainians, the leaders adopted the strategy be effectively established as a boundary of instilling a deep sense of victimization marker separating the people of Ukraine. through historical narratives where the imperialist Soviet Union was portrayed as the perpetrator of violence again ethnic Ukrainians.9 However, unlike many given the complex ethnic overlap nationalizing programs where ethnic others in the demographic composition are portrayed in a negative light, Ukrainian «of erstwhile Soviet republics, an identity-based approach to the highlighting the ethnic background of the problem would be either chaotic perpetrators.official history10 textbooksBesides, in carefully order to avoided avoid bias, schools were allowed liberty to choose

ones.11 The rhetoric of Russian leaders highlighting additional history books beyond the official the ethnic boundaries was remarkable. There had also been attempts to establish language as a boundary marker. President and interests of (ethnic) Russians” living in Kravchuk introduced a law requiring UkrainianPutin’s public territory assertion and to“to “ensure encourage the rights them Ukrainian presidents to know Ukrainian. The law had dissimilar impacts on different dream are some of his most visible attempts presidents during their political campaigns. towardsto find a solution”boundary andmaking. his ‘Novorossiya’14 While the Russian-speaking Kuchma made rhetoric was duly matched by his foreign frantic efforts to use Ukrainian during his minister, S. Lavrov, who found it Putin’s“very presidential campaign, the Ukrainian- hard (for people of multiple ethnicity) to speaking Yushchenko was found using live in a unitary state”.15 Nonetheless, all Russian while addressing eastern regions on the efforts of ‘political entrepreneurs of national TV during the Orange Revolution.12 ethnic boundary in Ukraine remained fuzzy for the law than for winning the hearts andidentity’ permeable. notwithstanding, If ethnic identity the was so-called a true andClearly, minds their ofattitudes the audience signified from less regardother concern for the people of East Ukraine, then ethnic groups. Attempts of the post-Maidan Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv with a high interim government to scrap the language percentage of ethnic Russians would surely law that assigned Russian the status of an follow the trails of Donetsk and Luhansk;

8 Giuliano, op. cit., p. 519. 9 Loc. cit. 10 A Journal of Comparative and International Education”, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2007, p. 319. J. G. Janmaat, The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: The Case of Russia and the Russians, “Compare: 11 Ibid. p. 313. 12 Polese, op. cit., p. 45. 13 Giuliano, op. cit., p. 517-518. 14 Giuliano, op. cit., p. 515-516. 15 Giuliano, op. cit., p. 516.

52 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 but they did not. Therefore, searching their individual ethnic identities, a new form of identity with a strong underpinning could be misleading. Moreover, given the of industrial culture: “a mix of freedom and complexfor ethnic ethnic roots overlap in the in Ukrainian the demographic conflict force, a characteristic respect for labour composition of erstwhile Soviet republics, (particularly miners) and physical power, an identity-based approach to the problem and a rejection of ethnic exclusivity”.19 It is would be either chaotic or, in the worst case, encourage dozens of others to initiate society organizational values and work their own separatist movements. ethicsnot difficult gradually to imagine develop how a in new an industrial form of bonding among the co-workers regardless of their ethnic differences. This form of a gradual process of industrialization of bonding or identity formation has hardly The discovery of coalfields in 1720 initiated anything to do with politics. The factory management often promotes such bonding theDonbas industrialization region. The flowprocess. of 16 international This must in order to maintain the organizational capitalhave placed between a heavy 1860 demand and 1890 on the intensified labour cohesion among workers from diverse force. Consequently, Donbas witnessed a ethnic origins. Therefore, whatever large in-migration from different parts of the pro-Russian attitude Donbas residents Imperial Russia and later the USSR, turning demonstrate today is not attributable to it into an ethnically mixed region.17 Today, their ethnic leaning but rather to their material interest in maintaining a familiar of other regions and countries in making industrial environment with the Soviet it is difficult to ascertain the relative share (now Russian)-style industry. Products to ascertain what percentage of them came to from these industries cannot compete with Donbastoday’s Donbaswillingly populace. and how Itmany is equally of them difficult were those from Western industries and hence forced to move in. Some non-Ukrainians are believed to have been deliberately transferred That explains why a large percentage of to Donbas region from other parts of the peoplefind their of demand Donetsk in Russianand Luhansk markets prefer only. USSR between 1926 and 1959 as part of a joining the Customs Union over the EU. They believe that a macroeconomic orientation 18 – much like the toward Europe would severely hamper their deliberate ‘Russianization’ or demographic regional business interests.20 diversificationsof a forced in-migration process to Donbas from other‘plantation parts ofof Ulster’. present-day Besides, Ukraine the possibility to meet Economy Driven Contradictions the rising demand for labourers in the then burgeoning industrial economy cannot the The central role of the economy in creating ruled out either. from the fact that those in control of the As the in-migrants got settled in their new economyand sustaining in East the Ukraine conflict are is also also those evident in abode, they gradually developed, besides control of politics. The post-Maidan turn of

16 B. De Cordier, Ukraine’s Vendée War? A Look at the “Resistance Identity” of the Donbass Insurgency, “Russian Analyti- cal Digest”, No. 198, 14 February 2017, p. 3. 17 Loc. cit. 18 De Cordier, loc. cit. 19 A. Portnov, How ‘Eastern Ukraine’ Was Lost, “Open Democracy, (http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ an- drii-portnov/how-eastern-ukraine-was-lost, access: 15 August 2017), p. 6. 20 Giuliano, op. cit., p. 518.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 53 events in East Ukraine was mostly shaped the rival groups. Replacing religious labels by the position of the regional oligarchs. In by phrases like nationalists, unionists, or Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, the decisive loyalists did little to overcome the identity pro-Ukrainian actions of local business elites barrier. It was only in the 1970s when a sort effectively neutralized the activities of pro- of rethinking occurred. It was realized that Russian forces.21 To the contrary, in Donetsk and Luhansk, a spontaneous demonstration identity but economic disparity that such of thousands of youthful pro-Maidan the key factor sustaining the conflict was not supporters in March and April 2014 went in vain, and the region capitulated to separatist artificially constructed ethnic boundaries forces due mostly to the indifferent attitude promote. The findings of the 1978 Glover

Akhmetov and O. Efremov.22 However, it A sense of economic loss has of the influential oligarchs such as R. fuelled both crises. Nonetheless, «in the case of Northern Ireland regionalis worth politics noting thatonly. theIt has political rather influence become the sense of loss was real, whereas in aof common oligarchs feature is not of the confined Ukrainian within politics the East Ukraine it is rather speculative

not diminish with political transitions. In the eventas a whole. of losing Moreover, their political their influence or executive does positions after a political transition, they use Report that “most IRA members came from cronies to represent their interests in the the ranks of the poorer working-class poised parliament.23 Therefore, any endeavour to precariously just above the unemployed” 25 Looking the positive power and guard against the back at East Ukraine, a similar trend can be resolve the Ukrainian conflict should utilize further reaffirmed this realization. difference. Thenegative trend influence of putting of these ethnic oligarchs. colours on observed, albeit, with a subtle but significant an otherwise economic problem is not A sense of economic loss has fuelled both crises. Nonetheless, in the case of Northern Northern Ireland also gave the appearance of Ireland the sense of loss was real, whereas in anunprecedented. identity issue. The Initially, perception the of conflict an ethnic in East Ukraine it is rather speculative. Various divide was cultivated in the very early stages interest groups from within and outside of the , in 1609, when the Ukraine have induced the working class of British sought to counterbalance the Catholic Donbas region with the fear of economic loss Irish population by exporting Protestant in the event of Kyiv pursuing a pro-EU macro- Scots to the area. For the next three centuries, economic policy. In Northern Ireland, it was the history of Ulster was marked by brutal realized that a peace process could survive sectarian violence.24 The birth of the Republic the shocks of violence only if supported by of Ireland in 1921 only changed the label of economic momentum.26 As various legislative

21 Portnov, op. cit., p. 7-8. 22 Marples, op. cit., p. 13. 23 H. Pleines, The Political Role of the Oligarchs, [in:] J. Besters-Dilger, P. Lang (eds.), Ukraine on its Way to Europe: Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, p. 113. 24 Hain MP, op. cit., p. 8. 25 The Portland Trust, Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland, London, 2007, p. 8. 26 Ibid., p. 4.

54 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 reforms pertaining to housing, employment, Northern Ireland without the consent of the and education reduced the disparity between majority of its people.29 In 1990, the British the Catholic and Protestant camps, the Secretary of State in Northern Ireland Peter Catholics gradually stepped back from their neutrality by making an open declaration that Ireland.27 Compared to Ulster, any initiative Brooke confirmed Britain’s constitutional todemand redress for the unification fear of economic with the lossRepublic in East of interest in Northern Ireland”.30 Again, in the Ukraine is likely to produce quicker results, as Downing“Britain had Street no selfishDeclaration strategic of 15 or Decembereconomic there is no real economic disparity between 1993, both British and Irish governments the ethnic groups. The people of Donbas share a unique industrial culture free from determination, independent of their own ethnic exclusivity. Besides, having suffered interests.recognized31 Finally, Northern in the Ireland’s 1998 rightBelfas to (Good self- enormous physical and economic losses from Friday) Agreement, both governments again 32 All willthe ongoingcontinue conflict,to bring them the ordinary more misfortunes people of confirmed the . thanDonbas what must the interest have realized groups that wanted the them conflict to these affirmations of neutrality from external believe the EU-centric economic policy would. leftstakeholders to the people ensured of Ulster. that Similarly, the onus aof peaceful finding However, strategies focused absolutely on solutiona peaceful to solution the Ukrainian to the conflict crisis presupposes is ultimately domestic populace may not be effective that both Ukraine and Russia maintain some unless the planners take due account of the degree of neutrality to let the people of East interests of external stakeholders – most Ukraine make a rational choice about their importantly, that of Russia. political status based on a majority consensus. However, due caution must be exercised to The Role of External Stakeholders guard against a distorted feedback from an

The role of external stakeholders in following the eruption of violence should beartificial heard populace. and those Those who whoentered fled thethe region not unprecedented either. Again, Ulster offers afresh should be carefully discarded from aaggravating ready reference. or diffusing While the internal unionists conflicts viewed is the evaluation process. Nonetheless, such their southern neighbour, the Republic of an arrangement would be possible only if Ireland, as a constant source of threat, the Ukraine and Russia sincerely agree to work nationalists, on the other hand, saw the British together in resolving the crisis. Any peace presence on the island as the key source of process must begin with an unconditional trouble.28 Consequently, a peaceful solution agreement between these two governments to cooperate. of Ireland and Britain maintain manifest neutralityto the conflict in their required role as arbitrators. that the RepublicThey did In order to bring Russia to some sort of so through signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement agreement, it is important to realize how in 1985, which clearly stipulated that there Russian economic interests relate to the would be no change in the political status of ongoing developments in Ukraine. The

27 Ibid., p. 8. 28 Hain MP, op. cit., p. 3. 29 The Portland Trust, op. cit., p. 34. 30 Hain MP, op. cit., p. 8. 31 The Portland Trust, loc. cit.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 55 crisis originates from the Russian fear of other concerns, Russia was particularly Ukraine developing closer economic ties apprehensive about the new Ukrainian with the EU at the expense of the Russian government signing the Association interests. Ukraine had two competing Agreement with the EU. Consequently, in an economic integration projects to choose unprecedented move, Russia immediately from: the Association Agreement with the annexed Crimea by force and engineered EU, within the framework of its Eastern the ethnic uprising in east and south Partnership Policy, and the Customs Union Ukraine.36 (CU) launched by Russia.33 In the post- Soviet region, Belarus and Kazakhstan The next important requirement is, again already joined the CU in 2010, while Armenia and agreed to join the commitment from both governments to Eurasian Economic Union, a more advanced partdrawing with from the theextremist lessons elements of Ulster, of a theirfirm version of the CU, in 2013. Russia expected respective camps. Russia should stop Ukraine to join the team, which would not providing moral and material support be possible if it signed the Association to the armed intruders in East Ukraine, Agreement with the EU.34 and Ukraine should put a check on its ultranationalist activists. A peace process Russia was the main supplier of gas, oil, and nuclear fuel to Ukraine. Moreover, Ukraine to a forced negotiation, not a conscious and Belarus provide important transit agreement,with ‘guns underfor it thekeeps table’ the willoption only open lead routes for Russian gas and oil export to Europe; so much that prolonged disruption of supply through these two countries a power-sharing arrangement might bring the Russian export to a total should be the last thing collapse.35 Therefore, Russia had been «for East Ukraine to accept, persistently trying to persuade the transit because it will only establish a countries to hand over the control of the false sense of a divided society transit pipelines and distribution networks to Gazprom.

The victory of Yanukovych in the to return to violence should the process presidential election of Ukraine in February fail to deliver the results preferred by the 2010 and his series of pro-Russian political extremist elements. Such an arrangement moves rekindled the Russian hope about Ukraine. When the Maidan events Both governments should make sincere effortsbenefits to the identify extremists, and notmake the usemoderates. of the Russia became seriously alarmed. Among compelled Yanukovych to flee the country, moderate elements within the conflict zone

32 The Portland Trust, op. cit., p. 35. 33 S.-S. Niculescu, ‘A Bridge Too Far’ – Examining a Possible Outcome of the Ukraine Crisis, “Europolity”, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2014, p. 96. 34 P. Rutland, An Unnecessary War: The Geopolitical Roots of the Ukraine Crisis, “Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives”, E-International Relations, Bristol, UK, March 2015, p. 136. 35 A. Zagorski, Eastern Partnership from the Russian Perspective, “Eastern Partnership-Russia”, Spring/Summer 2010, p. 12. 36 Rutland, op. cit., p. 137. 37 Portnov, op. cit., p. 4.

56 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 – again, a lesson from Ulster. Such elements of hatred and violence between the Catholics and Protestants for more than recollecting that some Donbas oligarchs three and a half centuries, Ulster might expressedmay not be their difficult willingness to identify. to mediate It is worth the have represented, arguably, a deeply talks between the Kyiv government and the divided society. Consequently, a power- regions where their business activities were sharing arrangement was possibly mostly concentrated in the initial stage the best solution the planners could 37 A constructive dialogue imagine. Nonetheless, some scholars among the governments of Ukraine and argue that consociationalism reproduces ofRussia the and conflict. the moderate elements of East “systemic ” by institutionally Ukraine is likely to produce a peaceful and incorporating the extreme elements of the conflicting parties in the government.40 Such an arrangement reinforces and Conclusionsmutually beneficial solution to the problem. sustains the sense of an ethnic divide among the people. The social history of So far, the paper has elaborated on how the East Ukraine is significantly different from that of Ulster. Donbas people never Ulster in resolving their crisis. Nonetheless, resorted to armed violence against each Ukrainians might find a suitable model in other. The ethnic boundary that some odd political entrepreneurs of identity have init isanother worth socio-economic realizing that acontext, given conflicteven if so passionately tried to construct does theyresolution have marked model doessimilarities. not fit perfectly Indeed, blind well not exist. Therefore, a power-sharing application of the Ulster model in Ukraine arrangement should be the last thing for could do more harm than good. While East Ukraine to accept, because it will only establish a false sense of a divided resolution in Ulster have a good number society. ofthe lessons approach to learn and from, modalities it is the of outcome conflict of Ulster that demands a careful analysis before suggesting it for Ukraine. Abdullah Al Yusuf is a Brigadier General of Bangladesh Army and a Rotary Peace Fellow earning Masters in The Belfast Agreement that marked the Peace Studies from International Christian University, end of the conflict in Ulster produced Japan. He previously had the field experience of serving consociationalism as a conflict regulation in two United Nations peacekeeping missions – in Haiti 39 mechanism. Consociationalism and in DR Congo. His research interests are: refugees, implies a power-sharing arrangement migrants, and stateless people. among the parties of a “deeply divided society”.39 Given the sustained nature

38 J. Hughes, Is Northern Ireland a ‘Model’ for Conflict Resolution? LSE Workshop on State Reconstruction after Civil War, 29 March 2011, p. 1. 39 Loc. cit. 40 Loc. cit.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 57 CONFLICTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR LESSONS FOR UKRAINE

Dr. Mariya Heletiy Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

The analysis will compare the conflicts in the Balkans of the 1990s and the war in Eastern Ukraine: their causes, historical background, political and economic context. It will also demonstrate how the mechanisms for the Balkan conflicts’ resolution may be applied in resolving the conflict in Ukraine. In addition, it will provide recommendations regarding policies and peace roadmap to be implemented in Ukraine.

Introduction independent Ukraine, where people share similar mentality and common history.

Soviet camp where a war followed the end The Ukrainians are not that different from ofUkraine the Cold is not War. the In first the country 1990s inand the 2000s, post- each other, unlike various peoples of the the was marked former Yugoslavia. Therefore, no one should by massacres and violence when the expect that the international community would recognize the independence of the so- for their independence. Only international called “Novorossiya” just like it recognized involvement,former Yugoslav mainly republics by NATO, were helped fighting to the independence of . resolve the deep crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo. Ukraine managed to avoid the bloody history At the same time, some solutions may of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but it potentially be used in Ukraine, including joined these countries with an active war in sanctions by the international community, an its territory in 2014, when an unimaginable international tribunal on crimes committed in Eastern Ukraine, and the Croatian the Russian invasion of Crimea and Donbas. approach to the return of its territories. conflict exploded in Eastern Ukraine, after In pursuit of a resolution of the Ukrainian Comparison of the Balkan Conflicts crisis, international community is trying to and the War in Eastern Ukraine

anduse thein some experience way – ofsimilar other ones. conflict However, zones. long history and roots in the Balkans, i.e. despiteThe Balkan the conflictswillingness are theto compare most current the inAs the a matter Middle of Ages fact, and ethnic after conflicts the WWII, have as a the aggression and hatred among mixed the situations in the Balkans and Eastern Christian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had UkraineBalkan conflictsare very anddifferent, the Ukrainian mainly due crisis, to been developing and stored for years. As a the Russian interference in sovereign and result of this ethnic antagonism, nurtured

58 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 Yugoslavia wanted to secede. That is opposite the Balkans in the 1990s, former neighbours, whofor ages, used during to live the peacefullyconflict development side-by-side, in an independent state and it broke out just started to kill each other.1 becauseof Ukraine, of the where Russian the interference. conflict emerged3 in

Contrary to the Balkans situation, the During the 1990s, Yugoslavia was a single state formed by six republics (Bosnia even partisan Russian Special Forces who and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Ukrainians on both sides of the conflict, and Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia) and two autonomous provinces of Serbia (Vojvodina participate in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and Kosovo), which were economically unequal. It broke up because of an economic in Ukraine, despite the fact and political crisis in the late 1980s4, which that the conflict parties was marked by the Croatian and Slovenian «might support different unwillingness to fund the rest of Yugoslavia, ideologies (pro-Ukrainian or pro- as well as by the multi-ethnic/multi-religious so-called “Donetsk/Lugansk Peoples composition of the population in these Republics”), there are no ancient republics and bloody history of different hatreds toward the opponents groups living together. On one hand, Serbia did not want to let Slovenia and Croatia go because of economic reasons, as they were share similar history, culture, language, the most economically developed: Slovenia religion, values, and way of living. Moreover, had a GDP per capita on par with the smaller economies of Western Europe, while Kosovo parties might support different ideologies province of Serbia was perhaps the most (pro-Ukrainianin Ukraine, despite or pro-so-calledthe fact that the“Donetsk/ conflict economically backward in all of Europe.5 Lugansk Peoples Republics”), there are On the other hand, protection of the Serbian no ancient hatreds toward the opponents. population served as an important argument Even more, both parties proclaim common for Serbia to start the wars in Croatia, Bosnia history, heritage, and “brotherhood” values and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, arguing that as grounds for recruiting efforts on the other it wanted to protect the Serbian population.6 2 On the large scale, all this explains why Furthermore,side of the conflict there line. was no external the intensity of violence was different in each country. For example, in Slovenia, predominantly populated by the Slovenians, becauseinterference the in therepublics Balkan conflicts,of the atformer least at the beginning. The conflicts emerged the conflict was very short-lived (it lasted

1 J. Perles, Conflict in the Balkans: The Serbian Refugee; Serbs Become Latest Victims in Changing Fortunes of War, “New York Times”, 07 August 1995, [http://www.nytimes.com accessed: 21 August 2017]. 2 Ukraine Conflict and Bosnian War: Similarities. “Radio Slobodna Europa”, 06 March 2015, [https://www.slobodnaevropa.org access: 21 August 2017]. 3 D. M. Herszenhorn, A. Roth, In East Ukraine, Protesters Seek Russian Troops, “New York Times”, 07 April 2014, [https://www.nytimes.com access: 21 August 2017]. 4 E. Zizmond, The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy, “Soviet Studies”, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1992), pp. 101-112. 5 M. Kelly, GDP in Yugoslavia: 1980-1989, “Making the History of 1989”, Item No. 671, [https://chnm.gmu.edu accessed: 21 August 2017]. 6 Croatia Profile – Timeline, “BBC News”, 17 March 2017, [http://www.bbc.com access 21 August 2017].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 59 Russia would never be an empire again. This in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo lasted mainly explains the Russian interference longeronly 10 anddays). were Contrary quite tobloody Slovenia, because conflicts of in these countries, despite the fact that the the numerous Serb communities protected Russian population is not residing there. by the Yugoslav authority. The Serbs were afraid of genocide and violence on the side of the Croatians, as it was the case during the World War II, or Muslims (Bosniaks actuallyThe conflicts populated in the Balkans by the exploded Serbs into because one and ) during the Ottoman country.of Milosevic’s In Ukraine, idea tocontrary unite to all the territories Balkan Empire times. The Serbs, remembering the killings and betrayals by Muslims during Donbas without the Russian interference,9 the Ottoman Empire, feared that the history countries,and the potential there wouldprotests be would no conflict not have in would repeat and were asking Milosevic for resulted in that kind of war that we observe help7. The Serbian authorities intervened and today. Russia used the political crisis in were accused of ethnic cleansings against Ukraine in 2013-2014 to destabilize the the Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians, and the situation in Ukraine, to prevent Ukrainian humanitarian crisis. The situation was very integration into the EU, and to show the complicated, and it should have been stopped international community that it is still an by the international community. international player.

Finally, the idea of creating the “Greater “DPR/LPR” and Kosovo Serbia”, which appeared in the end of the 1980s and was supported by Slobodan the sincere willingness of a majority of the envisaged the creation of a Serbian state, populationKosovo’s independence (Kosovo Albanians) became to a proclaim result of whichMilosevic, would had incorporate its ideological all influence.regions of It independence, due to violence and ethnic cleansing by the Serbian Military Forces. In the claimed territories of modern Croatia, 1998-1999, the ethnic Kosovo Albanians Bosniatraditional and significance Herzegovina, to the Serbs, Montenegro, including composed about 83% of the Kosovo Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo that Autonomous Province population, ethnic are populated by the Serbs.8 The “Greater Serbs about 10%, and persons of other Serbia” ideology is very similar to the ethnic groups were at about 7%.10 The data are very approximate as the last census was the territories of the post-Soviet republics: held in 1991 and later in 2011.11 withoutRussian Ukraine,willingness Georgia, to regain and other influence republics, over

7 Izvođenje dokaza Tužilaštva - Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina (Taking of Evidence of the Investigation – Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), “International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia”, 21 January 2004, [http://www.icty.org accessed: 29 August 2017]. 8 M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999: , War and the Great Powers, Penguin, 2001. 9 US: Photos Show Russia Fired into Ukraine, “CBS News”, 28 July 2014, [https://www.cbsnews.com accessed: 29 August 2017]. 10 H. Brunborg, Report on the Size and Ethnic Composition of the Population of Kosovo, “Research Gate”, 2017, [https://www.researchgate.net accessed: 30 August 2017]. 11 According to the 2011 Kosovo national census, the population in Kosovo in 2011 is composed of Albanians (92.9%), Bosniaks (1.6%), Serbs (1.5%), Turk (1.1%), Ashkali (0.9%), Egyptian (0.7%), Gorani (0.6%), Romani

minorities because northern Kosovo data (a largely Serb-inhabited region) were not included as the census was partially(0.5%), other/unspecified boycotted by the Serb (0.2%). and These Romani estimates communities may under-represent in southern Kosovo. the Serb, Romani, and some other ethnic [http://ask.rks-gov.net accessed: 29 August 2017].

60 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 At the same time, the so-called Donetsk would like to remain a part of Ukraine. But the number of supporters of DPR/LPR could be explained by the fear of brutal violence People’s Republic (“DPR”) and Lugansk towards enemies of the new regime.14 inPeople’s Eastern Republic Ukraine. (“LPR”) Contrary were to establishedKosovo, in 2001artificially the aftermajority the Russian population forces of intervened Donetsk Serbia-Ukraine and Serbia-Russia and Luhansk was represented by Relationships the Ukrainians (Donetsk – 56.9% Ukrainians and 38.2% Russians12; Luhansk Historically, Serbia has always been friendly oblast – 58% Ukrainians and 39% Russians13). to Russia and they have always been There was no violence or intimidation against supporting each other because of common other nationalities, including the Russians. religion, Orthodoxy. Russia supported Serbia during the war in Kosovo and at the After extreme level of violence and casualties times when Yugoslavia was falling apart. Russia has been a partner or better to say a “brother” to Serbia. In addition, Serbia thisin the territory territory with of Kosovo Serbia. during Despite the conflict,the fact does not entirely understand what Ukraine thatit was there hard is to a talksmall about number the unificationof the Serbs of is. In other words, for the Serbs, Ukrainian who remained in Kosovo, mainly in Northern territory is associated rather with Russia Mitrovica and in a small number of enclaves than with an independent state. Moreover, throughout Kosovo, it is unimaginable to the foreign policy of independent Ukraine talk about reintegration with Serbia. was not powerful enough to create a positive image of Ukraine as an independent state. The situation in Donbas is completely Finally, Ukraine has never been a special different. The Ukrainians are still the partner to Serbia, while Russia supported majority of the population: There are people Serbia when it was at war in Kosovo and who support the so-called “DPR”, “LPR”, or when NATO was bombarding Serbia. Russia “Novorossiya” projects and there are people was a Serbian ally when the Serbs felt as who do not. It would be a mistake to believe victims of aggression. Ukraine was silent, that those people who do not support even though it has not recognized the “Novorossiya” have all left the separatists independence of Kosovo and this might have territory: There are people who were not able to leave because of relatives, homes, and safety. As an example, sometimes it is Kosovo’splayed in Russia’s Independence and Serbia’s favour. as a safer to stay at home rather than to cross Precedent for Crimea and Occupied the border, because they can die while trying Territories in the East of Ukraine to leave their places of residence. Only a

governing body, established by the theminority building of the seizures general in 2014population—18% and about 55% in UnitedThe Assembly Interim ofAdministration Kosovo, the Mission official Donetsk and 24% in Luhansk—supported

12 Про кількість та склад населення Донецької області за підсумками Всеукраїнського перепису населення 2001 року (About Number and Composition of Population of according to 2001 All-Ukrainian Census), 2001 [http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua accessed: 30 August 2017]. 13 Про кількість та склад населення Луганської області за підсумками Всеукраїнського перепису населення 2001 року (About Number and Composition of Population of according to 2001 All-Ukrainian Census), 2001 [http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua accessed: 30 August 2017]. 14 E. Giuliano, The Origins of Separatism. Popular Grievance in Donetsk and Luhansk, “PONARS Eurasia Columbia Uni- versity”, Policy Memo, No. 396, October 2015, p. 1.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 61 the referenda, it seems that the freedom of independence in 2008.15 Despite the fact the referenda was not ensured, since pro- thatin 2001, the declaration adopted Kosovo’swas disputed declaration by Serbia, of Russian soldiers had taken control over the the International Court of Justice recognized territory (Crimea and Donbas) and controlled the public infrastructure. The freedom of a referendum requires the absence or at least becausethat Kosovo’s it provides declaration the right of of independencepeople to self- restraint of military forces of the opposing was not in conflict with international law parties and a neutrality of public authorities.19 was recognized following a legitimate referendum.determination,16 and Kosovo’s independence Conflict Resolution Roadmap for Ukraine In the case of Crimea and Donbas, it is actually an occupation of a Ukrainian territory by Russia, and this does not fall under the and the former Yugoslavia cannot be provision of the international law. The comparedNotwithstanding in terms the of conflictstheir driving in Ukraine forces, referenda held in Crimea and Donbas were not the decisions of the global community on legitimate and not recognized by states other the Balkan crisis can be implemented in than Russia, or by international organisations. One cannot guarantee that the referenda were scenarios like the imprisonment of Slobodan voluntary, honest, and fair as well as that Milosevicthe Russia-Ukraine or the conflict.40-year Insentence this regard, for the freedom, secrecy of voting, equality, and universality of elections were ensured. the International Criminal Furthermore, the referenda were not Tribunal for the Russia-Ukraine monitored by fair and independent «crisis should be established, in international organisations (OSCE/ODIHR, order to investigate the annexation of Council of Europe, etc.), which could evaluate Ukrainian territory, unlawful “hybrid” and legitimate the process. The results of warfare techniques employed in this the 2014 referenda should not be taken war, as well as human rights violations as a ground for evaluation of the majority of the population opinion, because it was boycotted by parts of the population. Finally,

17 It is very likely Serbs) might eventually be applied to the thatthere aare procedurally findings that thecorrect results referendum in Crimea RussianRadovan leadershipKaradžić (former involved leader as well.of Bosnian Many wouldand Donbas have wereled to falsified. a result in favour of an experts argue that the last decision of the accession to Russia.18 Based on the limited International Criminal Tribunal regarding factual evaluation of the situation during

Radovan Karadžić sends a clear signal to

15 A Constitutional Framework for Self-Government on Kosovo, Regulation No. 2001/9, [http://www.unmikonline.org accessed: 22 August 2017]. 16 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo: Advisory Opinion, “International Court of Justice”, 7 August 2010, p. 1. 17 [http://www.interpretermag.com accessed: 30 August 2017], p. 23. Putin Falsified Crimean ‘Referendum’ Results, Illarionov Says, “The Interpreter”, 24 March 2014, 18 Ch. Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis An International Law Perspective, “Max Plank Institute”, 2014, [http://www.mpil.de accessed: 29 August 2017], p. 23. 19 Ch. Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis An International Law Perspective, “Max Plank Institute”, 2014, [http://www.mpil.de accessed: 29 August 2017], p. 17.

62 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 Russian leader Putin that crimes against support as Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo did. humanity or war crimes do not have a Russia is a nuclear power and the UN Security period of limitations and the punishment for Council permanent member. It still plays a committed crimes is inevitable. role of international player and the U.S. needs

In the current international order, the Also, the Rome Statute, which established the international community tends to resolve a strong ally in and in fighting terrorism. by either Russia, or Ukraine, so legally this negotiation groups, and peacekeeping forces. toolInternational cannot be Criminal applied to Court, the Russia-Ukraine is not ratified However,conflicts very in non-violentoften those approaches ways: sanctions, do not it might be eventually unilaterally prosecuted rather show the aggressor room for impunity. forconflict. crimes In caseagainst of its humanity ratification in theby Ukraine, East of Therefore,bring any resultsa new for situation conflict resolution,requires new but Ukraine, as no war is without atrocities, war crimes, and violence. Bosnia and Kosovo were resolved only with thenon-traditional NATO interference. approaches. However, The NATO conflicts began in Therefore, currently, the only option is to continue to strengthen personal sanctions peaceful and diplomatic means proved to against the Russian leadership, as well as to take part in these conflicts only after all against Russian companies to decrease the limits, so it was the only possible measure to economic growth of Russia and to reduce stopbe inefficient the bloodshed. and violence went beyond the the possibility of Russian army funding. International pressure must be maintained Secondly, the International Criminal Tribunal on the Russian government to ensure for the Russia-Ukraine crisis should be their compliance with prior agreements. established, in order to investigate the The sanctions can be lifted only if Russia annexation of Ukrainian territory, unlawful cooperates with the international tribunal and “hybrid” warfare techniques employed in this war, as well as human rights violations. Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, visa regimes with This means that not only regular combatants thedoes U.S. not and interfere the EU in countries the conflict have resolution to be more in will be prosecuted, but also the commanders complicated for Russian citizens to raise their dissatisfaction with the regime. leadership, such as President Putin. Similar who gave the orders, and up to the army’s Taking into account that the Minsk process have killed people personally, but created all theto Karadžić supportive and conditions Milosevic, to Putin kill, to might torture, not resolution in Eastern Ukraine and the and to commit crimes against humanity. They Minskis not anAgreement efficient mechanismis constantly for violated, conflict international peacekeeping forces have to violence and crimes, but failed to do that. The be deployed in Ukraine. Despite the fact have had influence and control to stop the that under the current international law, case, as it shows that punishment is inevitable particularly the UN Charter, which “gives the with“Karadžić time scenario”and it is essentiallyis very illustrative important in this for Security Council primary responsibility for the reconciliation process. the maintenance of international peace and

On the other hand, Russia is not Serbia, and the Council can establish a UN peacekeeping Ukraine does not have such an unquestionable operation”security and20, inUN fulfilling peacekeepers this responsibility, have to be

20 Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping, “United Nations Peacekeeping”, [http://www.un.org accessed: 30 August 2017].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 63 deployed in Ukraine in this case, Russia as a required to organize democratic elections for member of the UN Security Council would local governing bodies under international veto such decision. Therefore, taking into monitoring and with a free participation account the precedents (Stabilisation Force of all residents of “DPR/LPR” not accused in Bosnia and Herzegovina21, Kosovo Force of crimes against humanity and internally [KFOR]22, etc.), the international community displaced people. may adopt a decision regarding forming and deployment of special international If the peace process does not bring peacekeeping forces including NATO forces. results, the Ukrainian government with These forces have to replace the OSCE Special the support of the international partners Monitoring Mission, whose mandate does not and peacekeeping forces can prepare for correspond with the challenges and risks. and launch an operation to return control over the occupied territories as well as Intervention of peacekeeping forces in to start proper reconciliation process. Ukraine is vital for security of Europe. The The Operation Storm (Oluja in Croatian, precedents in the Balkan history show that launched on 4 August 1995) for the retake of it is sometimes the only way to resolve the Krajina region, controlled by separatist ethnic Serbs since early 1991, may serve as an example for Ukraine. It lasted only 66 opposea protracted the numerous conflict, and particularly well-equipped when hours and resulted in the return of the region armya country’s of another weak country. armed Such forces committed cannot under the Croatian control23. The displaced involvement of the international community persons were given an option to remain in will indicate to every potential aggressor Croatia or leave for the Serbian-controlled that mutual respect, security, and democratic territory, while Croatian authorities values will be defended by all means, and promised safe corridors to the Bosnian Serb- acts of aggression will sooner or later be held territory. In addition, an agreement punished. between the Croatian government and the UN representatives was signed on 6 August After international peacekeeping forces 1995, stating the Croatian commitment to respect human rights of all individuals in the former Sectors North and South24. administrationseparate the conflictinghas to be partiesestablished and in a thecease-fire former comes uncontrolled into force, territories a transitional and If case of carrying out a military operation it would be required to demilitarize the for returning control over the territories, area, ensure conditions for the return of the Ukrainian government has to ensure internally displaced persons, and establish minimum casualties among non-combatants a temporary police force. It would also be and limited destruction of the houses

21 Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) was a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Bosnian war. Although SFOR was led by NATO, several non-NATO countries contributed troops. It was replaced by EUFOR Althea in December 2004. 22 Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo since June 1999. The operation derives its mandate from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia adopted after KFOR entered Kosovo on 11 June 1999. 23 Croatia Impunity for Abuses Committed During “Operation Storm” and the Denial of the Right of Refugees to Return of the Krajina, Vol. 8, No. 13 (D), August 1996. 24 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations Peace Force-United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) on Temporary Measures in the Areas Formerly Known as `Sector North’ and `Sector South, Zagreb, 06 August 1995.

64 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 and infrastructure. In addition, a proper leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia reconciliation process has to be organized, ensuring safety of all missing people on military, and politicians, etc.26 Moreover, both sides and a proper investigation of leadership,the former Yugoslav Croatian republics intelligence of officers,Croatia, crimes committed during the Anti-Terrorist Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have Operation (ATO), return of the property signed protocols on evidence exchange in to IDPs, illegally taken by the “DPR/LPR the course of prosecution for war crimes. authorities”, repatriation of the IDPs, and rebuilding of homes and infrastructure In addition, in all parts of the former ravaged by the war. during the 1990s, persons displaced by war Furthermore, amnesty law has to be fromYugoslavia areas affectedin which bythey ethnic now comprise conflicts adopted, which would ensure amnesty for an ethnic majority were able to return DPR/LPR supporters in case they did not to their homes fairly soon after the end commit war crimes. International human of hostilities. The governments adopted rights and police monitors have to be appropriate return policies, which were allowed to maintain presence and operate pursued by national authorities and the freely in areas formerly held by DPR/LPR international community. However, the forces. return of minorities was far less successful and most minority members are still displaced. In most areas, nationalist amnesty process organized in the Balkan politicians remained in power during the countries.It partially The reflects reconciliation the reconciliation/ in the former post-war period and did not facilitate the Yugoslavia is strongly connected with the return process of minorities, i.e. physical process of transitional justice in the region, security for prospective returnees was not which includes criminal prosecutions, ensured, they were unable to repossess truth commissions, reparations programs, their occupied homes or to have destroyed and various kinds of institutional reforms. homes reconstructed (Serbian Krajina, In the aftermath of massive human rights ).27 The reconciliation abuses, victims want to see the perpetrators process is still going on and it is focused on punished, to know the truth, and to building understanding and trust among all receive reparations25. In this term, the ethnic groups. establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia served Conclusions as an important instrument for prosecution of war criminals on all sides of the crisis The resolution of the Balkan crisis can (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims). As an serve as the precedent for the current and example, indictments were issued against generals involved in the “Operation Storm” and accused of crimes against humanity, bringingfuture conflict international resolution, peacekeeping including settling forces the conflict in Ukraine. It may include

25 F. Doninovska, The Process of Reconciliation in Western Balkans: Towards European Integration of the Region, “Inter- national Association for Political Science Students”, 21 December 2014, [https://www.iapss.org accessed: 30 August 2017]. 26 Key Figures of the Cases, “United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, [http://www.icty.org accessed: 30 August 2017]. 27 B. Ivanisevic, Legacy of War: Minority Returns in the Balkans, “Refworld”, [http://www.refworld.org accessed: 30 August 2017].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 65 to Ukraine, establishing international criminal tribunal, and launching operations Dr. Mariya Heletiy is a Deputy Project Director, for returning of the territories similar to Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, “Operation Storm”. After the reoccupation and an expert on the post-Yugoslavia conflicts. Before of the territories, a fair and impartial joining the centre, she worked as an Elections and reconciliation process has to be organized Political Processes Adviser at the USAID Ukraine, and all atrocities and war crimes have where she managed election and political parties’ to be investigated. Responsible persons should be prosecuted by either domestic or programmes, was a co-founder and manager of the international courts. newly established European Information Support Centre of the Ukrainian Parliament and International Dialogue Programme Manager for Open Ukraine Foundation. In addition, she was also engaged in various research assignments at the internationally recognized Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and at the University of California, Berkeley, in the .

66 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE BALKANS. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FOR UKRAINE

Dr. Miruna Troncotă National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania

In the 2000s, Russia tried in the ex-Soviet space to replicate the same arguments (and tactics) of relativising international law that the West/ NATO used in order to justify their own intervention in the ex-Yugoslav space back in the 1990s. This strategy of so-called ‘mimicry’ manifests by changing the meanings of international norms based on one’s own preferences, but does not accept other powers to behave in the same way. This strategy of legitimisation, which lies behind recognising the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008) or the annexation of Crimea (2014), mixes real elements with fake ones, and ends in distorting reality. To illustrate the political consequences of such practices, we can take a look at Russia’s strategy of invoking the Western ‘precedent’ in Kosovo in order to legitimate the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The paper aims to argue that when analysing Russia’s actions in Crimea in 2014, there is a need for a thorough analysis of the main legitimacy claims used to justify external intervention to outline potential lessons that could be learnt by Ukraine from the experiences of the Balkans.

‘Why are states looking for legitimacy study for discussing how the use of force when they challenge the international law in humanitarian interventions constitutes a based on their own interpretations of the hard case for the power of legal norms. This case, which was very much debated in the IR literature of the recent years, showed that foreignself-determination policy analysis. principle?’ In the last remains decades, a international norms should not be taken for externalfocal question intervention, in the fieldunder of different contemporary forms, granted, as they are the result of the power has been a predominant way of addressing games of big powers and they are exposed to security issues by great powers. Politically politicisation1. constructed threats were claimed to justify external intervention for humanitarian The contradictory perspectives focused on the legal arguments of secession point Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which ended thepurposes. war in NATO’sKosovo, campaignbecame a againstclassic case the law and its subsequent politicisation. towards the ‘relativisation’ of international

1 See more in C. Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2004.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 67 Bernhard and Kubik2 analysed the history its self-proclaimed independence in 2008) of legitimation claims made by Russia, in order to legitimate the illegal annexation understood as forms or traditions of imperial of Crimea in 2014. The paper aims to argue legitimacy. They proposed an instrumental explanation to the choices elites make when Crimea, especially when the precedent of deciding to present history in a particular that when analysing Russia’s actions in way. They are based on the observation is a need for a thorough analysis of the main that former empires or federal projects, legitimacyKosovo’s independence claims used wasto justify invoked, external there which have dismantled, tend to have a more intervention. This discussion might be very revisionist foreign policy, and this implies useful in outlining the potential lessons an active effort to remember some events in that could be learnt by Ukraine from the the past in a particular way. Many authors experiences of the Balkans. Moreover, a highlighted the tendency of great powers to closer look at the rhetoric surrounding the shape the malleable facts of history into self- justifying narrative discourses3. that it is as much about the past as about the presentcurrent or Ukrainian-Russian future. The conclusions conflict will reveals stress These approaches showed that the principle the main elements that could be useful for of self-determination in particular creates a lot of symbolic and political space for international actors (especially for settlingRussia’s the Legitimisation conflict in Ukraine. Strategies – revisionist states) to discursively build a the Smokescreens of ‘the Precedent’

the expansion of their territories. Russia, in ‘precedent’ in order to justify their claims for In any situation of ongoing conflict, the shadow of its Soviet Union’s past, as well ofcompeting leading ‘facts’or misleading and versions external of events opinion. are as Serbia, marked by its Yugoslav ‘grandeur’, produced – often for the specific purpose foreignare the policy countries actions. that Based fit on this that, category those reproduced by international journalists and countriesof ‘revisionism’, are more reflected prone than in aggressiveothers to expertsThose versionsin the media, of the become ‘facts’, a part which of the are sponsor secessionist groups and discourses political strategies of legitimisation. In the in their former federal countries. Balkans, there are numerous contradictory versions of the wars for the of The problem is that this strategy of Yugoslavia, with some countries accusing legitimisation mixes real elements with others of ethnic cleansing and others fake ones, and ends in distorting reality. rejecting the accusations. This is what I To illustrate this idea and its political consequences, we can take a look at severely and negatively affects the post- recently called ‘the war of meanings’ that visibly in Bosnia and Kosovo4. There is a interventionRussia’s strategy in 1999 of invokingand the recognition the Western of conflictgreat danger Europeanization that Ukraine processcould also most be ‘precedent’ in Kosovo (both the military

2 M. H. Bernhard, J. Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration, Oxford Uni- versity Press: Oxford 2014. 3 J. Subotic, Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change, “Foreign Policy Analysis”, 2015, No. 12, pp. 610–627. And A. Faizullaev, J. Cornut, Narrative Practice in International Politics and Diplomacy: The Case of the Crimean Crisis, “Journal of International Relations and Development”, 2016, [DOI 10.1057/jird.2016.6]. 4 Post-conflict Europeanization and the War of Meanings. Challenges to EU Conditionality in Bosnia and Kosovo, Tritonic Publishing House: Bucharest 2016. M. Troncotă,

68 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 affected by similar trends, especially when military actions against the breakaway looking at how Russia uses disinformation in states Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. order to propose different versions of events that occurred in the Ukrainian crisis. In this context, there were plenty of scholarly discussions that have comparatively There were a few attempts of the Russian examined the similarities and the leadership to provide legitimate grounds for the annexation of Crimea. The analysis strategies in the Western Balkans (former tries therefore to show that there is a gap Yugoslavdifferences space) between and thethe conflict Black Seasettlement Region between legitimisation discourses (pointing (former Soviet space) in recent years. It to what states narrate regarding their own was shown that the Russian foreign policy evaluation of the conditions) and the facts has used the Yugoslav secession wars and on the ground. From this point of view, an external intervention for the legitimisation of its own actions in the former Soviet space. Therefore, there is a need to highlight the

Russia launched a series of legal ambiguities, more precisely the tension ‘competing truths’ or ‘alternative betweenconsequences the principles of Russia’s of self-determination ability to exploit «facts’ regarding the annexation of and territorial integrity and between a Crimea. This put Ukraine’s government humanitarian intervention and an illegal in a very difficult position in front military intervention (open or covered) for of the international community a particular interpretation of international law. Have European policy makers learnt

context of a revived East-West division, issue that deserves more attention is the fact aresomething we witnessing from those a new experiences? form of external In the that Russia launched a series of ‘competing intervention and its legitimation taking

truths’ or ‘alternative facts’ regarding the place in Ukraine? frontannexation of the of international Crimea. This community. put Ukraine’s As legitimisation strategy of its military government in a very difficult position in interventionsSince the beginning both at of thehome 2000s, and Russia’sabroad has taken Western actions as a point of shown in a recent academic analysis, Putin’s reference. Most evidently, the 2008 invasion andnormative Russian justification language for speakers the seizure from of of Georgia was presented as a peacekeeping imminentCrimea was danger. ‘to protect’The Russian ethnic government Russians operation meant to defend lives of the incorporated Crimea by engaging in Russian citizens and peacekeepers in South a sophisticated effort of intervention, Ossetia, who were supposedly ‘attacked by through non-military and military means. An essential part in this process was to developed, Moscow even accused Tbilisi of genocideGeorgian troops’.against Then,the local as the population. war in Georgia After breach of Ukrainian territory5. The same promulgatetactics were used narratives by the regime justifying of Milosevic Russia’s the Kosovo precedent for recognition of the ceasefire,independence the Russian of Abkhazia government and South used

in the 1990s in order to justify Serbia’s

5 Romania’s Concentric Circles in the Line of Fire?, Policy paper, 2017 [http://dri.snspa.ro/uploads/brosura_policy_paper-v8-LE-hi_res.pdf] M. Troncotă,

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 69 Ossetia6. The same rhetoric was used in for the separatist war in Eastern Ukraine. On in Crimea in 2014. The parallel between severalannexation occasions, of Crimea President and Moscow’s Putin used support the Kosovothe case and of Crimea Russia’s was illegal used by intervention Russia to language of a humanitarian interventionist challenge international law from two main perspectives: as a way of justifying the use in Crimea. In order to explore a series of of force on a foreign territory, and also by possibleto rebut lessons criticism to of be Russia’s learnt involvementby Ukraine invoking the principle of self-determination. from the experiences of the Balkans in post-

What the analysis tries to stress at this main elements that are of crucial importance: point is that in the 2000s, Russia tried to a.conflict the role transformation, of using the I willpast focusin order on two to replicate in the ex-Soviet space the same justify political decisions and contestation arguments (and tactics) of relativising of international norms; b. unexpected international law that the West/NATO used consequences of external intervention. in order to justify their own intervention in the ex-Yugoslav space back in the 1990s. a) Instrumentalising the past is probably one of the most at provoking and showing the limits of what controversial, yet most widely used This strategy of so-called ‘mimicry’ aimed political strategies to date in the use of international norms based on its own Balkans. preferences,Russia called but ‘Western not accepting hypocrisy’, other meaning powers to behave in the same way. Foreign policy narratives are often based on ways in which direct observers of an Lessons to Be Learnt by Ukraine international event look to the past to make

It was much debated in recent years that usually create a symbolic space for the the Ukrainian crisis worked as a trigger for promotionsense of the ofpresent. various International interpretations conflicts of political events that interact in dynamic ways international affairs that goes far beyond the with their opinions and their stereotypes bordersthe revival of ofUkraine. a ‘New Moreover, Cold War’ those rhetoric deep in about domestic politics, foreign policy, divides have appeared not only in the Russia- West relations, but also in the European space at large, most evidently affecting relations mechanismsand a country’s implied subjective using history. controversial For the between the EU and the Western Balkans. claimsintervention about in the Crimea, history Russia’s of Ukraine. legitimising This Economic stagnation, defunct democracies, should be a warning for Ukraine not to and the weakening pull of Europe have all engage in the re-interpretation of history in presented opportunities to Russia to come order to respond to Russian attacks. In this regard, an important lesson to be learnt from the Balkans is that alternative narratives Theand fillmain the argument gap. of those supporting the about the past have the potential to do more

low level in the relations between Russia andidea ofthe a ‘NewWest, Cold triggered War’ is anby unprecedentedthe economic Oneharm important to the conflicting instrument parties. for destabilisation sanctions imposed by the latter following the

in the area where one aims to exert influence

6 Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia, “Eurasian Geography and Economics”, Vol. 49, No. 6, 2008, pp. 670–705. See more in G. Ó� Tuathail,

70 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 is the re-interpretation of history with the essentialist idea that ethnic composition can purpose of contesting borders. This is still, justify the secession of the territory. 25 years since the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, a strategy most often used In the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in the Balkans. The problem is that this draw attention to the association between is based on the premises that if the Balkan powerthe Balkans’ and instability,territorial thereclaims is based a need on to countriesdestabilisation get weaker is profitable and more for Russia.unstable, It ethnic arguments. This is where the they will be appealing neither to the EU, nor instrumentalisation of the past comes into to NATO. This strategy was applied also in play. All parties involved, countries, and the case of Ukraine. international organisations interpret the events of March 2014 in contrasting ways: Much of the politics in the Balkans is still connected to the past. For example, people pretext of defending the Russian minority who were directly involved in the war for While Russia justified its actions under the the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the Balkans managed to retain key positions in political against alleged Ukrainian ‘neo-Nazi groups’, life and business. Although they quickly onWestern the ground countries should perceived not be mistaken Moscow’s for adapted their behaviour to the changed theiractions representations as ‘an act of aggression’. in discourse. But the Russia facts environment, the legacy of the old regimes is aimed to blur the threshold between the still present in their political attitudes. The legal and illegal by exploiting some areas fact that the elites are trapped in a discourse of uncertainty in international law, while obsessed with the past makes the situation by using Russians and Russian speakers frommaking Ukraine unfounded as assertionsthe main oflegitimating ‘facts’ and referendumof the post-conflict in Crimea settlement in March even2014, more but devices. difficult. This applies more evidently to the speech in front of the State Duma on 18 An important lesson to be learnt from the March,mainly toin thewhich legitimising he drew aclaims parallel in V.between Putin’s Balkans is that multi-ethnic states and Kosovo and Crimea. This comparison cultural and religious differences are still remained misleading and controversial, hard to reconcile if the main actors do not especially because most of the EU countries share the main meanings of the processes are supporting Kosovo, but not supporting they go through. Ukraine should avoid deepening its divisions.

TheCrimea’s strategies secession. to instrumentalise the past b) External intervention, under for justifying the present foreign policy different forms, has been a predominant way of addressing security issues after the collapse of problemdecisions is are that part Ukraine of Russia’s has responded main strategy with Yugoslavia, but with limited results. thein same the Ukrainiantactics, and conflict.looking at The the Balkans biggest The geopolitical of the post-Cold development and democratisation. How War period has showed that any type of canexample, we distinguishthis is detrimental in this forcase a country’sbetween intervention has a potential of becoming historical arguments and facts and emotional a tool for the interference by a strong one in the affairs of a weak one. International Using the Kosovo precedent in the case of the law was built on the doctrine of non- blatantarguments breach based of sovereignty on an ‘imagined’ that occurred past? intervention, but great powers employed in Crimea is based on the dangerous sophisticated legitimacy discourses in

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 71 order to convince other states to accept their decisions and to legitimise their far less important in Ukraine than in the Balkans,The ethnic even dimension though Russian of the narratives conflict put is by countries before or after an intervention more emphasis on this. Is Russia entitled to againstinterventions. another The state justifications and the employedfollow-up intervene in Ukraine in order to protect the process, by which other countries and the international community as a whole was a crucial question raised in the years thatRussian-speaking followed the annexation citizens of of Ukraine? Crimea. This

result(through of politicisation. the UN General Assembly) find The intertwinement between the Ukrainian those justifications acceptable or not, is a events and the developments in the Balkans9 External intervention to stop the war can be stressed. Studies showed how the in Bosnia was delayed and could not prevent the ethnic genocide. In Kosovo, anti-government groups, disseminating the international community acted falseRussian informationhybrid activities and involved propaganda, financing more promptly in order to avoid further massacres by the Serbs of the Albanian as destabilising factors both in the Balkans community in Kosovo. However, whether andinfiltrating in Ukraine. agents ofRussia influence, sought who toworked gain

managed to reach their humanitarian institutions, bodies, and economy, and uses goalsthose interventionsremains a big were controversy efficient andin influence over (if not control of) critical state scholarly debates. M. Kaldor7 was one decisions in the two regions. In this strategy, of the authors who stressed a series of athat lot influenceof stress isto putshape on nationalcorruption, policies which and is lessons from the Balkan Wars in a post- used as the lubricant on which this system operates, concentrating on exploitation of the international community (particularly theconflict European reconstruction Union) could and proposed increase thatthe chances of sustainable peace, stability, state resources to further Russia’s networks and democracy by putting interests of the of influence. The essence of its policy is isplaying seen particularlya ‘weak hand’ in the the best fact possible that the ways, anti- 8. She promoted the concept of EUtaking rhetoric advantage started of toothers’ abound weaknesses. in local media. This citizens first in the case of the Ukrainian S. Bose also argued that one key driver of conflictlegitimises the intervention of international escalation in the Balkans in the early 1990s actors‘human in security’ a civil war as with the main the main reason goal that of poses a continuing risk as the Ukraine saving lives of innocent civilians. crisis unfolds10: that is the contribution

There are many limits to the parallels that can elections, referenda, even constitution- of ostensibly ‘democratic’ processes – Ukraine and the war in former Yugoslavia. be drawn between the conflict in and around making – to inflaming tensions.

7 M. Kaldor, Ukraine and Crimea. A Report from the Front, “The Nation”, 2015 [https://www.thenation.com/ article/ukraine-and-crimea-a-report-from-the-front/] 8 M. Kaldor, Ukraine and Crimea. A Report from the Front, “The Nation”, 2015 [https://www.thenation.com/ article/ukraine-and-crimea-a-report-from-the-front/] 9 Romania’s Concentric Circles in the Line of Fire?, Policy paper, 2017 [http://dri.snspa.ro/uploads/brosura_policy_paper-v8-LE-hi_res.pdf] M. Troncotă, 10 S. Bose, Ukraine’s Lessons from Balkans’ Nightmare, “Open Democracy”, 2014 [https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/sumantra-bose/ukraine-lessons-from-balkans-nightmare]

72 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 Overall, there are two main parallels most Second, there is a Dayton model that often invoked when discussing potential was proposed as a solution to a potential lessons to be learnt by Ukraine from the federalisation in Ukraine following the experience of the Balkans. They both deal Bosnian example. Some analysts suggested with unexpected consequences of external that because the Minsk II Agreement is not intervention and how third-party actors respected, Ukraine needs a sort of Dayton (such as the EU or OSCE) could help Ukraine Agreement12. At the end of March 2014, Russian foreign minister S. Lavrov pressed territories in Donbas. a demand to State Secretary J. Kerry that settle the conflict with the two separatist The (Dis-)Functionality of the that it be compelled to accept partition of Balkan ‘Precedents’ itsUkraine territory be and forced that to it establish ‘federalise’, the meaning Russian

alongside the Ukrainian13. The problem is thatlanguage the Dayton as the Peace second Agreement official language (1995) reappearedFirst, there in is the a ‘precedent’rhetoric of the created Russian by may have ended the war in Bosnia, but it also presidentKosovo’s secessionagain with from the Serbia. secessionist It has legitimised ethnic cleansing and saddled referendum in Crimea and subsequently Bosnia with a dysfunctional and extensive state structure. The country is ethnically Ukraine. The Declaration of Independence fragmented and the ethnically oriented ofensured the theAutonomous territory’s smoothRepublic takeover of Crimea from nationalist parties are predominantly also refers to the Kosovo Declaration of the ones that still call the shots. So there Independence as well as to the Decision of would be no reason to consider the Dayton the United Nations Court of Justice in 2010.11 decentralisation model as something that Public debates have already questioned the could in any way solve the problems of instrumentality of the Kosovo case for the Ukraine. Nevertheless, as the Pax analysis Russian foreign policy discourse, showing shows, one thing that could be borrowed that it is based on multiple errors and ‘forced from Bosnia is the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which meets on a monthly could hardly be more different. Attempts basis to monitor the Dayton Agreement. It similarities’. In reality, the two situations involves over 50 states and international Crimea are an unusually blatant exercise organisations that contribute to achieving into usefalse Kosovo moral to equivalency. justify Russia’s There actions is no in the Dayton objectives. It was suggested that a type of PIC for Minsk II could prove to be Russian population was threatened with any rather effective14. But this too would be yet remotelyevidence comparableindicating that atrocities Crimea’s at themajority- hands of the Ukrainian government, which was indeed the case for the Albanian community Moreover,another ‘external the agitation experiment’. over a status of the living in Kosovo. Russian language resembles the situation

11 Парламент Крыма принял Декларацию о независимости АРК и г. Севастополя (The Crimean Parliament Adopted Declaration of Independence of ARK and Sevastopol), 11 March 2014, [http://www.rada.crimea.ua/news/11_03_2014_1] Пресс-центр Верховного Совета АРК, Rada Crimea, 12 M. Pizzi, Is Ukraine the Next Bosnia?, “Al-Jazeera”, 14 March 2014, [http://america.aljazeera.com/ articles/2014/3/14/is-ukraine-the-nextbosnia.html] 13 S. Tisdall, Russia Sets Tough Conditions for Diplomatic Solution in Crimea, “The Guardian”, 30 March 2014, [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/30/russia-ukraine-john-kerry-sergei-lavrov-paris] 14 Lessons Learned from the Balkans Can Help Ukraine, [https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/lessons-learned-from-the-balkans-can-help-ukraine] “PAX”, 2015,

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 73 in Croatia in the 1990s, where Serbs alleged that they were victims of Croatian discrimination against the Serbian dialect there are clear reasons not to recommend the Dayton model «for Ukraine, especially that Inof theour languageopinion, oncethese called comparisons ‘Serbo-Croatian’ lay on a most of the citizens (be it Ukrainian seriesand now of misrepresentations called ‘Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian’. and are rather or Russian speakers) do not support overstretched. the scenario with a federal model that would split the country

strategy is not one of the land grabbing but oneI. Krastev of a state-re-building” argued that “Putin’s15. He currentfurther created a political system that, in addition tounsatisfied being extremely with the complex, results. put Moreover, too many it –added, a state “The that Kremlin’s is radically vision federalized for Ukraine’s with decisions in the hands of foreign actors itsfuture constituent is that it parts becomes allowed a ‘Greater to follow Bosnia’ their unaccountable to Bosnians (such as the natural cultural, economic and geopolitical preferences.” In other words, Russia might have in mind a strategy of ‘divide and thatOffice the of High Dayton Representative). Agreement Mosthas Bosnianrun its course,politicians but and they foreign cannot officials agree on now how agree to farther-reaching implications for Kyiv than modify or replace it and this leads to a huge merelyneutralise’, losing a Crimea. prospect Other that commentators would have crisis for constitutional reform. more convincingly argued that Bosnia is no model for Ukrainian peace16. Should Ukraine follow the same pattern for

There are plenty of reasons why the Bosnian As explained previously, there are clear peace-building process was exceptional reasonssecuring not peace to inrecommend the breakaway the regions?Dayton and could not offer a proper model for model for Ukraine, especially that most Ukraine. More than two decades after the of the citizens (be it Ukrainian or Russian speakers) do not support the scenario had generated the war persist in Bosnia with a federal model that would split the becauseconflict of ended, perpetuated interethnic ethnic hostilities divisions thatand country. Political fragmentation undermines complicated decision-making structures enshrined in the Dayton constitutional membership perspective did not succeed to setting. Bosnian politics is still divided Bosnia’s economy. The European Union along ethnic lines, with each group afraid aunite replacement the country’s for competingthe Dayton communities. Agreement the other two. The Dayton Peace Accords Bosnian stakeholders’ inability to agree on frozeof losing the ethnic power tensions, and influence rather than relative solved to As shown in previous research on the topic, theallowed Balkans the were country’s faced divisionswith multiple to persist. policy

the conflict, leaving each

15 I. Krastev, What Does Russia Want and Why, “Prospect Magazine”, 2014, [http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/ politics/what-does-russia-want-and-why] 16 Bosnia is No Model for Ukrainian Peace, “Balkans in Europe Policy Blog”, 2014, [http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/biepag/node/106] 17 EU’s “Laboratory” in the Western Balkans. Experimenting Europeanization without Democratization. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp.I. Bărbulescu, 63-99. M. Troncotă, “Revista Española de Ciencia Polí�tica”, No. 31, March 2013,

74 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 experiments in external intervention that Here one could argue that language is not, had detrimental political consequences, in fact, the most important predictor of which we called ‘Europeanization without separatist sentiments. Preferring stronger 17. I would argue that ties with Russia does not equate to wishing this is a pattern that should be avoided by to become a part of the Russian state. democratization’Ukrainian elites. Nevertheless, there are serious concerns about the fact that the EU has seen its The other lesson that could be learnt by power eroding in the Balkans. Consequently, Ukraine is from the dangers of separatism Moscow has been seeking to step up its and its promoters in the Balkans. Since former Yugoslavia. This could also be the 2010, M. Dodik has repeatedly threatened caseinfluence of Ukraine. all across the countries of the becoming Republika Srpska’s president in frequently promised to call for a referendum Conclusions. A New Strategic secession. Over the past five years, Dodik has Approach for Ukraine to protect ethnic Serbians from alleged attemptson Republika by the Bosniaks Srpska’s to future, take control vowing of For the many regional and international the substate. organisations engaged in the Balkans in the 1990s, the experience has been akin to Media reports that picture Ukraine as a both successes and failures occurred. It is off the mark, focusing on divisions that importantone large not ‘experimental to repeat the laboratory’ same in Ukraine, where deeply divided, almost artificial state are because this situation would be in favour of political life than it appears. In reality, Russia only and its strategy of maintaining beforeplay a muchCrimea, smaller the roleissue inof the separatism country’s was simply absent from the public debate. a new strategic approach and an alliance of Nevertheless, separatist rhetoric has ever frozen conflicts. In reality, Ukraine requires since been sponsored by Moscow. Moreover, by occupying a part of Ukraine, Russia sends For the many regional and a signal that Ukrainian borders are open international organisations «engaged in the Balkans in the the topic of the partition of Ukraine in the to question in order to artificially bring 1990s, the experience has been akin to one large ‘experimental history and regional divergences, the wish laboratory’ where both successes tolimelight. pursue European Despite the integration country’s has complex been a and failures occurred. It is important unifying, not a dividing, factor in Ukraine. not to repeat the same in Ukraine Ethnic divergence, with different parts of Ukraine not sharing historical memory and language, has not resulted in a public vote for separatism as in the case of Republika Srpska friends, partners, and supporters composed in Bosnia. It was part of the Russian strategy of countries with similar interests. The to make foreigners look at Ukraine through reform and transition experience of the the prism of ethnic division. The Ukrainian Balkans matters for Ukraine from a different authorities could take an important lesson perspective. In the 1990s, the Balkan learnt by dissociating from the far-right countries were in a similar – or possibly arguments and essentialist perspectives and worse – situation as Ukraine is today, and transform different languages and varied those in Europe and the West developed political aspirations and cultures from a institutions to turn war-torn countries into weakness into a strength. successful EU members, as in the case of

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 75 Croatia, or successful candidates, such as • the West positioning itself in a semi- Montenegro. Cold-War rhetoric and in antagonising relations with Russia.

reconstruction periods in the Balkans were The recent years has been the living interactionsThe main challenges among clashing of the ethnic post-conflict identities proof that communities that are suffering with poor governance and corruption. In the from economic hardship are increasingly Balkans, at the moment, their political and economic development is being delayed by future.inclined Corrupt to take practices, anyone’s help,low levels including of Kosovo, Bosnia/Republika Srpska). Not accountability,Russia’s, if there distortions is a promise of historical of a better facts onlyterritorial/secessionist bad relations with neighbours, conflicts (Serbia/but also internal politics are an important factor of hybrid war were the main methods used in destabilisation. Uncompromising political thisby using process controversial of reviving ‘precedents’, ‘the old spheres and even of elites and ethno-nationalist parties are part of the establishment and have consolidated their economic and political power in influences’ in Eastern Europe. these areas. This is a pattern that should be should apply the lessons learnt from avoided by Ukrainian elites. theA good Balkans settlement by avoiding of the conflict the dangers in Ukraine of cooperating with the same political elite. In Looking at the post-war Balkan such circumstances the Balkan experience reconstruction, there is a wide range of showed that party leadership will keep their existing institutions that helped the Balkan dominant position, limiting party democracy countries reform and grow their economies and halting advancement in the European that could also help Ukraine. Ukraine now integration process. confronts three main challenges that must be avoided with the lessons learnt from the Balkans: Dr. Miruna Troncotă is a Lecturer and Researcher • its own far-right extremism; at the Department of International Relations and European Integration at the National University of • Russia trying to solidify and recapture Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA), its long-time traditional areas of Romania. Her most recent book is “Post-conflict Europeanization and the War of Meanings: The the collateral danger of promoting the Challenges of EU Conditionality in Bosnia and Kosovo” Russophileinfluence and anti-Westernism control; this posesdiscourses also (Tritonic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2016). among Russian-speaking communities;

76 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 ACCESS TO INFORMATION: THE “ACHILLES’ HEEL” OF REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

Lesia Vasylenko Legal Hundred NGO

This article addresses the overlooked issue of lack of information and communication strategies in disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Particularly the author is concerned with the low awareness level (25%) of Ukrainian ex-combatants about access to the reintegration programmes and benefits. The experience of a number of post-conflict African countries is analysed in an attempt to find solutions for Ukraine. The final part of the article summarises approaches adopted by the Ukrainian government and their effect on accessibility of veteran rights.

The Ukrainian Setting for the military. Commonly known as veteran care, the system of social support for ex- a normal form of warfare. While political and overlooked in analytical works, where authors diplomaticHistorically solutionsspeaking, areprotracted sought, conflicts each party are tendcombatants to focus during on disarmament, ongoing conflicts demobilisation is often is concerned with maintaining a strong and (discharge), and reintegration (DDR), all of motivated military. In this respect, care for the which are usually discussed as attributes of reserve, which is often composed of recently discharged combatants, is fundamental. Care for the wounded, the dependants and Ukraine,the final solutionhowever, of has an armedhad to conflict. deal with DDR families of the deceased is another important six times in the last three years, with every new wave of demobilisation1. Over 160,000 willingness to serve, and the civilian support combatants have been discharged2 and component, defining attitudes in the army,

1 Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 14 January 2015 No.15/2015 “On Partial Mobilization”; Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 6 May 2015 No. 254/2015 “On the Dismissal of Servicemen Who Were Assigned to Military Service During the Mobilization, for a Special Period in Accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 6 May 2014 No. 454 “On Partial Mobilization”; Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 12 June 2015 No. 328/2015 “On the Dismissal of Servicemen Who Were Assigned to Military Service During the Mobilization, for a Special Period in Accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 21 July 2014 No. 607 “On Partial Mobilization”. 2 Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 25 March 2016 No. 115/2016 “On the Dismissal of Servicemen Who Were Assigned to Military Service During the Mobilization, for a Special Period in Accordance with the Decree of the Pres- ident of Ukraine as of 21 July 2014 No. 607 and During the First Wave of Mobilization in Accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 14 December 2015 No. 15”; Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 24 June 2016 No. 271/2016 “On the Dismissal of Servicemen Who Were Assigned to Military Service During the Second Wave of Mobilization, for a Special Period in Accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 14 December 2015 No. 15”; Decree of the President of Ukraine as of 26 September 2016 No. 411/2016 “On the Dismissal of Servicemen Who Were Assigned to Military Service During the Third Wave of Mobilization, for a Special Period in Accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine from 14 December 2015 No. 15”

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 77 immediately included in the First Line of the Operative Reserve3. This means that upon funded reintegration programmes. Some 70% an order from their direct commanders ofeligible these veterans for social continue benefits to andbe active government- military, and in case of an imminent military threat, which cannot help but bring confusion to the demobilised are to present themselves both the system of social welfare for armed immediately to the military units from which personnel and the system of veteran care. they were discharged, to be re-armed, and As the war goes on, the number of veterans to be able to undertake military duty in continues to grow, as do the problems with emergencies. administering veteran care and maintaining an integrated strong social fabric. To make this system of operative defence According to the surveys carried out by the solutions to many challenges, including World Bank5 and the OSCE6 in the beginning properwork inregistry practice of the Ukraine discharged, has balancing to find of 2017, there is a rather low satisfaction rate constitutional principles such as freedom of movement and duty to protect, ensuring some examples: only 29% of the veterans are attendance at reserve service trainings. happyamong with veterans the governmental with their benefits. programmes To cite on housing; 50% of the respondents managed as the government needs both to keep the to receive free land plots; and an even smaller dischargedThese tasks combat-readyare made all the and more to difficultensure number of veterans managed to get access they are fully integrated and functioning to free medical care (24%), psychological members of civilian society. This is where the problems start. aidrehabilitation to start a business (21%), (2%). tax benefits (13%), The acquisition of civilian status and vocational rehabilitation (5%), and financial sustainable employment and income is There are many reasons for such statistics, 4. but the fundamentals lie in the low levels of Finding the cure in circumstances of ongoing andconsidered occasionally “the escalating Achilles’ military heel of activity DDR” is they can be accessed. According to the OSCE survey,awareness 85% about of the therespondents benefits andindicated the ways that that in September 2014, less than six months they would like to receive more information intoproving the to war, be difficult,Ukraine especially adopted consideringlegislation providing the combat veteran status for the surprise, considering the government is good participants of the anti-terrorist operation. about the available benefits. This is no As of 1 September 2017, there are 311,456 has failed to make the information available combat veterans in Ukraine. All of them are onat declaringhow to access rights them. and listing benefits, but

3 Law of Ukraine “On Military Duty and Military Service” provides: “During a special period [it includes mobilization and war] the persons who are dismissed from the military ser-

and psychological requirements and their state of health is adequate for service in the military reserve.” vice are obliged to be enlisted in the military operational reserve of the first line, if they correspond to professional 4 S. Meek, M. Malan, Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa, Workshop Report, Institute of Security

5 Conflict in Ukraine. Socio-Economic Impact of Internal Displacement and Veteran Return, Summary Report, The In- ternationalStudies, 2004, Bank [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/118323/106%20FULL.pdf] for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, May 2017, [http://documents.worldbank. org/curated/en/571011497962214803/pdf/116489-REVISED-Updated-Report-Socioeconomic-Impacts-Inter- nal-Displacement-Veteran-Ret.pdf] 6 I. Volosevych, et al, Report on the Results of the Study of the System of Social Protection of the Participants of Combat Operations and Members of the Families of Those Who Died in the ATO, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, 15 December 2016.

78 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 sure the information has a wide outreach. the reintegration process. It seems only For instance, in Namibia, lack of information logicalLack of that information communication significantly strategies hinders caused many ex-combatants to be unable should precede the DDR process and wide to participate in training and other communication outreach programmes activities directed at reintegration.8 In this should be part of the reintegration process. particular case, the government failed as the Being aware of opportunities and knowing implementer. As the system of information gathering had not been set up, the any aspect of life. Lack of information means reintegration programmes were offered only thathow theto make opportunities use of them are isnot the used first to step their in to the veterans who had received severance full extent, if used at all. payments. Since not everyone was entitled to such payments, a considerable number of people were automatically left out of the enrolment lists for reintegration activities. It seems only logical that Consequently, the complex and expensive communication strategies system of trainings and workshops set up for «should precede the DDR ex-combatants across Namibia was not used process and wide communication to its full potential and the aim of easing outreach programmes should be tensions during the reintegration process part of the reintegration process was not reached.

demobilisation in did not provide for This article shall look at the experience theSimilarly, expenses the for first distribution and second of information. phase of across the world with designing and implementing communication strategies ex-combatants and their families interested alongside reintegration activities in post- inSignificant extensive difficulty reintegration occurred programmes. with getting During the third and fourth phase of be an attempt to formulate guidelines for demobilisation, 3% and 0.7% of the total Ukraine,conflict environments. considering the The DDR conclusion process shall has DDR budget respectively was allocated for been started and is well underway. counselling and information services.9 Thus, it was only during phase 3 that soldiers Issue Analysis were provided with a post-discharge orientation package and the opportunity to receive counselling after returning home. at the ex-combatant level, at the level of the As expected, the number of people involved governmentInformation deficienciesas the implementer, exist at three and levels:at the in reintegration programmes during phase level of the government as the coordinator.7 3 and 4 of the demobilisation process in When reintegration programmes are Uganda rose. devised, by government bodies, the UN, or others, budgets for communication are often overlooked or are too small to make Liberia and Sierra Leone showed that the Research carried out in post-conflict

7 N. J. Colletta, M. Kostner, I. Wiederhofer, Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegra- tion of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda, World Bank Discussion Paper, [http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/385411468757824135/pdf/multi-page.pdf] 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 79 main reasons for low registration in the feedback collection system, as there is no DDR programmes was linked to the lack of monitoring carried out of the reintegration information about such programmes.10 Once again, budgets were allocated and spent leads to government-run reintegration on setting up a nation-wide reintegration benefits most and least in demand. This system, but the stakeholders had not been the stakeholders preferring to turn to the non-governmentalprogrammes being deemedsector for inefficient assistance. and Although NGOs provide immediate solutions Innotified. all of the above examples, the lack of and help ease the burden of reintegration, information at the ex-combatant level was usually the donor-dependent projects are caused by the failure of the state as the short-term and unable to tackle serious implementer of reintegration programmes reintegration challenges. to provide information and disseminate it in ways that guarantee communication and A key lesson from the DDR process in engagement with the veteran community. Namibia and Uganda bears the title of “good data” and constitutes the need to implement Looking back at the example of Namibia, data collection and analysis systems, which it is also worth pointing out another could allow coordinated information sharing tendency. Usually government-run DDR and gathering. The World Bank discussion programmes are implemented alongside resettlement programmes and reintegration/ reintegration programmes made available in rehabilitation activities provided by civil thesepaper countries points out could that have the efficiencybeen improved, of the society organisations. In Namibia, the state had surveys been carried out and registers failed to ensure equal implementation maintained. A proper register can provide principles of reintegration and resettlement a clear record of the needs of the ex- programmes. This resulted in a single by them, and the opportunities still available differently, depending on the programme tocombatants, each individual. the benefits In addition, already coordination received theyunified chose group to access.of ex-combatants Tensions and being confusion treated of efforts between the government and NGO arose, which could otherwise have been programmes is required.11 Such an approach allows for a better budget allocation and is data coordination systems in place. In this also a cost-effective way to analyse veteran particularavoided, should situation, there the have state been failed sufficient as the needs to ensure the full reintegration of ex- coordinator of information and programmes. combatants into society.

In cases where governments are relatively Information Sharing Solutions successful in disseminating information, a vacuum remains in the realm of Dissemination of information only through information gathering. Registers are either government bodies often proves ineffective. mismanaged or not set up at all. There is no Thus, different information outlets are known

10 E. Tarnaala, Women in Armed Groups and Fighting Forces: Lessons Learned from Gender-sensitive DDR Programmes, Center for Security Studies, 24 July 2016, [http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/62b42fcf-a5ff-46d5-9e6a- 6bdb6d577289] 11 N. J. Colletta, M. Kostner, I. Wiederhofer, Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda, World Bank Discussion Paper, [http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/385411468757824135/pdf/multi-page.pdf]

80 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 to have been used. Considering media play a Meek and Mark Malan, demonstrates that through an increase in radio announcements in any country, they are encouraged to be and communication outreach activities activelyleading roleinvolved during in thereconciling post-conflict society period and the local communities were able to receive reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life. information on the DDR process and The media can be used to channel information particularly the reintegration programmes and foster public opinion in favour of available.12 The target audience consisted supporting peace processes and building not only of the local communities and reconciliation. This is especially important, ex-combatants, but also of donors and considering information from government international actors, local and international bodies is scarce and considered biased. media. Despite the initial opposition and ignorance of the commanders, the UNMIL radio broadcast 24 hours a day seven days a week and had the farthest reach of any radio Considering media play a leading station in Liberia. role during the post-conflict «period in any country, they are Radio broadcasting is most effective, encouraged to be actively involved in however, when paired with wider outreach reconciling society and reintegrating programmes. In Liberia and in Nepal, ex-combatants into civilian life for instance, traditional information dissemination channels were supplemented by training for local reporters, debate on security issues, and the build-up of civil- Radio is generally the most common source society knowledge, awareness, and capacity of information at regional, district, and to generate and participate in discussions on municipal levels, as it does not require reintegration.13

local communities. In addition, it is cheap, has The main task of any information campaign aliteracy wide reach,and can and be adaptedcan be a to portable the specifics source of of information. The use of the UN radio sure facts are interpreted correctly, so as has often been included as a provision in toin post-conflictpromote the environmentsestablishment is of to peace make peacebuilding agreements and a mechanism and to consolidate society. The challenge for the implementation of DDR programmes. is to counter myths and rumours, which Radio UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, Radio Okapi are common components of peace talks in the DRC, UNMIL Radio in Liberia, the use and integration processes.14 If accurate of local FM radio stations in Nepal are all information is not widely disseminated examples of the wide use of radio as a channel about reintegration aims, opportunities, for disseminating information. and packages on offer, then take-up by ex- combatants can be affected, expectations The experience of the United Nations Mission raised, and local communities antagonised. in Liberia (UNMIL), as described by Sarah

12 S. Meek, M. Malan, Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa, Workshop Report, Institute of Security

13 C. Watson, Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: What Role for the European Union, 2010, [http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/Economic_Reintegration_march_2010-1.pdf]Studies, 2004, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/118323/106%20FULL.pdf] 14 Les Mots Qui Tuent: Rumeurs, préjugés, stéréotypes et mythes parmi les peuples des pays des Grands Lacs d’Afrique,

“International Alert”, [http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/Les_Mots_Qui_Tuent.pdf] UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 81 Rumours lead to false hopes, whereby ex- only information about available social combatants refuse to accept assistance and professional adaptation programmes offered to them, believing there is more in for veterans, but also talked about the store. This causes veteran communities to need to establish social cohesion between feel left out and governments to be accused community members and ex-combatants. of corruption schemes. Misinformation about cash payments poses a particular This example shows that the added value of threat. Members of veteran groups discuss information campaigns lies in the build-up and compare salaries in the military of a new relationship narrative between ex- and the compensational payments after combatants and the rest of the population. demobilisation. During the DDR process, The government and the local bodies it became known in Liberia that the cash payment for ex-combatants in the neighbouring Ivory Coast was four times bigger. Investigations showed, however, Rumours lead to false hopes, that the USD 900 apparently offered in whereby ex-combatants refuse the Ivory Coast was actually the estimated «to accept assistance offered to monetary value of training and toolkits them, believing there is more in store. given to ex-combatants, as well as the 15 This causes veteran communities transitional safety allowance paid in cash. to feel left out and governments to be accused of corruption schemes Such examples are common in all veteran communities, especially when the tasks of communication and information are entrusted to different state bodies. are mainly focused on informing about The local media are likely to address reintegration programmes. Their task is to explain the reintegration process and form rather than to investigate full stories and an understanding among the stakeholders highlightrumours communicational from the veterans’ mistakes. perspective, This contributes to distracting ex-combatants to ex-combatants. The retranslation of and members of their families from of the purpose of social benefits provided reintegration activities, and heats up and online media resources reinforces the segregational tendencies and tensions in message,the government’s but also initiates message dialogues on radio, among TV, society. different social groups. Once discussions are set up, common solutions can be found In Nepal, this problem was tackled through and implemented in the long term. the establishment of training centres for journalists and coordination of smaller Conclusions from Africa and Lessons local radios with national broadcasts. Local for Ukraine FM stations played a key part in bringing the understanding of the reintegration The experience of different UN peacekeeping process across the country and piecing together civilians and ex-combatants. The environment on the African continent radio content was varied and included not demonstratemissions and that particularly the informational the post-conflict element

15 C. Watson, Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: What Role for the European Union, 2010, [http://www. ssddrc.org/uploads/Economic_Reintegration_march_2010-1.pdf]

82 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 of the reintegration processes is generally These registers should make it easy to see resources are wasted on the development of the post-conflict veteran community. ofoverlooked. reintegration As a result, mechanisms, significant financialwhich as well as those not accessed by the ex- consequently are not in use as the target combatants.the benefits andSuch activities an approach most inwill demand, allow audience is not aware of them. for proper budget allocation and tailoring of the re-integration programmes to match The best practices of ex-combatant the actual needs. The registers also facilitate reintegration are preconditioned by a clearly the analysis of the accessibility of different programmes. strategy. This strategy is developed together withdefined DDR andand budgetedresettlement communication programmes. So far, Ukraine has been successful in Information dissemination, counselling, and repeating all of the mistakes listed in the examples cited in this article. Veteran reintegration programmes (including social and professional adaptation, psychological The experience of different UN and medical rehabilitation) are administered peacekeeping missions and by the Ministry of Social Policy, the State «particularly the post-conflict Service for Veteran Affairs, the Ministry of environment on the African continent Health, and the Ministry of Defence (or the demonstrate that the informational relevant state defence and security agencies element of the reintegration where a person underwent service). processes is generally overlooked Although there is relative coordination among these four bodies at the central

work together. Moreover, a large number feedback gathering then become an integral government level, their local offices rarely part of the reintegration activities. Awareness and funded by local government bodies raising tools need to be designed to meet the (municipalities,of benefits available district councils, are administered etc.). needs of different members of the veteran community, including those that are illiterate. The information provided on the websites In this regard, national and local media should of local authorities and central government become partners in the DDR process. The bodies often differs. Almost 90% of the local media should be used creatively, particularly government websites have no information to cover non-standard entry points of ex- about the reintegration programmes or combatants into the reintegration process. 16 Essentially this means that ex-combatants and their In order for the reintegration programmes benefitsfamilies have available no access to veterans. to public information to be in demand and able to meet the actual on the programmes and budgets allocated needs of the veteran community, regular for ensuring social support and welfare of re-assessment of those needs and services this particular group. offered is called for. The best way to do so is to plan for electronic registers, which The national register of veterans is a closed would provide information on each member document accessible only by the National

16 Study carried out by the Legal Hundred NGO, [http://uacrisis.org/ua/59868-yurydychna-sotnia]

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 83 Security Service of Ukraine and the State information about solutions funded by the Service of Veteran Affairs. It is not integrated government, and explaining how these can with any other registers in the country and be accessed. it certainly does not contain any information Thus, Ukraine, as well as a whole list of Although a budget has been allocated for the other countries with similar economies creationas to the ofbenefits the register, used by essentially the ex-combatants. it remains and similar circumstances, often overlooks a list of names and contact numbers, which the importance of awareness raising in the three years since its creation have not activities. As budgets are scarce, it seems undergone revision. more important to invest in setting up reintegration programmes and having The media in Ukraine are largely involved in disseminating information, yet principally on a voluntary basis. This means that designingsufficient information funding to campaigns. provide socialAs a result,benefits, communication than to allocate with resources stakeholder for stories, showing where the system does groups is almost entirely ignored, although notpredominantly work. No training journalists programmes cover ‘failure’are or reintegration systems are set up. In have been available to journalists covering reintegration processes, and on a number of budgets are rarely spent by the end of the occasions the media have been responsible Ukraine’s case, this means that allocated for spreading false rumours, which heated on lack of demand. Ex-combatants, on the up tensions and aggression of ex-combatants otherfiscal hand, year andlack governmentknowledge about bodies access report to towards the government. Media cooperation various programmes that have been known is slightly better in the military sphere. to them and live under the impression “Army FM” is a specialised military radio that the state is paying lip service to them. channel owned by the Ministry of Defence, Unless addressed and budgeted for, the communication issue will continue to be the information. However, the radio channel source of many tensions, which can easily waswhich granted is a source national of government-verifiedbroadband only in August 2017, being broadcast before only on selected radio channels in the Luhansk and develop into conflicts across the country. Donetsk regions (where the theatre of war is Lesia Vasylenko is a founder and the chairwoman concentrated). of the Legal Hundred NGO, which provides legal assistance, guidance, and representation of combatants Information campaigns for reintegration and veterans in Ukraine. A lawyer by training, Lesia programmes have not been accounted for in is dedicating her efforts to veteran rights’ protection the annual state budgets since 2015. NGOs and the establishment of a fair social care system in and foreign donors (OSCE, UNDP, USAID, Ukraine. She is a 2010 World Wide Studies Fellow, and different embassies) usually provide a 2011 UCL LLM and 2017 John Smith Trust Fellow. activities in their reintegration projects. Her areas of interest are social and legal rights of the However,significant these budgets are usually for awareness directed raisingat the military, ex-combatants, informational defence and promotion of particular short-term projects, security, public diplomacy and counter-propaganda measures in military conflicts.

rather than at providing unified and correct

84 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017

ISSN 2518-7481 Issue 3 (9), 2017

86 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017